Contextualizing Turkey’s Tangled Web

Illuminating Turkey’s Troubled Present Through a Look at its Recent

Past

Patrick Elder, Sarah Jordan, Moatasem al-Bitar, Zach Carman, Kenyon Murley

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to historically contextualize Turkey‟s unique position

at the crossroads of East and West and how its interactions with the outside world

reverberate into the complex milieu of pressing issues in which the country occupies

center stage. We reject simplistic grand theorizing in favor of an approach that takes into

account how the past defines the terms in which we consider the present and act therein.

Turkey‟s current array of crises – the Kurds, Syria and its refugees, tensions with Russia,

authoritarian majoritarianism and liberal democratic backsliding – are all interconnected.

They are also the West‟s crises, and any Western policymaker or diplomat looking to

confront any of these problems must not only understand how they all interact, but also

the influence of Turkey‟s history in how these crises have played out to the present.

Introduction

Initially, this project‟s focus was on historically contextualizing the Syrian refugee crisis

from a wide variety of perspectives in order to provide a wider understanding of what is

one of the most pressing issues for the world to come to grips with, not only because of

its deep moral salience but also due to the potential knock-on effects at every level of

politics in the regions affected. But we came to realize the scope of such a project was

simply too broad and ambitious for the purposes of a master‟s thesis. As we attempted to

scale down, we searched for a connective thread that encompasses many of the same

tensions the refugee crisis is exposing and inflaming. Looking back, it now seems

inevitable that this would lead to a focus on the one place nearly every thread intersects:

Turkey.

The reason Turkey encompasses all these threads is not merely a coincidence. Nor

is it simply a product of its central role as a migration route for Syrian refugees. Rather, it

speaks to the country‟s unique position straddling not only the geographical boundary

between what we generally think of as East and West but also the political, socio-cultural,

and security boundaries and the institutions that encompass them.

However, Turkey is not simply the middle of the rope in a game of tug-of-war

between East and West. Nor is it simply a “torn country” seeking to cast off its ancient

identity in favor of joining an alternate civilization as conceived of by Sam Huntington in

his seminally controversial “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1997). Turkey‟s

Ottoman forerunner is in part responsible for and representative of the blurred boundary

between East and West. When we use these terms, they are not meant to invoke two

dichotomous, irreconcilable civilizations, but should rather be viewed as rough concepts

of shared geography, ethnicity, religion, culture, and so on. When one considers the

myriad facets of a “civilization” it should be no wonder that it is exceedingly difficult to

draw definitive boundaries around them. Each component of civilization spreads beyond

its borders at different speeds and with different intensities, creating overlaps and gaps

alike between it and its neighbors.

Here we eschew the commonplace resort to popular theories of international

relations such as realism, neoliberalism, and the various offshoots and opposing theories

they‟ve spawned in an attempt to move past the constraints of fitting facts to

generalizable notions of how international structures function. Instead, we attempt to

provide historical context to demonstrate that the history we‟ve lived and yet to live is

shaped by myriad forces which rise and fall in import as structures and ideas change over

time. We hew to the notion that, on the whole, international relations theories tend to

restrict our ability to piece together the complex web of forces that determine our present,

and are the antithesis of an objective approach to understanding the past and its

determination of our present.

Therefore we‟ve tried to pull from a diverse array of sources, primarily focused

on history and intimate understandings of the complex processes that have mostly

unwittingly shaped current perceptions. Turkey and its multifarious connections to topics

of import to international relations scholars provide fertile ground for disproving

simplistic notions that have driven foreign policy decision-making the world over.

This is an attempt to expose the most influential components of Turkey‟s

connections with West and East in order to better illuminate how the West in particular

can better understand this uniquely important country. By highlighting how history has

shaped Turkey‟s self-perception and others‟ perceptions of Turkey, we can better

understand how easy it is to talk past one another, assuming a shared lens through which

current events are perceived and positions are presented that often does not actually exist.

Those ignorant of the past and the lessons it illuminates will be doomed to stumble into

the same pitfalls that have plagued interstate relations for all of human history. Though

difficulties cannot be avoided simply through an understanding of both history and how

others perceive history, it is a central component to navigating how pre-existing policies

and the courses of action on offer for future policy are likely to unfold.

As former US Ambassador to Greece Monteagle Stearns writes in reference to the

inability of the US‟ foreign policy apparatus to deal with the issue of Cyprus:

As Henry Kissinger once observed, when events are compartmentalized

by experts, insufficient attention is given to their overall effect, and the

government spends more time “deciding where [it] is than where [it] is

going.” One might add that when policies are formulated without

reference to the experts, the government may go in circles, because it does

not know where it is or where it has been before (Stearns, 1992).

It is our intention to contribute to the squaring of this circle, because that is the essence of

historical contextualization.

We will begin with an historical overview of the foundations of the modern

Turkish republic, interspersed with details we felt relevant to Turkey‟s current situation.

We will then provide an overview of the development of Turkish foreign policy

throughout the ruling AKP‟s tenure in power along with a laying out of Turkey‟s various

current foreign policy challenges. We conclude with a section that ties together the

threads spun throughout the paper, showing how current conceptions of interests and

relations have been influenced by the past and how that same past provides examples of

various modes of interaction with Turkey and the lessons that can be derived from them.

Historically Contextualizing Modern Turkey

Turkey Turns West

The Turkish republic was born in fire and blood. Mustafa Kemal led the Turks on

a seemingly impossible campaign against an array of forces outnumbering and

outgunning him. His success against the odds and the subsequent establishment of the

Turkish nation-state earned him the name “Atatürk” – father of the Turks. When Atatürk

swept the European powers attempting to parcel out Anatolia amongst themselves and

other parties chief among them the Greeks and the Kurds, his was a fight epitomizing the

complicated relationship Turkey was to have with the West throughout its modern

history. For while he fought stridently against the grasping overreach of European

imperialism, he did so in an effort to establish a Turkish nation-state inspired by and

founded upon the ideals born of the enlightenment that Europe claimed as its guiding

light and justified its spreading power and subjugation of foreign unenlightened peoples

upon (Kinzer 2010). This struggle to at once reject Europe in an effort to further embrace

it presages much of Turkey‟s conflicted march toward modernity.

Atatürk and the Kemalist clique he fostered to perpetuate his aims utterly rejected

what they viewed as the constraining backwardness that the old Ottoman system and its

attachment to Islam shackled Turkey with. He was disgusted by the anachronisms of

Turkish rural life and the religion it was by then so closely entwined with. But not only

did he reject Islam and the sultanate, he also began the wage a social war to establish (to

his thinking, restore) a nationalist sentiment throughout all of Turkey meant to bind the

nation together, much in line with the nationalist tide Europe rode through the 19th and

early 20th centuries.

The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is still the lodestone of Turkish politics. He

is revered as the founder of the Turkish nation state, the one man who had more impact

on shaping modern Turkey than any other. He shaped the education and formative

experiences of generations of Turks, not only through expansion of public schooling and

the shaping of its curriculum, but through even more fundamental reforms like the

Romanisation of the Turkish language from its original Arabic script and the replacement

of many Arabic and Persian loanwords with either archaic or brand-new words with a

more Turkish sound (Kinzer, 2010).

His Turkey was a sharp break from the past, a rejection of all the trappings of the

Ottoman empire, those visible and pervasive signs reminding the Turks of their fall from

the heights of world power. Some may see the simultaneous rejection of foreign powers

and embracing of their ideals and culture as a strange paradox, one sustained by the

unquestioned rule of a paradoxical man himself. But this is the dilemma that has defined

Turkey throughout its modern lifespan. Turkey doesn‟t neatly fit into any larger grouping

of nations due to its complex and tortured past. It occupies a precarious space on so

many levels: geographically, politically, culturally, ethnically. And it is this precarious

position that helps to explain the modern Turkey and its international relations.

As can be seen in the story of its birth, Turkey‟s turn to the West did not begin

after World War II, but it was for the first time cemented and institutionalized by its

joining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Contextualizing Turkey‟s current

attitudes and policies toward the US and NATO are necessary to moving forward and

addressing Turkey‟s grievances, both legitimate and mythological. Without a full

understanding of Turkey‟s history within NATO the relationship is likely to continue

deteriorating as the two sides increasingly talk past each other. And while a firm

understanding of how Turkey‟s past conditions its present is no guarantee of the

achievement of harmonious relations, it can only be of benefit in the effort. The US in

particular has repeatedly failed to take into account how its policies affect Turkey and

then acted bewildered at its sudden about-faces and outbursts of anger and distrust.

Turkey‟s decision to join NATO was not much of a decision at all given the

choices on the table. Immediately after World War II, Stalin presented a set of demands

completely unacceptable to the Turkish government – to cede significant swathes of

territory in its east to an expanded Armenian state while ceding key port facilities to

Soviet control in the Dardanelles Straits in order to assure Soviet access to the

Mediterranean from its Black Sea ports (Larrabee, 2010). This proposal was just as

unpalatable to the US and its allies, presenting a clear case to apply the newly formulated

Truman Doctrine, which led quickly to escalating support and cooperation initiatives.

These culminated in Turkey‟s joining of NATO in 1952 along with Greece, who despite

their antagonistic past and future were at this time on relatively amicable terms, a

situation soon to deteriorate.

Turkey‟s integration into NATO was the start of formalized military and political

relations between the West and Turkey. Military aid and the promise of US intervention

in case of attack backed up by the growing US nuclear arsenal afforded Turkey external

stability. But this did not mean the complete satisficing of Turkish security concerns.

Internal security was never fully sated by the West‟s tentative embrace, and modern

tensions between the West and Turkey in part emanate from its interactions with

Turkey‟s efforts at achieving internal security and stability. In particular, the West‟s

disproportionately strong interaction with the Turkish military as opposed to civil society,

business, and non-military government contacts exposed it to accusations of complicity in

what was and still is (though to a lesser extent) a more complex and explicit role in

politics than was and is present in the Western nations with which Turkey was gravitating

toward (Aydinli, 2009).

The US in particular was unsure of how to handle Turkey for quite a while after it

joined NATO. Much of the problem stemmed from the US‟ simple lack of competency in

foreign affairs. It had little bureaucratic infrastructure to be a well-informed and

competent actor in most of the places throughout the world it was now exerting its

influence. Greece and Turkey were grouped with Italy in NATO‟s Southern Command,

despite the lack of geographical contiguity that would would necessary or even possible

the coordination and integration of the three countries‟ forces in the event of Soviet attack

(Chourchoulis, 2014). Until 1974, Greece and Turkey weren‟t even the responsibility of

the European bureau of the State Department. Instead, they were assigned to the State

Department‟s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA), within which they

were grouped with Iran in the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Stearns,

1992). It was rare that an NEA Assistant Secretary of State would be well-versed in both

Greek and Turkish affairs, which was certainly an enabling factor in the US‟ lack of

interest or understanding regarding Greek-Turkish relations.

Turkish armed forces were never so fully integrated into NATO command and

control structures as the armies of Western Europe (with the exception of the French,

depending on the period). The chief reasons for this lack of integration were the relative

geographical isolation of Turkey, the fact that it was never occupied during World War II

by either Axis or Allied troops, and its different conception of how its armed forces

should be composed to best accomplish its security objectives. Despite NATO‟s adoption

in the early 50s of a defensive posture predicated on the US‟ rapidly expanding arsenal of

nuclear weapons in order to compensate for the USSR‟s advantage in conventional

forces, Turkey was reluctant to restructure its armed forces to better incorporate nuclear

forces, preferring to maintain its focus on conventional infantry (Chourchoulis, 2014).

This amicability was not to last, however, due in principle to one issue: Cyprus.

This is not to say that Cyprus by itself invented or sustains Greek-Turkish animosity. But

Cyprus is the funnel through which Greco-Turkish tensions have been poured ever since

the outset of the Cold War and continuing to the present day.

Cyprus has been a thorn in Turkey‟s relations with the West ever since the British

began the process of granting Cyprus its independence, which was finally achieved in

1960 after years of Greek Cypriot revolt in favor of a political union with Greece, or

enosis. There is a deep well of historic grievance that people on both sides of the Aegean

have recourse to, but that well is most easily drawn upon by means of unresolved

disputes, left in such a state by past leaders who could afford to agree to disagree due to

more pressing issues at hand – issues that no longer prevent the issue from occupying a

prominent place in the minds of state and public. Chief among these was both the

domestic project of consolidating the nation-state, followed by threat from the Soviet

Union.

Both Turkey and Greece required the acquiescence of the European colonial

powers in some respect to achieve independence as nation-states. The cause of Greek

independence from the Ottoman Empire was one of long British, French, and Russian

involvement, with the British emerging as the most solidly pro-Greek power by the time

of the Ottoman Empire‟s collapse and dismemberment. Prime Minister Lloyd George

was an ardent supporter of the Greeks and their revanchist cause of claiming for Greece

the lands of East Thrace and Ionia1, which were granted to Greece under the terms of the

1 Ionia being wholly located on the Anatolian peninsula, while East Thrace was situated on the

west bank of the Dardanelles reaching north to the Black Sea, and within spitting distance of Constantinople.

Treaty of Sevres in the face of what seemed to be a lack of any capacity on the side of the

Turks to prevent this seizure (Kinzer, 2010). Atatürk thoroughly abused them of this

notion when he drove the Greek Army into the Aegean and secured Anatolia for the

Turkish nation state. But Atatürk was not all-powerful, and he was forced to bargain

away the islands of the Aegean as well as any claim to Cyprus to the British and Greeks.

This set the stage for the tensions in Turkey‟s surrounding waters that persist to this day.

The issue of Cyprus was initially of little salience in the immediate post-War

years, as it was firmly under British control and Greece was embroiled in civil war. The

issue moved to the forefront of Greek and Turkish foreign policy in 1955 as Britain

intensified its efforts to grant Cyprus independence (Bolukbasi, 1993). However, the

Greek Cypriot population was united behind the charismatic leader Patriarch Makarios

and his call for enosis – union with the Greek state – while the British were adamant on

establishing an independent Cyprus with a liberal, democratic constitution respecting

minority rights on the island. The Americans, meanwhile, decided the matter was best

considered a British colonial affair and should thus be left to the British to handle. Even

after being granted independence, the Americans tended to view Cyprus as an out-of-area

problem to be dealt with only at times of extreme tension that could have destabilizing

effects on American security interests. By adopting this approach, the US set itself up for

a series of belated interventions that former US Ambassador to Greece Monteagle Stearns

aptly described as, “Too much, too late” (Stearns, 1992).

1955 was the first year in which the Americans attempted to involve themselves

in the Cyprus dispute. It was in this year that tensions exploded between the Greeks and

Turks, catalyzed by anti-Greek riots in Istanbul which only encouraged more violence

against Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot militants. In response to the outbreak of

violence Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent identically-worded letters to the

Greek and Turkish prime ministers expressing the US‟ desire for the two countries to act

in the interests of NATO and the US by tamping down tensions and peaceably resolving

the Cyprus dispute. While Turkey reacted favorably to the letter, Greece was outraged by

the lack of acknowledgement of the Istanbul riots and the damage to the Greek

community in Turkey. The letter was sent in spite of the advice of the US embassy in

Greece, and was viewed as blackmail by the Greek government due to an implicit threat

to halt aid transfers if the parties were to exacerbate tensions (Stearns, 1992).

Ironically, NATO‟s stabilizing effect on the security situations of both Greece and

Turkey in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union likely contributed to each country

feeling confident enough to confront the other over Cyprus. And despite it being in

NATO‟s interest to promote peaceful, harmonious relations between the members of its

southeastern flank, it took a largely hands-off stance toward the brewing conflict. In fact,

Cyprus was considered an “out-of-area” issue by NATO during its early years

(Chourchoulis, 2014). As former ambassador Stearns describes the US approach to

problem-solving not just in the Cyprus situation, but in general, “When tensions between

Greece and Turkey are high, compromise is unthinkable; when low, unnecessary”

(Stearns, 1992). This was largely driven by a relative disinterest in the region as a whole,

its focus on the more immediate threat of guarding against the USSR along the border

with East Germany. However, it was also at least in part due to its not wanting to be seen

to take a side in the conflict, which would pose the threat of the offended party pulling

out of the alliance.

Again ironically, NATO‟s desire not to take sides ended up earning it the ire of

Greece and Turkey, who both perceived NATO as tacitly having taken the other‟s side by

not intervening in their favor. When the US eventually intervened at the height of tension

in the mid-60s via the infamous Johnson Letter, in which President Lyndon Johnson

suggested NATO‟s Article 5 commitment to defend Turkey from outside attack may not

hold if Turkey were to invade Cyprus and the USSR were to take advantage of this to

attack Turkey, the outrage amongst the Turkish government and its population was swift

and furious. The Johnson Letter became the locus of Turkish distrust of the US for the

next several decades, and served as the impetus for its own attempts at strategic

diversification up until the fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War (Larrabee, 2010).

Yet to simply pin the blame for the fallout in US-Turkish relations on this one

letter is misleading. Prime Minister Inönü was well aware of the dire consequences of a

Turkish invasion, as it had a high probability of resulting in war between Greece and

Turkey. Not only that, but Inönü knew that the Turkish military simply was not capable

of carrying out an amphibious assault and conquering the territory it sought to protect.

Inönü therefore made American mediation his primary focus. He suggested myriad ways

for America to resolve the crisis, none of which the Americans were willing or able to do.

What the Americans did suggest in the end was that Turkey simply invade Cyprus to

establish facts on the ground, at which point a peace deal could be brokered between

Greece and Turkey that would see the island partitioned between the two. However, not

only did the Americans refuse to give the official approval that Inönü insisted upon, but

they failed to realize the inability of Turkey‟s military to successfully carry out such an

invasion, which Inönü was well aware of (Bolukbasi, 1993).

The Cyprus dispute is an excellent example of the misunderstandings that can

manifest in a relationship between allies with differing conceptions of pressing threats to

their national interests, and how these different conceptions of security and the decisions

they beget have perpetuating effects over time. The US took a mostly disinterested stance

while the crisis brewed, gradually becoming more involved over time as it was made to

realize the potential consequences of allowing the situation to fester. This placed the US

in such a bind that it resorted to ill-considered, rash actions that durably tainted the trust

between the US and Turkey. Instead of conducting a concerted effort to mediate the

dispute, successive American administrations allowed the situation to fester until issuing

ultimatums. The Dulles and Johnson letters each each engendered the enmity of one of

the parties through implicit revocation of American support should they take actions

contrary to the US and NATO‟s interests, a result unintended in either situation, but

foreseeable by knowledgeable US agents.

Turkey’s History in the Middle East

Given the shift in Turkey‟s focus over the past decade-plus to the Middle East it is

only logical to contextualize Turkey‟s relationship with the region, in particular its

complex and often fraught relations with the Arab world. This section sheds some light

on the historic rivalry between the Turks and the Arabs, as well as between the Turks and

their other neighbors - especially the Kurds – which have large influences on Turkey‟s

regional foreign policy.

The Turkish-Arab relations go back centuries. Muslim Arabs began to conquer

Turkic regions starting in 705. The Ottomans, as heir to the Seljuk and Abbasid Empires

and, began to conquer Arab territories from 1516 onwards (Ekinci, 2015). Hence, the

Arab-Turkish convergence was always through Islam. Arabs coexisted peacefully under

Ottoman rule for four centuries. However, when the Turks seized power, the Arabs

became an oppressed ethnic community to a point where the Arabic language was strictly

prohibited. The first Arab „revolt‟ against the Ottoman regime was the beginning of the

bloodshed between the two. Subsequently, the Turks still hold a feeling of resentment of

being betrayed by their subjects, whereas the Arabs hold a memory of the Turks as

savage oppressors. The latter centuries of the Ottoman rule and their bloody expansion

into Eastern Europe only feeds into that „savagery‟ perception. The modern Turkish-Arab

relations - from 1920s onwards - have had its fair share of tensed relations. Turkey‟s

declared position of indifference during the Iraq war was a dark spot in how the Turks are

perceived as a pro-Western state that would not jump to the defense of its Arab or

Muslim neighbors. Turkey‟s position in NATO, Western alliances, and its quasi-

diplomatic and military ties with Israel remains as a major point of criticism. The fact that

Turkey did not have any notable accomplishments in terms of advocating for a

Palestinian state is naturally another shameful perception; albeit that is changing in recent

years with Erdogan‟s harder stance against the Israeli expansionist and brutal policies

against the Palestinians. The modern-day perpetually-tensed regional relations can be

traced back to certain pivotal moments circa the 19th

– 20th

century. The overarching

point is that Turkey and its Arab and Muslim majority neighbors alike continue to be

haunted by the historic events that in large part shape perceptions between all the parties

that are analyzed in this paper. Turkey‟s role vis-à-vis the Arab Spring and the

subsequent Syrian civil war continue to be controversial to say the least. Turkey is quite

possibly the most important player in the region in terms of the Western interests and

security concerns. Turkey, through its at times ambiguous foreign policy, has had some

positive impact in the region in the recent decades; nonetheless, by sitting on a virtual

fence in terms of its policies regarding the Arab world, Israel and the European Union -

in addition to its unresolved historic tensions, rivalries and quasi-wars with the Kurds and

the Armenians – Turkey‟s “zero problems with neighbors” policy has fallen apart.

The Islamic conquests, led by the Arab Muslims, stretched beyond the Fertile

Crescent and North Africa. Nonetheless, in a lot of these newly-conquered Muslim areas,

the indigenous people retained their languages and refused to accept a full Arab identity,

such as in certain regions of Algeria, Morocco and to a larger extent in Turkey; despite

the fact that Arabic was the main language of the Islamic teachings, as well as of other

dealings like commerce. Discrimination and division started the unraveling of the early

stages of the Islamic empire when the Umayyad rulers favored an Arab elite class. This

favoritism, together with changing the Caliph selection process from a collective

agreement - whereby the best candidate was agreed upon by the general Muslim

population based on their merits in leadership, piety and knowledge of Islam (Ijmaa’) - to

a monarchy system in which the Caliph passes on the crown to his son and or his chosen

heir, gave birth to a feeling of discontent among the Muslim population at large. The

Umayyad Caliphate was subsequently overthrown by another Arab dynasty-clan, the

Abbasids. The non-Arab population particularly, however, experienced a more harsh

exclusion and discrimination under the Umayyad Caliphate, which festered a feeling of

hate and hostility. Despite the Abbasid endorsement of the „shuubiya‟ movement which

aimed to de-Arabize Islam, the non-Arab population labeled as „mawali‟ revolted against

the later on fragmented Abbasid Empire and took control of the Caliphate. Most of these

„mawalis‟ were the Ottoman-Turks who consolidated their power in Constantinople

(modern day Turkey) and dominated the region for about 800 years (Shaw, 1976).

Following a classic cycle of the oppressed becoming the oppressor, the Ottomans

discriminated against the Arabs, instilled different classes of citizenship, imposed the

Turkish language and culture on their Arab subjects and ruled with an iron fist. These

prejudiced practices led the Arabs to unite, temporarily, under a common goal of

deposing the Turks and establishing an Arab homeland independent of the Ottomans.

The timeline of events of the modern history are relevant in understanding the

fragility of the Arab-Turkic relations, as well as other regional cross-relations. 1916-

1923: With the support of the British, the Arabs revolted against the Ottomans and

defeated them. However, the British made contradicting promises to the Arabs, the

French and the Jews, which resulted in the Arabs, as well as other ethnic groups, not

receiving their promised homeland (Toffolo, 2008). An Anglo-French accord signed in

1916, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, betrayed the Arabs – while not accounting

for the Kurds and other distinct groups such as the Armenians and the Greeks - and

carved up their lands based on the Anglo-French interests.

The subsequent infamous Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed the Jewish

people a home in Palestine, gave birth to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which became

the most pressing foreign policy issue for the larger Muslim world. The foreign policy of

any nation-state with a Muslim majority population that is seeking a hegemonic role in

the region naturally folded the Palestinian cause into its main agenda. For the following

decades countries like Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia all used the Palestinian

cause in one form or the other to justify most of their foreign, and at times, domestic

policies. Turkey continues to have tensed relations with Israel albeit having an informal

connection through certain mutual interests that can be best viewed in both countries‟

western-oriented alliances. This vague Turkish-Israeli relationship continues to serve as a

great example of how Turkey has an extremely confused and fluctuating role in the

Middle East. In 1920, following World War I, the victorious Allied powers and

representatives of the defeated government of Ottoman Turkey reached a pact of the

Treaty of Sèvres. The pact obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and

North Africa. The pact also accounted for an independent state of Armenia, for an

autonomous Kurdistan, and for a Greek controlled region in eastern Thrace and on the

Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands (Encyclopædia

Britannica, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the new Turkish nationalist regime, led by Mustafa

Ataturk, rejected the Treaty of Sèvres and replaced it by the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923.

The new treaty was signed by representatives of Turkey on one side and by Britain,

France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes

(Yugoslavia) on the other. After a seven-month conference, the treaty recognized the

boundaries of the modern state of Turkey, which did not include former Arab provinces –

in compliance with the Sykes-Picot agreement - nor the British and Italian controlled

Cyprus and Dodecanese respectively. The victors of World War I gave up their demands

for an autonomous region of a Turkish Kurdistan, and for a Turkish cession of territory to

Armenia. In an extreme bout of shortsightedness, the Allies were more concerned with

keeping all shipping routes open via the Turkish straits between the Aegean Sea and the

Black Sea than the autonomy of the indigenous groups in the region. Subsequently,

Ataturk allied with the Russians to split the Armenian Territories, engaged in a bloody

war to push the Greeks completely out of Anatolia, and for the following decades treated

the Kurds as „mountain Turks‟ while not granting the indigenous group any autonomy

whatsoever. The United States at the time, following its non-interventionist policy, did

not respond to the Armenian appeal for recognition of its territories which was a major

blow to any chances of a resolution to the Turkish-Armenian conflict.

New NATO, New Turkey

With a better understanding of Turkish relations with the Middle East, we can

now move past the fall of the USSR and into NATO‟s unleashing from the bonds of the

Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union signalled the imminent shuttering of NATO

in the minds of many throughout the world, but it was feared nowhere more deeply than

in Turkey. Despite the often fraught relations between Turkey and its Western allies and

the tenuous uncertainty still emanating from Cyprus and the Aegean, Turkey‟s leadership

recognized the great security advantage that the NATO umbrella bestowed upon it

(Athanassopoulou, 2014). And with the USSR‟s demise, NATO‟s continuing security

guarantee was no longer a certainty.

Luckily for Turkey (at least seemingly at first) Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq decided to

invade Kuwait, which engendered the American response resulting in the Gulf War. This

was the start of NATO‟s reconception of the strategic value of Turkey‟s place in the

alliance. With its steadily increasing footprint in the Middle East, NATO viewed Turkey

as an invaluable bridge to the Muslim world, acting at once as a democratic model for

other Muslim-majority countries to follow and a country whose participation in NATO

missions would enhance the alliance‟s legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim world

(Lesser, 1992). However, as we‟ve shown and as should have been apparent to Western

policymakers at the time, Turkey‟s relationship with the Middle East is much more

complicated and fraught than a simplistic notion of co-religionist solidarity could predict.

The Gulf War was a perfect chance for Turkey to prove its worth to the US and

NATO, and the then-Turkish PM Turgut Özal threw his full support behind the US effort,

providing everything the coalition asked for and more. For this reason, the Gulf War is

remembered by many in the US as the golden age of US-Turkish relations (Larrabee,

2010). And for the Turks it seemed to be as well – but for only a fleeting moment. In

retrospect, the Gulf War is viewed by the Turks as a false hope, a time when the US took

advantage of Turkish goodwill by the US‟ subsequent decisions regarding Iraq, most

specifically the Iraqi Kurds. When Saddam began his campaign of gassing the Kurds in

retaliation for their taking up arms against him, the US got Turkey to allow it to use their

air base in Incirlik to enforce a no-fly zone protecting Iraqi Kurds from Saddam‟s air

forces. The result was the establishment of a de facto autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq

that became a safe haven for PKK militants to plan and stage attacks on Turkey. In

addition, the US-imposed economic blockade of Iraq deprived Turkey of a major trading

partner, which not only harmed Turkey‟s economy in general but in particular

detrimentally impacted the economy of its predominantly Kurdish southeast, which only

made these Kurds more sympathetic to the PKK and other smaller Kurdish militant

factions due to economic dislocation. It‟s no mere coincidence that conflict between the

Turkish armed forces and the PKK escalated in the aftermath of the Gulf War (Barkey &

Fuller, 1997).

The Turkish leadership made these decisions even though they were likely to be

costly to them because of the firm belief that the US was indispensable for ensuring

Turkish security. But that was not enough of a reason for many Turks, with popular and

governmental opinion of the US was damaged in response. The pain was only

exacerbated as time passed and the US continually failed to adequately thank and

compensate Turkey for assistance that went against short-term Turkish national interest.

But the lowest point in US-Turkish relations was yet to come. Shortly after

coming to power, the AKP with Recep Tayyip Erdogan at its head was confronted with

the decision of whether to allow the US to stage troops in and route supplies through SE

Turkey to facilitate its invasion of Iraq. In a hurried and confused parliamentary session,

the Turkish parliament narrowly voted against providing the US with its requested

assistance. The Erdogan government then attempted to use the vote as leverage to extract

concessions from the US, but the Bush administration felt the demands were too costly

and went ahead with the invasion without a Turkish staging ground (Larrabee, 2010). The

US government felt blindsided and betrayed, which was only exacerbated by Turkey‟s

attempt to get on good terms with the Syrian government over the next few years despite

the Bush administration‟s attempts to isolate and censure Bashar al-Assad‟s government

for its role in facilitating the movement of foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq during

the height of the insurgency.

This outreach to a former implacable foe of Turkey was part of then-Foreign

Minister Ahmet Davutoglu‟s “zero problems with neighbors” approach to foreign policy

that saw Turkey branch out to its neighbors in an attempt to exert a stabilizing influence

on the region through positive cooperation and problem-solving. This strategy saw

Turkey reach out to former foes and relative strangers alike. The AKP‟s strategic

diversification is not unprecedented within NATO. In fact, its stalwart frenemy Greece

conducted a similar strategy in the early 1980s upon Andreas Papandreou‟s Panhellenic

Socialist Movement (PASOK)‟s victory in the 1981 elections. His father, Georgios

Papandreou, had been poised to prevail in elections in 1967 when a group of Greek

colonels conducted a coup d‟etat and established a junta that ruled Greece for the next

seven years. The colonels as well as the then-King of Greece Constantine II were wary of

the left-wing leanings of PASOK, in particular the statements coming from Andreas

Papandreou himself as a prominent member of his father‟s party. Because of the close

relationship of the CIA station officers in Greece with the colonels, as well as the US and

NATO‟s eventual recognition of the junta as the legitimate government of Greece,

Andreas Papandreou held a deep antipathy toward the US and NATO, holding them

directly responsible for the coup.2 The Greek people as well regarded the US as having a

direct hand in the junta‟s seizure of power, seeing the colonels‟ regime as virtual slaves to

US interests (Lampe, 2014).

Upon Andreas Papandreou‟s ascension to prime minister in 1981, he therefore

sought to diversify Greece‟s international relations by reaching out to communist regimes

from Albania to Poland. He was frequently openly antagonistic toward the US while

speaking approvingly of the USSR, praising it as a bastion of anti-imperialism due its

being anti-capitalist, whereas he considered the US to be inherently imperialistic due to

its embrace of capitalism (Loulis, 1984). Despite his bandying about the notion of leaving

2 However, available evidence indicates that the CIA and the US were caught unprepared by the colonels‟

coup, which in addition denunciations by the American ambassador to Greece of the coup and the fact that

the US waited until the failure of an attempted counter-coup later in 1967 to recognize the junta as the

legitimate government of Greece indicates that despite the approving sentiments of some CIA officers, the

US was not involved in instigating or supporting the coup (Lampe, 2014).

NATO, even he could not take that fateful step and risk the security of Greece (Lampe,

2014).

It‟s easy to draw a parallel between the AKP‟s gap between rhetoric and action

regarding the US and NATO. Despite frequent denunciations of Western imperialism

along with the diversification of its security relations Turkey and the AKP still clung to

the security of NATO and simultaneously strengthened cooperation with NATO in areas

such as radar and missile battery deployments, not to mention Erdoğan‟s general ignoring

of the Turkish parliament‟s vote against providing support to the US-led invasion of Iraq

in 2003 (Kardas, 2012). The AKP‟s strategic diversification was not so explicitly

predicated on denunciations of NATO and the US, but rather the academic analysis of

Davutoglu being put into practice, an analysis that placed Turkey at the fulcrum of

regional power for various reasons of geographic, cultural, and political centrality

(Murinson, 2006).

At the same time it was defying US efforts to isolate the Assad regime in Syria,

Turkey was in the midst of pitched battles against the PKK in SE Turkey. Turkey

repeatedly requested US military assistance in these battles, and felt the US should have

had a real interest in doing so given the potential destabilization of the Iraq-Turkey

border (Larrabee, 2010). The US, however, as it had done throughout the entire history of

its alliance with Turkey, refused to provide direct military assistance against the PKK.

One could blame this reluctance on Turkey‟s non-compliance with the US diplomatic

agenda or the lingering mistrust over the Turkish parliament‟s rejection of US troop

staging, or even on the US‟ desire not to upset the Iraqi Kurds in the Kurdish Regional

Government who were the US‟ most fervent supporters within Iraq during the invasion.

At the end of the day, the result was the same as it had always been, with Turkey not

receiving much of anything in the way of US military support against the PKK.

Complicating this refusal to provide support was the fact that the strongly pro-US

KRG was allowing the PKK to use its territory to avoid the Turkish armed forces and

stage attacks into SE Turkey. Turkey threatened the KRG with invasion if it were to

persist in allowing this state of affairs, even massing thousands of troops on the border in

2006. This scenario was only averted by intensive negotiations with the US that resulted

in the appointment of a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe to head PKK

policy coordination. Ankara quickly became disillusioned, however, as PKK attacks

gained intensity in 2007. At the height of the violence, PM Erdogan received approval

from the Turkish parliament to conduct cross-border strikes into Iraq. Yet, before he

carried them out, he tried one more time get US approval and assistance. Faced with the

prospect of Turkish military operations in the KRG, the US approved limited airstrikes

while providing for the first time actionable intelligence on PKK troop and materiel

movements (Larrabee, 2010).

The US has taken a largely disinterested and hands-off approach to Turkey over

the course of its alliance, which has often resulted in festering issues liable to explode

going unrecognized by the one player with the power the resolve them. However, as can

be demonstrated through the US‟ more robust engagement with Turkey over the PKK

over the course of the Iraq War, when US national security interests are perceived to be

directly at risk over Turkish-centered issues it suddenly finds the will and resources to

concertedly solve tackle the problem. The resources have always been there in the form

of US diplomats and expert analysts on the US payroll in the State Department as well as

independent experts who are readily available should the US call on their expertise. What

the US has lacked for most of its engagement with Turkey is the will and wherewithal to

coordinate and exploit these resources to the fullest except for brief junctures of the most

pressing crises. Given Turkey‟s central role in current Western security priorities, the US

can no longer afford to employ such a short-sighted strategy. In fact, it could never afford

it in the first place, and is currently reaping the rewards for its history of failures.

Turkey’s Present Circumstances

Trade/Economics

Since the 1990s, Turkey has continuously made strides in opening up to

international trade. By transforming its economy to cater to foreign trade (namely by

focusing resources heavily in the manufacturing sector), Turkey has expanded its amount

of trade greatly, and is now considered a “trading state”. Between 1985 and 2014, overall

foreign trade expanded from 19 billion dollars to 400 billion dollars, and the ratio of trade

to GDP increased from 11 percent to 59 percent, between 1970 to 2014 (Kirisci and

Ekim, 2015).

While Turkey has been able to greatly expand its participation on global trade, it

faces major challenges due to the volatility of its Middle Eastern neighbors in recent

years. As the situation within the Middle East worsens and exports to its neighboring

states continue to fall, Turkey will need to rely more and more on its trade relations with

the west to ensure economic stability. However, trade relations with the west seem to

have stagnated, as there has not been any major trade agreement made with the west since

the Customs Union agreement made between Turkey and the European Union in 1995,

and it has been left out of negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment

Partnership, much to the dismay of the Turkish Government.

Trade relations with the United States

Given that Turkey and the United States have a very close political, diplomatic,

and military relationship, one would assume that their economic relationship would be

just as close. However, this is not the case, with the two nations trade relations heavily

lacking when compared to the other key players within NATO, with bilateral trade

between the two nations only reaching 15 billion dollars in 2010 (Albright, Hadley, &

Cook, 2012). Bilateral trade between the two nations has improved in recent years, as

dialogues regarding liberalizing trade between the two allies have begun to increase, and

bilateral trade increasing to 20 billion dollars in 2012 (Zanotti, 2015). The trade

relationship between Turkey and the United States is heavily reliant on United States

Defense exports to Turkey.

While there is no official free trade agreement between United States and Turkey,

the United States, under President Obama, has started to bring the trade relationship

closer, with the establishment of the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial

Cooperation in 2009. Along with this dialogue between the two nations, President

Obama and President Erdogan have established another avenue for trade negotiations

called the High Level Committee, which was created created after the announcement of

the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, between the United

States and the European Union. President Erdogan has raised the idea of a free trade

agreement with the United States within the forum of the High Level committee.

However, no official free trade agreement negotiations have occurred (Boyraz, 2015).

Trade Relations with the European Union

The trade relationship between Turkey and European Union is much more

developed than that of the United States. Current trade relations are predominantly built

around the Customs Union signed in 1995. The Customs Union allows for manufactured

goods to be traded between member states of the European Union and Turkey, without

tariffs or quotas. A condition of this free trade for manufactured goods is that Turkey

must institute the same regulatory standards in its manufacturing sector that European

Governments must institute (Kirisci and Ekim, 2015).

The Customs Union with the European Union has allowed for trade to flourish

between the two nations, and it is one of the key factors that has allowed Turkey to

transition into a trade state. Between the years of 1995 and 2014, bilateral trade between

Turkey and the European Union expanded from 28 billion dollars to 158 billion dollars,

with the growth predominantly in the manufacturing sector, a direct result of the Customs

Union (Boyraz, 2015). However, Turkey‟s trade relationship with the European Union

still has great strides that it has yet to make, as the Customs Union is missing key

economic sectors, such as agriculture and services. Given that the original Customs

Union agreement was made with the understanding that it was a stepping stone for

Turkey officially joining the European Union, further economic integration would be

logical, if we are to assume that Turkey joining the EU is still on the table.

Turkish Foreign Policy Evolution

There is often a reference to Turkey‟s foreign policy as a “shift of axis” from its

more recent Western orientation to a more Eastern focus (Őniş, 2011). Turkey adopted a

policy of “zero problems with neighbors” in its relations with neighboring countries, and

views its role as an active regional and global power. To support this shift, critics point to

the Davos incident at the World Economic Forum, in which Turkey favored the

Palestinian cause at the expense of Israel, the “Mavi Marmara” flotilla crisis, in which 8

Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli soldiers while attempting to provide humanitarian

aid to Gaza. The third incident regarded the attempt by Turkey to negotiate a solution to

the Iranian nuclear dispute, one that did not result in sanctions on Iran (Őniş, 2011).

Another concern of turkey was the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and its

impact upon globalization. The “East” and “South” weathered the crisis much better than

the “West,” with the EU losing much of its attractiveness to Turkey, as those countries in

the periphery suffered greatly responding to the financial crisis (Őniş, 2011). With the

financial crisis, the G-8 was replaced by the G-20, of which Turkey was a member, and

allowed it greater voice in the creation of legislation and institutions in response to the

crisis. Turkey had reinforced its banking sector in response to the 2001 crisis, and now

had a stronger banking system than the West.

There are those in Turkey, the Eurasianists (among whom includes Ahmet

Davutoğlu, Turkey‟s Foreign Minister), who have advised “Turkey to de-emphasize its

ties with the European Union in favor of establishing closer ties with Central Asia, the

Caucasus, and Russia.” Opponents argue of the coming accession of Turkey into the

European Union (Bilgin, 2011). The Eurasianists discuss civilizational geopolitics, “an

understanding of culture and civilization as preordained determinants of international

behavior” (Bilgin, 2011). This worldview defined the world as civilized and less than

civilized. Only the civilized possessed the capacity for self-determination and sovereign

statehood, and Turkey, thus, adopted a Western perspective.

Turkey resumed relations with Russia during the period 1989 – 1991, and

envisioned a “Turkish World” stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. To

accomplish this goal, 1992 saw the creation of the Turkish International Cooperation and

Development Agency (TİKA). Contrary to the stated purpose of TİKA, its primary

purpose was to assist Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan as the Soviet Union was

disintegrating (Bilgin, 2011). Also created was the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

(BSEC) organization, which included Russia.

During this period, and to some degree in response to Turkey‟s efforts, Russia

created the “Near Abroad” doctrine, which referred to newly independent states

emanating from the old Soviet Union. Relations between Turkey and Russia declined,

primarily over the issues of Georgia and Chechnya, but still the two were able to form

agreements on “economics, scientific, and technical cooperation and exchange of military

personnel” (Bilgin, 2011).

In the early 1990‟s, energy assumed the primary issue in relations between

Turkey and Russia. Under the Tansu Çiller government (1993-1995), Turkey announced

its intention to become an energy hub. November, 1999, saw the signing of the Baku-

Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline agreement. And in March, 2001, Turkey signed a protocol

“agreement to purchase natural gas from Phase I of Shah Deniz Project in Azerbaijan”

(Bilgin, 2011).

Under the first JDP government, led by Abdullah Gül (2002-2003), the

government announced: “We will pursue cooperative relations that do not harm either

party‟s interests in line with good-neighborly practices with the Russian Federation, and

in line with our cultural affinities with the Central Asian and Caucasian Republics”

(Bilgin, 2011).

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-present) continued the policy of making Turkey an

energy hub. Projects that had been started at this time, with the exception of those

involving Russia, were completed, and the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline project

(2005) was announced (Bilgin, 2011, p. 188). Turkey also sought to strengthen relations

with Russia by signing the 2004-2005 Consultations Program addressing areas of

“counterterrorism, security, economy and consular work.” Vladimir Putin, while in

Turkey, signed The Joint Declaration on the Intensification of friendship and

Multidimensional Partnership (2004). In 2010, President Dmitriy Medvedev and Turkey

created The Council of High Level of Cooperation. Agreements for reciprocal visa-free

travel and for Russia to construct a nuclear power station in Akkuyu were signed. Turkey

also walked a tightrope by managing “good neighborliness” relations with Russia,

Georgia, and Armenia (Bilgin, 2011).

Turkey envisioned creating a “Turkish work from the Adriatic to the great Wall of

China,” while renewing relations with the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union

(Bilgin, 2011). A possible demonstration of a shift away from Europe and NATO was

Turkey‟s October, 2010 joint military maneuvers with China (Cornell, 2012). The retired

general, Tuncir Kilic, argues that Western security links should be severed, and Turkey

should pursue new strategic relations with Russia, China, and Iran. General Kircik and

others of similar mindset believe inclusion in NATO and pursuing accession to the

European Union is very limiting (Oğuzlu, 2010).

Yet, some would argue that China and the other Eastern Powers, Japan and India,

are more interested in securing and legitimizing their position of power in the region

rather than contributing to issues of global governance (Acharya, 2012). And still others,

such as Edward Burke of the Centre for European Reform believe that the West has

overlooked the role Turkey can play in its neighborhood in working with Iran, Russia,

and China to find a resolution to the problems in Syria (Nicolescu, 2012).

Turkey had been an early proponent of Armenian independence, recognizing

Armenia, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Humanitarian aid and facilitating the

Western flow of assistance was provided by Turkey. But difficulties with the Nagorno-

Barakakh conflict caused Turkey to close its border with Armenia to trade. Diplomatic

relations with Armenia were never established. All parties involved in the South

Caucasus region have been harmed by the limitations placed on barriers to trade.

Georgia has become a vocal supporter of normalized relations between Turkey and

Armenia (Emerson, 2004).

Turkish accession is also dependent upon resolving the issues with Armenia with

the EU calling for “good neighborly relations” between member states. Resolution of the

Turkish/Armenian dispute would be accelerated should the EU choose to begin accession

talks with Armenia. Until that time, the EU‟s influence over Armenia is minimal.

Reconciliation between the two countries could/would take the following form: as

the foreign ministers from both countries have resumed their contacts with one another, a

roadmap for reestablishing relations has already begun to be developed. This roadmap

would have a “set of simultaneous and sequential confidence measures,“ for example

reestablishing air routes between the two countries (Emerson, 2004). A proposal by

Emerson and Tocci suggest another route, in three steps:

1. Turkey could re-open its eastern border with Armenia for trade, and allow aid and

supplies to flow in the airspace above the Turkish border. Armenia would amend

its constitution by dropping any references to pre-1915 Armenia. This would

suggest a Turkish claim for territorial and border integrity. Armenia would be

required to recognize Turkey‟s disputed borders. Establish a Truth and

Reconciliation Committee be created by the two countries to explore and

investigate the events of 1915. To populate this committee, eminent historians

from both countries would be appointed, as well as any unbiased third-parties to

lend balance and credibility.

2. Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Contested territory occupied by

Armenia would be returned to Azerbaijan. Internationally guaranteed trade

corridors would be established between Karabakh and Armenia, and a second

corridor between Erzerum and Azerbaijan. Turkey could/would reestablish

relations with Armenia.

3. Resolve the status of Karabakh. There are two proposals that have been

suggested. One, Azerbaijan retains the Karabakh territory, allowing for quasi-

independence of the area, or, two, perform a land swap between Armenia and

Azerbaijan. Guaranteed access to Nakhichevan by Azerbaijan would also be

required (Emerson, 2004).

Turkey would not be viewed as an impartial mediator, but could work with

Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and EU representatives to overcome

the deadlock that exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This impression is reinforced

in that the Autonomous Region of Abkhazia in Georgia, which is pursuing a secessionist

campaign, has a smaller population than in corresponding Turkish Abkhazian diaspora.

Resolving this issue would lead to further development in the eastern Black Sea region,

with access to rail lines that would be reopened, as well as a proposed oil pipeline

running from Novorossick (Russia‟s main port on the Black Sea) to Supsa, in eastern

Georgia. This pipeline would link to the BTC pipeline, and could reinvigorate Russia‟s

interest in the South Caucasus region. Establishing relations with Armenia would allow

Turkey to exert more influence on Armenia (Emerson, 2004).

Europeanization

Europeanization not only affects those nations in the EU but also those candidates

for accession. The accession process itself for inclusion in the EU contains strict

economic and political guidelines which in effect, cause europeanization and

democratization. This occurred when the eastern european nations went through the

accession process. Countries such as those in the Central and Eastern region of Europe

saw such effects. Turkey‟s accession process, however, is taking a significantly longer

time. This is primarily due to the prominent differences between European and Turkish

political structure as well as culture. These differences have made the democratic changes

necessary for accession far more difficult. Democratization has been a long, and rather

tumultuous road for Turkey.

A significant part of Turkey‟s democratization efforts has been the reigning in of

the military, placing it more firmly under civilian control. The military‟s sidelining is no

panacea for democratic progress, however. Turkey and its people‟s complicated

relationship with the military defies a cookie-cutter interpretation in which the military‟s

intervention in politics is always a power play to preserve elite privileges. This is

certainly one motivation, but just as important to recognize is the widespread faith in the

military as an institution amongst the Turkish electorate. This faith derives from the

military‟s inextricable role in the founding and nurturing of the Turkish nation-state, not

only due to the success of Atatürk‟s campaign to liberate Anatolia but more importantly

the role the Turkish military played in counteracting authoritarian trends in

democratically-elected governments. It may seem a contradiction to associate military

coups followed by years of military rule with the preservation of democracy and social

order, and it is. But like so much else to do with Turkey, the relationship between

military and civilian government and the Turkish public‟s conception of this dynamic is

not so cut-and-dry as it is in the West.

The public has throughout Turkey‟s history conceived of the military as a force

for keeping in check distrusted politicians (Aydinli, 2009).3 The Turkish military has not

intervened for simple reasons of power gambits. Rather, it has always tried to read the

mood of the public and act when it appears politicians either overreach in a way the

public disapproves or prove incompetent in promoting social cohesion, safety, and

prosperity.

It is not impossible that the military could step in once again should Erdogan

continue to act increasingly erratically in foreign affairs while simultaneously pushing

more obviously and forcefully than ever to consolidate his personal power and in the

process severely alter Turkey‟s system of government. The Turkish military is still the

3 Perhaps stemming from the belief that the Ottoman Empire‟s collapse was brought about due to bungling

politicians and reinforced after multiple instances of political dysfunction after the Ottomans.

most trusted element of Turkish society (Poushter, 2015). However, Erdogan has had the

time in office necessary to bring the military under unprecedented civilian control by

establishing more robust oversight and appointing new generals loyal to him and his

cause, enabled by the overwhelming popularity of Erdogan‟s government both at home

and abroad during its first decade. The most important foreign pressure in bringing the

Turkish military to heel was the EU‟s accession offer. The EU was a goal easily grasped

and desired by the Turkish public, and the clear requirement of bringing the military

firmly under civilian control provided no leverage for the Turkish military to resist such

changes.

Turkish opinion of NATO in 1990’s

In 1996, a study was conducted by Dr. Atila Eralp of Middle East Technical

University in Turkey analysed the Turkish perception of NATO in the mid 1990‟s. His

study included two groups designated Senior Opinion Leaders and Junior Opinion

Leaders. Interviewees designated Senior held occupations that of academics, journalists,

staff of ministry of foreign affairs, and military circles. Junior interviewees held positions

in the prime-ministry institute of Middle East and Public administration, Academy of

ministry of foreign affairs as well as in departments of international relations or political

sciences. These two groups showed little interest at the time of the survey towards any

NATO security arrangements between Turkey and any other nation. The table below

shows the results.

Given the Condition that Turkey Remains as a NATO Member, Which of the

Following Security Arrangements May Be Contemplated.

4

Of all the proposed agreements listed, the most favorable security arrangement was that

between Turkey and the Western European Union (WEU), an organization that ceased to

exist in 2011. Even these numbers were in the minority. Both Senior and Junior

interviewees against the arrangements were in the majority.

Arab Spring

The Turkish confused stance vis-à-vis the Arab Spring is reflected in how the Arab

masses are divided about how the Turkish role is perceived. The Turkish position is not

only different for each state involved in the Arab Spring but it also changed for each state

since 2011. For instance, the Turkish regime was a supporter of the Egyptian Supreme

Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) when it assumed control upon the fall of Mubarak;

however that changed completely when the SCAF performed a coup d‟état against the

Muslim Brotherhood‟s Morsi. Turkey continues to harbor Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

members who face charges in Egypt and refuses to extradite them based on the strong

connections between the MB and Turkey‟s ruling party. This particular Turkish stance

places it up against the arguably strongest Arab coalition in the region - i.e. Egypt

(represented by the military general El Sisi, Saudi Arabia and the GCC members -with

4 The final report written by Dr. Erlap was submitted to NATO as a survey of the “upper-level” individuals

of Turkey.

the exception of Qatar and Jordan) - who declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist

organization that should be banned indefinitely. Turkey is also one of the main supporters

of the Syrian opposition groups who are more or less complicit in exacerbating Syria‟s

bloody civil war; this further complicates Turkey‟s position in the Arab World.

Additionally, Turkey‟s backtracking from its open door policy towards Syrian refugees

and its unscrupulous deal with the EU is just another monkey wrench in its pursuit of a

„zero problems with neighbors‟ utopian policy.

The Turkish position towards the Arab Spring has been ambiguous at best. Over

the past decade-plus Turkey has followed a foreign policy that in the words of its former

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, draws on a “holistic understanding of

historical trends and a sense of active agency, its progress in establishing a stable and

peaceful domestic order, and its reintegration with neighbors” (2012). These attempts to

„redefine‟ relations with the Arab world were coupled with efforts to contribute toward

the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab Spring presented the opportunity to

show that Turkey‟s tangible relative development is desperately needed in the Arab

world, which is still reminiscent of the old Turkey (Özhan, 2011).

The Arab Spring cannot be interpreted as a single isolated event; each country in fact had

a different experience despite some overlapping trends. It stems from the US abrogation

of the „Camp David‟ order that the region had largely operated under for the preceding

few decades. The order was first broken post the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the deposing

of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The implications of the invasion coupled with the crusade

against terrorism pushed a region that had been barely able to stand on the edge directly

into a bottomless dark pit. The Turkish position was a largely pro-Western one that, to a

large extent, played along with American efforts in the region. The Sunni Iraqis, who

were the most disenfranchised as a result of the invasion, do not consider Turkey as an

ally or even a good neighbor for that matter (Masoud et al., 2015). The Arab Spring,

despite all the early signs of the region‟s economic and political shambles, was a black

swan event that further challenged the status quo. Subsequently, Turkey was at a

crossroads of whether to advocate for the popular demands of democratization in the

Arab World, which would entail fundamentally changing the „Camp David‟ order, or to

proceed cautiously in accordance to Western foreign policies. Turkey benefited briefly

from its post 2002 “zero problems with neighbors” which encompassed diplomatic,

economic and civil society dimensions. Turkey took an active role in being a partner in

the major Arab-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts, especially in terms of the Palestinian

cause in the form of Turkey‟s outspoken reaction to Israel‟s attack on Gaza - in addition

to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‟s theatrical outburst at Davos - all of which

boosted Turkey‟s image within the Arab and Muslim world (Özhan, 2011). Turkey was,

and still is to an extent, viewed as a success story among the Arab populace mainly due to

its economic stature. In terms of the Arab Spring‟s implications on Turkey; “there has

been an intensive interaction between public officials, NGOs, universities, businessmen,

and ordinary people. As a result, while the Middle East was not at all included in the

agenda of the old Turkey, it began to be treated as a quasi „domestic issue‟ for the New

Turkey” (Özhan, 2011).

The Turkish position in regards to the Syrian case was the most clear from the

beginning; Assad must go. In this sense the Turkish, U.S. and European demands are

seemingly aligned. The Syrian opposition – almost entirely based out of Turkey – and its

media, as well as the different political groups, NGOs, activists all benefit from Turkey‟s

anti-Assad stance. Turkey houses more Syrian refugees than any other country in the

world, and while its deal with the European Union was supposed to portray further

commitment to the Syrian crisis, the unscrupulous fashion in which it was conducted,

together with questionable policies that involves denying asylum to „illegal‟ migrants, is

the beginning of the end of Turkey‟s heroic image. Turkey is internally conducting a

cost-benefit analysis of its position. Most recently, the resignation of Davutoğlu “raises

questions about the visa deal and opens up the prospect that the EU-Turkey refugee pact

could fall apart. The softly-spoken former diplomat had been the main architect on the

Turkish side of the controversial deal under which migrants arriving on the Greek islands

are sent back to Turkey” (Letsch & Rankin, 2016).

Conclusion

Turkey‟s situation is inherently precarious, and is likely to remain so for the

foreseeable future. Its security situation both internally and externally is fraught with

tension. It continues to face the unresolved disputes it has accrued over the course of

history regarding in particular the Armenian genocide, the Kurds, and Cyprus. It faces

new threats emanating from changing global circumstances, among them the changing

rhetoric and protocol around human rights issues facilitated by instant and constant

information communication coupled with both the spread of democracy worldwide and

the increasing salience of holding countries to account on the basis of their adherence to

liberal democratic values and the human rights associated therewith. This places Turkey

in a qualitatively different situation than during the Cold War, when it would receive

little to no reproach for shuttering four newspapers as it did in the 1950s (Stearns, 1992).

Turkey‟s relations with Russia have spiralled somewhat independently of the US

and EU‟s fallout with Russia, yet the two are inextricably tied together via NATO. In a

situation intensely reminiscent of NATO‟s preoccupation with the German front at the

start of the Cold War to the detriment of its southeastern front. Despite NATO‟s focus on

the Baltics as the next likely target of Russian aggression, Turkey is involved more

heavily in conflicts in which it and Russia occupy starkly opposing positions. Given the

active military measures being deployed in these conflicts, it would be prudent for NATO

to devote its attention more robustly to these conflicts.

Syria is the most obvious and immediate of these. Turkey is the most adamant

opponent of Bashar al-Assad‟s regime, and Moscow‟s intervention in favor of Assad has

brought active Russian military operations right to Turkey‟s doorstep, as the downing of

a Russian jet straying into Turkish airspace demonstrated. But perhaps even more

worrying is Turkey‟s full-blooded support for Azerbaijan in the dispute with Armenia

over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey‟s antagonistic relationship with Armenia – stemming

largely from the refusal of the Turkish government to recognize the Ottoman genocide

against Armenians during World War I – places it in direct opposition to Russia,

Armenia‟s major ally, over a persistently unstable “frozen conflict” with a tendency to

periodically burst into flames. Escalating tensions between the two main backers of each

side only increase the possibility of a renewal of fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh to

quickly escalate into a war between Turkey and Russia, with all the attendant

consequences for NATO and the world.

Further complicating Turkey‟s involvement in the Syrian civil war is the Kurdish

presence along the Syrian-Turkish border. As the border town of Kobane faced imminent

seizure by IS in 2015, the Turkish government‟s hands-off approach prompted mass

protests by Turkish Kurds and presaged a resurgence of violence between the PKK and

the Turkish military in the months to follow. The US, initially describing Kobane as

being of “little strategic value,” eventually intervened in favor of the Kurdish YPG,

preventing Kobane from falling and beginning the YPG‟s drive to take back all of the

territory along the Syrian border with Turkey east of the Euphrates. This event turned the

YPG into the West‟s closest ally against the Islamic State in Syria, and as they recovered

territory from IS at a breakneck pace, the YPG became indispensable to the fight against

IS. The only problem is that YPG is intimately tied to the PKK, a US-designated terrorist

organization, with the two groups sharing significant organizational and operational

overlap. It doesn‟t take an expert to recognize the damage Western hypocrisy on the PKK

does to its relations with Turkey, no matter the merits of supporting the YPG.

As the ramifications of the Syrian civil war spill across Turkey and into Europe in

the form of mass flows of refugees, a problem already of high-level importance to Europe

has taken on an even more pressing dimension. And as the EU-Turkey deal on refugees

showed, negotiations have inevitably spilled over into Turkey‟s contentious EU accession

negotiations with the inclusion of visa liberalization as a bargaining chip. The EU appears

to have misread the power dynamics at play in Turkey, however, as it negotiated the deal

with PM Davutoglu, who was promptly shown the door just weeks after the deal was

agreed to. Perhaps Angela Merkel felt she could strengthen Davutoglu‟s hand in

stymying Erdogan‟s bid for power to be formally shifted from the prime ministry to the

president through a constitutional referendum. If so, they failed to grasp the lack of

support for such a move within a firmly Erdogan-controlled AKP. In fact, despite his lack

of formal powers, President Erdogan was already firmly established as Turkey‟s center of

power. The EU-Turkey refugee deal may in fact turn into a pyrrhic victory for the EU,

and especially the driving force behind it Kanzlerin Angela Merkel, as conventions on

EU consensus-driven decision-making were subverted in order to secure the deal, not to

mention the wasted time and energy spent. However, considering the number of Turks

and Turkish Kurds living within the EU as well as the persistently positive view of the

Turkish population toward eventual EU membership, this will certainly not be the end of

Turkey and the EU‟s fraught relationship, despite President Erdogan‟s recent comments

seemingly forswearing any further moves to comply with EU accession protocols (BBC,

2016).

As if the EU and Turkey didn‟t have enough problems, Cyprus still persists as a

thorn in the side of their relations. Not only does it stymie Turkey‟s accession to the EU

(when it pursues it) but it also stymies EU-NATO cooperation. The EU only allows

discussions with NATO to take place when all members of the EU are present and

Turkey refuses to allow NATO to share any information. At the same time, under the

terms of the EU-NATO accord only Partnership for Peace (PfP) members can participate

in EU-NATO dialogues. Because Turkey continues to block Cyprus‟ acceptance into the

PfP, EU-NATO relations have been relegated to informal person-to-person discussions

insufficient to achieving a robust level of cooperation (Drent, 2015).

The key to navigating the immense complexity of Turkey‟s current strategic

predicament is to identify and tackle those problems that have readily available solutions

and can through their solving unlock new avenues of cooperation that can provide the key

to solving more fraught issues. Key to solving any of these issues, however, is concerted

and sustainable US engagement with each. As has been demonstrated, when the US

ignores its unique role at the center of global geopolitics, especially in those issues

directly involving its allies, problems remain unresolved and fester into crises. The West

in particular must be cognizant of Turkey‟s past and the way it has shaped its present

views. They must make this understanding clear to Turkey‟s leadership in an effort to

facilitate Turkey‟s understanding of Western perspectives. Though the drive toward

majoritarian authoritarianism presents immense difficulties to democratically-accountable

leaders in dealing with Turkey, that does not mean all cooperation is impossible. Rather,

leaders must be careful not to exacerbate these tensions by continuing to focus on issues

concerning Turkey in which there is little room for compromise, such as the refugee

crisis. Blatant capitulations to Erdogan‟s grasping for power and subversion of liberal

democratic strictures in exchange for tenuously paltry progress cannot but sour relations

when these efforts fail to move the needle. With the Kurdish issue only likely to become

increasingly salient in the years to come as Iraqi Kurds face a referendum on

independence and Syrian Kurds establish themselves as a power broker with autonomy,

the West must be cognizant of Turkey‟s intense concerns regarding these developments

and provide a more sympathetic ear along with tangible support in its fight against the

PKK, a fight that will almost certainly continue regardless of who takes the helm in

Turkey. While simple fixes are not readily available, the only path forward is concerted

and sustained effort on the part of those capable.

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