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China International Strategy Review (2019) 1:99–110https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00006-x

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Contested strategies: China, the United States, and the Indo‑Pacific security dilemma

Joel Wuthnow1

Received: 22 April 2019 / Accepted: 22 May 2019 / Published online: 21 June 2019 © This is a U.S. government work and not under copyright protection in the U.S.; foreign copyright protection may apply 2019

AbstractThe Sino-U.S. security dilemma is driven, in large part, by concerns in both coun-tries about the regional strategies being pursued by the other. U.S. analysts worry about the implications of China’s regional economic diplomacy, while their Chi-nese counterparts construe U.S. strategy as a containment plot. Those dynamics are accelerating under the bold approaches being undertaken by Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative and Donald Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. These perceptions are leading to responses which, in turn, make both sides feel even less secure. Neverthe-less, the security dilemma is mitigated by perceptions that both countries are facing serious constraints in achieving their regional ambitions, and by the sense that nei-ther country will be able to eliminate the key strategic advantages of the other. Poli-cymakers thus need to be aware that there is a gap between how regional strategies are explained and how they are received, and avoid particularly severe provocations that could lead to further tensions and counter-moves. But mutual constraints mean that leaders do not need to be overly sensitive, and provides some hope that a modi-cum of strategic stability can be injected into the relationship.

Keywords Security dilemma · Containment · Belt and Road Initiative · Indo-Pacific · Alliances · China · United States · Strategy

This paper reflects only the author’s views and not those of NDU, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

* Joel Wuthnow Joel.wuthnow.civ@ndu.edu

1 Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC 20024, USA

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1 Introduction

Strategic competition between China and the United States is on the rise, with fewer prospects that economic interdependence and cooperation on major global issues will serve the pacifying roles they once did. While this outcome is due in part to a structural power shift taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, part can also be explained by an intensifying Sino-U.S. security dilemma—usually defined as the pursuit of security by one state that is perceived as a threat by the other, triggering a spiral of competition (Jervis 1978). Scholars in both countries have identified vari-ous factors that have contributed to this problem in recent years, including China’s limited military transparency (Liff and Ikenberry 2014), nuclear modernization by both countries (Lieberthal and Wang 2012), differing views of international law (Teng 2017), U.S. narratives of Chinese “assertiveness” (Johnston 2013), and U.S. military activities near China’s borders (Wang 2013). Some have also identified fac-tors that could reduce the security dilemma.1

While the Sino-U.S. security dilemma is multifaceted, a fundamental problem is that both sides doubt the motives of the other in pursuing their regional strate-gies. China’s strategy, built on diplomatic and economic overtures to its neighbors, has been viewed in U.S. circles as promoting a Sino-centric regional order in which U.S. interests and values are marginalized, while a return of U.S. strategic focus on Asia—sidelined by the wars following 9/11—is often seen in China as a thinly veiled containment strategy. As discussed in this essay, the problem has increased under the bold strategies being pursued under Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has prompted U.S. concerns that countries could drift into China’s sphere of influence through “debt trap diplomacy” and other means. Trump’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy has led to Chinese concerns about stronger U.S. alliances around the region. As expected by the security dilemma, both sides are weighing counter-moves to preserve their own influence and reduce that of their opponent.

Competing U.S. and Chinese regional strategies are exacerbating the security dilemma, but predictions of an all-out strategic rivalry are misplaced. The key rea-son is that observers in both countries acknowledge the financial, diplomatic, and political constraints inhibiting the other side, while also taking stock of their own inability to deprive the other state of its key strategic advantage—U.S. strategists understand that direct competition with Chinese economic diplomacy is not fea-sible, while their Chinese counterparts realize the difficulties of breaking the U.S. alliance system. Mutual awareness of these constraints diminishes the aspirations of both states to gain a decisive advantage, and reduces the urgency to respond to the moves being pursued by the other. From this perspective, Washington and Beijing should take steps to avoid a spiraling competition, but often do not need to be overly cautious about avoiding provocations—in many cases, the other side might be less alarmed than imagined.

1 For instance, Ross (1999) argues that Asian geography is a limiting factor.

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2 U.S. concerns about BRI

The Sino-U.S. perception gap on the BRI and its security ramifications has grown over the past few years. Chinese officials and scholars argue that China-funded infrastructure loans and construction projects will enhance regional security, often interpreting its benefits through the “security-development nexus” (Stewart 2004; Chandler 2007). Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress work report argued that “com-mon development” of the sort promoted by the BRI “provides a fundamental safe-guard for peace and stability, and holds the key to various social issues” (Xi 2017). Chinese analysts explain that spurring growth through infrastructure spending could help mitigate the underlying sources of terrorism, calm tensions in regional terri-torial disputes, increase mutual trust, and promote stronger security partnerships (Wuthnow 2017, 9–10). Somewhat less prominent—though not entirely absent—are suggestions that BRI projects will undercut U.S. influence in Asia (Ibid, 11–13).

U.S. officials initially discussed the BRI in benign terms. President Obama noted that “Asia needs infrastructure…so to the extent that China wants to put capital into development projects around the region, that’s a good thing” (op cit., Wuthnow 2018). At the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum, Matthew Pottinger, senior director for Asia in President Trump’s National Security Council, said that “the United States recognizes the importance of improving economic connectivity through high-quality infrastructure development, and hence, welcomes efforts from all countries, includ-ing China, in achieving this” (Reuters 2017). These upbeat comments arguably dem-onstrated less about U.S. enthusiasm for the BRI than about conflicting U.S. priori-ties. Courting China’s cooperation on issues such as climate change, trade, Iran, and North Korea implied the need for positive, albeit rather vacuous, statements on an issue of importance for Xi (Kliman 2018, 4).

Since late 2017, U.S. appraisals have been more explicit in casting the BRI as a security challenge. In October 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (2017) described the “enormous levels of debt” infrastructure loans were imposing on some poorer recipients, referencing percolating concerns about Chinese “debt diplo-macy”— the use of debt obligations to sway the policies of foreign governments in China’s favor. The December 2017 National Security Strategy noted simply that “China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations” (The White House 2017). U.S. Department of Defense reports in 2018 argued that Beijing could leverage BRI investments to “shape” the interests of for-eign governments to “align with China’s,” and deter criticism of its “approach to sensitive issues” (U.S. Department of Defense 2018a, i; 2018b, 12). Those reports also stated that, from a military perspective, China might be able to rely on port ownership in countries such as Sri Lanka, Greece, and Australia to expand access for Chinese naval ships and equipment (Ibid).

U.S. scholars frequently raise similar concerns. Nadège Rolland (2017, 137) argues that Beijing aspires to use regional integration to promote a “new regional order…whose rules and norms reflect China’s values and serve its interests; a con-tinental stronghold insulated to some degree from American sea power”. Ratner (2018, 3–4) similarly posits that BRI projects could usher in an “illiberal regional

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order”, allow China to gain control of “major transportation facilities, includ-ing ports and airports”, and offer new “carrots and sticks to coerce U.S. allies and partners to reduce security cooperation with the United States”. Other scholars at the Center for a New American Security assert that overseas investments will give China “multiple points of leverage over global supply chains”, that could be used in a conflict “to influence market prices by limiting the availability of manufactured goods and nonrenewable commodities such as critical minerals” (Kliman 2018, 10).

Three factors can help explain this negative shift in U.S. perceptions. First was an eroding basis of Sino-U.S. cooperation. The Trump administration initially pursued cooperation on the bilateral trade deficit and North Korea, but that impetus declined with the lack of a trade agreement and a shift towards direct negotiations with Pyongyang. This in turn meant that there was less of a political rationale for avoid-ing antagonism on issues like BRI. Second was a growing bipartisan U.S. consensus about China as a strategic competitor, driven by concerns over China’s perceived malign economic policies, assertive land reclamation and military construction activities in the South China Sea, and “influence operations”, which some observers thought would subvert democratic processes (see, e.g., Pence 2018). This percep-tion, which gained official imprimatur in documents such as the 2017 National Secu-rity Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy, made cooperation less attrac-tive and put a spotlight on the BRI, which seemed to encapsulate China’s expansive regional ambitions.

Third, changing facts on the ground prompted increasing U.S. attention to the implications of BRI projects for U.S. strategic interests. One example is the problem of China leveraging port developments and investments to secure military access in new regions. A 2018 U.S. Department of Defense (2018a, ii) report contended that China’s inaugural military base in Djibouti (which had received significant Chinese infrastructure loans) and possible follow-on bases would “increase China’s ability to deter use of conventional military force, sustain operations abroad, and hold strate-gic economic corridors at risk”, and could promote global PLA capabilities which could “complicate adversary activities in the event of a conflict”. These factors meant that U.S. views were increasingly at odds with Chinese explanations.

3 Chinese concerns about the “Free and Open Indo Pacific”

Mirroring U.S. perceptions of the BRI, there is also a growing perception gap between U.S. articulations of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and Chinese con-cerns about U.S. regional strategy under Trump. During his November 2017 visit to Asia, President Trump (2017) vowed to “strengthen the bonds of friendship and commerce between all of the nations of the Indo-Pacific, and together, to promote our prosperity and security”. In April 2018, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong (2018) explained the guiding principles of the strategy, such as free-dom from coercion, “open sea lanes and open airways”, and reciprocal trade deals that would benefit people on both sides of the Pacific. These discussions sometimes implicitly referenced Chinese behavior—such as Wong’s reference to the need for

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infrastructure financing for smaller countries in a way that “does not weigh them down”—but the emphasis was providing a positive vision for the region.

Chinese official reactions ranged from noncommittal to skeptical. Asked about the Indo-Pacific concept, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said that it should “not tar-get a third party and should contribute to regional peace, stability, and prosperity” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed it as a “headline-grabbing idea,” arguing that “stoking a new Cold War is out of sync with the times and inciting bloc confrontation will find no market” (Chinese Min-istry of Foreign Affairs 2018). In response to U.S. announcements of new regional economic programs totaling $113 million, Wang said that, “When I first heard this figure of $113 million, I thought I heard wrong. At least it should be 10 times higher, for a superpower with $16 trillion of GDP” (Yong 2018). While avoiding outright criticism, these statements implied doubts about U.S. intentions and projected confi-dence that Beijing could withstand U.S. policies designed to undercut China’s influ-ence and strengthen U.S. commitments in the region.

While Chinese officials were often restrained in their responses, Chinese analysts have voiced strong concerns about elements of U.S. regional strategy. Senior Colo-nel Li Daguang (2018, 71–72) of China’s National Defense University, for instance, argues that components of the Indo-Pacific strategy, such as stronger alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, along with security partnerships with smaller states, such as Vietnam and Indonesia, reveal a U.S. goal of “retaining its influence in the Western Pacific and balancing other great powers”. Su (2017), a scholar at the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), similarly accuses the Trump administration of “reconstructing the containment framework of the Cold War to use against China, which enables the U.S. to enjoy the bene-fits of economic growth in the region and to sustain its global hegemony as long as possible”.

Specific concerns were raised about two defining elements of Trump’s strategy. First is the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, and associated military exercises involving those coun-tries. For some Chinese observers, this looked like a plot to create an “Asian NATO” encircling China (Wuthnow 2019). Second is the emphasis on U.S.–India defense cooperation. While previous U.S. administrations also pursued this goal, the phrase “Indo-Pacific” (including its use in the renamed U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) and repeated high-level engagements drew Chinese scrutiny. Xia and Zhong (2018, 27) worry that this cooperation may prompt India to ratchet up tensions along the Sino-Indian border and adopt a more hawkish posture on the BRI. Ye (2018, 10–11), director of South Asia studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warns that the U.S.–India partnership, along with the U.S.–Japan alliance, may become a second axis putting pressure around China’s periphery.

These assessments echo longstanding Chinese misgivings about U.S. military alliances. The major concern is that these alliances, along with exercises, forward basing, and other factors, are meant primarily to constrain China’s rise and hem it in militarily (Liff 2018, 156–157; Garver and Wang 2010). Such concerns were evident in Chinese views of the Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia”, which, like the Indo-Pacific strategy, sought to bolster U.S. alliances and military presence in

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the region, although some Chinese experts also understood the more benign eco-nomic motives driving the U.S. focus on Asia (Yung 2017). A related concern is that alliances, rather than restraining regional competition, could actually fuel rivalries by emboldening China’s adversaries. The classic case is the U.S.–Japan alliance, which Chinese scholars suspect is encouraging Tokyo to free itself from postwar limitations on the use of military force (Christensen 1999, 62–63). In sum, Chinese observers doubt the sincerity of U.S. motives in articulating a vision for a “free and open” region.

Other concerns centered on U.S. military operations and activities around Chi-na’s borders. A notable example is U.S. freedom of navigation (FON) patrols in the South China Sea, which became more routine during the Trump administration. Fudan University scholar Wu (2018, 85–86) notes that U.S. FON patrols during the first year of the Trump administration “far exceeded” those during the Obama years, which he attributes to more “operational freedom” being afforded to the U.S. mili-tary. Wu also contends that Washington pressed its allies, including Australia and the United Kingdom, to “send patrol ships to the South China Sea, adding pres-sure on China”. Similarly, Nanjing University scholar Zhu (2018, 19) writes that FON operations under Trump have “consisted of routes past more sensitive physical features with many changes of direction, which extended the amount of time U.S. warships were in waters where China did not want them”. In sum, Chinese observ-ers put little faith in the Trump administration’s explanation of the Indo-Pacific strat-egy’s positive aims.

4 Mutual constraints

Regional strategies being pursued under Xi and Trump, despite their self-professed benign motives, have raised concerns in both countries. As predicted by the logic of the security dilemma, strategists on both sides are considering how to respond to the regional strategies being pursued by the other. In response to the BRI, U.S. ana-lysts advocate circulating a persuasive “counter-narrative,” building ally and part-ner military capacity, coordinating with allies on alternative infrastructure financing schemes, and taking steps to “constrain China’s military access” in the Indian Ocean (Kliman and Grace 2018, 22–24). Responding to the adjustment in U.S. strategy under Trump, Chinese analysts suggest strengthening the BRI, peeling away coun-tries such as India through economic concessions, (Xia and Zhong 2018, 28; Wang 2018, 51; Hu 2018, 28–30) and maintaining readiness in China’s maritime periphery (Liang 2017). Depending on how aggressively each side responds, the result could be a further cycle of moves and counter-moves that generally makes all sides feel less secure.

Nevertheless, predictions of an escalating competition should not be overstated. One reason is that observers in each country recognize the constraints on the other’s ambitions. U.S. observers cite several weaknesses of the BRI. First, China’s lim-ited foreign exchange reserves and concerns about reduced exports associated with the U.S.–China trade conflict will reduce Beijing’s ability to expand infrastructure financing, which is critical to its “debt-trap diplomacy” (Joy-Perez and Scissors

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2018, 4). Second, problems such as poor credit worthiness of BRI partners, legal woes, and security risks are prompting Chinese officials to exercise caution and deterring some private investors. Recent evidence, for instance, points to a “notice-able slowdown” in BRI commercial property deals due to concerns about capital flight (Weiland 2019). Third, even without a well-coordinated U.S. “counter-narra-tive,” China is facing diplomatic pushback in countries ranging from the Maldives to Malaysia over BRI projects that do not benefit local populations (Hillman 2018).

Chinese analysts similarly chronicle the weaknesses in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. One common argument is that the Trump administration’s “America First” rhetoric, heavy-handed approach to trade, and skepticism of the value of alliances will reduce the confidence of regional states in U.S. commitments (Zhang 2018b; Chen 2018) and ultimately weaken U.S. influence in the region. Another argument is that most third parties, including U.S. allies, value their economic relationship with China and will thus avoid policies that antagonize Beijing, such as joining a U.S.-led containment plot (Global Times 2017). Many Chinese analysts also doubt that India can be pulled completely in the U.S. strategic orbit, given New Delhi’s historic non-alignment policy, rifts in U.S.-India relations (such as India’s arms relationship with Russia), and Sino-Indian economic cooperation (Zhang 2017,2018a; Xia and Zhong 2018, 26). Some also optimistically argue that mutual recognition of the importance of a stable and fruitful Sino-U.S. relationship will constrain the most provocative impulses of U.S. strategy (Chen 2018).

Also ameliorating the security dilemma is the realization that both countries can-not eliminate the key strategic advantages of the other. Regarding the BRI, U.S. ana-lysts recognize that a symmetrical response is not politically or financially viable. Although Congress has authorized an additional $30 billion in infrastructure devel-opment funding under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-ment (BUILD) Act, U.S. outlays are still far outmatched by China’s commitment of several hundred billion dollars. At most, U.S. analysts argue that Washington can provide meaningful alternatives, while recognizing that the BRI will continue to be a prime source of funding for many states. The Trump administration has also pro-posed budget cuts to agencies such as USAID and the Asian Development Bank which could have been instrumental to a more robust challenge. U.S. observers also understand that third parties have conflicted attitudes towards the BRI and similar initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with some states prior-itizing cooperation for economic reasons (or hoping to “co-opt” Chinese ambitions from the inside) (Harris 2019). This would make it difficult to orchestrate a balanc-ing coalition.

Chinese observers likewise anticipate limits on Beijing’s ability to frustrate Washington’s plans. The key reason is that there is little appetite within the region to disband U.S. alliances in favor of a new China-led security architecture. CICIR President Yuan (2017, 8) writes that China’s “economic and cultural advantages” have resulted in a “comprehensive stalemate” with the U.S. alliance system, and any further “fundamental change” in the situation will be difficult. China’s 2017 white paper on Asia–Pacific security also stated that “military alliances formed in history” would remain a fixture in the Asian security landscape but would be complemented by other organizations such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

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and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Rather than working to supplant the order, the white paper envisions “multiple mechanisms advancing together in the evolution of a regional security framework” (Chinese  State Council Information Office 2017). Eliminating U.S. alliances, though perhaps a long-term goal, might simply be unattainable for the foreseeable future.

5 Conclusion

There is little doubt that strategic competition between Washington and Beijing is accelerating, with rising security dilemma dynamics playing a key role. Both coun-tries posit that their regional strategies provide net positive outcomes for regional security (in addition to bringing valuable economic benefits as China and the United States seek to develop new markets and tap the region’s prodigious economic poten-tial), but these explanations have been discounted by elites and scholars on the other side. The outcome has been a continual process of strategic adjustment as both states seek to preserve their own interests in light of threats posed by the other. Nev-ertheless, the intensity of the resulting strategic competition has been reduced by an awareness among strategists that regional dominance in the current context is a mirage: hegemony is unlikely due to both internal constraints and to challenges fac-ing the other side.

This analysis has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, con-ceptualizing the security dilemma in the context of contemporary U.S.–China rela-tions requires taking into account perceptions about regional strategies writ large, rather than focusing narrowly on specific capabilities (as has often been emphasized in international relations theory).2 Chinese concerns center primarily on the U.S. alliance network and related activities, such as combined military exercises, forward deployments, and joint patrols, in addition to key security partnerships and initia-tives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.3 U.S. concerns about the BRI sug-gest that economic factors such as “debt diplomacy” and port investments could amplify the security dilemma because of their potential security implications.

A related implication concerns the ways in which security dilemmas can be reduced. Few analysts argue that economic interdependence and cooperation on major global issues, such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation, will have the stabilizing effects they once did. What could matter more in this case are doubts on both sides about the necessity and feasibility of outmaneuvering the other. While some analyses may overestimate the other side’s ability to carry out their strategy, sophisticated observers in both countries have expressed relatively balanced views about the capacity of their own side and the other to achieve anything approaching regional hegemony. Some constraints, including limited financial resources and the unwillingness of third parties to choose between Washington and Beijing, apply to

2 Earlier discussions focused in particular on the role of offensive weapons in intensifying the security dilemma. See, e.g., Van Evera (1998), Christensen (1999), and Glaser (1997).3 Liff and Ikenberry (2014, 87) make a similar point about U.S. alliances.

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both countries, while others, such as Trump’s “America First” philosophy, are more idiosyncratic.4 Awareness of one’s own limitations can also reduce the appetite for competition. This is borne out, to a degree, in U.S. recognition that direct competi-tion with the BRI is futile and in Chinese arguments that U.S. alliances may be here to stay.

From a policy perspective, the analysis has two key takeaways. First, U.S. and Chinese leaders need to be aware of the action–reaction cycle that is underway as both sides interpret the strategies of the other as a threat and contemplate counter-moves. Reassurance in terms of public messaging has not been effective to date and is likely of little value given how entrenched the concerns are in each country. What is needed is an assessment of whether there are particularly sensitive actions (exam-ples being Chinese land reclamation in the area of Scarborough Shoal and U.S. close-in reconnaissance operations) that could be shelved or modified to avoid pro-voking an escalatory response by the other side. This will take sustained dialogue by both sides to understand what types of behavior each side can and cannot accept. It should also be expected that military forces from both states will continue to operate in close proximity in places such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and so officials will need to develop mechanisms that can be used to defuse tensions in the case of miscommunications.

Second, despite the need to carefully manage competition, policymakers in both capitals should not be overly sensitive about avoiding provocations. A benefit of the mutual recognition of constraints is that specific actions and operations are unlikely to be perceived as a critical factor in tipping the regional balance in favor of one side or the other. Specific BRI investments will not eliminate (but in some cases may weaken) U.S. alliances, while FON operations, while distasteful to a Chinese audi-ence, will not undermine China’s broad economic advantages. Excessive restraint may often not be needed to avoid a conflagration, since the other side might not be alarmed in the first place. In sum, U.S. and Chinese officials will need to address the growing strategic competition taking place across the Indo-Pacific, but sober assessments about how successful each side can be should temper its most excessive manifestations.

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