1

2

3

Contents

Program ........................................................................................ 5

Abstracts ..................................................................................... 14

Session I .............................................................................. 14

I-A Philosophy of History (Room A) ..................................... 14

I-B Topics in Marxism (Room N) .......................................... 16

I-C Ancient Philosophy (Room C) ........................................ 19

I-D Philosophy of Medicine (Room S) .................................. 20

Session II.............................................................................. 23

II-A Phenomenology: Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Room A) ......................................................................................... 23

II-B Social and Political Philosophy (Room N) ...................... 26

II-C Metaphysics: On God (Room C) .................................... 28

II-D Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Society (Room S) ............................................................................................ 31

II-E Topics in Nietzsche (Salons) .......................................... 33

Session III ............................................................................. 36

III-A Topics in Husserlian Phenomenology (Room A) .......... 36

III-B Debates on Multiculturalism (Room N) ....................... 38

III-C Medieval Philosophy (Room C) .................................... 41

4

III-D Topics in Philosophy of Science and Metaphilosophy (Room S) ............................................................................. 43

Session IV ............................................................................ 46

IV-A Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Room A) ....... 46

IV-B On the Crisis of Modernity (Room N) .......................... 48

IV-C German Idealism and Beyond (Room C) ...................... 50

IV-D Language, Meaning, Hermeneutics (Room S) ............. 53

Acknowledgments ...................................................................... 56

Notes .......................................................................................... 57

5

Program

8:30-9:10 Breakfast

(Raadzaal)

9:10-9:30 Opening Remarks by GSC team and

Prof. Gerd van Riel, Dean of the Institute of Philosophy

(Kardinaal Mercierzaal)

9:30-11.00 Session I I-A Philosophy of History (Room A) Chair: Dr. Willem Styfhals BLAKE SCOTT (PhD), “On Truth and Lies in a Rhetorical Sense: Adorno, Nietzsche, and the Rescue of Rhetoric”.

VICTOR WEISBROD (ReMA), “Progress as a Concept of Orientation: Karl Löwith and Theodor W. Adorno as Guides to our Time”.

WILLEM WILLEMS (PhD), “Sartre on the Origin of History”.

6

I-B Topics in Marxism (Room N) Chair: Prof. Matthias Lievens DORUK ATAHAN ERBAS (MA), “In Search of a Lost Subject: Marx's Historical Materialism and the Subject”.

ANITA ISHAQ (ReMA), “Gramsci and the Political Character of Indifference”.

TOBIA ROSSI (MA), “The Human in the Spectacle: Guy Debord’s Conception of Life and Beyond”.

I-C Ancient Philosophy (Room C) Chair: Prof. Jan Opsomer DÀNIEL ATTILA KOVÁCS (MA; Erasmus), “Body and Self in Plotinus”.

DASHAN XU (ReMA), “Can We Be Friends with Trees?”.

I-D Philosophy of Medicine (Room S) Chair: Prof. Pieters Andriaens ZOË CLAESEN (MA), “The Role of Metaphors in Overdiagnosis and Overtreatment”.

RUEL MANNETTE (MA), “A Philosophical Evaluation of the Theoretical Viability of Introducing Macro-Determinants into Epidemiology”.

7

11.00-11:15 Coffee Break (Raadzaal)

11:15-13:00 Session II

II-A Phenomenology: Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Room A) Chair: Dr. Simon Truwant ANDREW DOMZAL (MA), “Authenticity from Oppression: A Heideggerian Account of the Ontological Effects of Racism”.

MARIE PONSEELE (MA), “Heidegger and the Dangers of ‘Being Interested’”.

FRANCESCO PUGLIARO (ReMA), “Intelligibility in the Nascent State: Structure and Phenomenon in the Early Merleau-Ponty”.

DONOVAN STEWART (MA), “Regional Ontologies and Destruction”.

II-B Social and Political Philosophy (Room N) Chair: Prof. Bart Pattyn THOMAS ACKE (MA), “Freedom and Economic Organization”.

HANS DE MEY (MA), “The Role of Comparative Social Identity in Intergroup Conflict”.

ALMIRA MERT (MA), “Hannah Arendt’s Concept of Citizenship and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy”.

8

II-C Metaphysics: On God (Room C) Chair: Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer ANTONIO E. FELLINE (ReMA), “‘Per illud potest colorari illa ratio Anselmi’: Duns Scotus on the trail of Anselm’s proof of the existence of God”.

WAI LAM FOO (ReMA), “Hegel's Idea of God in His Critique of Jacobi in Faith and Knowledge”.

PETRONELA SERBAN (MA), “Agapeic Transcendence and Metaxological Mediation”.

II-D Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Society (Room S) Chair: Dr. Lode Lauwaert DAVID HAACK (ReMA), “Climate Change and the Life-World”.

LISANN PENTTILÄ (ReMA), “The Imperative of an Existential Phenomenology of Responsibility: A Rethinking of the Environmental Crisis”.

ANN-KATRIEN OIMANN (MA), “Limitless Artificial Intelligence?”.

MASSIMILIANO SIMONS (PhD), “Animal-scientist, animal-philosopher”.

9

II-E Topics in Nietzsche (Salons) Chair: Dr. Dennis Vanden Auweele BRETT M. CRAWFORD (MA), “Comfort in Chaos: Untangling Nietzsche’s Thought”.

JOB MEIJER (ReMA), “Good and Evil, Nietzsche’s Moral Discernment as a Redefinition”.

TEUS DE KONING (ReMA), “A Good Beyond Good and Evil: Nietzsche and Generosity”.

13:00-14:00 Lunch (Raadzaal)

14:00-15:45 Session III

III-A Topics in Husserlian Phenomenology (Room A) Chair: Prof. Julia Jansen CARLOS ALBERTO ANAYA (ReMA), “The Sources of Open Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Phenomenology”.

ALEXANDER FERRANT (ReMA), “Escaping the Horns of a Trilemma: Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas on ‘Pre-Propositional’ Knowledge“.

LICHEN ZHANG (MA), “Husserl’s Externalism”.

10

III-B Debates on Multiculturalism (Room N) Chair: Dr. Alessandro Mulieri FRANCESCO CARPANINI (MSc in Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies), “Multiculturalism or Multinaturalism? A Biopolitical Consideration”.

ANNA MILIONI (ReMA, Onassis Foundation scholar), “Institutions, Individuals and the Responsibility Toward Immigrants”.

MAX MORRIS (ReMA), “The Cosmopolitan Alternatives: Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève”.

III-C Medieval Philosophy (Room C) Chair: Prof. Andrea Robiglio AUGUSTINE IKOTT (ReMA), “The Difficulty of Determinism in the Relation between Celestial Motion and Natural Motion in Averroes’ Exegesis on the Physics”.

CHI-FO KIM (PhD), “Giles of Rome on Existence and Essence as Duae Res”.

BRETT YARDLEY (PhD), “Revealed Testimony: Social Epistemology in Aquinas, al-Ghazali, and Saadya Gaon”.

11

III-D Topics in Philosophy of Science and Metaphilosophy (Room S) Chair: Prof. Sylvia Wenmackers SARA BLANCO (ReMA), “Free Will in the Block Universe: Determinateness versus Determinism”.

HANNES VAN ENGELAND (ReMA), “Infinitism and Determinism: Two Norms for Science”.

WILLIAM A. PETRY (MA), “The Problem with the Method of Cases: Is Naturalized Conceptual Analysis the Solution?”.

15:45-16:00 Coffee Break (Raadzaal)

16:00- 17:45 Session IV IV-A Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Room A) Chair: Prof. Roland Breeur ZIYA AYDI (MA), “Looking Through the Crystal-Image: The Vision of Time in Cinema”.

CHARLIE BOWEN (MA), “Deleuze’s Pre-Psychoanalytic Unconscious and the ‘Static Ontological Genesis’”.

GLEN MELVILLE (ReMA), “Death and Representation in Deleuze: From Freud to Blanchot”.

12

IV-B On the Crisis of Modernity (Room N) Chair: Prof. Ernst Wolff JEAN-BAPTISTE GHINS (MA), “The Technical Dimension of the Crisis of Modernity. A Dialogue Between The Human Condition and the Dialectic of Enlightenment”.

ARNO LOUWS (ReMA), “Consolation in a Secular Age”.

BEREND VAN WIJK (ReMA), “An Ethical Perspective on the Crisis of Neoliberalism”.

IV-C German Idealism and Beyond (Room C) Chair: Prof. Karin de Boer BAS BLAASSE (MA), “A Natural Discord: Implications of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie for the Conceptualisation of Nature in the Anthropocene”.

MARKOS HAILE FESEHA (PhD), “The Determination of the Social Labor Process: Hegel and Marx”.

ONUR KÖKERER (ReMA), “Dialectics and the Rule of Concept: A Reply to Adorno’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy”.

WOUTER VIJFHUIZE (ReMA), “Adorno’s Critique of Pure Reason: The Relevance of Adorno’s Early Criticism of Kant’s Epistemology in Negative Dialectics".

13

IV-D Language, Meaning, Hermeneutics (Room S) Chair: Dr. Daniel Villegas Velez ERIC BIEN (PhD), “The Limits of Interpretative Principles”.

XINGCHEN MAO (ReMA), “Phenomenology between Husserl and Dilthey: Theoretical Perspectives and Applications in Musical Experience”.

17:45-18:00 Coffee Break (Raadzaal)

18:00-19:00 Keynote Speech (Kardinaal Mercierzaal)

Prof. Mathias Lievens, “Representative democracy and its discontents: a Sartrean perspective”.

Chair: Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer.

19:00 Reception (Raadzaal)

14

Abstracts

Session I

I-A Philosophy of History (Room A) Chair: Dr. Willem Styfhals BLAKE SCOTT (PhD) “On Truth and Lies in a Rhetorical Sense: Adorno, Nietzsche, and the Rescue of Rhetoric”. If, since Aristotle, rhetoric has been seen as an antistrophos to dialectic, then our understanding of the one should modify our understanding of the other. To the extent that these concepts are internally related, Adorno’s negative dialectic invites us to rethink our understanding of rhetoric and its relationship to philosophy. In this paper I show how Adorno’s philosophy rethinks rhetoric by overcoming its primary tension—between rhetoric’s intention to persuade and the need for thought to pass through rhetoric if it is to have any relation to practice. First, I contextualize my reading by discussing Nietzsche’s 1872-1873 lectures on rhetoric. Tracing the influence of these lectures on Adorno’s thinking, I then analyze Adorno’s remarks on rhetoric and its relationship to dialectic in the final section of the introduction to Negative Dialectics, “Rhetoric”. Building on this analysis I then draw parallels between the above-mentioned tension in rhetoric and a more widely discussed tension in Adorno’s work, namely, his understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. By elucidating Adorno’s

15

understanding of rhetoric as a mediator between thought and practice, I argue that new, more satisfying answers can be given to the charge that Adorno’s practical philosophy ends in resignation. VICTOR WEISBROD (ReMA) “Progress as a Concept of Orientation: Karl Löwith and Theodor W. Adorno as Guides to our Time”. Where are we going? Today, we no longer know how to answer this question. Facing major crises on all sides – financial, ecological, and socio-political – we find ourselves in a state of disorientation. We are in dire need of orientation – and, as I will propose in my talk, this might be found in the concept of progress. Progress was the tagline of the eighteenth and nineteenth century – “onwards and upwards!”. By scrutinising the problems inherent to this naïve conception of progress, we might recover it in a more moderate and humane form, so that progress once again can serve as a concept of orientation. To perform this recovery, I utilise the work of Karl Löwith and Theodor W. Adorno. Via Löwith’s thesis of progress as secularised eschatology, I highlight the two main problems with the naïve conception of progress: the idea that history is entirely continuous and the neglect of individual pain and suffering. To overcome these problems, I reconstruct Adorno’s conception of progress as a dialectical process of domination and resistance; a process which we must take control of and orient towards the idea of humanity as a reconciled form of life. WILLEM WILLEMS (PhD) “Sartre on the Origin of History”. Sartre's central purpose in writing the Critique of Dialectical Reason is to render intelligible Marx’s principle that man is made

16

by history, but that it is also man that makes history. Product and producer must not be thought of independently, yet they are different. This relationship, in which one element refers to the other, Sartre calls an ‘internal negation’ or dialectical. But how are we to break through this dialectical circularity? How can we think of the origin of a circularity without prioritizing one element over the other and, thus, reducing one element to the other and transforming the internal negation into an external one? In other words: what is the origin of history? For Sartre, this is the onset of scarcity. In this talk, I will first take a look at the disruptive nature of scarcity; then, I turn to demonstrate Sartre’s Rousseauesque strategy in answering the question of the origin of history. What we need, according to Sartre, if we want to learn about history, is not some scientific model but, indeed, a ‘true fiction’ about this original event, the onset of scarcity.

I-B Topics in Marxism (Room N) Chair: Prof. Matthias Lievens DORUK ATAHAN ERBAS (MA) “In Search of a Lost Subject: Marx's Historical Materialism and the Subject”. This paper concerns the early writings of Karl Marx, dealing specifically with The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach. Arguably, the two crucial themes there exposed are the doctrine of Historical Materialism and the worker's resistance towards the current condition of society out of division of labour. After Marx, Engels included, many philosophers, activists and politicians have considered Historical Materialism along the line of a rigorous science which can provide causal explanations of social and political events in history. However, this consideration, by hinging

17

on a scientific model, risks to be completely alienated from the concept of an active subject which is the foremost bearer of the resistance. Therefore, from this perspective, Marx's early doctrine seems to be self-contradictory. In this essay I propose an alternative approach to possibly rethink the correlation between the concept of subject and historical materiality. So, firstly I will briefly introduce the contradiction manifested in the concept of historical materialism as a rigorous science. Secondly, I will investigate the place of the concept of subject in the early Marxian doctrine. Thirdly, I will re-identify the materiality, in the context of Historical Materialism, as phenomenality (of subject) and argue that this identification broadly saves the Marxian doctrine from being self-contradictory. ANITA ISHAQ (ReMA) “Gramsci and the Political Character of Indifference”. In his early journalistic production, Antonio Gramsci developed a sharp criticism of the attitude of ‘indifference’. He addressed the indifferent as the “dead weight of history”, as those who, by not taking sides, hinder the transformative process of reality. Even though his words - “to live means to be partisan” - are still relevant, little research has been done on what Gramsci really meant with ‘indifference’, and especially on how this concept relates to his later reflection on hegemony. In this paper, I will claim that Gramsci’s critique of indifference can be reconstructed as an immanent critique, a critique that proves the internal inconsistency of an apolitical choice made in a world dominated by hegemonies. I will discuss the notion of ‘indifference’ as is presented by Gramsci in the short text “I hate the indifferent”, and I will reassess its meaning in light of his later theories of hegemony and common sense.

18

TOBIA ROSSI (MA) “The Human in the Spectacle: Guy Debord’s Conception of Life and Beyond”. The phenomenological movement may be represented by the claim that ‘We don’t experience mere things; we rather constantly experience meanings’. Marxist philosophy objects to this that the ‘meanings’ we experience in our lives are distorted representations of reality operated by the dominant social and economic class. This latter view was supported by the French theorist Guy Debord, who, in his The Society of the Spectacle (1967), shows how post-war Western society has been permeated and constituted by a continuous ‘spectacularisation’ of every aspect of human life. Debord defines the ‘Spectacle’ and notably links it to the concept of ‘Life’, but the explication of the actual concept is left undeveloped – and it is here that phenomenology may turn out to be helpful. In my paper I aim to critically assess Debord’s notion of ‘Life’, by drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s forms-of-life. I will firstly submit Debord’s concepts to a detailed phenomenological investigation based on Heidegger’s powerful account on the ‘facticity’ of human life, which I then consider as a main starting point for Agamben. Finally, I will show how Agamben’s account can both clarify Debord’s view of ‘Life’ in capitalist societies, and use it to contrast the contemporary homologation of lives and meanings as envisaged by Debord.

19

I-C Ancient Philosophy (Room C) Chair: Prof. Jan Opsomer DÀNIEL ATTILA KOVÁCS (MA; Erasmus) “Body and Self in Plotinus”. Commentators on Plotinus generally agree that the question of the self is central to his thought. Nevertheless, there remain major disagreements concerning even the basic aspects of Plotinus’ philosophy of the self. One of the main strands of interpretation regards the self as something indefinite, that can make itself into various kinds of entities (Dodds 1960, Aubry 2014, Banner 2017, Hutchinson 2017). On another influential view, the self is basically identical to the soul and the transformations that the self undergoes have to be taken as internal to the soul (Chiaradonna – Maraffa 2018, Caluori 2015, Emilsson 2018). I make a contribution to this debate by examining Plotinus’s account of the Platonic separation of the soul from the body from the viewpoint of the question of the self. I argue that while the self has a fixed metaphysical structure, that also constitutes the normative dimension of self-determination, our actualization of that structure depends on our self-knowledge and correct self-identification. DASHAN XU (ReMA) “Can We Be Friends with Trees?”. People have affection with and have attachment to many things, such as artefacts, plants, animals, people and deities. In modern English, we might use ‘love’ to describe these sentiments. The ancient Greeks, and especially Aristotle, would use the word ‘philia’, commonly translated as friendship to denote these complex emotion and relationships. In the two works of ethics,

20

Aristotle primarily discusses friendship between men. Yet, he also mentions the possibility of friendship between domestic animals and men, between animals (EE, 1236b1-3) and the impossibility of friendship between men and gods (NE, 1159a7-12) and between men and artefacts (NE, 1155b30). Nowhere does he address the possibility of friendship between people and living beings with only vegetative souls, i.e., plants. My paper is a speculation about what Aristotle might say. I think it is a question Aristotle would like to address because he is fully aware of the fact that “to speak of friendship in the primary sense only is to do violence to the phenomena, […] in a sense all kinds are friendship, not as possessing a common name accidentally, […] but rather as in relation to one and the same thing” (EE, 1236b21-6). My speculation focuses on key features of friendship such as reciprocity, wish for the other, common perception and shared activity. Ultimately, this speculation leads me to question what it means for human beings to live together with other lives and why it matters, not to our survival but to our happiness.

I-D Philosophy of Medicine (Room S) Chair: Prof. Andreas De Block ZOË CLAESEN (MA) “The Role of Metaphors in Overdiagnosis and Overtreatment”. Metaphors are powerful transmitters of meaning. Hence, there is an ongoing debate about the use, utility, and impact of metaphors in medicine. Discussions about war metaphors are particularly dominant. War metaphors have the power to conceptualize the illness experience as a battle, which may turn disease into the invader or enemy, the body into a battleground, the patient into a soldier, and the physician into a commander. As a consequence, war metaphors lead to a “search and destroy” mentality that

21

provokes a tendency to overdiagnose and overtreat. (Malm 2016: 20). Overdiagnosis and overtreatment can lead to harm and suffering, excessive medical bills, and financial pressure on healthcare systems. Some healthcare providers indicate fear of litigation, patient-pressure and personal profit as causes of these problems (Lyu et al. 2017). In this talk, I postulate two additional contributing factors to overdiagnosis and overtreatment: the use of metaphors by physicians, and common metaphorical perceptions of disease. I argue that (i) the use of certain metaphors by physicians to explain a diagnosis can lead to overtreatment; and (ii) when those metaphors are associated with certain detectable, and through screening preventable, medical conditions in public discourse, overdiagnosis and subsequent overtreatment may ensue. RUEL MANNETTE (MA) “A Philosophical Evaluation of the Theoretical Viability of Introducing Macro-Determinants into Epidemiology”. Epidemiology is the science of mapping, preventing and projecting the reach of diseases among the world population. An essential concept for epidemiology are disease determinants. This comprises the various factors or causes that initiate the onset of a disease. Disease determinants are an essential and widely accepted concept for the study of disease. However, some theorists argue for the inclusion of a broader concept: macro-determinants. These are wide ranging socially structured phenomena that can directly impact how and where determinants interact with individuals. This raises the question: can macro-determinants cause diseases? If so, to what extent can an inclusion of the concept of macro-determinants be considered scientifically legitimate in the epidemiological context?

22

I begin my talk by outlining what macro-determinants are. Then, I will evaluate critiques of and alternatives to macro-determinants. I will provide what I consider a scientifically viable theoretical framework for epidemiology that can incorporate macro-determinants. Further on, I will address counter-arguments. If the analysis of macro-determinants is legitimate, then millions of lives are lost each year in ways that are directly caused by macro-determinants. As a response, I argue that a better understanding of how macro-determinants cause diseases can lead to more effective preventative measures.

23

Session II

II-A Phenomenology: Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Room A) Chair: Dr. Simon Truwant ANDREW DOMZAL (MA) “Authenticity from Oppression: A Heideggerian Account of the Ontological Effects of Racism”.

The goal of this project is to give a phenomenological account of the consequences of being black in an antiblack society using Martin Heidegger's Being and Time.

Heidegger’s account of Dasein balances between factors which determine being, and those which give Dasein the potential to choose within that being. Dasein is always thrown into a particular world to which it is attuned. This attunement is also reflective, Dasein understands itself through its world and society. Understanding and adapting to social norms is unavoidable, but dangerous because it can distort essential aspects of being—particularly Dasein’s potentiality. However, Dasein can break free from social norms, which are part of the they self, and reach authenticity.

I will use this framework to show how black people are attuned to the world and being as limited because of racism. Yet, barring a fall into self-hatred and acceptance of what I call the white they, black people have an easier time seeing social norms as constructs rather than absolutes. This, in turn, makes it easier for black people living in a racist society to reach authenticity.

24

MARIE PONSEELE (MA) “Heidegger and the dangers of ‘being interested’”.

The thesis I write this year will consider the phenomenon of ‘being interested’ from a Heideggerian viewpoint. Presumably, all of the issues that come to be treated in the conference will be interesting. And probably those who are most interested in the specific subject each time will be the speakers themselves. But y presentation on ‘the dangers of being interested’ is not meant to be a warning for those who speak about their involvement.

Rather, in my search for the conditions and the outline of sincerely ‘being interested’, I came to see that these conditions are at the same time the conditions that can turn our attitude into an attitude of superficiality and indifference. And I think we need to understand this downside of interest first, before we can appreciate the untained truthful interest.

I will examine the question through the lens of Heidegger's account of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world’. First I will show how I came to see ‘being interested’ as Heideggers ‘being-in-the-world’. Therefrom, we will be able to cast light upon two dangers of our interested mode of being: ‘Verfallenheit’ (falling) on the one hand, and the ‘Entweltichung’ (unworlding) on the other.

FRANCESCO PUGLIARO (ReMA) “Intelligibility in the Nascent State. Structure and Phenomenon in the Early Merleau-Ponty”.

This presentation is an attempt to show the philosophical importance of the notion of structure in Merleau-Ponty’s early philosophy, and the role it played in his transformation of phenomenology. In The Structure of Behavior, his earliest and arguably most overlooked work, he grants to the notion of structure the function of rethinking the relationship between nature and consciousness. For whereas the natural sciences, by

25

endorsing a realist view, assumed nature to be composed of external events, transcendental philosophy treated nature as an objective unity dependent on consciousness. However, in his analyses on the emergence of structures within the natural world, that is of wholes which cannot be reduced to a sum of parts existing in themselves, Merleau-Ponty argues that neither approach is tenable, due to their failure to understand their specific phenomenal character. In this presentation, I will outline the movement of Merleau-Ponty’s analyses, showing how they determine a radicalizing of phenomenology.

First, I will present the problem of structure as a critique of realism. Here I will argue that the structures of organic life need to be understood as unities of meaning, retaining an essential relationship with consciousness. Thus, in the second section I will focus on their phenomenal character, which, according to Merleau-Ponty, does not point to a pure reflexive consciousness, but to the subject of perception. Lastly, I will present Merleau-Ponty’s gesture as a form of phenomenological reduction, leading to perception as the transcendental field of phenomenological reflection.

DONOVAN STEWART (MA) “Regional Ontologies and Destruction”.

One of the traditional critiques of Being and Time is its apparent lack of a treatment of ethics. This paper returns to Being and Time and argues that there is an ethical significance to be found in Heidegger’s concept of destruction. Although Heidegger did not explicitly bring this out, the opening of possibility inherent in the destruction of western metaphysics qua regional ontologies, is crucial for ethics as such. Accordingly, if traditional western accounts of the ethical have referred to metaphysical production, Heideggerian destruction in this paradigm would be the unacknowledged pre-ethical opening which makes the repetition

26

of the ethical possible. It is from the necessary starting point of unquestioned givenness from which the force of destruction gains its necessity. As uncovered through the thought in Being and Time, this destructive force pushes the limits of western metaphysics through Heidegger’s formulation of the question of Being. This movement of destruction opens up ontic sedimentation allowing for the possibility of newness and difference. In this way, the destruction of regional ontologies is in a radical, ontological sense, ethical.

II-B Social and Political Philosophy (Room N) Chair: Prof. Bart Pattyn THOMAS ACKE (MA) “Freedom and Economic Organization”.

Freedom of action is always confined by certain limits and dependencies. For example, there are certain limiting political institutions, such as laws, but there are also all kinds of economic dependencies which confine our freedom, as in the relationship between employer and employee for example. More than that, in some cases the fulfilment of the necessary economic activities constitute a condition for what we mean by free activities. According to the way in which the economy is organized, there are different dependencies inherent in those economic activities. Therefore, the way in which we are free, within as well as beyond the economic sphere, also differs. How the economy is organized varies from people securing their livelihoods autonomously – historically the life of the peasantry – to ever more far-reaching dependencies on other people through the emergence of division of labor and the market system. Using Arendt, I will argue that a certain degree of subsistence which is independent from others - or characterized by only limited interdependencies with others, is

27

a necessary condition for freedom as Arendt understands it. Firstly, I will discuss the concepts of freedom and organization according to Arendt, and then I will discuss freedom with regard to economic organization.

HANS DE MEY (MA) “The Role of Comparative Social Identity in Intergroup Conflict”.

The existence of a distinctive in-group/out-group psychology, together with the mechanisms of in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice, are arguably some of the best-documented phenomena in all contemporary social psychology. Conceptualized as a root of intergroup conflict, they also pose problems in resolving issues pertaining to race, gender, and other axes of discrimination. Drawing upon social identity theory as developed by Henri Tajfel, I will provide an ontological framework for these phenomena that centers around the comparative nature of social identity. I will expand upon existing theory by resolving perceived problems with the notion of comparativeness by grounding it in concepts of joint intentionality and joint commitment as explicated in the work of Margaret Gilbert. The resulting framework will provide a philosophical foundation that will aid in understanding social identity and the need for in-group/out-group distinctions, while also providing a general structure for policy that aims to resolve issues of intergroup conflict without activating or aggravating the mechanisms of in-group/out-group psychology.

ALMIRA MERT (MA) “Hannah Arendt’s Concept of Citizenship and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy”.

I will argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of externalism, rather than internalism as some scholars usually attribute to, when we place it in the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. This paper consists of three parts. The first one concerns whether

28

Husserl regards consciousness as isolated from the world. I will elaborate that the intentionality is a key feature of consciousness, which enables consciousness to reach the external world. The second part is about some internalist challenges. I will demonstrate that according to Husserl’s analysis of “Noema” and “Noesis” in intentionality, the internalist objections of illusion and hallucination will be solved. Finally, in my third section, I will show how Husserl’s phenomenology presents a better account on the relationship between mind and world than standard versions of externalism. As a conclusion, I will at the same time show how Husserl somehow goes beyond the debate between externalism and internalism, and offers a more comprehensive theory on the issue.

II-C Metaphysics: On God (Room C) Chair: Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer ANTONIO E. FELLINE (ReMA) “‘Per illud potest colorari illa ratio Anselmi’: Duns Scotus on the trail of Anselm’s proof of the existence of God”.

When dealing with the existence of God, Duns Scotus tries to conjoin the best of the Anselmian proof with his own. Anselm seems to be necessary to demonstrate not only God’s existence, but also His actual infinity. However, on Scotus’s account, Anselm’s proof is unsatisfactory: even though it has the merit of deriving the necessity of God, it is an a priori proof. Instead, the task Scotus pursues is to develop a metaphysical proof demonstrating the necessity of God and His actual infinity, but moving from a posteriori premises. Even though Scotus affirms Anselm’s argument just needs to be touched up (colorare rationem), I argue that his rethinking of the proof is far beyond what Anselm himself intended to say. To strengthen my hypothesis, I shall divide my

29

paper as follows. Firstly, I will provide a general outline of Scotus’s proof of the existence of God (Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 1). Secondly, I will focus on the proof of the efficiency related to the infinity of God (Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 117). Thirdly, I will reconsider the previous sections to show how they relate to Anselm’s proof.

WAI LAM FOO (ReMA) “Hegel's Idea of God in His Critique of Jacobi in Faith and Knowledge”.

Hegel’s Faith and Knowledge consists of three main parts, namely, his critique of Kantian, Jacobian and Fichtean philosophies. For understandable reasons, most commentators have focused on Hegel’s critique of Kant, while that of Jacobi has received relatively little attention. In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s critique of Jacobi is the central part of the text, where Hegel expounds his idea of God as the absolute identity of thought and being. While Jacobi claims God is either transcendent or immanent, Hegel argues that God cannot be spoken of as either one of these. I will begin by illustrating the role Hegel gives to Jacobi in Faith and Knowledge. Then I will explain Hegel’s idea of absolute identity by analyzing his discussions of Jacobi’s criticisms of Spinoza’s notions of time and the actual infinite. Finally, I will discuss Hegel’s idea of God as the absolute identity of thought and being, to which the opposing categories of transcendence and immanence do not apply.

PETRONELA SERBAN (MA) “Agapeic Transcendence and Metaxological Mediation”

Is contemporary thought concerned enough with retrieving and re- enacting the true sources and resources of metaphysics, of which pre- modernity seemed to be closer and more aware? A growing hiatus between the pre- modern and modern paradigms, articulated dramatically in Enlightenment and its

30

transcendentalism, turning to a new tonality within German Idealism, giving rise to a deconstruction of thought in post- modernism, sees its consequence in a traumatic crisis of intelligibility without precedent. Once the critical peak surpassed into the decline of some of the most important and seemingly trustworthy of the modern theories, do we have an appropriate sense of reconsidering human condition as a religious one in a post- secular age?

The quest for transcendence is initiated and driven by God in His revealing. According to the Desmondian view, the metaxological understanding is the truth of the univocal, equivocal and dialectical approaches. William Desmond rediscovers and embarks on an Augustinian journey, concluding firmly to the favour of a logos of the metaxu, an ethos impregnated with religious value from which the being, ethical and aesthetic values are derived, and a metaxological intermediation which doesn’t allow the immanence- transcendence dualism to nest comfortably in its intended establishment.

In this perspective, I will explore: a critique of the Enlightenment stance, by reminding about being and recognition of an original, prior endowment which enables and gives us a condition of a passio of thought; further, an endeavour to overcome the Idealistic metaphysical insufficiency, by re- establishing the truth of the beyond as agapeic transcendence, excessive source bridging the distance to immanence, gifting and sustaining it.

31

II-D Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Society (Room S) Chair: Dr. Lode Lauwaert DAVID HAACK (ReMA) “Climate Change and the Life-World”.

Edmund Husserl’s notion of the life-world is the world as we experience it most. This paper explores how the life-world affects our focus on certain phenomena, namely climate change. In order to understand climate change, I turn to the media studies concept of issue attention, which examines how much focus is placed on a particular issue in the media. Schafer, Ivanova and Schmidt ask if long-term weather trends or extreme weather events increase issue attention on climate change. I borrow the concept of issue attention and apply it to an analysis of the life-world, an aspect of which is pre-predicative and guides many of our judgements and therefore our reasoning. The life-world is also the basis from which our motivations arise, which we then pursue through various natural sciences. It is possible, then, to follow our reasoning from the world as we are in it most, which serves as the foundation for our reasoning, to our natural sciences, which are fashioned in our original experience. This study moves from the history of our cultural discussion of climate change to the life-world in order to point out structuring aspects that shape our reasoning about climate change.

LISANN PENTTILÄ (ReMA) “The Imperative of an Existential Phenomenology of Responsibility: A Rethinking of the Environmental Crisis”.

Pressing contemporary problems – e.g. climate change, nationalism, and poverty – indicate that there is something about current conceptions and implementations of responsibility that

32

fails, and therefore an urgency to fundamentally rethink it. I assert that contemporary socio-political problems occur because we are alienated from our ontological “plurality” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958), or in other words, we fail to recognize that we fundamentally exist in the mode of being-with others [Mitsein] (Heidegger, Being and Time, 2010 [1927]). This alienation is immediately related to different manifestations of irresponsibility. I will focus specifically on the relation between irresponsibility and the climate crisis. I suggest that an existential and phenomenological account of responsibility can function as the necessary platform upon which we can better understand and analyze different forms of irresponsibility, and particularly, environmental irresponsibility.

ANN-KATRIEN OIMANN (MA) “Limitless Artificial Intelligence?”.

Anno 2019 Artificial Intelligence is omnipresent. Surgeons can be helped by robots, algorithms provide personalized advertising on our social media, AlphaGO wins against GO champion Lee Se-dol, and AI is used in the composition of music. This is accompanied on the one hand with boundless optimism about the benefits of artificial intelligence. On the other hand, however, questions arise whether there are areas in which artificial intelligence should not have a place and what distinguishes those areas from those in which we do welcome the arrival of artificial intelligence. I want to investigate the possible limits of AI by means of the hypothesis of an artificial judge replacing the human judge. I will discuss why I have chosen this hypothesis and which method I use in my thesis to try to determine the limits of artificial intelligence.

33

MASSIMILIANO SIMONS (PhD) “Animal-scientist, animal-philosopher”.

Animals have been the object of study of many sciences, ranging from molecular biology to social psychology. But can it make sense to say that they can become the subject of scientific research? In this presentation I aim to explore different ways of how to conceptualize the contributions of animals to scientific research. More specifically, I aim to do two things. Firstly, I wish to explore the different ways in which these contributions can be conceptualized, ranging from seeing animals as passive objects of study to full-blown co-researchers themselves. Secondly, the goal is to distil from this a normative stance on what good scientific practices should look like. In that sense, animals cannot only become scientists, but philosophers as well. For this second claim, I will mainly draw inspiration from the work of Vinciane Despret and Isabelle Stengers, who argue that good science should be ‘risky’ science.

II-E Topics in Nietzsche (Salons) Chair: Dr. Dennis Vanden Auweele BRETT M. CRAWFORD (MA) “Comfort in Chaos: Untangling Nietzsche’s Thought”.

What does it mean to “become who we are”? In Friedrich Nietzsche’s “The Gay Science”, this phrase comes up again and again, but its true meaning has puzzled many philosophers. To truly understand this notion of self in Nietzsche, one must untangle the paradoxes within the work. There is no way to systematize Nietzsche’s philosophy, but within “The Gay Science” and “Beyond Good and Evil” lies the heart of Nietzsche’s thought. Within these books, lies the key to any Nietzschean account regarding personal identity. To explicate this account, one must

34

deal with the paradoxes and contradictions that Nietzsche presents us with. In my thesis, I aim to untangle this beautiful twisted mess in an effort to show the life-affirming aspects that are fundamental to any understanding of Nietzsche.

JOB MEIJER (ReMA) “Good and Evil, Nietzsche’s Moral Discernment as a Redefinition”.

The purpose of Nietzsche’s seminal book, Beyond Good and Evil, is to do exactly what the title promises: to go beyond the conceptions of good and evil to understand the world and ourselves. This promise raises the question of whether he succeeds in doing so. In my view, he fails at ‘going beyond’. Instead, as I argue, he redefines the concepts of good and evil, allowing him astute moral discernment, the ability to tell good from bad.

In this paper I will show how Nietzsche redefines good and evil by employing two lines of questioning. The first line asks the question of what the difference is between Nietzsche’s own philosophy and the noble morality he describes, noble morality being the life-affirming morality standing opposite slave morality, which shapes itself through negative emotion. I argue that he tries to overcome the vulnerability of noble morality to slave morality, thus reconceptualizing the concept ‘good’.

The second line of questioning seeks to describe the theory of emotions that Nietzsche employs. Here, I argue that it is in the guise of passive emotions that evil acts within Nietzsche’s work. I define ‘passive emotion’ as an emotion that leads people to consequences they do not openly intend.

Lastly, I will show how the redefinitions of these two concepts are fundamental for the moral discernment that his philosophy reveals.

35

TEUS DE KONING (ReMA) “A good beyond Good and Evil: Nietzsche and Generosity”.

Nietzsche is both an enticing and a disturbing writer. His writings are enticing because they contain a promise of freedom, of overcoming the burdensome guilt of traditional ethics and metaphysics. But there is also the disturbing side in Nietzsche, the violent side of a will to power that seems to celebrate sheer strength, disregarding any care for other human beings. The traditional care for what is good seems to be relegated to a care for being strong. Many commentators therefore take a critical stance to those aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and there are many references in his text to support such a position. However, I think the diversity of Nietzsche’s text provides space for other approaches. Aphorism 449 of Daybreak is such a text where not power but generosity is emphasized by Nietzsche. I will first show how this generosity is compatible with the affirmation of strength that is found more often within Nietzsche’s writings. Further, I will analyse how generosity also entails a going beyond oneself that fits with Nietzsche’s deconstruction of the subject. I will conclude by showing how Nietzsche’s thinking beyond ethical foundations still gravitates around agathon.

36

Session III

III-A Topics in Husserlian Phenomenology (Room A) Chair: Prof. Julia Jansen CARLOS ALBERTO ANAYA (ReMA) “The Sources of Open Intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Phenomenology”.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and its role in the constitution of objectivity. Running parallel to this interest is the consensus that Husserl operates with at least three kinds of intersubjectivity. My interest in this essay is with “open intersubjectivity” and Dan Zahavi’s interpretation of it. Focusing on the textual basis of Zahavi’s interpretation of open intersubjectivity in Husserl’s oeuvre, I aim to show that Zahavi’s conclusion, – which is, open intersubjectivity is the a priori structure that makes possible the actual experience of the other subject – is only half of the story. That is, I argue that open intersubjectivity can be examined from both the point of view of static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology, and each method reveals a different aspect of the same phenomenon. To demonstrate this, I first provide an exposition of Zahavi’s interpretation of open intersubjectivity. Second, I show how two different methodologies are employed in the textual sources of Zahavi’s interpretation. This allows for an alternative interpretation of open intersubjectivity. Third, I provide that alternative interpretation of open intersubjectivity, which can be

37

called a genetic phenomenology of open intersubjectivity. I conclude that both of these interpretations are two, a priori, sides of the same coin.

ALEXANDER FERRANT (ReMA) “Escaping the Horns of a Trilemma: Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas on "Pre-Propositional" Knowledge“.

Certain contemporary philosophers, characteristically in analytic schools, take it as given that belief is an essential condition of knowledge, and many understand belief to be propositional. I argue that, understood in a certain way, this seems to lead to the skepticism of Agrippa’s Trilemma, a.k.a. the Münchhausen Trilemma. Husserlian phenomenology avoids this problem by denying the premise that all knowledge begins in propositions since for Husserl, there is “pre-propositional” knowledge.” I argue this in three steps: 1) I present the typical response of philosophers who hold that the beginning of knowledge is in propositions and then argue that this position seems to lead to the skepticism of the Trilemma; 2) I support the claim that Husserl avoids the problem by appealing to the Logical Investigations, especially in Investigation I, II, V, and VI, where Husserl treats of nominal acts and judgment; and 3) I support the viability of Husserl’s position by retrieving a philosophical precedent to it, namely the position of Thomas Aquinas, who also holds that knowledge begins prior to the formation of propositions.

LICHEN ZHANG (MA) “Husserl’s Externalism”.

I will argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of externalism, rather than internalism as some scholars usually attribute to, when we place it in the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. This paper consists of three parts. The first one concerns whether Husserl regards consciousness as isolated from the world. I will

38

elaborate that the intentionality is a key feature of consciousness, which enables consciousness to reach the external world. The second part is about some internalist challenges. I will demonstrate that according to Husserl’s analysis of “Noema” and “Noesis” in intentionality, the internalist objections of illusion and hallucination will be solved. Finally, in my third section, I will show how Husserl’s phenomenology presents a better account on the relationship between mind and world than standard versions of externalism. As a conclusion, I will at the same time show how Husserl somehow goes beyond the debate between externalism and internalism, and offers a more comprehensive theory on the issue.

III-B Debates on Multiculturalism (Room N) Chair: Dr. Alessandro Mulieri FRANCESCO CARPANINI (MSc in Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies) “Multiculturalism or Multinaturalism? A biopolitical consideration”.

This presentation explores the terms multiculturalism and multinaturalism in order to outline an original biopolitical account of their contrasting horizons. Multiculturalism has been elaborated to describe modern societies in which different cultures can coexist by sharing the same, supposedly neutral, baseline. On the contrary, multinaturalism has more recently been suggested by scholars of the so-called ontological turn in anthropology. Multinaturalism represents a way to move beyond the universality of the idea of many cultures interacting in front of the backdrop of a given Nature, which is seen as altogether removed from the social realm. Multinaturalism was first introduced by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro with reference to

39

Amerindian ontology and then elaborated further by Bruno Latour in contrast with the modern understanding of Science. This presentation reconsiders these two opposite terms through the lens of Foucauldian biopolitics. In particular, I shed light on how multiculturalism emerges from the modern process of medicalization. And I delve into the biopolitical normativity supporting the modern conception of society, which points to the dichotomous distinction between a plurality of cultures and a singular natural sphere. In doing so, my discourse also aims at challenging the normative role played by biopolitics in both philosophical and ethnographic research.

ANNA MILIONI (ReMA, Onassis Foundation scholar) “Institutions, Individuals and the Responsibility Toward Immigrants”.

The increasing number of immigrants coming to Europe has provoked an ongoing discussion on the question of our responsibility towards them. While it is commonly accepted that we lack a just institutional framework to regulate this responsibility and secure a just allocation of rights and duties, there is great divergence of opinions on how to address this issue. In my paper, I employ the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur to examine our individual responsibility towards immigrants, in the absence of just institutional arrangements. Even though Ricoeur has not dealt systematically with the question of the stranger, I argue that his analyses of identity, alterity and justice provide us with crucial normative directions. I begin by outlining Ricoeur’s justification of social institutions, stressing the dependence of their legitimacy on the common desire to live together within just institutions. Then, I examine the figures of the judge and the translator as arbitrators of differences. I conclude by proposing an analogy between Ricoeur’s model of linguistic hospitality and the accommodation of immigrants.

40

MAX MORRIS (ReMA) “The Cosmopolitan Alternatives: Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève”.

The voices of Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève are seldom heard in discussions of cosmopolitanism. That is not because they have nothing (important) to say on the topic, but because they appear to be playing an altogether different game. The two thinkers disagree on one central issue: Whether Being is dynamic or eternal, and neither claims to have resolved it. Kojève argues that the question is irrelevant in connection with the relation of philosophy and politics, because philosophy is only relevant to politics insofar as its claims can be tested on the plane of history. History itself can, in Kojève’s view, put an end to the tension between the two. Man, including the philosopher, would be permanently “satisfied” in the “universal and homogeneous state”. Conversely, Strauss claims that the relevance of philosophy for politics depends on its transcendence of history in the direction, not of eternal Being, but rather the eternal problems. Philosophy is a way of life that is essentially incompatible with the political way of life, because the latter prematurely resolves the question of the best way of life. But that is not to say that philosophy is anti-social. For Strauss, the philosopher’s recognition of the perennial problems simultaneously grants him admittance to a form of trans-political, trans-historical cosmopolitan community. This paper will argue that, according to the philosophical positions of both Strauss and Kojève, Strauss’ cosmopolitanism is superior to Kojève’s alternative.

41

III-C Medieval Philosophy (Room C) Chair: Prof. Andrea Robiglio AUGUSTINE IKOTT (ReMA) “The Difficulty on Determinism in the Relation between Celestial Motion and Natural Motion in Averroes’ Exegesis on the Physics”.

Presupposing that Thomas Aquinas always uses motion to explain God’s act of will, I observe that in the Commentaria [Expositio] in octos libros Physicorum, he relies on Averroes (1126-1198) for information, and critiques the Arabic commentator on the corpus aristotelicum as completely missing the point intended by Aristotle. My argument untangles through Silvia Donati’s “Is Celestial Motion a Natural Motion? Averroes’ Position and Its Reception in The Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth-Century Commentary Tradition of the Physics” (2015). I examine whether Averroes may be described as a determinist or an indeterminist in a discussion on God’s freedom of will, through three moments that aim to demonstrate his position on celestial motion and natural motion in dialogue with Avicenna. However, I consider the task of identifying particular orientations in the different versions of his commentaries on the Physics, beyond the scope of the present undertaking. First, I untangle Donati’s concern that Aristotle provides two apparently conflicting accounts of the causes of motion in Physics II and VIII. Second, I enlarge the discussion around the succession argument in Physics VIII.1, albeit through a common structure with the two preceding books of the Physics. Here the accent is placed on Aquinas’ reception of Averroes’ exegesis, especially on how the succession argument untangles through the moving-agent argument in Physics VII.1. Third, I elucidate Averroes’ effort to circumvent the question of determinism arising from the apparently conflicting accounts of the causes of motion in the Physics. Averroes sought to circumvent determinism in opposition to Avicenna and earlier commentators,

42

who conceded its scientific basis in necessary causality. I conclude with notes on the distinctiveness of Aquinas reception of Aristotle’s contribution on the notion of nature.

CHI-FO KIM (PhD) “Giles of Rome on Existence and Essence as Duae Res”.

Giles of Rome (d. 1316) famously applies the term “res” to both existence and essence, but exactly why remains disputed. Giles’ contemporaries, especially Henry of Ghent, have criticised this application of “res”, charging Giles with setting up an infinite regress. Contrary to Henry, I will argue that Giles’ use of “res” does not cause an infinite regress. Rather, Giles uses “res” as a marker-word to denote a metaphysical principle which is extrinsic to another principle. Hence, the existence and the essence of a creature, being “duae res”, are two principles extrinsic to one another. To show this, I take the following steps: First, I compare and contrast how Henry and Giles understand and use “res”. Then, I connect Giles’ usage of “res” to his theory of real distinction between existence and essence. Finally, I defend Giles’ application of “res” to existence and essence against the criticism of Henry.

BRETT YARDLEY (PhD) “Revealed Testimony: Social Epistemology in Aquinas, al-Ghazali, and Saadya Gaon”.

In the Abrahamic faiths, God speaks. If God is a speaker, then textual revelation is testimonial. Since testimony is knowledge obtained by hearing from a speaker, testimony (and subsequently Scripture) has been historically deemed inferior to immediate personal experience and reason. This is relevant for thinkers from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam who viewed Scripture as a trustworthy and reliable source of knowledge from God to man.

43

Using contemporary social epistemology’s standards of testimonial justification, I will introduce the testimonial accounts of Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazali, and Thomas Aquinas. My aim is to show that, while social epistemology is a new field, its concepts of testimony and testimonial “justification” have always been present in historical thinkers. I show that Aquinas, al-Ghazali and Saadya Gaon use different terminology to affirm the testimonial reliability of Scripture and general everyday practical epistemology. As a result, the credibility of religious knowledge is maintained in a propositional form which is transmittable to other humans with the same level of testimonial warrant.

III-D Topics in Philosophy of Science and Metaphilosophy (Room S) Chair: Prof. Sylvia Wenmackers SARA BLANCO (ReMA) “Free Will in the Block Universe: Determinateness versus Determinism”.

Space and time have been traditionally conceived as two different entities, the two kind of coordinates in which events take place. Since special relativity this mindset has been abandoned in order to think about spacetime, rather than space and time. When time is introduced as the fourth dimension, it seems coherent to rethink the universe as a block in which everything already exists: past, present and future. This means that every event is determinate (not determined).

The aim of my project is twofold. First, I aim clarify the conceptual difference between determinateness and determinism, and to explain why we find the former in the block universe, but not necessarily the latter. Second, I explore which impact this distinction has on the free will debate.

44

In order to do so, I will start by briefly introducing the concept of block universe. Then, I aim to develop the difference between determinateness and determinism. Finally, I will clarify what I mean by free will (in contrast to other positions as compatibilism or libertarianism), in order to see how it operates in a determinate universe.

HANNES VAN ENGELAND (ReMA) “Infinitism and Determinism: Two Norms for Science”.

Infinitism is the position in epistemology which states that justification for knowledge is given by an infinite non-repeating chain of reasons. Determinism is notoriously hard to define. In this presentation I will take it to be a metaphysical theory which defends the ontological claim that all of reality is reason-able. As such, it puts forward the absolute, radical claim that the whole universe and every part in it can be completely explained.

I will argue that combined, these two positions assure that science will always progress and stay clear from dogmatism.

In order to reach this conclusion, I will first discuss the Münchhausen (Agrippean) trilemma and the three positions that purport to solve it: infinitism, foundationalism and coherentism. Secondly, I will consider determinism and indeterminism. Finally, I will show that among all possible combinations, the combination of infinitism with determinism is the most ontological prudent position which can and therefore should be maintained.

WILLIAM A. PETRY (MA) “The Problem with the Method of Cases: Is Naturalized Conceptual Analysis the Solution?”.

Contemporary analytic philosophers widely use the method of cases (e.g. the Gettier cases) to elicit judgments about philosophically interesting concepts (viz. knowledge, intentionality, causality, etc.). Recently, commentators have

45

questioned the methodological fitness of the method of cases. In particular, experimental philosophers criticize the method of cases because it relies on intuitions about philosophically interesting concepts. Edouard Machery (2017) argues that the aim of the method of cases is “modally immodest” because it investigates the metaphysical necessity of concepts (e.g. knowledge). For Machery, concepts are psychological entities that cannot be assessed for metaphysical analyticity. Machery’s solution is to assess the validity of inferences made about the concepts we possess and reform those that are invalid. Valid inferences are empirically established. In this paper I argue that scientific and statistical data illuminate inferences made about concepts; nevertheless, it does not offer a prescriptive norm for conceptual use. Machery’s solution ultimately requires a representational theory of language that assumes an ideal use of concepts. I propose that clarifying inferences about concepts requires an analysis of how the concepts are actually being used. Applying later Wittgenstein’s family resemblance concepts, I propose an analysis of concepts without assuming a prescriptive norm of conceptual use.

46

Session IV

IV-A Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Room A) Chair: Prof. Roland Breeur ZIYA AYDI (MA) “Looking Through the Crystal-Image: The Vision of Time in Cinema”.

Gilles Deleuze’s classification of images -which forms the main framework of his film theory- seeks not only to build philosophical analysis of films, but also to introduce a new philosophical language through cinema which will enable the re-evaluation of certain notions from a different perspective. In this regard, Deleuze's conception of the crystal-image is of great importance in terms of its relationship with time. The aim of this paper is to illuminate the crystal-image as a specific type of visual sign that makes time and its fundamental operation visible. In accordance with this purpose, I will first introduce this concept in the context of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema. Then, I will analyse scenes from films to find examples of crystal-images in them. I will use certain films that Deleuze mentions, but additionally more contemporary examples to check the validity of his conception. I will conclude by connecting it to Henri Bergson's theory of time and memory, which is the basis of Deleuze’s analysis.

CHARLIE BOWEN (MA) “Deleuze’s Pre-Psychoanalytic Unconscious and the ‘Static Ontological Genesis’”.

This paper deals with Deleuze’s conceptions of the unconscious prior to his engagement with psychoanalysis in Capitalism and

47

Schizophrenia (co-written with Guattari). It argues that Deleuze uses a concept of the unconscious distinct from – and not necessarily opposed to – the psychoanalytic model, grounded in his readings of Nietzsche, Bergson, and Leibniz. This “pre-psychoanalytic unconscious” (Holland 2012) then comes into conflict with the Freudian and Lacanian models in The Logic of Sense, most acutely in the sixteenth series: “The Static Ontological Genesis”. This paper argues that this conflict is important for understanding the tension between Deleuze and Lacan that runs through their careers, culminating in the polemics of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. This tension has produced much critical debate, with some seeing the two as fundamentally opposed, and others seeing them as basically similar. How we understand this tension, this paper argues, defines to a large extent our readings of both Lacan and Deleuze, and the figure of the unconscious in the “Static Ontological Genesis” is crucial in this understanding.

GLEN MELVILLE (ReMA) “Death and Representation in Deleuze: From Freud to Blanchot”.

Current scholarship concerned with Deleuze’s recuperation of a ‘death instinct’ leaves unclear the precise content of the conception of death to which this instinct corresponds. In this paper I argue that Deleuze’s third synthesis of time in fact furnishes us with all we need to make this conception clear. I demonstrate this by means of three analyses: i) I provide an account of the Freudian death-drive [‘Trieb’] in terms of repetition and representation, thereby making clear the metaphysical stakes of the discussion; ii) I then show that for Deleuze – whose third synthesis of time entails the rejection of both the repetition of the Sameness and representation of trauma central to the Freudian account – there is a death instinct which permits neither the positing of a metaphysical ‘ground’ fit for representation, nor the return to any ‘prior’ state or model; iii) finally, I demonstrate via discussion of Blanchot that by virtue of this Deleuzian rejection,

48

that which constitutes ‘death’ is now no more than the impersonal return of difference freed from the categories of subjective representation.

IV-B On the Crisis of Modernity (Room N) Chair: Prof. Ernst Wolff JEAN-BAPTISTE GHINS (MA) “The Technical Dimension of the Crisis of Modernity. A Dialogue Between The Human Condition and the Dialectic of Enlightenment”.

Modernity is characterized by the rise of the notion of ‘subject’ with its alleged capability of self-determination. The advent of modernity announced the establishment of societies within which all human beings would live freely and autonomously. The perplexity arose when modernity experienced the advent of totalitarian regimes and a wide number of deadly conflicts. The discrepancy between what modernity had promised and what it generated spawned the notion of “crisis of modernity”. My claim is that the way technologies has been developed throughout history, especially from the end of the nineteenth century, and the relationship we have fostered with them has played a capital role in this crisis. My inquiry takes the form of a dialogue between Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition and Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. The two texts shed light on the causes of the crisis of modernity. The aim of my talk is to unearth what responsibility their authors bestow upon technique in the rise of this crisis.

I begin by outlining the concept of “modernity” and show how it has been addressed by Arendt, Adorno and Horkheimer. Then, I define the notions of “technique” and “technology” and underline the “technical” dimension of the crisis. Finally, I conclude by briefly

49

exploring the consequences of these views for our contemporary world.

ARNO LOUWS (ReMA) “Consolation in a Secular Age”.

Everybody is in need of consolation, particularly when experiencing alienation, sickness or death. Transcendent and religious sources of consolation used to be important for consoling cases of existential grief. Many contemporary scientists and philosophers, however, reject transcendent truths as sources of consolation, but claim they find consolation in immanent sources such as art and the idea of progress. But Patricia De Martelaere criticises people who look for consolation in beauty of myths, religious symbols and works of art without accepting these as true, accusing such stances of self-deception. This raises the question whether immanent consolation for existential grief is at all possible.

By analysing the concepts of consolation and transcendence, I show that beauty, progress and interpersonal relationships can be acknowledged as legitimate sources of consolation. These sources are not necessarily transcendent, but at least transcendental as they make a certain understanding of reality possible and in that way transform grief. However, as I go on to show, people with a strict naturalistic worldview should also reject these forms of consolation.

BEREND VAN WIJK (ReMA) “An Ethical Perspective on the Crisis of Neoliberalism”.

Michel Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism, The Birth of Biopolitics, inspire many critiques of contemporary society. Recently, a growing number of them display the idea the neoliberal governmentality is in a crisis. In my view, however, they

50

only indicate that neoliberalism incites various crises. Thus, the all-round available claim that neoliberalism is in a crisis needs additional explanation. In this paper, I interpret that claim as an ethical imperative on the basis of Foucault’s work on governmentality. I firstly elaborate on the dual significance of that notion, referring both to political regimes and to a conception of agency. Secondly, I elaborate on the relation between crises of governmentality and the agency of subjects. I maintain, contrary to the popular view, that a crisis of governmentality does not refer to a sudden emergency. Instead, it can be seen as a long-term search for a new art of government. Lastly, I argue that the theme of a ‘neoliberal crisis’ can be seen as an ethical-political imperative that serves to excite a specific kind of agency, namely a critical engagement with the contemporary regime of power.

IV-C German Idealism and Beyond (Room C) Chair: Prof. Karin de Boer BAS BLAASSE (MA) “A Natural Discord: Implications in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie for the Conceptualisation of Nature in the Anthropocene”.

Through an interpretation of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, this research proposes a concept of nature that moves beyond a nature-human binary, so as to facilitate environmental thinking in the Anthropocene. In the wake of anthropogenic climate change, environmental philosophy aims at rethinking the relationship between humans and their natural environment. I argue, however, that the concept of nature prevalent in environmental thinking is incapable of actually doing so. A large number of environmentalists persistently define nature in opposition to that which is human. This traditional nature-human dualism prevents us from understanding how we relate to the world we know,

51

inhabit and affect. Firstly, I underpin this with the Anthropocene-hypothesis, which claims that we have entered a human-dominated geological epoch. In order to understand nature beyond the operative object-subject schemes, I secondly draw upon Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. Central is his intention of unifying opposites without disregarding difference: how can subjectivity genuinely have its place in nature, whereas it nonetheless distinguishes itself from it? I argue that Schelling helps us to conceptualise nature, not as opposed to human activity, but as a dynamic and organic system in which both human and nonhuman activities are defined in terms of their relations.

MARKOS HAILE FESEHA (PhD) “The Determination of the Social Labor Process: Hegel and Marx”.

Ancient practical philosophy focused on the given social order but lacked the idea of a free subject that plays a crucial role in determining the social labour process. Modern practical philosophy, for its part, excludes the concrete content of the social order while providing the formerly excluded element: the idea of a free subject. Only Hegel’s concept of objective spirit provides the unity of the free subject with the concrete social order and, thus, moves beyond the one-sidedness of the other approaches.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right deals with the social production within a specific sphere of civil society, namely, the system of needs. Although Hegel acknowledges that labour produces commodities possessing the social qualities of use, possession and exchange value, he does not elaborate on labour as a social process. But, as I will show in this talk, in his Grundrisse, Marx offers an account that systematically completes Hegel’s insight into the social determination of production. I do so in two steps: first, I briefly introduce Hegel’s insight into practical philosophy in general and the system of needs in particular; then, I present Marx’s

52

breakthrough in the determination of the labour process under capital.

ONUR KÖKERER (ReMA) “Dialectics and the Rule of Concept: A Reply to Adorno’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy”.

Central to the enlightenment tradition is the idea that philosophy requires an indubitable and self-constitutive foundation to comprehend reality. Contrary hereto, Hegel’s philosophy is not based on such a foundation but, instead, unfolds itself through a dialectical movement. Despite his rejection of foundations, Hegel’s philosophy not only embraces but also advances the aim of the enlightenment tradition, as it seeks to comprehend reality in its totality. On Adorno’s view, however, the aim of philosophy is not to be totalizing but, rather, to embrace the heterogeneity of reality, which cannot be conceptualized in its totality. That is, we must embrace the primacy of things over our concepts. But, according to Adorno, since Hegel’s philosophy strives to comprehend reality in its totality, it presupposes the primacy of concepts. In this paper, I determine to what extent Hegel’s philosophy presupposes what Adorno calls the primacy of concepts. To do that, I first give a preliminary account of Hegelian dialectics by focusing on Hegel’s Logic. Then, I clarify what Adorno means by the primacy of things. Finally, I critically engage with Adorno’s critique of Hegelian dialectics and assess his interpretation of the latter as presupposing the primacy of concepts.

WOUTER VIJFHUIZE (ReMA) “Adorno’s Critique of Pure Reason: The Relevance of Adorno’s Early Criticism of Kant’s Epistemology in Negative Dialectics".

It is a well-known fact that Adorno started his academic career with typical neo-Kantian concerns. His earliest writings have

53

received relatively little attention in secondary literature however. According to the main consensus, Adorno’s early writings on epistemology must be strictly separated from his mature philosophical positions (O’Connor 2004). In my view, it is necessary to clarify to what extent Adorno’s early epistemological concerns inform his mature philosophy. This paper aims to show that Adorno’s academic criticism of Kant’s inconsistencies regarding the foundational status of the transcendental subject sheds light on the historical and conceptual basis of Adorno’s rejection of epistemology in his mature work. My argument requires three steps. I first examine Adorno’s early criticism of Kant’s concept of transcendental apperception, advanced in The Concept of the Unconsciousness in Transcendental Psychology (1927). I subsequently outline Adorno’s mature critique of Kant’s appeal to transcendental apperception, developed in his lecture course Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1959). In the final step, I interpret Adorno’s Negative Dialectics (1966) as developing a critical epistemology, which departs from a rejection of Kant’s epistemology, in order to foreground the relevance of his early writings for the articulation of his mature position.

IV-D Language, Meaning, Hermeneutics (Room S) Chair: Dr. Daniel Villegas Velez ERIC BIEN (PhD) “The Limits of Interpretative Principles”.

Hans-Georg Gadamer and Donald Davidson were the twentieth century's two great theorists of interpretation. According to the former, interpretation as a process never ends while, according to the latter, the principle of charity should be applied across the board in interpretation. However, this seems to imply that, for Gadamer, there is no limit to the extent of interpretation while, for

54

Davidson, there is no limit to the application of charity. I argue that such limitless positions cannot be sustained without qualification. For it does seem possible, indeed, to arrive at the right interpretation of a text, and, similarly, to discover an empty bewitchment of our charitable commitments. A sense of obscurantism will be used as an example to demonstrate both scenarios.

In my talk, I will give an overview of Gadamer's hermeneutics, including his position mentioned above, which he calls "the hermeneutic situation." I will also give an overview of Davidson's theory of radical interpretation and principle of charity. These considerations will allow us to consider certain forms of obscurantism that tend to object to the limitless positions of Gadamer and Davidson.

XINGCHEN MAO (ReMA) “Phenomenology between Husserl and Dilthey: Theoretical Perspectives and Applications in Musical Experience”.

Dilthey criticises the Husserlian notion of philosophy as a rigorous science, taking issues with Husserl’s demand of “presuppsitionlessness” and his method of obtaining a universal theory of knowledge. This confrontation defined two approaches in the phenomenological movement: Husserl’s “describing phenomenology,” which focuses on describing the very fluctuation of an experiential flux, and Dilthey’s “interpretive hermeneutics,” which works by constantly altering one’s interpretations to match the ever changing flux. These two modes of achieving a universal theory of knowledge do not coincide, and their relation has not been properly determined.

In this paper, I revisit the relation between these two methods, offering two angles: a theoretical perspective and an applied one, in three steps. Firstly, I present the methodological issue between phenomenology and hermeneutics, in relation to the idea of

55

rigorous science as being free from presuppositions. Then, I discuss the Husserlian response to Dilthey’s critique, to establish the epistemological fundamentality of phenomenology. Finally, I turn to a ‘musical phenomenology,’ to examine how the methodological relation between phenomenology and hermeneutics can be applied in practice. With this example, I show how phenomenology serves as the substrate of hermeneutics as an interpretative mode of understanding, working together towards a common end.

56

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to

Prof. Gerd van Riel, Dean of the Institute of Philosophy. Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer, Director of the International Program. Prof. Mathias Lievens, Keynote Speaker. All chairs and moderators. Fran Venken, Website and Advertising. Sofie Keyaerts, Administrative Support.

Conference Organisers:

Rin Jeong. Sara Blanco. Anita Ishaq. Onur Kökerer. Henrique Macedo Juca. Tobia Rossi. Maren Sprutacz. Victor Weisbrod. Dr. Simon Truwant, coordinator.

57

Notes

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

58

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

59

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

60

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

61

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

62