constructivist approaches to european integration

INTRODUCTION

The complexities and challenges for a chaptersuch as this are captured in the very phrase‘social construction of Europe’. Should theemphasis be on Europe – thus suggesting thesui generis nature of the post-war Europeanproject and the special, regional-specific(constructivist) conceptual tools needed to studyit? Or, should it be on the words social construc-tion, implying a particular analytic orientationthat can be applied across regions – includingbut not limited to Europe and the EU?

This essay comes down heavily in favour ofthe latter, as this would seem a natural choice.After all, within political science, construc-tivism’s origins and two-decade long gestationwere within the subfield of international rela-tions, not in EU studies (Adler 2002; see alsoHaas 2001). The latter in fact only discovered itquite recently (Christiansen et al. 2001).

I thus view constructivism as a particularanalytic orientation that, in this case, is appliedto Europe. This leads me to evaluate the litera-ture under review in a certain way. I am lessinterested in ascertaining whether we have orare developing a specific constructivist theory of

integration – something to compete withintergovernmentalism or neofunctionalism.Indeed, I would argue this is precisely not thedevelopment to be encouraged (see also Risse2004a: 174). Rather, I ask how constructivistinsights as applied to Europe are shedding lighton issues – the nature of political order, the (re)construction of identity, the formation of polit-ical community – of more general interest.

My bottom line is that constructivists study-ing Europe and their counterparts elsewhere(mainly located in North America) have muchto gain from a more sustained encounter anddialogue. Conventional constructivists need toget serious about meta-theory and power,while interpretative and critical/radical oneswould do well to take more care in opera-tionalizing arguments at the level of methods.As such weaknesses are largely off-setting –where one side is weak the other is strong –they will be more easily addressed to the extentthat constructivists overcome their internaldivisions. Furthermore, all constructivists willbenefit from a more systematic integration ofdomestic politics into their arguments.

The remainder of this essay is organized asfollows. I begin with a discussion of three typesof constructivist scholarship – their generic

3Constructivist Approaches to

European Integration

J E F F R E Y T . C H E C K E L

Jorgenson-Ch-03.qxd 8/25/2006 8:16 PM

features and how they are being applied to theEU and the study of Europe – highlighting keydifferences among them. The core of the essayis four sections each using a different prism –epistemology, methods, power, domesticpolitics – to evaluate constructivist scholar-ship on Europe. I conclude with a plea forbridge building among different constructivistscholars studying the EU as well as the broaderinternational arena.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISMS:CONVENTIONAL, INTERPRETATIVEAND CRITICAL/RADICAL

Constructivist approaches to the study ofEurope are trendy. Deliberation, discourses,norms, persuasion, identity, socialization,arguing – such concepts are now frequentlyinvoked in debates over the past and future ofthe European project. To make better senseof such terms – and the very different waysin which they are employed – I distinguishamong conventional, interpretative and critical/radical variants of constructivism (Checkel2004: 230–1; see also Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998;Christiansen et al. 2001: 1–21).

Conventional constructivism, which is theschool dominant in the US, examines the role ofnorms and, in fewer cases, identity in shapinginternational political outcomes. These scholarsare positivist in epistemological orientation andstrong advocates of bridge building amongdiverse theoretical perspectives; the qualitative,process-tracing case study is their typicalmethodological starting point. Institutional andorganizational theory (March and Olsen, forth-coming [AQ1]; see also Finnemore 1996b;Trondal 2001), as well as sociology (Finnemoreand Sikkink 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 1999,2004; Wendt 1999) are sources of theoreticalinspiration.

Within EU studies, conventional construc-tivism has been applied in a variety of ways.Caporaso et al. (2003a, b), for example, haveexplored the functioning of EU institutionswith the explicit goal of building bridgesbetween rationalist and sociological work (seealso Beach 2005). Lewis (1998, 2005) has

examined the causal effect of norms byfocusing on mechanisms of persuasion androle playing, and done so in a hard case forconstructivism – the EU’s highly intergovern-mental Committee of Permanent Represen-tatives, or COREPER.

Interpretative constructivism, which enjoysgreater popularity in Europe, explores the roleof language in mediating and constructingsocial reality. Given its commitment to variousforms of post-positivist epistemologies, thisrole is not explanatory in the sense thatA causes B. Rather, constructivist scholarshipof this sort asks ‘how possible’ questions. Forexample, instead of examining what factorscaused what aspects of a state’s identity tochange – as would the conventional main-stream (Checkel 2001) – interpretative con-structivists would explore the backgroundconditions and linguistic constructions (dis-courses) that made any such change possible inthe first place. In an interpretative study ofGerman identity, Banchoff (1999) argues pre-cisely that his analytic task is not to ‘establishthe effects of identity on state action’. Rather, itis to ‘demonstrate the content of state identityin a particular case – a necessary first step inthe constructivist analysis of action’ (Banchoff1999: 271).

Put differently, interpretative constructivistsare committed to a deeply inductive researchstrategy that targets the reconstruction ofstate/agent identity, with the methods encom-passing a variety of linguistic techniques.Consider Hopf ’s recent study of Sovietand Russian identity. He begins not with somehypotheses or theory about what might causethat identity to change, as would scholars witha strong commitment to positivist methods(Laitin 1998). Rather, Hopf seeks to uncoverSoviet-Russian identity as it emerges from avariety of texts, ranging from novels to minutesof Politburo meetings; his methods are textualand narrative. Furthermore, and to the extentpossible, he engages in no prior theorization,instead letting the texts speak for themselves,as it were (Hopf 2002).

Critical/radical constructivists maintain thelinguistic focus, but add an explicitly normativedimension by probing a researcher’s own

HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS2


implication in the reproduction of the identitiesand world he/she is studying. Discourse-theoretical methods are again emphasized, butwith a greater emphasis on the power and dom-ination inherent in language. For both inter-pretative and critical/radical constructivists, keysources of theoretical inspiration lay in linguis-tic approaches – Wittgenstein, say – and conti-nental social theory – Habermas, Bourdieu andDerrida, among others (Hopf 1998; Price andReus-Smit 1998; Neumann 2002).

To continue with the example of Germany, acritical/radical constructivist might argue asfollows,

German military involvement abroad, within anapproach that starts from norms [as would most con-ventional constructivists – JTC], becomes the result of areasoning process within a given and unquestionednorm structure. And the use of the military becomes theonly feasible alternative in a world limited by materialconditions, such as the possibility of death. In otherwords, by attempting to start from ‘reality’ the statusquo is privileged as independent, and binding condi-tions that limit our possibilities are asserted (Zehfuss2002: 254–5).

The scholarly enterprise is not neutral. Ourchoices, be they analytic (starting with givennorms) or methodological (adopting the foun-dationalist assumption that there exists a real-ity external to our theorizing) are notinnocent. They have consequences for whichwe, as scholars, should bear responsibility. Thispoliticized view of the academy – which isheavily indebted to the insights of Derrida – isfar, far removed from the problem-driven,‘let’s-just-get-on-with-the-research’ perspec-tive of the conventional constructivist.

Post-positivist constructivists – be theyinterpretative or critical/radical – explore theEU and European institutions in a mannerquite different from their conventional coun-terparts. Instead of starting with certain givens –say, a set of social norms – and exploring theircausal impact on outcomes, they mightexplore the discursive practices that make pos-sible certain EU norms in the first place(Schwellnus 2005a). For these scholars, lan-guage becomes much more fluid. Thus, instudying the politics of integration through alinguistic prism, the focus would be less onlanguage as acts of persuasion (as conventional

constructivists would argue – Gheciu 2005b)and more on underlying speech acts, struc-tures of argumentation, or discursive powerstructures (Diez 1999; Waever 2004).

Another strand of post-positivist construc-tivist theorizing on Europe bases itself on thecritical social theory of Jürgen Habermas.1 Ifthe buzzwords for conventional constructivistsare norms and identity, and those for interpre-tative and critical/radical scholars are powerand discourse, then for Habermasians studyingEurope, they are deliberation and legitimacy(Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Neyer 2003;CIDEL 2005). While conventional construc-tivists would be interested in exploring thedegree to which supranational institutionslike the Commission affect the values andidentities of social agents (Hooghe 2005),Habermasians orientation would instead askwhat kind of identity the EU should possess ifit is to be a democratic and legitimate entity(Fossum 2003; Eriksen and Fossum 2004).

This review in hand, we can now explore inmore detail constructivist contributions to EUstudies and the challenges they face.

THE TROUBLE WITH POSITIVISM

The conventional constructivists who studyEurope or the EU are empirically orientedscholars who just want to get on with it – thatis, conduct research on the fascinating world ofEuropean politics. The paradigm wars andmeta-theoretical bloodletting are for others.‘To get on with it’, they often rely on a methodknown as process tracing.

The process-tracing method attempts to identify theintervening causal process – the causal chain and causalmechanism – between an independent variable (or vari-ables) and the outcome of the dependent variable. …Process tracing forces the investigator to take equifinal-ity into account, that is, to consider the alternative pathsthrough which the outcome could have occurred, and itoffers the possibility of mapping out one or morepotential causal paths that are consistent with the out-come and the process-tracing evidence in a single case(Bennett and George 2005: 206–7).

The use of this method has allowed mainstreamconstructivists to advance nuanced, carefullydocumented claims on, say, the socializing

CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 3


power of European institutions (Lewis 2005).Indeed, one leading text sees process tracingas a central element in the constructivistmethodological tool kit (Bennett and George2005: 206).2

This is all fine and good, but empiricalinsight on Europe is being purchased at theexpense of a very basic lack of meta-theoreticalclarity. By meta-theory, I refer here not so muchto ontology, which means to advance claimsabout existence, as to epistemology or how wecome to know. On the level of ontology, virtu-ally all constructivists are on the same page,recognizing the deeply social nature of theworld around us. However, as the last sectionindicated, there is no common epistemologicalground for constructivists.

In fact, process tracing would appear to befundamentally at odds with the interpretativeepistemologies at the core of constructivistsocial theory (Guzzini 2000: 155–62; see alsoCheckel 2005c). It only works if you holdthings constant in a series of steps: A causes B;B then causes C; C then causes D; and so on.Such an approach simply cannot capture therecursivity and fluidity of post-positivist epis-temologies. Not surprisingly, the very fewinterpretative constructivists who do employprocess tracing are careful to separate it fromthe discursive and narrative techniques at theheart of their approach (Hopf 2002).

Why is this a problem for conventionalconstructivists? After all, they made a con-scious choice to ground their scholarship inpositivism – one that has had significantempirical pay-offs. Yet, there are both princi-pled and practical reasons for being worriedabout such a move. On the former, questionsof philosophy and conceptual coherence domatter, even in subfields such as EU studies orAmerican IR, where neglect of such topics iswidespread (Wight 2002: 26–37). Mixingapples and oranges can be a recipe for intellec-tual disarray. Put bluntly, without more atten-tion to basic philosophical issues, conventionalconstructivists are setting themselves up for areprise of Legro and Moravscik’s [AQ2] (1999)superb and on-the-mark critique of the con-ceptual confusion that characterizes contem-porary realist scholarship. Their title – ‘Is

Anybody Still a Realist?’ – could simply bereplaced by ‘Is Anybody Still a Constructivist?’

In practical terms, this lack of attention toquestions of epistemology is seriously limitingthe bridge building efforts of conventionalconstructivists, a much cherished goal to whichI return below.

If these principled and practical issues aresuch problems, why have they received very lit-tle attention to date? Two factors are at work,one generic to American IR scholarship, andone specific to conventional constructivism.For the former, meta-theory has not been atopic of primary concern for many years.Moreover, the normalization of epistemologi-cal discourse – ‘we’re all positivists, so whytalk about epistemology’ – in mainstreamUS international relations journals such asInternational Organization and InternationalStudies Quarterly furthers this sense that all isin order.

An example is helpful. For over a decade,one of the most influential – if not the mostinfluential – treatises on methods and designfor American IR has been King et al.’s (1994)Designing Social Inquiry. This book was and isused by many conventional constructivists –and has helped these scholars significantly atthe levels of research design and methods.While King et al. was the subject of manyreviews, their focus was telling. They examinedand questioned not the manuscript’s underly-ing positivist philosophical basis, but its prac-tical suggestions. The critique was ‘in house’(positivist), as it were (Johnson 2006: 227,236–40).

Only now are we seeing the first, detailedassessments that question the positivist episte-mological basis of King et al., exploring howthis seriously limits the utility of their advicefor qualitative researchers, including conven-tional constructivists (Johnson 2006; Lebow2006; Lebow and Lichbach 2006). Consider thecentrally important question of causation.King et al. endorse a view of it that rendersirrelevant the causal mechanisms that are cru-cial for so many conventional constructivists(Johnson 2006: 236–7). If this is indeed thecase, why have the latter been content to acceptsuch a state of affairs?



At this point, my story intersects with thesecond, conventional-constructivist-specific,reason for why epistemology has beenneglected. Virtually all conventional construc-tivists have taken their theoretical and meta-theoretical inspiration from the work ofAlexander Wendt. A consistent theme inWendt’s writing has been that the real meta-theoretical issues to address are more ontolog-ical than epistemological, and that once weagree on ontology – as most constructivists do –the rest (epistemology) will fall into place(Wendt 1999). While this view has morerecently come under attack (Chernoff 2002,2005: ch. 2), it was appealing to many as itallowed constructivists to get on with theirwork without getting caught up in the compli-cated and at times highly personalized world ofepistemological debate.

Yet, such debate and epistemological reflec-tion can no longer be avoided. My sectionheading was no mistake – there is a ‘troublewith positivism’. As many interpretative andcritical/radical constructivists have noted(Zehfuss 2002: chs. 1, 6; and, especially,Guzzini 2000), conventional constructivists doneed more carefully to explicate their episte-mological assumptions. This is true in generaland all the more so for those who endorsemethods like process tracing. And such arethink will likely require a turn to post-positivist philosophies of science.

To develop this line of criticism, I considerthe debate about bridge building betweenrational choice and constructivism, and how ithas been applied to EU studies. This has beenan exciting and, increasingly, controversialtopic among constructivists in recent years.Researchers have followed up general calls forbridge building (Adler 1997) with increasinglysophisticated conceptual schemas for fittingconstructivism better with its rivals. Theseinclude ideas on how one can integrate theideational and the material, game theory andsocial constructivism, strategic-choice andcognitive perspectives, and other-regardingand self-interested behaviour (Katzensteinet al. 1998; Lebow 2001; Lepgold and Lamborn2001; Fearon and Wendt 2002; Hemmer andKatzenstein 2002). At the level of research

designs and strategies, scholars have beenequally creative, advocating notions of sequenc-ing, domains of application and scope condi-tions as ways to integrate constructivism withits theoretical rivals (March and Olsen, forth-coming [AQ1]).

Most importantly, though, a growing num-ber of empirical projects are testing these inte-grative schemes and designs on a variety ofdifferent topics in Europe or EU studies. Theseinclude institutional theory and the EuropeanUnion (Caporaso et al. 2003a); complianceand European regional organizations (Kelley2004); compliance and the European Union(Boerzel 2002; Tallberg 2002; Beach 2005);international institutions and socialization inEurope (Checkel 2005b); and the transpositionof EU directives (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005;Mastenbroek 2005). Collectively, these bridge-building efforts demonstrate that scholars havegotten down to the hard work of better speci-fying their alternative constructivist and ratio-nalist theories, thus providing more completeyet still methodologically sound explanationsfor understanding developments in the EU orEurope more generally.

The point of increasing controversy isthat the bridges being built have just one lane,going from conventional constructivism torational choice (Zehfuss 2002: chs.1–2). Giventhat in principle they could have two lanes(with the second going from conventionalconstructivism to interpretative and critical/radical work) we need to understand betterwhy this is not happening. If conventional con-structivists are metatheoretically inconsistent,then these bridge builders face a more practicalproblem of constructing multi-lane bridges. Inboth cases, however, the culprit is positivism(see also Friedrichs 2003: 2–7).

Epistemology is thus not so easy to getaround, and this is all the more true at the day-to-day, empirical levels. To see why, return tothe Caporaso et al., EU/institutional-theoryprocess-tracing, bridge-building project.Caporaso et al. had hoped to include one ormore interpretative constructivists doing workon European integration. As they thoughtabout it more, however, worries arose. Howwould they integrate these individuals into the



collaboration? Would their emphasis on whyquestions unfairly limit and constrain theinterpretative focus on how? How would(could?) interpretative constructivists imple-ment a process-tracing technique within theirown discursive studies?

In the end, they chose not to include suchscholars, not out of sinister motives to delegit-imize research agendas, but out of a practicalconcern to finish within a reasonable timeframe. In the project’s introduction, they dis-cuss this dilemma.

This choice bears an inevitable cost in the practicalexclusion of a body of scholarship of a different episte-mological bent. We thus knowingly proceed partiallyand incrementally, aware of the terrain left uncovered. IfAspinwall and Schneider are right in suggesting thattranscending epistemological differences represents abridge too far, then our choice is one that prevents thebest (epistemological agreement) from being the enemyof the good (intraepistemological, intertheoreticalprogress) (Caporaso et al. 2003b: 24–5).

This is not an ideal state of affairs. Basically, itimplies that we build bridges where we cancontrol for epistemology, which, in turn,means they have only one lane – be it in thestudy of EU institutions or elsewhere. As Sil(2000: 354) has argued more generally, contin-uing epistemological disagreements ‘militateagainst the emergence of a genuinely collabo-rative, truly integrated field of comparativeanalysis’ (see also Forum Debate 2003).

This is where interpretative and critical/radical constructivists studying Europe canoffer their conventional colleagues a helpinghand. The former, who tend to highlight muchmore questions of meta-theory,3 could wellargue that the conclusions in that last paragraphare too bleak. Indeed, if one takes epistemology –in its various post-positivist guises – more seri-ously, there may be hope for the process tracersand bridge builders.

One possible post-positivist starting pointwould be scientific realism. The latter is aphilosophical position, one that should besharply distinguished from the various formsof theoretical realism in IR. Developed byphilosophers such as Hilary Putnam and RoyBashkar, it is the ‘view that the objects of scien-tific theories are objects that exist indepen-dently of investigators’ minds and that the

theoretical terms of their theories indeed referto real objects in the world’ (Chernoff 2005:41). For many scientific realists, these ‘realobjects’ are precisely the causal mechanismshighlighted in conventional constructivist,process-tracing case studies of European insti-tutions (Risse-Kappen 1995; Schimmelfennig2003, for example). Scientific realism is alsoepistemologically opportunist in that ‘no onemethod, or epistemology could be expected tofit all cases’ (Wight 2002: 36; more generally,see Lane 1996).

With such qualities, it would seem ideallyplaced both to give process tracing conceptualgrounding and – equally important – create anepistemological platform broad enough tounite nearly all constructivists in a renewedeffort at (multi-lane) bridge building. Indeed,pragmatic realism – as Adler (2002: 98) calls it –may ‘provide a way to consolidate the commonground within IR constructivism’.

Given such conceptual foundations, processtracers and bridge builders can then begin toask hard questions about their communitystandards – standards anchored in a philo-sophically coherent base. What counts as goodprocess tracing? How do we know process trac-ing when we see it? How can discourse/textualand process-tracing approaches be combinedin any bridge building effort (see also Hopf2002)? Does bridge building require a specialmethodology of its own?

Answers to such questions need not onlycome from scientific realism. Analytic eclecti-cism (Katzenstein and Sil 2005), various formsof pragmatism (Cochran 2002; Johnson 2006)or conventionalism (Chernoff 2002, 2005) canachieve the same end. That end is to give IR –in my case, constructivists studying Europe – amiddle-ground philosophy and epistemologythat can fill the vast methodological spacebetween American-style positivism andEuropean post-structuralism (see also Lebowand Lichbach 2006: ch.1).

METHODS AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN

In recent years, there have been a growingnumber of calls by both conventional and



interpretative constructivists for greaterattention to methods (Milliken 1999; Adler2002: 109–11; Neumann 2003). This trendneeds to continue, with future methodologi-cal discussions transcending the positivist-interpretive epistemological divide (see alsoLin 1998; Caprioli 2004).

The importance of such boundary crossingcan be seen in the following example, takenfrom my own, conventional constructivistwork on new citizenship and membershipnorms in Europe. I have been concerned withtracking the initial development of thesenorms within committees of several Europeanregional organizations. My hunch was thatarguing dynamics played some role in thesesettings, thus shifting the preferences ofnational agents. In theorizing such processes,I turned to a laboratory-experimental litera-ture on persuasion taken from social psychol-ogy, from which I developed hypotheses on theroles of agent properties (for example, theirdegree of authoritativeness) and of privacy inpromoting persuasion (Checkel 2001; see alsoJohnston 2001, forthcoming [AQ3]). To testthese arguments, I relied on a traditional posi-tivist methodological tool kit – process tracing,triangulation across sources and interviews(Checkel 2003).

When I presented my findings at severalmeetings, however, interpretative construc-tivists pointed to a theoretical-methodologicalgap in the analysis. Particular agents are notonly persuasive because they are authoritativeor because they argue in private. Their argu-ments are also persuasive because they areenabled and legitimated by the broader socialdiscourse in which they are embedded. Did aparticular agent’s arguments in a particularcommittee resonate with this broader socialdiscourse?

Constructivist colleagues were thus suggest-ing that I had lost sight of the (social) structuralcontext. In positivist-empiricist terms, I had apotential problem of omitted variable bias,while, for interpretivists, the issue was one ofmissing the broader forces that enable and makepossible human agency. Whatever you call it, thepoint and lesson are the same. To provide amore complete account of persuasion’s role, it

will be necessary to supplement my positivistmethodologies with others grounded in inter-pretative techniques (see also Jacobsen 2003:58). This theme of epistemological cross-fertilization can be developed in more detail byexploring how various constructivists studyingthe EU and Europe have operationalized the lin-guistic turn.

Taking Language Seriously

Knowledgeable readers may be puzzled by thissubtitle. Do not constructivists already takelanguage very seriously? After all, it is a centralanalytic category in their narratives and causalstories. Interpretative and critical/radical con-structivists focus on discourse, speech acts andtextual analysis. The conventional sort, by the-orizing roles for arguing, persuasion andrhetorical action, see language as a causalmechanism leading to changes in core agentproperties. Thus, the question is not ‘whetherlanguage is important; the question is ratherwhich approach to language’ – and, I wouldadd, how to use it as a practical research tool(Fierke 2002: 351 [emphasis in original]).

For interpretative and critical/radical schol-ars studying the EU and Europe, a central chal-lenge is to continue the methodologicaldiscussion begun by individuals like Millikenand Neumann. Among the issues that shouldbe addressed are the proper balance betweentextual approaches and those emphasizingpractice (Hopf 2002: 269–70; Neumann 2002),and the degree to which these scholars needexplicitly to describe and justify the sourcesand techniques they use to reconstruct dis-courses (Milliken 1999). On the latter, I am notsuggesting a positivist primer that puts dis-course into variable language or seeks to estab-lish a single way of conducting such analyses.Rather, the time is ripe for further debateabout best practices for those working withdiscourse and texts.

The importance of such a move is high-lighted by two examples, one specifically onthe EU and one on Europe more generally. Onthe former, Schwellnus has recently developedan innovative argumentative approach for



exploring the role of norms in the process ofEU enlargement. Convincingly showing thelimitations of conventional constructivistapproaches to EU enlargement that view argu-ments as causes for action (Schimmelfennig2003), Schwellnus adopts an interpretativestand-point that instead explores the role ofarguments in providing reasons and justifica-tions for action. This is then applied to the caseof Polish accession to the EU and the issue ofminority rights. Schwellnus (2005a, b: 62–70)thus begins to operationalize and apply empir-ically arguments about arguing.

A key phrase in that last sentence is ‘beginsto operationalize’. Indeed, the reader is oftenleft wondering how the rich textual analysiswas actually conducted. How do we know thatcertain arguments about minority rightsbecame dominant? What was the pool ofsource material? What were the counting rules?How were choices made by the author? We arenever told, which is a pity for it undercuts theplausibility of the story Schwellnus so nicelyotherwise tells. Put differently, the reader needsto know the (interpretive) community stan-dards to which the author adheres when apply-ing his argument empirically. Given that his isdecidedly not an ‘anything goes’ post-modernproject, these issues must be addressed.

A second example concerns the exercise (orlack thereof) of German military power ina radically changed post-Cold War Europe. Ina richly empirical study, Maja Zehfuss offers acritical/radical constructivist account of con-temporary Germany’s role in internationalmilitary operations. Her goal is not to explainwhy German policy took certain directions –intervening or not in a disintegratingYugoslavia in the 1990s, say. Consistent with anepistemological underpinning that drawsupon the work of scholars like Derrida,Zehfuss instead shrinks the gap between ana-lyst and object, exploring the political respon-sibility of scholars in studying and interpretingGerman policy in particular ways. In this man-ner, she captures the ethical and criticaldimensions that are so often missing in con-ventional and interpretative constructiviststudies on the EU or Germany more specifi-cally (Banchoff 1999; Rittberger 2001: ch. 5).

Zehfuss’s method for connecting theoryand empirics is discourse analysis. Yet, quitesurprisingly – and especially for a volume withsuch a strong empirical focus – the reader isgiven no indication for how this analysis willbe conducted. Surely, Zehfuss has some rulesor hunches for identifying when normativecommitments are ‘shared amongst a numberof people’, for recognizing ‘prominent narra-tives’, or for how she identifies and recon-structs instances of ‘shared meaning’ (Zehfuss2002: 120–2, 127–8). Her silence raises ques-tions about the validity and reliability of thereconstructions, which, as Hopf (2002) sonicely shows, are key issues for critical/radicalconstructivists as well.

In sum, interpretative and critical/radicalconstructivists studying the EU and Europecould profit from more sustained attention tomethods (see also Waever 2004: 213–14). Here,their conventional constructivist counterpartsmight offer a useful role model regardingmethodological self-awareness.4 The pointwould not be to mimic the particular methodsemployed by the latter. Process tracing is notwhat Zehfuss’s study requires! Rather, the goalwould be to state, operationalize and adhere tothe appropriate community methodologicalstandards given the questions asked (see alsoHopf 2006; Lebow 2006: 10). This is preciselythe achievement of the best conventional con-structivist work on the EU or Europe moregenerally (Farrell and Flynn 1999; Parsons2003; Smith 2004b; Lewis 2005; Sedelmeier2005).

Taking Arguing Seriously

For a second group of conventional and inter-pretive constructivists, the challenge is of adifferent sort. In this case, it is time for a dis-cussion and debate between proponents ofarguing-deliberation and persuasion perspec-tives. Both groups are united in a concern forexploring how social communication and lan-guage can affect the outcomes and dynamics ofEuropean and international politics. Both alsooperate with a much thicker conception of lan-guage than rational choice scholars – one



where language constitutes the identities andinterests of actors, and not merely constrainsthem.

Despite such common ground, the twogroups disagree on the best micro-mechanismfor studying language. Students of arguingdraw upon Habermas’ theory of commu-nicative action (Lynch 1999, 2002; Risse 2000;Sjursen 2002; Forum 2005), while proponentsof persuasion make use of insights drawn fromsocial psychology and communications theory(Johnston 2001; Checkel 2003).

This debate should have a theoretical,methodological and empirical component.Theoretically, a key question is whetherHabermas’ social theory can be specified andoperationalized in such a way as to allow forthe development of a robust empirical researchprogramme. Risse (2000) has suggested this ispossible. However, scholars like Johnston havequestioned the very basis of Habermas’ theory,arguing that the real heavy lifting in hisapproach is done by persuasion (Johnston2001). It is thus not the force of the betterargument that changes minds, as students ofHabermas would claim. Rather, argumentscarry the day when advanced by individualswith particular characteristics who operate inparticular kinds of institutional settings thatare conducive to persuasion.

Methodologically, a central challenge forproponents of both arguing and persuasion isrecognizing it when they see it. While scholarslike Johnston (forthcoming [AQ3]) have pro-posed specific methodological strategies, westill have only preliminary empirical tests ofthem, especially as applied to Europe and theEU (Sjursen 2002; Checkel 2003; Pollack2003). Moreover, there is continuing and wor-rying confusion on the question of agency. Inparticular, do robust explanatory claims aboutarguing and persuasion need to control foractor motives? Habermasians answer in thenegative (Schwellnus 2005a), while students ofpersuasion suggest that ‘getting between theearlobes’ is both necessary and possible(Johnston 2001; Gheciu 2005b).

Empirically, a key question is how publicityaffects dynamics of arguing and persuasion.Students of arguing see publicity’s role as

critically important. Making argumentspublicly – to an audience – means one mustprovide reasons and give justifications. Thisvery act renders unimportant the search formotivations as publicity induces an agent tobehave in a way that is perceived as impartialand credible, even if – deep down – he/she isbeing strategic and hypocritical (Eriksen andFossum 2000: 48–9; Kleine and Risse 2005:11–12). Moreover, the gap between what ispublicly stated and privately believed will likelyshrink over time as preferences are adapted tobehaviour (Elster 1998: 111; see also Zürn[AQ4] and Checkel 2005: 1053–4). Theorists ofpersuasion argue the exact opposite. That is,publicity creates a situation where agents aremore likely to play to the audience and ‘grandstand’ than to rethink their basic preferences. Incontrast, privacy creates a setting where actorscan truthfully speak their minds and argue in aprincipled way (Checkel 2001; Johnston 2001;see also Kleine and Risse 2005: 12).

Ironically and very much in keeping with acentral theme of this essay, both sides in thisdebate would benefit by rethinking, or perhapsbetter said, broadening their respective episte-mological starting point. For Habermasians, aturn to positivism would have two benefits.For one, it might better alert them to the highlyinstrumental view of theoretical concepts theyare developing (Wight 2002: 29, 41), and howthis will lead them down the same problematictheory-building route as the rational choicetheorists they so often criticize. The latter buildtheir theories – in a very instrumental fashion –on ‘as if ’ assumptions. Agents act as if they areegoistical and self-interested.

If agent motivations are likewise bracketedas we develop theories on the role of argu-ments, we end up with the same type of ‘as if ’reasoning, only now assuming that agents areother-regarding and moved by the force of thebetter argument. In both cases, the result isweak substantive theory that tells us littleabout how preferences are actually constituted(see also Wendt 1999: 119–22).

For students of European institutions, thismatters – tremendously. From numeroussources – memoir literature, observations of therecent constitutional convention, interviews – we



know that arguments and elements ofdeliberation are present and seem to play animportant role in the integration process.Missing is the substantive theory that might bet-ter tell when and under what conditions theymatter. Here, a little positivism could help.Indeed, substantive theories about arguing anddeliberation do exist, but are being developed byIR scholars who have integrated Habermasianinsights with elements of positivism (Lynch1999, 2002; Mueller and Risse 2001; Crawford2002; Deitelhoff and Mueller 2005; Kleine andRisse 2005).

There is a second – an equally important –reason why a bit of positivism might be healthyfor Habermasian students of the EU. Many ofthese scholars, like Habermas himself, are nor-mative theorists. Yet, the best normative theoryupdates its arguments in light of new empiricalfindings – findings typically anchored in a pos-itivist epistemological frame. On the hotlydebated question of publicity, for example,several recent projects, which examine bothEuropean and international institutions,report that publicity has precisely the negativeaffects predicted by persuasion theorists(Deitelhoff and Mueller 2005: 174; Naurin,forthcoming [AQ5]; see also Stasavage 2004:696, passim). This result must have somebearing on the normative argumentation. AsLebow (2006: 17–180 so nicely puts it, ‘norma-tive theorizing must deal with facts just asempirical research must address norms. Theydo not inhabit separate worlds’.

Proponents of persuasion in this debate facethe opposite problem – a surfeit of substantive,problem-solving theory. These scholars haveadvanced hypotheses for when persuasionshould have causal force and begun developingmethodological tools for measuring suchdynamics in the European context (Gheciu2005a; Lewis 2005). Absent, however, is critical-ethical reflection concerning the implicationsof their findings.5

Consider recent conventional constructivistwork on persuasion that assesses the socializ-ing power of European institutions – that is,the degree to which bodies like the EuropeanCommission induce a (partial) shift in the alle-giances and identities of national agents. Are

such value shifts normatively desirable?What are the implications for democraticand legitimate governance within and beyondthe European nation state? These questions arecentrally important, but remain unanswered(Checkel 2005b; see also Zürn [AQ4] andCheckel 2005: 1072–4). To address them,recourse to critical epistemologies and per-spectives will be necessary; positivism andproblem-solving theory will not be enough.

CONCEPTUAL LACUNA –WHERE’S POWER?

Those familiar with the EU literature – andespecially that on its foreign and securitypolicy – might question whether there is anysuch conceptual gap. We have numerous stud-ies of normative or civilian power Europe, andof the EU’s will and ability to exercise softpower (Manners 2002; Hyde-Price 2004; Smith2004a; Sjursen 2006b). Missing in this discus-sion and in much of the constructivist litera-ture on Europe and the EU more generally,however, is an understanding of power that isboth more hard-edged and multi-faceted. Byhard-edged, I simply mean the compulsive faceof power (the ability of A to get B to do what Botherwise would not do).

By multi-faceted, I refer to conceptions ofpower that go beyond this standard coercive-compulsive notion to capture its institutionaland productive dimensions as well. Specifically,institutional power is actors’ control of othersin indirect ways, where formal and informalinstitutions mediate between A and B; workingthrough the rules of these institutions, A con-strains the actions of B. Productive power isgenerated through discourse and the systemsof knowledge through which meaning is pro-duced and transformed (Barnett and Duvall2005: 51, 55, passim; see also Bially Mattern2004, 2005: ch. 4).

It is the students of deliberation and con-ventional constructivists studying the EU whohave been especially remiss in neglectingpower’s role. With Habermasian studies ofdeliberation and arguing in EU institutions,



one gets the sense that compulsory power ispresent but nonetheless ignored (Joerges andNeyer 1997a, b; Neyer 2003; Magnette 2004).As Hyde-Price (2006: 218, citing E. H. Carr)argues more specifically on deliberative studiesof EU foreign and security policy, there oftenseems to be an ‘almost total neglect of power’.It makes matters no better to invoke power, butto do so in ways that run counter to common-sense understandings. One analyst, for exam-ple, defines the EU’s ‘communicative power’as the ability of its policies and principleto endure critical public scrutiny (Sjursen2006a: 174).

Thus, while Habermas may enjoin us tobackground power (Risse 2000), reality is morecomplex. One need not be a hard-nosed inter-governmentalist or bargaining theorist torecognize the plain truth that arguments areoften used to shame, twist arms and compel,as a growing conventional constructivistliterature in IR and EU studies confirms(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999;Schimmelfennig 2003).

For sure, compulsory-coercive power ismentioned in many of these Habermasianstudies. However, they are typically notdesigned to test competitively the ‘power of thebetter argument’ against the power-basedalternative explanation, where arguments areused to compel. Given that empirical researchin this tradition appears to draw upon a stan-dard positivist toolkit (Haacke 2005: 185–6;Romsloe 2004; Sjursen 2004: 117), such com-petitive testing is a requirement, not an option(see also Pollack 2003).

Conventional constructivist studies of per-suasion and socialization in the EU provide asecond example of power’s under-specifiedrole, in this case, missing its institutional andproductive dimensions. The earlier critique(above) of my own work on persuasion wasprecisely about a neglect of productive power.Yes, acts of persuasion occurred in the institu-tional settings studied (Checkel 2001, 2003),but productive power – the background, dis-cursive construction of meaning (see also Doty1993: 299) – likely played a role as well. It didthis by enabling and legitimating the argu-ments of individual persuaders.

In addition, institutional power would seemto play a central, albeit unspecified, role in con-ventional constructivist studies of socializationwithin European institutions (Checkel 2005b).All too often, this work reifies institutions,imbuing them with fixed values and meaning,but not asking from where these came or whycertain ones are simply absent (see alsoJohnston 2005). Why does the EU, say, pro-mote one conception of minority rights vis-à-vis candidate countries, but refuse to apply thissame standard to its own member states(Schwellnus 2005a, b)? Perhaps this discrep-ancy (and hypocrisy) is explained by the exer-cise of institutional power, in this case, theability to keep certain issues off the EU agenda.

The bottom line is that both Habermasiansand conventional constructivists studying theEU need to bring power back in, and should doso in two ways. Epistemologically, they willneed to draw upon insights from interpretiveand critical/radical forms of constructivism,where power plays a much more central role(Waever 2004). In disciplinary terms, theyshould look to IR theory, where thereis renewed interest in the conceptualizationand study of power (Guzzini 1993; Barnettand Duvall 2005; Bially Mattern 2005;Hurrell 2005).

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THEEUROPEAN PROJECT

There is an understandable temptation whenstudying the EU and other European institu-tions not to worry too much about – or, moreformally, to bracket off – domestic politics.After all, much is happening in Europe –supranational polity building, the creation ofthe Euro, socialization beyond the nation state,the constitutionalization of the EU, the cre-ation of an European identity – that is stronglysuggestive of a Westphalian system beingtransformed and of a nation state in retreat.While recognizing the undeniable importanceof such trends and facts, it would be a signalmistake for scholars to neglect the domesticand national. Unfortunately, all too many



researchers – be they classic integrationtheorists or constructivists – commit preciselythis error (see also Zürn [AQ4] and Checkel2005: 1068–72).

Start with those integration warhorses –neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.Both focused overwhelmingly on the Europeanlevel, seeking to explain supranational loyaltytransfers or interstate bargaining, respectively.More recent approaches – supranationalism,policy networks, institutional analysis – havecontinued the European-level focus, albeitwith a broader range of dependent variables –from the emergence of European governancestructures to the multi-layered nature ofEuropean policymaking (Diez and Wiener2004).

In all this work, systematic attention to, letalone explicit theorization of, domestic politicsis notable mainly by its absence. For sure, thedomestic is present in integration theory. AsHaas argued many years ago, ‘nationally consti-tuted groups’ – largely in the form of politicalelites – play a central role in integration (Risse2005: 293, quoting from Haas 1958).

More recently, the starting point forMoravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism is aclear specification of domestic interests. Yet,these are simply read off a country’s structuralposition in the global political economy(Moravcsik 1998). Such arguments by Haasand Moravcsik, while intriguing, are notthe same as a theory of domestic politics.A similar theoretical gap is also found inEuropeanization studies (Caporaso et al. 2001:ch. 1) and work on multi-level governance(Hooge [AQ6] and Marks 2001).6

Do constructivists studying the EU orEurope avoid this trap, instead robustly theo-rizing the domestic political? It would appearnot. Consider recent work on two quintessen-tially constructivist topics – socialization andidentity. A central finding of this research isthat domestic politics play a key, if under-theorized, role in any socialization dynamic orprocess of identity change in the EU or inEurope more generally. Depending upon theauthor and his/her disciplinary and epistemo-logical orientation, European identity orsocialization experiences appear to be shaped

decisively by a wide array of domestic factors –deeply entrenched social discourses, previousbureaucratic experience, or the structure ofnational institutions (Risse and Maier 2003).

Several examples highlight the extent of thistheoretical under-specification. In her study ofNATO and socialization, Gheciu (2005a, b)argues that noviceness plays an important rolein determining the likelihood of successfulsocialization. Using a more explicit domesticpolitics language, one might simply argue thatnoviceness is all about measuring the degree ofnational bureaucratic or cultural embedded-ness of particular individuals.

Schimmelfennig (2005) theorizes thatsocialization outcomes promoted by the EUand other European institutions are heavilyinfluenced by the structure of domestic partyconstellations. Quantitative studies of identitychange and socialization within the Commission(Hooghe 2005) or within Council workinggroups (Beyers 2005) exercise great care in con-trolling for the independent effect of domesticfactors, be these prior national bureaucraticexperiences, exposure to federal nationalstructures, or the like.

While all this attention to the domesticpolitical should be welcomed, more needs tobe done (see also Gourevitch 2002). At thispoint, the tendency is too often for ad-hocism to prevail, where domestic factors areadded, but unguided by some broader andoverarching theoretical argument. Such argu-ments – be they about elites, institutions orpluralism – are readily found in work oncomparative politics, a point made forcefullyover a decade ago by Milner (1992). Morerecently, Cortell and Davis (2000: 83–4) haveargued that ‘[f]urther research into the rela-tionship between the effects of socializingforces on the international system and states’domestic politics is required because itremains poorly understood’. If students ofinternational relations are going to pushcomparativists to give up an exclusive focuson ‘methodological nationalism’ in whichnational political systems are compared as ifthey were independent of each other (Zürn[AQ4] 2002: 248), then it is only fair to askthat students of integration – constructivists



or otherwise – reciprocate by systematicallybuilding arguments about domestic politicsinto their approaches.

In making these connections to the domestic,EU constructivists should dynamically integratefactors across different levels of analysis –national and European, in this case. Dynamicmeans that one goes back and forth across levels,emphasizing the simultaneity of internationaland domestic developments. This stands in con-trast to an additive or residual varianceapproach – for many years the norm amongintegration and IR theorists – where theresearcher explores one level at a time, explain-ing as much as possible there, before consider-ing factors at other levels (Moravcsik 1993;Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1993).

To see the difference, consider again Hooghe’s(2005) study of socialization and identity changewithin the European Commission. Her mainfinding is that much of the European-levelsocialization we see in the Commission is infact a product of prior, national socialization.The approach here is basically additive, whichsuits her design well. Yet, an intriguing possi-bility is that those national-level experiencesare themselves enmeshed with and shaped byEuropean factors. A dynamic integration of thetwo levels could better capture such interplay(see also Risse 2005: 305).

For sure, there are complicated methodicalissues involved in any such integration. Withconventional constructivists, their positivistunderstanding of explanation presents aproblem and challenge. After all, to argue andshow that A is a cause of B requires that some-thing be held constant, which is seemingly atodds with the dynamic approach sketchedabove. Yet, work on feedback loops (Johnston2005) and bracketing techniques (Finnemore1996a) suggests this particular problem is sur-mountable (see also Martin and Simmons1998: 749; Katzenstein 2003: 737–9).

Interpretive and critical/radical construc-tivists, in contrast, would seem ideally placedto exploit the benefits of such a dynamic inte-gration of the domestic and European. Therecursivity at the heart of their epistemologicalworld view allows precisely for an explo-ration of the simultaneity of international and

domestic developments (Diez 1999; see alsoPrice 1997). While no interpretivist himself,Risse has recently made a remarkably similarclaim in regards to constructivist research onEuropean identity. In what he calls a marblecake model, the various components of anindividual’s identity cannot be separated ondifferent levels; rather, different components –German and European, say – ‘influence …mesh and blend into each other’ (Risse 2005:296; see also Risse 2004b: 251–2).

Such a dynamic approach would benefit con-structivist research on the EU/Europe in twoways. First, an emphasis on simultaneity andcross-cutting influences would keep the focuson process, where it should rightly be, givenexisting biases toward structural accounts in theliterature. This is as true of conventional con-structivist studies of European socialization(Checkel 2005a) as it is of interpretive analysesoffering highly structural readings of Europeanidentity focused either on discourses (Rosamond2001) or public spheres (Fossum and Trenz2005).

Second, a dynamic, cross-cutting approachmight better alert constructivist students ofEU socialization to an understudied element intheir analyses – feedback effects. What happensto the socializing agents or structures them-selves – the EU Commission and Council, orthe Committee of Permanent Representatives,say – when they attempt (and perhaps fail) tosocialize a target group? There is a tendency forthe causal arrows to point mainly in one direc-tion: from socializer to socializee. To take oneexample, if would be a fascinating follow-onstudy to Gheciu’s exploration of NATO’ssocializing role in Romania and the Czechrepublic to consider the effect on NATO if her‘baby generals’ talked back, thus reversing thecausal arrows (see also Johnston 2005, onemergent property effects).

My arguments on the importance of domesticpolitics in EU constructivist research find sup-port in three closely related literatures. AmongIR constructivists, there is now a growingrecognition that, as Hopf so nicely puts it,‘constructivism [starts] at home’, which inmore operational terms means that ‘domesticsociety … must be brought back into any



constructivist account of world politics’ (Hopf2002: 1, 278).7

Within the field of European studies, twosimilar – and very recent – trends are at work.Scholars of integration are coming to recog-nize that the EU – and theory about it – is tosome extent becoming a victim of its own suc-cess. The deepening of integration over thepast decade and the current process of consti-tutionalization have spawned increasingdomestic political resistance to and mobiliza-tion against the European project. In turn, thishas led prominent theorists of integration toadd a strong domestic politics-politicizationelement to their arguments. In the context ofintegration theory, Leon Lindberg’s permissiveconsensus appears to have been transformedinto its opposite – a constraining dissensus(Hooghe and Marks 2004: 5; see also Diez andWiener 2004: 238–46).

In addition, new work on Europeanizationemphasizes domestic cultural context, theoriz-ing and documenting how religious communi-ties that are at once both deeply national andtransnational are likely to slow the degree ofEuropeanization in an enlarged EuropeanUnion (Byrnes and Katzenstein, forthcoming[AQ7]).

CONCLUSIONS – CAN’T WE GET ALONGBETTER THAN THIS?

To talk of a constructivist scholarly commu-nity studying Europe is to invoke an oxy-moron. The devil is in that word community,for it implies shared standards and identity. Assuggested throughout this essay, such commoncommunity standards – especially at the levelof epistemology and methods – do not exist.8

This state of affairs suggests two ways forward.The first is the path of least resistance, whichmeans to let present trends continue.Conventional constructivists studying Europecould continue their courtship of the rational-ist (US) mainstream, while Habermasiandeliberation theorists could create their ownlife world disconnected from empirical reality –to take just two examples. However, down this

path lie group think, closed citation cartelsand, most important, intellectual closure.

The second way forward is more ambitiousand intellectually challenging. It is a waydefined by bridge building – not betweenrational choice and constructivism, but withinthe community of constructivist scholarsstudying Europe. As an American-trained aca-demic who has lived and worked in Europesince 1996, I am often struck by the parochial-ism of much of the constructivist scholarshipon both sides of the Atlantic.

Clearly, there are understandable (and hardto change) sociology-of-knowledge reasonswhy national or regional academic communi-ties develop in certain ways (Waever 1998). Yet,the way forward – defined as better knowledgeof the (European) world around us – is by con-necting these diverse communities.Constructivists studying the EU have an extra-ordinary, real time, laboratory for addressingissues – political order within and beyond thenation state, the construction of community,the formation of actor identity and interests –of central concern to the broader disciplines.By anchoring their research programmes inthese larger disciplinary frames and by speak-ing more to each other, they could learn anawful lot.

My call here is for conceptual and meta-the-oretical pluralism in the constructivist study ofEurope – not unity. The latter would be arecipe for a make-everyone-happy analytic andconceptual mush. Rather, the point is toencourage dialogue, conversation and mutuallearning – about epistemologies, methods,power and domestic politics. Done properly,such a bridging exercise could turn the tables adecade hence, with EU constructivists teachingtheir disciplinary colleagues a few new tricks.Indeed, the ultimate sign of success would be ifthat adjective EU in front of constructivistswere to vanish.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Knud Erik Jørgensen and Mark Pollackfor detailed and helpful comments on earlier



drafts. Parts of this chapter were previouslypublished in Review of International Studies, 30(2004).

NOTES

1 Not all the scholars named here would accept the des-ignation constructivist, preferring instead to self-identifyas students of deliberative democracy. I include thembecause, like constructivists, their underlying ontology isdeeply social and they view language – arguing and delib-eration, in their case – as constitutive of actor identity.

2 For sure, conventional constructivists employ meth-ods other than process tracing – quantitative-statisticaltechniques or survey research, say (Finnemore 1996b).However, irrespective of methodological choice, the episte-mological tension outlined below remains.

3 Consider the European Journal of InternationalRelations. Recent volumes of this important outlet forinterpretive and critical/radical constructivists contain agood number of essays specifically devoted to philosophyof science and epistemology.

4 For example, conventional constructivists are playing anactive role in the new – and highly successful – qualitativemethods organized section within the American PoliticalScience Association. Symposium 2004.

5 This same imbalance – where positive, substantivetheory far outstrips critical reflection – is found in con-ventional constructivist work on EU enlargement(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 2005;Schimmelfennig 2003; Kelley 2004).

6 To be fair to students of Europeanization, their focusis the effects of Europe on the nation state and its domes-tic politics. The latter is thus their dependent variable,which one typically does not attempt to theorize.

7 Here, IR rationalists are ahead of their constructivistcounterparts, as they have been working to theorize thedomestic political for nearly a decade (Keohane andMilner 1996, Milner 1997, Martin 2000, for example).

8 This is where Moravcsik’s (2001) hard-hitting butlargely fair critique of constructivist research on the EUgoes astray. He assumes a universality of (positivist) com-munity standards where in fact none exists.

REFERENCES

Adler, E. (1997) ‘Seizing the middle ground: con-structivism in world politics’, European Journal ofInternational Relations, 3(3): 319–63.

Adler, E. (2002) ‘Constructivism and interna-tional relations’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse andB. Simmons (eds), Handbook of InternationalRelations. London: Sage Publications. pp. 95–118.

Banchoff, T. (1999) ‘German identity and Europeanintegration’, European Journal of InternationalRelations, 5(3): 259–90.

Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (2005) ‘Power in interna-tional politics’, International Organization, 59(1):39–76.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999) ‘The politics,power and pathologies of international organiza-tions’, International Organization, 53(4): 699–732.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004) Rules for theWorld: International Organizations in GlobalPolitics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Beach, D. (2005) ‘Why governments comply: anintegrative compliance model that bridges thegap between instrumental and normative modelsof compliance’, Journal of European Public Policy,12(1): 113–42.

Bennett, A. and George, A. (2005) Case Studies andTheory Development in the Social Sciences.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Beyers, J. (2005) ‘Multiple embeddedness andsocialization in Europe: the case of council offi-cials’, International Organization, 59(4): 899–936.

Bially Mattern, J. (2004) ‘Power in realist-constructivistresearch’, International Studies Review, 6(2): 343–6.

Bially Mattern, J. (2005) Ordering InternationalPolitics: Identity, Crisis and Representational Force.New York: Routledge.

Boerzel, T. (2002) ‘When states do not obey the law:non-compliance in the European Union’, Paperpresented at the ARENA Research Seminar,6 June. Oslo: ARENA Centre for EuropeanStudies, University of Oslo.

Byrnes, T. and Katzenstein, P. (eds) (forthcoming[AQ7]) Praying for Europe: Secular States andTransnational Religion in an Expanding EU.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Caporaso, J., Checkel, J.T. and Jupille, J. (eds)(2003a) ‘Integrating institutions: rationalism,constructivism and the study of the Europeanunion’, Special Issue of Comparative PoliticalStudies, 36(1–2): 5–231.

Caporaso, J., Checkel, J.T. and Jupille, J. (eds)(2003b) ‘Integrating institutions: rationalism,constructivism and the study of the Europeanunion – introduction’, Comparative PoliticalStudies, 36(1–2): 7–41.

Caporaso, J., Cowles, M.G. and Risse, T. (eds) (2001)Transforming Europe: Europeanization andDomestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress.

Caprioli, M. (2004) ‘Feminist IR theory and quantita-tive methodology: a critical analysis’, InternationalStudies Review, 6(2): 253–69.



Checkel, J.T. (2001) ‘Why comply? Social learningand European identity change’, InternationalOrganization, 55(3): 553–88.

Checkel, J.T. (2003) ‘‘Going native’ in Europe?Theorizing social interaction in European institu-tions’, Comparative Political Studies, 36(1–2):209–31.

Checkel, J.T. (2004) ‘Social constructivisms in globaland European politics: a review essay’, Review ofInternational Studies, 30(2): 229–44.

Checkel, J.T. (2005a) ‘International institutions andsocialization in Europe: introduction and frame-work’, International Organization, 59(4): 801–26.

Checkel, J.T. (ed.) (2005b) ‘International institu-tions and socialization in Europe’, Special Issue ofInternational Organization, 59(4): 801–1079.

Checkel, J.T. (2005c) ‘It’s the process stupid! Processtracing in the study of European and interna-tional politics’, in A. Klotz (ed.), QualitativeMethods in International Relations. Syracuse, NY:Maxwell School, Syracuse University. [AQ8]

Chernoff, F. (2002) ‘Scientific realism as a meta-theory of international politics’, InternationalStudies Quarterly, 46(2): 189–207.

Chernoff, F. (2005) The Power of International Theory:Reforging the Link to Foreign Policy-Making throughScientific Enquiry. New York: Routledge.

Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A.(eds) (2001) The Social Construction of Europe.London: Sage Publications.

CIDEL (2005) Towards a Citizens’ Europe? Report fromthe European-Wide Research Project Citizenship andDemocratic Legitimacy in the European Union(CIDEL). Oslo: Arena Centre for European Studies,University of Oslo.

Cochran, M. (2002) ‘Deweyan pragmatism andpost-positivist social science in IR’, Millennium,31(3): 525–48.

Cortell, A. and Davis, J. (2000) ‘Understanding thedomestic impact of international norms: aresearch agenda’, International Studies Review,2(1): 65–90.

Crawford, N. (2002) Argument and Change in WorldPolitics: Ethics, Decolonization and HumanitarianIntervention. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Deitelhoff, N. and Mueller, H. (2005) ‘Theoretical par-adise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas’,Review of International Studies, 31(1): 167–79.

Diez, T. (1999) ‘Speaking ‘Europe’: the politics ofintegration discourse’, Journal of European PublicPolicy, 6(4): 598–613.

Diez, T. and Wiener, A. (eds) (2004) EuropeanIntegration Theory. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Dimitrova, A. and Rhinard, M. (2005) ‘The power ofnorms in the transposition of EU directives’,European Integration Online Papers, 9(16).Available online at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop, accessed2 December 2005.

Doty, R.L. (1993) ‘Foreign policy as social construc-tion. A post-positivist analysis of US counterin-surgency policy in the Philippines’, InternationalStudies Quarterly, 37(3): 297–320.

Elster, J. (ed.) (1998) Deliberative Democracy.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E. (eds) (2000)Democracy in the European Union: Integrationthrough Deliberation? London: Routledge.

Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E. (2004) ‘Europe insearch of legitimacy: strategies of legitimationassessed’, International Political Science Review,25(4): 435–59.

Farrell, H. and Flynn, G. (1999) ‘Piecing together thedemocratic peace: the CSCE and the ‘construc-tion’ of security in post-cold war Europe’,International Organization, 53(3): 505–36.

Fearon, J. and Wendt, A. (2002) ‘Rationalism v. con-structivism: a skeptical view’, in W. Carlsnaes,T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds), Handbook ofInternational Relations. London: Sage Publications.pp. 52–72.

Fierke, K. (2002) ‘Links across the abyss: languageand logic in international relations’, InternationalStudies Quarterly, 46(3): 331–54.

Finnemore, M. (1996a) National Interests in Inter-national Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, M. (1996b) ‘Norms, culture and worldpolitics: insights from sociology’s institutional-ism’, International Organization, 50(2): 325–48.

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘Internationalnorm dynamics and political change’,International Organization, 52(3): 887–917.

Forum (2005) ‘A useful dialogue? Habermas andinternational relations’, Review of InternationalStudies, 31(1): 127–209.

Forum Debate (2003) ‘Are dialogue and synthesispossible in international relations?’ InternationalStudies Review, 5(1): 123–53.

Fossum, J.E. (2003) ‘The European union: in searchof an identity’, European Journal of PoliticalTheory, 2(3): 319–40.

Fossum, J.E. and Trenz, H.-J. (2005) ‘The EU’s fledg-ling society: from deafening silence to criticalvoice in European constitution making’, Paperpresented at the ARENA Research Seminar, 4October. Oslo: ARENA Centre for EuropeanStudies, University of Oslo.

Friedrichs, J. (2003) ‘Middle ground or half-wayhouse? Social constructivism and the theory of



European integration’, Unpublished Mimeo.Bremen: School of Humanities and SocialSciences, International University Bremen, 4March.

Gheciu, A. (2005a) ‘Security institutions as agents ofsocialization? NATO and post-cold war centraland eastern Europe’, International Organization,59(4): 973–1012.

Gheciu, A. (2005b) NATO in the ‘New Europe’: ThePolitics of International Socialization After theCold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Gourevitch, P. (2002) ‘Domestic politics and interna-tional relations’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse andB. Simmons (eds), Handbook of InternationalRelations . London: Sage Publications. pp. 309–28.

Guzzini, S. (1993) ‘Structural power: the limits ofneorealist analysis’, International Organization,47(3): 443–78.

Guzzini, S. (2000) ‘A reconstruction of construc-tivism in international relations’, EuropeanJournal of International Relations, 6(2): 147–82.

Haacke, J. (2005) ‘The Frankfurt school and inter-national relations: on the centrality of recogni-tion’, Review of International Studies, 31(1):181–94.

Haas, E.B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political,Social and Economic Forces, 1950–57. Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E.B. (2001) ‘Does constructivism subsumeneo-functionalism?’, in T. Christiansen, K.E.Joergensen and A. Wiener (eds), The SocialConstruction of Europe. London: SagePublications. pp. 22–31.

Hemmer, C. and Katzenstein, P. (2002) ‘Why is thereno NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalismand the origins of multilateralism’, InternationalOrganization, 56(2): 575–608.

Hooghe, L. (2005) ‘Several roads lead to interna-tional norms, but few via international socializa-tion: a case study of the European commission’,International Organization, 59(4): 861–98.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) Multi-LevelGovernance and European Integration. Boulder,CO: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2004) ‘The neofunction-alists were (almost) right: politicization andEuropean integration’, Paper presented at theARENA Research Seminar, 5 October. Oslo:ARENA Centre for European Studies, Universityof Oslo.

Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The promise of constructivism ininternational relations theory’, InternationalSecurity, 23(1): 171–200.

Hopf, T. (2002) Social Construction of InternationalPolitics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow,

1955 and 1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress.

Hopf, T. (2006) ‘The limits of interpreting evidence’,in R.N. Lebow and M. Lichbach (eds), Theory andEvidence, ch.3. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.[AQ9]

Hurrell, A. (2005) ‘Power, institutions and theproduction of inequality’, in M. Barnett andR. Duvall (eds), Power and Global Governance.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.33–58.

Hyde-Price, A. (2004) ‘The EU, power and coercion:from ‘civilian’ to ‘civilising’ power’, Paper pre-sented at a CIDEL-ARENA workshop on FromCivilian to Military Power: The European Unionat a Crossroads, October. Oslo: Arena Centre forEuropean Studies, University of Oslo.

Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: arealist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy,13(2): 217–34.

Jacobsen, J.K. (2003) ‘Duelling constructivisms: apost-mortem on the ideas debate in IR/IPE’,Review of International Studies, 29(1): 39–60.

Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (1997a) ‘From intergovern-mental bargaining to deliberative politicalprocesses: the constitutionalisation of comitology’,European Law Journal, 3(3): 273–99.

Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (1997b) ‘Transforming strate-gic interaction into deliberative problem-solving:European comitology in the foodstuffs sector’,Journal of European Public Policy, 4(4): 609–25.

Johnson, J. (2006) ‘Consequences of positivism: apragmatist assessment’, Comparative PoliticalStudies, 39(2): 224–52.

Johnston, A.I. (2001) ‘Treating international institu-tions as social environments’, InternationalStudies Quarterly, 45(4): 487–516.

Johnston, A.I. (2005) ‘Conclusions and extensions:toward mid-range theorizing and beyondEurope’, International Organization, 59(4):1013–1044.

Johnston, A.I. (forthcoming [AQ3]) Social States:China in International Institutions. Princeton:Princeton University Press.

Katzenstein, P. (2003) ‘Same war–different views:Germany, Japan and counterterrorism’,International Organization, 57(4): 731–0.

Katzenstein, P. and Sil, R. (2005) ‘What is analyticeclecticism and why do we need it? A pragmatistperspective on problems and mechanisms in thestudy of world politics’, Paper presented at theAnnual Convention of the American PoliticalScience Association, September. Washington, DC.

Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R. and Krasner, S. (eds)(1998) ‘International Organization at fifty:



exploration and contestation in the study ofworld politics’, Special Issue of InternationalOrganization, 52(4): 645–1061.

Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists BeyondBorders: Advocacy Networks in InternationalPolitics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kelley, J. (2004) Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Powerof Norms and Incentives. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Keohane, R. and Milner, H. (eds) (1996)Internationalization and Domestic Politics.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. (1994) DesigningSocial Inquiry: Scientific Inference in QualitativeResearch. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kleine, M. and Risse, T. (2005) ‘Arguing and persua-sion in the European convention’, Draft Report.Berlin: Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science,Free University Berlin.

Laitin, D. (1998) Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press.

Lane, R. (1996) ‘Positivism, scientific realism andpolitical science: recent developments in the phi-losophy of science’, Journal of Theoretical Politics,8(3): 361–82.

Lebow, R.N. (2001) ‘Thucydides the constructivist’,American Political Science Review, 95(3): 547–60.

Lebow, R.N. (2006) ‘What can we know? How do weknow?’, in R.N. Lebow and M. Lichbach (eds),Theory and Evidence, ch. 1. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. [AQ10]

Lebow, R.N. and Lichbach, M. (eds) (2006) Theoryand Evidence. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Legro, J. and Moravcsik, A. (1999) ‘Is anybody still arealist?’ International Security, 24(2): 5–55.

Lepgold, J. and Lamborn, A. (2001) ‘Locatingbridges: connecting research agendas on cogni-tion and strategic choice’, International StudiesReview, 3(3): 3–30.

Lewis, J. (1998) ‘Is the ‘hard bargaining’ image of thecouncil misleading? The committee of perma-nent representatives and the local elections direc-tive’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36(4):479–504.

Lewis, J. (2005) ‘The janus face of Brussels: social-ization and everyday decision making in theEuropean union’, International Organization,59(4): 937–72.

Lin, A.C. (1998) ‘Bridging positivist and interpre-tivist approaches to qualitative methods’, PolicyStudies Journal, 26(1): 162–80.

Lynch, M. (1999) State Interests and Public Spheres:The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity.New York: Columbia University Press.

Lynch, M. (2002) ‘Why engage? China and the logicof communicative engagement’, European Journalof International Relations, 8(2): 187–230.

Magnette, P. (2004) ‘Coping with constitutionalincompatibilities: bargains and rhetoric in the con-vention on the future of Europe’, Paper presented atthe ARENA Research Seminar, 2 March. Oslo: ArenaCentre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: acontradiction in terms?’, Journal of CommonMarket Studies, 40(2): 235–58.

March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (forthcoming [AQ1]) ‘Thelogic of appropriateness’, in R. Goodin, M.lMoran and M. Rein (eds), Handbook of PublicPolicy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Martin, L. (2000) Democratic Commitments:Legislatures and International Cooperation.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Martin, L. and Simmons, B. (1998) ‘Theories andempirical studies of international institutions’,International Organization, 52(3): 729–58.

Mastenbroek, E. (2005) ‘What role for politics?Applying neo-institutionalism to EU transposi-tion’, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of theEuropean Consortium for Political Research,April. Granada, Spain.

Milliken, J. (1999) ‘The study of discourse in inter-national relations: a critique of research andmethods’, European Journal of InternationalRelations, 5(2): 225–54.

Milner, H. (1992) ‘International theories of cooper-ation among nations: strengths and weaknesses (areview essay)’, World Politics, 44(3): 466–96.

Milner, H. (1997) Interests, Institutions andInformation: Domestic Politics and InternationalRelations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Integrating international anddomestic theories of international bargaining’, inP.B. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam (eds),Double-edged Diplomacy. InternationalBargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley, CA:University of California Press. pp. 3–42.

Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: SocialPurpose and State Power from Messina toMaastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Moravcsik, A. (2001) ‘Constructivism and Europeanintegration: a critique’, in T. Christiansen, K.E.Joergensen and A. Wiener (eds), The SocialConstruction of Europe. London: Sage Publications.pp. 176–88.

Mueller, H. and Risse, T. (2001) Arguing andPersuasion in Multilateral Negotiations. A grantproposal to the Volkswagen foundation, 6 August.Berlin: Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science,Free University Berlin.



Mueller, H. and Risse-Kappen, T. (1993) ‘From theoutside in and from the inside out: internationalrelations, domestic politics and foreign policy’, inD. Skidmore and V. Hudson (eds), The Limits ofState Autonomy: Societal Groups and ForeignPolicy Formulation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.pp. 25–48.

Naurin, D. (forthcoming [AQ5]) ‘Backstage behav-ior? Lobbyists in public and private settings inSweden and the European union’, ComparativePolitics.

Neumann, I. (2002) ‘Returning practice to the lin-guistic turn: the case of diplomacy’, Millennium,31(3): 627–51.

Neumann, I. (2003) ‘From meta to method: the mate-riality of discourse’, Unpublished Manuscript. Oslo:Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Neyer, J. (2003) ‘Discourse and order in the EU: adeliberative approach to multi-level governance’,Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(4): 687–706.

Parsons, C. (2003) A Certain Idea of Europe. Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press.

Pollack, M. (2003) ‘Deliberative democracy ormember-state control mechanism? Two images ofcomitology’, Comparative Political Studies,36(1–2): 125–55.

Price, R. (1997) The Chemical Weapons Taboo.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Price, R. and Reus-Smit, C. (1998) ‘Dangerousliaisons? Critical international theory and con-structivism’, European Journal of InternationalRelations, 4(3): 259–94.

Risse, T. (2000) ‘‘Let’s argue!’: communicative actionin world politics’, International Organization,54(1): 1–40.

Risse, T. (2004a) ‘Social constructivism andEuropean integration’, in T. Diez and A. Wiener(eds), European Integration Theory. Oxford:Oxford University Press. pp. 159–76.

Risse, T. (2004b) ‘European institutions and identitychange: what have we learned?’, in R. Herrmann,T. Risse and M. Brewer (eds), TransnationalIdentities: Becoming European in the EU. Boulder,CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 247–72.

Risse, T. (2005) ‘Neo-functionalism, European iden-tity, and the puzzles of European integration’,Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2): 291–309.

Risse, T. and Maier, M. (eds) (2003) ‘Europeanization,collective identities and public discourses’, DraftFinal Report Submitted to the EuropeanCommission. Florence, Italy: European UniversityInstitute and Robert Schuman Centre forAdvanced Studies.

Risse, T., Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (1999) ThePower of Human Rights: International Norms and

Domestic Change. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Risse-Kappen, T. (1995) Cooperation amongDemocracies: The European Influence on USForeign Policy. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Rittberger, V. (ed.) (2001) German Foreign Policysince Unification: Theories and Case Studies.Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Romsloe, B. (2004) EU’s External Policy: Are theLilliputians Impotent or Potent? The Case of CrisisManagement in the Amsterdam Treaty. ARENAWorking Paper 04/22. Oslo: Arena Centre forEuropean Studies, University of Oslo.

Rosamond, B. (2001) ‘Discourses of globalizationand European identities’, in T. Christiansen, K.E.Jørgensen and A. Wiener (eds), The SocialConstruction of Europe. London: SagePublications. pp. 158–75.

Ruggie, J.G. (1998) ‘What makes the world hangtogether? Neo-utilitarianism and the social con-structivist challenge’, International Organization,52(4): 855–885.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2003) The EU, NATO and theIntegration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2005) ‘Strategic calculation andinternational socialization: membership incen-tives, party constellations, and sustained compli-ance in central and eastern Europe’, InternationalOrganization, 59(4): 827–60.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2002)‘European union enlargement – theoretical andcomparative approaches’, Special Issue of Journalof European Public Policy, 9(4): 499–665.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) TheEuropeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Schwellnus, G. (2005a) ‘Dynamics of norm-con-struction and resonance in the context of EUenlargement: minority rights in Poland’, PhDThesis. Belfast: Faculty of Legal, Social andEducational Sciences, Queen’s University Belfast.

Schwellnus, G. (2005b) ‘The adoption of nondiscrimi-nation and minority protection rules in Romania,Hungary and Poland’, in F. Schimmelfennig andU. Sedelmeier (eds), The Europeanization ofCentral and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press. pp. 51–70.

Sedelmeier, U. (2005) Constructing the Path toEastern Enlargement: The Uneven Policy Impact ofEU Identity. Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress.

Sil, R. (2000) ‘The foundations of eclecticism: theepistemological status of agency, culture and



structure in social theory’, Journal of TheoreticalPolitics, 12(3): 353–87.

Sjursen, H. (2002) ‘Why expand? The question oflegitimacy and justification in the EU’s enlarge-ment policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies,40(3): 491–513.

Sjursen, H. (2004) ‘Changes to European security ina communicative perspective’, Cooperation andConflict, 39(2): 107–28.

Sjursen, H. (2006a) ‘What kind of power?’ Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, 13(2): 169–81.

Sjursen, H. (2006b) ‘The EU as a ‘normative power’:how can this be?’ Journal of European PublicPolicy, 13(2): 235–51.

Smith, K.E. (2004a) ‘Still ‘civilian power EU’?’, Paperpresented at a CIDEL-ARENA workshop onFrom Civilian to Military Power: The EuropeanUnion at a Crossroads, October. Oslo: ArenaCentre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

Smith, M. (2004b) ‘Institutionalization, policyadaptation and European foreign policy coopera-tion’, European Journal of International Relations,10(1): 95–136.

Stasavage, D. (2004) ‘Open-door or closed-door?Transparency in domestic and international bar-gaining’, International Organization, 58(4): 667–703.

Symposium: Discourse and Content Analysis (2004)Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the AmericanPolitical Science Association Organized Section onQualitative Methods, 2(1): 15–39. [AQ11]

Tallberg, J. (2002) ‘Paths to compliance: enforce-ment, management and the European union’,International Organization, 56(3): 609–44.

Trondal, J. (2001) ‘Is there any social constructivist –institutionalist divide? Unpacking social mecha-nisms affecting representational roles among EUdecision-makers’, Journal of European PublicPolicy, 8(1): 1–23.

Waever, O. (1998) ‘The sociology of a not so interna-tional discipline: American and European develop-ments in international relations’, InternationalOrganization, 52(4): 687–728. [AQ12]

Waever, O. (2004) ‘Discursive approaches’, in T. Diezand A. Wiener (eds), European IntegrationTheory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.pp. 197–216.

Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of InternationalPolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wight, C. (2002) ‘Philosophy of social science andinternational relations’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risseand B. Simmons (eds), Handbook of InternationalRelations. London: Sage Publications. pp. 23–51.

Zehfuss, M. (2002) Constructivism in InternationalRelations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Zuern, M. (2002) ‘From interdependence to global-ization’, in W. Carlsnaes, B. Simmons and T. Risse(eds), Handbook of International Relations.London: Sage Publications. pp. 235–54.

Zuern, M. and Checkel, J.T. (2005) ‘Getting socializedto build bridges: constructivism and rationalism,Europe and the nation-state’, InternationalOrganization, 59(4): 1045–79.



constructivist approaches to european integration

Documents