STUDIEN ZUR DEUTSCHENLITERATUR Band 9l

Herausgegeben von Wilfried Barner, Richard Brinkmannund Conrad Wiedemann

Richard T. Gray

Constructive Destruction

Kafka's Aphorisms:Literary Tradition and Literary Transformation

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1987

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek

Gray, Richard T.:Constructive destruction : Kafka's aphorisms : literary tradition and literary transfor-mation / Richard T. Gray. - Tübingen : Niemeyer, 1987.

(Studien zur deutschen Literatur ; Bd. 91)NE:GT

ISBN 3-484-18091-9 ISSN 0081-7236

© Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1987Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Ohne Genehmigung des Verlages ist es nicht gestattet, diesesBuch oder Teile daraus photomechanisch zu vervielfältigen. Printed in Germany.Satz und Druck: Laupp & Göbel, TübingenEinband: Heinrich Koch, Tübingen

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

CHAPTER ONE:History, Tradition, and Structure of the Aphorism 21

I. The History of the Aphorism 24II. The German and French Models of Aphoristic Expression . . . . 36III. The Text-Internal Dialectic of the Aphorism 46IV. Aphorism and Hermeneutics:

The Text-External Dialectic 52V. Aphorism and Linguistic Scepticism 60

CHAPTER Two:Aphorism and Aphorists in Turn-of-the-Century Austria 64

I. Aphorism and Zeitgeist 65II. From Impression to Epiphany:

The Aphorism in the Austrian Jahrhundertwende 85A) Ambivalence Toward the Form of the Aphorism 87B) The Aphorism of Impression 90C) The Aphorism of Epiphany 93

III. Aphorism and Sprachkrise in Turn-of-the-Century Austria . . . 98A) Aphorism and Spracbkritik 99B) Mzudmer's Kritik der Sprache 101C) Hofmannsthal's Chandos 103D) Musil: Essayism and Aphoristics 109E) Karl Kraus: Aphorism and Critique of Sprachgebrauch 112F) Wittgenstein's Tractatus 116

CHAPTER THREE:Kafka: Aphoristic Text and Aphoristic Context 119

I. Kafka and Turn-of-the-Century Austria 121II. Kafka's Inclination Toward Aphoristic Utterances 124

III. Kafka and "Aphoristics" 134A) The Conflict of Individual and Universal 135B) Aphorism and the Fragmentary 149C) Dynamism and Perspectivism 154D) Kafka's Conceptual Patterns 159

IV. Kafka's Aphorisms and the Crisis of Communication 163

CHAPTER FOUR:Kafka and his Aphoristic Precursors 172

I. Aphorism and Autobiography:Self-Observation and Self-Projection 174

II. Pascal and Kierkegaard:Scepticism and Critical Method 190

III. Aphorism and Polemics: Karl Kraus 203

CHAPTER FIVE:Kafka's Aphorisms: Intratext and Intertext 210

I. Compositional History and Compositional Strategies of Kafka'sAphorisms 216

II. Form and Structure of Kafka's Aphorisms 233A) Lexical Features 236B) Metaphor 244C) Syntactic Elements 252D) Logical Structures 253

CHAPTER Six:Aphorism and Met-Aphorism:The Relationship of Aphorism and Parable in Kafka's (Euvre 264

BIBLIOGRAPHY 293

VI

"Sentenzen-Leser. - Die schlechtesten Leser von Senten-zen sind die Freunde ihres Urhebers, im Falle sie beflis-sen sind, aus dem Allgemeinen wieder auf das Beson-dere zurückzuraten, dem die Sentenz ihren Ursprungverdankt: denn durch diese Topfguckerei machen sie dieganze Mühe des Autors zunichte, so daß sie nun ver-dientermaßen anstatt einer philosophischen Stimmungund Belehrung besten- oder schlimmstenfalls nichts alsdie Befriedigung der gemeinen Neugierde zum Gewinnerhalten."Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches

Introduction

Franz Kafka the aphorist has undergone a radically different critical receptionthan either Franz Kafka the novelist/storyteller or Franz Kafka the artisticpersonality. While Kafka's novels and stories have become the standard"acid-test" by which innovative interpretive methodologies must measuretheir efficacy, Kafka's aphorisms have been greatly ignored, or treated asmere adjuncts to his letters and diaries, and thus as reflexes indicative prima-rily of trends in his life, and only secondarily of transformations in his art andpoetics.1 It is remarkable, in fact, that in spite of the geometrical progressionwith which secondary literature on Kafka's art and life has appeared, asrecently as 1980 one critic could remark that Kafka's aphorisms have re-mained terra incognita.2 However, while the aphorisms have only infre-quently been treated as texts meriting in and of themselves careful literary-critical analysis, even a cursory glance at most scholarly investigations ofKafka's work betrays the fundamental role these texts have played in theevolution and support of critical opinions on Kafka. Not uncommonly Kaf-ka's aphoristic pronouncements become points of departure for the interpre-tation of his works as a whole; and almost without exception the aphorismsserve as interpretive instruments by means of which critics of diverseideological and methodological persuasions demonstrate the "authenticity"of specific interpretations of any and all of Kafka's narratives. Ultimately,however, one wonders whether these aphoristic texts, which make up such a

1 See Hartmut Binder, Motiv und Gestaltung bei Frank , Abhandlungen zurKunst-, Musik- und Literaturwissenschaft, Bd. 37 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966), p. 85;henceforth-cited as MuG.

2 Claude David, "Die Geschichte Abrahams: Zu Kafkas Auseinandersetzung mitKierkegaard," Bild und Gedanke: Festschrift für Gerhan Baumann zum 60. Ge-burtstag, ed. Günter Schnitzler, et al. (Munich: Fink, 1980), p. 80.

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small portion of Kafka's ceuvre, have not been accorded an interpretiveweight incommensurate with their actual significance. This is the centralproblem which this study seeks to clarify. It attempts to define the positionof Kafka's aphoristic writings in relation to his life and works, as well as inthe context of the history of the aphorism as literary genre.

Compared with the body of aphorisms produced by such writers asLichtenberg, Nietzsche, or Karl Kraus, Kafka's aphoristic production ap-pears exceedingly small: we possess only two aphoristic collections by Kaf-ka, the so-called "Betrachtungen über Sünde, Leid, Hoffnung und denwahren Weg," and the group of reflections entitled "Er." Taken togetherthese collections include only about 150 texts. It is possible, of course, torecognize and isolate aphoristic remarks in Kafka's letters, diaries, and - to amore limited extent - in his novels and stories. Still, even after these sourceshave been examined, Kafka's aphoristic production remains slight. Despitethis scant quantity of aphorisms, Kafka is generally recognized as one of thesignificant aphorists in modern German literature, on occasion even ac-claimed as one of the greatest German aphorists,3 and he is consistentlyrepresented in anthological collections of aphorisms.4 Certainly, Kafka isknown as an author of outstanding quality, not as one of extensive quantity,and this is true for his aphorisms as well as for his narrative works.

Upon initial reflection one is surprised to find that an author prized forsuch expansive narratives as Der Verschollene, Der Prozeß, and Das Schloßwould be recognized simultaneously as a prominent aphorist. In fact,J. P. Stern alleges, with certain justification, that the impulse toward thecreation of aphorisms stands in diametrical opposition to the drive towardnarrative exposition.5 On the surface, at least, the apodictic force and well-defined structure of Kafka's aphorisms contrast markedly with the con-scious, mysterious subjectivity and infinitely expandable structure of thenovels; yet, as we shall see, even in this respect Kafka's aphorisms canultimately be connected with his fragmentary narratives. Indeed, characteris-tic of Kafka's innovative narrative technique is an internal tension arisingfrom the desire for conclusiveness and apodictic certainty on the one hand,

This is the opinion of Eudo C. Mason, "The Aphorism," The Romantic Period inGermany, ed. Siegbert Prawer (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), p. 229.Most recently aphorisms by Kafka appeared in the anthology Deutsche Aphoris-men, ed. Gerhard Fieguth, Reclam Universalbibliothek, 9889 (Stuttgart: Reclam,1978); Kafka is also represented in the anthology Jüdische Aphorismen aus zweiJahrtausenden, ed. Egon Zeitlin (Frankfurt: Ner-Tamid-Verlag, 1963), in which,surprisingly, Karl Kraus, the most prolific modern Jewish-German aphorist, isabsent.J.P.Stern, Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions (Bloomington: IndianaUniv. Press, 1959), pp. 192-3.

and, on the other, a labyrinthine openness and inconclusiveness which inces-santly frustrates this drive for closure. Thus the commonly accepted contrastbetween a sterile, legalistic, or bureaucratic style of language and the fantas-tic, nightmarish, and often wildly imaginative narrated events can be as-cribed to the creation of a linguistic structure, aphoristic in its precision andlaconism, which is constantly ruptured by "realities" it cannot contain.Viewed in this manner, the spiraling process by which Kafka's narrativestypically develop (without going anywhere) appears as the persistent inter-ruption of structural attempts at "aphoristic" closure.6 As our discussion ofthe nature of aphoristic expression will elucidate, precisely this underminingof its own persuasive structure and logic is constitutive of the aphorism asgenre.

In German literary history the marriage of aphoristic and novelistic formhas proven quite fruitful on different levels. Goethe, for example, includedaphoristic collections in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre and in Die Wahlver-wandtschaften. Moreover, aphoristic utterances are frequently integrated inan almost imperceptible way into the narrative discourse of the novel. Com-monly, as for example in Thomas Mann's Der Zauberberg, the characters ofa novel carry on discussions studded with aphoristic statements. At the sametime, characters often provide moralistic resumes of their situations in theform of aphoristic-didactic observations. In addition, the narrator of a tale isfrequently in a position to supply aphoristic commentaries on the narratedevents.7 Significantly, however, Kafka's narratives display none of thesetraditional patterns of integration between aphoristic and novelistic im-pulses. Hence one is tempted to view Kafka's narratives as distinctly non-aphoristic, since one of their fundamental characteristics is the technical im-possibility of distanced commentaries on the narrated events by eithercharacters or narrator.8 Whereas aphoristic reflections occur in traditionalnarratives in order to aid in the characterization of individuals or situations,in Kafka's narratives such observations are smothered in the morass of un-certain speculation which dominates the narrative. The unitary perspectivecommon to Kafka's narratives banishes any reflective commentary on the

The relationship of aphoristic and narrative tendencies in Kafka's literature will bedealt with in chapter six.The role of the "omniscient" narrator in much of the literature of realism is one ofaphoristic commentator.Friedrich Beissner, Der Erzähler Franz Kafka: Ein Vortrag (Stuttgart: Kohlham-mer, 1952) and Martin Waiser, Beschreibung einer Form: Versuch über FranzKafka, Ullstein Taschenbuch, Nr.2878 (1951; rpt. Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1972), esp.p. 35, provided the earliest analyses of Kafka's narrative style and its effects; seealso Dietrich Krusche, Kafka und Kafka-Deutung: Die problematisierte Interak-tion, Kritische Information, 5 (Munich: Fink, 1974), p. 29.

part of the narrator with regard to the narrated events; in addition, thesubjective isolation of each of Kafka's characters prevents them from attain-ing distanced perspectives either on themselves or on the fictional events,effectively preventing them from voicing any but the most myopic com-mentaries. Yet on a structural level, Kafka's fiction displays traits analogousto those of aphoristic expression; and altered application of the possibilitiesof aphoristic expression in his novels is one symptom of Kafka's attempt toproblematize the naive objectivity of traditional fictional patterns inheringboth in the text itself and in the interactional structures with its readers.9

Any investigation of. Kafka's aphoristic texts must overcome a number ofinitial hurdles. The first and most debilitating of these is the absence of areliable edition of these texts. While Max Brod's edition of Kafka's works,appropriately termed by one critic a "Werkausgabe mit Schlagseite,"10 hashampered the critical examination of all of Kafka's works, Brod's edition iseven more deceptive where the aphoristic texts are concerned. The appear-ance of the historical-critical edition of Kafka's works should finally putsome of these problems to rest, but at this writing the volume containingKafka's aphorisms has not yet been published." The very nature of theaphoristic text is responsible for its sensitivity to minor alterations. Apho-risms are textual types which display an uncommon stylistic density andwhich depend heavily on subtle internal-referential potentials of language. Inthis sense aphoristic expression perhaps merely represents a concentratedmodel of all "literary" language, in which every individual element is func-tionally connected with the textual whole. Hence in the instance of minia-ture, compact texts such as aphorisms, variants in a single word, or even inpunctuation, can radically alter the significance of the entire text. FranzMautner, for example, writes of the extraordinary sensitivity of the aphoris-tic text: "Keine zweite Gattung ist so empfindlich gegen die Störung ihresinneren Gleichgewichts wie diese, deren Wesen beinahe die labile Teilhabe

On the interaction of text and reader see Wolfgang Iser, Der implizite Leser (Mu-nich: Fink, 1972); on Kafka's innovative strategies for altering the reading patternsof his public, see Russell Berman, "Producing the Reader: Kafka and the Moder-nist Organization of Reception," Newsletter of the Kafka Society of America, 6,no. 1&2 (June & December, 1982), pp. 14-18.Dieter Hasselblatt, Zauber und Logik: Eine Kafka Studie (Cologne: Verlag Wis-senschaft und Politik, 1964), p. 9.While necessity demands that I cite from Brod's currently available edition of theaphorisms, I will describe in some detail the errors in his edition and the variouschanges that these texts went through in Kafka's own process of composition orrevision. I an indebted to Professor Jürgen Born and to Hans-Gerd Koch forpermitting me access to the Kafka manuscripts in the "Forschungsstelle für PragerDeutsche Literatur" at the Gesamthochschule Wuppertal.

an den Gebieten der Kunst und des Denkens ist."12 Moreover, aphorisms,traditionally gathered in collections, tend to carry on subtle dialogues withother texts within the same collection, as well as with the aphorisms of otherwriters, and impure textual renderings tend to obscure this subtle intertextu-al communication.13

This already complicated circumstance is further problematized by thesignificance which Max Brod attributed to Kafka's aphorisms. Brod's influ-ence on the evolution of Kafka-scholarship has been as profound as it hasbeen problematic. Nowhere, however, has his example been so dogmaticand unshakable as in the instance of Kafka's aphoristic texts. Although it hasbecome commonplace for scholars to pillory Brod and the interpreters who,following him, view Kafka's texts as Dante-like allegories, Brod's concep-tion of Kafka's aphoristic texts, which is just as misguided, has never beenseriously challenged. The leitmotif that permeates all of Brod's writings onKafka is Brod's "intuitive" sense that Kafka's personality contained a posi-tive aspect which did not find adequate expression in Kafka's fiction. Theemphasis Brod places on Kafka's sense of humor is but one manifestation ofthis desire to highlight his friend's more "optimistic" traits.14 However,Brod's primary defense against the labelling of Kafka as a pessimist and"decadent" evolves out of his interpretation of the aphorisms. Brod's error isone which pervades much of the criticism on Kafka: based on characteristicsof the person Franz Kafka, with whom, to be sure, Brod was well ac-quainted, he draws conslusions about the artist Franz Kafka. Admittedly,there is perhaps no other writer for whom biography and literature are sointimately and fundamentally intertwined. But it is certainly a gross over-simplification to align immediately the role of author with the empiricalperson who assumes the authorial function, and thus to identify life andwork. And even if we were to disregard this overriding theoretical objec-tion, there would still be no reason to expect, as Brod does, that everycharacteristic in Kafka's personality will have a parallel characteristic in hiswork. Brod assumes, in other words, that the totality of the writer's personmust find expression in that writer's works. Thus he implicitly attributespriority to Kafka's biography over critical interpretation of his literature, and

Franz Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," Der Aphorismus, ed.Gerhard Neumann, Wege der Forschung, Bd. 356 (Darmstadt: WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft, 1976), p. 3 7.Elias Canetti, for example, writes: "Die großen Aphoristiker lesen sich so, als obsie einander gut gekannt hätten." Quoted by Gerhan Baumann, "Zur Aphori-stik," Entwürfe (Munich: Fink, 1976), p. 59.See, for example, Max Brod, Über Franz Kafka, Fischer Taschenbuch, 1496(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1974), pp. 51, 117, and 277; henceforth cited as FK.

this precedent characterizes much of the subsequent scholarship on Kafka.Wishing to portray Kafka as a "Lebensbeispiel" (FK, 299), Brod franticallyattempts to distill exemplary attitudes out of Kafka's writing. Despite hisown admission that Kafka's life and not his words bear testimony to a beliefin higher truths (FK, 153), Brod undauntedly searches for evidence of thisbelief in Kafka's texts. Adhering to the dictum "seek and ye shall find," Brod"miraculously" discovers the evidence he desires in Kafka's aphorisms.

Brod's thesis that Kafka's aphorisms, in contradistinction to his narra-tives, reflect an optimistic belief in higher "truths" leads to a strict separationof Kafka's aphorisms from his narrative works, implicity denying the "artis-tic" aspects of the former. Summing up his view, Brod writes:

In den Erzählungen zeigt Kafka wie der Mensch verwirrt wird und seinen Wegverfehlt, in den Aphorismen wird dieser Weg selbst gezeigt und Entwirrung kün-digt sich an. - Selbstverständlich soll und kann man diese beiden Weltsichten beiKafka nicht mechanisch sondern. Auch in den Aphorismen steht viel, wobei einemvor Weh und Ratlosigkeit der Atem stehen bleibt; andererseits gibt es auch in denRomanen Durchblicke zur Hoffnung hin, nicht bloß Aspekte der Hoffnungslosig-keit. Immer ist Kafka der ganze Kafka; hat man aber dies gesagt und nochmalsgesagt und bekräftigt, so bleibt einem letzten Endes doch nicht benommen, im'Kafka der Aphorismen' stärker seine lehrende, helfende Qualität hervorleuchten,im Kafka der erzählenden Phantasie seine chaotischen Selbstbedrängungen undKrisen entrollen zu sehen. (FK, 214)

I cite this passage in its entirety in order to be fair to Brod, who, whileinsisting on the distinction, warns of the dangers inherent in delineating toostrictly between the aphoristic and narrative tendencies in Kafka's works.Yet significantly, he never questions that two "Weltanschauungen" do exist,and this assumption itself is what makes Brod's view questionable. His ownqualifications indicate that he himself is not wholly comfortable with thehypothesis he sets forth. Moreover, although he wants to group the apho-risms together as indicators of Kafka's "optimistic" side, Brod himself dis-qualifies the texts of the collection "Er," calling them a "Tiefpunkt, einErlahmen seiner [Kafka's] Glaubenskraft" (FK, 236). There remain, then,only the aphorisms of the collection "Betrachtungen über Sünde, Leid, Hoff-nung und den wahren Weg," whose title, not surprisingly, comes from Brodhimself. However, even if one were inclined to accept Brod's opinion wherethese texts are concerned, the temporal restriction of these texts, composedin a single six-month span of Kafka's life (the months immediately followingthe diagnosis of Kafka's tuberculosis), should suffice to debunk the notionthat these aphorisms are symptomatic of Kafka's general world-view.

Brod's portrayal of Kafka is colored by the desire to view his friend as areligious personality rather than as a creative writer. "Kafka ist als ein Er-neuerer der altjüdischen Religiosität aufzufassen, die den ganzen Menschen,die sittliche Tat und Entscheidung des Einzelnen im Geheimsten seiner Seele

verlangt" (FK, 279). Brod takes the aphorisms, despite their temporal limita-tion, to be the quintessential expression of Kafka's belief (FK, 238) and as thecreations of "der eigentliche, der kompromißlos glaubende und demGlauben entsprechend aktiv werdende Kafka" (FK, 313, emphasis added).Are we to assume that the "true" Kafka only came to word during these sixmonths? Just as mysterious, indeterminate narratives are endemic to Kafkathe fiction writer, so Brod would have us believe, are definitive maxims onreligion and belief characteristic of Kafka the religious aphorist. This reli-gious Kafka "will nichts anderes geben als objektiv Gültiges, Leitlinien derWahrheit für sich wie für alle" (FK, 313, emphasis added). Consequently,Brod represents the aphorisms as "Wahrheitssprüche" (FK, 303) of a didacticsort, created by a religious person for the purpose of teaching and com-municating his faith. In other words, Brod perceives the "Kafka of theaphorisms" as a kind of religious proselyte. However, Brod's thesis regard-ing Kafka's aphorisms is doubly distorted: first, Brod bases his interpretationnot on the texts themselves, but rather on his preconception of their creator;secondly, he misconstrues the nature and purpose of aphoristic expressionitself, and thus he mistakenly conceives Kafka's aphorisms as "objective" and"truthful" statements of religious belief. Kafka's aphorisms, as I intend soshow, are anything but the manifest expressive form lent to certain religiousconvictions. Brod's major error, then, lies in his denial of the literary charac-ter of Kafka's aphoristic texts. He assumes that the aphorisms manifest asimple and straightforward use of language, not complicated by the produc-tively equivocal polysemia of "literary" expression, and that these texts canbe taken as definitive "truths," recognized and cast into language by Kafka.Brod thus clamps austere limitations on the discourse of Kafka's aphorisms,limitations that most subsequent critics respect.

Brod's conscious and willful misrepresentation of Kafka's aphorisms canbe demonstrated clearly through the examination of one glaring example ofdistorted misreading. In defense of his position, Brod cites the followingaphoristic text:

Er ist der Meinung, man müsse nur einmal zum Guten übergehn und sei schongerettet, ohne Rücksicht auf die Vergangenheit und sogar ohne Rücksicht auf dieZukunft.

Brod's interpretive commentary reads as follows:

Die Autonomie und geradezu die Ewigkeit einer einzigen einmaligen guten Tat,ihr 'kairos', konnte, wie mir scheint, keine eindringlichere Formulierung finden alsdieses Aphorisma Kafkas, den (all solchen Äußerungen zum Trotz) einen Deka-denten zu nennen, heute geradezu ein Gesellschaftsspiel geworden ist. (FK, 312)

Clearly, Brod's primary motive is to defend his friend against the curse ofdecadence. To do so, however, he is forced to perpetrate the willful distor-

tion of Kafka's words. First of all, Brod reads this text as though it were asentence from a letter or diary beginning "Ich hin der Meinung ..." Heignores the stylistic objectivity inherent in the third-person pronoun, view-ing this as a flimsy cover for the personal truth of the author. Moreover,Brod fails to indicate that he has extracted this "aphorism" out of a largercontext: his misrepresentation of Kafka's words becomes obvious when thiscontext is replaced.

Er hat viele Richter, sie sind wie ein Heer von Vögeln, das in einem Baum sitzt.Ihre Stimmen gehen durcheinander, die Rang- und Zuständigkeitsfragen sindnicht zu entwirren, auch werden die Plätze fortwährend gewechselt. Einzelneerkennt man doch wieder heraus, zum Beispiel einen, welcher der Meinung ist,man müsse nur einmal zum Guten übergehn und sei schon gerettet ohne Rücksichtauf die Vergangenheit und sogar ohne Rücksicht auf die Zukunft. Eine Meinung,die offenbar zum Bösen verlocken muß, wenn nicht die Auslegung dieses Über-gangs zum Guten sehr streng ist. Und das ist sie allerdings, dieser Richter hat nochnicht einen einzigen Fall als ihm zugehörig anerkannt. (H, 420)

This fragment, which has begun to undergo narrative development, breaksoff after a few more lines. Clearly, the opinion which Brod attributes toKafka is in fact the opinion of a fictional "judge" in a fragmentary story.Within this original context the "aphoristic" statement is anything but une-quivocal; for although this judge subscribes to the belief that one good deedsuffices for salvation, his strict definition of this transition from evil to gooddisallows all possible concrete examples. Hence the implications of the textgo contrary to Brod's interpretation, for this judge's refusal to accept cases istantamount to a de facto rejection of any possible transitions from evil togood. What Brod represents as an "aphorism" portraying Kafka's belief inabsolute goodness proves in actuality to be a literary text depicting thetension, so typical of Kafka's works, between a theoretically recognizedpossibility and the simultaneous denial of its concrete realizability.

Despite the erroneous assumptions and interpretive errors which informBrod's analysis of Kafka's aphorisms, his appraisal has yet to be dislodgedfrom its position of dominance. Thus, adhering to Brod's conception, mostscholars who have attempted unified interpretations of Kafka's aphorismsplace these texts into a religious-philosophical context.15 Werner Hoffmann'stwo book-length investigations, Kafkas Aphorismen and "Ansturm gegen dieletzte irdische Grenze": Aphorismen und Spätwerk Kafkas, conceive theaphorisms in terms of Kafka's search for God, orienting them on the basis

See Felix Weltsclv" Kafkas Aphorismen," Neue deutsche Hefte, 4 (1954), 307-12;Günther Braun, "Franz'Kafkas Aphorismen: Humoristische Meditationen der Exi-stenz," Der Deutschunterricht, 18 (1966), 107-18.

both of structure and content in the tradition of Jewish mysticism.16 ChristaDeinert-Trotta employs a similar approach, with the difference that she findsin Kafka's aphorisms the expression of a non-sectarian religiosity. Neitherher assumption about the nature of these texts, nor her methodologicalapproach deviates from the example set by Brod. Arguing that Kafka'saphorisms express a religious sentiment that transcends all specific dogmas,she objects solely to Brod's attempt to cast the religiosity of these texts in aZionist light.17 In a similar vein, Helen Milfull has maintained that Kafkaconstructs a "Heilsgeschichte" in his aphorisms, which, far from evincingthe Zionism Brod wished to perceive in Kafka, approaches a theology re-miniscent of Protestantism and Hassidism.18 Most recently, Walter Strolzhas emphasized Kafka's theology of "das Unzerstörbare" as articulated in theaphorisms, and pointed to intertextual relationships between these texts andthe Bible.19 These positions, it is clear, simply offer modified versions of the"party line" on Kafka's aphorisms as propagated by Max Brod.

Other interpretive analyses of the aphorisms, while on the surface con-tradicting or altering these assessments, work from similar preconceptions.Much as early interpreters of Kafka's novels substituted one allegorical read-ing for another, critics of the aphorisms have tended simply to substitutevarious philosophical readings in which Kafka's reflections take on newmeaning. Günther Braun, for example, perceives the aphorisms as humoris-tic meditations on existence, in the spirit of Kierkegaard, which spring fromKafka's awareness of a discrepancy between the seemingly hopeless existen-tial situation of humanity and the necessary religious hope, lacking all cer-tainty, which ultimately makes one's existential situation "humoristically"bearable.20 Much in the same fashion, Hans-Günther Pott, in an unpublisheddissertation on Kafka's aphorisms, advocates that we understand these textsas Kafka's "Form der 'geistigen Existenzbehauptung'"; thus he replaces thereligious interpretation of the aphorisms with one which grounds their con-tent in the philosophy of existentialism.21 It is to Pott's credit, however, that

16 Werner Hoffmann, Kafkas Aphorismen (Bern: Francke, 1975) and "Ansturm gegendie letzte irdische Grenze": Aphorismen und Spätwerk Kafkas (Bern: Francke,1984).

17 Christa Deinert-Trotta, "Der Umweg über die Welt zum Absoluten": Der religiöseInhalt der Aphorismen Franz Kafkas (Reggio Calabria: Tip. M.DeFranco, 1975).

18 Heien Milfull, "The Theological Position of Kafka's Aphorisms," Seminar, 18(1982), 168-83.

19 Walter Strolz, "Kafkas Vertrauen zum Unzerstörbaren im Menschen," Frankfur-ter Hefte, 38, no. 11 (1983), pp. 53-63.

20 Günther Braun, "Franz Kafkas Aphorismen: Humoristische Meditationen der Exi-stenz," esp. pp. 107-10.

21 Hans-Günther Pott, "Die aphoristischen Texte Franz Kafkas. Stil und Gedanken-welt," Diss., Freiburg i. Br., 1958, esp. p. 7.

he is the first scholar seriously to take matters of structure and style intoaccount when dealing with Kafka's aphorisms; however, he does so in orderto relate Kafka's aphoristic discourse to modes of existential communication,and not to the tradition of the aphorism as a form of expression whichparticipates in a philosophical as well as a literary tradition, these two fre-quently melding into one.22 Ritchie Robertson, in a recent article on Kafka'saphorisms, investigates the influence of Kierkegaard's thought and the im-portance of Jewish mysticism in these texts, focusing on Kafka's drive forintegration into a coherent community as it is reflected in the aphoristictexts.23

These last described approaches to Kafka's aphorisms possess one com-mon virtue which distinguishes them from other analyses in which theaphorisms are given perfunctory, methodologically unreflected treatment:they conceive the individual aphoristic texts as elements of a coherent groupin which the individual text is involved in constant dialogue with the othermember texts in the aphoristic collection. This group configuration, and theinternal contradiction and correction of established positions which it notonly allows, but invites, is a fundamental characteristic of aphoristic expres-sion.24 Still, these attempts at a unified interpretation of Kafka's aphorismssuffer from common deficiencies. Most significantly, all of these scholarsoverlook completely the fruitfulness of the aphoristic tradition in Germanliterature and philosophy as a context for the study of Kafka's aphorisms.Moreover, each of these interpretations works from the assumption thatKafka's aphorisms coalesce into a coherent ideological position, while tradi-tionally the aphorism is a symptom of the express lack of, or protest againstsuch a systematic ideology.25

If Brod's influence on evaluations of Kafka's aphorisms is manifest in thepersistence with which religious-philosophical themes are extracted from

22 Pott, "Die aphoristischen Texte Franz Kafkas," pp. 12-19.23 Ritchie Robertson, "Kafka's Ziirau Aphorisms," Oxford German Studies, 14

(1983), 73-91.24 Gerhart Neumann has emphasized this "collective" aspect of aphoristic expression

in his monumental study of this genre, Ideenparadiese: Untersuchungen zur Apho-ristik von Lichtenberg, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel und Goethe (Munich: Fink,1976), passim, esp. p. 277. Kafka's awareness of this tradition of the aphoristiccollection is evidenced by the fact that he gathered from the Oktavhefte chosenaphorisms which he subsequently collected on numbered slips of paper. For infor-mation on the "manuscripts" of Kafka's aphorisms see Brod's description in the"Anmerkungen" to his edition, H, 437-8; see also Werner Hoffmann's account inthe Kafka-Handbuch, ed. Hartmut Binder, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1979), II,475.

25 On the anti-systematic thrust of aphoristic expression, see Hans Margolius, "Sy-stem und Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus, pp. 280-292.

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these texts, his segregation of the aphorisms from Kafka's narrative workshas had far-reaching methodological implications as well. It has become averitable leitmotif in Kafka-scholarship that the aphorisms take a place out-side of the perplexing visions which inform Kafka's fiction. Even the faciledistinction between the "optimistic" world of the aphorisms and the "pes-simistic" one of the narratives has stubbornly persisted. Patrick Bridgwater,for example, writes of Kafka's "permanent and positive insights into life"which the aphorisms contain.26 Most recently this same segregation of Kaf-ka's aphorisms from his "literary" works has been advocated by BertNagel.27 Malcolm Pasley, as well, distinguishes between Kafka's narrativeand meditative works, claiming that in the case of the latter one can scarcelyspeak of creative inspiration as the driving force behind their production.28

By denying the inspirational source of the aphorisms, Pasley establishesthem as somehow "non-artistic" meditations with incontrovertibly accessi-ble meaning. More than just flying in the face of the subtle complexity andambiguity of these texts, Pasley's appraisal is at cross-purposes with a centraltheory that relates the production of aphorisms to the experiencing of aninspired "epiphanic" insight.29 Thus, in this instance as well, failure to takeaccount of the nature of aphoristic expression in general is responsible for themisjudging of Kafka's aphorisms.

More often than not, this fundamental stance vis-a-vis Kafka's aphorismsis accepted without ever being specifically articulated. This becomes espe-cially evident when one scrutinizes the role which the aphorisms have playedin the evolution of critical interpretations of Kafka's works: these texts arecordoned off from Kafka's fiction simply in order that they may be reinte-grated at a different interpretive level. In other words, as long as the apho-risms are handled as personal, "non-literary" meditations, i. e. as Kafka'smetacommentary on his life, art, and aesthetic practice, they can be read asfoundational principles in which Kafka's literature can be grounded. Ratherthan as further examples of Kafka's art, then, they are treated as exegetical

26 Patrick Bridgwater, Kafka and Nietzsche, Studien zur Germanistik, Anglistik undKomparatistik, Bd. 23 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), p. 21.

27 Bert Nagel, Kafka und die Weltliteratur: Zusammenhänge und Wechselwirkungen(Munich: Winkler, 1983), p.202.

28 Malcolm Pasley, "Der Schreibakt und das Geschriebene: Zur Frage der Entste-hung von Kafkas Texten," Franz Kafka: Themen und Probleme, ed. Claude Da-vid, Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 1451 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 8t Ruprecht,1980), p. 23.

29 Franz Mautner has described the inspirational idea behind the aphorism as an"Einfall"; see "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," pp. 46-51; see also EudoC. Mason, "The Aphorism," p. 205. The relation between aphorism and epiphanywill be discussed below.

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annotations to this art. This pervasive practice has recently been lent thestatus of encyclopaedic indubitability by Werner Hoffmann, who, in hisdiscussion of Kafka's aphorisms in Binder's Kafka-Handbuch (the title ofwhich claims a certain final validity for the positions it represents), writesthat these texts "enthalten in kunstvoller Verdichtung die WeltanschauungKafkas."30 Given the equivocality of Kafka's literature, it is not surprisingthat scholars seeking determinate meanings in these works would cling tothe aphorisms, representing them as rare instances of unambiguous self-reflection on Kafka's part. To be sure, the apodictic style of Kafka's aphoris-tic remarks seems to lend this conception some credibility. However, anexamination of the history of the aphorism indicates that this gesture ofdecisive determinacy embodied in the apodictic style of aphoristic expressionserves to disguise a content whose meaning is malleable, unstable, and multi-ply - if not infinitely - interpretable. The misconceived notion of Kafka'saphorisms as texts which possess objective validity and express his ultimate"Weltanschauung" is predicated on a fallacious notion of the character ofaphoristic expression itself. Aphorisms, much as any other literary genre, donot contain im-mediately accessible doctrinary pronouncements; their sig-nification is not direct and unambiguous, lying on a "referential" surface;rather it is diffuse and diverse, embedded in the very essence of the text'slanguage, and only mediately discernible through interpretive events. If thereceptive history of Kafka's aphorisms has been singularly uni-dimensionaland non-controversial, then this is because the texts themselves have beentreated in a uni-dimensional and non-controversial manner. For the mostpart, hermeneutical complications in the comprehension of the aphorismshave been ignored or brushed aside. Consequently, the aphoristic texts fig-ure prominently in every and all interpretations of Kafka's art, regardless ofthe conflicts among these interpretations themselves. This fact alone indi-cates that these texts, which each critic considers to be unequivocal, mustindeed possess the same productive indeterminacy characteristic of Kafka'sart in general. If, as has often been asserted, all writing is literature for Kafka,whether in the form of novels, stories, letters, or diaries,31 then there is nojustification for suspending this principle when discussing Kafka's apho-risms.

One further methodological problem is involved when critics apply Kaf-ka's aphorisms as universally valid interpretive instruments: employing the

30 Werner Hoffmann, Kaßa-Handbuch, II, 475.31 This argument has been most forcefully and convincingly represented by Walter

H.Sokel, who writes: "[Kafka] hat sein Leben stilisiert gesehen. Selbst die intim-sten Dokumente - Tagebücher und Briefe - sind bei ihm immer Literatur, Dich-tung." See Sokel, Franz Kafka: Tragik und Ironie, Fischer Taschenbuch, 1790(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1976), p. 8.

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aphorisms in this manner overlooks the temporal restrictions of these textswithin Kafka's aeuvre, a mistake we have already mentioned in the contextof Brod's interpretations of the aphorisms. Consequently, it is not uncom-mon for aphorisms from the years 1917-18 or 1920 to be invoked in supportof interpretations of works from any and all periods of Kafka's life.32 Theprocedure of ascribing to specific aphoristic texts an interpretive authorityrelevant for the whole of Kafka's life and art is radically ahistorical. It as-sumes, among other things, that Kafka's poetics remained consistentthroughout his entire creative life. In addition, this practice denies the apho-risms, as textual phenomena, any position of uniqueness in the configurationof literary forms appropriated by Kafka for his literary endeavor. Scholarshence often find themselves in the paradoxical situation of acknowledgingthe singularity of circumstances which produced Kafka's aphoristic texts,while simultaneously eradicating this singularity in the interpretive processby which the aphorisms are lent an abstract significance which transcends theimpeti underlying their creation. Thus biographical limitations are conven-iently forgotten in order to establish the aphorisms as universally valid ex-pressions of Kafka's world-view.33 This is the underlying paradox of a bio-graphical positivism which invokes the role of the "author" as a fundamentalprinciple of unity, while simultaneously emphasizing particularity and indi-viduality of life-experiences as they become manifest in the text.

Hartmut Binder's conception of Kafka's aphorisms is indicative of thisdominant trend in the critical reception of these texts. An examination of hisposition, then, will illuminate some of the problems inherent in this ap-proach to the aphorisms. In Motiv und Gestaltung bei Franz Kafka, Binderpresents one of the few significant attempts at integrating an interpretation ofthe aphorisms, taken as a coherent group, into an overarching analysis ofKafka's poetics. Binder's goal is a characterization of the creative process

This practice is so prevalent that almost any critical source could serve as anexample. Two most recent instances will serve as illustrations. Susanne Kessler,Kafka - Poetik der sinnlichen Welt: Strukturen sprach kritischen Erzählens, Germa-nistische Abhandlungen, 53 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1983), analyzes quite competentlyKafka's critique of language as documented in his aphorisms, but she assumes thatthe substance of this critique remained constant for Kafka throughout his life; thusshe retrospectively applies these statements as theoretical commentaries on Kafka'spoetics as represented in the novel Der Verschollene. Gerhard Kurz, Traum-Schrecken: Kafkas literarische Existenzanalyse (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1980), takes asimilar tack, identifying in Kafka's aphorisms specific patterns of thought whichhe defines as constitutive of Kafka's thought in general, and thus universallyapplicable to Kafka's fiction. Kurz overlooks the extent to which these structuresare inherent in aphoristic expression in general, and not specific reflexes character-istic of Kafka.See especially Werner Hoffmann, Kafka-Handbuch, II, 474—97.

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informing the production of Kafka's works. Arguing that the distinctivefeature of Kafka's creativity is a manner of metaphorical thought in whichimages supplant abstract concepts, Binder conceives Kafka's aphoristic pro-nouncements as manifestations of a transitional stage in this metaphoricalprocess (MuG, 47).34 Binder argues that Kafka's art is rooted in personalexperience, but that in the transition from life to literature the motivatingexperience is rendered unrecognizable by the radicality of its metaphoricaltransfiguration. Binder imputes special significance to Kafka's aphorismsinsofar as he views them as texts in which the metamorphosis of "livedexperience" into literature remains incomplete. Thus the aphorisms, as man-ifestations of intermediate creative stages between "Lebenszeugnis" and itsliterary representation, provide the critic with rare glimpses into the other-wise mysterious workings of Kafka's creative method. However, this assess-ment denigrates Kafka's aphorisms to the status of creative half-way houses.

In order to throw into relief the difficulties in Binder's skilled and cogentargument, it is helpful to examine a less subtle application of the sameapproach. A. P. Foulkes follows a strategy similar to that of Binder, strivingsystematically to articulate the hierarchical development from "Lebenszeug-nis" through intermediary aphoristic image, to narrative exposition for .eachof Kafka's works.35 The obvious forcedness with which Foulkes, ignoringquestions of chronology, correlates biographical fact, aphoristic metaphor,and literary exposition exposes the artificiality of this procedure. This artifi-ciality characterizes Binder's method as well, with the important differencethat Binder exploits a detailed chronology of Kafka's life and art in order towork toward an ultimate overthrowing of chronological considerations,these finally being "aufgehoben" in the mysterious unity that, for Binder,comprises Kafka's life and art. Binder's approach betrays especially well thefundamental contradiction between an insistence on the relevance of bio-graphical data for the understanding of Kafka's literature, and the overcomingof chronology in order to arrive at a totalizing and unitary conception ofKafka's creative process. Positivistic, biographical criticism, bound as it is tohistorical data, becomes aberrant when applied in support of ahistoricallygeneralized hypotheses. Especially Binder's conception of Kafka's aphorismsmanifests this conflict between the individual impetus of lived experience ascreative ground for Kafka's literature, and the universalizing understanding

34 Ingeborg Henel has objected to Binder's definition of this process, arguing thatKafka's metaphors are the product of a secondary mental procedure in whichabstract conception is translated into metaphorical form; "Kafka als Denker,"Franz Kafka: The'men utid Probleme, pp. 48-65; esp. p. 49.

35 A. P. Foulkes, The Reluctant Pessimist: A Study of Franz Kafka (The Hague: Mou-ton, 1967).

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which eradicates all difference and arrives at a monolithic and extra-historicalconception of these texts.

Binder's interpretive analysis of the content of Kafka's aphorisms is cal-culated to corroborate his final thesis that developmental models are inap-propriate for describing the diversity of Kafka's art. Since Kafka's literatureis obviously not uniform, Binder can only reject the principle of develop-ment by postulating the simultaneous existence of various literary strategiesin Kafka's creative warehouse (MuG, 395-6). Interpreting selected aphoristictexts, Binder seeks to establish Kafka's scepticism toward the traditionalconception of developmental progress (MuG, 65-78). This once established,he employs it in defense of his argument against the existence of progressivedevelopment in Kafka's artistic practice (MuG, 65, 395). However, there isno reason to assume that any intellectual objections Kafka might have har-bored with regard to the notion of personal development should have beensystematically enforced in his own life; nor is there any reason to believe thatKafka was able consciously to control and stabilize his life and artistic crea-tions from within, successfully fending off any powers of change that mightaffect him from without. Binder himself, in fact, admits that Kafka's at-titudes on his art changed, but he continues to reject the possibility that thesechanges in attitude might have influenced Kafka's creative practice (MuG,383-87). Any intellectual rejection of the concept of development whichKafka might have articulated is not necessarily tantamount to a consistentresistance to development where his poetic practice is concerned.36 Indeed,this would suggest a certain satisfaction on Kafka's part with his own artisticstrategies, and it is common knowledge that just the opposite was the case.Moreover, in Binder's analysis it remains unclear precisely how Kafka'sunitary creative process would yield such diverse narrative forms, and whycertain forms should manifest themselves at one particular time and notanother.37 But the credibility of Binder's thesis is not what is at issue here:important for the purpose of this investigation is simply recognition of thecentral role Binder - almost unwittingly - accords his interpretation of Kaf-ka's aphorisms. Binder's approach is symptomatic in that it, like most othersuch treatments of the aphorisms, applies these texts as means to somegreater interpretive end, and not as interpretive ends in themselves.38 This

36 Ritchie Robertson, contrary to Binder, argues that Kafka's aphorisms affirm theprinciple of development, "Kafka's Ziirau Aphorisms," p. 79.

37 Walter Sokel's hypothesis that Kafka's narrative portrayal underwent a fundamen-tal change between the years 1915-18 from the perspectivistic to the parabolic ismuch sounder; see Walter H. Sokel, "Das Verhältnis der Erzählperspektive zuErzählgeschehen und Sinngehalt in 'Vor dem Gesetz', 'Schakale und Araber' und'Der Prozeß', ZfdtPh, 86 (1967), 267-300.

38 Despite its title, Binder's later book, Kafka in neuer Sicht: Mimik, Gestik und

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situation is largely responsible for the various distortions of Kafka's apho-risms, since they are routinely exploited to serve some other critical purpose.Binder's failure to evaluate Kafka's aphorisms within the context of thehistory and tradition of this literary form leads to fundamental misconcep-tions, and in this sense his errors are symptomatic of the interpretive cul-de-sacs into which most critics have been led where Kafka's aphorisms areconcerned.

Only very few critics have managed to extricate themselves from suchproblems and approach the aphorisms as texts deserving of serious literaryanalysis. Gerhard Neumann has made an important contribution toward acharacterization of the idiosyncrasies of Kafka's figure of paradox, basing hisanalysis on selected aphorisms.39 Likewise, Shimon Sandbank has offeredinsightful analyses of some of the techniques Kafka employs in his apho-risms, viewing them as calculated strategies which "surprise" the reader.40

Such analyses, however, have been the exception rather than the rule inscholarship on Kafka's aphorisms. Even these scholars, however, ignore therelationship of Kafka's texts to the tradition and history of the aphorism.Still, it is on the foundations laid in these studies that my investigation seeksto build.

The aphorism has received relatively little attention from literary histo-rians or theoreticans. The increasing compartmentalization of academic dis-ciplines is partially responsible for this state of affairs, since the aphorism,falling between philosophy and literature, has often been ignored by literarycritics because it was considered to belong to the intellectual territory ofphilosophers.41 Recently, in fact, one literary scholar has asserted that the

Personengefüge als Darstellungsformen des Autobiographischen (Stuttgart: Metz-ler, 1976), offers no substantial revisions of his previous perspectives on Kafka,and this is especially true where the aphorisms are concerned. He continues toview the aphorisms as "Lebenszeugnisse," relating them closely to Kafka's diaries(pp. 85 & 87). Thus he contends that Kafka's aphorisms betray the transformationof biographical material "ins Philosophisch-Erkenntnistheoretische" (p. 98). How-ever, in this study Binder attempts to assess more completely the significance ofKafka's turn to aphoristic expression at a given period of his life, claiming that thedrive toward aphoristic formulation bespeaks Kafka's coming-to-terms with hislife situation and his resignation to the limited horizons of his existence (p. 81).Such an assertion, however, fails to take cognizance of a central quality endemic toaphoristic expression: for the aphorism is a form of expression which traditionallysignals the refusal to acquiesce in passive resignation to given conditions - witnessthe aphoristic writings of Nietzsche and Karl Kraus.

39 Gerhard Neumann, "Umkehrung und Ablenkung: Franz Kafkas 'gleitendes Para-dox'," DVjs, 42 (1968), 702-744.

40 S.fhimon] Sandbank, "Surprise Techniques in Kafka's Aphorisms," Orbis Litte-rarum, 25 (1970), 261-74.

41 This point has been argued by William Johnston, "The Vienna School of Aphorists

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aphorism is not a literary form at all.42 The confusion dominating criticalevaluations of Kafka's aphorisms is thus a manifestation of the greater confu-sion which surrounds assessments of the aphorism in general. Most scholarswho concern themselves with definitions of the aphorism begin by pointingto the multiplicity of conceptions associated with this literary genre.43 FranzMautner, one of the foremost theoreticians on the aphorism, attributes thisconfusion to the fact that the word "aphorism" has experienced a "Formge-schichte" which is wholly distinct from its "Wortgeschichte."44 Consequent-ly, aphorisms are designated by a wealth of different names - "aphorism,""sentence," "maxim," "reflection" - all of which are used more or lessinterchangeably, the result being that the word "aphorism" comes to meansimply "jfede sonst nicht definierbare kürzere Prosaaufzeichnung."45 Thisproblem is further complicated by the existence of two distinct, if outwardlyrelated aphoristic traditions, the one represented by the French maxim of theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the other consisting in the relativelyindependent development of the German aphorism, beginning with GeorgChristoph Lichtenberg in the late eighteenth century.46 Furthermore, withinthe German tradition the terms "Aphorismus" and "aphoristisch" areequivocal, referring at once to a fragmentary, anti-systematic, non-exposi-tory mode of philosophical meditation (Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Wittgen-stein), and to a literary genre in which rules of structure, expression andform take precedence over philosophical content (Lichtenberg, the Roman-tics, Friedrich Hebbel, Karl Kraus).47 In some instances no clear line can bedrawn between philosophical and literary aphorism. The Romantics, forexample, were intent on annulling the delineation between these two intel-

1880-1915: Reflections on a Neglected Genre," Turn of the Century: GermanLiterature and Art 1890-1915: The McMaster Colloquium on German Literature,ed. Gerald Chappie and Hans H. Schulte (Bonn: Bouvier, 1981), p. 277.R. H. Stephenson, "On the Widespread Use of an Inappropriate and RestrictiveModel of the Literary Aphorism," MLR, 75 (1980), 1-17.See, for example, Hermann Asemissen, "Notizen über den Aphorismus," DerAphorismus, p. 159; Karl Hans Bühner, "Über den Aphorismus," Welt und Wort,6 (1951), 267; Günther J.[oachim], "Warum soviel Aphorismen?," Neue DeutscheHefte, 5 (1958-59), 739; Franz Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gat-tung," Der Aphorismus, pp. 21-22; Gerhard Neumann, Ideenparadiese, p. 127.Franz Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," p.22.Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," p. 31.On the differentiation between the French and German aphoristic traditions seeWalter Wehe, "Geist und Form des deutschen Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus,p. 142.On the aphorism as philosophical form see Heinz Krüger, Studien über den Apho-rismus als philosophische Form (Frankfurt: Nest Verlag, 1957); Hans Margolius,"Aphorismus und Ethik," Der Aphorismus, pp. 293-304; Hans Margolius, "Sys-tem und Aphorismus, Der Aphorismus, pp. 280-292.

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lectual pursuits, and the aphorism became for them a paradigm for thismarriage of literature and philosophy. In the writings of Nietzsche, as well,literary and philosophical moments can not clearly be distinguished.Nietzsche's tremendous influence on subsequent writers is thus also respon-sible for the association of the aphorism with "philosophical" expression. Yetone must keep in mind that Nietzsche's mode of "philosophizing with ahammer," in this sense similar to the "symphilosophizing" of the Roman-tics, did not strive for systematic determinacy, but rather sought to under-mine all determinate patterns of thought. In this "aesthetic" indeterminacy,philosophical and literary aphorism converge.

The purpose of the present study is to attempt an orientation of Kafka'saphoristic writings in the tradition of the aphorism in Germany and Austria.Because, as the history of criticism on Kafka's aphorisms demonstrates, onecan not presume common knowledge regarding this tradition among scho-lars, my investigation must begin by establishing briefly the history of theaphorism as genre. This is the focus of my first chapter.

The second chapter, which also serves as a kind of introduction into thehistory and problematics of aphoristic expression, is concerned with the roleof the aphorism in the Austrian Jahrhundertwende. Taking as my point ofdeparture the proliferation of aphorisms in Austrian intellectual circles of thisperiod, I attempt to explain through intellectual-historical analysis the impetiwhich led to this renaissance of the aphorism. In particular, I document theextent to which this widespread turn to aphoristic forms manifests a literaryresponse to the problems of the Sprachkrise which plagued Austrian intellec-tuals at this time.

The third chapter attempts to ground Kafka's aphoristic thought in thelarger context outlined in the two chapters that precede it. Beginning with anintellectual-historical analysis of Kafka's evolving views on language,metaphor, and art, I bring the intellectual problematics with which Kafkawas concerned into relation with the intellectual issues which traditionallymotivated the application of aphoristic discourse. Kafka's intellectual crisis isassociated with the Sprachkrise of his Austrian contemporaries, and his turnto aphoristic expression is analyzed as a calculated strategy for overcomingthis crisis of communication.48

In the fourth chapter I turn to Kafka's "aphoristic precursors," investigat-ing his acquaintance with authors and works which are indicative of thetradition of the literary aphorism, and analyzing his reception of theiraphoristic works. This examination, while proceeding "biographically" and"positivistically," at least in its reliance on documentary evidence, is not a

See Richard Gray, "Suggestive Metaphor: Kafka's Aphorisms and the Crisis ofCommunication*" DVjs, 59 (1984), 454-69.

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"source" study in the narrow sense; rather, its primary purpose is to docu-ment the diverse avenues by which Kafka was provided examples of themanifold structures and purposes of aphoristic expression. This serves bothto anchor his aphoristic impulse in this tradition, and also to account for thediverstiy of his aphoristic forms. In addition, by examining in some detailKafka's reception of these aphoristic writings we can form an idea about thepurposes and goals of aphoristic expression as Kafka perceived them basedon his readings and their effect. Kafka's reception of aphoristic writingsindicates that he discovered in aphoristic expression a manner of textualizingthe self in which the biographically "factual" and the literarily "fictional"enter into a productive interaction which simultaneously expresses and cre-ates the "author."

The fifth chapter provides a detailed history of Kafka's aphoristic texts, adescription of his aphoristic manuscripts, and an analysis of the process bywhich the aphoristic texts were created. These examinations serve to supplya preliminary orientation of Kafka in the tradition of the aphorism based on acomparison of his methods and structures of thought with those of otheraphorists. The chapter then continues this positioning of Kafka in the tradi-tion of the aphorism through detailed analyses of his aphoristic texts, align-ing them structurally and stylistically with the typical modes of aphoristicexpression, and juxtaposing them to texts by representative German andAustrian aphorists. In this way I hope to evaluate the extent to which Kafka'stexts manifest formal and structural characteristics inherent in aphoristicexpression in general.

Once Kafka's aphorisms have been analyzed and characterized, and hisposition in the historical development of the aphorism as literary genre hasbeen established, the final chapter attempts to assess the significance ofaphoristic expression in the overall development of Kafka's fiction. I arguethat Kafka's turn to aphoristic expression occurs as a response to dissatisfac-tion with his previous narrative practice, and that his experiments with theaphorism help him to evolve certain techniques which exert a determininginfluence on the evolution of his parabolic style. The aphorisms, then, be-come keys to the understanding of structure and purpose of the Kafkanparable, and thus their integral role in Kafka's general artistic profile iselucidated.

A word about the title of my study: "Constructive Destruction" ("auf-bauende Zerstörung") is a phrase used by Kafka to describe the discursivemethod of Kierkegaard. I take this description to be generally appropriate tothe method of the aphorist, as well as relevant to the practice Kafka employsin his aphoristic texts. Kafka applies the aphorism in an attempt to find a newliterary-discursive method for coming to terms with the self in textual form.He comes to understand aphoristic discourse as a means of expression in

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which self-critique and self-projection productively interrelate to produce a"constructive destruction" of the self, i. e. a dismantling and reconstructionof the self accomplished through a specific textual medium. The phrase"literary transformation" in my subtitle refers both to this process of trans-forming the self through its textualization, and to the process of transforma-tion which the aphorism ultimately undergoes in Kafka's works as it istransmogrified into the narrative form of the Kafkan parable.

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CHAPTER ONE:

History, Tradition, and Structure of the Aphorism

The history and tradition of the aphorism as expressive form are fraughtwith contradictions, paradoxes, and ironies. The most immediate and in-fluential of these is signalled by the necessity of preceding an investigationinto Kafka's aphorisms with an overview of the historical evolution, intellec-tual problematics, and discursive structure of this genre. What investigatorof Kafka's novels would need to follow a similar procedure? This generallack of critical awareness regarding the purpose and qualities of aphoristicdiscourse is attributable to the relegation of the aphorism to the status of a"minor" literary genre - if, indeed, it is regarded as a literary genre at all. Yetthe aphorism has actually played quite a significant role in the history ofGerman literature at least since the Romantic age. Indeed, the aphorismfigured centrally in the poetic theories and practices of the early GermanRomantics, and their aphoristic model was to have far-reaching influence.However, the ail-too static periodization of literary "movements" has in thisinstance hindered the abstraction of this aphoristic model out of its literary-historical context. While one must be careful not to universalize uncriticallysuch seemingly paradigmatic representations, treating them as an "Ur"-formto which all other manifestations can be reduced, there is no reason toartificially restrict the application of a model, especially if its employmentpromises to be productive.

Nietzsche is a further example of a prominent and highly influentialfigure in German literature whose name is associated with the aphorism.Much as in the case of the Romantics, however, studies of Nietzsche'saphoristic method have tended to concentrate on the appropriateness of thisform for his thought: his "salesmanship" as a propagator of this genre, whilecommonly recognized, is rarely examined in a critical and reflective man-ner.1 Again, many of the individual qualities which mark Nietzsche's

1 On the role of the aphorism in Nietzsche's works see Bernard Greiner, FriedrichNietzsche: Versuch und Versuchung in seinen Aphorismen, Zur Erkenntnis derDichtung, Bd. 11 (Munich: Fink, 1972); Hiltrud Häntzschel-Schlotke, "Der Apho-rismus als Stilform bei Nietzsche," Diss. Heidelberg 1967; Heinz Krüger Studienüber den Aphorismus als philosophische Form.

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aphoristic style are abstractable and applicable to the aphorisms of otherwriters.

In scholarly investigations of the aphorism two trends stand out: on theone hand, the attempt to arrive at a purely theoretical definition or charac-terization of the aphorism; on the other hand, the examination of theaphoristic style or aphoristic texts of a single author.2 In an important sense,then, the trends in scholarship on the aphorism manifest in exaggerated formthe aberrations and failings of traditional literary history, concentrating onsimple linear relationships to document "influence," and fleeing into syn-chronic analysis or theoretical abstraction where historical examinationseems too facile. Hans Robert Jauss has described the complicated dialecticobtaining between creation, reception, and production of literary texts, envi-sioning analysis which takes cognizance of this dialectic as the contemporarychallenge for literary historians and literary scholarship in general.3 Theaphorism, perhaps more than any other literary form, has been the victimboth of undeserved neglect and of the terror of methodologies.

The nature of the aphorism itself is partially responsible for the generaluncertainty of critics with regard to this genre. Even among those scholarswho have devoted concerted research to the aphorism, there is disagreementas to whether the aphorism belongs to the realm of philosophy or to that ofliterature.4 In fact, it is one of the most intriguing characteristics of theaphorism that it consciously repudiates the distinctions between philosophy,literature, and criticism, emphasizing the commonality of a hermeneuticalsituation in which word becomes the medium in a dynamic process ofunderstanding ("Verstehen"). One of the "Fragmente" of Friedrich Schlegelformulates this universally applicable dialectic of "word" and "reading":"Buchstaben als fixierter Geist. Lesen heißt, gebundenden Geist frei machen,also eine magische Handlung."5 As we shall see, both the Romantic "Frag-

2 The major exception to this is Gerhard Neumann's seminal study Ideenparadiese,op. cit.

3 Hans Robert Jauss, "Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissen-schaft," Literaturgeschichte als Provokation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970),pp. 144-207; esp. p. 172.

4 On the aphorism as philosophical form, see Heinz Krüger, Studien über denAphorismus als philosophische Form; Hans Margolius, "Aphorismus und Ethik,"and "System und Aphorismus," both essays reprinted in the volume Der Aphoris-mus, pp. 293-304 and 280-292 respectively. Recently R. H. Stephenson hasattempted to deny literary status to the aphorism, "On the Widespread Use of anInappropriate and Restrictive Model of the Literary Aphorism," Modern Langua-ge Review, 75 (1980), 1-17. In the atmosphere of poststructuralism, of course, thevery distinctions between philosophy, literature, and criticsm have been placed inquestion - indeed, all experience of reality has been described as the experience of"texts."

5 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Ausgabe seiner Schriften, ed. Ernst Behler (Munich:

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ment" and the modern aphorism exemplify this "magical" relationship be-tween letter and spirit.

In his Genealogie der Moral, Nietzsche mentions the difficulty whichaphoristic form presents to interpreters, and he locates this difficulty "darin,daß man diese Form heute nicht schwer genug nimmt."6 While Nietzsche'sclaim is still valid for literary scholars today, it would be unjust to attributeinsufficient scholarly conceptions of the aphorism solely to the reticence ofscholars to approach this genre, or to the hitherto common practices ofliterary scholarship itself. For indeed, the aphorism is an unusually prob-lematical genre, and its modern practitioners tend to cultivate, for reasonsappropriate to the individual case, precisely this problematical aspect of theaphorism. Thus Nietzsche, for one, calling aphorism and "sentence," inwhich he believes himself to be the German master, "die Formen der 'Ewig-keit'," describes his goal as one of creating "Dinge . . ., an denen umsonstdie Zeit ihre Zähne versucht" (Werke, II, 1026). What the Romantics termedthe "infinity" of the aphorism, and Nietzsche its "eternity," is nothing more- and nothing less - than the aphorism's hermeneutical challenge. In otherwords, the modern aphorist frequently relies on this form of expression inorder to present his/her interpreters with an interpretive task of premierdifficulty. Unfortunately, literary scholarship has too often succumbed inthe face of such a challenge. In this sense, the aphorist's willed obscurity ispartially responsible for the neglect or hermeneutical maltreatment this formhas suffered at the hands of literary critics.

Adequate critical assessments of the aphorism have been further retardedby the chameleon-like quality of this form, viewed from a historical perspec-tive. The aphorism enjoys an exceedingly long and rich history; this history,however, far from displaying a linear or evolutionary development, ischaracterized by frequent radical shifts in the nature and applicative functionof the aphorism. Misconceptions of the aphoristic production of particularauthors are often attributable to ignorance of this multi-faceted history, or tothe unreflected application of a historically limited model beyond its actualrealm of relevance. This, as I have argued in my introduction, is almostuniversally the case in evaluations of Kafka's aphorisms. And if the existenceof various aphoristic sub-species were not enough, this already complexsituation has been complicated further by the host of appellations underwhich these diverse aphoristic forms have paraded.7 These are the conditions

Schöningh, 1958 ff.), XVIII, 297; further references are indicated by the abbrevia-tion KA, volume and page number.Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke in drei Bänden, ed. Karl Schlechte (Munich: Hanser,1966), II, 770; henceforth cited as Werke, with volume and page number.Franz Mautner refers to this as the independence of "Wortgeschichte" from"Formgeschichte," "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," pp. 21-22.

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which require as a prerequisite to the analysis of Kafka's aphorisms an inves-tigation into the historical manifestations, intellectual problematics,methodologies, and applicative functions which determine the historicalcountenances of the aphorism as literary form.

I. The History of the Aphorism

Significant for the evolution of the aphorism is its origin in the naturalsciences. The Greek physician Hippocrates (ca. 460-370 B.C.) used the word"aphorismos" to denote a concise summary of symptoms and treatments forcommon illnesses. The simple, laconic form of the utterance served amnemonic-didactic function, enhancing one's ability to commit the estab-lished treatment to memory. Even in the Hippocratic aphorism, however,which was intended to serve a specific, practical purpose, one finds in theformulation a suggestive lack of specificity. For example, the observation"vita brevis, ars longa," attributed to Hippocrates, certainly is a pronounce-ment of philosophical depth; yet it has no medicinal application - exceptperhaps as a resigned conclusion to failed treatment. However, precisely thisgenerality - and hence abstractability - of the Hippocratic aphorism hasengendered its historical viability. Nothing prevented many of these state-ments from being applied to numerous realms and activities of human be-ings, which, by way of analogical extension, were related to the initialtherapeutic purpose of these pronouncements. One relatively modern exam-ple documents this metaphorical transposition of a Hippocratic aphorismfrom the realm of medicine to that of politics. As an epigraph to his dramaDie Räuber, Schiller chose the following Hippocratic text:

Quae medicamenta non sanat, ferrum sanatquae ferrum non sanat, ignis sanat,quae vero ignis non sanat, insanabilia reputari oportet.8

Schiller, not coincidentally, suppressed the more resigned third line of thisaphorism, which, for obvious reasons, is not appropriate for a "revolution-ary" drama. This deletion implies that for the Sturm und Drang dramatistthere were no conceivable political illnesses that either knife or fire could not"heal." The analogical transposition of the medicinal aphorism from its ap-plication to the health of individuals onto the political realm to describe the"health" of the political "organism" is not unique to Schiller. In fact, thistransferral of the applicative sphere of the aphorism to politics had occurred

Quoted in the Ciceronian translation as cited by Buchmann, Geflügelte Worte,26th ed. (Berlin: Haude und Spenersche Buchhandlung, 1920), p.352.

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in Spain, Italy, and France already in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-turies.9 This political aphorism is exemplified in the maxims of politicalaction established by such thinkers as Perez, Graciän, and Machiavelli.

The development of the "maxim" and "sentence" of the French moralistsin the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries represents a further transpositionof the Hippocratic aphorism from the realm of medicine; in this case thetransposition is effected onto the sphere of morality. In this sense the maximsof, for example, La Rouchefoucauld are not concerned either with the physi-cal or political health of humans, but rather with their social well-being.Thus these aphoristic "rules" function as pronouncements intended to guidethe actions of the individual with regard to the "health" and stability of thecommunity.

Last but not least, the aphorism also found application in the realm ofreligion and the human spirit, manifest most notably in the Pensees of BlaisePascal. In this instance especially the aphorism becomes a form of introspec-tive reflection through which one struggles to arrive at a proper "Christian"interaction with oneself and one's God. The common denominator of allthese various applications of aphoristic expression is concern with the centralaspects of human existence, be they physical, political, social, or spiritual.This involvement with "health" and the furthering of life-impulses remains afundamental trait of the aphorism, and one which returns throughout itshistory. It is no coincidence, for example, that Schopenhauer should com-pose his "Lebensweisheit" in aphoristic form; just as it is no coincidence thata philosopher such as Nietzsche, centrally concerned with a return of hu-manity to an immediate, authentic relationship to life, should gravitatenaturally to the form of the aphorism.10 Kafka's turn to aphoristic form inthe crisis period after the diagnosis of tuberculosis, of course, takes on pro-found significance in this context. Respect for "life," then, and for its inter-ests, however they may be defined, informs the use of the aphorism since itsvery inception.

One final applicative sphere must be mentioned here, especially since itprovides a pivotal connection to Kafka's aphoristic production: this is therealm of law. Here again the aphorism is concerned with the well-being ofthe individual and the community; yet particularly pronounced in the legalmaxim is the relationship between aphoristic statement and applicative judg-

This process of transformation to the political sphere is best described by Jürgenvon Stackelberg, "Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes Aphorismus," DerAphorismus, pp. 209-225.On the importance of the aphorism as a form which is close to life, see Krüger,Studien über den Aphorismus als philosophische Form, p. 55; see also Hans Margo-lius, "System und Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus, p. 289.

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ment.11 This aspect brings the legal aphorism into close proximity with the"moral" maxims of the French. What stands out in both the ethical and legalapplications of aphoristic expression is the evocation of what can be called,broadly speaking, a hermeneutical process. This function is most obvious inthe realm of law where abstract "rule" is formulated on the basis of concrete"cases." Under ideal circumstances, a mutually determining dialectic obtainsbetween "case" and "rule," such that each individual case stretches or altersslightly the application of the rule, while each rule subsumes under its aegisthose cases to which it productively can be applied. This interchange be-tween abstract law and specific case is fundamental to the aphorism in all ofits manifestations, and it is one of the primary characteristics which bringsthe structure and purpose of the aphorism into relation with the activity ofhermeneutics.12 Not insignificantly, for Hans-Georg Gadamer juridical her-meneutics becomes the paradigmatic model for the applicative functionwhich Gadamer postulates for literary hermeneutics.13 This dialectic be-tween particular and universal, quintessential to the aphorism, will be dealtwith in more detail below. At this point, however, anticipating ideas yet tobe presented, we must mention Kafka's nearly obsessive concern with prob-lems of "judgment" - an issue with which his aphorisms will also deal - andthe potential significance of his juristic education in shaping the characteristicreflections on the difficulties of an applicative hermeneutics, in broad terms,and for helping to determine his position with regard to history and functionof the aphorism.

While the aphorisms of Hippocrates are the "source" from which theseother aphoristic traditions spring, a second fundamental source for the incep-tion and evolution of the aphorism, again originating in the natural sciences,is found in Francis Bacon's valorization of the aphorism as a fitting expres-sive medium for the empirical scientist. As in the instances already discussed,Bacon's application of the aphorism is grounded in a desire to further aspecific principle of „life." In this case, however, life is not conceived interms of the merely human, but rather - corresponding to the interests of theempirical scientist - extends to the entire realm of the phenomenal world.Bacon strives for an honest and "truthful" rendering of the perceivedphenomena of the world, and he sees the virtue of the aphorism in its lack of

On the legal maxim, see Peter Stein, Regulae Juris: From Juristic Rules to LegalMaxims (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966).Gerhard Neumann has emphasized the process of mediation between universal andparticular which defines the nature of aphoristic expression; see his Ideenparadiese,pp. 74-5, 79, 745, and also his "Einleitung," Der Aphorismus, p. 5.Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Die exemplarische Bedeutung der juristischen Hermeneu-tik," Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 2nded. (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1965), pp.307-23.

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dogmatic system and its subsequent flexibility: the aphorism allows for anisolated registering of "facts," without forcing these isolated facts into a rigidconfiguration from the outset. In Bacon's own words: "This delivering ofknowledge in distinct and disjointed aphorisms doth leave the wit of manmore free to turn and toss, and to make use of that which is delivered tomore several purposes and applications."14 This flexibility in application ispredicated on the combinatory freedom left to the human mind when"knowledge" is mediated in unconnected fragments. The aphorism, as frag-mentary mode of expression, is more adequate to an honest, undogmaticsearch for truth.

The implications of Bacon's defense of the aphoristic presentation ofknowledge are profound and must be examined in detail - especially sincethe Baconian model exerted a formative influence on the German aphoristictradition through the figure of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. Clearly, theposition of the empirical scientist in Bacon's conception is not one of amerely passive recorder of perceived facts and witnessed phenomena. The"wit" of the observer must function as the organizing power which ordersdata, lending them a comprehensive (and comprehensible) "sense." Bacon,then, emphasizes the factor of interpretation in the derivation of knowledge:the freely associating, combinatory capacity of the human mind must alwaysbe at work as the processor of data. Paul Requadt juxtaposes this attitude ofthe Baconian scientist to the drive for systematic thought: "die Geistesverfas-sung des empirischen Forschers, des Aphoristikers in Bacons Sinne, gründetsich in dem Verzicht auf absolutes Wissen, wie es die Systemphilosophenbeanspruchen."15 Yet it would be an overstatement of the issue to claim thatBacon champions an antisystematic approach to science; more apt is GerhardNeumann's assertion that Bacon strives for a synthesis of system and pureobservation.16 This implies that observations must be made, and "facts"recorded, without prior intentions or prejudices influencing (and thus fal-sifying) their perception. In other words, system cannot exist prior to theestablishing of facts, but must be constructed "after the fact," i. e. in accord-ance with perceived facts. Here we discover in Bacon's theory the sameinterplay between particulars and abstraction which characterized the her-meneutical interaction of legal maxim and individual case. Bacon, in short,does not attack systems per se, rather he opposes all forms of dogmatism, of

Francis Bacon, quoted by Brian Vickers, "The Aphorism," Francis Bacon andRenaissance Prose, p. 67; Vickers also notes the connection of Bacon's thoughts onthe aphorism to the tradition of the legal aphorism, pp. 66-7.Paul Requadt, Lichtenberg, Sprache und Literatur, 13 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,1964), p. 141.Neumann, Ideenparadiese, p. 72.

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inflexible, "systematic" structuring in which the principle of organizationtakes precedence over individual facts - in which structure is forced upon thephenomena, rather than derived from them.17 Thus knowledge for Bacon iscontinually subject to change, involved in a process of "advancement," andinherently progressive. Rigidity is the enemy of truth, and the primaryvirtue of the aphorism is that it not only allows, but actually demands aflexible attitude with regard to the organization of individual facts andphenomena. The isolated aphoristic fragment, so to speak, represents thelinguistic equivalent to the independent, autonomous, not yet systematizedphenomenon.

This scepticism toward systems and systematizers is characteristic ofmost aphorists. Nietzsche, for example, writes in Götzendämmerung: "ichmißtraue allen Systematikern und gehe ihnen aus dem Weg. Der Wille zumSystem ist ein Mangel an Rechtschaffenheit" (Werke, II, 946). In a similarvein, Wittgenstein complains about the artificiality of being forced to thinkin a serial, expository manner:

Wenn ich für mich denke, ohne ein Buch schreiben zu wollen, so springe ich umdas Thema herum; das ist die einzige mir natürliche Denkweise. In einer Reihegezwungen, fortzudenken, ist mir eine Qual. Soll ich es nun überhaupt probieren?Ich verschwende unsägliche Mühe auf ein Anordnen der Gedanken, das vielleichtgar keinen Wert hat.18

Wittgenstein's remarks can stand for the sentiments of most aphorists. How-ever, whereas he emphasizes the naturalness of autonomous thoughts, un-constrained by the ordering logic which brings them into a consistent sys-tem, Bacon's attitude is founded more on the experimental curiosity of theempirical scientist. In this sense the aphoristic method of Bacon correspondsto the experimental attitude, characterized by a subtle dialectical interchangebetween working hypothesis and derived facts. Inspired subjective thought,"wit," figures fundamentally in the advancement of knowledge.19 This "in-ventive," creative element accounts for growth in knowledge, and dogmaticadherence to a system suppresses this progressive factor.

Brian Vickers has quite appropriately described Bacon's aphoristic modelof organization as "cellular."20 This term fittingly characterizes the loose

17 On Bacon's fundamentally anti-dogmatic stance, see Vickers, p. 72.18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977),

p. 60.19 One is tempted here to construe Bacon's view as one which anticipates in signifi-

cant ways the "paradigm" theory of scientific revolution put forth by ThomasS. Kühn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chi-cago Press, 1970).

20 Vickers, p. 82.

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interconnection of the aphoristic grouping of thoughts and observations, aswell as the autonomous status of each individual thought. Furthermore, thisorganic metaphor underscores the necessity of each element in the properfunctioning of the whole. Yet what this aphoristic arrangement freely admits- indeed, emphasizes - is the existence of "gaps." For the aphorist in Bacon'ssense, knowledge exists only in counterpoint to an admission of ignorance.Recognition of the "gaps" in one's understanding spurs the aphorist on tofurther investigation. This preference for doubt over certainty is expressed inthe following way by the aphorist Ernst Freiherr von Feuchtersieben: "dasZweifelhafte scheint mir interessanter als das Ausgemachte."21 Much in thissceptical attitude, of course, is reminiscent of Socratic irony.22 Much in thesame way that Socrates applied his pose of ignorance in order to further thequest for knowledge and truth, the aphorist employs "ignorance" in theform of incomplete relations to motivate the search for, and discovery of,truth. As we shall see, the aphorism also incorporates the dialogical processfundamental to the Socratic method. This aspect lends the aphorism itsheuristic function.

Bacon is the first influential modern thinker consciously to propound anddefend an aphoristic method, distinguishing it from dogmatic systematiza-tion. In doing so he delineates two investigative methods, the methodusmagistralis and the methodus initiativa, corresponding to the positions ofproven, accepted, unquestioned knowledge, and of hypothetical propositionrespectively. As defined by Bacon, "magistralis siquidem docet, initiativaintimat. Magistralis poscit, ut fides habitur us quae dicunter. Initiativa veropotius, et examen subeant."23 The "didactic" method states a conclusionwhich is to be unquestioningly accepted; the "initiative" method presents anidea or hypothesis which begs examination. The initiative method, whichBacon aligns with the aphoristic procedure, corresponds to the open attitudeof discovery which Bacon demands from the empirical scientist. Theaphoristic investigator initiates a search for truth, giving priority to thissearch itself, rather than to any prefigured conclusion.

Three qualities of the Baconian aphoristic model, to sum up, were ofseminal importance for the development of the German aphorism: 1) Ba-con's emphasis on the freedom of human wit, and the role of creative subjec-tivity in the "advancement" of knowledge; 2) closely related to this, thepriority afforded empirical, unprejudiced observation over abstract, a prioriconception and systematization, thus emphasizing the individual experience

21 Ernst Freiherr von Feuchtersieben, Zur Dialektik der Seele, 36th ed. (Vienna: CarlGerholds Sohn, 1873), pp. ix-x.

22 Cf. Krüger, p. 122, who emphasizes the aphorist's pose of "Nichtwissen."23 Quoted by Requadt, Lichtenherg, p. 187.

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of the investigator; 3) Bacon's attitude of productive scepticism, evident inthe questioning of established truths, the dismantling of rigid systems, andthe experimental curiosity of the scientist. These attributes characterize theaphoristic method of Lichtenberg, the founder of the aphoristic tradition inGermany.24

While Lichtenberg's Sudelbücher mark the inception of the characteristicform of the German aphorism, the word "aphorism" is itself never appliedby Lichtenberg to his reflections. These notebooks, never prepared or sortedfor publication, have the quality of diaries or sketchbooks: they contain theoccasional notes, jottings, observations, and reflections of a perceptive andspry mind. Throughout these notebooks the simple recording of observa-tions, conforming to the empirical scientist's receptivity to externalphenomena, alternate with witty remarks, keen intellectual analysis, intro-spective meditation, scientific-mathematical notes, and creative flights ofassociative fancy. A few examples from the Sudelbücher will document boththe rich variety of texts, and their reliance on principles which Bacon associ-ated with the aphoristic method.

In the following note Lichtenberg describes his undogmatic, aphoristic-empirical method and its benefits:

Durch das planlose Umherstreifen durch die planlosen Streifzüge der Phantasiewird nicht selten das Wild aufgejagt, das die planvolle Philosophie in ihrer wohlge-ordneten Haushaltung gebrauchen kann. (J 1550)25

One is reminded here not only of the critique which aphorists typically directat systematic philosophies, but also of the ascendancy Bacon attributed tofragmentary observation and creative subjective thought. In the metaphor ofthe hunt Lichtenberg describes the attitude of searching which informs hisreflections; but he also indicates that it is a hunt which is guided by phantasyand chance, rather than by deliberation or cunning. This text also embodiesone of the quintessential features of Lichtenberg's aphoristic style: the em-ployment of metaphorical exposition.26 Metaphorical leaps, of course, areone manifestation of that subjective quality of "Witz" to which Lichtenberg,

24 See Requadt, pp. 141-45 on Bacon's significance for Lichtenberg's aphorisms; cf.also Neumann, Ideenparadiese, pp. 69-73.

25 Lichtenberg's aphorisms will be cited by notebook and reflection number follow-ing the modernized edition of his Schriften und Briefe, ed. Wolfgang Promies(Munich: Hanser, 1966).

26 On the role of metaphor in Lichtenberg's aphorisms, see Helmut Arntzen, "Apho-rismus und Sprache: Lichtenberg und Karl Kraus," Literatur im Zeitalter derInformation (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1971), p. 330; Neumann, Ideenparadiese,pp. 238-46; Requadt, p. 19; J. P. Stern, "A Literary Definition of the Aphorism,"Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions, p. 157.

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like Bacon, assigned so much import.27 Lichtenberg describes the relation-ship between subjective wit and "objective" reason in another of his apho-risms.

Der Witz ist der Finder und der Verstand der Beobachter. (J 1620)

Dis-covery, according to this reflection, occurs only through the creativeapplication of wit. The "observational" capacity of reason, Lichtenberg im-plies, only becomes relevant after wit has made a discovery worthy ofscrutiny. This thought is repeated in slightly different form in anotheraphorism.

Man muß etwas Neues machen um etwas Neues zu sehen. (J 1770)

Ingenuity, inspiration, and creativity are the factors which contribute to theadvancement of knowledge; reason is then applied a fortiori to these newinsights in order to test their logical validity. Metaphor and associative anal-ogy are frequently the principles based on which Lichtenberg "makes some-thing new." Indeed, the aphoristic method in general lends itself well to suchproductive association of thoughts: first, because in the suppression of ex-position (in its reliance on pure observation) the aphorism permits free in-terpretation of its statement; secondly, because the isolation of the individualaphorisms begs the free association among texts which display some similar-ity or mutual relevance.

Matter-of-fact remarks often take on a mysterious, unexpressed meaningin Lichtenberg's notebooks, as in the following example.

Die Eiszapfen sind am stärksten bei der Quellef,] die Ströme am Ende. (J 1526)

On the surface this aphorism simply records an observable fact. Based ontheir commonality of substance, Lichtenberg relates icicles to streams, andexploits this association in order to express the contrast: icicles, strongest attheir source; and streams, weakest at their source. But Lichtenberg suppres-ses this internal logic, and in the process of supplying it, the reader is led tosuggestive implications which far transcend the surface of the text itself:Does, for example, this imply, by analogy, that all things which are rigid -systems, for one - are strong initially but tend to become weaker the furtherthey move from their source, while things which are fluid - the initiativemethod of the aphorist comes to mind - appear weakest at the outset butgrow ever stronger as they approach their "delta"? In the present context it isnot significant that we be able to give a definitive answer to this question;important is the simple recognition of the manner in which such ostensibly

See Neumann, Ideenparadiese, p. 100.

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facile texts can become pregnant with profound meanings through suggestedanalogical relationships.

Lichtenberg views the tendency to assign overriding significance tootherwise insignificant details as a prominent trait in his personality.

Einer der merkwürdigsten Züge in meinem Charakter ist gewiß der seltsameAberglaube, womit ich aus jeder Sache eine Vorbedeutung ziehe und in einemTage hundert Dinge zum Orakel mache . . . Jedes Kriechen eines Insekts dient mirzu Antworten über Fragen über mein Schicksal. Ist das nicht sonderbar von einemProfessor der Physik? Ist es aber nicht in menschlicher Natur gegründet und nurbei mir monströs geworden, ausgedehnt über die Proportion natürlicher Mi-schung, wo es heilsam ist? (J 715)

Meaningless events are read as signs, i.e. imbued with a significance thattranscends their own essence. In this example, of course, Lichtenberg de-scribes how objective events or observations of fact become symbolic in-scriptions of subjective, internal phenomena: "reading" the details of thephenomenal world becomes a manner for "reading" the self and divining itsfate. Yet this principle applies on a more general level and informs Lichten-berg's drive to project symbolic meanings onto observations or events.28 Wecan better imagine, in this context, the association he might have had on theoccasion of jotting down the reflection about icicles and streams quotedabove. This same process is at work in the following aphorism.

Die Sand-Uhren erinnern nicht bloß an die schnelle Flucht der Zeit, sondern auchzugleich an den Staub in welchen wir einst verfallen werden. (C 27)

Lichtenberg takes the hourglass not only for a symbol in which the passingof time is concretized, but also, through association of sand with the dustwhich one becomes after death, for a concretization of death itself.

This drive toward the free attribution of significance - a veritable rage forinterpretation - is not the only manifestation of creative "wit" in Lichten-berg's notebooks. The brooding quality manifest in this tendency is only oneside of Lichtenberg's reflections; the other side is characterized by a humoris-tic playfulness evoked by mesalliance and metaphorical extension.

Nichts als Knochen und Überrock. (E 217)

This laconic remark might be the response to an observation, but it ismarked by the suppression of any occasion or subsidiary interpretation. Itpresents a perfect example of the productive isolation of remarks so funda-mental to aphoristic expression. Lacking both subject and verb, the state-ment is constructed in conscious reference to the formulaic utterance "Nichtsals Knochen und Haut." Substituting "Überrock" for "Haut," the aphorist

28 See Wilhelm Grenzmann, "Probleme des Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus, p. 191.

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gains the advantage of surprise. Out of the unanticipated diversion awayfrom the reader's expectations, this text derives its humor. Moreover, thisremark hints at the posture which the aphorist commonly takes vis-ä-visformulaic, reified forms of language. Lichtenberg, in this sense the typicalaphorist, takes great pleasure in the manipulation and "de-construction" offormulaic utterances.

Two further aphorisms will serve to document the playfulness withwhich Lichtenberg transforms otherwise banal observations into clever,poignant aphorisms.

Er kann sich einen ganzen Tag in einer warmen Vorstellung sonnen. (C 38)Experimental-Politik, die französische Revolution. (L 322)

The second of these texts is formed by the joining in unexpressed analogy oftwo otherwise unconnected ideas. The first aphorism also functions on thebasis of an analogy; this time by transferring the pleasure associated withsunning oneself to the enjoyment one experiences with the formulation of acomforting idea. The abstract conception "Vorstellung" is substituted forthe concrete object "sun."

Thus far we have concentrated on the manifestations of creative subjec-tivity in Lichtenberg's aphorisms. Again, it is important to recognize that forLichtenberg, much as for Bacon, creative wit and objective observationinteract productively in the formulation of "knowledge." To the extent thatLichtenberg's aphorisms fuse metaphorical fancy and empirical observation,we can witness in them that combination of science and poetry, aestheticsand logic, which for later thinkers will become the hallmark of theaphorism.29

Lichtenberg also displays the trait of progressive scepticism which Baconregarded as central to the advancement of knowledge.

Dinge zu bezweifeln, die ganz ohne weitere Untersuchung jetzt geglaubt werden,das ist die Hauptsache überall. Q 1276)3°

Lichtenberg's doubt is not the product of nihilistic scepticism which doubtsfor the sake of doubt alone; rather it is a positive, progressive scepticismwhich questions accepted truths in order to test and re-test their validity. Onthe one hand, this bespeaks an attitude of independent self-reliance - onlythat is true which one has proven for oneself; on the other hand, this attitudebetrays a reluctance to accept universally formulated or accepted principleswithout first demonstrating that they indeed have validity in individual and

29 This relationship, of course, was especially important for the Romantic aphorists,but it is still present in such thinkers as Wittgenstein.

30 Cf. also J 1389.

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particular cases. In other words, Lichtenberg, as aphoristic investigator, re-mains sceptical of all generalizations or universal principles until he hasproven their feasibility for himself. This is the trait of the aphoristic thinkerwhich Paul Requadt calls "Selbstdenken. "31 One must remain cognizant ofboth words which form the compound "Selbstdenken"; for self-reliance isjust one aspect of this: the other is active thought. Thus "Selbstdenken"reflects the requirement of the aphorist that abstract law and particular in-stance never occur independent of one another, so that the progressive dia-lectic which informs their relationship might never be lost.

There is yet one rather "modern" implication in this attitude of produc-tive scepticism: the refusal to accept traditional truths without first re-testingthem can be taken as an indication that truth itself has been recognized to behistorically relative. Once all ideological claims to absolute, eternal validityhave been debunked, such truths must continually be revalidated or dis-carded: every historical epoch must decide on the applicability of past truthsfor its own unique situation. Hence truth itself becomes a category which issubject to the relativizing, altering force of history. While Lichtenberg mayonly have had a vague inkling of this profound insight, precisely such aware-ness of all-encompassing relativity is fundamental to the attitude of theaphorists who follow him.

If the attitudes of the empiricist and aphorist in Bacon's sense determinedin primary fashion Lichtenberg's thought and the nature of his Sudelhucher,then this dimension was certainly intensified and given new direction by theprofound influence of Lutheran pietism on Lichtenberg, the son of a Protes-tant preacher. On the one hand, the pietistic emphasis on the subjective andindividual unquestionably reinforced his posture regarding the role of sub-jectivity in the discovery of truth. Even more significant, perhaps, is thetendency toward reflective, brooding ponderings which the pietistic em-phasis on inwardness imparted to Lichtenberg. This helps to shape thesearching introspection characteristic of many of Lichtenberg's reflections.We have witnessed this trait in the meditation which revealed to us Lichten-berg's obsession with the symbolic interpretation of objects and events. Thissame self-searching quality is evident in this text as well.

Indem ich jetzt die Feder ansetze fühle ich mich so voll, meinem Gegenstand sogewachsen, sehe mein Buch in dem Keim so deutlich vor mir, daß ich es fastversuchen mögte mit einem einzigen Wort auszusprechen. (E 224)

This simple observation, as we know in retrospect, speaks volumes aboutLichtenberg's inability to complete major projects and undertakings. We aretempted, in fact, to read his self-diagnosis as a succinct analysis of the curse

31 Requadt, pp. 151-54.

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of all "fragmentises." Beyond this, however, Lichtenberg's reflection betraysa demeanor of distanced, objectifying - indeed, nearly alienated - observa-tion of the self; Lichtenberg seems, in fact, to set the objectifying posture ofthe empirical scientist loose upon the self, turning this scrutinizing gazeinward. Paul Requadt has employed the word "Selbstbeobachtung" to des-ignate this introspective aspect of Lichtenberg's notebooks, juxtaposing it tothe externally directed gaze of the empirical scientist which Requadt terms"Menschenbeobachtung."32 This introspective tendency explains to a largepart the diary-like quality of Lichtenberg's Sudelbücher. Yet regardless ofwhich direction his reflections take, whether inward toward the self, oroutward toward the phenomenal world of things or the social world ofhuman beings, Lichtenberg's thought displays the intermingling of the sub-jective (creative) and the objective (scientific). If his scientific observationsare guided by subjective wit, then his self-reflections are tempered by thedistanced, objective stance of the empirical observer. I shall refer to theformer instance as a subjectification of the objective, and the latter instance Iwill call the objectification of the subjective. These are two primary impulseswhich define Lichtenberg's aphoristic method, and which will subsequentlybe of assistance in assessing the aphoristic tendencies of other writers, espe-cially those of Kafka.

At this point it is requisite to ward off the possible impression that thesetwo trends in Lichtenberg's thought and aphoristic practice are mutuallyexclusive and that they somehow alternate with one another. In fact, in thecases of some texts it is not clear which of these drives is at work. Thereexists, moreover, an entire class of aphoristic texts characteristic of theSudelbücher which are defined by the very blurring of internal and externalspheres: these are the aphoristic texts composed in the otherwise uncommonthird-person "Er"-form.

Er hatte seine Bibliothek verwachsen, so wie man eine Weste verwächst. Biblio-theken können überhaupt der Seele zu enge und zu weit werden. (B 112)

The third-person form appears to be a reflex of "Menschenbeobachtung,"i. e. the recording of an observation about some other person. Yet this textcan just as easily be read as a self-reflection in which the self is treated as anobjectified "other." The point is not that we must decide between these twopossibilities, but rather that both co-exist, without one necessarily takingprecedence over the other. The second sentence of this aphorism, whichexpands the concrete observation into an abstract generalized statement,reinforces this multiplicity insofar as it implies applicability in numerouscircumstances. We experience in the text itself, then, a movement from

Requadt, pp. 20-81.

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particularized "er" to a universal statement on the possible relationshipsbetween libraries and "souls." This movement toward abstraction is under-scored both by the generalizing adverb "überhaupt," and by the expansionfrom concrete to abstract that is modelled in the metaphorical analogy"clothes are to bodies as libraries are to souls." Thus, while this reflectionmay indeed have been stimulated by either external observation or self-reflection, the occasional stimulus loses its significance in the very move-ment of the text away from the concrete toward the abstract. The interming-ling of specific example and generalized formulation in this aphorism relieson the process of induction; the reader of the text not only follows thisprocess, but eventually reverses it, moving deductively back from the gener-al hypothesis to a particular instance in her or his own life, so that in the actof reception the objective is once again subjectivized, the universal par-ticularized. The productive isolation or contextlessness of the aphoristic re-mark furthers this receptive process in which the reader is required to supplyexamples. "Menschenbeobachtung" and "Selbstbeobachtung," then, areunited by their reliance on a similar dialectical tension between particular andgeneral. In the text cited above these two processes are one, and it becomesirrelevant whether the impetus for the reflection is the self or some thirdperson: in either case, what is at stake is the subsumption of the concreteunder a universal hypothesis, and the further providing of specific examplesthat either corroborate or contradict the hypothesis.33

II. The German and French Models of Aphoristic Expression

The tension between subjectivity and objectivity, logical reason andmetaphorical fancy, describes the parameters of aphoristic expression as in-troduced by Lichtenberg. He himself possessed both enough self-objectivityto recognize the limits of such a method, and enough subjective faith todistill virtues out of these limitations.

Wenn auch meine Philosophie nicht hinreicht, etwas Neues auszufinden, so hat siedoch Herz genug, das längst Geglaubte für unausgemacht zu halten. (K 49)

The undermining of established values was not yet an end in itself for Lich-tenberg; but he viewed it as a satisfactory secondary result of his method.This critical, destructive posture takes on primary importance for lateraphorists such as Nietzsche and Kraus - indeed, it becomes a central feature

We will return to this issue when we examine Kafka's aphorisms, for here as wellthe "Er"-form becomes a significant part of the repertory of aphoristic forms, andit functions for Kafka in a like manner.

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of the aphorism in the German tradition. Thus the aphorism takes root inGermany not as an expressive form placed in the service of traditional values;nor does it undertake the dogmatic presentation of new values; rather itstrives to imbue static, rigid values and truths with fluidity and flexibility,assigning to them the character of general hypotheses whose validity mustcontinuously be tested through the application to particular instances. In thewords of Gerhard Neumann, the aphorism, especially in the German tradi-tion, insists "gerade auf dieser Darstellung des Konflikts zwischen dem Ein-zelnen, Beobachteten, Bemerkten, sinnlich Aufgenommenen einerseits undseiner Aufhebung im Allgemeinen, Merksatzhaften, Reflektierten, durchden Geist Abstrahierten andererseits."34 Out of the portrayal of this conflict,this dialectical interchange between hypothesis and experiment, between lawand application, the German aphorism derives its progressive quality.

The intellectual impeti that shape the aphorisms of Lichtenberg have beendiscussed here in some detail because they help form the basis for delineatingthe German aphorism from its counterpart in other national literatures. Mostimportantly, our remarks about Lichtenberg's aphoristic notebooks providea number of departure points for segregating the German aphorism from themaxims of the French moralists. This is imperative simply because it is theselatter texts which traditionally have served as the models for determining thenature and thrust of aphoristic expression. All too often scholars have viewedthe German aphorism with eyes conditioned by perceptions of the "sen-tences" of the French moralists, without considering whether this is an ap-propriate model. Indeed, a great deal of the confusion that surrounds con-ceptions of the aphorism stems from this misapplication of an inappropriateparadigm onto a considerably different aphoristic type.3* W. H. Auden andLouis Kronenberger, for example, seem to have the French maxim in mindwhen, in their "Foreword" to The Faber Book of Aphorisms, they claim thatan aphorism "must convince every reader that it is either universally true ortrue of every member of the class to which it refers, irrespective of thereader's convictions."36 This definition could hardly contrast more sharply

34 Neumann, "Einleitung," Der Aphorismus, p.5; cf. also Ideenparadiese, pp. 760-1.35 Among those who refer to the general confusion surrounding assessments of the

aphorism are Kurt Besser, Die Problematik der aphoristischen Form bei Lichten-berg, Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis und Nietzsche (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt,1935), pp. 9 & 15; Karl Hans Bühner, "Über den Aphorismus," Welt und Wort, 6(1951), pp. 266-7; J. Günther, "Warum soviel Aphorismen?," Neue deutsche Hef-te, 5 (1958-59), p. 739; Franz Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung,"pp. 21-2; Ulrich Horstmann, "Der englische Aphorismus: Expeditionseinladungzu einer apokryphen Gattung," Poetica, 15 (1983), p. 35.

36 Auden and Kronenberger, "Foreword," The Faber Book of Aphorisms (London:Faber & Faber, 1962), p.vii.

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with the undogmatic nature of the aphorism as descended from Bacon'sempirical method. Similarly, Fritz Schalk, attempting to define the French"aphorism," as he calls it, writes: "der Aphorismus als eine spezifischeKunstgattung unterscheidet sich durch seine philosophische Absicht als eineapodiktische, verallgemeinernde Wahrheit von allen Allegorien, Gleichnis-sen, Apothegmen, die man auch bei den Aphoristikern oft findet."37 Thoseinvestigating the German tradition might invert Schalk's hierarchy, discov-ering the true aphoristic "finds" in what he also finds. At any rate, scholarsconcerned with the German tradition of the aphorism object almost Una vocato the definition of the aphorism as an apodictic, universal truth. WalterWehe, for instance, claims:

[Der Aphorismus] will nichts Objektives, Endgültiges, sondern räumt mit altenGeglaubtheiten auf, um neuen Spielraum zu gewinnen; er definiert und systemati-siert nicht, sondern deutet zukunftsferne Möglichkeiten an; er ist seinem Wesennach dynamisch.38

One is reminded of Bacon's distinction between dogmatic and initiativemethods, the latter specifically associated by him with the form of the apho-rism. Indeed, Bacon's terminology can be employed to segregate the "initia-tive" aphorism of the German tradition from the "dogmatic" aphorism ofthe French moralists. The "sentences" of such writers as La Rouchefoucauldand Chamfort tend toward the reformulation of accepted ideas in a strikingand rhetorical manner.39 The brilliant form in which the thought is expressedtakes precedence, in this instance, over originality of content.40

Darin also hat sich der deutsche vom französischen Aphorismus unabhängig ge-macht, daß er nicht einer gesicherten oder für sicher gehaltenen Erkenntnis dieabgeschlossene und abgewogene Form gibt, sondern eine neue absichtlich aufrei-zende Erkenntnis zur Diskussion stellt und dabei schon ihre Formulierung sokategorisch wählt, daß einer Auseinandersetzung nicht auszuweichen ist.41

Franz Mautner draws a similar distinction, claiming that the aphorisms ofLichtenberg, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel

37 Fritz Schalk, "Das Wesen des französischen Aphorismus," Die neueren Sprachen,41 (1933), p. 99.

38 Walter Wehe, "Geist und Form des deutschen Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus,p. 135.

39 See Albert Höft, "Das historische Werden des Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus,p. 115.

40 It would appear that scholars who argue the primacy of form over content for theaphorism are relying on the French model; see, for example, Karl Hans Buhner,"Über den Aphorismus," p. 267; Arthur-Hermann Fink, Maxime und Fragment:Grenzmöglichkeiten einer Kunst/arm: Zur Morphologie des Aphorismus, Wort-kunst, Neue Folge, Bd. 9 (Munich: Hueber, 1934), p. 10.

41 Wehe, "Geist und Form des deutschen Aphorismus," p. 142.

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all have much in common which distinguishes them from the sentences of theFrench moralists: a stress on subjectivity, glorification of the freedom, mobility,and the intuitiveness of thought; the belief that truth may be found throughexperimentation with thought and language; a predilection for the ambiguity oflanguage because it reflects the ambiguity of the world; and a concern for "open-ness," for stimulation of the reader.42

A number of hypotheses have been put forward to account for these startlingdifferences in what is generally viewed as a unified, trans-national aphoristictradition. One is somewhat reluctant to relate these differences to nationalcharacter or culture. In fact, the final intermingling of these separate types -or, perhaps more germane, the sublation of the dogmatic in the initiativeaphorism - in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries goes against such cul-tural biases. Much more significant, of course, are temporal-historical con-siderations: the German aphorism evolves 150 years later than its Frenchcounterpart.43 Moreover, the aphorism develops in Germany in the backlashof the Kantian "revolution," and as Gerhard Neumann has argued, the re-sulting scepticism about the absolute value of theoretical knowledge contrib-uted to the constitution of the German aphorism as a form which attempts tointegrate theoretical and empirical perspectives.44 Based on this underminingof theoretical knowledge in what Neumann calls the "second Copernicanrevolution" and the prior subversion of reliable empirical knowledge in theinitial Copernican revolution, Neumann interprets the aphorisms of Lichten-berg, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and Goethe as attempts to evolve an epis-temological position which mediates between empirical and theoreticalknowledge, fusing these two in an interactive and mutually corrective sys-tem.45 Neumann terms this the "transcendental moralism" of the Germanaphorism, and it becomes his basis for distinguishing the German aphorismfrom its French counterpart.

Die Frage der traditionellen Moralistik nach dem Menschen und seiner Lebenssi-tuation wird im deutschen Aphorismus um 1800 überstiegen und zur Frage nachder konfliktbestimmten Erkenntnissituztion des Menschen erweitert.46

In the transcendental-moralistic aphorism of the German tradition, the verypossiblity of knowledge and of understanding is problematized, and this

42 Franz Mautner, "Maxim(e)s, Sentences, Fragmente, Aphorismen," Proceedings ofthe IVtb Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association (TheHague: Mouton, 1966), p. 816.

43 See Neumann, Ideenparadiese, p. 737.44 Neumann, Ideenparadiese, pp. 41-2; 69.45 Ideenparadiese, pp. 742, 820.46 Ideenparadiese, p. 826.

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problematization is presented in terms of the incessant struggle betweenparticular and general, body and spirit, logic and aesthetics.47

The French moralists and German aphorists can further be distinguishedin terms of their positions and attitudes vis-ä-vis society. The "sentences" ofthe French were products of social interaction and specifically intended forthis social setting; they grew out of the sociable interchange of the salon andwere eventually presented to salon society for its approval.48 Thus thethemes and forms of the maxims are partially determined by their participa-tion in the salon atmosphere. It is not surprising, then, that these "sen-tences," formulated within a societal framework as well as created for thissocial context, would reiterate the traditional cultural and moral values cov-eted by this society.

In contradistinction to this, the German aphorist is commonly conceivedas an individual isolated from any concrete, influential social context.49 Lich-tenberg's aphorisms, with their monologic, diary-like quality, archetypicallyrepresent the role of the aphoristic notebook as an ersatz for dialogue andsocial interchange.50 On the surface, the aphorisms of the Romantics wouldseem to be compatible with the French model, at least insofar as these "Frag-mente" were explicitly conceived in dialogical relation to one another, in thespirit of Romantic "symphilosophieren." Even the designation "Fragment"seems to indicate the integration of the individual thought into a greater,communal whole. To be sure, the early Romantics did form a society, acommunity of their own; but this intellectual community cannot be associ-ated with the ruling society of Germany at that time. In fact, the Romantics,like most German intellectuals of the period, were isolated as a group fromthe social and political centers of German society in a way which was nottrue for the French moralists. This alienation from the surrounding societyhas been viewed as paradigmatic for German intellectuals of the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries.

47 Neumann, Ideenparadiese, pp. 750-760.48 Wehe, pp.130; 132.49 See Besser, Die Problematik der aphoristischen Form, p. 131; Johannes Klein, "We-

sen und Bau des deutschen Aphorismus," Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift,22 (1934), p. 359; Arthur-Hermann Fink, Maxime und Fragment, p. 100; HerbertRoch, "Über den Aphorismus," Deutsches Volkstum, 17 (1935), 515; Wehe,p. 132.

50 Ralph-Rainer Wuthenow, "Literaturkritik, Essayistik und Aphoristik," DeutscheLiteratur: Eine Sozialgeschichte, vol. 4, ed. Horst Albert Glaser, RoRoRo 6253,(Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1980), p. 142. While Wuthenow emphasizes that Lichten-berg's aphorisms are produced by a "lonely" individual, he is incorrect in viewingthem therefore as a "Sonderform." This factor, much to the contrary, makes themconsistent with the general position of the German aphorism.

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Isolated from their uneducated fellow-townsmen, barred from the aristocracy,scattered over many sleepy little residences throughout a vast, disorganized realm,with no salons or coffeehouses in which to find their equals, the German intellectu-al had nothing to look to except himself and the vast unused knowledge of hismind.51

This turn inward toward the self, while already apparent in Lichtenberg'sSudelbücher, is nowhere so pronounced as in the Romantic "Fragment." Asalready mentioned, the subjectivity of Lichtenberg's meditations manifestsitself in his brooding introspection and in the metaphorical fancy with whichhe imbues observed phenomena. Yet in Lichtenberg's aphorisms subjectiveand objective postures remain in constant interplay, and the objective stanceof the empirical scientist is never absent. In contrast to this, the Romantic"Fragment" manifests a subjectivity unbridled by the constraints of objectiv-ity. One prominent signal of this is the disappearance in the Romantic apho-rism of anything but cognitive reality. It is no longer events, phenomena, orempirical observations which stimulate thought, but rather only thoughtitself. Even the reliance of the Romantic aphorism on pseudo-logical struc-tures and formulae can be interpreted as an attempt to disguise the over-blown subjectivity of these reflections behind a mask of reason and logic.The Romantic "Fragment," then, marks a shift from the concrete realitycharacteristic of Lichtenberg's aphorisms to an abstract mental realm inwhich thoughts commune with one another. This intensification of the sub-jective element of the aphorism is of primary consequence for the historicalevolution of this form in Germany. Emphatic subjectivity is one characteris-tic which helps distinguish the German aphorism from the French "sen-tence."52

Historically speaking, there is no direct line of influence from Lichten-berg's Sudelhiicher to the aphorisms of Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. Lich-tenberg's notebooks were first published in 1805, a number of years after theconcentrated production of aphorisms by the Romantics (Lyceumsfrag-mente, 1797; Athenäumsfragmente, 1798; Ideen, 1799; Blutenstaub, 1798).This lack of a direct influence, however, only helps to reinforce the specula-tion that the German aphorism of this period springs from a unified intellec-tual-historical source.53 Indeed, Friedrich Schlegel's fascination with aphoris-tic form was initiated by his brother's review of a German translation ofChamfort's Maximes et Pensees, indicating that the formal stimulus to the

51 Walter H.Sokel, The Writer in Extremis (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1959),p. 17f.

52 On the subjectivity of the aphorism, see Besser, p. 101-2; Grenzmann, p. 195;Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung, p. 63; Wehe, p. 131.

53 Neumann makes this argument, Ideenparadiese, p. 69.

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Romantic "Fragment" came from the tradition of the French maxim. This isevident in the character of the Romantic "Fragment," which, in contrast tothe aphorisms of Lichtenberg, reflects the conscious rhetoric, intricate struc-tures, and formal poignancy of the French „sentence." Thus the Romanticsappropriate the stylistic characteristics of the French aphorism, while adapt-ing it to their distinct purpose. Their model is then of both formal andcontentual significance for the further development of the aphorism in Ger-many.

Lichtenberg's aphorisms, one must remember, were never sorted andhoned for publication, and this accounts in part for the impression of diffuse-ness with which they leave the reader. Lichtenberg's reflections rarely havethe rhetorical power and pithiness which are associated both with the French"sentence" and the Romantic "Fragment." It is the stunning conflict between"objective" linguistic form and subjectivity of contentual expression whichthe Romantic "Fragment" introduces into the tradition of the aphorism. Thisconflict will become the constitutive element of the German aphorism in thenineteenth and twentieth centuries.54 Lichtenberg's aphorisms, we recall,also display an intermingling of subjective and objective principles; but inthis instance the ground of this conflict can be located in an intellectualstance, in the productive interplay of empirically objective observation andsubjective "wit." In the case of the Romantic "Fragment" this conflict is"sublimated," so to speak, into one between a subjective intellectual postureand objective formulation of that position. Objectivity disappears on anintellectual level, only to resurface on the level of form and style. Put in otherwords: If Lichtenberg's aphorisms represent the conflict between objectivityand subjectivity in their statement-level, in the Romantic "Fragment" thisobjectivity is dialectically sublated and preserved in the external linguisticform of the aphorism. It is this trait, this rhetorically persuasive presentationof purely subjective ideas, that has led some critics of the aphorism to call itan authoritarian form of expression. According to this view, the aphorism isan inherently dangerous genre, for it is a type of deceptive pronouncementwhich persuades through the power of its own rhetorical presence, ratherthan through the logical viability and reasonableness of its arguments.55

This, in turn, has seduced some critics into associating aphoristic expression

54 On the conflict of content and form in the German aphorism, see Besser, p. 103;Siegfried Grosse, "Das syntaktische Feld des Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus,p. 383; Krüger, p. 111; Wehe, p. 131.

55 On this "dangerous" aspect of aphoristic expression, see Karlheinz Gehrmann,"Lesefrüchte und Aphorismen," Welt und Wort, 4 (1949), p. 11; Besser, p. 135;Krüger, p. 13; Emil Lucka, "Der Aphorismus," Das literarische Echo, 21(1918-19), columns 17-20.

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with the blinding, beguiling aspect of propaganda. Nietzsche, on the otherhand, views precisely this tension between objective form and subjectivecontent as the virtue of the aphorism, calling this conflict a "moral paradox.""Der Glaube in der Form, der Unglaube im Inhalt - das macht den Reiz derSentenz aus - also eine moralische Paradoxie.56 Kurt Besser expands on thisformulation, writing: "Objektivität in der Form - Subjektivität im Inhalt,das ist das Wesen des Aphorismus in immer stärkerem Maße von Lichten-berg bis Nietzsche."57

The frequent assertion that in the German aphorism content is secondaryto form represents an incorrect formulation of this relationship.58 It would befalse to attribute priority to either of these, for the effectiveness of the apho-rism derives from the balanced conflict of these textual dimensions. Withoutthis tension between subjective content and objective form the aphorismwould lose both its typical provocativeness, as well as its "infinite," progres-sive quality. This interaction is responsible for the aphorism's ability, in thewords of one scholar, "to express more than it says."59 In the Romantic andpost-Romantic German aphorism imperative diction and rhetorical forcelend a subjective content the guise of objectivity; reciprocally, the subjectivecontent tempers the apodictic language of the text. "Aphorismen sagen et-was nicht Selbstverständliches, aber sie sagen es so, daß es sich scheinbar vonselbst versteht."60

This tension between open content and closed form is the central featurewhich distinguishes the German aphorism from the maxim of the Frenchmoralists.61 The difference between these two forms can thus not be effec-tively reduced either to textual, or to more strictly speaking "structural"characteristics; rather it resides primarily in opposing intellectual positionswith regard to the validity of inherited, traditional, "objective" values. Thesedistinct stances are expressed in the interaction of content and form, notsolely in one or the other of these. I will call these stances "integrative" in theinstance of the maxim, and "antagonistic" in the case of the German apho-rism. I employ the word "integration" not necessarily as a positive expletive,but rather, following representatives of the Frankfurt School of socialtheory, as a tendency toward the eradication of all opposition and difference.The inclination of the French maxim toward a smooth integration of content

54 Quoted by Besser, p. 103.57 Besser, p. 103.58 On the primacy of form over content see, for example, Buhner, p. 267; Fink,

p. 10.59 Hermann Ulrich Asemissen, "Notizen über den Aphorismus," Der Aphorismus,

p. 163.40 Asemissen, "Notizen über den Aphorismus," p. 163." See Franz Mautner, "Maxim(e)s, Sentences, Fragmente, Aphorismen," p. 816.

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and form, expressing an accepted moral law in a morally persuasive tone andstyle, replicates the socially integrative function which the maxims per-formed. Their centripetal structural movement corresponds to the drive forreiteration and revitalization of established ethical and social positions. In itsreceptive aspect, then, the maxim functions in such a way as to draw itsreader back into the moral circle of society. The centrifugal movement of theGerman aphorism, inherent in the antagonism of content and form, corre-sponds to its antagonistic position with regard to the established conventionsof society: it seeks to draw its audience out of the circle - to the extent thatsuch a circle even exists - challenging rigid ideologies with its non-integra-tive, non-integrable subjectivity.62 In short, the German aphorism is "ec-centric," in the truest sense of this word.

The oppositional posture of the German aphorism will be discussed morefully below. At this point it seems appropriate to caution once again that theadjectives "French" and "German," as applied in the delineation of the inte-grative and antagonistic aphorism respectively, refer to the historical originsof these forms, and not to characteristics necessarily inherent in either Frenchor German culture. Thus it is the overriding literary program of Romanti-cism in Germany which determines the appropriateness of the "Fragment"for these writers. One need only recall Novalis's definition of "romanticiz-ing" in order to become cognizant of the proximity of Romantic poetics tothe specific form of the German aphorism.

Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein geheimniß-volles Ansehn, dem Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einenunendlichen Schein gebe so romantisiere ich es -. (Schriften, II, 545)63

The antagonistic aphorism, however, is by no means restricted to Germanauthors. To be sure, the French aphorists of the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies gravitate toward this aphoristic type.64 Conversely, the integrativeaphorism is employed by some German writers - Goethe's Maximen undReflexionen fall partially into this category, as do Hugo von HofmannsthaPsaphorisms in the Buch der Freundet

62 A number of scholars have brought out the antagonistic relationship which theaphorist senses for his environment; see Asemissen, p. 165; Wilhelm Grenzmann,"Probleme des Aphorismus," pp.181 & 188; Krüger, p. 106; Neumann, "Einlei-tung," p. 3; György Nädor, "Über einen Aphorismustyp und seine antiken Vor-läufer," Das Altertum, 8 (1962), p. 11; Herbert Roch, "Über den Aphorismus,"p. 515.

63 Novalis, Schriften, ed. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel, 4 vols. (Stuttgart:Kohlhammer, 1960); henceforth cited as Schriften with volume and page number.

64 Neumann makes this point, Ideenparadiese, pp. 68 f.65 Rainer Noltenius coins the term "geselliger Aphorismus" to describe the apho-

risms of Goethe and Hofmannsthal; see his Hofmannsthal - Schröder - Schnitzler·.

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The division of the aphoristic genre into two distinct types, conclusive(dogmatic) and stimulative (initiative), runs like a leitmotif through the liter-ature on this genre. Wittgenstein metaphorically summarizes the nature ofthese two aphoristic types when he comments: "Es gibt Bemerkungen, diesäen, und Bemerkungen, die ernten."66 The image of "sowing" for the pro-vocative aphoristic remark reminds one of such designations as Novalis's"Blutenstaub" and Carl Dallago's "Sämereien," both terms chosen to de-scribe aphoristic collections.67 "Reaping," on the other hand, fittingly de-scribes the conclusiveness and finality of the dogmatic aphorism in its capaci-ty as succinct summarizer of traditional values.

This partition of the genre of the aphorism into two distinct types isreflected as well in the definitions that scholars have attributed to the Greekverb aphorizein from which the word "aphorism" derives. Most commonlyit is translated as "to delimit," "to mark off," or "to define"; however, it isalternatively taken to mean "to set beyond a horizon," or "to expand beyondits established context."68 It is quite possible, of course, that this seconddefinition has been read back into the original meaning of the word"aphorizein," based on association with the qualities of the aphorism. Be thatas it may, the distinction itself has been firmly established in scholarship onthe aphorism, primarily due to the seminal work done by Franz Mautner inthe area of aphorism studies. Mautner's differentiation between the aphorismof "Einfall" and that of "Klärung" overlaps to a large extent with what wehave called the initiative (ec-centric) and the dogmatic (integrative) aphoris-tic types. Mautner describes "Einfall" in terms of the "Ausgangspunkt be-wußten Denkens," or, more metaphorically, as "das Aufreißen einer Aus-sicht auf nebelverhülltes Gebiet."69 Thus "Einfall" refers to "inspired"thought, the sudden, unplanned, and unpredictable discovery of a uniqueinsight. "Klärung," in contrast to this, is described as the "Endpunkt bewuß-ten Denkens" and as "das Finden der Antwort auf angestrengtes Fragen."70

Mautner, then, emphasizes the conscious attitude of searching versus the

Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des modernen Aphorismus, Germanistische Abhand-lungen, 30 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1969), pp. 5 f. Noltenius, of course, also includesthe Romantic "Fragment" in this category, presumably because of the "commu-nal" nature of these texts themselves; however, in its receptive aspect, the Roman-tic "Fragment" does not fit into this category.

66 Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, p. 148.67 Dallago's aphorisms appeared in the magazine Der Brenner, issues 1 (1910); 2

(1911-12); 3 (1912-13) and 5 (1915), commonly under the heading "kleine Säme-reien."

68 See Neumann, Ideenparadiese, pp. 26-7 for a discussion of these two interpreta-tions of the Greek verb.

69 Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als Literatur," p. 285.70 Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als Literatur," pp. 285 f.

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unconscious event of inspiration in drawing his distinction. He attempts torelate these differing attitudes to distinct formal or textual elements, butthese associations remain problematic.71 Finally, Mautner views "Einfall" asbeing paradigmatically at work in the Romantic "Fragment," while"Klärung" he sees as typical of the French maxim.72 All of these distinctionshave contributed significantly to our understanding of the nature and func-tion of these two common aphoristic types. However, these differentiationshave their limitations, and they are no substitute for close analysis of thesedistinct aphoristic types with an eye for structural considerations as well asfor receptive impact. The sections that follow will attempt to shed somelight both on the internal structural workings of the aphorism, and on thedimension of reception. To this end I will discuss the aphorism in terms ofwhat I call its text-internal dialectic and its text-external dialectic, seeking todifferentiate the previously examined aphoristic types on these grounds.

III. The Text-Internal Dialectic of the Aphorism

Hiltrud Häntzschel-Schlotke has pointed to an essential paradox between thepathological search for truth and simultaneous scepticism about the verypossibility of truth that she believes to be characteristic of the thought ofNietzsche.73 This same paradox is typical of the thought of most Germanaphorists. The aphorism, even for such thinkers as Francis Bacon, is a modeof expression explicitly concerned with the accurate representation of facts;yet the aphorist commonly questions the very possibility of truthful rep-resentation, so that the aphoristic endeavor is conditioned by this fundamen-tal conflict. Truth itself becomes problematic for the aphorist, for, at best, itis something recognized to be historically and culturally - i. e. contextually -determined. The progressive, incessantly changing character of truth moti-vates the aphorist to evolve an expressive form which reflects this alterabilityin its own potential for multiple "sense." The antagonism inscribed withinthe structure of the aphorism, which stems from the conflict it presentsbetween apodictically "closed" form and infinitely "open" content, reflectsthe conflict of truth which is characteristic of aphoristic thought. The apho-rism is so effective in its portrayal of this conflict simply because it concen-trates this tension into such confined textual space. This conflict itself hasbeen variously construed by critics. Some, like Johannes Klein, view it sim-

71 "Der Aphorismus als Literatur," pp.287 & 293f.72 Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," Der Aphorismus, p. 57.73 Hiltrud Häntzschel-Schlotke, "Der Aphorismus als Stilform bei Nietzsche," Diss.

Heidelberg 1967, p. 12.

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ply as the paradigmatic tension between the extremely finite and the infinite:"Unendlichkeit und Kürze treffen sich im Aphorismus."74 Heinz Krügerattributes metaphysical significance to this tension, interpreting it as theconflict between being and becoming.75

The common denominator in all descriptions of the internal structure ofthe aphorism is the pattern of dualistic opposition in which two conflictingdrives function in a reciprocal interchange. Numerous oppositional pairs canbe - and have been - substituted into this structure by various theoreticiansor aphorists. Friedrich Schlegel, writing in a letter to Novalis from De-cember 2, 1798, asserted:

Die Fragmente von mir . . . sind klassische Materialien und klassische Studienoder Experimente eines Schriftstellers, der die Schriftstellerei als Kunst und alsWissenschaft treibt oder zu treiben strebt.76

This conception of the aphorism as a textual form which merges the interestsof art and science is often reiterated by scholars.77 Closely related to this isthe conception of the aphorism as a fusion of logical and aesthetical princi-ples,78 a view which perceives aphorists as thinkers suspended between thepoles of rationality and mysticism.79 To these Gerhard Neumann adds theconflicts of "Denken" and "Darstellung," spirituality and sensuality, para-dox and metaphor, among others.80 This multiplicity underscores the cen-trality of this dualistic oppositional model for aphoristic thought and expres-sion.

The struggle between antagonistic principles that the aphorism evidencesin its "deep-structural" or thought level is also reflected in the rhetorico-syntactical elements which structure the textual surface. The aphorism dem-onstrates a penchant for the application of dualistically structured figures ofspeech such as antithesis, antimetabole, syntactical parallelism, syntacticalinversion, and use of copula. A few exemplary aphorisms will help elucidatethis. The first example is a text by Lichtenberg.

Nicht jeder Original-Kopf führt eine Original-Feder, und nicht jede Original-Feder wird von einem originellen Kopf regiert. (E 414)

74 Johannes Klein, "Wesen und Bau des deutschen Aphorismus," p. 361.75 Krüger, p. 105.76 Quoted by Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," p. 40.77 See, for example, Neumann, "Einleitung," p. 9; Wehe, p. 134; Wuthenow, ''Lite-

raturkritik, Essayistik und Aphoristik," p. 146 f.78 Neumann, "Einleitung," p. 15; Ideenparadiese, pp. 75; 84; Wittgenstein's Trac-

tatus incorporates this conception into its philosophical purpose.79 Grenzmann, p. 192; Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als Literatur," p. 299, "Der

Aphorismus als literarische Gattung," p. 73.80 Ideenparadiese, pp. 760, 773, 826; "Einleitung," p. 9.

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This aphorism is structured around inversion in the form of antimetabole:the order of "Original-Kopf" and "Original-Feder" of the first clause isinverted to become "Original-Feder" and "originellen Kopf" in the second.This inversion contrasts with the parallelism of the two clauses, introducedby anaphora ("Nicht jeder," "nicht jede"). These clauses, moreover, joinedby copula, follow identical syntactical patterns: negation, demonstrative arti-cle, verb, object. More interesting, and simultaneously more aphoristicallycharacteristic, are the subtle ways in which this text diverts from either crassparallelism or simple inversion. This is accomplished, on the one hand, bythe variation from "Original-Kopf" to "originellen Kopf," and in the trans-formation from active voice in the first clause to passive voice in the second.In addition, Lichtenberg plays on the semantic similarity of the verbs"führen" and "regieren." In the phrase "Feder führen," of course, the verbloses its common association with leadership; but the introduction of thesynonym "regieren" in the second clause draws out this meaning. The as-sociation with "Feder führend" in the sense of "acting in the stead of" or"substituting for" is also evoked, so that the central tensions are constructedaround issues of control or lack of control. We perceive in this example thedepth of meaning which can be achieved with what appear to be shallowdevices. Significant here is the manner in which Lichtenberg systematicallydeviates from pure opposition or identity, thus avoiding the impression ofmere mechanical ordering which would detract from the power of theaphoristic statement. It has been maintained of Nietzsche's aphorisms thatthey function similarily, establishing oppositions in such a way "daß nichtvon einer Sache ihr genaues logisches Gegenteil behauptet wird, sondernetwas, das neben der streng logischen contradictio liegt, um eine Nuanceverschoben."81 Gerhard Neumann perceives this process of inversion anddiversion as quintessential to the aphorism.82 Even more significant in thecontext of this study is Neumann's detailed analysis of just such a procedurein Kafka's aphorisms, a technique which Neumann refers to as Kafka's"gleitendes Paradox."83 Kafka's employment of this "standard" aphoristictechnique helps to forge a bond between his aphoristic texts and the traditionof the German aphorism, which abounds with such texts as the one byLichtenberg cited above.

Our second example of an aphoristic text which paradigmatically dis-plays aphoristic techniques and strategies comes from Novalis.

Alles ist Samenkorn. (Schriften, II, 563)

81 Häntzschel-Schlotke, "Der Aphorismus als Stilform bei Nietzsche," p. 53.82 Ideenparadiese, p. 757.83 "Umkehrung und Ablenkung: Franz Kafkas 'gleitendes Paradox'," DVjs, 42

(1968), 702-744.

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This text belongs to a sub-genre of the aphorism commonly called the"pseudo-definition." Especially noteworthy in this example is the extremecondensation of the text, as well as the mathematical objectivity of thesimple equation "Alles" = "Samenkorn." This structural matter-of-factnesscontrasts with the universalizing tendency inherent in the "Alles" and in themetaphorical relationship established with the reference to "seed." Themetaphorical association is made palatable by the simple and persuasive logicof the syntactical structure. Reformulated into the terminology RomanJakobson employed in his celebrated essay "Two Aspects of Language andTwo Types of Aphasic Disturbances,"84 linguistic contiguity is employed tounderwrite and buttress the associative abandon of the similarity function.

A similar, if more complex interplay between logic and metaphoricalassociation, contiguity and similarity, can be identified in the followinganalogical aphorism by Friedrich Schlegel.

Das Druckenlassen verhält sich zum Denken wie eine Wochenstube zum erstenKuß. (KA, II, 174)

This text is structured around proportional analogy in the form "A is to B asC is to D." In order to elucidate the relationship between thought and itsconcrete expression in the written word, Schlegel compares it to the relation-ship between first kiss, i. e. the inception of physical love, and its culmina-tion in the birth of a child. Of primary interest in our context is the mannerin which logical necessity and creative association intermingle to produce athought which is both unusual, yet easily acceptable. Schlegel establishes onelogical relationship, then associatively applies it to a wholly distinct config-uration, thereby transferring this logical relation from one configuration tothe other. Contiguity and similarity function in complicity to bring aboutthis novel insight into the relationship between conception and concretiza-tion of a text. Other elements in this aphorism contribute to the overalleffect; the metonymic expression "Wochenstube" for pregnancy and birth,especially, encourages the reader to read its structurally parallel element,"Druckenlassen," as a metonymic cipher for the complex of ideas associatedwith the process of textual production. One can then easily imagine the textas a "child" born of its parents, but free to evolve according to its ownhistorical experience and contacts.

These examples have been intended to demonstrate the correspondenceof conceptual oppositions and interactions on the expressive level of theaphorism with linguistic, i. e. semantic or syntactic, oppositions on its textu-

Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Distur-bances," Fundamentals of Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), pp. 53-82, esp.pp. 76-82.

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al level. This recurrence of oppositions on distinct textual levels, and theinteractive possibilities which result from it, determines the peculiar densityand effectiveness of the "German" aphorism. Ultimately, as will becomeclear, these text-internal tensions are further coupled to text-externalphenomena established in the act of reception.

Scholarship on the aphorism has been burdened with a proliferation ofconceptual pairs introduced in order to define this complex set of dualities. Itwould be of great benefit if these oppositions could be subsumed under onepair of terms. I propose adoption of Roman Jakobson's distinction betweenthe "metaphoric" and " metonymic" poles to describe the diverse opposi-tions discussed here.85 Jakobson's terminology has the advantage of havingachieved general currency among scholars. In this sense, it is not a matter ofintroducing new terminology, but rather of simply adapting that commonterminology to the specific case of the study of the aphorism. More signifi-cant yet is the breadth inherent in these terms themselves, since, as Jakobsonhimself emphasized, they are applicable both in the area of semantics and inthe realm of syntax.86 The concomitant expressions "similarity" and "conti-guity" prove especially effective in attempting to portray both the linguisticcharacteristics of the aphoristic text, and its expressive relationships on thelevel of thought. Metonymy, or contiguity function, adequately definesboth syntactical and logical structures which function on the basis of serialcombination; metaphor, or similarity function, refers both to the linguisticfigure of speech and to the process of association which allows substitutionbased on perceived similarity.

Freely applying this terminology, one can hazard a descriptive definitionof the aphorism which is general enough to be encompassing, yet specificenough to be useful; in addition, this definition can allow for limited speciesvariation within the generic category. Using Jakobson's phrases the apho-rism can be defined as a prose genre in which, in a strictly compressed textualspace, the metaphorical and metonymical drives of language and thoughtenter into an exaggerated dialectical interplay, at times waging a heated andconcerted struggle against each other, while at other times mutually rein-forcing one another. The aphorism, then, expresses in consciously exagger-ated fashion the dialectical relationship between similarity and contiguity,metaphor and metonymy, creative association and logical order. In this

85 Jakobson, "The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles," Fundamentals of Language,pp. 76-82.

84 Jakobson, p. 88. Hugh B redin has criticized the proliferation of Jakobson's termi-nology precisely because of its pliability; see his article "Roman Jakobson onMetaphor and Metonymy," Literature and Philosophy, 8, No. 1 (1984), pp.89-103.

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context one is still able to conceive of the aphorism, as does Neumann, as anexpressive form that portrays and problematizes the " Erkenntnissituation"of human beings as spanned between art and science, depiction and abstractthought, empirical and theoretical knowledge.87

Jakobson's distinction is easily graftable onto the differentiation ofaphoristic categories as proposed by Kurt Besser,88 allowing for a rudimen-tary subdivision of aphoristic types. Besser suggests that, delineating accord-ing to the thought processes ("Arten der Gedankenbildung") active in theproduction of aphoristic texts, one can differentiate three distinct aphoristictypes. He cites association, analogy, and antithesis as these three fundamen-tal principles of thought formation. Association he connects to the applica-tion of metaphor, and he conceives Lichtenberg's aphorisms as texts whichdemonstrate a dominance of metaphorical relationships. Analogy Besser re-lates to the application of mathematical or logical formulae, and he finds suchprinciples to be dominant in the aphorisms of Friedrich Schlegel andNovalis. Finally, Besser associates antithesis with the propensity to con-tradict established values, i.e. the drive for the transvaluation of values; andnot surprisingly he views Nietzsche's aphorisms as paradigmatic examples oftexts which embody this reflex.

Besser's categorization is quite useful and has the advantage that it relatesindividual types to the aphoristic production of exemplary authors.Nonetheless, some overhauling of his categorization is in order. The majorpitfall one must avoid at all cost is to take these distinctions too absolutely:one can never speak of a thought process which is at work alone in theproduction of a particular aphoristic text; at best one can argue for thedominance of one of these principles over the others. That is to say that mostaphoristic texts will manifest all of these principles to greater or lesser de-grees, and in the final analysis it is the relative mixture of these that issignificant. It is also requisite that one bracket off the category of antithesisfrom the other two; for while association and analogy are primarily text-internal principles, antithesis is text-external, i. e. its functioning depends onthe establishing of a frame of reference that exists beyond the text itself. Inother words, while association and analogy are constructed within the textand are therefore text-specific, antithesis can only be constructed in the act ofreception and is thus reader-specific. Once this segregation has been accom-plished, one can easily substitute the terms "metaphor" and "similarity" forBesser's associative principle, and the words "metonymy" and "contiguity"for what Besser calls analogy. This friendly amendment to Besser's proposed

87 Ideenparadiese, pp. 760, 773, 826.88 Besser, pp. 80-86.

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categorization allows us to speak of a "metaphoric" aphorism where similar-ity functions predominate, and a "metonymic" aphorism where contiguityprinciples rule. For Besser's third category I will apply the term "contra-dictory" aphorism, emphasizing the rejection of accepted "truths."

It cannot be emphasized enough that these three principles are by nomeans mutually exclusive. Indeed, in the textual analyses accomplished thusfar we have concentrated on the productive interaction of these distinctdrives. The ultimate purpose of this categorization, then, is, on the onehand, to allow for coherent discussion and analysis of the aphoristic produc-tion of various authors, while applying consistent terminology throughout;on the other hand, this procedure will allow for an orientation of Kafka'saphorisms into this typology, and thus provide the basis for a relative assess-ment of the position of his aphoristic texts within the landscape of aphoristictypes and possibilities.

IV. Aphorism and Hermeneutics: The Text-External Dialectic

More than perhaps any other literary form, the aphorism is typified by itsself-conscious awareness of the receptive act of reading. Critics have general-ly attributed considerable importance to the exaggerated emphasis thataphorists and aphorisms place on effect and effectiveness. Hermann Asemis-sen goes so far as to maintain that the distinguishing characteristic of theaphorism is its unique effect, and that the presence of this stimulation, com-monly called the aphoristic pointe, can be made into the acid test for thediscovery of genuine aphorisms. "So oft jener spezifische ästhetische Genußsich einstellt, gibt sich ein echter Aphorismus zu entdecken."89 To be sure,while the aphorism is a literary genre which is conceived with explicit andemphatic appeal to its readers, this is not necessarily a trait which distin-guishes it from other genres. First of all, one must consider the aphorism'seffect as one characteristic among many which determine the nature of thegenre. Secondly, one must closely examine the precise constitution of theinteraction between text and reader in the case of the aphorism, as well as thetextual strategies which guide it, in order to arrive at aspects of this interac-tion which are specific to aphoristic discourse.

The aphorism's appeal to its reader is commonly conceived in terms ofthe demand expressed in the text that the reader complete, supply, or test thepresented thought.90 This demand, of course, is related to the applicative89 Asemissen, p. 161.90 On the reader's role in the reception of the aphorism, see Asemissen, p. 164;

Albrecht Fabri, "Fragment, Aphorismus, Essai," Hochland, 36 (1939), p. 516;Krüger, p. 41; Neumann, "Einleitung," p. 5; Wuthenow, p. 145.

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function of the aphorism as described by Bacon. Implicit in the "univer-salized" formulation of the aphoristic statement is the requirement that thereader work deductively from this generalization to specific incidents, re-turning back from the specific to the general through a process of induction.

Nietzsche describes one strategy of fragmentary expression in an apho-rism from Menschliches Allzumenschliches, and this program could be ap-plied to the aphorist in general.

Denker als Stilisten. - Die meisten Denker schreiben schlecht, weil sie uns nichtnur ihre Gedanken, sondern auch das Denken der Gedanken mitteilen. (Werke, I,563)

The aphorist, then, is someone who supplies only a skeletal outline ofthoughts, allowing the reader to "flesh out" this skeleton by supplying the"thinking"that leads to the "thoughts." The aphoristic method, accordingly,corresponds to the recording of conclusions without indicating the assump-tions out of which they develop. Because of this suppression of the develop-mental process, the aphoristic thought appears to occur suspended without acontext; the reader reacts by attempting to reconstruct the thought processfor which the aphoristic remark serves as a conclusion. Goethe describes theaphorism in similar terms as a stimulant to re-constructive thought, claimingthat such "kaum zusammenhängend[e] Sätze . . . uns aber nötigen, vermit-telst eines umgekehrten Findens und Erfindens rückwärtszugehen und unsdie Filiation solcher Gedanken von weit her, von unten herauf wo möglichzu vergegenwärtigen."91 Significantly, Goethe emphasizes precisely the re-verse process by which the reader must proceed from conclusion, throughconceptual development, to initial stimulus. In this manner the aphorismactually performs a profoundly didactic function: while it may not functionas a dogmatic transmitter of knowledge or values, it does mediate a methodof discovery, encouraging its reader to appropriate its conceptual apparatus.As Heinz Krüger has so pointedly phrased it, the "Selbstdenken" of theaphorist encourages "Selbstdenken" in the reader of aphorisms.92

This re-creative process which the aphorism animates has promptedsome scholars to compare aphoristic texts to oracular statements or riddles.93

Like these, the aphorism displays an enigmatic quality which impels one toscrutinize its make-up and its content. Thus, although expressed in the formof an unequivocal assertion, the aphorism is in fact a question; for its persua-

91 Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Goethes Werke, "Hamburger Ausgabe," 7th ed.,14 vols., ed. Erich Trunz, (Hamburg: Christian Wegener Verlag, 1967), VIII,124-5.

92 Krüger, p. 41.93 György Nador, "Über einen Aphorismustyp und seine antiken Vorläufer," pp. 9

& 12; Asemissen, p. 164; Requadt, p. 138.

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sive, apodictic language represents a challenge to the audience, begging it tocorroborate the stated opinion, or to differ with it. The reader is engaged in athoughtful dialogue with the text.94 In its receptive dimension the aphorismparadigmatically induces the hermeneutical interaction of the text and readerin which a progressive dialogue ensues upon the questioning of the reader bythe text.95 In other words, the formal provocation and thoughtful provoca-tiveness of the aphorism invite the reader to enter into the hermeneuticalprocess of "understanding." This function of the aphorism has been suc-cinctly and aphoristically formulated by Kurt Hiller.

Weil es unmöglich ist, das Gesamte in einem Satz auszusagen, ist das System nötig;der Aphorismus, damit es möglich wird, hineinzuspringen in das Gesamte miteinem Satz.96

Hiller's remark hints at a more subtle relationship between aphorism andsystematic understanding than that of mere contrast. The aphorism, heproposes, makes entrance into the systematic whole possible - it catapultsone into the very heart of the issues addressed. We only need to substitute"Zirkel" for "das Gesamte" in this reflection to recognize its proximity toMartin Heidegger's famous statement about the hermeneutic circle.

Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus -, sondern in ihn nach derrechten Weise hineinzukommen. Dieser Zirkel des Verstehens ist nicht ein Kreis,in dem sich eine beliebige Erkenntnisart bewegt, sondern er ist der Ausdruck derexistenzialen Vor-struktur des Daseins selbst. Der Zirkel darf nicht zu einem vi-tiosum und sei es auch zu einem geduldeten herabgezogen werden. In ihm verbirgtsich eine positive Möglichkeit ursprünglichen Erkennens, die freilich in echterWeise nur dann ergriffen ist, wenn die Auslegung verstanden hat, daß ihre erste,ständige und letzte Aufgabe bleibt, sich jeweils Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriffnicht durch Einfalle und Volksbegriffe vergeben zu lassen, sondern in deren Aus-arbeitung aus den Sachen selbst her das wissenschaftliche Thema zu sichern.97

The circular procedure of hermeneutical understanding recalls the applicativeprocess demanded of the aphorism in which the interpreter constantly medi-ates between particular and universal, and vice versa. Heidegger's commentreminds us also that the hermeneutically productive aphorism can never besimple "Einfall," just as it cannot rely on "Volksbegriffe"; instead, it must begrounded in "Vorhabe," "Vorsicht," and "Vorgriff" that are evolved "aus

94 Nädor has emphasized the dialogic character of the aphorism, pp. 8-12.95 This dialogic aspect of hermeneutics has been most avidly defended by Hans-

Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode; see esp. the chapter "Der hermeneuti-sche Vorrang der Frage," pp.344-60, in particular pp.348 & 351.

% Hiller's aphorism is anthologized in the collection Jüdische Aphorismen aus zweiJahrtausenden, ed. Egon Zeitlin (Frankfurt: Ner-Tamid-Verlag, 1963), p. 123.

97 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 15th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), paragraph32, p. 153.

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den Sachen selbst." This requirement does not ring all that different from thedemand of the aphorist and empirical scientist Francis Bacon that any systemof understanding remain in touch with the phenomena - indeed, be derivedfrom the phenomena - which it attempts to explain.

Viewed in the context of recent theories of hermeneutics, the aphorism as"fragment" serves as an entranceway into the circular relationship of part towhole, whole to part which hermeneutical theory describes. As self-con-scious fragment - as the part which calls for contextualization in a whole -the aphorism challenges the reader to project a contextual whole underwhich the part can sensibly be subsumed.98 Hermeneutics, as the interactivedialectic of part and whole, provides a productive horizon in which theprogressive, dialectical structure of the aphorism can be comprehended. Thetext-internal dualities of the aphorism prefigure and pro-ject this text-exter-nal dialectic of interactive "Verstehen."

Of utmost significance for the peculiarities of inception and developmentof the aphorism in the German tradition is its historically parallel evolutionto the development of hermeneutical thought in the Romantic and post-Romantic periods." The dynamism and thoughtful progressivity of theaphorism are fundamentally related to the dynamic circularity of hermeneu-tic understanding. Gadamer's portrayal of the "Polarität von Vertrautheitund Fremdheit, auf die sich die Aufgabe der Hermeneutik gründet,"100

evokes the tension between the known and the unknown, the common andthe unique that characterizes aphoristic expression. Gadamer further desig-nates the locus of hermeneutics as this space between the known and theunknown, asserting emphatically: "In diesem Zwischen ist der wahre Ortder Hermeneutik."101 Our previous analysis has sought to lay bare the dialec-tically interactive structure essential to the aphorism. On all of the levelsexamined the aphorism betrays its true locus as the "Zwischen," the "in-between" of its oppositional poles. This locus is defined by a process ofmediation, of reciprocal interaction: this is precisely the dynamics whichGadamer, following Kant and Schiller, refers to as "Spiel," and conceives asthe principle movement of aesthetic portrayal.102 Gadamer's summation ofthis process rings strikingly similar to descriptions of the dynamics ofaphoristic expression. "Immer ist das Hin und Her einer Bewegung gemeint,

98 On "Sinn" and "Entwerfen" see Gadamer, p. 251.99 This historical coincidence of hermeneutics and "aphoristics" in the German tradi-

tion has, to the best of my knowledge, never been remarked upon in detail byscholars.

100 Gadamer, p. 279.101 Gadamer, p. 279.102 See Gadamer, pp. 97-105.

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die an keinem Ziele festgemacht ist, an dem sie endet."103 The "infinity" ofthe aphorism, in this context, comes to be understood not as an infinitybeyond, but as an infinity within, much as in geometry there exists an infinitenumber of further points between any two established points on a line. In theinteraction of aphoristic text and reader, the to-and-fro between object andsubject, between textually objectified subject and interpretive-receptive sub-ject, the aphorism presents the "Spiel" of progressive, dialogic interpretationof the sort postulated by Gadamer. The rejection of Cartesian objectivitythus informs in essential ways both the development of modern hermeneuti-cal theory in Germany,104 and the historically parallel evolution of German"aphoristics."

Nietzsche was profoundly aware of this relationship between the form ofthe aphorism and the hermeneutical endeavor, as a passage from his "Vor-rede" to Zur Genealogie der Moral demonstrates.

Ein Aphorismus, rechtschaffen geprägt und ausgegossen, ist damit, daß er abgele-sen ist, noch nicht "entziffert"; vielmehr hat nun erst dessen Auslegung zu begin-nen, zu der es eine Kunst der Auslegung bedarf. (Werke, II, 770)

The primary virtue of the aphorism, then, is precisely that it cannot be readcasually; it requires of its reader the learning and the applying of a "Kunst derAuslegung." The introduction and dissemination of this art of interpretationis the central purpose of the aphorism in the German tradition.

A question remains as to the devices and techniques employed in aphoris-tic expression which would conform to the evocation of this hermeneuticalprovocation. I will refer to these devices as the aphorism's strategies ofinvolvement, and categorize them according to three principles: consciousobscurity; cotextuality; and intertextuality.

The "obscurantist" element of aphoristic expression is inherent in itscharacter as "riddle" or oracle. This technique is marked by a consciousobfuscation of what is otherwise clear, or by a mystification of the common-place. In this context it is worthwhile to recall once again Novalis's defini-tion of the process of romanticization, for it emphasizes this estrangement ofthe familiar:

Indem ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein geheimniß-volles Ansehn, dem Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einenunendlichen Schein gebe so romantisiere ich es -. (Schriften, II, 545)

The coincidence of this definition with the purpose and goal of the aphorismunderscores the organic connection of this genre to the poetics of the early

103 Gadamer, p. 99.104 On the rejection of Cartesian thought by hermeneutics, see David Couzens Hoy,

The Critical Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley:Univ. of California Press, 1978), p. 3.

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Romantics.105 Nietzsche also addresses the issue of conscious obscurity,maintaining in paragraph 381 of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft: "Man will nichtnur verstanden werden, wenn man schreibt, sondern ebenso gewiß auchnicht verstanden werden" (Werke, II, 256). Nietzsche, however, as he him-self goes on to describe, employs obscurity of expression as a means forselecting his readership. Unclarity serves to discourage those readers forwhom the texts are not suitable, or who are not already cognizant of theproblems the texts address. Nonetheless, this points just as directly atNietzsche's awareness of the interpretive effort which the reception of thesetexts entails, and he implies that only those readers will "understand" histexts who are intelligent and ambitious enough to reconstruct their "sense"despite its obscurity. Certainly, Nietzsche also believed that certain asser-tions can simply not be made "up front," but must be hidden in subterfuge.Another aphqrist, Karl Kraus, refers to the programmatic complexity of histexts, locating the specific purpose of this complexity in the desire to promptan interpretive commentary on the part of the reader.

Zu meinen Glossen ist ein Kommentar notwendig. Sonst sind sie zu leicht ver-ständlich. (BW, 287)106

In his early fragments on hermeneutics, Schleiermacher emphasized the roleof contradiction and unclarity as the stimuli which initiate the "unendlicheAufgabe" of understanding.

Zwei entgegengesetzte Maximen beim Verstehen, l.) Ich verstehe alles bis ich aufeinen Widerspruch oder Nonsens stoße 2.) ich verstehe nichts was ich nicht alsnothwendig einsehe und construiren kann. Das Verstehen nach der letzten Maxi-me ist eine unendliche Aufgabe.107

Schleiermacher's reflection indicates some of the points of intersection be-tween the nature of the aphorism and the nascent theory of hermeneutics.The conflicting dualities inherent in aphoristic expression, its productivecontradictions, its "openness," and its enigmatic obscurity are all relatedforms of "appeal" to the reader which initiate the obsession for entering in onthe infinite task of understanding. All function by engaging reader and textin a hermeneutical event.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of aphoristic expression is thegroup configuration - the aphoristic "collection" - in which these texts are

105 Fink, p. 95 associates the principle of unclarity with the Romantic "Fragment,"and bases his distinction of the "Fragment" from the French maxim on this trait.

106 Kraus's aphorisms will be cited from the edition Beim Wort genommen, ed. Hein-rich Fischer (Munich: Kosel, 1955) and noted by the abbreviation BW and the pagenumber.

107 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: CarlWinter, 1959), p. 31.

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traditionally published. The centrality of this group configuration in theaphorism's depiction of humankind's problematical epistemological situa-tion has been emphasized by Gerhard Neumann.108 Structuralistmethodologies, however, have provided the most fruitful approach for theexamination of this group configuration of the aphorism. Serge Meleucpoints to the break between individual aphorisms as a "space" opened up inthe surface of the greater aphoristic "text" - text understood here as theentire collection of aphorisms taken as a whole.109 The "gaps" between thesub-texts in the aphoristic collection take on the character of interpretive"spaces" which mark the need for the reader to supply interpretive connec-tions. Put another way, the gaps between the aphoristic texts act as symbolicindicators of the absent "totality."110 Harald Fricke has drawn the conse-quences of this insight for an examination of the receptive dimension ofaphoristic expression.

Erst die Bruchstelle beim Übergang von einem Aphorismus zum nächsten verleihtalso jedem einzelnen von ihnen den Charakter des Fragmentarischen und bewegtden Leser dazu, die fehlenden Teile des Bruchstücks durch eigene (und deshalbpersönlich gefärbte) Denkanstrengung zu ergänzen."1

This brings Fricke to the fruitful conception of "co-textual deviance" as afundamental factor in the characterization of aphoristic texts.112 While such atheory of "Leerstellen" and "Aussparungen" justifiably seems inadequate fora description of the receptive guidance system of the novel,113 its appropri-ateness for aphoristic expression can hardly be questioned.

If the co-textuality of the aphoristic collection represents a structure ofself-contextualization, the aphorism typically seeks to define itself in relationto textually external contexts as well.114 Many different techniques lendthemselves to this end, from outright confrontation of ideologically or

108 "Einleitung," p. 9; Ideenparadiese, p. 277.IW Serge Meleuc, "Struktur der Maxime," Strukturalismus in der Literaturwissen-

schaft, ed. Heinz Blumensath (Cologne: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1972), pp. 296-7.110 The vitality of a theory of the aphorism for contemporary literary theory, includ-

ing not only hermeneutics and reception theory, but also varieties of "post-struc-turalism," crystalizes around an examination of the aphoristic "text" as a collectionor configuration.

111 Harald Fricke, "Sprachabweichungen und Gattungsnormen: Zur Theorie literari-scher Textsorten am Beispiel des Aphorismus," Textsorten und literarische Gat-tungen: Dokumentation der Germanistentage in Hamburg (Berlin: E.Schmidt,1983), p. 270.

112 Fricke, "Sprachabweichungen und Gattungsnormen," p. 275.113 I am referring, of course, to Wolfgang Iser's Der Akt des Lesens: Theorie ästheti-

scher Wirkung (Munich: Fink, 1976).114 Neumann, Ideenparadiese, p. 758 points to the dual contextuality of the aphorism.

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ethically established mores, to the playful or critical parody of canonicaltexts. This contra-dictory drive of the aphorism expresses itself in its rhetori-cally aggressive tone, and in its intertextual appropriation and perversion ofproverbial wisdom.115 This strategy of involvement functions by means ofthe evocation of specific culturally-determined conceptions or attitudes withwhich the reader can be expected to be familiar, followed by the consciousdeflation of these notions through the application of parodistic techniques -exaggeration, understatement, recontextualization, to name a few. Parodis-tic-satiric re-formulation of proverbial statements or canonical texts areamong the favorite devices of such aggressive, critical aphorists as Nietzscheand Karl Kraus.116 An aphorism from Menschliches Allzumenschliches exem-plifies this technique.

Der Asket - Der Asket macht aus der Tugend eine Not. (Werke, I, 497)

In order to re-evaluate the notion of asceticism, Nietzsche applies a structuralinversion of the proverbial statement "aus der Not eine Tugend machen."This inversion is structurally parallel to the inversion which Nietzsche wantsto effect in the value attributed to asceticism. In addition, by playing on alinguistic pattern familiar to the reader, Nietzsche can lend his shocking re-definition the ring of the proverbial.

Some of Karl Kraus's perversions of proverbs are even more wry andbiting, penetrating through the glossy surface which covers over cultural andsocial degeneration.

Die Deutschen - das Volk der Richter und Henker. (BW, 156)

By replacing two letters, Kraus prophetically transforms the nation of poetsand thinkers into that of judges and executioners.

As the central text of Western culture, the Bible, not surprisingly, pro-vides an almost inexhaustible source of material for the contra-dictoryaphorist. Kraus, for example, appears to want to turn Martin Luther into acitizen of turn-of-the-century Vienna when he allows him the followingFreudian slip. .

Wes das Herz leer ist, des gehet der Mund über. (BW, 156)

Kraus's critique of loquatiousness, of course, reads like a programmaticdefense of the laconism of the aphorist. But this assertion would fall flat if it

115 On the contra-dictory aspect of aphoristic expression, see Grenzmann, p. 181;Ulrich Horstmann, "Der englische Aphorismus," p. 59; Serge Meleuc, p.314;Wuthenow, p. 145.

116 On the use of quotation in Nietzsche's aphorisms, see Häntzschel-Schlotke,pp. 101 & 114; on the parodistic aphorism see Krüger, pp. 17 f.

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were not simultaneously able to display profundity in its own brevity, andKraus at least gives the impression of having accomplished this due to hisclever manipulation of Luther's saying.

These are examples of just a few of the multiple techniques that serve theaphorist as a means to his parodistic end. The contra-dictory aphorist perpe-trates a critique of ideology, whether this be conceived in cultural, socio-economical, political, or ethical terms. Since ideological attitudes of all kindsare archetypically preserved in language, art, customs, traditions, and canon-ical texts, these become the prime targets of the aggressively contra-dictoryaphorist. This is in keeping with Nietzsche's doctrine of the "Umwertungaller Werte," a doctrine which one hundred years later has itself assumed atinge of the proverbial, rigidly ideological. Most recently such thinkers asTheodor Adorno, Hans Kudzus, and Hermann Schweppenhäuser have em-ployed the aphorism as a weapon in their battle against the strongholds ofideology.117

All of the strategies discussed here function to instigate the participationof the reader in the derivation of textual meaning. The reader is thus encour-aged to become a hermeneutical extension of the text and its author, much inthe fashion described in a "Fragment" by Novalis.

Der wahre Leser muß der erweiterte Autor seyn. Er ist die höhere Instanz, die dieSache von der niedern Instanz schon vorgearbeitet erhält. Das Gefühl, vermittelstdessen der Autor die Materialien seiner Schrift geschieden hat, scheidet beymLesen wieder das Rohe und Gebildete des Buchs - (Schriften, II, 470)

Essential to the aphorism is this conscious engagement of the reader in ahermeneutical process on the basis of which the reader, in keeping with afundamental hermeneutic doctrine, "understands" the author better (i.e.other) than the author understands herself/himself.

V. Aphorism and Linguistic Scepticism

The fundamental question with which hermeneutics is concerned is thetranslatability of spirit into word and word back into spirit - the compatibili-ty of "Geist" and "Buchstabe."118 Language, as the medium through which

117 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, Gesammelte Schriften, vol.4, ed. Rolf Tiede-mann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980); Hans Kudzus, Jaworte, Neinworte (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1970); Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Verbotene Frucht: Aphorismenund Fragmente (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966).

118 Richard Palmer has analyzed the importance of the concept of translation forhermeneutics; see his Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Hei-degger, and Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 26-32.

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the bridging of spirit and spirit is accomplished, becomes a phenomenon ofprimary concern for the hermeneuticist, as well as for the aphorist. KurtBesser has argued that two influential intellectual-historical movements de-termine the intellectual impeti underpinning the evolution of aphoristic ex-pression: the Babylonian confusion of tongues; and the Heraclitean notion ofincessant flux.119 Both of these impinge upon the aphorist's conception of theinherent limitations of language. No doubt, the Babylonian confusion oftongues represents precisely that linguistic isolation and encapsulation whichmakes the existence of "Hermes" as messenger and translator necessary. Thehermeneutical problem only arises with the breakdown of a belief in themystical unity of humankind. Recognition of incessant flux and transcience,on the other hand, points ultimately to the problem of history and historicalrelativity. It is this problem of adequately comprehending textual materialwritten in foreign languages and at historically foreign times which moti-vates the development of the science of hermeneutics.

Insight into the fluidity of reality and the historical relativity of culturalvalues automatically calls forth a crisis of language; for language appears tobe less fluid and less pliable than the reality it seeks to express. The typicalaphorist is painfully aware of the rigidity of language, and thus attempts toexplode culturally sedimented linguistic constructions. Just as the aphoristhas been found to be in the paradoxical position of both loving truth anddoubting its very existence, so too he/she worships language while doubtingits ability adequately to convey perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. This hasprompted Gerhart Baumann to speak of aphorists as "Sprachliebende undSprachverleugner." 12°

The aphorism is conditioned by the aphorist's love-hate relationship withlanguage, which culminates in the attempt to overcome language throughlanguage itself.121 The aphorist is aware of two inherent dangers in language:one is the fear that language devolves into nonsense whenever important,unique recognitions need to be expressed; the other is on the opposite ex-treme, namely the fear that language makes things ail-too sensible. In thelatter case language falls into platitude, and instead of communicating freshknowledge it satisfies itself with the corroboration of the commonplace, thusbecoming an instrument in the tyranny of the banal. In the former extremelanguage becomes totally individual and hence fails to communicate itsunique insight - it lapses into the non-sensical.

It is not necessary to examine the relationship between aphorism and thecrisis of language in any detail at this juncture, for it will concern us in the

119 Besser, p. 107.120 Gerhart Baumann, "Zur Aphoristik," p. 67.121 Cf. Krüger, p. 18.

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next chapter.122 However, one final point about the aphorist's relationship tolanguage belongs in this context. I have argued here, among other things, forthe adoption of the terms "metaphor" and "metonymy" to describe thegamut of dualistic oppositions found in aphoristic expression. Metaphor, theassociative principle of thought and language, can be identified with theinherent danger of language to lapse into nonsense. In exaggerated instances,metaphor no longer is predicated on substitution by similarity, but rather isindicative of unreconstructable free association. Metonymy, understood asthe linguistic drive toward combination, relates to the danger of linguisticplatitude insofar as the combinatory logic of language can take precedenceover the function of substitution. In other words, the two linguistic disor-ders which Jakobson designates as similarity disorder (the suppression ofsimilarity or metaphor) and contiguity disorder (the suppression of the logicof combination in favor of free association) are both anathema to the apho-rist. The aphorist infuses new metaphorical relations into the frozen patternsof linguistic contiguity; likewise, metaphorical freedom is checked by thecombinational structures of language.

Not coincidentally, Lichtenberg, the initiator of the German aphoristictradition, is an important precursor of the "Sprachkritiker" of the nineteenthand twentieth centuries.123 His scepticism about the expressive capacities oflanguage, expressed in the following meditation, anticipates the positions offuture aphorists such as Kraus, Wittgenstein, and Kafka.

Unsere falsche Philosophie ist der ganzen Sprache einverleibt; wir können so zusagen nicht raisonnieren, ohne falsch zu raisonnieren. Man bedenkt nicht, daßSprechen, ohne Rücksicht von was, eine Philosophie ist. . . . Unsere ganze Phi-losophie ist Berichtigung des Sprachgebrauchs, also, die Berichtigung einer Phi-losophie, und zwar der allgemeinsten. (H 146)

Nietzsche expresses a similar critique of language in his penetrating essay"Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn," and in more succinctform in an aphorism from Menschliches Allzumenschliches.

Gefahr der Sprache für die geistige Freiheit. - Jedes Wort ist ein Vorurteil. (Werke,I, 903)

This critique of language is one of the firmest bonds connecting diverseaphorists in the entire historical tradition of the aphorism in Germany andAustria. In the atmosphere of cultural, social, and political demise which

122 On the relationship of aphorism and language, see Helmut Arntzen, "Aphorismusund Sprache: Lichtenberg und Karl Kraus," Literatur im Zeitalter der Information(Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1971), pp. 323-38; Besser, pp. 101, 122, 131; Grenzmann,p. 197.

123 Cf. Arntzen, "Aphorismus und Sprache," pp. 323-38.

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enveloped the declining Habsburg monarchy at the turn of the century,"Sprachkritik" and the employment of the aphorism became organicallyconnected. This atmosphere shaped the development of Franz Kafka andfundamentally influenced his turn to the form of the aphorism. It is to thiscultural and intellectual context which we now turn in an attempt to under-stand the full import of Kafka's appropriation of the form of the aphorism.

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CHAPTER Two

Aphorism and Aphorists in Turn-of-the-Century Austria

As early as 1962 the literary historian Ivar Ivask pointed to an apparentpenchant toward the form of the aphorism among Austrian intellectuals andcited the need for a thorough scholarly investigation of the significance ofaphoristic expression in Austrian letters.1 No one has as yet responded toIvask's challenge, and the absence of such a historical-critical survey of theaphorism in Austrian literature and philosophy complicates any attempt toorient Kafka's aphoristic production in the context of the aphoristic traditionin Austria. The ideas presented in this chapter are no substitute for theexpansive history which Ivask envisioned. That is to say that the remarksmade here are not conceived as ends in themselves; rather, they are presentedultimately as a kind of historical backdrop against which the aphorisms ofKafka will take on new significance and meanings. Consequently, the histor-ical evolution of aphoristic expression among nineteenth century Austrianintellectuals will be almost totally ignored here. It would be impossible topay attention to every Austrian aphorist who has contributed to the vitalityand variety of this genre; thus the scope will be restricted to certain centralaphorists who are approximate contemporaries of Kafka and who sharedwith him the particular cultural-political conditions endemic to the Austrianempire in its years of dissolution. There are specific questions to which thischapter hopes to provide some answers. What, for example, are the social,political, cultural, and intellectual conditions which give rise to the wide-spread interest by Austrians of this period in aphoristic modes of expression?Are there inherent connections between the intellectual-historical conditionsthat account for the development of the aphorism in the German-languagetradition, as described in the preceding chapter, and the intellectual-culturalsituation in which Austrian writers found themselves at the turn of thecentury? Do the strategies of aphoristic expression share any fundamentalprecepts with literary or philosophical movements prominent in Austria at

1 Ivar Ivask, "Das große Erbe," Das große Erbe, Stiasny Bücherei, 100 (Vienna:Stiasny, 1962), pp. 5-59; see especially the sub-section of this essay with the title"Theologie als Grammatik: Der Aphorismus als die österreichische Form des Phi-losophierens, " pp. 38-46.

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this time? To what ends did Austrians employ aphoristic expression, and arethere definable parameters which condition the structure and applicativepurpose of the aphorism? In addressing these issues it is hoped that we canthereby attain a more complete picture of the possible cultural-intellectualundercurrents that might have influenced Kafka's turn to the aphorism asexpressive from.

The present investigation will be divided into three sections. In the first,general cultural and social phenomena will be examined briefly for theirrelevance to the employment of fragmentary modes of expression. The sec-ond section attempts to outline the relevant extremes of aphoristic produc-tivity in Austrian culture at the turn of the century. The final section de-velops the fundamental interrelationship between the problematic of theSprachkrise which afflicted so many Austrians of this period and the intellec-tual issues underpinning employment of the aphorism as discursive form.

I. Aphorism and Zeitgeist

It is no longer possible today to use the word "Zeitgeist" in a naive andunreflected manner to summarize the nebulous social, political, and culturalrelations which give a certain historical epoch its specific character. Nonethe-less, it is also impossible to argue that individuals develop in a historicalvacuum, independent or ignorant of the cultural, social, and politicalphenomena going on around them. The conception of a "Zeitgeist" can stillbe useful when this term is stripped of its mystique. The influence of ahistorical epoch on the character of its artists, for example, can never be fullyelucidated, just as one can never postulate a closed historical epoch in termsof a finite totality. One is constantly dealing with "trends" and "move-ments"; i.e. with highly flexible and constantly altering circumstances.Moreover, the individual cannot simply be viewed as a "product" of a cer-tain intellectual or social climate, but rather simultaneously as a contributorto this climate. It is with these reservations that the word "Zeitgeist" isemployed here. It is not, nor could it be, a matter of defining elements inKafka's art which are mere reflexes of general historical circumstances. Onthe other hand, there is no reason why Kafka's aphorisms should be treatedas though they were solely the products of a creative genius operating be-yond time and space. These extremes, it seems to me, have been particularlyprevalent in scholarship on Kafka. Too often Kafka is viewed as an artistcreating out of isolation, recording the dreams of a tortured psyche, or,alternately, as a product of the "triple ghetto" of the German Jews living inPrague. While these directions should not unequivocally be declared invalid,neither should they be viewed as absolute. I intend the word "Zeitgeist" as

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used here to mark out a space between these two extremes. Kafka was manythings: an extraordinary artist, a Jew, a lawyer, a member of the professionalclass, an Austrian citizen, an active participant in literary-cultural activities.The intellectual-social climate of the declining Habsburg monarchy is rele-vant for Kafka's literature.2 Indeed, especially in the instance of Kafka's turnto the form of the aphorism it is clear that general cultural phenomena playeda fundamental role. Austrian intellectuals of this period, among them Kafka,were especially drawn to the form of the aphorism. It is requisite for anunderstanding of the aphoristic production of these Austrian authors that weanalyze the factors which impelled them to employ this mode of fragmen-tary expression.

In the preceding chapter we found that certain intellectual phenomena areassociated with the evolution and employment of aphoristic expression.These are, above all: a Heraclitean awareness of incessant flux; the problemsof communication resulting from the Babylonian confusion of tongues; andthe crisis of integrating idea and experience, this crisis called forth and under-scored by the Copernican and Kantian revolutions. To be sure, these are allphenomena which touched the entire Western world in varying degrees. Yetthere is a sense in which Austria-Hungary in its years of decline representedin concentrated microcosm these social, cultural, and intellectual crises. The"decline of the West," as prophesied by Oswald Spengler, seemed paradig-matically to be prefigured in the decline of the multi-national Habsburgstate. In the "Abendblatt" of November 10, 1871, the liberal Austrian news-paper Die Neue Freie Presse described Austria-Hungary as "das Land derUnwahrscheinlichkeiten, der Unbegreiflichkeiten, der Absurditäten."3 Onecan scarcely imagine a more apt description of this political dinosaur. In thisheir to the Holy Roman Empire, which itself was already an anachronismwhen put to rest by Napoleon in 1806, both imperial traditions and politicalcumbersomeness lived joyfully and blindly onward. How could life in thisodd political concoction of disparate kingdoms and peoples be anything but"improbable, incomprehensible, and absurd" in the age of economic impe-rialism and the self-conscious nation-state? Only a political philosophy of"Fortwursteln," of making do and of procrastinating, allowed for the affairs

On the significance of the Austrian environment for Kafka and his an see JuliusM.Herz, "Franz Kafka and Austria: National Background and Ethnic Identity,"MAL, 11, no.3/4 (1978), pp.301-18; Antal Mädl, "Kafka und Kafkanien," ActaLitterari Academiae Scientium Hungarii, 21 (1979), 401-07; Andrew Weeks, "Kaf-ka und die Zeugnisse vom versunkenen Kakanien," Sprache im technischen Zeital-ter, 3 (1983), 320-37.Quoted by L. H. Bailey, "Ferdinand Kürnberger, Friedrich Schlögl and the Feuil-leton in Gründerzeit Vienna," Forum for Modern Language Studies, 13 (1977),161.

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of state to transpire in halting fashion. Certainly, by 1900 this political entityhad to appear.to the intelligent observer as a mottled harlequin whose ex-istence in the age of industrialization had to become more "improbable" witheach passing year. In a world in which scientific and technological knowl-edge was supplanting religious belief, and in which the fragmenting powersof nationalism were shattering faith in divine unity, this community ofdisparate peoples united by one emperor and one religion, the last central-European dynastic state, had no place whatsoever. Illusion became a modusvivendi for those citizens of this state who wished to preserve the brittlegrandeur of imperial stature. If, as has been claimed, this state was theresearch laboratory for world destruction, then this was because the strainsof the modern, technological world were more severly felt in this anach-ronistic environment.4

Among the symptoms of the unmanageability of this state was the lack ofa manageably pronounceable name by which one might refer to it. RobertMusil solved this problem by ironically dubbing this empire "Kakanien."Alas, his aid came too late, for by the time Musil could give it an appropriatename, " Kakanien" had ceased to exist. However, the most suitable picture oflife in this empire is that drawn by Musil in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften.To be sure, it is absolutely appropriate that this society which thrived so onaestheticism should find its most accurate historical description in a work ofart. Certainly, no history book could be as effective at conjuring up theattitudes and circumstances of this collapsing political and cultural entity as isMusil's novel.

Überhaupt, wie vieles Merkwürdige ließe sich über dieses versunkene Kakaniensagen! Es war zum Beispiel kaiserlich-königlich und war kaiserlich und königlich;eines der beiden Zeichen k. k. oder k. und k. trug dort jede Sache und Person, aberes bedurfte trotzdem einer Geheimwissenschaft, um immer sicher entscheiden zukönnen, welche Einrichtungen und Menschen k. k. und welche k. und k. zu rufenwaren. Es nannte sich schriftlich Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie und ließsich mündlich Österreich rufen; mit einem Namen also, den es mit feierlichemStaatsschwur abgelegt hatte, aber in allen Gefühlsangelegenheiten beibehielt, zumZeichen, daß Gefühle ebenso wichtig sind wie Staatsrecht und Vorschriften nichtden wirklichen Lebensernst bedeuten. Es war nach seiner Verfassung liberal, aberes wurde klerikal regiert. Es wurde klerikal regiert, aber man lebte freisinnig. Vordem Gesetz waren alle Bürger gleich, aber nicht alle waren eben Bürger. Man hatteein Parlament, welches so gewaltigen Gebrauch von seiner Freiheit machte, daßman es gewöhnlich geschlossen hielt; aber man hatte auch einen Notstandspara-graphen, mit dessen Hilfe man ohne das Parlament auskam, und jedesmal, wennalles sich schon über den Absolutismus freute, ordnete die Krone an, daß nun dochwieder parlamentarisch regiert werden müsse. Solcher Geschehnisse gab es viele in

See Frank Field, The Last Days of Mankind: Karl Kraus and His Vienna (London:MacMillan, 1967), p. 10.

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diesem Staat, und zu ihnen gehörten auch jene nationalen Kämpfe, die mit Rechtdie Neugierde Europas auf sich zogen und heute ganz falsch dargestellt werden.Sie waren so heftig, daß ihretwegen die Staatsmaschine mehrmals im Jahr stockteund stillstand, aber in den Zwischenzeiten und Staatspausen kam man ausgezeich-net miteinander aus und tat, als ob nichts gewesen wäre. Und es war auch nichtsWirkliches gewesen. Es hatte sich bloß die Abneigung jedes Menschen gegen dieBestrebungen jedes anderen Menschen, in der wir heute alle einig sind, in diesemStaat schon früh, und man kann sagen, zu einem sublimierten Zeremoniell ausge-bildet, das noch große Folgen hätte haben können, wenn seine Entwicklung nichtdurch eine Katastrophe vor der Zeit unterbrochen worden wäre.5

The themes of Musil's novel are intricately intertwined with the historicalconditions of Kakania's demise. Yet, as the cited passage indicates, Musilconsidered the crises of Kakania to be prefigurations of the modern crises ofWestern humankind. This is what Musil means when he calls Kakania "derfortgeschrittenste Staat" (MoE, 35): Kakania's progressiveness consisted inits being the state which sensed the intellectual, cultural, and social tremorsof modernity earlier and with greater concentration than any other state.Musil's description brings out many of the central problems of the dualmonarchy: its cumbersome, bureaucratic structure; its crippling fragmenta-tion into nationalistic factions; the unpredictability of its parliamentary-ab-solutistic system of government; its characteristic "Protektion" and"Schlamperei," which meant that every rule had as many exceptions as therewere people able to procure exceptional treatment. But especially in itsatomistic fragmentation into mutually inimical groups Kakania was a micro-cosmic prefiguration of the industrial interest-group world. Schopenhauerand Nietzsche had formulated philosophies based on the metaphysics of thewill, focusing on the principles of individuation and struggle; Darwin hadproposed that mere biological survival was a function of an organism'sability to adapt and to overcome hostility; Marx and Engels had argued thathuman societies were structured around the existence of classes with con-flicting interests. Kakania was the social-political embodiment of all thesetheories of conflict: in this state each of these theories could demonstrate itsvalidity. Kakania was shaken so profoundly by these "revolutions" preciselybecause it had remained so stubbornly "conservative" over the course of itsown evolution. It represented a realm still steeped in the world-view of theCounter-Reformationist Baroque, glorifying life as a physical manifestationof spiritual harmony. The de-mystification of life and spirit which accom-panied industrialization could not help but be sensed most profoundly in thisatmosphere. "Man hat Wirklichkeit gewonnen und Traum verloren," is

5 Roben Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, ed. Adolf Frise (Hamburg: Ro-wohlt, 1952), pp. 33-4. Further references will be cited with the abbreviation MoEand page number. ·

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Musil's succinct assessment of this circumstance (MoE, 39). Mathematicswas the new "god" of the age, but it was a god which infiltrated "wie einDämon in alle Anwendungen [des] Lebens" (MoE, 39 f.). Kakania, like itsage, was atomistic, but unlike the atom it lacked a stable nucleus, and henceit was destined to dissolve into unelected disaffinities. In short, Kakania was,to use a metaphor germane to our investigation, a collection of aphorisms,an unstructured structure composed of numerous individual elements, eachproclaiming its own independent validity, each one distinguishing itselffrom the others, often by means of direct confrontation or contradiction.The spiritual and political situation of Austria-Hungary, then, was con-sidered by Musil to be representative of the modern age. He describes theconfusion of the modern world in terms reminiscent of a description of theaphorism: "Es war das . . . die bekannte Zusammenhanglosigkeit der Einfal-le und ihre Ausbreitung ohne Mittelpunkt, die für die Gegenwart kennzeich-nend ist und deren merkwürdige Arithmetik ausmacht, die vom Hundert-sten ins Tausendste kommt, ohne eine Einheit zu haben" (MoE, 20). WhatMusil describes here is simply the aphoristic age, a world in which change,relativity, and difference have supplanted constancy, absolutes, and the uni-fied totality. Musil's Ulrich, the "man without qualities," is a representativeof this new world whose fundamental principle is uncertainty.

Er kann, wenn er seine Empfindungen überwacht, zu nichts ohne Vorbehalt jasagen; er sucht die mögliche Geliebte, aber weiß nicht, ob es die richtige ist; er istimstande zu töten, ohne sicher zu sein, daß er es tun muß. Der Wille seiner eigenenNatur, sich zu entwickeln, verbietet ihm, an das Vollendete zu glauben; aber alles,was ihm entgegentritt, tut so, als ob es vollendet wäre. Er ahnt: diese Ordnung istnicht so fest, wie sie sich gibt; kein Ding, kein Ich, keine Form, kein Grundsatzsind sicher, alles ist in einer unsichtbaren, aber niemals ruhenden Wandlung begrif-fen, im Unfesten liegt mehr von der Zukunft als im Festen, und die Gegenwart istnichts als eine Hypothese, über die man noch nicht hinausgekommen ist. (MoE,249 f.)

The paradoxical result of Ulrich's realization that restrictive "must" has beensupplanted by progressive and potential "can" is hesitation, uncertainty,inconsequence - absence of "qualities."

Life in fin de siede Austria-Hungary was fraught with political strife. Itwas the fault of the liberal regime, which drew its support from the German-speaking middle class and the Jewish bourgeoisie of the cities, that it refusedto address these political conflicts as real issues which demanded real solu-tions, but rather chose to ignore them in the hope they might disappear ontheir own.6 The imperial ideal was used by the ruling classes as a tool with

Carl Schorske has investigated in detail the crisis of Austrian liberalism at the turnof the century; see his Fin de siede Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York:,Knopf, 1980), esp. pp. 4-10; 232-33; 259-60.

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which to stabilize the status quo - imperial glory and national pride, it wasassumed, and not political concessions, would ultimately assuage the em-pire's struggling nationalities and fuse these national fragments into an impe-rial whole. Musil sums up the relationship between rulers and ruled in Aus-tria-Hungary with consummate irony: "zum Schluß gab es in Kakanien nurnoch unterdrückte Nationen und einen obersten Kreis von Personen, die dieeigentlichen Unterdrücker waren und sich maßlos von den Unterdrücktengefoppt und geplagt fühlten" (MoE, 515). Musil's comment brings out theapparent incomprehension with which the aristocracy and the bourgeoisieviewed the rebelliousness of the empire's suppressed nationalities. When theBadeni language reforms were announced - reforms which placed the Czechlanguage on an equal footing with German in Bohemia, where Czechs faroutnumbered Germans - the bourgeoisie felt it had been hoaxed once toooften: the streets of. Vienna and Linz filled with protesters demanding theretraction of the Badeni laws. When the reforms were indeed withdrawn,demonstrations broke out in Bohemia and the empire suddenly found itselfaflame with near-revolutionary sentiments and activities. This incident para-digmatically portrays the manner in which the bureaucratic ruling class un-wittingly unleashed the centrifugal forces that would ultimately destroy theempire. Their stubborn preservationist attitude could not help but evokesuch drastic responses, since it snuffed out all attempts at just reform.7 Eachvictory, such as the successful repeal of the Badeni laws, was merely appar-ent, leading eventually to increased tensions and further political strain. Inthe three years that followed the retraction of these reforms, the nationalistgroups in parliament practiced an unrelenting obstructionism which broughtthe political mechanism to a halt. In 1900 the " Beamtenministerium" wasformed in order to circumvent the ineffectuality of parliament. This ad-ministration devised strategies for stilling national discontent: on the onehand, it attempted to introduce economic reforms that would improve con-ditions on that front and thus have an appeasing effect; on the other hand, itconcentrated on the generation of new cultural programs that would providerallying points for all the disparate citizens of this multi-national state.Through this Utopian policy - astonishingly lacking in the astuteness ofRealpolitik - the administration sought to dissolve national interests andreinstate overarching mutual interests in their stead.8 As if it were not

7 For a description of the revolts that resulted from the Badeni resolutions, see AllanJanik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon & Schuster,1973), pp.57f.; see also Egon Erwin Kisch, Marktplatz der Sensationen (Vienna:Globus, 1947), pp. 34 f.

8 Carl Schorske describes the program of the "Beamtenministerium," Fin de siedeVienna, pp. 236-38.

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enough that the rulers of Austria-Hungary were suspended in their ownillusions and thus could not face modern political realities, they sufferedunder the further delusion that their political underlings would be swept intoaffirmation of the status quo through the illusion of a unified and gloriouscultural identity.· The remodelling of Vienna during the "Ringstraße" periodinto a capital city of pseudo-historical grandeur represents the most "con-crete" attempt to divert from political reality by emphasizing tradition, art,and culture.

This officially sanctioned division between reality and illusion - or moreprecisely, this incessant glossing over of reality in favor of an illusory age ofpast glory - had deep historical-cultural roots in the Habsburg empire. Afterthe defeat of the Turks in 1683, Austria turned to the task of rebuilding itsravished territory. -This reconstruction took place in the spirit of the Coun-ter-Reformation and under the powerful influence of the Baroque. In thepictorial arts, of course, Baroque artists exploited the illusion of depth andthree-dimensionality. The sensuality and illusory beauty of the Baroqueevolved quite naturally as a compensatory response to the horrors and de-struction of the Turkish invasion. The Baroque glorification of life, and theexaltation of such leaders as Prince Eugen who were responsible for subdu-ing the Turks, reflects a new optimism built overtop of the despair of war.Certain artistic trends in turn-of-the-century Austria are reminiscent of thisBaroque tradition, for example, the tendency of the "Jugendstil" artists to-ward ornamentation, the portrayal of sensuality, and flamboyance. In litera-ture one thinks immediately of the revival of the "Schein"/eSein" problema-tic, for example in the dramas of Arthur Schnitzler (Der grüne Kakadu). Onerecalls as well the fascination of Hofmannsthal's fool Claudio (Der Tor undder Tod) with the objects which surround him. The Biedermeier obsessionwith artfully constructed but generally useless objects represents a transposi-tion of this Baroque mentality into the sphere of the reigning bourgeoisie.Other examples of the historical tenacity of the Baroque in Austrian litera-ture can be found in the return to the Christian mystery play and the "Fest-spieP by such authors as Hofmannsthal and Kralik von Meyrwalden, andeven in the neo-Baroque prose style of Musil, ornamented with similies andemploying such techniques as periphrasis.

Almost without exception the artists of German-speaking Austria-Hun-gary rose out of the upper-middle class composed of professionals and Jew-ish bourgeoisie associated with the spirit of liberalism. This class began togather considerable economic and political power in the last decades of thenineteenth century, and it developed aristocratic aspirations, without pos-sessing the "heritage" which alone distinguishes true "aristocracy." Therewas only one realm in which this middle class could enact a sort of assimila-tion of aristocratic qualities - in the sphere of culture. Aristocratic preten-

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sions, however, remain mere pretensions, and thus they must ultimatelycontribute to the generation of a world outlook which is characterized bydisconcern for social reality and a fostering of one's private illusions.Aesthetics, in the diagnosis of such cultural critics as Kraus, Loos, Wittgen-stein, and Broch, becomes independent of ethical imperatives and thus de-generates into ornament, pomp, lie, kitsch. Hermann Broch's devastatingcommentary on the aestheticism of this epoch is bitter, but to the point.

Was Überdeckung von Armut durch Reichtum letztlich bedeutet, das wurde inWien, wurde in seiner geisterhaften Blütezeit klarer denn irgendwo und irgend-wann anders: ein Minimum an ethischen Werten sollte durch ein Maximum anästhetischen, die keine mehr waren, überdeckt werden, und sie konnten keinemehr sein, weil der nicht auf ethischer Basis gewachsene ästhetische Wert seinGegenteil ist, nämlich Kitsch. Und als Metropole des Kitsches wurde Wien auchdie des Wert-Vakuums der Epoche.9

Political liberalism, in the hands of this aspiring middle class, became aconservative political-cultural force closely intertwined with the spirit of theBiedermeier.10 This class lived, then, in a world of political unreality, andthose raised in the atmosphere of this confined, over-stylized, aestheticizedbourgeois world would eventually experience profound shock when con-fronted with the social-political reality in which their dream was embedded.Hermann Bahr expresses in exemplary fashion the disillusionment that thisconfrontation of dream and reality provoked.

Das war das gemeinsame Grunderlebnis jener Generation [born in the 1860's]: mitbeschönigenden und vertuschenden Meinungen, denen die Welt für ein kleinbür-gerliches Idyll galt, sah diese Jugend sich plötzlich der Wirklichkeit der großenStadt ausgesetzt. Da zerfiel am ersten Tag alles, woran wir bisher geglaubt, woraufwir vertraut und unseren Fuß gesetzt hatten, unser Denken zerbrach und im An-blick der zügellosen Gier, mit der sich im großstädtischen Gedränge von Neid undHaß jeder über jeden stürzt, fanden wir uns verraten und betrogen."

Marie Herzfeld confirms the impact that this destruction of inherited idealshad on the fin de siede generation. "Wir sind umgeben von einer Weltabsterbender Ideale, die wir von den Vätern ererbt haben und mit unserembesten Lieben geliebt, und es fehlt uns nun die Kraft des Aufschwunges,welcher neue, wertvolle Lebenslockungen schafft."12 Herzfeld implicitly ties

9 Hermann Broch, Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit, Essays in der Piper-Bücherei, 194(Munich: Piper, 1964), p. 87 f.

10 The socialist critic Albert Fuchs gives a trenchant analysis of the conservativethrust of Austrian liberalism, Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867-1918 (Vien-na: Globus, 1949), pp. 3-39; see also Schorske, pp. 4-10.

11 Hermann Bahr, "Inventur der Zeit," Inventur (Berlin: Fischer, 1912), pp. 11 f.12 Marie Herzfeld, "Fin-de-Siecle," Die Wiener Moderne: Literatur, Kunst und Mu-

sik zwischen 1890 und 1910, ed. Gotthart Wunberg, Reclam Universalbibliothek,7742 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981), p. 260.

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the weariness of this generation and the fin de siede sense of pessimism to thedemise and destruction of these Utopian ideals inherited from the previousgeneration. This discrepancy between the ideals this class was brought up tobelieve in and the social reality they eventually were given to face is afundamental experience of the German-speaking artists and intellectuals ofthis generation. We have already discussed the extent to which the aphorismas expressive form develops and thrives in an intellectual climate whichperceives a pressing need for mediation between the realms of idea andexperience, between theoretical and empirical knowledge. The existence ofsuch a dramatic gulf between these two spheres for the Austrian writers ofthis generation helps to account for their susceptibility to the form of theaphorism, since it traditionally sought to come to terms with this centralproblem with which they found themselves confronted.

The example of the Badeni language resolutions sheds light on the objectof our investigation for yet another reason; for it is certainly not insignificantthat at issue in these resolutions, and in the uproar that followed, was theproblem of language or languages. It has often been observed that one couldnot be an intellectual in turn-of-the-century Austria without possessing anacute awareness of language as social medium, political tool, and as decep-tive mask. Fritz Mauthner, whose three-volume Beiträge zu einer Kritik derSprache is a central document for the Sprachkrise of the period, claimed thathis critical reflections on language were sparked by the environment inwhich he grew up.13 Mauthner claims that the constant contact with no lessthan three languages (German, Czech, Yiddish) made him question the verypossibility of truth in language. His case, of course, is perhaps the mostcelebrated, but Mauthner's situation is indicative for inhabitants of Austria-Hungary. The problematization of language as communicative mediumcame quite naturally to these citizens of the modern-day Babylon. As weshall see in a following section, this widespread critical reflection on lan-guage was to be a significant factor responsible for the popularity of theaphorism at this time.

Two figures deserve mention as thinkers of immeasurable prominenceand influence for intellectuals of fin de siede Austria and whose work pro-vided the theoretical basis as well as practical models for their aphoristicproduction: Friedrich Nietzsche and Ernst Mach. Our concern here will benot with the import of their thought per se, but rather with the relevance oftheir central concerns for the problematics of aphoristic expression. In theinstance of Nietzsche the issues are exceedingly clear and need only be men-tioned in passing. Nietzsche's role as intellectual mentor for this generation

Fritz Mauthner, Prager Jugendjahre: Erinnerungen (1918; rpt. Frankfurt: Fischer,1969), pp. 30 f., 197 f.

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of artists has never been questioned.14 No doubt, not only the central con-cepts of Nietzsche's philosophy underwent popular dissemination at thistime, but also the aphoristic form typical of his writings left its mark on thisgeneration.

More veiled, and perhaps more controversial, are the relationships be-tween the work of Ernst Mach and the intellectual problematics of theaphorism. Mach, of course, has received wide recognition as the philosopherwho supplied the theoretical underpinnings for the impressionist movement.Hermann Bahr discovered in Mach's sensualist philosophy the confirmationof ideas he had expressed a number of years earlier.15 In 1891, more than tenyears before he discovered Mach, Bahr had formulated a sensualist theory ofknowledge.

Die Sensationen allein sind Wahrheit, zuverlässige und unwiderlegliche Wahrheit;das Ich ist immer schon Konstruktion, willkürliche Anordnung, Umdeutung undZurichtung der Wahrheit, die jeden Augenblick anders gerät, wie es einem gefällt,eben nach der Willkür der jeweiligen Stimmungen, und man hat ebenso vielBerechtigung, sich selber gleich hundert Iche zu substituieren, nach Belieben, aufVorrat, woher und wonach die Dekadence zu ihrer Ichlosigkeit gedrängt ward.16

Significant in Bahr's claim, and resonant in Mach's philosophy as well, is theapplication of the notion of flux in the spiritual realm, going beyond itsrelevance to material reality. Not merely the "objective" world is in a con-stant state of flux, but now even the ego, the receptive organ and organizerof perceptions, is considered subject to instability and incessant change.Truth, and thus, for Bahr, art as well, are reduced to a series of momentarysensations: nothing carries the features of permanence. Fragmentary artforms, such as the aphorism, it is clear, represent one appropriate response tothis recognition.

Mach's point of departure in his seminal work Die Analyse der Empfin-dungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen lies in the beliefthat the limitations of man's knowledge are defined by the limitations of hissenses - sensual qualities are taken to be an absolute threshold, and the"object" is considered to be a mere postulate based on a given set of sensa-tions.17 Hence Mach concludes that objects are "Gedankensymbole für Emp-

On the influence of Nietzsche in Austria, see William McGrath, Dionysian An andPopulist Politics in Austria (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1974).Hermann Bahr, "Das unrettbare Ich" (1903), Zur Überwindung des Naturalismus:Theoretische Schriften 1887-1904, ed. Gotthart Wunberg, Sprache und Literatur,46 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968), pp. 183-92.Bahr, "Wahrheit, Wahrheit," Zur Überwindung des Naturalismus, p. 84.Ernst Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischenzum Psychischen, 2nd expanded edition (Jena: Verlag Gustav Fischer, 1900); hence-forth cited as AE.

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findungskomplexe" (AE, 20). He takes his philosophy to be "anti-metaphys-ical" because it rejects investigation of the projected object in favor of exami-nation of the sensations themselves which give rise to this projection. Inother words, Mach rejects all constructs which transcend the pure physicali-ty of sensation, including the static object and the static ego.18 Neural stimulibecome the center of the empirical world, for it is only here, in the realm ofsensation, that the dichotomy between physical and psychical phenomenacan be overcome (see AE, 14f.; 19f.; 37-42; 206). Subjectivity and objectivi-ty are conjoined in the realm of sensations; for all phenomena are simultane-ously physical, i. e. relating to the body, and psychical. The most significantresult of this identification of subjective and objective, physical and psychi-cal, is the obliteration of any distinction between fact and illusion. Since thequalities attributed to an object are dependent on the conditions of percep-tion, there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as deception, rather there areonly varying aspects of perception (AE, 5 f.). With the localization of "truth"in sensations, all means for establishing objective, absolute truths disappear.

Mach's philosophy displays a number of significant points of overlapwith the attitude of the aphorist as described in the preceding chapter.Mach's sensualist orientation betrays a fundamental relationship to empiri-cist views of knowledge, emphasizing the role of perception and observa-tion. But it problematizes this empirical stance in a "Kantian" manner bydenying any necessary, absolute (i.e. non-subjective) link between subjec-tive perception and objective world. Analysis of the world is reduced toanalysis of one's changing impressions and perceptions of the world. Ulti-mately, of course, the subjectivization of knowledge corresponds to a theoryof perspectivism and relativity. "Objective" awareness can only be defined interms of intersubjective agreement: a multiplicity of experimental proposi-tions, hypotheses, or perceptions derived from varying perspectives orpoints of departure can lead to a movement toward „truth." One mustimagine here the geometrical figure of hyperbola, a curve which approachesever nearer the spacial axes by which it is confined, but which even ininfinity never reaches these axes. The validity of propositions resides, forMach as for the aphorist, in the relative ability of any hypothesis to advancethis movement. The validity of the individual proposition, then, becomesirrelevant in itself; its validity is defined in terms of a greater purpose and isrelative to this purpose. Hence even a blatantly false statement can be "valid"to the extent that it incites further investigation into the circumstances itclaims to describe. "Kein Standpunkt," Mach writes, "hat absolute bleibende

Mach's introduction to his Analyse der Empfindungen, the "Anti-MetaphysischeVorbemerkung" points to the acutely anti-metaphysical thrust of his arguments.

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Geltung; jeder ist nur wichtig für einen bestimmten Zweck" (AE, 27).Knowledge and error are granted an identical epistemological status, knowl-edge being segregated from error only on the basis of experimental "suc-cess." "Erkenntnis und Irrtum fließen aus denselben psychischen Quellen: nurder Erfolg vermag beide zu scheiden. Der klar erkannte Irrtum ist als Korrek-tiv ebenso erkenntnisfördernd wie die positive Erkenntnis."19 Mach's em-phasis on the value of hypothetical propositions, regardless of their truth orfalsehood, his stress on perspectivism and intersubjective relations, and hisimage of the scientist as searcher rather than as knower all relate his thoughtto the tradition of the aphorism as represented by such thinkers as FrancisBacon.

Mach's scientific attitude replicates the primary attitude of the aphorist:this can be described as an uncommon intellectual honesty, a strict anti-dogmatism, and an emphatic recognition of the limitations of one's ownendeavors. Mach went so far as to insist on the recognition of the necessarylimitations to human knowledge as a prerequisite to scientific investigation.

Es wird also am Zweckmässigsten sein, die Grenzen unseres Wissens, die sichüberall zeigen, anzuerkennen und das Streben nach eindeutiger Bestimmtheit alsein Ideal anzusehen, das wir in unserem Denken, so weit als möglich, verwirkli-chen. (AE, 237)

Wittgenstein would echo this proposition a decade and a half later in theintroduction to his Tractatus logico-philosophicus, insisting that the restric-tions of our thought are determined by the restrictions of our language.20

Mach's "anti-metaphysics," then, was paradigmatic for the anti-metaphysi-cal posture of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. Indeed, this group ofthinkers had initially called itself the "Ernst Mach Verein," in recognition ofthe formative influence of Mach's thought. It would be incorrect, however,to portray this anti-metaphysical attitude as one inimical to speculation;rather, it is a stance which insists simply on the a priori limitations placedupon every search for knowledge, and on a restriction of scientific andphilosophical investigation to that space defined by these limits.

One corollary of this conscious setting of limitations to the relevantsphere of knowledge is the belief that within this restricted space issues areeminently soluble. It was this belief, of course, that permitted Wittgensteinto claim in the Tractatus that he had essentially solved all the crucial prob-lems of philosophy.21 If questions remain unanswered, according to this

19 Ernst Mach, Erkenntnis und Irrtum: Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung (Leip-zig: Verlag Johann Barth, 1905), p. 114.

20 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, edition suhrkamp, 12(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), p. 7; henceforth cited as Tr by proposition number.

21 See Wittgenstein's introduction to the Tractatus, p. 8.

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view, then the fault lies with the nature or formulation of the question itself(cf. AE, 209). Here Mach takes an initial step in the transposition of theproblems of knowledge into the sphere of language. This interrelationshipbetween language and knowledge would be of central importance for theViennese logical positivists, just as it had been crucial to most of the thinkersin the German aphoristic tradition.

One final reflex of this concern with language and the expressibility ofknowledge in Mach's philosophy is relevant to our theme: this is Mach'stheory of "Denkökonomie." Mach proposes, simply put, that the least com-plex depiction of any circumstance or condition will always be closest to theactual state of affairs (AE, 37). " Denkökonomie," in other words, representsan application of the mathematical principle of reduction to the simplestpossible form in the realm of thought and scientific-philosophical investiga-tion. According to this view, all "proper" conclusions will occur in relativelysimple formulations, freed of all extraneous terms and unencumbered bysubordinate qualifications. The problem of truthful recognition is thus notmerely reduced to a problem of precise formulation; it is further emphasizedthat such formulations must in their very essence be simple and compact -one is tempted to say, aphoristic.

If various cultural, social, and intellectual phenomena or circumstances inturn-of-the-century Austria tended to encourage cultivation of fragmentary,yet succinct formulations of the historical "state of affairs," then writers ofthis time were no less energetic in their valorization of fragmentary, "minia-ture" forms of expression. Indeed, in some instances their vindications ringwith missionary zeal. Karl Kraus's brilliant laudations of the aphorism arethe most stunning examples of this tendency.22In fact, there was an intenseawareness among Austrian writers of the time that "reduced," compact,momentary expressive forms were the demand of the time. To some extentthis reflects profound changes in the substance and pace of modern Westerncivilization: artistic forms which feigned stability, permanence, or "eternity"were considered out of character with the age. One need only recall thethrust of Marinetti's Manifeste du futurisms (1909) to assess the impact of therapidly advancing technologization of society on conceptions of art and theartist. The valorization of the "kleine Form" was further buttressed in Aus-tria-Hungary by the "absurd" state of social-political conditions, as well asby the intellectual trends discussed above.

When in 1926 the Austrian journalist and writer Alfred Polgar publishedhis second collection of prose miniatures in book form, Orchester vonOben,2* he found it necessary to defend the fragmentary prose pieces he had

22 See, for example, BW, 116; 117; 132; 161; 238.23 Alfred Polgar, Orchester von Oben (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1926).

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presented his public a year earlier in the volume An den Rand geschrieben.2*In the preface to Orchester von Oben, entitled "Die kleine Form (quasi einVorwort)," Polgar writes of his "konsequentes, mit mancher Qual ver-knüpftes schriftstellerisches Bemühen, aus hundert Seiten zehn zumachen."25 Polgar's "painful" task reflects one of the central drives of theaphorist: the desire to condense a maximum of meaning into a minimum ofwords. Polgar's formulation, in fact, is strikingly reminiscent of Nietzsche'sclaim that it was his goal "in zehn Sätzen zu sagen, was jeder andere in einemBuch sagt, was jeder andere in einem Buch nicht sagt."26 Karl Kraus, charac-teristically, turns the programmatic virtue of condensed, laconic expressioninto self-praise and implicit critique of his more "verbose" contemporaries.

Es gibt Schriftsteller, die schon in zwanzig Seiten ausdrücken können, wozu ichmanchmal sogar zwei Zeilen brauche. (BW, 116)

Both the substance and the medium of Polgar's justification of fragmentaryforms are significant in our context: the substance because it is symptomaticof a general awareness among Austrian writers of the appropriateness ofprose miniatures for the historical time and setting in which they write; themedium because the expository, prosaic style in which this defense is formu-lated testifies to a degeneration of the laconism, efficacy, and poignancycharacteristic of the "kleine Form" which Polgar is at pains to defend. Thefragment, in other words, is no longer applicable in the service of its owndefense. By the time of Polgar's writing, the "golden age" of the literaryfragment in Austria is on the wane. Yet it is partly Polgar's position as a late-comer which allows him to perceive so clearly the relationship between"kleine Form" and "Zeitgeist." For these reasons Polgar's introduction de-serves to be cited at some length.

Aber ich möchte für diese kleine Form, hätte ich nur hierzu das nötige Pathos, mitsehr großen Worten eintreten: denn ich glaube, daß sie der Spannung und demBedürfnis der Zeit gemäß ist, gemäßer jedenfalls, als, wie eine flache Analogievermuten mag, geschriebene Wolkenkratzer es sind. Ich halte episodische Kürzefür durchaus angemessen der Rolle, die heute der Schriftstellerei zukommt. AußerDebatte bleibt ja das Wunder des großen Werks, bleibt die Berechtigung dertausend Druckseiten für eine Vision, deren ideeles Riesenmaß in geringerem Raumnicht Erscheinung werden könnte. Aber wie wenige sind unter uns Schreibenden,die eine solche Genie-Portion an Raum beanspruchen dürften. Wer von den Erzäh-lern und Betrachtern hat so Großes zu sagen, daß er sich unmöglich kürzer fassenkönnte, als er tut? Wo ist der Geist, dem gemeine Welt, sich ihm verbindend, soWichtig-Neues von ihrem Chemismus offenbarte, daß solche Offenbarung zufixieren die knappste Form und Formel nicht genügte? . . .

24 Alfred Polgar, An den Rand geschrieben (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1925).25 Orchester von Oben, p. 10.26 Quoted by Grosse, "Das syntaktische Feld des Aphorismus," p. 384.

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Das Leben ist zu kurz für lange Literatur, zu flüchtig für verweilendes Schil-dern und Betrachten, zu psychopathisch für Psychologie, zu romanhaft für Roma-ne, zu rasch verfallen der Gärung und Zersetzung, als daß es sich in langen undbreiten Büchern lang und breit bewahren ließe. Daß die Schriftsteller Zeit finden,weitläufig zu schreiben, kann ich zur Not verstehen: der Dämon treibt, Fülledrängt sie, der gewaltige Strom gräbt sich sein gewaltiges Bett. Da kann mannichts machen. Aber daß Menschen dieser tobenden, von nie erlittenen Wehengeschüttelten Epoche Ruhe und Zeit, innere Zeit, finden, weitläufig zu lesen, istmir ein rechtes Mirakel. Ein großes Beben rüttelt die geistige Welt, wirft um, wassteht, versenkt das sicher Gegründete, treibt neuen Erdgrund hoch: wie vermes-sen, auf solchem Boden schwer und massiv zu bauen! Ewigkeiten erweisen sich alszeitlich, die solidesten Götter als Götzen, alle Anker sind gelichtet, kein Menschweiß, wohin die Reise geht, aber daß sie geht und wie [sjausend rasch sie geht,spüren wir am Schwindel: wer wollte da mit überflüssigem Gepäck beladen sein?Ballast ist auszuwerfen - und was alles entpuppt sich nicht als Ballast? - kürzesteLinie von Punkt zu Punkt heißt das Gebot der fliehenden Stunde.

Auch das Ästhetische. Dick ist beschwerlich, dick ist häßlich; und "schöneLiteratur" mit geschwollenem Wanst ein Widerspruch im Beiwon.27

Polgar's comments bear testimony to the persistence of attitudes associatedwith the fin de siede well into the third decade of the twentieth century. Hisassault is directed primarily at the age in which he lives, and only secondarilyat the insufficiencies of those authors living in this age. Spiritual and materialflux, instability, the disappearance of eternal values and absolute measures,fleetingness, upheaval: all of these characteristics of the modern age under-mine the drive toward expansive literature. What is perhaps most telling inPolgar's remarks, however, is his essential admiration for the "great" litera-ture which he deems impractical and impracticable in his day. Indeed, Polgarseems to mourn the very impossibility of such expansive literature, so that inhis defense of the "kleine Form" he is merely making a virtue of necessity.His own insecurity as a writer is expressed in the doubt in his ability tosummon the necessary "pathos" for a justification of "die kleine Form"; hisanalogies are by his own admission "flach"; he is sceptical about the ability ofhimself and his contemporaries to create works of genius. Polgar, in short, isa reluctant miniaturist. This was not the case for some of the Austrianwriters who preceded Polgar. The "modesty" of the age, Polgar argues,demands "modest" forms of literature; but there was nothing "modest"about aphoristic, fragmentary modes of expression for the likes of a KarlKraus. Even more inherently "modest" artists such as Peter Altenberg,touched as he was by intellectual circumstances and a cultural pessimismsimilar to that expressed by Polgar, were able to embrace fragmentary formssuch as the aphorism with more conviction. Polgar's "defense," appropriateas his associations between "small form" and social-cultural conditions are,

27 Polgar, Orchester von Oben, pp. 11-13.

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remains oddly diffident, reflecting a growing uncertainty about the virtuesof fragmentary writing, and perhaps indicative of a greater crisis of literaturein general.

By way of contrast, Altenberg's justification of his terse, succinct literarystyle exudes conviction and self-confidence.

Ich möchte einen Menschen in einem Satze schildern, ein Erlebnis der Seele aufeiner Seite, eine Landschaft in einem Worte! Lege an, Künstler, ziele, triff insSchwarze! Basta.28

Yet it is not mere brevity which Altenberg strives for; a significant part of hisliterary program is the desire to intimate significance beyond what the wordsexpress. His personal impressions are intended to leave the audience withinfinitely expandable impressions. Altenberg chooses a stunningly expres-sive metaphor to depict this interaction between text and reader: the literarywork is spiritual bouillon that the readers must "dissolve" in order to "di-gest" its significance.

Denn sind meine kleinen Sachen Dichtungen?! Keineswegs. Es sind Extrakte!Extrakte des Lebens. Das Leben der Seele und des zufälligen Tages, in 2-3 Seiteneingedampft, vom Überflüssigen befreit wie das Rind im Liebig-Tiegel! DemLeser bleibe es überlassen, diese Extrakte aus eigenen Kräften wieder aufzulösen,in genießbare Bouillon zu verwandeln, aufkochen zu lassen im eigenen Geiste, miteinem Worte, sie dünnflüssig und verdaulich zu machen.29

Although Altenberg denies that his impressionistic sketches are "Dich-tungen," his metaphor makes clear that they are precisely that: "compact-ions," in the literal sense of the word "Dichtungen."

There are some obvious correspondences between literary impressionismand the essence of aphoristic form. Primary among these is the productiveintermingling of subjective fantasy and objective observation: subjectifica-tion of the objective, or objectification of the subjective, to reiterate theterminology employed to describe the impulses evident in Lichtenberg'sSudelbiicher. "Reporter der Seele" is the suggestive title of one of Alten-berg's collections, indicating the manner in which the feuilletonist objectifieshis inner life for the edification and entertainment of others. But u\efeuille-ton is just as likely to "report" on some social event, imbuing it with thesubjective impressions of the one who is reporting. Literary impressionismof the Altenberg cast, then, is just as much soulful reporting as it is reportingon the state of the soul. Other qualities which conjoin aphorism and impres-sionism are the fleetingness of momentary experiences, the "episodic"

28 Peter Altenberg, "Selbstbiographie," Ausgewählte Werke in zwei Bänden, ed.Dietrich Simon (Munich: Hanser, 1979), I, 82.

29 Altenberg, "Selbstbiographie," Ausgewählte Werke in zwei Bänden, I, 81.

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character of life, and the emphatic insistance on the interactive aspect ofliterature.30

Polgar and Altenberg have been employed here to document an aware-ness among Austrian literati of the appropriateness of fragmentary expres-sive forms such as the aphorism to the turn-of-the-century spirit. A similarawareness can be documented among some literary critics of the sameperiod. In an article entitled "Essai und Aphorismus" (1907), Kurt WalterGoldschmidt refers to the sudden popularity that these forms have attained atthe time, and he attributes this popularity to the fact that these smaller formscorrespond more closely to the quickened tempo of modern life.31 InGoldschmidt's view, symptomatic of the evolution of modern humankind isa flagging of its capacity for systematization, accompanied by a correspond-ing increase in its analytical capabilities.32 Breadth of thought, Goldschmidtimplies, is supplanted by analytical depth, and he considers the predilectionfor essay and aphorism to be a reflection of this shift.33 Goldschmidt goes onto claim that the aphorism as artistic form is especially suited to the modern"Künstler-Denker-Persönlichkeit."34 He thus indicates a move away fromnarration and representation toward philosophical-scientific reflection in theliterature of the period. The encroachment of science into the realm of art,for which the Naturalist movement is the best example, appears toGoldschmidt to be indicative of literature at the beginning of the twentiethcentury.

In the essay "Kleinform und Zeitgeist" (1929), Otto Maurer also attemptsto come to terms with the popularity of aphoristic form and its appropriate-ness for the modern age.35 Maurer goes so far as to maintain that aphoristicthought is not only suitable, but that it is the natural form of thought,

30 These issues will be discussed below in detail in the excursus on the aphorism inAustria.

31 Kurt Walter Goldschmidt, "Essai und Aphorismus," Das literarische Echo, 9(1906-07), column 1715.

32 Goldschmidt, col. 1715.33 The validity or falsehood of Goldschmidt's hypothesis is not at issue here. How-

ever, it is important to note that for many aphorists - Nietzsche and Adorno cometo mind immediately - precisely the opposite of this thesis would obtain. Theaphorism expresses, especially in the view of such socially critical thinkers asAdorno, a rebellion against the ominous trend toward systematization in the polit-ical-ideological sphere - a trend which tends to blunt and repulse analytical incur-sions into established ideological systems. The aphorism, thus understood, doesnot represent a response to a faltering capacity for systematization, but rather,much to the contrary, a rebellion against an overreliance on systematization.

34 "Essai und Aphorismus," columns 1717, 1718.35 Otto Maurer, "Kleinform und Zeitgeist: Bemerkungen zu einigen neuen Aphori-

stikern," Eckart: Blätter für evangelische Geisteskultur, 5 (1929), 200-215.

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systematic thought being, by implication, artificial. "Die natürliche Formdes Denkens ist aphoristisch, denn Denken ist Leben, und nichts Richtigeresläßt sich über das Leben sagen, als daß es Rhythmus sei, Pulsschlag: Span-nung und Entspannung, Ausdehnung und Zusammenziehung . . ,"36 Mau-rer's claim is significant because it bears testimony to the widespread accept-ance and approval that the aphorism had attained in intellectual circles. Hisconnection of aphoristic expression to the "natural" systolic and diastolicmovement of life underscores the common association of the aphorism withprogressive change, as well as its proximity to the philosophies of life popu-lar at the time. Maurer further claims that the aphorism is an "Ausdruck derWeltzertrümmerung und der Sehnsucht nach dem Ganzwerden."37 Here hetouches on a motif that recurs throughout the history of the aphorism: thepostulate that use of the aphorism arises primarily during times of extremecultural-political crisis and transformation.38

Not all contemporary critics assessed the aphorism in such a positivemanner. Emil Lucka, for example, in his essay "Der Aphorismus" (1918),printed in the influential literary revue Das literarische Echo exactly oneyear after Kafka began to write his aphorisms in the third Oktavheft (Oc-tober, 1917), criticizes the aphorism for precisely those qualities whichthe typical aphorist construes as its virtues: non-systematization, connection-lessness, incompletion, tendency toward the paradoxial.39 The aphorism,Lucka asserts, is neither art nor philosophy, but some of each, and this is itsflaw. "Der Aphorismus ist ein Gebilde, das seinen Gehalt dem Kreis derGedanken, seine Form dem Kunstwerk entlehnt, und so muß er, in zweiBereichen stehend, immer etwas kentaurisch Halbes bleiben, nicht nur wenner mangelhaft ist, sondern am meisten dort, wo er seine größte Vollendungerreicht hat."40 Lucka's negative assessment notwithstanding, it is clear thatthe impetus to his critique derives from an impression that the aphorism, this"impure" form, has been proliferating at what appears to him to be analarming rate.

One final analysis must be accomplished before concluding our investiga-tion into the possible correspondence between the inclination of turn-of-the-

36 "Kleinform und Zeitgeist," p. 200.37 "Kleinform und Zeitgeist," p. 206.38 This view is represented, for example, by Wilhelm Grenzmann, "Probleme des

Aphorismus," p. 181; Albert Höft, "Das historische Werden des Aphorismus,"p. 112; Herbert Roch, "Über den Aphorismus," p. 515; Walter Wehe, "Geist undForm des deutschen Aphorismus," p. 137. Gerhard Neumann takes issue with thisclaim; see Ideenparadiese, p. 42.

39 Emil Lucka, "Der Aphorismus," Das literarische Echo, 21 (1918-19), columns17-20.

40 Lucka, "Der Aphorismus," column 17.

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century Austrian intellectuals toward employment of the aphorism and thehistorical, socio-political, and cultural phenomena indicative of this epoch.Here we must return more specifically to the history and development of theaphorism as expressive form. It is an odd quirk of the German-languagetradition of the aphorism, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, that whilethe textual form itself is prominent in the works of major writers, the word"Aphorismus" itself is not commonly associated with this formal tradition.Instead one finds such appellations as "Fragment," "Sentenz," "Maximenund Reflexionen," and "Sudelbuch." However, around 1900, especiallyamong Austrian writers, the word "Aphorismus" (sometimes occuring inthe bastardized form "Aphorisma") consistently comes to be associated withthe formal tradition of the aphorism. In other words, the split between"Wortgeschichte" and "Formgeschichte," which previous to this time wascharacteristic of the German aphoristic tradition, ends rather abruptly. It isdifficult to discern exactly what events or incidents might account for thischange, but one thing is certain: that the merger of form and name reflectsthe increased concern with this manner of expression.

One is tempted to attribute the new-found currency of the word"Aphorismus" to the dissemination of Nietzsche's writings at the turn of thecentury. However, in his early works Nietzsche consistently used the term"Sentenz" to designate his fragmentary form of philosophizing. Only in theposthumously published notes Der Wille zur Macht do the words "Aphoris-mus" and "aphoristisch" occur consistently/1 The authoress Marie vonEbner-Eschenbach, of course, published as early as 1880 a collection ofreflections with the title Aphorismen, and included as an epigraph to thisvolume an original aphorism which reflects on the theory of aphoristic ex-pression. Although her influence as an aphorist is slight, one cannot excludethe possibility that her collection contributed to the broader acceptance of theterm "Aphorismus." This conjecture is lent some credibility by HermannBahr's assertion that Ebner-Eschenbach's writings exerted a powerful influ-ence on the authors of "Young Austria."42

The strongest impetus to this turn-around may, however, actually derivefrom an ostensibly unlikely source: the aphorisms of Lichtenberg. In thesense that Lichtenberg is the precursor of all the Austrian aphorists of thisgeneration, his influence on the form of the aphorism is anything but unlike-ly. However, Lichtenberg himself never uses the word "Aphorismus" todesignate his "scribblings," and so the association of his jottings with this

See Krüger, Der Aphorismus als philosophische Form, pp. 95-107 for an analysis ofNietzsche's use of the terminology "Sentenz" and "Aphorismus."Hermann Bahr, "Das junge Österreich," Zur Überwindung des Naturalismus,pp. 143 & 145.

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appellation seems initially surprising. Lichtenberg's significance for turn-of-the-century Austrian intellectuals can best be measured by the list of namesof those who expressed admiration for him. Among scientists andphilosophers, both Mach and Wittgenstein indicated that they were im-pressed by Lichtenberg's writings.43 The author Egon Friedell admired Lich-tenberg's reflections enough to publish an edition of selected texts in 1910,44

and even Karl Kraus expressed admiration for the profundity of Lichten-berg's revelatory method.45 Hofmannsthal included no less than four apho-risms by Lichtenberg in his own aphoristic collection, Buch der Freunde.*6

The key to Lichtenberg's popularity lies in part in the frequency withwhich excerpts from his notebooks were published between 1870 and 1900.47

In none of these editions, however, does the word "Aphorismus" occur inthe title. Yet Albert Leitzmann would ensure the association of Lichtenberg'sname with the form of the aphorism shortly after 1900 by publishing thedefinitive and complete edition of Lichtenberg's notebooks under the titleGeorg Christoph Lichtenbergs Aphorismen!1* Leitzmann's connection of thisterm with Lichtenberg's reflections obviously takes hold. In 1913 Leitzmannhimself edited a selection of these texts for the popular Insel-Büchereiseries,49 and in 1919 no fewer than three editions of Lichtenberg's aphorismsappeared, all by different editors, yet all bearing the title "Aphorismen."50

43 See Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, pp. 134 & 176.44 Lichtenberg: Ein -verkleinertes Bild seines Gedankenlebens, ed. Egon Friedell

(Stuttgart: Lutz, [1910]).45 See BW, 127, 336-38, and Janik and Toulmin, p. 90.46 Aphorisms from Hofmannsthal's Buch der Freunde will be cited from the volume

Aufzeichnungen, Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben, ed. Herbert Steiner(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1959), henceforth cited as A; the aphorisms by Lichtenberg arefound on A 15, 17, 18, & 36.

47 The list of editions of Lichtenberg's writings includes: Lichtenberg: Gedanken undMaximen: Lichtstrahlen aus seinen Werken, ed. Eduard Griesebach (Leipzig:Brockhaus, 1871); Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Eugen Reichel, Reclam Universalbi-bliothek, 1286-1289 (Leipzig: Reclam, [1880]); Aus Lichtenbergs Nachlaß: Aufsät-ze, Briefe, Tagebuchblätter, Briefe, ed. Albert Leitzmann (Weimar: Böhlau, 1889);Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Adolf Wilbrandt (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1893); Bemerkun-gen vermischten Inhalts (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, [ca. 1899]); in addi-tion, almost 200 pages were dedicated to Lichtenberg's writings in volume 141 ofthe anthology Deutsche Nationalliteratur.

48 Georg Christoph Lichtenbergs Aphorismen, ed. Albert Leitzmann (Berlin: B. Behr,1902-1908).

49 Lichtenberg, Aphorismen, ed. Albert Leitzmann, Insel-Bücherei, Nr. 33 (Leipzig:Insel, 1913).

50 Aphorismen, ed. Dora Mitzky (Munich: Dreiländer, 1919); Aphorismen, ed. Ale-xander von Gleichen-Rußwurm (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, [1919], Aphoris-men, Die kleinen Saturnbücher, Nr. 20 (Heidelberg: Meister, [1919]).

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This list of titles and editions indicates not only the extreme popularity ofLichtenberg's writings at the turn of the century, but also the nascent promi-nence of the generic term "Aphorismus" after 1900, as well as the associationof this term with Lichtenberg's reflections.

In this first section our concern has been with establishing the veritablerenaissance that the aphorism underwent in turn-of-the-century Austria, andassociating the prominence of this form with intellectual, cultural, and socio-political circumstances in the declining Austro-Hungarian empire. In thenext two sections these more general observations will give way to specificanalyses of the application of the aphorism by Austrian thinkers of theperiod.

II. From Impression to Epiphany:The Aphorism in the Austrian Jahrhundertwende

The aphorism as expressive medium experienced an unusual floweringamong intellectuals in Vienna at the turn of the century.51 The list of writerswho composed aphorisms and reflected on the nature of this genre at thistime includes Altenberg, Hofmannsthal, Karl Kraus, Musil, RichardSchaukai, Moritz Schlick, Schnitzler, Otto Weininger, and Wittgenstein. Nodoubt, this proliferation of aphorisms represents the culmination of a ten-dency toward aphoristic-fragmentary modes of expression traditionally evi-denced among Austrian intellectuals.52 Still, there are specific conditions andfundamental intellectual circumstances which caused this tradition to be-come especially fruitful at the turn of the century. The purpose of theseremarks is to outline some of the characteristics which contributed to thenear obsession of Viennese writers with aphoristic forms in the final years ofthe declining monarchy. Since my portrayal here cannot be complete, I shallinstead describe two aphoristic types which delimit the range of aphoristicproductivity in this period. I have chosen the terms "impression" and"epiphany" to describe these extremes. Each expression is intended tocharacterize a distinct aphoristic method in a two-fold manner: first, withregard to the creative impulse which calls forth the production of an apho-rism; secondly, with regard to the response which the aphoristic text isprogrammed to evoke in its readers or listeners.

See William Johnston, "The Vienna School of Aphorists 1880-1930: Reflections ona Neglected Genre," Turn of the Century: German Literature and Art 1890-191 ,ed. Gerald Chappie & Hans Schulte (Bonn: Bouvier, 1981), pp. 275-90.Ivar Ivask, "Das große Erbe," esp. pp. 38-46.

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My terminology departs fundamentally from that traditionally associatedwith scholarship on the aphorism. In his seminal essays on this genre, FranzMautner introduced the words " Einfall" and "Klärung" into the criticalvocabulary to denote two essentially distinct aphoristic types.53 "Einfall"refers to the stimulating thought, the aper£u, which takes the thinker bysurprise, occuring beyond all acts of willing and intending, and which be-comes manifest in the insight the aphorism expresses. While this conceptionis peripherally related to what I call the aphorism of epiphany, one majordifference exists: Mautner applies his term exclusively to the productivemoment of aphoristic expression. Mautner's second term, "Klärung," de-scribes the aphoristic thought as the long-sought solution to a dilemma.Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach conceived her aphoristic texts along theselines, as the epigraph she composed for her collection of aphorisms demon-strates: "Ein Aphorismus ist der letzte Ring einer langen Gedankenkette."54

Mautner's distinction is useful insofar as it defines two different aphoristicimpulses and their corresponding thought-processes. "Einfall" describes theposition of the aphorist as one of passive mouthpiece for intellectual revela-tion; "Klärung" portrays the aphorist in the role of active quester afterknowledge. Yet the differentiation between unconscious, inspired "Einfall"and consciously executed "Klärung" breaks down upon careful scrutiny. Forone thing, these processes themselves are never clearly distinct; indeed, mostaphorisms are informed by the interaction of these active and passive mo-ments. More crucial, however, is that Mautner focuses only on the produc-tive element, completely ignoring the receptive dimension. Aphorisms,perhaps even more so than other literary texts, are not only products of acreator, but also products for a receiving public. As we have noted, scholarsconcerned with the nature of the aphorism have continually emphasized thecentrality of reception in determining the characteristics of this genre. Insegregating "impressionistic" and "epiphanic" aphoristic types in the Aus-trian Jahrhundertwende, my purpose is to define these categories accordingboth to creative and receptive impulses. As will become clear, in eachaphoristic type a parallelism of creative and receptive moments can be dis-cerned, so that the aphorism becomes an explicit medium for transferring aspecific experience to its audience in accordance with a well-conceivedstrategy. In both cases, then, the aphorism is employed as the means to anend that is fulfilled in the moment of reception.

55 Mautner, "Der Aphorismus als Literatur," pp. 285-7; see also his "Der Aphoris-mus als literarische Gattung," pp. 46-51.

54 Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach, "Aphorismen," Das Gemeindekind, Novellen,Aphorismen, Werke, vol. l, ed. Johannes Klein (Munich: Winkler, 1956), p. 865.

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A) Ambivalence Toward the Form of the Aphorism

One of the typical characteristics of aphorists is their inclination to reflectaphoristically on the form of the aphorism itself. This acute self-conscious-ness is one of the general traits which marks the aphorism as a "modern"genre and helps account for its general popularity in recent times.55 AmongAustrians who wrote in, and wrote on aphorisms, one discovers an astonish-ing disparity of evaluations. The most disparaging comment is perhaps thatof Arthur Schnitzler:

Schüttle ein Aphorisma, so fällt eine Lüge heraus und eine Banalität bleibt übrig.56

Despite this devastating condemnation of the aphorism, Schnitzler placedconsiderable stock in this form of expression, as evidenced by the fact that hecomposed aphorisms during his entire creative life.57 His divided attitudetoward this genre is nowhere so manifest as in the "Vorwort" to his Buch derSprüche und Bedenken, first published in 1927.58 Schnitzler begins by excus-ing himself for the publication of remarks that contain both "Selbstverständ-lichkeiten" and statements "die nichts weiter sind als geistreich, also kaummehr wahr." At the same time, he comes to the defense of these texts:"Trotzdem trete ich für jeden meiner Aussprüche ein, auch für solche, die ichheute vielleicht nicht völlig aufrecht halten oder nicht einmal niederschreibenwollte." He continues by justifying the publication of these texts as a meansfor clarifying and correcting the public's assessment of his "Verhältnis zu densogenannten ewigen und zu manchen zeitlichen Fragen." Thus, while ques-tioning the very merit and truth of such aphoristic remarks, Schnitzler is stillprepared to publish them and even to justify their publication on the groundthat these documents elucidate intellectual positions he once considered orrepresented.

Schnitzler is not alone among Austrians of this period in his ambivalencetoward the aphorism. Robert Musil also expressed doubts about the efficacyof this genre.

Aphorismus: Nicht Fisch und nicht Fleisch. Nicht Epigramm und nicht Entdek-kung. Es fehlt ihm anscheinend an der Ganzheit, Einprägsamkeit, Reduzierbarkeitodgl. Bloß Bewegung ohne Ergebnis, Knotenpunkt usw. Darum die Abneigunggegen ihn. Schlage es nicht in den Wind!59

55 See J. P. Stern, "A Literary Definition of the Aphorism," pp. 214-15.56 Arthur Schnitzler, Aphorismen und Betrachtungen, ed. Robert Weiss (Frankfurt:

Fischer, 1967), p. 132.57 This is pointed out by Rainer Noltenius, Hofmannsthal - Schröder - Schnitzler:

Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des modernen Aphorismus, p. 142.58 The "Vorwort" to this collection is quoted from the edition Aphorismen und

Betrachtungen; all cited passages are from p. 7.59 Robert Musil, Tagebücher, Aphorismen, Essays und Reden: Gesammelte Werke in

Einzelausgaben, ed. Adolf Frise (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1955), p. 423.

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Clearly, Musil does not succumb to his scepticism about the aphorism, anddespite serious second thoughts he tends later in life more and more towardthe cultivation of aphoristic forms.60 Peter Altenberg also points to the con-flicting opinions that this society held with regard to the function and pur-pose of the aphorism. "Aphorismen sind doch keine Aphorismen, um Got-tes willen! Es ist doch nur, um euch im Leben rasch kurz zu helfend Alten-berg objects to a common disapprobation of the aphorism, as, for instance,that expressed by Schnitzler. Mere aphorisms, Altenberg suggests, areperhaps nothing more than artful lies or trite commonplaces, but true apho-risms, far from being insignificant, contain profound truths that can influ-ence our lives and our thought in substantial ways. Thinking perhaps of theorigin of aphoristic expression in the medicinal formulae of Hippocrates,Altenberg views the aphorism as a social-spiritual tonic whose purpose is tohelp individuals live better. Karl Kraus, the much-disputed master amongAustrian aphorists, summarizes these two evaluations in a poignant aphoris-tic text:

Der Aphorismus deckt sich nie mit der Wahrheit; er ist entweder eine halbe Wahr-heit oder anderthalb. (BW, 161)

Often smacking of the proverbial, aphorisms tend toward banal half-truth;yet, as this text itself so forcefully demonstrates, aphoristic expression iscapable of fracturing banal commonplaces and transcending simple "truth."In these negative and positive evaluations reside the extremes of aphoristicexpression which I refer to as "impression" and "epiphany." As Altenbergand Kraus both indicate, these extremes cannot be conceived in artificialisolation from one another; indeed, there is a fundamental interdependencebetween the aphorism of impression as literary-philosophical commonplace,and the epiphanic aphorism of "transcendental" truth.

Typical of the literary Jahrhundertwende, according to one critic, is theaccompanying of every significant idea, profound experience, or insightfulrecognition by an inherently similar yet trivialized variant.62 The aphorism

60 See Wolfgang Frese, "Robert Musil in Switzerland: Aphorism and PragmaticTradition," Exile: The Writer's Experience, ed. John Spalek and R. F. Bell, Univ.of North Carolina Studies in Germanic Languages and Literatures, 99 (ChapelHill: Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1982), p. 217; Marie-Louise Roth, "Essay undEssayismus bei Robert Musil," Probleme der Moderne: Festschrift für WalterH.Sokel, ed. Benjamin Bennett (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1983), p. 124.

61 Peter Altenberg, Ausgewählte Werke in zwei Bänden, II, 59; see also II, 121, 130.62 Wolfdietrich Rasch, "Aspekte der deutschen Literatur um 1900," Zur deutschen

Literatur seit der Jahrhundertwende (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1967), p. 35.

of the period archetypically reflects this parallelism of the profound and thetrivial. To be sure, both the aphorism of impression and that of epiphany arerooted in the historical tradition of the aphorism, where this parallelism oftrivial and profound applications is continually in evidence. The aphorismhas alternately been associated with the proverb as the expression of a com-monplace, and with a quasi-philosophical mode of expression which formu-lates daring new insights that contradict traditional knowledge and values.Nietzsche's aphorisms, through the very popularity which they enjoyed atthe turn of the century, tended to reinforce this dichotomy. While theycertainly displayed the caustic, critical attitude of one who philosophizedwith a hammer, in the process of popularization this quality often disap-peared, so that only the brilliant form of Nietzsche's remarks was appropri-ated by dilettantes. In these popularized versions the aphorism devolves intohollow form, or into a vehicle for the clever formulation of banal "Lebens-wahrheiten." This division between aphoristic platitude and aphoristicallyexpressed critical insight is reflected in the applicative purpose of the apho-rism: it can either serve the ends of propagandistic deception, beguiling itsaudience with a glamorous form that disguises its own, as well as its author'svacuity; or it can present ideological critique, demonstrating through its owndialectical reversals a method by which accepted truths are contravened,turned inside out to expose their shabby linings. Kraus conjures up this dualaspect of aphoristic expression in another of his aphorisms which reflects onthe essence of this genre.

Einen Aphorismus zu schreiben, wenn man es kann, ist oft schwer. Viel leichter istes, einen Aphorismus zu schreiben, wenn man es nicht kann. (BW, 132)

On one level this text suggests that only those who have true ability to writeprofound aphorisms are aware of the difficulty involved in composing suchtexts; thus good aphorists find the creation of aphorisms difficult, while pooraphorists find it ail-too easy. Read on another level, this aphorism impliesthat it takes more than just rhetorical ability and desire to write profoundaphorisms, for such texts derive ultimately from an inspiration beyond allability and desire. Hence, true aphorisms "occur" to one when one leastexpects them. Regardless of which interpretive level one scrutinizes, this textleads ultimately to the same conclusion: namely, that there is a world ofdifference between the aphorism as mere well-wrought formulation, and theaphorism as brilliant insight, painstakingly formulated. The aphorist as dilet-tante is motivated by the mere technical desire to make, remaining insensi-tive to the creative subtleties of aphoristic form. The aphorist as inspiredartist is motivated by an epiphanic insight and recognizes the labor involvedin lending this insight a suitable linguistic form.

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B) The Aphorism of Impression

I have chosen the word "impression" to designate the less critically reflectiveof these two aphoristic types, in part because of the automatic associationwith "impressionism" which it evokes. As outlined above, a number offundamental characteristics align aphoristic expression closely with thephilosophy of impressionism. This proximity helps to explain the generalflourishing of the aphorism at this time in Vienna, the center of literaryimpressionism. In the essay "Wahrheit, Wahrheit" (1891), Hermann Bahrgave paradigmatic expression to the crisis of truth as experienced by theViennese impressionists. "Sensationen, nichts als Sensationen, unverbun-dene Augenblicksbilder der eiligen Ereignisse auf den Nerven - das charak-terisiert diese letzte Phase, in welche die Wahrheit jetzt die Literatur ge-trieben hat."63 Obviously, the fragmentary, unsystematic form of the apho-rism provided impressionists with a literary genre in which they could viablyrepresent this philosophy of totally relativized, momentary truth. Where theworld decomposes into a series of unrelated sensual perceptions, only frag-mentary forms of expression such as the aphorism are commensurate withthis disjointed reality. The aphorism becomes one of the literary counter-parts of pointilism in pictorial art. Furthermore, it possesses numerouscharacteristics which relate it to the feuilleton, the acknowledged trademarkof Viennese impressionistic literature. Both aphorism and feuilleton con-sciously strive to intermingle subjective and objective realms, ultimatelyquestioning the very nature of such a distinction. Each calls attention to theoccasionality of its stimulus, while simultaneously reducing this stimulus toa mere pretext for the unfolding of wholly personal, subjective, and oftensentimental ponderings. Both forms rely heavily on that untranslatable qual-ity of "Witz" to entertain or titillate their audience. Moreover, each tends tobe a residual product of societal interaction. Finally, both forms tend tocommunicate indirectly more about their creator than they do directly aboutthe object spoken or written of. One can easily imagine the importanceaphoristic formulations must have had in the coffeehouse existence of Vien-nese intellectuals. The dialogic sketches of Altenberg and the dramatic dia-logues of Schnitzler's plays bear testimony to the value this society placed onpointedly witty linguistic formulation. If in the Paris salons of the seven-teenth and eighteenth centuries the maxims of the French moralists bothprovided subject matter for conversation and displayed the linguistic andintellectual abilities of their creators, the aphorism functioned in Viennesecoffeehouse society as the verbal trump-card in a game of social one-upman-ship.

63 Hermann Bahr, "Wahrheit, Wahrheit," Zur Überwindung des Naturalismus,p. 84.

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Role-playing comprised a fundamental aspect of Viennese life during theJahrhundertwende. In much the same way that the Habsburg empire parad-ed an image of historical grandeur in the buildings of the Ringstraße, itscitizens sought to project their own pretentious values in facades of dress andof language. More than a mere metaphor for life, the theater became iden-tified with life itself. One imagines life in Vienna at this time as one never-ending "Komödie," authored by Nestroy, in which the aphorism functionsas a verbal tool by means of which one accomplishes both self-aggrandize-ment and the verbal subjugation of one's dialogic partners. This emphasis onthe theatrical helps to define the paradox characteristic of Vienna's impres-sionistic generation: while seeking to relate to life with spontaneity andimmediacy, these ostensible subscribers to life were only able to play at life.Thus their desire to live spontaneously was preempted by the very self-consciousness with which they responded to this desire. The aphorism ofimpression can be identified with this paradox of impressionism insofar as itis indicative of an affected, deliberate, and detached attitude toward life.Indeed, the impressionistic aphorism manifests this paradox of "staged im-mediacy,'' this self-conscious consciouslessness associated with the figure ofthe dandy.

Analyzing the fate of all literary decadence, Nietzsche wrote in Der FallWagner:

Womit kennzeichnet sich jede literarische decadence") Damit, daß das Leben nichtmehr im Ganzen wohnt. Das Wort wird souverän und springt aus dem Satzhinaus, der Satz greift über und verdunkelt den Sinn der Seite, die Seite gewinntLeben auf Unkosten des Ganzen - das Ganze ist kein Ganzes mehr . . . Das Ganzelebt überhaupt nicht mehr: es ist zusammengesetzt, gerechnet, künstlich, ein Arte-fakt. - (Werke, II, 917)

Subordination of the whole to the elemental and atomistic bespeaks an ex-aggerated emphasis on the fleeting and fragmentary. Ultimately, however,scepticism with regard to the whole gives way to the holism of the part.Fragments take on a microcosmic significance - they become "Gleichnisse"for the absent whole. For those who sacrifice their "selves" to a societal role,verbal showpieces such as the aphorism become the stand-ins for their absentself. In the words of Herbert Roch, the aphorism of this period "[wird] zurbloßen Paradoxie, zum formalen Spielzeug der Dekadenz und des Ästheten-tums, zur Chrysantheme, die man im geistigen Knopfloch trägt."64 In thiscontext the dual meaning of the designation "impression" for the aphorismof literary decadence comes to light. If, from the perspective of composition,the aphorism registers an impression made on the writer/speaker by some

Herben Roch, "Über den Aphorismus," Deutsches Volkstum, 17 (1935), 518.

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external or internal event, from the perspective of audience reception theaphorism functions as a strategy for making an impression; that is, as a toolby means of which one impresses a self-conceived image of oneself uponone's social contacts.

This second function of the aphorism of impression is paradigmaticallyportrayed in the sketch entitled "Agonie" from Schnitzler's Anatol. Max,Anatol's verbal sparring partner, is about to take leave of his troubled friend.At the door he suddenly stops and says to Anatol: "Ich kann unmöglich ohneAphorisma abgehen!" After brushing aside Anatol's interruptions, Max re-cites the following aphorism: "Das Weib ist ein Rätsel: - So sagt man! Wasfür ein Rätsel wären wir erst für das Weib, wenn es vernünftig genug wäre,über uns nachzudenken?" Anatol responds to this recitation with shouts ofbravo, to which Max bows in recognition and departs.65 Schnitzler's artisticcontrol over his characters is demonstrated by the ironical commentary that,unbeknown to Max, his aphorism makes on the perverse interaction be-tween the sexes which is characteristic of this dramatic world. Of course,Max's purpose in reciting this aphorism is purely theatrical. Anatol's bravosand Max's bow underscore the extent to which this performance is intendedmerely to leave Anatol with a calculated impression of Max's wit and sagaci-ty. In addition, this aphorism performs a simple social function: it providesMax with artificial, formal closure for his departure, allowing him to leave onan emphatic - if not wholly appropriate - note. Max essentially employsaphoristic expression for the purpose of projecting the role with which heidentifies. Thus he cleverly manipulates the impressionistic philosophy ofthe fragmentary to his own ends: in a world in which otherwise insignificantdetails take on overriding significance and symbolic value, one can controlthe impression one makes on others by presenting them with forceful, in-flated details which give false testimony to one's character. The dandy calcu-lates that others will make mountains out of his aphoristic molehills.66

Such superficial employment of the aphorism as an intellectual ornamentis not without precedent in the tradition of this genre. English renaissanceculture, for example, is noted for its memorization, hoarding, and timely"spending" of aphoristic remarks in an appropriate context.67 Not coinciden-tally, Francis Bacon's valorization of aphoristic expression as an appropriatemethodological procedure for the scientist and philosopher evolved in this

65 Arthur Schnitzler, Die dramatischen Werke, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1962), I,84-5.

66 The significance of aphoristic pronouncements for the dandyistic type is wellrepresented in Richard Schaukal's Leben und Meinungen des Herrn Andreas vonBalthesser, eines Dilettanten und Dandy (Munich and Leipzig: Georg Müller,1907).

67 See Brian Vickers, "The Aphorism," p. 77.

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context. Similarily, the widespread employment of such pretentious, inau-thentic aphoristic turns of phrase in Viennese society could hardly help butevoke a critical response among those sensitive and sensible enough to pene-trate this smokescreen. Responding to this proliferation of aphoristic pro-nouncements, Peter Altenberg - himself an aphorist by persuasion - diag-noses what he calls "'Aphorismen' spenden" as a symptom of "Größen-wahn."68 In a similar vein, Musil recoils from the thought of someone whowould constantly spout aphorisms, claiming: "Jemand, der auf einemSpaziergang zehn solcher Bemerkungen von sich gäbe, wäre un-angenehm."69 The aphorism of "epiphany" evolves as one critical reactionagainst the deceitful and inauthentic use of language embodied in the apho-rism of "impression."

C) The Aphorism of Epiphany

Numerous intellectuals of turn-of-the-century Vienna, among them Hof-mannsthal and Musil, expressed a certain fascination for the epiphanic ex-perience.70 Epiphany, we know, is a kind of mystical experience whichoccurs when some everyday object suddenly and unpredictably takes on anindescribable meaning, becoming in a momentary flash an indicator oftranscendental significance. In the aphorism of epiphany everyday languagefunctions as that commonplace object which is suddenly infused with aprofound significance. Altenberg describes in the following way thisepiphanic character inherent in the act of aphoristic creation: "Aphorismensollen nicht 'ausgedachte' Wahrheiten sein, sondern momentane Erleuch-tungen aus dem Unterbewußtsein."71 However, just as the aphorism ofimpression demonstrated its creative and receptive relevance, so too the de-signation "epiphany" refers both to the creative stimulus of the aphoristictext, and to the response which it evokes in its public. In its applicativefunction the epiphanic aphorism, in stark contrast to the aphorism of impres-sion, becomes a critical tool. These aphorisms are structured in such a man-ner as to re-produce for the reader the epiphanic experience that led to theircreation. Thus the aphoristic pointe, the startling turn so characteristic of theaphorism, seeks, in the aphorism of epiphany, to re-create for the reader this

68 Altenberg, II, 161.69 Musil, Tagebücher, Aphorismen, Essays und Reden, . 542.70 On the role of epiphany in the literature of this period, see Theodore Ziolkowsky,

"James Joyces Epiphanie und die Überwindung der empirischen Welt in der moder-nen deutschen Prosa," DVjs, 35 (1961), 594-616; Walter Hilsbecher, "Das Zeitalterdes Fragments," Das Zeitalter des Fragments, ed. Horst Lehner (Herrenalb: Erd-mann, 1964), p. 240.

71 Altenberg, II, 232.

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momentary flash of insight. Hence one of the primary strategies of theepiphanic aphorism is to establish particular expectations in its reader, onlyto undercut them. In Vienna the ground for this aphorism of contra-dictionwas especially well prepared by the dissemination of the trivialized aphorismof impression. Thus, where the Viennese public might expect innocenthumor or a game of stunning verbal acrobatics, the epiphanic aphorismserved it a healthy dose of self-critique, laying bare its degenerate verbalpomp. In this manifestation the aphorism became the ideal medium for acritique of the "Sprachgebrauch" of this society, for it simultaneously couldparody the shallowness of "theatrical" language - language used as an inau-thentic guise - and demonstrate a more proper, profound, penetrating use oflanguage.

The aphorisms of Karl Kraus form a focal point for the consolidation andsubsequent dissemination of this critically attuned aphorism of epiphany.While Nietzsche's model is certainly present in Kraus's employment of theaphorism as a polemical weapon in his crusade against shallowness and self-deception, the playful satire of Lichtenberg's aphorisms also had a determin-ing influence on the style and function of Kraus's aphoristic texts. Lichten-berg's aphoristic method exemplified for Kraus a kind of revelatory "dig-ging," to use Kraus's metaphor, in which the audience is also encouraged towield a shovel.

Lichtenberg gräbt tiefer als irgendeiner, aber er kommt nicht wieder hinauf. Erredet unter der Erde. Nur wer selbst tief gräbt, hört ihn. (BW, 127)

In his literary archaeology, Lichtenberg refuses to unearth and openly dis-play his finds; he requires, instead, that those wishing to share this treasurethemselves become archaeologists. Kraus's comment, then, not only ade-quately describes Lichtenberg's method, it also highlights the demand thatLichtenberg and Kraus exact from their audiences. Kraus's readers are notasked merely to accept passively the "meaning" or insights of his aphorisms;rather they must actively participate in the discovery and production of thismeaning. In the struggle to "understand" Kraus's aphoristic texts, the readerlearns how to dig below the surface of language and uncover its hiddentreasures.

The conscious complexity of Kraus's texts serves to call forth this her-meneutical engagement of the reader. Kraus comments on his obscurity inthe following text:

Zu meinen Glossen ist ein Kommentar notwendig. Sonst sind sie zu leicht ver-ständlich. (BW, 287)

By being cryptic, Kraus guarantees that those who wish to understand himwill have to confront the complexity and subtlety of his language. In the actof deciphering the text that Kraus has enciphered, the reader produces an

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interpretive commentary that evolves out of this interaction. Thus Krausmanipulates his readers, jockeying them into a position in which they mustperform a hermeneutical task, insofar as they must "create" for themselvesthe meaning of his text. In this sense Kraus attempts to transfer to the readerhis "epiphanic" insight into the profundity of language and the proper rela-tionship to it; the reader, thus, undergoes an epiphanic experience in uncov-ering the meaning hidden deep within the text. Kraus goes so far as to defineliterary artistry in terms of this ability to conceal a "solution" behind the"riddle" of the text.

Künstler ist nur einer, der aus der Lösung ein Rätsel machen kann. (#W, 338)

Kraus champions an interactive dialogue between creator and recipient inwhich the latter, through a process of hermeneutical reconstruction, re-discovers the insight which motivated the creator. The reader is subtlyguided to an epiphanic experience in which the mystery of "meaning" issuddenly revealed. This revelation is accompanied by the pleasure of discov-ery as well as by pride in one's active role in distilling significance out of thetext.

The aphorism is a literary form perfectly suited to such a task because ofits traditional association with such pronouncements as the oracular riddle.The role of the reader as "completer" of the aphoristic comment, as her-meneutical participant in the text's meaning, is constitutive of the genre.72

Of course, this characteristic corresponds to a conventional literary principle:the artistry of the unexpressed, or the sanctum silentium of literary aesthetics.Given the " Sprachmystik" of this generation, and the impact of Kierkegaardas mediated by the work of Theodor Haecker,73 the currency of this doctrineduring the Jahrhundertwende is not surprising. Altenberg explicity sub-scribed to this method, writing in his "Selbstbiographie": "ich halte dafür:Was man 'weise verschweigt', ist künstlerischer, als was man 'geschwätzigausspricht'. Nicht?!"74

The aphorism is one of Kraus's major weapons in his campaign for thecritical enlightenment of his contemporaries. He describes this "pedagogi-cal" endeavor in his essay "Die Sprache." "Abgründe don sehen zu lehren,wo Gemeinplätze sind - das wäre die pädagogische Aufgabe an einer in

On the relationship of the aphorism to oracular statements, see chapter one aboveand also György Nädor, "Über einen Aphorismustyp und seine antiken Vorläu-fer," pp. 8-12; on the reader's role as participant see Asemissen, p. 165; Grenz-mann, p. 193.Theodor Haecker, Seren Kierkegaard und die Philosophie der Innerlichkeit (Mu-nich: Brenner Verlag, 1913).Altenberg, I, 82.

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Sünden erwachsenen Nation."75 Armed with the rhetorical power of theaphorism, Kraus was equal to this task. The aphorism provided him with aform of expression in which he could hold the corrupt use of language up tothe corrupters, while simultaneously engaging them in a process of reflectionthrough which they themselves could discover the "abysses" lurking in theirplatitudes. One aphorism will serve to illustrate this technique.

Der verfluchte Kerl, rief sie, hat mich in gesegnete Umstände gebracht! (BW, 42)

The gesture of quotation establishes a social context for this remark. Yet theisolation of the aphoristic utterance functions to extract the remark from anycontext, setting it apart and allowing it to be critically scrutinized. Thus theaphorism is neither divorced from the social situation in which its signifi-cance arises, nor is it submerged in this social context. The satirical effect ofthe text derives from the semantic tension arising from the contrastiveinteraction of the words "verflucht" and "gesegnet." Through this contrast,the thoughtless employment of the euphemistic phrase "in gesegnete Um-stände bringen" is thrown into relief. The reader comes to understand howthe words in this expression have lost their individual meaning and havefrozen into cliche. While this technique is by no means restricted to Kraus'saphorisms, the contextlessness of the aphoristic remark highlights the inter-nal contradictions in such unreflected "Sprachgebrauch.·1 This, in turn, con-tributes to the receptive effect of the aphorism and helps initiate that processof reflection on language which Kraus sees as his pedagogical task.

Kraus applies the aphorism to an essentially didactic end, but one whichis both subtle and profound. Instead of simply describing the perversions oflanguage from which he recoils - the method a schoolteacher might use -Kraus presents the perpetrators of such perversions with aphoristic texts inwhich these infractions are exposed in all their absurdity. Choosing an indi-rect method, Kraus allows his audience the pleasure of discovering the errorsthemselves - with the additional pedagogical reinforcement that accom-panies this pleasure. Kraus's readers, then, re-enact the critical procedurewhich his aphoristic texts embody. This transferral of a critical method ofreading is the central function of the aphorism of epiphany.

If the aphorism of "impression" functions as a verbal ornament, hung outin public to bear witness to its creator's intellectual sagacity, the aphorism of"epiphany" exhibits a disposition toward the anti-ornamental, the purposive,the critical. In the latter instance, aphoristic language becomes a model forspeech which is concisely reduced to its elemental components and which,

75 Kraus, "Die Sprache," Die Sprache, ed. Heinrich Fischer (Munich: Kösel, 1954),p. 438.

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transcending these confines, communicates a stunning insight. As Kraushimself admitted, his satirical artistry consisted in controlling the language ofothers, as he put it, while his own language might do with him what itwanted.76 Kraus's aphorisms represent one more satirical appropriation ofthe language of his Viennese contemporaries. Thus the epiphanic aphorism,as applied by Kraus, should be understood not as a simultaneous and coinci-dentally parallel form to the aphorism of impression, but rather as a calcu-lated reaction against it. Kraus excelled at jumping on the linguistic pro-clivities of his fellow Viennese, transforming their vices into his virtues. Hisadoption of the aphorism is therefore not just a response to the inherentmerits of this form of expression, but also a revolt against the hollowaphoristic pronouncements with which Viennese society masked its moraland intellectual shallowness.

Kraus's influence on other Viennese intellectuals, especially on the earlyWittgenstein, has been frequently noted and need not be examined in detailhere.77 Central in this context is simply the recognition that Kraus's apho-risms, attempting to "show" what they cannot "say" - at least not withequivalent pedagogical force - prefigure in their literary practice the theoryWittgenstein was to evolve in the Tractatus. Significantly, however, Krausnot only influenced the substance of Wittgenstein's theory, but also theaphoristic form in which it was presented. Wittgenstein, moreover, assignsthe same significance to the active interpretive participation of his reader asdid Kraus. In the penultimate proposition of the Tractatus, Wittgensteinasserts:

Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, daß sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende alsunsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie - auf ihnen - über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Ermuß sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Ermuß diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig. (6. 54)

The epiphanic aphorism is defined by this demand for participation, comple-tion, and ultimate transcendence on the part of the reader. It attains this byprefiguring in its own structure the conditions through which the reader canre-create its initial insight. Kraus is the genius behind this method, and hismodel was imitated by many who followed. Aside from Wittgenstein, EgonFriedeil and Alfred Polgar deserve mention, although their aphorisms rarelymanifest the skill and control evident in Kraus's aphoristic texts.

76 "Ich beherrsche nur die Sprache der ändern. Die meinige macht mit mir, was siewill." (BW, 326)

77 See especially Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna esp.pp. 81-90; and also Werner Kraft, "Ludwig Wittgenstein und Karl Kraus," Dieneue deutsche Rundschau, 72 (1961), 812-44.

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I have attempted here to present some ideas which would help to explainthe general prominence of aphoristic expression among turn-of-the-centuryViennese writers. In defining the "impressionistic" and "epiphanic" aspectsof aphoristic expression, I have sought to delineate the extremes in an exten-sive range of aphoristic types. While these polar extremes are not artificialconstructs - indeed, they are concretely manifested in the aphoristic dia-logues of Schnitzler's dramas on the one hand, and in the satirical-criticalaphorisms of Karl Kraus on the other - it is nevertheless true that theaphoristic production of most Viennese writers of the time falls somewherebetween these poles. Peter Altenberg's aphoristic production, for example,occupies the space midway between the extremes of the "impressionistic"and "epiphanic" aphorism. The "sociable" aphorisms of Hofmannsthal,78 toname just one other prominent example, reflect a productive appropriationand creative transfiguration of the purpose and function of the impressionis-tic aphorism. Nonetheless, only the concurrent existence and fruitful inter-penetration of these opposing drives can explain the uncommon flourishingof the aphorism in the Austrian Jahrhundertwende. The following section isspecifically concerned with the phenomenon of epiphany and the relevanceof the aphorism as a means of expression through which Austrian intellectu-als of the period sought to overcome the crisis of language.

III. Aphorism and Sprachkrise in Turn-of-the-Century Austria

Acknowledgement of the formative role of the phenomenon commonlycalled "Sprachkrise" for the literature and philosophy of the Austrian Jahr-hundertwende has become a literary-historical commonplace. As is the casewith many overwhelmingly accepted notions, however, general agreementon the validity of this recognition has often forestalled investigation into thespecific practices of writers and philosophers of this period which might beregarded as manifestations of this crisis of language. My intent in whatfollows is to investigate just such an instance in which the intellectual prob-lematics of Sprachkrise and its concomitant Sprachkritik influenced particularmethodological and formal practices informing specific works of authorstouched by this phenomenon. My focal point will be the less established, ifequally valid recognition that among Austrian intellectuals of this period,especially among those concerned with the crisis or critique of language, the

78 The designation "sociable" ("gesellig") for the aphorisms of Hofmannsthal wasintroduced by Rainer Noltenius, Hofmannsthal - Schröder - Schnitzler: Möglich-keiten und Grenzen des modernen Aphorismus, p. 5.

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aphorism evolves into a significant genre in their repertory of literary orphilosophical forms of expression.79

Among those Austrian writers affected by the Sprachkrise who alsoturned to the form of the aphorism at simultaneous or subsequent points intheir creative lives one can count Kafka, Schnitzler, Hofmannsthal, Musil,Kraus, and Wittgenstein, to name just a few. This section will examine therelationship of aphoristic form and Sprachkrise in works of the last four ofthese thinkers. In the instances of Hofmannsthal and Musil the object ofanalysis will not be their aphoristic texts, but rather narrative works whichtreat of the intellectual aporias indicative of the crisis of language and pro-pose formal solutions reminiscent of those constitutive of the aphorism intheir search to transcend the recognized limitations of linguistic expression.In the cases of Kraus and Wittgenstein the form of the aphorism is discussedas the fitting medium for their respective critiques of language. These ana-lyses are preceded by a general introduction into the historical relationshipobtaining between employment of the aphorism and the drive to experimentwith and test the expressive possibilities of language, and by a summary ofthe fundamental intellectual issues of Sprachkritik as elucidated through theexample of Fritz Mauthner's Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache.

A) Aphorism and Sprachkritik

Critics concerned with the nature of the aphorism have commonly associ-ated production in this genre with a peculiar form of aphoristic thoughtwhose salient characteristic is a polarity between rationality and mysticism.This conflict between logic and feeling, between the succinctly comprehen-sible and the unfathomable, crystalizes for many aphorists around questionsabout the limitations and potential of language as expressive medium.80

Aphorists are motivated by a desire to test the adequacies of language on twolevels: structurally through the manipulation of syntactic and rhetoricalmechanisms; semantically through such devices as word-play, metaphor,neologism, and pun. While in the first instance they sound out the potentialinherent in the logic of language, in the second case they experiment with theillogical, metaphysical dimension of language. Yet the aphorist's experience

79 See William Johnston, "The Vienna School of Aphorists 1880-1930: Reflections ona Neglected Genre," pp. 275-90. While Johnston correctly claims that the Viennaof this period was a "seedbed of aphorisms" (275), he does not investigate theintellectual, social, or political impeti behind the proliferation of this form ofexpression.

80 See Helmut Arntzen, "Aphorismus und Sprache: Lichtenberg und Karl Kraus,"pp. 323-38.

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of language as communicative medium remains ambivalent, reflecting fluc-tuation between faith and doubt with regard to the expressive capacities oflanguage. While enjoying language's playfulness and richness of expression,aphorists simultaneously sense that such equivocality impedes precise, truth-ful expression; at the same time, they can laud language for its logical clarity,while suspecting that this lucidity merely falsifies the labyrinthine complexi-ty of the world and of thought. The aphorism, with its quintessential tensionbetween precise, apodictic, tightly-structured language and ambiguous,multi-layered statement, formalizes this discord. As Karl Kraus so aphoristi-cally put it: "Der Aphorismus deckt sich nie mit der Wahrheit; er ist ent-weder eine halbe Wahrheit oder anderthalb" (BW, 161). Either way, onemight claim, attempting to read between the lines of this text, an aphorism isstructured around a half-truth, this being its direct, simple form which oftensmacks of the merely formulaic. However, while the trite aphorism nevergoes beyond this formulaic half-truth, the profound aphorism challenges itwith a novel assertion. By fusing rhetorical "half-truth" with its own unique"whole-truth," the effective aphorism manages, according to another ofKraus's aphorisms, to wing beyond the stratified "truths" of society (BW,117).

As noted in the preceding chapter, aphorists are questers after truth;however, they do not understand truth to be given, unalterable, and trans-mitted by an infallible tradition. On the contrary, truth, like reality andthought, is considered to be in a constant process of dynamic change, and assuch only approachable through incessant interrogation of that which hasfrozen into accepted "truth." This belief encourages aphorists to explode thetemples of truth, exposing them as mere ideological deceptions; they attemptto infuse truth with a new dynamism that resists the temptation of precisedefinition, stagnation, reification. "Aufbauende Zerstörung" is the phrasewhich Franz Kafka used to describe this attitude, applying it to the essentiallyaphoristic method of Kierkegaard (cf. H, 125). Language, which neatlycategorizes diverse thoughts and perceptions, ignoring difference and focus-ing on similarity, is largely responsible for the reification of truth. Conse-quently, this tendency must be fought in language itself. Thus the aphorismconsciously fractures the conventionalized structures and concepts of lan-guage, while simultaneously exploiting this conventionality for its ownends. It portrays language as something that is complex in its simplicity, andsimple in its complexity. By juxtaposing and intertwining ossified structureswith subtle semantic nuances and paradoxes, the aphorism calls attention tothe petrified half-truths of convention, while concurrently recombining theelements of language to reveal meanings that transcend established truths.We might say, then, waxing aphoristic for a moment, that aphorisms don'tadvance a truth, they advance truth.

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B) Mauthner's Kritik der Sprache

The proximity of the aphorist's "philosophy" of language to the problema-tics of the Austrian Sprachkrise is best elucidated by comparison with funda-mental principles of Fritz Mauthner's Kritik der Sprache. As Walter Eschen-bacher has argued, the importance of Mauthner's critique lies in the fact thatit poignantly summarizes ideas that were widespread among Austrian intel-lectuals of the period.81 Thus Mauthner's contribution is not that of anoriginal thinker advancing stimulating, seminal conceptions, but rather thatof a popularizer of thoughts which had attained currency in intellectualcircles. Hofmannsthal, therefore, plays down the influence of Mauthner'swritings on his Ein Brief when responding to a query regarding the possibleimpact of the Kritik der Sprache on this text. While admitting his acquaint-ance with Mauthner's work, Hofmannsthal adds: "Meine Gedanken sindfrüh ähnliche Wege gegangen, vom Metaphorischen der Sprache manchmalmehr entzückt, manchmal mehr beängstigt."82 Hofmannsthals response issignificant because it pinpoints the central issue of Mauthner's critique: lan-guage's metaphoricity. Expressing ideas strikingly similar to those inNietzsche's essay "Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn,"Mauthner conceives of language as a fundamentally metaphorical, and thus"mendacious," phenomenon. The very act in which language is created, thetransformation of sense data into articulated sounds, is an act of metaphori-zation (KdS, II, 467-69).83 Due to this inherent metaphoricity, languagecannot express "truth," which, for Mauthner, can only consist in the perfectidentity of language with the objective reality it is intended to express. Thisinability to jettison the adequation theory of truth brings with it the linguis-tic scepticism characteristic of the Austrian Sprachkrise in its various man-ifestations.84 Mauthner concludes that language fails in what should be itsprimary task: the communication of knowledge (KdS, I, 86-90). He furtheremphasizes, in this context, the process of abstraction which makes languagepossible. Functioning only through the formation of types and categories,

81 Walter Eschenbacher, Fritz Mauthner und die deutsche Literatur um 1900, Euro-päische Hochschulschriften, Reihe l, Bd. 163 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1977),pp. 122 & 124.

82 Hofmannsthal's letter to Fritz Mauthner from November 3, 1902, Martin Stern,"Der Briefwechsel Hofmannsthal-Fritz Mauthner," Hofmannsthal-Blätter, 19-20(1978), 33.

83 Mauthner's Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache will be referred to with the abbre-viation KdS, volume, and page number following the first edition (Stuttgart:Cotta, 1901-02).

84 See Katherine Arens, "Linguistic Scepticism: Towards a Productive Definition,"Monatshefte, 74 (1982), 150; Franz Deubzer, Methoden der Sprachkritik, Münch-ner germanistische Beiträge, Bd. 27 (Munich: Fink, 1980), p. 28.

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language can never be adequate to a reality which knows only individualsand specific, distinct instances (KaS, I, 476). The conditio sine qua non oflanguage and thought, so Mauthner, rests in the process of forgetting. Cog-nitive or linguistic classifications, concepts, are arrived at by the implacableignoring of difference and the exclusive highlighting of similarity. Suchconcepts no longer accord with the phenomena of reality (Ac/5, I, 283).

Sprachkritik as practiced by Austrians of the Jahrhundertwende was anessentially Janus-faced phenomenon. While the preceding comments relatethe negative thrust, the characteristic "Sprachskepsis" of Mauthner and hiscontemporaries, this very scepticism commonly evoked an equal and oppo-site response, calling forth a "Sprachmystik" which affirmed the magical,metaphorical power of language.85 This leads, for Mauthner and for others,to a belief in the poetic, the aesthetic relevance of language. Whilemetaphoricity inhibits language's capacity to communicate "truth," precise-ly this characteristic defines its appropriateness as a creative material, suitedfor poets, but not for scientists and philosophers (KdS, I, 97). Only thisultimate affirmation of metaphor could justify Mauthner's own predilectiontoward application of this figure of speech in his own writing. Indeed,Mauthner relies heavily on poignant metaphors, often expanded into con-ceits, for the exposition of his critique of language (Cf. KdS, I, 28, 81).Mauthner's equivocal evaluation of metaphor is indicative of the centralparadox of all Sprachkritik: namely, that this criticism of language is neces-sarily dependent on the very medium it attacks. Hence Mauthner finds him-self in the position of attempting to further "science" or philosophy whileapplying, quite consciously, an "artistic" medium. Use of language, despitelogical scepticism in its efficacy, is legitimized by the mystical belief inlanguage's metaphorical potency. Through this affirmative application ofmetaphor, language becomes, so to speak, its own metalanguage.

Though himself employing systematic exposition, Mauthner praisesforms of unsystematic, fragmentary expression as the only conceivablepromoters of human knowledge (KdS, I, 645). He regards it as the "Gipfelder Skepsis . . ., dass es nämlich in der Geschichte des Menschengeistesimmer nur sichere Beobachtungen, Aper$us gebe, nicht aber Gesetze, Ur-teile, Sätze" (KdS, I, 136). Mauthner continues, quoting Goethe from theeighth paragraph of the "Abhandlung über den Zwischenkieferknochen":

'Ein . . . , ein solches Gewahrwerden, Auffassen, Vorstellen, Begriff, Idee,wie man es nennen mag, behält immerfort, man gebärde sich wie man will, eine

See Deubzer, Methoden der Sprachkritik, p. 28; C. A. M. Noble, Sprachskepsis:Über Dichtung der Moderne, Zusammenhänge der deutschen Literatur, Bd. l(Munich: edition text und kritik, 1978), p. 41. One is reminded as well of Nietz-sche's characteristic re-affirmation of metaphor in the essay "Über Wahrheit undLüge im außermoralischen Sinn."

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esoterische Eigenschaft; im ganzen lässt sich's aussprechen, aber nicht beweisen, imeinzelnen lässt sich's wohl vorzeigen, doch bringt man es nicht rund und fertig.'(KdS, I, 136).

The advancement of knowledge, then, does not occur through logical analy-sis and development, systematic progress, but rather through conceptualleaps, sudden insights of unknown origin, inspiration, meta-phor. The vir-tues of the aperfu, as described by Goethe and appropriated by Mauthner,ring similar to the characteristics of aphoristic expression. Especially thisunnamable "esoteric quality," which cannot be rounded off or brought to aclose, reminds one of the aphorism. Moreover, Goethe's emphasis on thenon-provable which lets itself be shown ("vorzeigen") anticipates inrudimentary fashion Wittgenstein's celebrated distinction between showing("zeigen") and saying in language.

Subscribing to the characteristic world-view of this period, Mauthnerconceives of reality as a chaos of non-related fragments (KdS, I, 351). Onlyfragmentary forms of thought and expression - the apercu, the aphorism -are commensurate with such a reality. Not only do these fragments imitatethe fragmentariness of reality, but they make no claim to permanence, toclosure and finality; they resist being frozen into concepts. As we have seen,Mauthner's writing style in the Kritik der Sprache reflects only in the mostsuperficial way his recognitions about the need for unsystematic formulationin order to approximate "truth." Mauthner's striking metaphors are in-tended to correspond to the brilliant "aperfus" defended by Goethe. It iscertainly for this reason, and for his lack of scientific rigor, that Mauthner'sstyle has been characterized as "aphoristisch-essayistisch."86 Indeed, Mauth-ner's metaphoric flights of fancy lend his treatise an air of the anecdotal,undermining its own serious intent. Thus his attempt to evolve a metaphoric"metalanguage" for the formulation of his critique of language is a question-able success. Nonetheless, it represents a halting first step in the progressionwhich would culminate in Wittgenstein's application of aphoristic expres-sion to accomplish this same end.

C) Hofmannsthal's Chandos

Hugo von Hofmannsthal's Ein Brief is commonly regarded as the centralliterary document reflecting the crisis of language. Mauthner's belief thatHofmannsthal's text was written in response to his Kritik der Sprache under-scores the extent to which the intellectual currents of this "letter" participatein the notions of Sprachkritik as represented by Mauthner. Indeed, the crisis

Eschenbacher, Fritz Mauthner und die deutsche Literatur um 1900, p. 126.

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- or crises - described by the fictive Philip Lord Chandos bear strikingresemblance to specific points of Mauthner's critique.

Chandos' intial state of all-encompassing harmony is characterized by hisbeing "mitten drinnen" in all of nature (PII, 10),87 a condition in which hesenses his participation in, and control over the objects of the world (PII,11). The first symptom of Chandos' crisis is the rupturing of this harmonicexistence, which, in retrospect, Chandos terms "aufgeschwollene An-maßung" (PII, 11). His new condition is signaled by a loss of control, aninability to combine the fragments of reality into a cohesive whole either inthought or in speech (PII, 11). At first Chandos is irritated by everydayabstractions, but this ultimately leads to a condition in which he can utter nojudgment whatsoever, because, as he so artfully puts it, the words dissolve inhis mouth "wie modrige Pilze" (PH, 12).

The following passage from Mauthner's magnum opus underlines certainsimilarities in his and Hofmannsthal's conceptions. Attacking the overlyabstract "Kultursprachen" used by poets and intellectuals, Mauthner writes:

so hat der Dichter und der Denker unserer Zeit alle Wortfetische zweier Jahrtau-sende in seinem Gehirn beisammen und kann kein Urteil mehr fällen, kann keinGefühl mehr ausdrücken, ohne dass die Worte wie ein gespenstischer Verwand-lungskünstler auf dem Drahtseil ein Maskenkostüm nach dem anderen abstreifenund ihn auslachen und unter den Kleidern durch das Rasseln ihrer Knochen verra-ten, dass sie halbverweste Gerippe sind." (KdS, I, 215)

What stands out in this passage, aligning it closely with the Chandos-letter,is the degeneration of the ability to pass judgment, this being predicated onthe insidious abstractions, "Wortfetische," in Mauthner's terminology,inherent in the cultivated languages. Moreover, Mauthner's specific rejectionof the " Kultursprachen" relates directly to Chandos' abandoning of specificcultivated languages because they no longer serve to communicate what isimportant to him. Chandos, then, in his position as poet and thinker of theseventeenth century, recognizes the degenerate quality of the languages inwhich he is given to speak and write. However, more telling than even theseresemblances is a common stylistic tendency shared by Mauthner and Chan-dos: their flight into metaphor at the crucial points of their exposition whenwords begin to fail them. While Hofmannsthal's metaphors are not as exag-gerated and uncontrolled as Mauthner's, the fact remains that at those pointswhen the expositional structure of the letter demands an emphatic and con-clusive turn, Hofmannsthal/Chandos slips into metaphor or simile.Moreover, the images which Chandos chooses, far from placing a definitive

Hofmannsthal's Chandos-letter is quoted from the edition Prosa H, ed. HerbertSteiner (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1951) and will henceforth be cited as PII with the pagenumber.

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stamp on his argument, often lead into unsettling equivocality, introducingthat "esoteric quality" with which Goethe characterized the aper$u. Chan-dos' metaphors, like Mauthner's, represent his attempt to leap beyond thestatic abstractions and rhetorical logic of the cultivated languages, creating afreshness of expression that relates to the ever-freshness of a perpetuallychanging reality.

Chandos' scepticism about the adequacy of language provides the basisfor a uniquely mystical interaction with objects of the world. If in his origi-nal state of harmony Chandos experienced the entirety of the world as asubset of himself, viewing himself ns "swollen" macrocosm encompassingand controlling all reality, his mystical experiences consist in the subordina-tion of the self to the world and its independent fragments. No longermanipulating, Chandos is manipulated, overwhelmed in certain unpredict-able moments by various "Nichtigkeiten" which reveal to him the "Gegen-wart des Unendlichen" (PH, 16). Chandos' macrocosmic subsumption ofreality to his ego gives way to a microcosmic conception of the whole inwhich Chandos' ego is just one among infinite fragments reflecting thewhole.88 In other words, the specific, the particular, becomes a kind ofmetaphorical encipherment of the whole, the vehicle through which thewhole becomes accessible. One of Hofmannsthal's aphorisms from the Buchder Freunde expresses this relationship. "Nicht daß einer alles wisse, kannverlangt werden, sondern daß er, indem er um eins weiß, um alles wisse" (A,35). This is the insight mediated to Chandos through the experience of hisso-called epiphanies: discovering the whole in the elemental.89 "Denn es ist jaetwas völlig Unbenanntes und auch wohl kaum Benennbares," Chandoswrites of his epiphanies, "das in solchen Augenblicken, irgendeine Er-scheinung meiner alltäglichen Umgebung mit einer überschwellenden Fluthöheren Lebens wie ein Gefäß erfüllend, mir sich ankündet" (PH, 14). Hav-ing lost his control over totalizing abstractions, Chandos despairs of hisability to express the essence of this "higher life." Thu* he repeatedly inter-jects comments about the futility of his attempt to describe these experiencesin words (PII, 14, 15, 17). Comparing himself to Tantalus, Chandos ex-plains how the "Geheimnisse des Glaubens" as well as "die irdischen Begrif-fe" recede from his longing grasp (PH, 11). In the same way, words merely"wrestle down" the "Cherubim" of his epiphanies (PII, 16), so that thesemirages dissipate whenever Chandos approaches them with language. The

88 Cf. Hofmannsthal's retrospective analysis of just such a movement from macro-cosmic to microcosmic in his own life (A, 234).

89 Cf. Ziolkowski, "James Joyces Epiphanie und die Überwindung der empirischenWelt in der modernen deutschen Prosa," p. 599.

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overriding paradox of Chandos' situation, as has frequently been noted,90

lies in his, according to most assessments, successful attempt at communicat-ing that which he claims is ineffable. Linguistic limitation is overcome inspecific practices adapted by Chandos in the composition of his letter, prac-tices designed to recreate in language the epiphanic experiences to whichChandos is subjected. Chandos' transcending of language in language bearscertain similarities to the notion of the aperfu as propounded by Mauthner,and to the general theory and practice of aphoristic expression. Hisepiphanies correspond closely to the flash of insight independent of rationalargument that Mauthner associated with the term "apergu," itself closelyaligned with the term "Einfall" as it is applied to describe the insight whichmotivates the formulation of an aphorism.

Had Chandos or Mauthner searched for an established form of expressionwhich would conform to the communication of their epiphanies or apergus,then the aphorism would certainly have offered itself as the appropriateform. In fact, the aphorism traditionally embodies what might be called aform of linguistic epiphany. Not only is the creation of the aphorism moti-vated by an epiphanic insight, it is also constructed in such a way as toprogram this insight into the reception of the text. In other words, theaphorism seeks to recreate through its characteristic pointe the epiphany thatled to its own creation, communicating indirectly the individual experiencewhich served as its motivating force. Hofmannsthal/Chandos, I wish toclaim, succeeds in effecting the same type of indirect communication byemploying techniques common to aphoristic expression. In doing so, hisliterary praxis moves well beyond Mauthner's rudimentary and overdonemetaphorical re-enactment of his apersus.91

Before outlining this thesis, it is necessary to document Hofmannsthal'saccess to the intellectual considerations which give rise to aphoristic expres-sion. This can be accomplished by re-investigating the significance of FrancisBacon, the addressee.of Chandos' letter, for the background of this text.92

90 See, for example, Erwin Kobel, Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Berlin: Walter de Gruy-ter, 1970), p. 143; Karl Pestalozzi, Sprachskepsis und Sprachmagie im Werk desjungen Hofmannsthal (Zürich: Atlantis Verlag, 1958), p. 121; Martin Stern,"Briefwechsel Hofmannsthal - Fritz Mauthner," p. 30.

91 Benjamin Bennett, "Chandos and His Neighbors," DVjs, 49 (1975), 330, inter-prets the irony of Hofmannsthal's text as the medium of its indirectlycommunicated message.

92 On Hofmannsthal and Bacon see H.Stefan Schultz, "Hofmannsthal and Bacon:The Sources of the Chandos Letter," Comparative Literature, 13 (1961), 1-15;Gotthart Wunberg, "Rationale Epiphanie: Der Brief des Lord Chandos," Derfrühe Hofmannsthal: Schizophrenie als dichterische Struktur, Sprache und Litera-tur, 25 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), pp. 106-17.

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In a letter of January 16, 1903 to his friend Andrian, Hofmannsthal indi-cates that his reading of Bacon's "essays" provided the stimulus for thecomposition of Ein Brief.93 H. Stefan Schultz and Gotthart Wunberg havedocumented the considerable influence of diverse texts by Bacon on theChandos-letter, ranging from the Novum Organum to The Advancement ofLearning and Bacon's collection of apophthegms.94 Especially Wunberg haselucidated the relationship between Bacon's critique of conceptual "idola"and Chandos' aversion to abstractions and simplifying generalizations. In-deed, in the initial propositions of Bacon's Novum Organum one finds aconcise summary of the symptoms of Chandos' crises: from an attack onabstractions (aphs. 16 & 51); to a favoring of particular recognitions overgeneralizations (aph. 24), and the related conviction that we should abandonabstractions in favor of particular observations (aph. 36); to the descriptionof words as "idols" which hinder rather than further understanding (aphs.59-60).95 What is more, the form of Bacon's presentation is consciously andstrictly adapted to his recognitions: he employs an aphoristic method, focus-ing on particulars while rejecting systematic connectedness and overridingabstractions. Bacon, we recall, recommended the aphoristic method for em-pirical investigation, and through Georg Christoph Lichtenberg his aphoris-tic model entered into the German literary tradition. The general impact ofBacon's thought on the content of HofmannsthaPs Chandos-letter, then,induces us to seek out manifestations of Bacon's influence in formal aspectsof this text as well.

Clearly, at least in this work, Hofmannsthal does not appropriate Bacon'saphoristic method. He does, however, apparently respond to a recommen-dation included in Bacon's Advancement of Learning. In Chapter XII, BookTwo of this work, discussing the significance of citing the words of famousindividuals when depicting the history of an epoch, Bacon writes:

And not only the actions of mankind, but also their sayings, ought to be pre-served, and may doubtless be sometimes inserted in history, so far as they decentlyserve to illustrate the narration of facts; but books of orations, epistles, and apoph-thegms, are the proper repositories of human discourse. The speeches of wise menupon matters of business, weighty causes, or difficult points, are of great use, notonly for eloquence, but for the knowledge of things themselves. But the letters of

93 Hofmannsthal, letter to Andrian from January 16, 1903, Hofmannsthal - AndrianBriefwechsel, ed. Walter H.Perl (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1968), p. 160.

94 Schultz, "Hofmannsthal and Bacon," pp. 6-7; Wunberg, "Rationale Epiphanie,"pp. 108-10.

95 Bacon's Novum Organum is cited by aphorism number from the edition Advance-ment of Learning and Novum Organum, ed James F. Creighton (London: TheColonial Press, 1900); References to the Advancement of Learning are cited bypage number from this same volume.

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wise men upon serious affairs are yet more serviceable in points of civil prudence,as of all human speech nothing is more solid or excellent than such epistles, (p. 61)

HofmannsthaPs letter appears as a response to numerous points made byBacon in this passage. We recall, for instance, Chandos' plan to compose acollection of apophthegms along the lines described here (PII, 9-10). Inaddition, Chandos' insertion of the sayings of great men, especially the storyof Crassus, serve, corresponding with Bacon's recommendation, "to illus-trate the narration of facts." Finally, and most significant, is Hofmannsthal'schoice of epistolary form, which Bacon praises as the highest manner ofhuman speech, for the exposition of his ideas. It is in this sense, it seems tome, that we should understand Hofmannsthal's comment to Andrian that inwriting the letter he sought to imitate the "Sprechton" of the seventeenthcentury.96 In other words, Hofmannsthal was striving to accomplish in hisfictive epistle that "excellent" form of human speech of which, according toBacon, "nothing is more solid." At the same time, of course, Hofmannsthalwas motivated by personal considerations. In the same letter to Andrian heclaims that the "Anreiz" to such a work would disappear if he were toexpress the personal content of the fictional letter in a direct, confessionalmanner. This consideration, then, could explain Hofmannsthal's avoidanceof the more direct, personal form of the aphorism, since the voice of theauthor can be taken to be more perceptible behind such expression than it isbehind the fictional epistolary form which Hofmannsthal eventually chose.Nonetheless, as we have seen, Bacon's influence is evidenced in this choice aswell.97

When Hofmannsthal opts for the epistolary form in composing this text,the general purpose and structure of aphoristic expression are not whollypassed over. Chandos, as we have seen, repeatedly employs the metaphor ofthe overflowing vessel to communicate the fullness of his mysticalepiphanies (PII, 14). Hofmannsthal, in an attempt textually to reproduce justsuch an experience, chooses the limiting vessels of epistolary form and the"Sprechton" of the seventeenth century. This he infuses with Chandos'"fieberisches Denken," his "Denken in einem Material, das unmittelbarer,flüssiger, glühender ist als Worte" (PH, 19). Typical of this letter, as well asof the form of the aphorism, is the introduction of a subjective content intowhat would otherwise be a purely sterile form. Hofmannsthal's text, viewedin this manner, represents a fusion of principles referred to, but individuallyrejected, by Chandos. Recalling his past literary plans, Chandos mocks his

96 Letter to Andrian, January 16,1903, Briefwechsel Hofmannsthal-Andrian, p. 160.97 Hofmannsthal's stated intention to create a series of such epistolary works (Brief-

wechsel Hofmannsthal - Andrian, p. 160) underscores the reliance on Bacon'sconception of the value of such letters.

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naive faith in the power of rhetoric, citing its inability to penetrate "insInnere der Dinge" (PH, 8); yet he unabashedly applies rhetoric in his ownletter, as he himself admits (PII, 8).98 Likewise, writing of a planned history,Chandos enthusiastically details his "Erkenntnis der Form . . ., jener tiefen,wahren, inneren Form, die jenseits des Geheges der rhetorischen Kunststückeerst geahnt werden kann" and which "hebt [das Stoffliche] auf und schafftDichtung und Wahrheit zugleich" (PII, 9). Again, while Chandos has os-tensibly put aside the history which was to embody this recognition, thedescribed method informs the composition of this very letter. What Chan-dos/Hofmannsthal achieves, in the spirit of the best aphorists, is an inter-penetration of rhetorical structure and an "inner form" which transcendsthese rhetorical limits. Hofmannsthal/Chandos, while longing for a "newlanguage" in which he will finally be able to express himself, actually effectsin the formulation of these desires a restructuring, re-shaping, and re-apply-ing of the "old language," forcing it to communicate beyond its admittedlimitations. Hofmannsthal's response to this challenge reflects on a generallevel the response of the aphorist to the same challenge. Like the aphorist, hecomposes a text which is defined by strict structural and stylistic boundaries,while filling this insignificant "Gefäß" with equivocal metaphors and inde-finable meanings that can only be sensed beyond these restrictions. Thus inits "inner form" this letter reproduces for the reader the epiphanic experi-ences described by its fictional character: language, of whose "Nichtigkeit"Chandos is complaining, takes on the ability of those other "Nichtigkeiten"which occasion Chandos' epiphanies, becoming a vessel filled out with inex-pressible significance.

D) Musil: Essayism and Aphoristics

The importance of Hofmannsthal's Ein Brief for the interrelation of apho-rism and Sprachkrise resides in the inscribing of the intellectual problematicsof the crisis of language in a literary form which, reflecting structure andpurpose of the aphorism, transcends these problems in the very act of de-scribing them. The importance of Robert Musil's novel Der Mann ohneEigenschaften for our topic rests in the theoretical description of the "Essay"as conceived in this novel and applied to its composition. While this noveldoes not constitute a radical transformation of the form of the historicalnovel per se, it does strive to adapt it to the conception of "essayistic"expression evolved by Musil's protagonist, Ulrich. The principles andcharacteristics of this "Essayismus" overlap almost exactly with those ofaphoristic expression.

98 Cf. Bennett, "Chandos and His Neighbors," p. 329.

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Ulrich's world-view is informed by the same sense of fragmentation,relativity, flux, and instability that sparked Chandos' crisis. Ulrich senses,"kein Ding, kein Ich, keine Form, kein Grundsatz sind sicher, alles ist ineiner unsichtbaren, aber niemals ruhenden Wandlung begriffen, im Unfestenliegt mehr von der Zukunft als im Festen, und die Gegenwart ist nichts alseine Hypothese, über die man noch nicht hinausgekommen ist" (MoE, 250).Ulrich's "qualitylessness" is an expression of his acceptance of, and adjust-ment to, this state of affairs; hence, in contrast to Chandos, he does not recoilin despair. Indeed, in his theory of the "Utopie des Essayismus" he tries tocome to terms intellectually with this modern condition. Seeking a mode ofexpression which would circumvent the mendacity of the frozen concept,Ulrich, experiencing a kind of intellectual epiphany, formulates his theory ofessayism.

In Ulrich war später, bei gemehrtem geistigen Vermögen, daraus eine Vorstellunggeworden, die er nun nicht mehr mit dem unsicheren Wort Hypothese, sondernaus bestimmten Gründen mit dem eigentümlichen Begriff eines Essays verband.Ungefähr wie ein Essay in der Folge seiner Abschnitte ein Ding von vielen Seitennimmt, ohne es ganz zu erfassen, - denn ein ganz erfaßtes Ding verliert mit einemMale seinen Umfang und schmilzt zu einem Begriff ein - glaubte er, Welt undeigenes Leben am richtigsten ansehen und behandeln zu können. (MoE, 250)

Musil's novel, of course, employs this procedure in its own novelistic-essay-istic structure, approaching the interrelation of the man without qualitieswith the world of "Kakania" from various sides." Ulrich ultimately arrivesat a working definition of this mode of expression, claiming

ein Essay ist die einmalige und unabänderliche Gestalt, die das innere Leben einesMenschen in einem entscheidenden Gedanken annimmt. Nichts ist dem fremderals die Unverantwortlichkeit und Halbfertigkeit der Einfalle, die man Subjektivitätnennt, aber auch wahr und falsch, klug und unklug sind keine Begriffe, die sich aufsolche Gedanken anwenden lassen, die dennoch Gesetzen unterstehn, die nichtweniger streng sind, als sie zart und unaussprechlich erscheinen. (MoE, 253)

Ulrich's notion of the essay as the form that the inner life of a person takes onin a decisive thought reminds us of Hofmannsthal's concern with the expres-sion of personal content through the application of a particular form in theChandos-letter. Musil, like Hofmannsthal, is careful to steer away from puresubjectivism. As he makes clear, the guiding principle of the essayist is notrandomness, but rather a finely-tuned adaptability to ever-changing cir-cumstances. Consequently, he can refer to the essay with the oxymoronicphrase "phantastische Genauigkeit" (MoE, 247), claiming, paradoxically,that it holds to the facts of a fluid reality, while so-called "pedantic exact-

99 On the essayistic character of MusiPs novel, see Marie-Louise Roth, "Essay undEssayismus bei Robert Musil," Probleme der Moderne, pp. 121-22.

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itude" (MoE, 247) clings to fantasy visions of a stable, unchanging world.The essay, then, is closely adapted to the flux and transience both of thematerial world and of the world of human values. Bound to the moment, itmakes no claim to lasting truth, even welcoming contradiction or refutation.Speaking of the essayist, Ulrich defines him as a "paradoxe Verbindung vonGenauigkeit und Unbestimmtheit" possessing "jene unbestechliche gewollteKaltblütigkeit, die das Temperament der Exaktheit darstellt; über dieseEigenschaft hinaus ist aber alles andere unbestimmt" (MoE, 246-7). Thisdescription, of course, concisely defines the traditional attitude of the apho-rist, whose "cold-blooded" drive toward exactitude is undercut by the equal-ly strong desire for equivocality. Ulrich's essay, like the aphorism, traces amiddle course between subjectivity and objectivity, truth and falsehood,science and literature.100 Hence Ulrich terms essayists "Meister des innerlichschwebenden Lebens," whose realm lies "zwischen Religion und Wissen,zwischen Beispiel und Lehre, zwischen amor intellectualis und Gedicht"(MoE, 253-4).

Ulrich's theory of essayism directly addresses a dimension that Mauthnerand Hofmannsthal merely hint at: namely, the sphere of the ethical.101 Ul-rich's expressed goal in applying essayistic form is to find a manner oftreating and viewing "Welt und eigenes Leben" in the most correct way(MoE, 250). This integration of the individual with society is the surpremegoal of all ethics. However, in a world infatuated with the notion of relativi-ty, ethical propositions cannot take the form of unbending laws. They can-not be wholly objective, but neither can they be wholly subjective, for atthese extremes violence is done either to the "law" or to the individual.Depicting the ambivalent situation of the essayist, Ulrich writes: "Ein Mann,der die Wahrheit will, wird Gelehrter; ein Mann, der seine Subjektivitätspielen lassen will, wird vielleicht Schriftsteller; was aber soll ein Mann tun,der etwas will, das dazwischen liegt?" (MoE, 254). The implied answer tothis rhetorical question is: Become an essayist! When Ulrich, expanding onthis problem of the "dazwischen," gives examples of statements that fall intothis nether realm, he specifically mentions ethical propositions. "SolcheBeispiele, die 'dazwischen' liegen, liefert aber jeder moralische Satz, etwagleich der bekannte und einfache: Du sollst nicht töten. Man sieht auf denersten Blick, daß er weder eine Wahrheit ist noch eine Subjektivität" (MoE,

100 Cf. Musil, Tagebücher, Aphorismen, p. 1317; Marie-Louise Roth, "Essay und Es-sayismus bei Robert Musil," p. 124, also points out, without going into detailedanalysis, that Musil's conception of the essay closely approaches the traditionalidea of the aphorism.

101 Benjamin Bennett notes the ethical element in the Chandos-letter, "Chandos andHis Neighbors," pp.329 & 331.

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254). Ulrich's essay, then, like the aphorism, must function in the manner ofthe moral proposition, couching subjective reflection in apodictic, objectivelanguage. While the form of the proposition might imply an irresistibleimperative, the substance must remain equivocal so that no clear-cut re-sponse appears appropriate. "Aesthetic" openness softens the moral impera-tive, allowing it space for fluctuation, infusing it with an adaptability thatpermits it to be construed ever anew according to changing circumstances.Writing on the form of the essay, Musil gave expression to the fusion ofethics and aesthetics that he associated with this genre: "Für mich knüpfensich an das Wort Essay Ethik und Ästhetik."102 The final two Austrianthinkers to be discussed here, Karl Kraus and Ludwig Wittgenstein, alsoassociated a combination of ethics and aesthetics with a particular form ofexpression. In their cases, however, this genre no longer parades under suchappellations as "essay," something which is evolved in theory, but practicedonly on a limited scale within the expository framework of a novel: theaphorism finally receives its just recognition as a suitable medium for theexpression of a critique of language.

E) Karl Kraus: Aphorism and Critique of Sprachgebrauch

Karl Kraus's position with regard to Sprachkrise and Sprachkritik displays amarkedly different complexion than that of Mauthner and Hofmannsthal. Iffor the latter Sprachkritik arose from a crisis predicated on scepticism aboutthe sufficiency of language in general as a medium of communication, Krauswas never touched by such doubts. Securely believing in the communicativepower of language and in his own ability to wield this power, Kraus directedhis critiques at the misuse of language perpetrated by his contemporaries.Here one must follow the suggestion of Hans-Jürgen Heringer and distin-guish, applying Saussurian terminology, among different objects of Sprach-kritik: 1) critique of "langage," of the fundamental capacity of language ingeneral; 2) critique of "langue," of the specific body of utterances possiblewithin a given language; 3) critique of "parole," of specific utterances ofindividual speakers.103 To be sure, in practice the divisions between thesethree modes of Sprachkritik can be fluid, hence it is not always possible toachieve a clear-cut delineation. Still, generally speaking, Mauthner's andHofmannsthal's objections to language tend to fall into the first category,

102 Musil, Tagebücher, Aphorismen, p. 1334. On the ethical import of aphoristic ex-pression see Hans Margolius, "Aphorismen und Ethik," Der Aphorismus,pp. 293-304.

103 Hans-Jürgen Heringer, "Karl Kraus als Sprachkritiker," Muttersprache, 77 (1967),256.

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whereas Kraus's critiques generally belong to the third group, concentratingon the exposition of language's misuse in the "parole" of others.104

While retaining its distinctiveness, Kraus's brand of Sprachkritik demon-strates many similarities with that of his fellow Austrians. In particular theintellectual presuppositions upon which Kraus's "philosophy" of language isbased adhere to principles coherent with the general background of theSprachkrise. As we have repeatedly seen, at the heart of the language crisislies a "truth" crisis: specifically, the problematization of the adaequatio theoryof truth.105 While Mauthner and Hofmannsthal view the breach betweenlanguage and reality as one embedded in the very essence of language ("Ian-gage"), Kraus locates this discrepancy in deviations from an ideal "Sprach-gebrauch" in which word and reality are viewed as united. Thus, whileMauthner and Hofmannsthal's Chandos can do little more than long for thisreinstatement of "truth," Kraus believes that it must be actively striven for.Correspondence between language and reality is not inherently given, itmust be accomplished in every utterance.106 It would be grossly incorrect,however, to accuse Kraus of mere stylistic nit-picking. He lambasts discordbetween linguistic expression and the reality it intends to describe becausesuch language is ultimately deceptive, consciously or unconsciously distort-ing reality. However, instead of resigning himself to the ubiquity of mislead-ing, improper language, Kraus turns to active struggle.

The aphorism becomes an important weapon in Kraus's linguistic arsenal.Aside from its adaptability to a polemical purpose, the aphorism inherent-ly possesses many of the linguistic virtues Kraus champions. Among these isthe merit of brevity, programmatically defended in this aphorism: "Scheinhat mehr Buchstaben als Sein" (BW, 267). On the literal level this aphorismstates a simple fact: that the word "Schein" contains more letters than theword "Sein." On a deeper level, however, it proposes that verbosity isindicative of "Schein," or obscurantist language, whereas brevity manifests awill to truth, or "Sein." Kraus's aphorism itself provides an example of justsuch laconic language which reveals a profound significance lurking behindits superficial simplicity. Clarity of expression, then, is merely the surfaceaspect which signals hidden complexity.

Das Unverständliche in der Wortkunst.. . darf nicht den äußeren Sinn berühren.Der muß klarer sein, als was Hinz und Kunz einander zu sagen haben. Das Ge-heimnisvolle sei hinter der Klarheit. Kunst ist etwas, was so klar ist, daß es nie-

104 Heringer, "Karl Kraus als Sprachkritiker," p. 260.105 Deubzer, Methoden der Sprachkritik, p. 28.104 Heringer, p.262; Jay Bodine, "Karl Kraus's Conception of Language," MAL, 8

(1975), 306 & 308; J. Bodine, "Paradigms of Truthful Literary and Artistic Expres-sivity: Karl Kraus and Vienna at the Turn of the Century," GR, 56 (1981), 44.

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mand versteht. Daß über allen Gipfeln Ruh' ist, begreift jeder Deutsche und hatgleichwohl noch keiner erfaßt. (BW, 434)

Kraus exploits this complexity in simplicity in his application of aphoristicexpression. No other literary form is so adequate to the task of presenting auniversally comprehensible external sense while divulging a secretive, notwholly graspable significance behind this clarity.

Kraus also made use of the aphorism as a means for revealing and com-bating superfluous abstraction in language. If for Mauthner and others thetendency toward abstraction was construed as an essential characteristic oflanguage, responsible for its debilitation, Kraus again located this quality inthe misuse of language and set out on a merciless campaign to unmaskthoughtless abstractions, leading language back to concrete sense. This is theessence of Kraus's program of "taking thought by the word," as he called it(BW, 236). Kraus's penchant for plays on words, often constructed aroundthe contrast between concrete and abstract meanings, is one manifestation ofthis battle against abstraction. Another is his debunking of formulaic utter-ances devoid of individual content. In a society which wore senseless phrasesas a cover for its emptiness, Kraus indefatigably sought to fill out thesehollow linguistic shells, exposing the banality they tried to mask. Conse-quently, Kraus turned against all forms of stagnant phrase, whether proverb,cliche, polite formula, or dictum. Not even the great sayings of famous poetsand thinkers are spared his annihilating parodies, since these so often areprogrammatically applied as the crutches for a lame "culture." The aphorismoffers itself as a perfect genre for the execution of such a program. Especiallyin the hands of Nietzsche the aphorism had proven its effectiveness as aparodistic device and as a weapon in the war against established values.Kraus brings this tradition of the parodistic aphorism to its zenith. Becauseof its inherent tendency to play off paradoxes, puns, equivocalities, etc.against the rigidity of formulaic, rhetorical structures, the aphorism lendsitself well to Kraus's purpose. While betraying the inadequacy of reifiedexpressions, the aphorism simultaneously demonstrates the capacity of lan-guage to achieve thoughtful profundity even within these confines.

The ethical dimension of aphoristic expression is also a reflex of theessential duality outwardly manifest in its tension between content and form.In ethical terms, the aphorism thematizes the problematical relationship ofgeneral and specific, the former represented in its universalizing form, thelatter in its individual content.107 Franz Deubzer has represented Kraus'sSprachkritik as a critique of the power of judgment, of the ability to trans-

107 This is the central position of Gerhard Neumann's theory of the German apho-rism; see his Ideenparadiese, pp. 39, 69-75; and also his "Einleitung" to the volumeDer Aphorismus, pp. 5-10.

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pose empirical observation into generalized abstraction and subsequentlyrelate the latter back to the former.108 Musil, we remember, defined "essay-ism" as the art of statements which lie between these two poles. Kraus placesthe aphorism in the service of an analogous goal. Indeed, the dialecticalinterplay of general and specific, which defines the dynamics of aphoristicexpression, makes it the ideal medium for such a task. Much more than this,however, the aphorism at once combines lesson with example. That is, theaphorism displays a didactic function insofar as it not only portrays thesuccessful integration of universal and particular in a dynamic system ofmutual interplay, it also involves its readers in this process, confrontingthem with the necessity of shifting from general to specific and vice versa inorder to re-produce the "secret" in the text. In the operation of decipheringthe aphorism's "hidden" message, then, the reader must enter the interplayin which instance and rule, concrete and abstract, universal and particularcarry on a contrapuntal dialogue.

The manner in which Kraus's aphorisms serve as a didactic model for theeffective penetration of language can be elucidated through one example.

Die Verzerrung der Realität im Bericht ist der wahrheitsgetreue Bericht über dieRealität. (BW, 229)

We should first note the simple, almost mechanical structure of this text.Combining syntactic parallelism, the copula "sein," structural reversal, andsemantic contrast, this aphorism arrives at the paradox that distortion is asymptom of truth. In newspaper reports, this text claims, distortion ofreality is the ultimate statement on the condition of reality. Thus Krausdescribes how a "truth" profounder than the ostensible truth depicted on thesurface of language can be attained through critical reading. He demonstrateshow language must be read against the grain, going beyond what it merelysays to what it is a manifestation of. This critical process is modelled in theoperation required of the reader in order to decipher Kraus's aphorisms.Consequently, Kraus justifies the obscurity of his writing, claiming that itforces the reader to compose a commentary, that is, actively work towardinterpretation (cf. BW, 287). Each of Kraus's aphorisms, then, forces itsreader to practice that act of deciphering and interpretation which Krausbelieves should be at work whenever one is confronted with language.

The demonstrative aspect of aphoristic expression lends it a meta-com-municative function. The achievement of a "metalanguage" through whichcritical reflection on language might find an appropriate medium of expres-sion was a priority for all the representatives of the Austrian Sprachkrise.What Mauthner attempted with his metaphorical fancies, Hofmannsthal

108 Deubzer, pp. 61-2.

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with his personalization of historical fiction, and Musil with his essayisticnovel, was traditionally manifest in the aphorism. Kraus productively ap-propriated this traditional mode of expression to accomplish his "metacri-tique" of language through language. The aphorism paradigmatically por-trays Kraus's belief "daß Sprache nicht bloß das, was sprechbar ist, in sichbegreift, sondern daß in ihr auch alles was nicht gesprochen wird erlebbar ist[sie]; daß es in ihr auf das Wort so sehr ankommt, daß noch wichtiger als dasWort das ist, was zwischen den Worten ist."109 The meaningfulness of thesilence between and beyond words was to figure centrally in Wittgenstein'saphoristic treatise the Tractatus logico-philosophicus.

F) Wittgenstein's Tractatus

The impact of Kraus's Sprachkritik both on Wittgenstein's thoughts on lan-guage and on his choice of aphoristic form as the medium of these thoughtshas often been commented upon and need not be dealt with here.110 Myremarks will be restricted to an exposition of the integral role of aphoristicform in the Tractatus, relating this to the general crisis of language and theethical thrust of Sprachkritik.

Wittgenstein's "sagen'Vzeigen" distinction delineates the dual capacityof linguistic communication. "Was sich in der Sprache ausdrückt," Wittgen-stein writes, "können wir nicht durch sie ausdrücken" (TV, 4. 121). Hecontinues: "Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden" (Tr, 4.1212). Wittgenstein indicates that there are definite limits to what one canconsciously, i. e. intentionally utter through language; this, however, is dis-tinct from that which is expressed in language itself. Thus he, like Kraus,situates this transcendental capacity in specific utterances, in "parole," andnot in "langage." That is, for Wittgenstein, too, such transcendental signifi-cance is only manifest in proper use of language. Proper use, in this context,is defined as the application of language with full consciousness of, and intotal accord with, its recognized restrictions. Only utterances restricted tosaying the sayable, resisting the temptation to infringe on the proper sphereof silence, accomplish simultaneously a showing of the showable, with itsineffable "truth." In adhering to limitations, paradoxically, limitation is

109 Karl Kraus, "Bei den Tschechen und bei den Deutschen," Die Sprache, p. 343.110 On the influence of Kraus on Wittgenstein see Dagmar Barnouw, "Loos, Kraus,

Wittgenstein and the Problem of Authenticity," Turn of the Century: GermanLiterature and Art 1890-191 }, pp. 267-70; Gottfried Gabriel, "Logik als Literatur?:Zur Bedeutung des Literarischen bei Wittgenstein," Merkur, 32 (1978), 360-62;Werner Kraft, "Wittgenstein und Karl Kraus"; Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein'sVienna, pp. 199-207.

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overcome. This, on one level, is the ethical import of the Tractatus, teach-ing, as it does, transcendence through adherence.

Wittgenstein's choice of aphoristic expression for communicating theideas laid out in the Tractatus is no coincidence. His concern with the essen-tial structure of language, and his identification of structure with the ethicaldimension, demanded a mode of expression in which structure and ethicalimplication figure prominently. No form other than the aphorism so repre-sents the unification of fundamental linguistic structures with a transcenden-tal significance. Wittgenstein hints at the metaphyiscal significance of hisown statemenis when he claims in his penultimate proposition that whoeverunderstands his words will transcend them (Tr, 6. 54). The aphorism exem-plifies a reduction of an utterance to its atomic elements and its elementarypropositions, while showing that such laconic language is capable of hintingat an indefinable meaning, an unutterable essence. As Kraus put it: "EinenAphorismus kann man in keine Schreibmaschine diktieren. Es würde zulange dauern" (BW, 116). Among the multiple meanings of this aphorism isthe idea that despite - or better, because of - its succinctness, the aphorismharbors a complex of meanings that defy mechanical expression. Wittgen-stein employed the aphorism because it paradigmatically embodied these di-verse yet interrelated functions of language. While working within a nar-rowly defined space of the utterable, the aphorism is yet able to portrayaesthetically, to hint at transcendental significance.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus represents a culmination of trends evident inAustrian Sprachkritik of this period. Like Kraus, Wittgenstein presents asolution to the aporia of the Sprachkrise, the achievement of a metalanguagewhose capacities would transcend those of ordinary language, by turning theproblem on its head. Radically blocking off the "beyond," Wittgensteinturns back into ordinary language itself. The solution lies not in going fur-ther beyond language, but rather in returning from beyond it, adjusting lan-guage usage to language's inherent limitations. Language's expressibility isincreased not by expansion, ever-greater abstraction, but rather by reductionto elementary components and immanent meanings. The aphorism served asthe model of just such reduced utterances.

In his autobiography, Fritz Mauthner claimed of his Sprachkritik that itrepresented "ein verzweifelter, letzter Versuch, die Geistesbrücke zu schla-gen zwischen dem notwendigen erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus unddem ebenso notwendigen praktischen Lebensrealismus. "U1 Goethe ex-pressed a similar recognition of the need for mediation between the realmsof idea and experience in his essay "Bedenken und Ergeben," stating "daß

Fritz Mauthner, Prager Jugend jähre, p. 220 f. .

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zwischen Idee und Erfahrung eine gewisse Kluft befestigt scheint, die zuüberschreiten unsere ganze Kraft sich vergeblich bemüht."112 This attempt tobridge the spheres of abstract and concrete, of individual and general, subjectand object; this desire, in other words, to establish a mode of expressionwhich might communicate that practical wisdom which Aristotle termedphronesis,ni was, as Mauthner indicates, the driving force behind the crisisand critique of language in turn-of-the-century Austria. At the same time, asI have tried to show, this intellectual dilemma shaped the evolution of theaphorism in Germany and Austria, defining its characteristic ethical dimen-sion, termed "transcendental moralism" by Gerhard Neumann.114 In bothcases investigation of, and experimentation within, the space of this ethicaldimension, especially regarding the problematical integration of universaland particular, was paradigmatically carried out in the realm of language.This coincidence of the intellectual impeti underlying the critique of lan-guage and the intellectual problems with which the aphorism is traditionallyconcerned led Austrian thinkers of this period to apply the aphorism as amedium through which to attempt a resolution of this crisis of language.

112 "Bedenken und Ergeben," Goethes Werke, "Hamburger Ausgabe," 14 vols., ed.Dorothea Kühn, et al. (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1955), XIII, 31.

113 The relevance of the concept of phronesis for literary hermeneutics has been em-phasized by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 18 f. & 296-300.

114 Neumann, Ideenparadiese, pp.58; 68f.; 79; "Einleitung," Der Aphorismus,pp. 8-10.

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CHAPTER THREE

Kafka: Aphoristic Text and Aphoristic Context

The initial two chapters of this study have concerned themselves with estab-lishing two distinct yet complementary contexts with reference to whichnew understandings of Kafka's aphoristic texts, and the impulses that led totheir creation, can be won. The present chapter aims at an initial juxtaposi-tion of the issues which concerned Kafka in his life and art to those problemsassociated here with "aphoristics" and the intellectual crises of the fin desiede generation in Austria. It must be kept in mind that the contexts em-ployed here are not necessarily absolute horizons against which one canunderstand the "phenomenon" of Kafka; rather they are applied with therelative and limiting purpose of defining Kafka's intellectual dilemmas inrelation to those of his Austrian contemporaries; further, we hope to gain anunderstanding of Kafka's aphorisms and the impulse which motivated theircreation within the context of the literary aphorism in Germany and Austria.

A few words of methodological justification are in order. The procedureof contextualization has frequently been applied to Kafka and his literature,with varying degrees of success. One thinks immediately of the seeminglyomnipresent attempts to define the nature of Kafka's life, language, andliterature in terms of the multiple-ghetto experience of German-speakingJews in Prague.1 On the deep-methodological level, at least, this approach ishardly different from those which contextualize Kafka and his works usingFreudian psychology, existential philosophy, or variously defined literary,social, and intellectual movements. What makes Kafka somewhat unique isthe manner in which his work appears to demonstrate its Darwinian surviva-

1 The "poverty" of the Prague-German dialect, once thought to have had a deter-mining influence on Kafka's literary style, was first diagnosed by Fritz Mauthner;see his Prager Jugendjahre: Erinnerungen, p. 49; see also Peter Demetz, "Nocheinmal Prager Deutsch," Literatur und Kritik, l (Sept., 1966), 58-59; Emil Skala,"Das Prager Deutsch," Weltfreunde, ed. Eduard Goldstücker (Prague: Academia,1967), pp. 119-25; Pavel Trost, "Franz Kafka und das Prager Deutsch, Germanisti-ca Pragensia, 3 (1964), 29-37; P.Trost, "Und wiederum Prager Deutsch,"Literatur und Kritik, l (Dec., 1966), 107-8; Klaus Wagenbach, Franz Kafka inSelbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten, Rowohlts Monographien, 91 (Reinbek beiHamburg: Rowohlt, 1964), p. 56.

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bility, showing itself able to "adapt" its characteristics according to the di-verse environments into which it is placed.2 This fact alone indicates thatsuch contextualizations can only offer conclusions relevant to the establishedcontexts; the results of such investigations, in other words, are valid onlywithin the confines of well-defined methodological purposes. Obviously,one must avoid selecting contexts which, for example, are anachronistic orotherwise far-fetched in order not to restrict or undermine the applicabilityof the results. At the same time, one must guard against the temptation of"totalization," of drawing too general and universalizing conclusions andthus transgressing one's own self-imposed limitations. This is the temptationto which allegorizing interpretations generally succumb, ignoring the differ-ence of text and context and joining them into an integrated whole withoutbreaks and fissures. This caveat must seem especially valid for investigationsof Kafka's aphoristic texts, since it is constitutive of the aphoristic genre thatit suppresses the totality in favor of the part, and problematizes the move-ment from text to foundational context.3

The contextualizing procedure employed here is applied with awarenessof its restrictions. In this sense our method is in line with the "initiative"method described by the aphorist Francis Bacon: the contextualization ofKafka's thought and aphoristic works serves an experimental purpose, striv-ing to offer new perspectives on Kafka's aphoristic production and the fac-tors which motivated it - perspectives which then must be weighed andtested to determine their validity and usefulness beyond the contexts estab-lished here. At the same time, the contextualizing procedure can be justifiedin terms of hermeneutic theory; here again it is significant to emphasize theopen, undogmatic confrontation of text with the pre-determined horizon ofunderstanding, allowing for that interaction of text and context that ischaracteristic both of hermeneutics, and of the aphoristic method.

The goal of the present chapter, these prefatory remarks having beenmade, is to demonstrate the profitability of embedding Kafka's intellectualcrises and his turn to the form of the aphorism in the context of Austrianletters at the turn of the century. Thus this investigation begins by arguingagainst Prague, a too restrictive context, and for the broader orientation ofKafka in the fin de siede Austrian atmosphere. The next section documentsaphoristic tendencies in Kafka's verbal and written style throughout variousperiods of his life, attempting to demonstrate that Kafka's concentration on

This is one manner of describing the so-called "multi-valency" of Kafka's texts,their seemingly infinite interpretability.This is the fundamental error of all those approaches to Kafka's aphorisms men-tioned in the introduction which seek to discover in these texts a "Weltan-schauung" or systematic philosophy.

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the aphorism later in his life represents the exploitation of a deeper penchantfor aphoristic expression. The major portion of the chapter will then betaken up by two intellectual-historical investigations: the first examines theintellectual crises of Kafka's life in terms of "aphoristics," i. e. those intellec-tual issues associated in the first two chapters with the development and useof the aphorism; this then leads directly into the second issue, an analysis ofKafka's aphoristic method, emphasizing the function of the aphorism forKafka as an attempt to overcome his lifelong crisis of communication.

I. Kafka and Turn-of-the-Century Austria

Franz Kafka was, among other things, an Austrian writer. While this appearsto be an ail-too obvious assertion, it is nevertheless one which is ail-too oftenoverlooked. The early obsession with Kafka's Prague, and with the mythol-ogy that evolved around this city and its artists, is largely responsible for thediversion of scholarly energy from the examination of other contexts that areequally as relevant for Kafka and his work. For many the "mystique" ofPrague and the crises of the multiple ghetto were the direct correlates of themystique and crises of Kafka's texts, so that Prague was imagined as the veryincarnation of the "Kafkaesque."4 The irony of the myth of Prague, asClaudio Magris has pointed out, is that it was evoked, substantiated, andsustained by the Prague artists themselves.5 Magris claims that these artistsresponded to the contradictions preferred them by the Prague environmentby conjuring up visions of Prague as a "verzaubertes Reich."6 However, ithas rarely been asked whether the contradictions of Prague were really grea-ter than those, say, of Vienna; or why "mythology" would be an appropriateresponse to Prague but not to Vienna. Indeed, while accusing others ofsuccumbing too easily to the "myth" of Prague,7 Magris himself is guilty ofabetting this mythology, assuming from the outset that Prague really issomehow "different," an environment which is so unique as to functionformatively - to the exclusion of other factors - on the development of its"sensitive" artistic residents. Instead of banishing the myth of Prague, Mag-ris focuses on its aetiology, investigating the factors that led to its creation.

As an alternative to Magris' approach, one might condemn the Praguemyth as a self-indulgent self-invention of a "province" struggling to keep up

4 See Claudio Magris, "Prag als Oxymoron," Neohelicon, 7 (1980), 12-15; cf. alsothe essays on Kafka and Prague cited in note 1 above.

5 Claudio Magris, "Prag als Oxymoron," p.2.6 "Prag als Oxymoron," p. 12.7 "Prag als Oxymoron," p. 15.

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with the artistic or literary reputation of the nearby capital city. It was thecreators of this mythology themselves, in other words, who could expect tobenefit most from its dissemination. Max Brod's institutionalization of the"Prager Kreis" is just one more such mythologization in which self-defi-nition and self-interest are suspected as the motivating factors.8 Brod, ofcourse, portrays Kafka as an integral member of this Prague circle, subsum-ing his art under this broader category. However, it seems more correct tosay that the "Prager Kreis" was defined by Kafka's inclusion in it, and thatwithout Kafka it would not have received the considerable literary-historicalattention it has subsequently earned. This is also true to some extent of thePrague myth, which was certainly shaped by the reception of Kafka morethan the reception of Kafka was determined by it.

Ernst Fischer was one of the first scholars openly to challenge this narrowdefinition of Kafka as a "local" poet.9 Fischer argued that Prague was noth-ing more than a microcosmic representation of the Habsburg monarchy;indeed Prague was for him "die zur Stadt gewordene Problematik der Mon-archie."10 Still, Fischer perhaps made too much of Kafka's occupation as"Beamter," consequently emphasizing the relationship between the un-wieldy bureaucratic structures of the Habsburg empire and Kafka's portrayalof impenetrable, cumbersome bureaucracies. Andrew Weeks has sought tounderpin this thesis by supplying documentary evidence in support of thenotion that Kafka's portrayal of the problematical "Dienstverhältnis" wastrue to actual conditions in the empire.11 Apt as these observations are, theyshould not divert attention from some of the profounder connections be-tween Kafka and the society and culture of fin de siede Austria.

Certain aspects of Kafka's thought, above all his incessant critique of theexpressive capacities of language, have often been viewed in relation tointellectual developments in Austria.12 Of special significance in the presentcontext is Peter Cersowsky's orientation of Kafka's thought and works inthe phenomenon of literary decadence.™ Cersowsky advocates, as I do aswell, the freeing of Kafka and his works from the extreme literary-historical

Max Brod, Der Prager Kreis (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1966).Ernst Fischer, "Franz Kafka," Von Grillparzer zu Kafka (Vienna: Die Buch-gemeinde, 1962), pp. 289-94.Fischer, "Franz Kafka," p. 289.Andrew Weeks, "Kafka und die Zeugnisse vom versunkenen Kakanien," Spracheim technischen Zeitalter, 3 (1983), 320-27, esp. p. 327.See Kurz, Traum-Schrecken, p. 197; Susanne Kessler, Kafka - Poetik der sinnlichenWelt, pp. 5-23; Günter Heintz, Frank Kafka: Sprachreflexion als dichterische Ein-bildungskraft (Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 1983), pp. 23—6.Peter Cersowsky, "Mein ganzes Leben ist auf Literatur gerichtet": Franz Kafka imKontext der literarischen Dekadenz (Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 1983).

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isolation to which they have commonly been subjected. Taking quite literal-ly Kafka's frequent assertions about the centrality of literature for his life,Cersowsky argues that Kafka's documented familiarity with considerableamounts of literature, contemporary and otherwise, legitimates the readingof his works within broader literary-historical contexts.14

At any rate, it should be clear that literary Prague was not the island it hasoften been made out to be. If anything, the geographical and linguisticisolation of the Prague-German writers caused them to forge even strongerlinks with the centers of German cultural life, Vienna and Berlin. Indeed, theassumed "uniqueness" of Prague may be attributable to its intermediaryposition between expressionist Berlin and impressionist Vienna, combininginto one contorted face the guises of the most important artistic movementsof the period. Certainly publishers such as Kurt Wolff and Ernst Rowohlthad considerable influence in the German literary world, and they broughtcohesion to the diverse writers and movements by rallying them under thebanners of their publishing houses. In addition, one can scarcely overesti-mate the significance of such literary journals as Die Aktion, Der Brenner,Die Fackel, Der Kunstwart, Das literarische Echo, Die neue Rundschau, DerSturm, and Die weißen Blätter for the widespread dissemination and circula-tion of ideas and literary practices. For his part, Kafka had access to these andother publications through the "Lese- und Redehalle der deutschen Studen-ten in Prag," of which he was a member while attending the university.15

Furthermore, one must consider the intellectual interaction fostered in suchliterary coffeehouses as the Cafe Arco, which Kafka is known to have fre-quented,16 and in such discussion groups as the Fanta circle, in which Kafkaalso participated for a time.17 Kafka's diaries and letters provide us withample testimony to his on-going and pervasive interest in the literary "hap-penings" which were occuring around him. As one who was attentive to theAustrian literary scene, Kafka is certain to have taken notice of the incipientpopularity of aphoristic expression among his contemporaries. At the veryleast, it is unlikely that he was not familiar with the aphorisms of PeterAltenberg, published regularly in the Prager Tagblatt,18 or with those of

11 Cersowsky, p. 7.15 See Gerhard Kurz, "Der junge Kafka im Kontext," Der junge Kafka, ed. G. Kurz,

suhrkamp taschenbuch materialien, 2035 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 13.16 See G. Kurz, "Der junge Kafka im Kontext," p. 13; see also Kafka-Handbuch, I,

286-9.17 See especially Wagenbach, Franz Kafka: Eine Biographie seiner Jugend, pp. 111-5;

Kafka-Handbuch, I, 186-9; and Peter Neesen's study of the influence of thethought of the Brentanists on Kafka, Vom Louvrezirkel zum Prozeß: Franz Kafkaund die Psychologie Franz Brentanos, Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik, Nr. 81(Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1972).

18 Aphorisms by Altenberg were printed in the Prager Tagblatt on March 1, 1914;

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Karl Kraus, whose writings held Kafka's interest throughout his life. Anexamination of these and other possible avenues through which Kafka mayhave become acquainted with the form of the aphorism is reserved for thefollowing chapter.

The evidence brought here does not pretend to be exhaustive, for thepoint is merely that there is sufficient justification to assume that Kafka, byno means isolated by the Prague environment, had access to the literary andcultural activities of fin de siede Austria, and that his turn to the form of theaphorism may have been influenced by an awareness of the renaissance thisform was experiencing among his fellow Austrians.

II. Kafka's Inclination Toward Aphoristic Utterances

Kafka's intensive occupation with the form of the aphorism is concentratedinto two periods of his life: the months from October 1917 to February 1918,in which he composes the aphorisms in the third and fourth Oktavhefte; andthe months of January and February 1920, in which the "Er" aphorisms arewritten. These apparent temporal limitations in Kafka's concentrated pro-duction of aphorisms should not lead one to conclude mechanically that theaphorism is therefore a temporary and transitional form in Kafka's aeuvre.Much to the contrary, although the aphorism dominates during these crea-tive periods, it is never totally absent at other times. Indeed, there is evidencewhich indicates a continued awareness of, and creative interest in, aphoristicutterances over long stretches of Kafka's life. My thesis will be that theperiods of intense occupation with the aphorism represent the breakthroughof a tendency that had been perennially present, if latent, in Kafka's creativepersonality, and that it would remain a creative undercurrent throughout hislife.

The testimony of Kafka's friends and acquaintances indicates that in dis-cussions and in everyday acts of communication Kafka's pronouncementstended toward the aphoristic. In his memoirs Willy Haas has described Kafkaas "ein feiner, delikater Jüngling, immer etwas schüchtern lächelnd, vollpreziöser, merkwürdiger, aphoristischer Äußerungen."19 This depiction ofKafka's verbal style is corroborated by Max Brod, who, in describing Kaf-ka's manner of speech, emphasized the profundity and pointedness of his

April 12, 1914; June 7, 1914; November 25, 1915; April 23, 1916; May 21, 1916;May 31, 1916; June 22, 1916; June 25, 1916; July 9, 1916; July 14, 1916; August 6,1916; August 13, 1916; August 20, 1916; November 9, 1916; November 12, 1916;and May 27, 1917.Willy Haas, Die literarische Welt, List-Bücher, 174-75 (Munich: List, 1960), p. 35.

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utterances. "Es war Kafka absolut unmöglich, etwas Unbedeutendes zu sa-gen. Ich habe nie ein untiefes Wort aus seinem Munde gehört" (FK, 190).While it is easy to imagine that Brod overstates the issue here, there is noreason to doubt the substance of his remark.

A similar impression of Kafka's statements is recorded by GustavJanouch.

Frank [sic] Kafka konnte strittige Dinge mit einer einzigen Bemerkung blitzartigbeleuchten. Dabei bemühte er sich nie, geistreich oder gar witzig zu erscheinen.Was immer er sagte, aus seinem Munde klang es einfach, selbstverständlich, natür-lich.20

The fact that these Statements agree with one another lends them a highdegree of credibility. Taken together they evoke an image of Kafka as anatural rhetorician, able to draw succinct, persuasive conclusions or expresspersonal insights with simplicity and logical clarity. This is the general styleof the utterances which are represented by Janouch in his "Conversations" asbeing Kafka's. In fact, as related by Eduard Goldstücker, it was precisely theaphoristic character of these "Gespräche" which convinced Max Brod oftheir authenticity.21 Brod further claimed that Dora Dymant, Kafka's com-panion in the last years of his life, "erkannte den unverwechselbaren StilKafkas und seine Denkweise" in Janouch's "Gespräche" (FK, 188). Gold-stücker has justifiably questioned the authenticity of Janouch's book; indeed,he has exposed these conversations as aprocryphal. Still, Goldstucker's cri-tique is levelled primarily at the substance of these reflections. Although hedoubts the authenticity of their style as well, there are reasons for believingthat the style itself approaches that style characteristic of Kafka. Beyond thefact that this is corroborated by Brod and Dora Dymant, it seems likely thatif Janouch wished to pass his documents off as authentic, he would at leasthave to imitate the style he had come to recognize as Kafka's. I do not intendthis as a defense of Janouch. On the other hand, while the statements heattributes to Kafka are highly suspect - and I will refrain throughout myinvestigation from citing their substance as evidence - their apocryphal na-ture could only hope to be masked by a close imitation of Kafka's style. It isonly on this level that I find them to be of value, albeit of an extremelylimited sort. Nonetheless, all of these sources indicate that Kafka's manner ofspeech, as well as this thought, tended toward the formulation of strikingapergus.

20 Gustav Janouch, Gespräche mit Kafka, Fischer Bücherei, 417 (Frankfurt: Fischer,1961), p. 95.

21 Eduard Goldstücker, "Kafkas Eckermann?: Zu Gustav Janouchs 'Gespräche mitKafka'," Franz Kafka: Themen und Probleme, p. 253.

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This image of Kafka as one whose speech was studded with pithyaphoristic utterances seems to run counter to the assessment one makes basedon an acquaintance with the diaries and letters. Except for the Oktavhefte,which display a plethora of aphorisms, Kafka's written documents givesparse evidence of any inclination toward the matter-of-factness and rhetori-cal drive associated with aphoristic expression. While one can turn upaphoristic statements in the letters and diaries, the fact remains that theirnumber is small. This fact alone does not refute the characterization ofKafka's verbal style presented above; it does, however, suggest that onemust distinguish between Kafka's verbal and his written styles.

Kafka's diffidence where his own writing is concerned is to some extentthe reflex of an exaggerated emphasis on the authority and authenticity ofwritten expression. This lack of faith in himself and in his ability to arrive atdefinitive formulations that might deserve to be cast (and fixed) in writtenform is, of course, a syndrome common to aphorists, and it finds its ultimateexpression in the productive scepticism of the sort represented by Lichten-berg. However, when carried to an extreme, such diffidence can undermineall forms of assertiveness. This is a crucial conflict for all aphorists insofar asthey are sceptics driven to assertions not out of conviction, but, paradoxical-ly, out of the very need to doubt. Typically the aphorist works around thisparadox by speaking through masks, assuming viewpoints and perspectiveswhich are not necessarily identical with his/her own sentiments on any givenissue.22 Such assertions are made in a spirit of experimentation, beggingcorrection or contradiction. The more immediate dialogic situation of verbalcommunication lends itself especially well to such an attitude.

The aphorism in Vienna thrived in the verbal exchanges indigenous tothe theatrical, coffeehouse environment of its cultural life. Here the aphorismfunctioned as a linguistic mask which was appropriate to this atmosphere. Atthe same time, the critical appropriation of the "impressionistic" aphorismby such thinkers as Kraus and Wittgenstein turned this genre into a weapondirected against precisely such shallowness of expression. Integral to thiscritical appropriation is the shift from verbal communication - exemplifiedon the literary plane in the dramatic dialogues of Schnitzler's plays - to theaphorism as "scriptively" fixed expression. This same transition is central foran understanding of Kafka's turn to the composition of aphorisms in writtenform during the months in Ziirau; for one of the fundamental crises of thisperiod is the dilemma of authentic expression, of distinguishing truth and liein fixed utterances. Kafka's crisis of language, similar to that of his Austrian

22 On the relationship of mask and perspectivism see Lothar Hönnighausen, "Maskeund Perspektive: Weltanschauliche Voraussetzungen des perspektivischen Er-zählens," CRM, 26 (1976), 287-307.

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contemporaries, was at heart a crisis of truthful communication, and as sucha crisis of the "fixing" of the dynamic. In his aphorisms Kafka was attempt-ing in a specific way to resolve his own crisis of fixation and falsification inlanguage.

It is easy to see that verbal contact and written formulation were com-municative processes of a different linguistic order for Kafka. One needthink only of his penchant for the substitution of epistolary communicationfor immediate human contact.23 The documents which most intensivelyrepresent this substitution of written expression for immediate verbal com-munication and experience are the Briefe an Felice, and it is perhaps notcoincidental that these letters are among the most "composed" and, inciden-tally, non-aphoristic, of all of Kafka's texts. This could betoken Kafka'sdesire to carry on this relationship, and indeed all other ones of primarysignificance, in a medium that seemed to him most authentic, i.e. where,paradoxically, it was most difficult for him to hide behind a linguistic mask.This privileging of written expression is permeated, as Kafka himself wascertainly aware, by a supreme irony: namely, that life appeared to him to bemost authentic and "immediate" when "mediated" through the distance ofthe written word. His veneration of written expression often expressed itselfin negative terms as a fear of the fixed and unalterable. Written expression,Kafka seemed to believe, has a mysterious way of transfiguring reality,placing its own stamp upon the world. Thus, in a diary entry from 1911,Kafka defends his reluctance to write about his "Selbsterkenntnis" by point-ing to the power of scriptive fixation.

Ich habe vieles in diesen Tagen über mich nicht aufgeschrieben, teils aus Faulheit. . ., teils aber auch aus Angst, meine Selbsterkenntnis zu verraten. Diese Angst istberechtigt, denn endgültig durch Aufschreiben fixiert dürfte eine Selbsterkenntnisnur dann werden, wenn dies in größter Vollständigkeit bis in alle nebensächlichenKonsequenzen hinein sowie mit gänzlicher Wahrhaftigkeit geschehen könnte.Denn geschieht dies nicht - und ich bin dessen jedenfalls nicht fähig -, dann ersetztdas Aufgeschriebene nach eigener Absicht und mit der Übermacht des Fixiertendas bloß allgemein Gefühlte nur in der Weise, daß das richtige Gefühl schwindet,während die Wertlosigkeit des Notierten zu spät erkannt wird. (7, 37-8)

What in communion with the self is portrayed in a negative light as a falsifi-cation of one's self-knowledge, can take on a positive aspect in writteninteraction with others. Of course, recognition of the danger inherent inwritten fixation is one of the factors which motivates the aphorist to dese-crate the shrines of language, to contradict and "deconstruct" traditional ad-ages, wisdoms, and maxims that have been "fixed" in language. In the

See especially Elias Canetti, Der andere Prozeß: Kafkas Briefe an Felice, ReiheHanser, 23 (Munich: Hanser, 1969), esp. p. 18.

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passage cited, to be sure, Kafka is concerned not with the "fixations" inher-ent in one's cultural inheritance, but rather with the definitive recording ofone's own self-observations. His essential insight into the "Übermacht desFixierten" provides not only the basis for conceiving the fundamental falsifi-cation embodied in written expression, but also implies the knowledge thatmanipulation of written language also can entail manipulation, if not ofreality itself, then at least of others' perception of reality, which for Kafka isprobably one and the same thing. Written words have a way of freeingthemselves from their cognitive, emotive, or empirical impulse, gainingindependence and lives of their own, and thus ultimately undermining - or,alternatively, asserting - the value of the initial thought or experience. Kafkasaw the recording of his self-observations in the most complete form pos-sible as one way of avoiding the falsification of these insights.24 The aphoris-tic method he would apply some years later to accomplish a similar task,however, would make no pretense to completion, suggesting that at thispoint Kafka was more concerned with experimental written formulation, oreven with the projecting of verbal masks for the self by means of writtenexpression. This question will be addressed more fully in the followingchapter.

The critique of written expression cited above is not an isolated occur-rence in Kafka's life-documents. Three years later, in a letter to Crete Blochwritten in April 1914, Kafka reiterates this judgment, in this instance, how-ever, in broader and more damning language. "Das Schreiben selbst verführtoft zu falschen Fixierungen. Es gibt eine Schwerkraft der Sätze, der man sichnicht entziehen kann" (BF, 555). Here the "seductive" force of "fixation" isdiagnosed as residing internally in the very act of writing. In the process ofwritten recording, language evolves a logic all its own and works itself freeboth from the writer wielding the pen, and from the impetus which initiallymotivated the act of writing itself. Written expression tends to obey its ownlaws of growth and development, straying from - or transcending - theintentions of the subject who is ostensibly in control. Yet the metaphor ofseduction which Kafka employs here hints at an equivocal evaluation of thisphenomenon: viewed from the fixed-point of morality, perhaps, seductionimplies a fall from grace; however, from the perspective of the "pleasureprinciple," seduction promises perhaps unexpected joy and satisfaction.Both of these evaluations are relevant to the act of writing for Kafka: self-betrayal and unanticipated passion. Kafka's approbation of the self-abandon-ment he experienced while composing "Das Urteil," the story which

24 The letters to Felice could be interpreted as one attempt on Kafka's part to achievea degree of "completeness" in formulating his self-recognitions. Thus this corres-pondence could be interpreted as a kind of epistolary substitute for the diary.

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marked his "breakthrough," is rightfully famous. "Nur so kann geschriebenwerden, nur in einem solchen Zusammenhang, mit solcher vollständigenÖffnung des Leibes und der Seele" (T, 294). Kafka valorizes the loss ofcontrol which occurs in the act of writing; indeed, the very value of writtenexpression seems to be defined by this surrender of self-mastery to thepower, the internal, independent "logic" of written expression.

Kafka summarizes the distinction between verbal and written expressionin a diary entry from July 1913: "Wenn ich etwas sage, verliert es sofort undendgültig die Wichtigkeit, wenn ich es aufschreibe, verliert es sie auch im-mer, gewinnt aber manchmal eine neue" ( , 308). This assertion appears tomove radically away from the conception of writing as something whichmerely seduces one into false fixations. In fact, however, these conflictingevaluations are actually complementary, and they coexist side by side forKafka throughout his life. For while scriptive "fixation" entails a surrenderto the absolute, indubitable "presence" of the fixed formulation, and to thisextent implies falsification of one's thoughts, observations, or sentiments,the very "presence" of the fixed form allows for the possibility that writtenexpression will supplant reality - the possibility that the alteration of "truth"in the process of fixation will constitute a creative modification, not a falsifi-cation.

These reflections can be of assistance in making plausible a picture ofKafka as one who spoke in aphoristic utterances, but whose writing tends forthe most part to shun aphoristic apodiction. We must keep in mind that theaphorism itself exists and thrives in the equivocation described above regard-ing the danger of fixation in language on the one hand, and the creativepower of language on the other. The spoken aphorism, because of the tran-sitory nature of the medium of speech, more easily betrays its mask-likecharacter, and there is little danger that what is a momentary and spontane-ous product of dialogic interaction will be taken as an eternal insight orpersonal watchword. The written aphorism, more so than the spoken one,tends toward the "false fixation" of truth. While this is certainly a differenceobtaining between written and spoken mediums per se, this difference iscompounded by the imperative diction and rhetorical assertiveness of theaphorism as expressive form: its feigning of "truth" can easily be mistakenfor conviction.25 By the same token, the overcoming of this fear of the

25 This equivocation on the part of authors who employ aphorisms is paradigmatical-ly represented by Schnitzler, who, as we have already seen, insists in the introduc-tion to his Buch der Sprüche und Bedenken that the mask-like aphorisms of hisdramatic characters not be taken for his opinions; at the same time he is motivatedto publish this collection of aphorisms in order to clarify his own views.

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scriptively "fixed" is seminal to the evolution of the aphorist. Thus, whenthe aphorism as written form takes a predominant position in Kafka's liter-ary creativity, that faith in the power and independence of written expression- its ability to productively alter and shape subjective and objective realitythrough its overwhelming material presence - has, at least temporarily,come to the fore. This belief in the creative potential of language, its abilityto create out of itself and yet to unearth an unsuspected truthfulness (not,however, in the sense of dogma), is central to the aphoristic production ofsuch writers as Lichtenberg, Kraus, and Wittgenstein.

Despite the relative paucity of aphoristic remarks in most of Kafka'swritten documents, it is possible to identify and isolate aphoristic statementsin letters and diaries from diverse periods of his life. Some of Kafka's earliestletters reveal stunning aphorisms that could easily be lifted out of theircontexts and made to stand on their own. One example occurs in a letter toOskar Pollak from November 1903 when, after reporting on the authors heis currently reading, Kafka remarks: "Manches Buch wirkt wie ein Schlüsselzu fremden Sälen des eigenen Schlosses" (Br, 20). While one can certainlydiscern from this remark the personal significance which Kafka derived fromtexts that moved him, one must, of course, be careful not to generalize thisremark too broadly beyond its contextual occurrence, even though thegenerality of the language itself encourages us to do so. Indeed, it is suchgeneralizing tendencies, embodied here in the opening words "ManchesBuch," which lend the statement its aphoristic character in the first place.Typical of the aphorism is also the shift into metaphor or simile as soon asthe subject of the text has been named. This movement from concrete notionto metaphorical image replicates the movement from particular experienceto abstracted, universalizing formulation which underlies the aphorism. Theconcision and simplicity of language also help lend this statement an aphoris-tic quality.

Other similarly aphoristic remarks can be found throughout Kafka's let-ters. Further examples from the years 1903 and 1904 will be examined laterin another context. My current goal is simply to document the occurrence oftypically aphoristic diction in diverse periods of Kafka's life. An examplefrom his final years can be found in a letter dated August 3, 1923. Complain-ing in characteristic fashion about his headaches and sleeplessness, Kafkaspeculates that these maladies are attributable to an inherent aversion toremaining for any length of time in one place. "Vielleicht darf ich nicht solange an einem Ort bleiben; es gibt Menschen, die sich ein Heimatgefühl nurerwerben können, wenn sie reisen" (Br, 439). As in the previous example,here too Kafka generalizes from his personal circumstances, including him-self in a fictive community of "Menschen" whose malady he shares. Insteadof expanding into metaphor, however, this statement derives its pointedness

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from the paradox that a sense of being at home evolves only when one is onthe move.

Numerous other examples of embedded aphorisms could be cited fromKafka's letters.26 The epistolary situation, of course, most closely replicatesin written form the dialogic exchange of verbal communication, so that it isperhaps not unusual to find aphoristic utterances throughout Kafka's corre-spondence. The letters to Milena, written for the most part in a period whenKafka was actively involved with the creation of aphorisms, provide anespecially fruitful source of such generalized, yet laconic and rhetoricallypointed remarks.27 However, Kafka's diaries also provide numerous exam-ples of aphoristic statements. On December 17, 1910, for example, Kafkarecords a note about Zeno's paradox of motion. "Zeno sagte auf eine dring-liche Frage hin, ob denn nichts ruhe: Ja, der fliegende Pfeil ruht" ( , 29). Thesource of Kafka's knowledge about Zeno's paradox is unknown; significanthere, however, is the recognition that, as Gerhard Neumann has shown,Kafka lends this already aphoristic material a further aphoristic bent.28 Im-mediately following this notation Kafka jots down the first independentaphoristic remark that can be found in his writings.

Wenn die Franzosen ihrem Wesen nach Deutsche wären, wie würden sie dann erstvon den Deutschen bewundert sein. ( , 29)

For Kafka this appears to be an atypically light-hearted aphorism. The if/then structure is a common aphoristic device, which, in a play on syllogisticlogic, allows for the experimental establishment of theoretical circumstancesfrom which speculative results can be derived. Kafka implies in this apho-rism, of course, that the Germans will never admire the French, for theassumed identity of French and German which the text postulates is unlikely,to say the least. By thus undercutting its own assumed point of departure, thisaphoristic text offers an ironical comment on the unbridgeable gulf Kafkaperceives to exist between these two nations. This playing-off of nationalrivalries, moreover, is a technique beloved by aphorists, who make sport ofridiculing allegiances of this sort.29 Seven years later, when Kafka begancomposing the aphorisms of the Oktavhefte, the playfulness of this textwould be almost entirely supplanted by the brooding, questioning qualitycommonly associated with Kafka's aphoristic texts.

See, for example, Br, 26, 40, 142, 260, 267, 400, 439, 473.For aphoristic statements in the letters to Milena, see, for example, BM, 11, 159,261, 263, 302.Gerhard Neumann, "Umkehrung und Ablenkung," pp. 702-3.Kraus, by way of example, devotes an entire section, "Von zwei Städten," in Prodomo et mundo to the ironical contrast between the cities of Berlin and Vienna, aswell as their inhabitants; see also Hofmannsthal's Buch der Freunde, A, 54 & 57.

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Not only did Kafka consciously compose aphorisms in his diaries yearsbefore the writing of the texts in the Oktavhefte; the aphorism continued tobe a mode of self-expression which he employed throughout the remainderof his life. A diary entry from 1922 formulated in aphoristic diction bearstestimony to Kafka's continuing concern for the condensed, pointed expres-sive form characteristic of this genre.

Ewige Jugend ist unmöglich; selbst wenn kein anderes Hindernis wäre, die Selbst-beobachtung machte sie unmöglich. (T, 579)

Characteristically aphoristic is the straight-forward, apodictic language ofthis remark; characteristically Kafkan is the "selbst wenn" construction andthe accompanying elimination of interferring conditions only so that oneoverriding restriction might in the end hold sway. The theme of self-obser-vation itself is one with which we are familiar from the work of otheraphorists, among them Lichtenberg. A similar remark from the Tagebücherof Friedrich Hebbel gives some indication of the unconscious "intertextual"relations between Kafka's text and the work of other aphorists.

Selbstbeobachtung wäre freilich sehr schön, aber man verändert sich, währendman sich beobachtet.30

Not coincidentally, Kafka counted Hebbel's diaries among his favoritebooks.31 This is just one example which demonstrates how Kafka's aphoris-tic texts participate structurally and thematically in the "rites" of a particulargenre. Subsequent analysis of Kafka's aphorisms will reveal the multitude ofinterconnections between these texts and those of other German aphorists.

Further examples of aphorisms in Kafka's diaries reinforce the hypothesisthat in composing these texts Kafka was at least unconsciously aware that hewas working within the parameters of a particular genre; for repeatedly onediscovers that his aphorisms conform to the tendencies and compositionalstructures - not to mention the themes - typical of aphoristic expression. Astriking aphorism written in Kafka's diary in 1913, as one further example,demonstrates an inversion of perspective like that which can be found in theaphorisms of Lichtenberg or Nietzsche, to name just two.

Die Entdeckungen haben sich dem Menschen aufgedrängt. (T, 340)

In the world of the aphorist, discoveries are not sought out by humans,rather they are pressed upon them from outside as if by force. In this text

30 Friedrich Hebbel, Tagebücher, ed. Richard Maria Werner, 4 vols. (Berlin:B.Behrs, 1903), entry no. 1991.

31 See Brod, FK, 99, and Kafka's reception of these diaries recorded in a letter toOskar Pollak, fir, 27-8. The possible influence of Hebbel's aphorisms on the char-acter of Kafka's aphorisms will be taken up subsequently.

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Kafka "re-values" the concept of "discovery" by implying that what appearsas dis-covery is in fact reve(a)lation: what from the human perspective ap-pears as an uncovering, proves to be emergence. One is reminded here of thesignificance of the "Einfall" or epiphanic insight for the aphorist. Kafkadownplays the individual effort responsible for such insights and criticizes byimplication the haughtiness with which humans often credit themselves orone another for stumbling across "discoveries." "Einfall," inspiration, anddiscovery must be stripped of any implication which suggests that the sub-ject somehow actively wills, masters, or controls such an event: it is foistedupon one, so to speak, from without.

I will cite one final example of an aphoristic utterance from Kafka'sTagebücher in order to give a fuller picture of the variety of aphoristic typeswhich are to be found here.32

Die Lärmtrompeten des Nichts. (7", 523)

What is especially curious about this remark is that it occurs as an isolatedentry, devoid of any discernible impulse. It remains unclear whether the textwas composed in response to some empirical stimulus; whether it is theconclusion of abstract deliberations; or if it is merely recorded out of purepleasure in the paradoxicality of the conception itself. This is a circumstancethat marks many of the entries in Kafka's Oktavhefte. Conspicuous in theabove aphorism is the structural reduction of the thought to a concisemetaphor which conjoins concrete image ("Lärmtrompeten") and abstractdesignation ("Nichts") in a mutually stimulating tension. The paradoxicalconception that the arrival of nothingness, the radically non-empirical,should be announced by something as emphatically "empirical" as "noisetrumpets" is underscored by the very opposition in the word " Lärmtrompe-ten" itself: trumpets commonly announce with harmonious fanfares, notwith discordant noise. Ultimately, then, this ostensibly simple remark callsforth a variety of questions about the character of a "nothingness" whose"presence" is announced by noise trumpets. The significance of the text, infact, resides in this stimulation to further reflection, one of the foremostdesires of the aphorist.

Aside from such independent aphorisms composed as texts unto them-selves, the diaries also display the presence of aphoristic formulations em-bedded within larger reflections.

Die Furcht vor Narrheit. Narrheit in jedem geradeaus strebenden, alles anderevergessen machenden Gefühl sehn. Was ist dann die Nicht-Narrheit? Nicht-Narr-heit ist, vor der Schwelle, zur Seite des Einganges bettlerhaft stehn, verwesen undumstürzen. (T, 338)

32 For further examples of aphorisms in the diaries, see 275, 290, 349, 375, 443,454, 480, 508, 531, 541, 575, 581.

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This passage develops as a dialogue on the part of the self with the self.Kafka's reflections on foolishness lead him to ask about the essence of thenon-foolish, and he answers his own question with an aphoristic utterance inthe form of a pseudo-definition. The translation of an abstract concept into aconcrete scenario tending toward the narrative is a trend characteristic ofKafka's thought in general, and it has certain consequences for the style of hisaphorisms, as we shall see.

The preceding observations attempt to demonstrate that Kafka's aware-ness of, and occupation with, aphoristic structures is much more pervasivethan has generally been recognized. It will be left to later analysis to speculateon the possible avenues through which Kafka might have obtained this con-sciousness of the forms, structures, themes, and strategies commonly associ-ated with the aphorism. Meanwhile, we will undertake an investigation ofthe central intellectual problems which concerned Kafka over his life, relat-ing them to the intellectual issues which we have previously associated withthe evanescence of aphoristic expression in Germany in general, and in Aus-tria at the turn of the century in particular. The proximity of Kafka's intellec-tual dilemmas to those intellectual-historical issues associated with the rise ofaphoristic expression will help us better to understand his turn to the apho-rism within the context of his life and literature.

III. Kafka and "Aphoristics"

The word "aphoristics" shall be taken here as a short-hand way of referringto those crises and aporias which have been discussed in the first two chap-ters as the central issues underlying the evolution and practice of aphoristicexpression in Germany and Austria. These include: the rupture between ideaand experience; the split between the abstracting, synthesizing, unifyingprocedures of mind and the manifold individuality of the empirically apper-ceived; the irrevocable sense that both physical and psychic reality are in noway stable and eternally definable, but rather characterized by incessantchange; the abandonment of a single, "absolute" point of view in favor of aconstantly fluctuating perspective; a valorization of the unsystematic overthe systematic, and a concomitant suspicion of all systems; the parallelprivileging of the fragmentary over the whole; and finally, the crisis oflanguage as the concrete medium in which each of these diverse issues ismanifest.

If this list of intellectual issues reads like an inventory of the crises ofmodernism in general, then this is no coincidence; for the aphorism, morethan any other literary-philosophical mode of expression, evolves in tandemto these crises of modernism, both as a response to them, and as an attempt

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to devise a manner of expression which simultaneously takes account of andovercomes these issues. In this sense one could certainly make the argumentthat the aphorism is the ultimate expressive form of modernism, embodyingas it does an ever-growing scepticism about the value of reason and ofsystematic thought. At the same time, this catalogue of problems can almostinstinctively be associated with the crises that shaped Kafka's life and art.However, it is not our task here to relate Kafka's attitudes to those represent-ative of literary modernism in general - this has already been attempted onnumerous fronts;33 rather, our attention will be more narrowly focused onthe interrelationship of these problems in Kafka's life and thought with thedevelopment of his own aphoristic impulse and the character of his aphoris-tic texts. The proximity of Kafka's intellectual crises to the dilemmas en-demic to aphoristics not only helps to illuminate his gradual turn toward theform of the aphorism, but also presents the framework necessary for acritical re-evaluation of the nature and purpose of his aphoristic writings.

A) The Conflict of Individual and Universal

The problematical mediation between particular and universal, individualand community, which informs the issues of aphoristics also helped shapethe dilemmas characteristic of Kafka's life. This crisis appears in two distinctyet related guises, one epistemological, the other ethical. What in epis-temological terms presents itself as the problematical interaction betweenparticular recognitions and the unifying, totalizing, subsuming - and thusfalsifying - character of abstraction, occurs in the sphere of ethics as theirresolvable conflict between the absolutely individual and the communitywhich recognizes only the representative. For Kafka's Austrian contem-poraries, language was perceived as the realm in which both the epis-temological and ethical sides of this question made themselves paradigmati-cally evident, allowing critique of language to become the most prominentand generalized form in which attempts at portrayal or resolution of thesecrises were carried out. This will prove to be the case for Kafka as well,whose diverse crises of language continually divulge themselves to be reflex-es that closely parallel epistemological or ethical issues. The fundamentalconflicts of Kafka's life - bachelorhood versus marriage, individuality and

See, for example, Cersowsky, "Mein ganzes Wesen ist auf Literatur gerichtet";David Miles, '"Pleats, Pockets, Buckles, and Buttons': Kafka's New Literalismand the Poetics of the Fragment," Probleme der Moderne, pp. 331^42; MargotNorris, "Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, and the Problem of Mimesis," MLN, 95(1980), 1232-53.

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the absence of community, be it national, religious, or cultural - can beunderstood within this context and related to Kafka's crisis of language.34

Characteristic especially of Kafka's early period is the tendency to lamentabout the absence of community or tradition in which he might ground hislife and personal experience. In a letter to Oskar Pollak from 1903, Kafkaportrays in general terms the conflict between the isolated existence of thehermit and life integrated into the community of others.

[JJemand, der hinter dem Baum steht, sagt mir leise: "Du wirst nichts tun ohneandere", ich aber schreibe jetzt mit Bedeutung und zierlichem Satzbau: "Einsiede-lei ist widerlich, man lege seine Eier ehrlich vor aller Welt, die Sonne wird sieausbrüten; man beiße lieber ins Leben statt in seine Zunge; man ehre den Maul-wurf und seine An, aber man mache ihn nicht zu seinem Heiligen." Da sagt mirjemand, der nicht mehr hinter dem Baume ist. "Ist das am Ende wahr und einWunderding des Sommers?" (Br, 17-18)

Only the context of these remarks lends them clarity and indicates theirprofound significance: they serve as an introduction to Kafka's request thatPollak read and judge the literary sketches he has produced up until this pointin his life. This making-public of his literary creations is what Kafka refers toas "laying one's eggs before the eyes of the world." The dialogic situation,which projects onto another person the impetus to this act of laying himselfbare, alludes to the reluctant self-overcoming which such an action entailsfor Kafka. The link between a community of others and those literary workscreated by the hermit is forged in the process of reception, i. e. when theseworks cease to be the "brooding" of the recluse at his desk and enter into acommunity of readers. Kafka's well-known reluctance to publish his works,more that just a symptom of his own insecurity and diffidence, is a reflex ofthis more general concern that the individual significance of his writing willbe lost once it is subjected to reception by a community. His reluctancemanifests itself subtly in the cited passage through the dichotomy betweenthe "someone" who speaks ("jemand . . . sagt"), and the act of writing ("ichaber schreibe") with which Kafka responds to the admonition that he willaccomplish nothing without others. His ambivalence is expressed in theavoidance of immediate, spoken communication with this "someone," andthe resultant privileging of written language as a mediated form of com-munication. Of yet greater significance for the present context, however, isthe character of the "ornamental sentence structure" which Kafka, accordingto his own assessment, employs in his written response; for what he com-poses is a series of aphorism-like generalities, separated from one another by

The decisive steps in this direction have been taken by Sokel in his articles "Kafka'sPoetics of the Inner Self," MAL, 11, nos.3-4 (1978), pp. 37-58, and "Languageand Truth in the Two Worlds of Franz Kafka, GQ, 52 (1979), 364-84.

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a semi-colon. The apodictic quality of these universalizing formulations, farfrom making them persuasive, tends instead - and in this they remain true tothe essence of aphoristic expression - to problematize the identification of theindividual, here Kafka, with these general pronouncements. This is clear toKafka's dialogic partner in this somewhat fractured exchange; for, steppingout from behind the tree, he questions the truth of these general proposi-tions. Hence two conclusions relevant to the present argument can be drawnfrom this passage: first of all, Kafka experienced the questionable mediationbetween individual and community in the literary sphere as a problematiza-tion of the dynamics obtaining between creative and receptive dimensions,the first being wholly individual, the second essentially communal; second-ly, even at this very early stage in his literary productivity Kafka responds tothis conflict with written, universalizing formulations of an aphoristic type.To be sure, at this point he shows apprehension about the ability of suchstatements to bridge the gap between creative individual and receptive com-munity; yet it is nonetheless significant that he instinctively, as it were, turnsto such "ornamental sentence structure" when confronted with this conflict."Aphoristic" language presented itself to Kafka even at this juncture as apossible, if yet insufficient, mode of expressing the individual in terms of theuniversal, and thus as a conceivable way of fusing individual and universal ina single communicative act.

The crisis of integration of the individual into some form of communitywas central especially during Kafka's Ziirau-period in which the major col-lection of aphorisms was composed in the Oktavhefte. Having given up, forthe most part, on the practicability of marriage to Felice as an entrance intosome form of communal life, Kafka turned to romanticized conceptions,dreaming of integration into a simple rural community, retreating from thecity to the "Dorf" of Zürau, and busying himself with such endeavors asgardening. That he perhaps had actually found a manner of life reasonablyappropriate to his being is reflected in the fact that even years later he consid-ered this "Dorf-Jahr" to be one of the better years of his life (BM, 105). Thecentrality of this conflict between individual and community for this periodis brought out by a letter to Max Brod from October 1917, written immedi-ately prior to Kafka's departure for Zürau. Brod was adamantly against thistrip, believing that it would interfere with Kafka's recovery.35 Responding toBrod's admonitions that it is his responsibility to get well, Kafka writes:

Deine Begründung der Notwendigkeit, sich gesund zu machen, ist schön, aberutopisch. Das, was Du mir als Aufgabe gibst, hätte vielleicht ein Engel über dem

35 See Kafka's letters to Ottla in which Brod's opposition is described, BO, 45-6,letters no. 51 and 52.

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Ehebett meiner Eltern ausführen können oder noch besser: über dem Ehebettmeines Volkes, vorausgesetzt, daß ich eines habe. (Br, 182-3)

Kafka repudiates the task of working for his own healthy constitution, as-serting that such would have to have been afforded him either at his concep-tion, or at the conception of his "Volk." Presumably Kafka is referring hereto his Judaism, but the qualification that he adds expresses his ultimate beliefthat he is not an integral part of any community whatsoever. His two-foldapplication of the metonymical image of the "Ehebett," moreover, has far-reaching implications in this context, suggesting that Kafka has been im-peded from the very moment of his birth, of the birth of his "Volk," fromattaining a state of "health." In addition, the image of the "Ehebett" under-scores the extent to which matrimony, the most intimate of relations, sym-bolizes the entrance into community for Kafka. The absence of an "angelic"act over the "Ehebett" of his parents and his "Volk" inhibits, so this excerptimplies, Kafka's own ability to inhabit an "Ehebett."

One month later, writing to Brod from his retreat in Ziirau, Kafkasummarizes his sense that he has been excluded from participation in anycommunity.

Ich habe in der Stadt, in der Familie, dem Beruf, der Gesellschaft, der Liebesbezie-hung (setz sie, wenn Du willst, an die erste Stelle), der bestehenden oder zuerstrebenden Volksgemeinschaft, im dem allen habe ich mich nicht bewahrt unddies in solcher Weise, wie es - hier habe ich scharf beobachtet - niemandem ringsum mich geschehen ist. (Br, 194-5)

Here Kafka places the responsibility for his failed integration upon himself,rather than reducing it to circumstances beyond his control. The retreat toZiirau is in a sense identical with this recognition, for it represents for Kafkathe ultimate cutting of all those communal ties he enumerates here and whichhe associated with his life in Prague. Thus it is significant that Kafka placeshis failure to live in the city at the head of this list; this, in turn, hints at themanner in which the "Dorf" Ziirau became representative for Kafka's at-tempt to turn his back on these failures and seek a form of integration in anew and untried sphere.

The problem of integration remains preeminent during the Ziirau period.Of course, it was the appearance of tuberculosis which forced Kafka finallyto confront this issue head-on. It would be untrue to Kafka's own perceptionof the matter to say that this confrontation was thrust upon him from with-out: he, after all, viewed the illness as a collaborative product of his lung andhis brain (cf. Br, 161), i. e. as something internal to himself. Nonetheless, theillness forced him to confront this fundamental aporia of his life, and theresults of this confrontation in the literary realm are the aphorisms andsketches of the Oktavhefte. This does not mean, however, that the aphoris-

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tic meditations embody Kafka's resolution of this dilemma and signal his"surrender" to communality in the form of religiosity, as most scholars whohave explicitly dealt with these texts assume. While Robertson, to take oneexample, is thoroughly justified in his claim that the Ziirau aphorisms re-volve around questions about the problematical mediation between indi-vidual and community,36 it seems to me false to conclude that these textsevolve an "ethics" which pave Kafka's way to the community of his fellowhuman beings.37 Indeed, characteristic of the aphorism as expressive form isthat it concerns itself with this very tension between individual and com-munity, suspending any resolution and concentrating on a problematizationof the conflict itself. Kafka's aphorisms of this period signal his attempt toapproach this issue by means of a textual idiom which conventionally dealtwith this conflict. Thus these texts simply reflect Kafka's concerted applica-tion of his energies to the investigation of this conflict between himself asindividual, and integration into any community. I do not take this to implyresolution, but rather intensification of the dilemma itself. Moreover, onemust keep in mind that in the above-cited list of communities from whichKafka felt himself excluded, a religious community is conspicuously absent.Indeed, one of the telling aspects of Kafka's own assessment of this problemis the fact that he views the conflict between individual and community to bethe key to his lack of community on various levels. Each significant failure inhis life is associated with one of these levels of non-integration; religiousnon-integration was apparently not of the same significance, or of the sameorder, as those crises of integration he mentions here. In the final analysis,Kafka's lament that he had never been given the chance to participate inJudaism, and his pervasive interest in the Yiddish theater as a manifestationof the culture of this lost "Volk," represent his desire to be a part of a secularcommunity, a "Volksgemeinschaft," as he expressed it, and thus are notexpressions of religious interests in any specific sense.38

Kafka's conflict between individuality and integration was perhaps themost pervasive of his life, and it did not miraculously recede after the Ziirauperiod - one of the surest signs that no resolution, and certainly no lastingone, was achieved. A reflection recorded in Kafka's diary in October 1921indicates that this conflict between individual and community remainedcentral to him well after the "Dorf-Jahr." In this reflection (see T, 547-8),Kafka takes his own conscious refusal to participate in the regularly occur-ring card-game played by his parents as indicative of his rejection of each and

36 Robertson, "Kafka's Ziirau Aphorisms," pp. 73-5.37 Robertson, p. 87.38 This argument has been made by Sokel; see his article "Between Gnosticism and

Jehovah: The Dilemma in Kafka's Religious Attitude," South Atlantic Review, 50,no. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 3-22; esp. p. 6.

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every invitation to enter a communal, public life. He realizes that any lamentto the effect that he had not been carried onward by the "Lebensstrom" wasout of place, for he would simply have turned down any offer made to him(T, 547-8). A few days later Kafka takes up these deliberations again, thistime after having attempted to take part in the family card-game. Thisparticipation, he is forced to admit, does not procure for him the desiredsense of "Nähersein"; on the contrary, he merely senses this participation tobe "überhäuft von Müdigkeit, Langeweile, Trauer über die verlorene Zeit"(T, 548). Clearly Kafka feels himself trapped between the extremes of loneli-ness, on the one hand, and an "unproductive" communality on the other.While recognizing that his rejection of .all forms of community is self-in-flicted, he cannot help but view such communal activities as "verloreneZeit," stolen from him at the expense of the literary activity carried out in theisolation of his room. Kafka's reflection continues with a description of thisno-man's land between loneliness and community to which he believedhimself to be condemned.

Dieses Grenzland zwischen Einsamkeit und Gemeinschaft habe ich nur äußerstselten überschritten, ich habe mich darin sogar mehr angesiedelt als in der Einsam-keit selbst. Was für ein lebendiges schönes Land war im Vergleich hierzu Robin-sons Insel. (T, 548)

Kafka perceived absolute loneliness as far preferable to the "Grenzland"between loneliness and community in which he found himself. The loneli-ness of Robinson would have provided conditions ideally suited to Kafka'screative spirit. As he claimed in a letter to Felice: "Ich brauche zu meinemSchreiben Abgeschiedenheit, nicht 'wie ein Einsiedler', das wäre nichtgenug, sondern wie ein Toter" (BF, 412). Thus Kafka's assertion that he wasdoomed to be "zerrieben zwischen dem Bureau und dem Schreiben" (BF,407) is just another way of expressing his sense of being trapped in this"Grenzland." The "office" was for him merely the most concrete and mostpainful representation of his sacrifice to the community, whereas writingnever ceased to be an activity of loneliness. It is not an exaggeration to claimthat this unresolved conflict, or, put more absolutely, the unresolvability ofthe conflict, "ground down" Kafka, and that it was this issue which hebelieved had manifest itself in his "Lungenwunde" (Br, 161).39 This over-arching sense of inhabiting a problematical "Grenzland," of being banishedor exiled to a realm of the in-between, is, as we have noted, fundamental tothe situation of the aphorist in general.40 Musil, we recall, described the

39 This unresolved conflict overlaps with what Sokel has termed the oppositionbetween "naturalist" and "spiritualist" tendencies in Kafka's life and art; see Sokel,"Language and Truth in the Two Worlds of Franz Kafka."

40 Neumann emphasizes die position of the aphorist as one of exile, Ideenparadiese,p. 750.

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situation of the essayist/aphorist as one of being "dazwischen," betweenobjectivity and subjectivity, truth and play, universal and individual (cf.MoE, 254). In the Ziirau period this conflict of the "dazwischen" arose forKafka in its most exaggerated form, and accompanying the heightening ofthis conflict there occurred a shift to the aphoristic, or a prominent surfacingof aphoristic tendencies in Kafka's literary production.

Thus far we have examined the "ethical" aspect of this problematicalmediation between individual and community in Kafka's life. This crisis alsotakes the form of an epistemological dilemma for Kafka, as is especiallyevident in some of the deliberations written in the Zurau period. An often-cited reflection from the third Oktavheft succinctly summarizes the issues atstake here for Kafka.

Ist es möglich, etwas Untröstliches zu denken? Oder vielmehr etwas Untröstlichesohne den Hauch des Trostes? Ein Ausweg läge darin, daß das Erkennen als solchesTrost ist. Man könnte also wohl denken: Du mußt dich beseitigen, und könntesich doch ohne Fälschung dieser Erkenntnis aufrecht erhalten, am Bewußtsein, eserkannt zu haben. Das heißt dann wirklich, an den eigenen Haaren sich aus demSumpf gezogen haben. Was in der körperlichen Welt lächerlich ist, ist in dergeistigen möglich. Dort gilt kein Schwerkraftgesetz, (die Engel fliegen nicht, siehaben1 nicht irgendeine Schwerkraft aufgehoben, nur wir Beobachter der irdischenWelt wissen es nicht besser zu denken), was allerdings für uns nicht vorstellbar ist,oder erst auf einer hohen Stufe. Wie kläglich ist meine Selbsterkenntnis, verglichenetwa mit meiner Kenntnis meines Zimmers. (Abend.) Warum? Es gibt keineBeobachtung der innern Welt, so wie es eine der äußern gibt. Zumindest deskripti-ve Psychologie ist wahrscheinlich in der Gänze ein Anthropomorphismus, einAusragen der Grenzen. Die innere Welt läßt sich nur leben, nicht beschreiben. (H,71-2)

I cite this passage at some length because it is quite instructive to pursue thekernel-thought through those various shifts and transitions so typical ofKafka's conceptual procedure. Beginning with a question about the consol-ing aspect of thought, Kafka postulates that abstract knowledge ("Erken-nen") is in its very essence a form of consolation. If this were true, heconcedes, then this represents nothing but an "Ausweg." In a move charac-teristic of his conceptual strategies, Kafka then proceeds to take the word"Ausweg" literally and to shift by means of this literalization from abstractreflection to concrete example. One can recognize the need to eliminateoneself, he claims, and yet continue to live by virtue of this mere recognitionitself. Kafka then chooses a metaphor that describes this reflex: draggingoneself out of a bog by one's own hair, an apparent reference to the Miinch-hausen tales. Out of this metaphor he then abstracts a proposition, the thrustof which is the unbridgeability of the dichotomy between physical andspiritual worlds. He explicates this postulate by taking as an example the lawof gravity, asserting that this physical law is invalid in the realm of the spirit.The parenthetical comment which introduces the opposition between

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"angels," as representatives of the spiritual world, and "we observers of theearthly world" is of fundamental significance because it points to the mannerin which an essentially epistemological issue is ultimately cloaked in terms oftraditional religious conceptions. Kafka projects this conflict between ab-stract and empirical knowledge into the Judeo-Christian dichotomy betweenspiritual and physical worlds. This is an impulse that is typical of Kafka inthis period, and it accounts for the so-called "religious" tendency often attri-buted to the aphorisms produced at this time. However, Kafka's apparentobsession with the mythology of humankind's Fall from grace is merely aveiled concern with the problem of knowledge, which, after all, is the im-petus behind humankind's Fall even in traditional religious conceptions. Inother words, it is the tension between knowledge and existence, between"divine" recognition and ail-too human experience, which peers throughKafka's application of religious terminology in the aphorisms.41 Kafka, ofcourse, was certainly cognizant of Kleist's association of this religious motifwith the problem of knowledge and life in his essay "Über das Marionet-tentheater."42 Indeed, Kafka probably was aware of the use of this religiousmythology to describe epistemological issues in German Idealism, as well assimilar tendencies in such aphoristic writers as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, andeven Friedrich Hebbel. Gerhard Neumann has demonstrated that themythology of the "Fall" is traditionally applied by aphorists as a short-handway of representing the split between idea and experience, thought and life.43

In their application of religious conceptions to serve a similar end, Kafka'saphorisms from the Ziirau period partake of this long-standing tradition.There is, to be sure, a Utopia implied in the use of these religious motifs;however, it is a Utopia of thought - an "Ideenparadies," to cite Neumann'sfelicitous designation - and not a Utopia of a religious type. Moreover, it is aUtopia which functions, as it were, ex negativo, a consciously idealized con-ception of a perfect union between knowledge and existence, idea and ex-perience, with a view to which the imperfection of the earthly world comesinto greater focus. This Utopian thrust has been most impressively articu-lated by Theodor Adorno in paragraph 53 of his Minima Moralia.

41 A number of critics have observed that Kafka's religious conceptions in the apho-risms represent epistemological issues: see Stanley Corngold, "Kafka's DoubleHelix," The Literary Review, 26 (1983), p. 526; Gerhard Kurz, Traum-Schrecken,p. 141; Sabina Kienlechner, Negativität der Erkenntnis im Werk Franz Kafkas,Studien zur dt. Literatur, Bd.66 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1981), pp.5 & 33; RalfNicolai, "Wahrheit und Lüge bei Kafka und Nietzsche," Literaturwissenschaft-liches Jahrbuch, Neue Folge, 22 (1981), pp. 256f. & 263.

42 Robertson draws the connection to Kleist's essay, p. 83, as does Kurz, Traum-Schrecken, p. 196.

43 Ideenparadiese, p. 826.

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Zum Ende. — Philosophie, wie sie im Angesicht der Verzweiflung einzig noch zuverantworten ist, wäre der Versuch, alle Dinge so zu betrachten, wie sie vomStandpunkt der Erlösung aus sich darstellen. Erkenntnis hat kein Licht, als das vonder Erlösung her auf die Welt scheint: alles andere erschöpft sich in der Nachkon-struktion und bleibt ein Stück Technik. Perspektiven müssen hergestellt werden,in denen die Welt ähnlich sich versetzt, verfremdet, ihre Risse und Schrundeoffenbart, wie sie einmal als bedürftig und entstellt im Messianischen Lichte dalie-gen wird. Ohne Willkür und Gewalt, ganz aus der Fühlung mit den Gegenständenheraus solche Perspektiven zu gewinnen, darauf allein kommt es dem Denkenan.44

Adorno, of course, is describing his own method here; but his method, to besure, has certain affinities with that of the aphorist: his portrayal, in fact,succinctly describes the aphoristic method which, without doing violence tothe phenomena it considers, estranges and displaces them, opening up tearsand cracks in the fabric of (ideologically) fixed conceptions of the world.This search for new perspectives from the standpoint of redemption charac-terizes the tenor of Kafka's aphoristic incursions into the sphere of "religion"- this word understood here in its broadest sense as the meta-physical ormeta-actual.45 The aphorisms represent Kafka's struggle in what Sokel hascalled a "double-bind" between heavenly and earthly realms.46 This conflict,however, should be read as a mythological enciphering of the conflict be-tween thought and life, possiblity and actuality, "Erkenntnis" and existencein the world.

The reflection in the third Oktavheft which gave rise to this excursus isexemplary of the fluid transition between epistemological dilemma and re-ligious-mythological portrayal frequently found in Kafka's aphorisms. If wereturn now to this meditation, we can follow it through two more signifi-cant transitions. Almost instinctively Kafka transforms the problem ofknowledge into one of self-knowledge. Why, Kafka ponders, is one'sknowledge of the external world so much more extensive than that of one'sown inner world? He answers this by postulating a strict dichotomy betweenouter and inner worlds, claiming that the inner world cannot be observed.After having passed through various other phases, the duality between rec-ognition and life which motivated Kafka's reflection is altered into one be-tween external and internal realms. The transitional duality between thephysical and the spiritual glides into this penultimate dichotomy in which,by association, external world is related to the physical, and internal world to

44 Adorno, Minima Moralia, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4 ed. Rolf Tiedemann(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980), p. 281.

45 Sokel has argued for a broader understanding of the notion of "religion" in Kafka,"Between Gnosticism and Jehovah," p. 11.

46 Sokel, ibid., p. 12.

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the spiritual. This identification of the internal sphere with the realm of thespiritual, the meta-physical, or, more precisely, intra-physical, is, as I haveargued elsewhere, characteristic of Kafka's thought during his aphoristicperiod.47 This internalization of the spiritual and transcendental - a displace-ment of the meta-physical to the internal realm of the individual - figuresprominently in the evolution of Kafka's aphoristic method. Returning onceagain to Kafka's meditation, we can pursue one final variation of thedichotomy discussed thus far. After expressing doubt about the efficacy ofdescriptive psychology, Kafka arrives at the aphoristically expressed propo-sition: "Die innere Welt läßt sich nur leben, nicht beschreiben." In a finaltwist, the duality omnipresent in this meditation now becomes one betweenexperience and its portrayal. We witness here the subtle manner in which forKafka the crisis of knowledge almost imperceptible, yet automatically, be-comes a crisis of expression - that is, a crisis of literature. Not satisfied withmere experience of the inner world, Kafka is driven to describe it. Suchdescription, however, is by its very nature impossible. This entire series ofdilemmas, then, culminates in the overriding dilemma of literature, and thatmeans the dilemma of the portrayal of experience rather than the experienc-ing of it. The conciliatory moment with which Kafka's reflection began isabsent in this conclusion. This ultimate conflict - that between inner life andits portrayal - has become absolute, allowing for no possibility of mediation.

The problematical transmission of traditional material, its cryptic, oftenobscure significance, is one of the most prominent leitmotifs in Kafka'sworks. This holds for the Oktavhefte as well, where, in particular, Kafkapicks up mythological material of various sorts, re-interpreting and re-working its significance. This is not only the case for such parables as "DasSchweigen der Sirenen" and "Prometheus," but is also true of Kafka's re-shaping of Biblical material. In so doing, Kafka is carrying out an «r-her-meneutical act: interpreting the Bible, the originary interpretive object ofhermeneutics, in a manner which lends it significance in a particular histori-cal context. This means that traditional material, when applied by Kafka,undergoes critical appropriation and revision. A comment from the secondOktavheft makes clear the manner in which Kafka's understanding ofpassed-down material always was guided by an interaction in which thespeculative faculty of the interpreter plays a determining role.

Die geschriebene und überlieferte Weltgeschichte versagt oft vollständig, dasmenschliche Ahnungsvermögen aber führt zwar oft irre, führt aber, verläßt einennicht. So ist zum Beispiel die Überlieferung von den sieben Weltwundern immer

Cf. R. Gray, "Suggestive Metaphor: Kafka's Aphorisms and the Crisis of Com-munication," DVjs, 58 (1984), 454-69, esp. pp. 460-2.

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von dem Gerücht umgeben gewesen, daß noch ein achtes Weltwunder bestandenhabe und es wurden auch über dieses achte Wunder verschiedene einander viel-leicht widersprechende Mitteilungen gemacht, deren Unsicherheit man durch dasDunkel der alten Zeiten erklärte. (H, 65)

Although admitting the possibility that speculation errs, Kafka emphasizesthat it nonetheless leads somewhere: it has significance at least insofar as ithas direction. Certainty of an "authentic" interpretation is abandoned for theact of interpretation itself, which, while it may lead to equivocal or evencontradictory conclusions, still lends direction or directions to one'sthought. Kafka's hermeneutical appropriations of Biblical material must beconceived in terms of this interplay between the hermeneutical "Ahnungs-vermögen'' and the cryptic "darkness" of the object of interpretation. Toread Kafka's reflections on traditional religious material as dogmatic expres-sions of religious belief denies the ultimate equivocality of the interpretiveresult of Kafka's confrontation with these themes. What he presents in hisaphorisms are interpretive hypotheses and transitional, mutable viewpoints,not final conclusions - should Kafka even have believed that such werepossible.

Interpretive equivocality and lack of finality are qualities which link Kaf-ka's aphorisms to the tradition of the German aphorism in general. Not theintegration of the individual into the universalizing religious or ethical com-munity is what is at issue, but rather the problematization of any suchintegrative act. Kafka takes interpretive uncertainty to be essential to thehuman condition in general. This "undecidability" constitutes the nature of"sin," sin conceived by Kafka as the oppositional space between two inimicalabsolutes, pure knowledge and pure life.

Wir sind nicht nur deshalb sündig, weil wir vom Baum der Erkenntnis gegessenhaben, sondern auch deshalb, weil wir vom Baum des Lebens noch nicht gegessenhaben. Sündig ist der Stand, in dem wir uns befinden, unabhängig von Schuld,(aph. 83)

Kafka takes issue with traditional religious conceptions of sin on two counts:first of all, sin is not associated with human guilt; secondly, sin is not moti-vated by some action, but rather by the impossibility of a certain action,namely, eating from the tree of life. Sin, then, is merely a word whichsummarizes the human condition of being caught in the half-way housebetween knowledge and life. Kafka's reflections on paradise and human-kind's Fall constantly revolve around the tension between these two poles,represented in the Biblical conceptions of the tree of knowledge and the treeof life. Thus, in an aphorism from the third Oktavheft closely related to theone just cited, Kafka asserts that humankind is separated from God on twosides: on one side because of the Fall and the eating from the tree of knowl-edge; on the other because of the inability to eat from the tree of life.

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Wir sind von Gott beiderseitig getrennt: Der Sündenfall trennt uns von ihm, derBaum des Lebens trennt ihn von uns. (H, 101)

In a similar deliberation, Kafka portrays the condition of humanity in termsof the unfulfilled threats or promises made by the snake and by God. Insteadof dying after eating from the tree of knowledge, as God had warned,humankind became mortal, i.e. it attained the "capacity" for death; insteadof becoming equal to God as the snake promised, humankind attained the"capacity" for becoming god-like (cf. H, 101 f.). According to this text thefate of the human being appears to be that of restriction to mere poten-tialities: mortality, or the potential for death, and knowledge, or the poten-tial for god-like understanding. As in the ethical side of this dilemma, whereKafka diagnosed his position on the border between loneliness and commu-nality, in its epistemological aspect Kafka portrays the condemnation to "in-betweenness" as the crux of the matter. This "in-betweenness" is, however,not a "state" in the sense of being static, but rather a dynamic condition.Hence in one of the longer reflections on this subject, Kafka claims of theexile from paradise that it was "keine Tat, sondern ein Geschehen" (H, 106);i. e. humankind's Fall is a never-ending occurrence which repeats itself inces-santly. This is corroborated by Kafka's assertion in aphorism 64/65 that thebanishment from paradise is a process, a "Vorgang," that repeats itself eter-nally. One of Kafka's most famous aphorisms depicts this middle position ofthe human being in terms of a simultaneous chaining of humankind to theheavenly and earthly realms.

Er ist ein freier und gesicherter Bürger der Erde, denn er ist an eine Kette gelegt,die lang genug ist, um ihm alle irdischen Räume frei zu geben, und doch nur solang, daß nichts ihn über die Grenzen der Erde reißen kann. Gleichzeitig aber ist erauch ein freier und gesicherter Bürger des Himmels, denn er ist auch an eineähnlich berechnete Himmelskette gelegt. Will er nun auf die Erde, erdrosselt ihndas Halsband des Himmels, will er in den Himmel, jenes der Erde. Und trotzdemhat er alle Möglichkeiten und fühlt es; ja, er weigert sich sogar, das Ganze auf einenFehler bei der ersten Fesselung zurückzuführen, (aph. 66)

This entire meditation, of course, evolves out of the initial paradox that ineach realm this "citizen" is free despite his chain. The ultimate compromiseof his freedom, however, derives from the conflicts of the double chaining,so that all that remains is pure potentiality: "trotzdem hat er alle Möglich-keiten." Pure possibility, however, is itself paradoxical, for it excludes eoipso one essential possibility: that of realization or actualization of any givenpotential. The situation Kafka describes here, then, denies humankind'scapacity to transform reflection on the possible into concrete enactment inlife: the split between abstract knowledge and the practical realm of livedexperience is absolute.

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Thus far we have examined how in Kafka's aphoristic texts of the Zürauperiod the fundamental dichotomy between thought and experience tends tobe portrayed through critical appropriations of the religious mythology re-lating to humankind's Fall from grace. Humankind's restriction to the"Grenzland" between existence and knowledge correlates directly to theproblematization of the mediative movement between theory and practice.The intertwining of these issues, characteristic of Kafka's aphorisms, isquintessentially demonstrated by one of the longer reflections from the thirdOktavheft.

Niemand kann sich mit der Erkenntnis allein begnügen, sondern muß sich bestre-ben, ihr gemäß zu handeln. Dazu aber ist ihm die Kraft nicht mitgegeben, er mußdaher sich zerstören, selbst auf die Gefahr hin, sogar dadurch die notwendige Kraftnicht zu erhalten, aber es bleibt ihm nichts anderes übrig, als dieser letzte Versuch.(Das ist auch der Sinn der Todesdrohung beim Verbot des Essens vom Baume derErkenntnis; vielleicht ist das auch der ursprüngliche Sinn des natürlichen Todes.)Vor diesem Versuch nun fürchtet er sich; lieber will er die Erkenntnis des Gutenund Bösen rückgängig machen (die Bezeichnung "SündenfalP geht auf dieseAngst zurück); aber das Geschehene kann nicht rückgängig gemacht, sondern nurgetrübt werden. Zu diesem Zweck entstehen die Motivationen. Die ganze Welt istihrer voll, ja die ganze sichtbare Welt ist vielleicht nichts anderes als eine Motiva-tion des einen Augenblick lang ruhenwollenden Menschen. Ein Versuch, die Tat-sache der Erkenntnis zu fälschen, die Erkenntnis erst zum Ziel zu machen. (H,102-3)

The impossibility of actions that accord with recognition, and the concomi-tant impossibility of satisfaction with knowledge alone, lead to attempts torevoke knowledge itself. From this derive what Kafka terms "dieMotivationen," on which the entire human world subsists; and these, inturn, represent the attempt to deny the possession of knowledge, projectingit as a goal into the future. In other words, the impossibility of moving fromabstract knowledge to practical action evokes the desire to nullify knowledgeitself. A similar thought is expressed by another aphorism from the thirdOktavheft:

Erkenntnis haben wir. Wer sich besonders um sie bemüht, ist verdächtig, sichgegen sie zu bemühn. (H, 104)

In a paradoxical reversal, the search for knowledge is presented as an attemptto deny knowledge; i. e. to revoke the Fall from paradise, the representativesymbol of humankind's acquisition of knowledge, and return humanity to astate of "grace." Grace implies simply liberation from the tortured positionbetween knowledge and action, thought and life.

Kafka's obsession with this tension between theoretical knowledge andits practical implementation is especially prominent during the Zürau period.While it is certainly true that Kafka's generalizations about the human condi-tion are predicated on analyses of his own life and personal experience,

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reduction of these texts to mere biographical facts simply reconstructs inreverse the process which Kafka set into motion. It is more significant tofollow through the literary manifestations of the problems themselves inorder to determine what consequences they have for Kafka's literary creativi-ty. In the case of the aphorisms, at least, the centrality of precisely this issueof the problematical mediation between thought and experience, universalknowledge and particular implementation, may have suggested to Kafka theappropriateness of this expressive form for the dilemmas on which he fo-cused in the Zürau period. The aphorisms mark an essential shift in thecharacter of Kafka's literary production - this alone explains why scholarshave so avidly striven to isolate the aphoristic writings from Kafka's othertexts. Yet crucial to the understanding of Kafka's turn to the aphorism is anunderstanding of this genre itself, and of its suitability to the issues withwhich Kafka was concerned during the period at which he took up this form.

My argument, simply stated, is that religious issues are by no means thelowest common denominator of Kafka's aphorisms in general, or of theirtreatment of the problem of humankind in particular. On the contrary,religious motifs serve as mytho-religious encipherings of the profounderepistemological crisis endemic to the situation of humanity as diagnosed byKafka. The centrality of the dichotomy between knowledge and its im-plementation, theory and practice - in other words, of the insufferable mid-dle-realm between knowledge and pure existence to which, in Kafka's view,humankind is condemned - is demonstrated by the frequency with whichthe structural essence of this problem manifests itself in various concretiza-tions. The split between knowledge and life, as we have repeatedly seen, canalternately take the form of a dichotomy between theory and practice, exter-nal world and internal world, phenomenal and noumenal, experience and itsportrayal, or even truth and lie. The following aphoristic texts present across-section of these diverse manifestations of an identical problem, whichfor the sake of brevity I will henceforth refer to as the structure of exclu-sion.48

Von außen wird man die Welt mit Theorien immer siegreich eindrücken undgleich mit in die Grube fallen, aber nur von innen sich und sie still und wahrerhalten. (H, 74)Nicht jeder kann die Wahrheit sehn, aber sein. (//, 94)Wirklich urteilen kann nur die Partei, als Partei aber kann sie nicht urteilen. Dem-nach gibt es in der Welt keine Urteilsmöglichkeit, sondern nur deren Schimmer.(H, 86)

48 Manfred Frank and Gerhard Kurz have pointed out the significance of this struc-ture in German Idealist conceptions of the problem of knowledge. They include intheir investigation a section on Kafka; see their "Ordo inversus: Zu einer Reflexions-figur bei Novalis, Hölderlin, Kleist und Kafka," Geist und Zeichen: Festschrift fürArthur Henkel, ed. H. Anton, et al. (Heidelberg: Winter, 1977), pp. 75-97.

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Wahrheit ist unteilbar, kann sich also selbst nicht erkennen; wer sie erkennen will,muß Lüge sein. (aph. 80)

The multiplicity of contexts in which this structure occurs leads to the sur-mise that the individual manifestations are actually secondary to the presen-tation of the structure itself. In much the same sense, Biblical motifs inKafka's aphorisms serve merely as vehicles for the depiction of this funda-mental structure of exclusion which Kafka diagnosed as central to the con-flicts of his life, and of humanity in general. In the instance of these texts,structure itself has become central. This, of course, is just one further reasonwhy the aphorism was an appropriate form of expression for the endeavorKafka was involved in at this time. Much like Wittgenstein's theory (andaphoristic demonstration) in the Tractatus of the dual expressivity of lan-guage, these texts by Kafka indirectly "show" an identical structure, whilewhat they "say" is in each case quite different.49 In the structure of exclusionpervasive in his aphoristic texts, Kafka structurally presents the conflict ofmediation that he diagnosed as the preeminent dilemma of his life, one fromwhich all of his concrete conflicts derived. This mediative conflict is tradi-tionally a central issue of aphoristics, and Kafka's awareness of this factprobably influenced his turn to aphoristic expression during the Ziirauperiod when he sought concertedly to come to terms with this issue.

B) Aphorism and the Fragmentary

Of the other conceptual issues which link Kafka's thought and literature tothose of the aphorist, the problem of the fragment and the fragmentarycomes immediately to mind. The aphorist, as one who recognizes the neces-sity of the fragmentary, yet who seeks to turn this necessity into a virtue,might be termed the fragmentist par excellence. That is to say that the apho-rist, while desiring the whole, recognizes, in the words of Adorno, that thewhole is the untruth ("Das Ganze ist das Unwahre").50 The Utopia of thewhole finds expression in two elements of aphoristic expression: in theapodictic finality of its rhetorical discourse; and in the group configurationwhich through cotextual deviance emphasizes the gaps and ruptures betweenindividual fragments, while simultaneously projecting an outline of thewhole in the very counterpoint of textual presence and textual absence.Kafka's entire literary endeavor can certainly be called an art of the fragmen-tary: the word "fragment" is the designation which most aptly unifies hisliterary production, whether one considers the early sketches published

See my "Suggestive Metaphor," pp. 465-6.See Adorno, Minima Moralia, p. 55.

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under the title Betrachtung, the fragmentary novels and stories, or, indeed,the aphoristic texts. My argument will be that in Kafka's case, as is true ofthe aphorist in general, the fragmentary results from an equivocal attitudetoward the finality of conclusions, and that the strategies of his texts aregoverned by a desire to divert from finality. All of Kafka's literature, like theaphorism in general, is marked by this reluctant refusal of the whole.51

One of the paradoxes of Kafka's artistic sensibility is that, while possess-ing a keen sense of the requirement for artistic closure, most of his worksremained fragmentary. To be sure, it was the uncompromising nature of thisdemand itself which inhibited Kafka's ability to conclude his texts. Thedanger Kafka sensed was the imposition, grounded in the drive for closure,of an artifical conclusion onto a story. In other words, the conclusion isforced, instead of evolving out of the text itself independent of the willing,mastering authorical subject. The satisfaction Kafka felt with the story "DasUrteil" derived in part from the natural evolution of the story out of itself.On the other hand, Kafka sharply criticized the story "In der Strafkolonie" ina letter to his editor, Kurt Wolff: "Zwei oder drei Seiten kurz vor [dem]Ende sind Machwerk, ihr Vorhandensein deutet auf einen tieferen Mangel,es ist da irgendwo ein Wurm, der selbst das Volle der Geschichte hohlmacht" (Br, 159).52 The significance Kafka attributed to conclusions in gen-eral is indicated in his assertion that the single error near the end of this story- an error that even he cannot identify more closely - undermines the tale inits entirety. The artificial "Machwerk," rather than shoring up the story,actually hollows it out. But this self-critique of "Strafkolonie" reflects morethan just Kafka's dissatisfaction with this one work; indeed, as an entry fromhis diary from 1911 demonstrates, Kafka reflected in general about the diffi-culty of endings.

Die Schwierigkeiten der Beendigung, selbst eines kleinen Aufsatzes, liegen nichtdarin, daß unser Gefühl für das Ende des Stückes ein Feuer verlangt, das dertatsächliche bisherige Inhalt aus sich selbst nicht hat erzeugen können, sie entstehenvielmehr dadurch, daß selbst der kleinste Aufsatz vom Verfasser eine Selbstzu-friedenheit und eine Verlorenheit in sich selbst verlangt, aus der an die Luft desgewöhnlichen Tages zu treten, ohne starken Entschluß und äußern Anspornschwierig ist, so daß man eher, als der Aufsatz rund geschlossen wird und man stillabgleiten darf, vorher, von der Unruhe getrieben, ausreißt und dann der Schlußvon außenher geradezu mit Händen beendigt werden muß, die nicht nur arbeiten,sondern sich auch festhalten müssen. (T, 218-9)53

51 Peter Cersowsky discusses the problem of the fragmentary in Kafka's works insome detail, relating it to the tendency toward the fragmentary in literary deca-dence; "Mein ganzes Wesen ist auf Literatur gerichtet," pp. 85-6.

52 See also Sokel, "Das Verhältnis von Erzählperspektive zum Erzählgeschehen,"p. 721.

53 For other reflections on the problem of closure, see T, 142, 542, 548; and Br, 120.

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The difficulty of arriving at conclusions is not predicated on a lack of "fire"or inspiration, but rather due to what seems to be an uneasiness that arisesprecisely out of this self-absorption itself. The depth of Kafka's "Ver-lorenheit" in the successful act of creation can be fathomed in his descriptionsof the writing of "Das Urteil" (cf. , 293-4; 296-7). The very profundity ofthis self-absorption seems to cause Kafka to pull himself prematurely out ofthe trance-like state of creativity, at which point the text has to be concludedfrom without, i. e. artificially. One might imagine such creative abandon as asubmersion in water, from which after a certain prescribed time limit onemust return to the air. If one can remain submerged until the work is con-cluded, so that the end evolves uninterruptedly out of what precedes it, thenthe text will be "rounded out," as Kafka describes it. Such rounding out doesnot necessarily imply for Kafka concluding with a forceful points or a rhetor-ical flourish, it simply implies pursuing the creative vision to its own self-imposed end.

Given this austere creative demand, we can easily understand why Kafkagravitated toward shorter literary forms, and why the novels could not butremain fragmentary. Throughout his life Kafka complained of the lack oftime he had for his writing, squeezing it in between office and a few hours ofsleep, despising even the slightest interruption of his "free" time devoted toliterature. According to the description cited above, one can understand notonly why Kafka's works tended to remain fragmentary, but also even whythose which were completed in a formal sense have an element of the frag-mentary about them. This also helps shape the episodic character of thelarger texts, especially the novels. The "paratactic" structure of Der Prozeß,in fact, is so prominent that the individual chapters stand on their own to theextent that even their logical order in the narrative remains in question. AsKafka himself depicted it, he could only arrive at conclusions, at a rounding-out of the narrative, within a single creative session, so that longer workswould naturally take on the appearance of paratactically combined episodes,each entire unto itself.

Ironically, during the Ziirau period, one of the first extended spans oftime free of the burden of the office that he ever enjoyed, Kafka concernshimself almost solely with the composition of prose miniatures. In recentyears a great deal has been made about the influence that external conditionsexerted upon Kafka's writing.54 While in general this thesis seems convinc-ing, at times some of its manifestations border on the ludicrous. Such is thecase, it seems to me, with Pasley's assertion that Kafka's desire to compose

See, for example, Malcolm Pasley, "Der Schreibakt und das Geschriebene," andWolf Kittler, "Brief oder Blick: Die Schreibsituation der frühen Texte Franz Kaf-kas," Der junge Kafka, pp. 40-67.

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miniatures is reflected in the miniature format of the octavo notebooks inwhich they were composed.55 Aside from the fact that such an explanationsays nothing whatsoever about possible initial motivations behind the deci-sion to compose short works in the first place, it seems further to evincesurrender to the Kafka mystique: a writer such as Kafka could never beswayed out of mundane reasons - lack of money, wartime paper shortages,unavailability of other notebook formats - to choose even the paper hewrites on! Hartmut Binder has suggested a more convincing hypothesis,namely that Kafka chose the smaller format - assuming, of course, that itwas a matter of choice at all - because he wanted the notebooks to fit into apocket and thus be easily portable.56 Nonetheless, in the final analysis there isno reason to doubt that intellectual considerations played a formidable role inKafka's turn to shorter textual forms in the Zürau period, regardless ofwhether the choice of the octavo format was predicated on a consciousdecision.

Throughout his life Kafka displayed a penchant for "die kleine Form," apenchant which can be explained on the basis of various intellectual-histori-cal contexts. On the one hand, it is one of the aspects that links Kafka's workto that of his Austrian contemporaries whose predilection for "die kleineForm" has already been examined.57 One critic has chosen a somewhatbroader context, aligning Kafka's tendency toward the literary fragmentwith the loss of totality characteristic of literary decadence in general. "Ver-lust der Ganzheit als Signum der Dekadenz: Dies bedeutet bei Kafka auchFormzerfall, Selbständigkeit von Einzelskizzen und Fragmentarisierung alsmaßgeblicher Stilzug in einer Persistenz, die sich keineswegs auf die frühenSchriften beschränkt."58 In a yet more extensive intellectual context, theautonomy of the part at the expense of the whole which marks Kafka'sliterature has been understood in terms of the celebration of the fragmentaryas characteristic of modernism.59 Regardless of the context in which onewishes to embed it, Kafka's predilection for the fragmentary cannot be de-nied. What is significant, however, is that Kafka adhered to the modernistnotion - and the traditional belief of the aphorist - that truth resides inindividual details, not in the completely grasped whole. He expresses thisthought in a letter to Brod from July 1916.

Ich werde das Ganze nur beschreiben, mehr als das, was man sieht, kann ich nichtsagen. Man sieht aber nur allerkleinste Kleinigkeiten und das allerdings ist bezeich-

55 Pasley, "Der Schreibakt und das Geschriebene," p. 12.56 Binder's hypothesis is transmitted by Pasley, p. 24.57 See Kurz, Traum-Schrecken, p. 9, and also Cersowsky, passim.58 Cersowsky, p. 85.59 David Miles, "'Pleats, Pockets, Buckles, and Buttons'," p. 342.

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nend, meiner Meinung nach. Es spricht für Wahrhaftigkeit auch gegenüber demBlödesten. Mehr als Kleinigkeiten kann man mit bloßem Auge dort, wo Wahrheitist, nicht sehn. (Ar, 141-2)

On the basis of this passage, one can almost imagine Kafka as a disciple ofErnst Mach, whose sensualist theory of knowledge attained far-reachingcurrency in Austria at the time. Similar to Mach, Kafka both restricts "truth"to that which is empirically perceptible, and reduces the totality of animpression to a series of fragments. Kafka goes so far as to assert here thatfragmentation is a certain sign of truth. Of course, he does not exclude thepossibility that truth transcends this fragmentation perceived "mit bloßemAuge," but he restricts the perceptibility of truth to an awareness of thefragmentary. What goes beyond this is, in Machian terms, the meta-physicalor meta-sensual.

As I have already argued, the aphorism presented itself to Austrian intel-lectuals of the period as an appropriate form of expression, one which tookaccount of this fragmentization of truth, and which problematized the inter-play of empirical and cognitive spheres. Simultaneously, the aphorism ap-peared to some thinkers as an expressive form equal to the task of stretchingthe limits of a language restricted to the world of the senses. The proximityof Kafka's thoughts on language to this conception is brought out in hisfamous aphorism which asserts this very limitation of language to the sensu-al realm.

Die Sprache kann für alles außerhalb der sinnlichen Welt nur andeutungsweise,aber niemals auch nur annähernd vergleichsweise gebraucht werden, da sie, ent-sprechend der sinnlichen Welt, nur vom Besitz und seinen Beziehungen handelt.(aph.57)

The goal of critical aphorists such as Kraus and Wittgenstein was to developa mode of expression in which reference and implication, sensual and meta-sensual, were somehow bound together. This, as we shall see shortly, wasthe case for Kafka as well when he turned to the aphorism in the fall of 1917.For the moment it is important simply to realize that for Kafka, as for theaphorist in general, the fragmentary - and that means the merely sensual;"Besitz und sein[e] Beziehungen" - is rarely an end in itself, but rather anindicator of an absence, of a metaphysical (i. e. meta-sensual) truth which isabsent in the physical world. This modernist concern is reflected in thepredilection for aphoristic discourse, which, in the terminology ofmetaphysics, juxtaposes presence and absence, "Vergleich" and "An-deutung," "saying" and showing," or, in the terminology of linguistics,plays off reference and implication. The aphorism allows Kafka and hisfellow aphorists to glorify the truth of the fragmentary, without, however,

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abandoning in thought the Utopia of the whole and complete.60 The dialecti-cal relationship obtaining between Kafka's compulsion for closure and hisinsistence on the fragmentary, as well as the dialectic manifest in the conflictbetween the rhetorical closure of aphoristic structure and the open, seeming-ly endless interpretability of its content, are inherently related. A similarcontrast between formal closure and interpretive openness is characteristic ofall of Kafka's literary texts, and his gravitation toward such a structurecertainly helped shape his eventual turn to the aphorism, a form in whichsuch a contrast is constitutive of the genre itself.

C) Dynamism and Perspectivism

Closely tied to Kafka's vision of the physical world as a realm of looselyconnected fragments is his conception that reality and truth are caught up inan endless process of change. Subscription to this Heraclitean notion of fluxin both the physical and intellectual realms is, as has been shown, one of thecentral precepts of aphoristics. Kafka describes his own sense of the dyna-mism of truth in a letter to Milena. "Es ist schwer, die Wahrheit zu sagen,denn es gibt zwar nur eine, aber sie ist lebendig und hat daher ein lebendigwechselndes Gesicht" (BM, 73). In a parenthetical remark written in Czech,Kafka adds that the face of truth is never beautiful; at best it is now and againpretty. Kafka's words here must be viewed with care, for it is significant thathe does not question one's ability to perceive truth, but rather only thepossibility of speaking it. Here we recognize once again Kafka's awareness ofthe danger that language falsely fixes what is in essence dynamic. Goethe hadexpressed this insight in the following manner: "Der Mensch, indem erspricht, muß für den Augenblick einseitig werden; es giebt keine Mit-theilung, keine Lehre, ohne Sonderung."61 Speech inherently implies theassumption of a fixed perspective; truth, however, cannot be held down bythe ballast of language.

It is well known that Kafka understood the outbreak of tuberculosis infall 1917 as the appearance of an internal, spiritual "wound" which had longfestered within him; as such, the illness was conceived as "true" (in the senseof "integral") to his being. Yet he was still overwhelmed by the incom-

Jacques Derrick associates nostalgia for the lost origin or absent totality with"modernist" (as opposed to postmodernist) tendencies inherent especially, in hisview, in structuralism; see his "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of theHuman Sciences," Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bates (Chicago: Univ. ofChigaco Press, 1978), p. 292.Goethe, Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit, ed. Siegfried Scheibe (Ber-lin: Akademie Verlag, 1970), p. 426.

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prehensibility of this wound and of the internal circumstances which hadevoked it. Writing to Brod from Ziirau, Kafka portrayed the incomprehensi-bility of this "wound" in terms of a lack of perspective when confrontedwith an ever-changing dynamic mass.

Allerdings ist hier noch die Wunde, deren Sinnbild nur die Lungenwunde ist. Dumißverstehst es, Max, nach Deinen letzten Worten im Hausflur, aber ich mißver-stehe es auch vielleicht und es gibt (so wird es auch bei Deinen innern Angelegen-heiten sein) überhaupt kein Verständnis solchen Dingen gegenüber, weil es keinenÜberblick gibt, so verwühlt und immer in Bewegung ist die riesige, im Wachstumnicht aufhörende Masse. (Br, 161)

Kafka's concern with this internal sphere of the self ("innereAngelegenheiten") remains constant throughout his life, but it takes on al-most exaggerated proportions in the months directly following the physicalappearance of the "wound" in his lung. The aphorisms of the Oktavhefterepresent his preeminent attempt to find an expressive medium which couldcome to terms with his insight into the incomprehensibility of this internalrealm, to evolve a discourse which takes into consideration the dynamicalterability of its object and which gives easy access to shifting perspectives.Faced with this "gigantic mass" of confusion when he directs his gaze in-ward, Kafka understands that there is no standpoint from which this confu-sion will coalesce into an easily graspable whole. There is, as Kafka em-phasizes, no overview with regard to one's internal world, and this impliesthat it can be conceived - and expressed - only in fragments grounded invarious perspectives: there is no totality.

While after the fall of 1917 Kafka applied the problem of perspectivealmost exlusively to the issue of the understanding of one's innermost being,perspectivism was a doctrine which had long been present in Kafka's mind inmore general terms, only to attain a certain specificity in the crisis monthsafter the diagnosis of tuberculosis. A diary entry from 1913 bears testimonyto Kafka's general belief that reality cannot be sorted out due to the fact thatone lacks a perspective from which such an overriding analytic act mightoccur.

Zwischen Freiheit und Sklaverei kreuzen sich die wirklichen schrecklichen Wegeohne Führung für die kommende Strecke und unter sofortigem Verlöschen derschon zurückgelegten. Solcher Wege gibt es unzählige oder nur einen, man kanndas nicht feststellen, denn es gibt keine Übersicht. (T, 345)

This passage reads like a summary of the situation of Kafka's protagonists ingeneral, who, bound to their own limited perspectives, lack insight not onlyinto the motivations of others, but also into their own, and who thus canneither see whence they are coming or whither they are going. Lack ofoverview is, in Kafka's world, tantamount to lack of control, inability to bethe master of one's own fate. The fragmentary, episodic nature of the narra-

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tives is accounted for in part, then, by this absence of overview, whichentails inability to draw overriding connections, to project a system, to makeand follow a plan.62 Adherence to the principles of perspectivism also hadcertain ramifications in Kafka's own life and thought. To Felice he admittedhis ability "to divide himself in thought" ("In Gedanken kann ich michteilen," BF, 459). One of the primary manifestations of this was Kafka'scapacity to place himself within the head of another person, even of anadversary such as his father, and bring out the arguments that belong to thisperspective. Writing to Felice in 1913, Kafka admits about his relationshipwith his father: "Das Merkwürdigste in meinem Verhältnis zu ihm ist abervielleicht, daß ich es bis aufs äußerste verstehe, nicht mit ihm, aber in ihm zufühlen und zu leiden" (BF, 453). Kafka makes liberal use of this talent in the"Brief an den Vater," when, in his conclusion, he summarizes the argumentsthat the father would likely bring against the case he has made (cf. H,221-3).63 Certainly, this was a strategy which was nurtured by Kafka's legaltraining; for the anticipation of arguments which the opposition might bringagainst one's own position is essential to the wary establishment of one'scase, as well as to the preparation of a firm rebuttal.

Kafka not only recognized that all knowledge is grounded in a particularperspective, he practiced in his own search for knowledge and truth thatfluidity of perspective which could help one avoid dogmatism. Nietzsche, ofcourse, was one of the first to express an awareness of the dependence ofknowledge and truth on perspective.

Es gibt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches "Erkennen"; undje mehr Affekte wir über eine Sache zu Worte kommen lassen, je mehr Augen,verschiedene Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollstän-diger wird unser "Begriff" dieser Sache, unsre "Objektivität" sein. (Werke, II,86l)64

Nietzsche's aphoristic method represents one attempt at a realization of thisapproximation of objectivity through the establishing of differing perspec-tives on a given subject. Kafka's aphoristic texts also demonstrate the realiza-tion of this perspectivistic approach to knowledge, both on a formal and on a

62 On the relationship of perspective and the fragmentary in Kafka's art, see GünterHeintz, Franz Kafka: Sprachreflexion als dichterische Einbildungskraft, p. 119; seealso Kafka's interpretation of "Das Urteil" in which he points out the significanceof perspective in this story, BF, 397.

63 See fir, 58 for a further example of Kafka's absorption in the perspective of others.64 The connection of Kafka to the perspectivism of Nietzsche is made by Cersowsky,

p. 43; cf. also Günter Heintz, Sprachreflexion als dichterische Einbildungskraft,p. 119, and Wiebrecht Ries, Transzendenz als Terror: Eine religionsphilosophischeStudie über Franz Kafka, Phronesis, Bd 4 (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider,1977), p. 72.

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thematic level. The problem of perspectivism, for example, is thematized inthe following aphoristic text.

Es gibt im gleichen Menschen Erkenntnisse, die bei völliger Verschiedenheit dochdas gleiche Objekt haben, so daß wieder nur auf verschiedene Subjekte im gleichenMenschen rückgeschlossen werden muß. (aph. 72)

We are reminded again of Ernst Mach's refutation of the constancy of asingle ego, and of Hermann Bahr's suggestion that the self is composed ofmultiple subjects. One result of the application of such an insight in Kafka'saphoristic texts is that one must take care not to interpret any single aphoris-tic statement as Kafka's last word on a given subject. Indeed, true to theessence of aphoristic expression, Kafka often gives complementary or con-tradictory treatments of a single subject matter in diverse aphoristic texts.The interpreter of Kafka's aphorisms is therefore always confined to a rela-tively narrow interpretive space: withstanding the temptation to attributeabsolute and final validity to any single aphoristic utterance, one must at-tempt to view thematically related texts in their essential mutual interaction.At the same time, one must be careful not to systematize these sub-groupstoo strictly, for that also would amount to an interpretive affront against theanti-systematic, undogmatic openness of the aphorisms. This is the fine linewhich I am attempting to follow in my investigation of these texts.

The issue of perspectivism is treated thematically in numerous aphorismsby Kafka. In the following example this problem is depicted through thefabrication of a scenario in which differing perspectives are shown to begrounded in self-interest.

Verschiedenheit der Anschauungen, die man etwa von einem Apfel haben kann:die Anschauung des kleinen Jungen, der den Hals strecken muß, um noch knappden Apfel auf der Tischplatte zu sehn, und die Anschauung des Hausherrn, der denApfel nimmt und frei dem Tischgenossen reicht, (aph. 11/12)

The question of perspective is transposed into a psychological dimensionthrough the subtle conjoining of perspective and attitude on the object per-ceived. For the young boy who must strain his neck to glimpse the apple onthe table, the apple becomes an object of desire; for the master of the house,by contrast, the apple is in unimpeded view, and this reflects on his abilityto pick up this object and hand it to the boy. The text thus alludes to the factthat the limited perspective of the boy is a function of his subservience, hislack of control over the object and his own situation; while the "master"indeed "masters" the situation by virtue of his commanding perspective.Those whose perspective grants them dominance are, in turn, in a positionto grant favors to the subservient, thus affirming their own mastery, as wellas the servility of the others.

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The significance of perspectivistic portrayal for Kafka's aphorisms is alsoevident on a purely structural level. The inversion of conventional wisdomor accepted points of view is one of the primary expressions of the aphorist'sdesire to highlight the flexibility of perspectives. With the inversion of per-spective, as Nietzsche's aphorisms so often demonstrate, there follows aninversion of values. A very early aphorism recorded in Kafka's diary in 1913provides a brilliant instance of such perspectival inversion.

Die Entdeckungen haben sich dem Menschen aufgedrängt. ( , 340)

This re-interpretation of dis-covery as something that forces itself upon the"discoverer" has already been examined and need not be discussed furtherhere. Let us look instead at a famous aphorism from the Ziirau period withan eye for its application of perspectival inversion as a textual strategy.

Ein Käfig ging einen Vogel suchen, (aph. 16)65

Gerhard Neumann has explicated this aphorism in terms of what he callsKafka's "gleitendes Paradox."66 As Neumann demonstrates, what initiallyappears to be a mere inversion proves on closer inspection to be much morecomplex: for a bird that seeks a cage is no more "logical" than a cage seekinga bird, since birds are by convention associated with freedom, not with thedesire for captivity. The ostensible structural inversion, then, has been graft-ed onto an initial conceptual inversion of the symbolic value of "birdness."The resultant "gliding paradox," derived from the interaction of these twoinversions, effects a process of incessant recursion in which no definite in-terpretive perspective can be conclusively held on to. Far from merely re-versing a conventional perspective, Kafka's text employs a strategy thatevokes various perspectival reversals through the fusion of two inversionsthat conflict with one another from distinct textual levels (one structural, theother conceptual or semantic). In this sense Kafka's aphorism goes evenbeyond Nietzsche's perspectivistic aphorisms; for it alludes, in a text that islinguistically otherwise quite simple, to the infinite perspectives, and henceinfinite values or "meanings," that even such a superficially simple statementcan call forth.67

The perspectivistic quality of Kafka's aphorisms is significant not merelybecause its presence helps connect his aphoristic texts to the principles of

65 See H, 104 for an aphorism that employs a similar technique.66 Neumann, "Umkehrung und Ablenkung," p. 706.67 See also Kurz, Traum-Schrecken, who is of the opinion that Kafka believed only

inversion of the apparent could possibly reveal truth, and who thus asserts that onemust read Kafka's texts as conscious inversions of their overt statements, pp. 37,90, and passim; see also his section on Kafka in the article written in conjunctionwith Manfred Frank, "Ordo inversus," pp. 91-7.

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aphoristic expression in general, but also because of the non-dogmatic atti-tude that such a position - or non-position, to be more precise - implies.This, it seems to me, is one of the strongest arguments that can be broughtagainst those who find philosophical or religious "doctrines" in these texts. Ifthe aphorisms reveal a perspective of their own - as, indeed, they must, sinceall expression is rooted in some standpoint or set of standpoints - then this"perspective" must be conceived as a spectrum in which numerous points ofview converge. The "statement" of this convergence is not one which can bediscerned in the positions explicitly expressed in these texts; rather it canonly be fathomed through consideration of the form that these remarks take- and form implies here aphoristic form. In other words, speaking withWittgenstein, it is what Kafka's aphorisms - true to this genre - show, andnot what they say, that is of fundamental significance.

D) Kafka's Conceptual Patterns

A few scholars have maintained that the aphorism is a mode of expressionwhich is appropriate to Kafka's general conceptual patterns.68 While it isclearly impossible to draw strict correspondences between certain elementsor structures of thought and the production of aphorisms - this sounds rathertoo deterministic - one can turn this statement around and maintain thataphorists tend to display certain patterns or proclivities in their thought thatcan be associated with a predilection for this mode of expression.69 Most ofthose inclinations associated with "aphoristic thought" are tendencies evi-dent in Kafka's conceptual patterns.

Perhaps the most prominent characteristic in Kafka's thought whichaligns him with the manner of thinking typical of the aphorist is his predilec-tion for the un-systematic or anti-systematic.70 Kafka himself described histhought as "nebelhaft," blaming this quality for the tremendous difficulty hehad in carrying on cohesive discussions with others.

Die für andere Menschen gewiß unglaublichen Schwierigkeiten, die ich beim Re-den mit Menschen habe, haben darin ihren Grund, daß mein Denken oder bessermein Bewußtseinsinhalt ganz nebelhaft ist, daß ich darin, so weit es nur auf michankommt, ungestört und manchmal selbstzufrieden ruhe, daß aber ein menschli-ches Gespräch Zuspitzung, Festigung und dauernden Zusammenhang braucht,Dinge, die es in mir nicht gibt. (T, 460-1)

68 Kurz, Traum-Schrecken, p. 36; Patrick Bridgwater, Kafka and Nietzsche, p. 21.69 Paul Requadt has summarized these characteristics of "aphoristic" thought, "Das

aphoristische Denken," Lichtenherg, pp. 133-165; esp. pp. 143-54; see alsoGerhard Fieguth, "Nachwort," Deutsche Aphorismen, pp. 368-77.

70 On the unsystematic in Kafka's thought, see Ernst Pawel, The Nightmare ofReason: A life of Franz Kafka (New York: Farar, Straus, Giroux, 1984), p. 69; BertNagel, Kaßa und die Weltliteratur, p. 307; Binder, Kafka in neuer Sicht, pp. 8-12.

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Among the qualities responsible for his self-diagnosed incompetence in con-versation, Kafka cites lack of connection, absence of firmness or conviction,and an inability to reduce the manifold to manageable proportions. All ofthese point to Kafka's openness and lack of dogmatism, both in thought andin conversation, as well as to an inherent intellectual curiosity that forbidshim to close himself off to new cognitive possibilities. In this sense Kafka'spatterns of thought resemble those of the aphorist, for whom experimenta-tion with new and always different hypotheses takes precedence over dog-matic reliance on a fixed theoretical position.71 The rage for qualification,retraction, or reassessment of previously stated assertions is one of the mostprominent manifestations of the inherent instability of individual thoughtsor statements in Kafka's conceptual process. Stanley Corngold has arguedconvincingly that in these constant "recursions" Kafka establishes a field inwhich oppositions remain unresolved.72 Kafka's interest is held by the ten-sion of this unresolved play of oppositions, according to Corngold, not bythe resolute poles of these opposing positions. This structural pattern ofincessant recursions is precisely what we have examined in the conflictinginversions in Kafka's aphorism on the bird in search of a cage. Indeed,Neumann's "gleitendes Paradox" and Corngold's notion of "recursion" arenearly identical. Such recursions are the structural manifestation of the "un-decidability" in Kafka's thought, his unwillingness to allow his conceptuali-zations or reflections to remain stagnant or stable. This fluidity and "unde-cidability" are central in Kafka's aphorisms.

In the self-diagnosis examined above, Kafka also emphasized the "con-nectionlessness" of his thoughts. This quality, while characteristic of theaphorist, is also characteristic of the modern age - Musil describes this as „diebekannte Zusammenhanglosigkeit der Einfalle und ihre Ausbreitung ohneMittelpunkt, die für die Gegenwart kennzeichnend ist" (MoE, 20). Thisconnectionlessness of individual thoughts is responsible for the fragmentary,episodic quality of Kafka's works. Binder has designated this tendency inKafka's thought as the "Absolutsetzung des Einzelphänomens."73 Applyingthe terminology of Jakobson, this phenomenon could be described as animposition of contiguity onto the axis of substitution: Kafka's narrativesevolve in the metaphonc plane as a metonymic expansion of the associativepotential inherent in the initial image or situation. This thesis is consistentwith hypotheses about the literalization of metaphor in Kafka's works,74 as

Ingeborg Henel also points out the experimental aspect in Kafka's thought, "Kafkaals Denker," Franz Kafka: Themen und Probleme, p. 52.Stanley Corngold, "Kafka's Double Helix," p. 528.Binder, Kafka in neuer Sicht, p. 15.This was first put forward by Günther Anders, Kafka: Pro und Contra (Munich:C. H.Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951), pp. 39-42, and has since become a

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well as with the assertion that Kafka's texts evolve out of their own linguisticelements which steer and direct from within, as it were, the course of thenarrative.75 Moreover, the application of Jakobson's terminology allows anadjudication of this proposition with my earlier remarks on the aphorism as atextual type which attempts to project its internal tension through an exag-gerated conflict between metaphorical and metonymical components of lan-guage. The struggle between similarity and contiguity, in fact, is common inKafka's writing in general, and in this sense one might claim, as Bridgwaterhas, that all of Kafka's texts have something "aphoristic" about them.76 Theunique texture of Kafka's narratives is woven not of simple metaphoricaldescription, but from a contiguous, and that implies "realistic," evolutionwithin the plane of the metaphorical itself.77 Thus what is commonly per-ceived as a confusion of the realistic and the fantastic in Kafka's writing isattributable to this intertwining of similarity and contiguity. For while Kaf-ka's texts are indeed "fraught with background," to cite Erich Auerbach'sphrase associated with the obscurity of Biblical narratives, they are simul-taneously obsessed with surface, and to this extent "realistic" in Auerbach'ssense as well.78 Auerbach's and Jakobson's terminology appear to me to bewholly compatible with one another in this respect. Contiguity relates towhat Auerbach describes as the concentration on "foreground," similaritywith what he refers to as "fraught with background." Kafka's texts in gen-eral are neither solely "foregrounded" (contiguous), nor solely "fraught withbackground" (metaphorical, similar); rather they are composed of a com-pressed interaction between these two principles, a phenomenon which ac-counts for the rational irrationalism of Kafka's narratives, as it does for thelogical mysticism of his aphorisms.

These deliberations have led us somewhat far afield of our investigationinto the conceptual patterns in Kafka's thought. What they are intended todemonstrate is the proximity of Kafka's logical mysticism with that com-monly associated with "aphoristic" thought. At the same time it is thisundermining of reason, and the concomitant dismantling of the totality,which has encouraged some critics to place Kafka within a deconstructive

standard thesis of Kafka-scholarship. See also Corngold, The Commentator's De-spair (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973), pp. 1-38.Günter Heintz, pp. 9 & 55.Bridgwater, p. 21, who bases his claim on the observation that the reader ofKafka's texts is always referred back to the inner logic of the text itself.We recall that Jakobson associated contiguity with the literature of Realism,metaphor with that of Romanticism, "Two Aspects of Language," pp. 81-2.Erich Auerbach, "Odysseus' Scar," Mimesis, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,1953) pp. 3-23; see also David Miles, op. cit., p. 332, on Kafka's poetics as one ofsurface, not of either presence or absence.

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tradition.79 One might simply add to this that a deprivileging of reason andof the logical totality is integral to the aphorism as genre, a fact which makesit, so to speak, "deconstructive" in its very essence. Typical for the aphorist,as for the deconstructionist, is what Kafka terms "[d]as Grauenhafte des bloßSchematischen" ( , 375). This horror of the purely schematic, the artificiallysystematic, has its corollary in a valorization of the conceptual leap, theepiphanic element of thought.80 Kafka, in fact, considered the conceptualleap to be symptomatic of his own process of conceptualization. In a letter toFelice in which he addresses his faulty memory and the resultant inability tolearn from prior experiences, Kafka asserts:

Ich kann nicht denken, in meinem Denken stoße ich immerfort an Grenzen, imSprung kann ich noch einzelweise manches erfassen, zusammenhängendes, ent-wicklungsmäßiges Denken ist mir ganz unmöglich. Ich kann auch nicht eigentlicherzählen, ja fast nicht einmal reden; . . . Das einzige, was ich habe, sind irgend-welche Kräfte, die sich in einer im normalen Zustand gar nicht erkennbaren Tiefezur Literatur koncentrieren . . . (BF, 400)

Kafka again insists on the fragmentary, unsystematic nature of his thought,and on his incapacity for progressive, developmental reasoning. Only theconceptual "leap" permits him, according to his analysis, to grasp things"einzelweise." Most important, however, is Kafka's own assertion that thisconceptual process determines his literature, which, by his own admission, isnot actually "narration" in a strict sense, but a concentration of powerssomewhere in the internal depths of his being. This description is consistentwith previous passages examined in which Kafka depicts the way his textsevolve out of the creative activity itself. Kafka, of course, had once com-pared his creative moments to the "hellseherische Zustände" he had heardRudolf Steiner describe.

Mein Glück, meine Fähigkeiten und jede Möglichkeit, irgendwie zu nützen, liegenseit jeher im Literarischen. Und hier habe ich allerdings Zustände erlebt (nichtviele), die meiner Meinung nach den von Ihnen, Herr Doktor [Steiner], be-schriebenen hellseherischen Zuständen sehr nahestehen, in welchen ich ganz undgar in jedem Einfall wohnte, aber jeden Einfall auch erfüllte und in welchen ichmich nicht nur an meinen Grenzen fühlte, sondern an den Grenzen des Menschli-chen überhaupt. ( , 57)

Kafka's description of these states of mind has striking similarities to theepiphanic experiences portrayed by Hofmannsthal's Lord Chandos, in par-ticular the flowing over of one's very being into the reflection, and the

79 See, for example, Margot Norris, "Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, and the Problem ofMimesis," p. 1251.

80 See Reiner Stach, "Eine höhere Art der Beobachtung: Zum Verhältnis individuel-ler und kollektiver Erfahrung im Werk Kafkas," Neue Rundschau, 95, no. 1/2(1984), p. 220.

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sensation of running up against the limits of the humanly conceivable. The"filling up," as Kafka depicts it, of the epiphany by his very being is consis-tent with his descriptions of the manner in which he was consumed by hiscreative impulses. These consuming "Einfalle" provide the basis of his litera-ture.

This epiphanic element in Kafka's thought will later aid us in an orienta-tion of his aphoristic production in the tension between epiphanic andimpressionistic moments which characterize the extremes of aphoristic pro-duction among Kafka's Austrian contemporaries. Further aspects of Kafka'sthought which align it with the thought characteristic of aphorists could bementioned here: for example his tendency toward the contra-diction and re-interpretation of conventional conceptions and values. This analysis, how-ever, is best reserved for the chapter dealing with typical forms and tenden-cies in Kafka's aphorisms themselves. The final task of the present chapter isthe portrayal of an overview of Kafka's crisis of language, sketching itsrelevance for his aphoristic production, and its relationship to the "Sprach-kritik'' of his Austrian contemporaries.

IV. Kafka's Aphorisms and the Crisis of Communication

In an entry from the fourth Oktavheft dated February 7, 1918, Kafka de-velops a dramatic dialogue in which the self discusses with itself its own"internal command." The concluding remarks of this dialogue summarizeconcisely many of the issues addressed above, embedding them in an over-riding crisis of communication.81

Warum vergleichst du das innere Gebot mit einem Traum? Scheint es wie diesersinnlos, ohne Zusammenhang, unvermeidlich, einmalig, grundlos beglückendoder ängstigend, nicht zur Gänze mitteilbar und zur Mitteilung drängend? (H,111)

Kafka then deals with each of these questions individually, affirming themwithout exception in the response that follows.

Alles das; - sinnlos, denn nur wenn ich ihr nicht folge, kann ich hier bestehn; ohneZusammenhang, ich weiß nicht, wer es gebietet und worauf er abzielt; unvermeid-lich, es trifft mich unvorbereitet und mit der gleichen Überraschung wie dasTräumen den Schlafenden, der doch, da er sich schlafen legte, auf Träume gefaßtsein mußte. Es ist einmalig oder scheint wenigstens so, denn ich kann es nichtbefolgen, es vermischt sich nicht mit dem Wirklichen und behält dadurch seine

I have dealt in some detail with the relationship of Kafka's aphorisms to his crisis ofcommunication in the previously cited article "Suggestive Metaphor: Kafka'sAphorisms and the Crisis of Communication."

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unberührte Einmaligkeit; es beglückt und ängstigt grundlos, allerdings viel selte-ner das erste als das zweite; es ist nicht mitteilbar, weil es nicht faßbar ist und esdrängt zur Mitteilung aus demselben Grunde. (H, 111-2)

Two elements in particular from this description hark back to problemsalready outlined: one of these is the fragmentary connectionlessness of theinternal command, its autonomous existence in and of itself, without refer-ence to some practical goal or contextual whole; the other is the fundamentalparadox that informs the internal command, namely that it cannot be trans-posed into reality, acted out, followed in practice. No bridge exists thatcould link the internal realm from which this command issues with theexternal realm of sensual reality.

This conflict between theory and practice is quite persistent in Kafka'slater works, resurfacing repeatedly in different forms, one of the most prom-inent manifestations being in the parable "Von den Gleichnissen."82 Like theindividual's "internal command," the words of the wiseman in this parablecannot be followed in reality: to adhere to his command "Gehe hinüber"would mean to leave the real, sensual world and enter into one where the selfwould be mere "Gleichnis," i.e. parable or metaphor.83 The irreconcilabilityof the "sagenhaftes Drüben" of parable with the here and now of reality ishighlighted in the dialogue which follows the initial exposition. The firstspeaker insists that one need only follow the parables to become a parableoneself and hence be freed of one's daily toil. A second speaker retorts thatthis command is itself a parable, implying that it is thus not implementable,hence underscoring the split between parabolic and real worlds. The fact thatthis speaker can "win" only in reality further emphasizes the impossiblity oftranscending reality and entering the "sagenhaftes Drüben." In this sense, theirreconcilability of the dialogic partners reflects the irreconcilability of thepositions they represent.

The reflection on the internal command of the individual from 1918 andthe parable "Von den Gleichnissen" from 1922 are connected, in addition tothe similarity of this central problem, by some common stylistic or formalfeatures. Most prominent among these is the dialogic situation which struc-tures each of these texts. This form has the· advantage that it presents on a

For the text of this parable, which I shall not quote here, see BeK, 96.See Sokel, "Language and Truth in the Two Worlds of Franz Kafka," pp. 379-80;for other related interpretations of this parable, see Helmut Arntzen, "Franz Kafka,Von den Gleichnissen," Literatur im Zeitalter der Information, Athenäum Paper-backs Germanistik, 5 (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1971), pp. 86-92; Beda Allemann,"Kafka, Von den Gleichnissen," ZfdtPh, 83 (1964), 106-12; I.Strohschneider-Kohrs, "Erzähllogik und Verstehensprozeß in Kafkas Gleichnis Von den Gleichnis-sen," Probleme des Erzählens in der Weltliteratur: Festschrift für Kate Hamburger,ed. Fritz Martini (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1971), pp. 303-29.

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structural level the conflict of communication which is the thematic thrust ofboth texts. Inability to communicate, then, is in the case of both these worksrelated to the unbridgeable gap which separates external and internal realms,sensual world and internal command, "Gleichnis" and reality. This,moreover, is identical with the conflict between "epistemological idealism"and "practical realism" to which Fritz Mauthner attributed the impetus to his"Sprachkritik. "84

We have repeatedly observed that epistemological conflicts ultimatelyexpress themselves as conflicts of expression or communication for Kafka.This is true for the years prior to his aphoristic period, as it is for the yearsafterward as well. As with his Austrian contemporaries, crises of knowledgetook the form of crises of communication for Kafka.85 Linguistic truth forKafka, as for his fellow Austrians, consisted in "the perfect adaequatio be-tween word and feeling, between linguistic sign and inner being."86 ForKafka and his Austrian contemporaries, identification of language with therealm of the sensual and empirical led to a problematization of the adaequatiotheory of truth. This is the basis for Kafka's condemnation of language inthis, one of his most famous aphorisms.

Die Sprache kann für alles außerhalb der sinnlichen Welt nur andeutungsweise,aber niemals auch nur annähernd vergleichsweise gebraucht werden, da sie, ent-sprechend der sinnlichen Welt, nur vom Besitz und seinen Beziehungen handelt.(aph.57)

Despite what appears to be a scathing indictment of language because of itsinherent limitations, Kafka recognizes one possible manner in which lan-guage might be applied to the non-sensual realm, to the "inner" world andthe "inner command" of the individual. Such language would be applied not"vergleichsweise," but rather "andeutungsweise," suggestively. It is my hy-pothesis that Kafka's turn to the form of the aphorism in 1917-8 reflects hisattempts to evolve a literary practice which would conform to the "sugges-tive" use of language for communication of the internally "transcendent." Inthis sense, Kafka's aphorisms correspond to new insights arrived at in theZiirau period, and they manifest a marked shift in Kafka's attempts to evolvea literary practice sufficient to the incommunicable nature of his internalcommand.

84 Fritz Mauthner, Prager Jugendjahre, pp. 220 f; cf. chapter two above.85 On Kafka and the Sprachkrise, see Heintz, Spracbreflexion als dichterische Einbil-

dungskraft, pp. 10 & 23-6; Susanne Kessler, Kafka - Poetik der sinnlichen Welt:Strukturen sprachkritischen Erzählens, pp. 5-10; Kurz, Traum-Schrecken, p. 197;and the articles by Sokel, "Language and Truth in the Two Worlds of FranzKafka," and "Kafka's Poetics of the Inner Self."

86 Sokel, "Kafka's Poetics of the Inner Self," p. 39.

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We have already seen that for numerous authors of the Austrian Jahrhun-dertwende the struggle with language culminated in the paradoxical attemptto overcome language through language itself. What Hofmannsthal soughtto accomplish through the "mask" of sixteenth-century rhetoric, andMauthner through his metaphorical abandon, aphorists like Kraus and Witt-genstein attempted to achieve through the application of the aphorism as acritical "metalanguage" which communicated indirectly by means of its in-ternal structure. During his aphoristic period Kafka too turned to the apho-rism as a form of indirect communication, seeking to overcome the crisis ofcommunication which had plagued him throughout his entire life. Insofar ashe turns to the suggestive use of language, Kafka's solution resembles themethod of indirect communication practiced by Kierkegaard, whose worksKafka read in the Ziirau period. At the same time, his appropriation ofaphoristic form at this time betrays Kafka's insight into the potentials andpossibilities of this means of expression.

In order to elucidate the manner in which certain aphoristic texts embodyan overcoming of this crisis of communication, and thus represent com-munication of the incommunicable, we must examine Kafka's deliberationson metaphor as trope. After all, aphorism 57 indicts the tendency of lan-guage to operate "vergleichsweise"; and the wiseman's words in "Von denGleichnissen" are denounced for being mere "metaphor." As early as thenovella "Beschreibung eines Kampfes" Kafka had objected to the substitu-tion of "zufällige Namen," that is, of unusual metaphors, for the "wahrhaf-tige Namen der Dinge" (BeK, 43). Such substitution elicits "dieses Fieber,diese Seekrankheit auf festem Lande" (BeK, 43) which the protagonist ex-periences. The unavoidability of metaphor, of course, is indicated by thevery application of this trope in its own condemnation. Yet the problemwith such fortuitous names is not that they are not appropriate, but ratherthat they are incomprehensible. Thus instead of communicating the subjec-tive impression of the speaker, they merely complete his isolation within hisown subjectivity. In other words, metaphor might indeed be able to de-scribe, but never communicate the subjective aspect of experience. Thus thesupplicant in Kafka's story, in whom this crisis takes place, appears to be thattype of "intuitive" individual, whose intuitions Nietzsche, in the essay"Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn," explicitly defined asincommunicable: "für sie [die Intuitionen] ist das Wort nicht gemacht, derMensch verstummt, wenn er sie sieht, oder redet in lauter verbotenenMetaphern und unerhörten Begriffsfügungen" (Werke, III, 321). Such for-bidden metaphors, such "zufällige Namen" which undermine the conven-tions by which the significance of signs is established, remain individual andincommunicable.

The opposite extreme, or language employed strictly within the context

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of social convention, is just as insufficient from Kafka's perspective (see BeK,44). For while it permits communication, it does not allow for the communi-cation of anything that is individual, of anything that would, so to speak,extend beyond what is allowable within the given conventions of communi-cation. Thus at this extreme one falls into cliche, or into the reiteration ofwhat has already been established and is mutually understood prior to the actof communication.87

In this early novella Kafka indicts two polar extremes of language, onlyone of which he identifies with metaphor. In the attack on metaphor ex-pressed some years later, in December 1921, metaphor appears as the indica-tion of linguistic insufficiency in both the spiritualist and naturalist poles ofexpression.

Aus einem Brief: "Ich wärme mich daran in diesem traurigen Winter." Die Meta-phern sind eines in dem vielen, was mich am Schreiben verzweifeln läßt. DieUnselbständigkeit des Schreibens, die Abhängigkeit vdn dem Dienstmädchen, daseinheizt, von der Katze, die sich am Ofen wärmt, selbst vom armen alten Men-schen, der sich wärmt. Alles dies sind selbständige, eigengesetzliche Verrichtun-gen, nur das Schreiben ist hilflos, wohnt nicht in sich selbst, ist Spaß und Ver-zweiflung. (T, 550-1)

If in "Beschreibung eines Kampfes" Kafka had criticized metaphor becauseof its tendency to free itself from conventionalized and accepted ways ofdescribing reality, here he inverts this evaluation, attacking metaphor pre-cisely for its overt dependence on the physical, sensual world of perception.Because of this lack of autonomy, metaphor, or the reference of the non-sensual to the world of the sensual, inherently implies a reduction of theinternal and intuitive - the meta-physical - to the sphere of the physicallyexperienceable. Kafka objects precisely to the mediative function ofmetaphor, its position between the internal individual and external reality. Ifwe recall here Kafka's diagnosis of his own problematical situation as onedefined by the crisis of the in-between, then we can begin to understand howthe critique of metaphor - and, by explicit association, that of language and"writing" - relates to the crisis of individual and community portrayedabove. Yet disguised within this critique there lie hidden the possibilities of asolution to the problem: for if metaphor as trope is guilty of demeaning theinternal command of the individual by referring it to the realm of empiricalexperience, then one way out is presented by the conscious uprooting ofmetaphor from this referentiality. This process, of course, would be inti-mately related to the "absolutization" of metaphor which occurs throughout

Sokel has identified these two linguistic extremes with what he terms the"spiritualist" and "naturalist" poles of Kafka's entire existence, "Language andTruth," p. 374.

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Kafka's works. There is yet, however, a new dimension in this uprootedapplication of metaphor, described succinctly in aphorism 57 as the applica-tion of language "andeutungsweise," and not "vergleichsweise." Thestrategy of numerous aphoristic texts by Kafka from 1917 onward is exactlysuch a "suggestive" application of metaphorical language, employed in thesearch for a possible avenue out of the crisis of communication.

Before examining examples of aphoristic texts which embody such sug-gestive metaphors, it is informative to compare Kafka's conclusions aboutmetaphor with thoughts expressed by Nietzsche in "Über Wahrheit undLüge im außermoralischen Sinn." Nietzsche, an important precursor of theAustrian "Sprachkritiker" of the turn of the century, denies that there can beany adequate expression of an object in a subject. He terms such adequateexpression "ein widerspruchsvolles Unding," adding:

denn zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären, wie zwischen Subjekt undObjekt, gibt es keine Kausalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, sondernhöchstens ein ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Übertragung [em-phasis added], eine nachstammelnde Übersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache:wozu es aber jedenfalls einer frei dichtenden und frei erfindenden Mittelsphäre undMittelkraft bedarf. (Werke, III, 317)

Nietzsche, at least, seeks to distill certain virtues out of this creative "middle-sphere" which for Kafka was the crux of his lament. For Nietzsche therejection of adaequatio calls forth the highlighting of a peculiarly aestheticattitude: a faltering trans-lation, a suggestive meta-phorization supplants theone-to-one correspondence of reference between subject and object.

It remains for us to discuss the manner in which certain aphoristic textsby Kafka demonstrate a move toward creative appropriation of the "Mittel-sphäre" and "Mittelkraft" which he diagnosed as the home of metaphor. Wemust keep in mind that Kafka's goal in his literature was the expression ofthe internal command of the individual, something which by nature seemedto him to be ineffable. He depicts the paradoxical drive toward the com-munication of this incommunicable essence in a letter to Milena: "ich suchenur immerfort etwas Nicht-Mitteilbares mitzuteilen, etwas Unerklärbareszu erklären, von etwas zu erzählen, was ich in den Knochen habe und wasnur in diesen Knochen erlebt werden kann" (BM, 296). The ineffable thatKafka seeks to express resides "in his bones," i. e. in the internal sphere of hisvery being.88 An aphorism from Kafka's miscellaneous fragments depicts theinterrelatedness of this issue with the problem of perspective.

Was baust du? - Ich will einen Gang graben. Es muß ein Fortschritt geschehn. Zuhoch oben ist mein Standort. (H, 386-7)

Kurz also emphasizes Kafka's drive for the expression of the essence of his ownexistence, Traum-Schrecken, pp. 194—200.

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In a typical aphoristic inversion, Kafka reverses the traditional notion thatincreased height and distance afford one a better perspective. The reflectionimmediately following this one in Kafka's notebooks points to the relation-ship of the requirement of an internal perspective with Kafka's crisis ofcommunication.

Wir graben den Schacht von Babel. (H, 387)

If the tower of Babel signifies humankind's striving for a heavenly, divineperspective on life, then the "pit" of Babel represents the desire for an inter-nal perspective on existence. Simultaneously, the reference to "Babel" al-ludes to the fact that the digging of the pit of Babel will most certainly befrustrated by linguistic confusion. The insufficiency of language for such atask is implied in the very image Kafka chooses.

If language is indeed not equal to the communication of one's internalperspective, why not just remain silent? While this was the option Chandoschose, Kafka emphasizes that one is driven to the attempt to communicatethe ineffable. One alternative with which Kafka experimented in his aphoris-tic texts from the Oktavhefte was the uprooting of metaphor from strictreferentiality and its employment suggestively to hint at the structural es-sence of this internal world of the individual. When applied this way thecomparative function of metaphor reverts to indirect implication. The fol-lowing texts are exemplary of what I designate here as suggestive metaphor.

Kein Tropfen überfließt und für keinen Tropfen ist mehr Platz. (H, 99)Noch spielen die Jagdhunde im Hof, aber das Wild entgeht ihnen nicht, so sehr esjetzt schon durch die Wälder jagt. (aph. 43)Eine durch Schritte nicht tief ausgehöhlte Treppenstufe ist, von sich selber ausgesehen, nur etwas öde zusammengefügtes Hölzernes, (aph. 59)Leoparden brechen in den Tempel ein und saufen die Opferkrüge leer; das wieder-holt sich immer wieder; schließlich kann man es vorausberechnen, und es wird einTeil der Zeremonie, (aph. 20)Wie ein Weg im Herbst: Kaum ist er rein gekehrt, bedeckt er sich wieder mit dentrockenen Blättern, (aph. 15)

Kafka's dilemma lay in the tension between the recognition that the internalworld could only be lived, not described, and the conflicting drive to com-municate precisely this internal world. The aphorisms cited above representan attempt to overcome this problem insofar as they apply non-referentialmetaphors to show the essential structural patterns of his internal crises. Inthis sense Kafka's turn to the aphorism is related to Wittgenstein's motiva-tion for employing aphoristic expression in the Tractates; for the aphorismparadigmatically represents a mode of expression which shows within itsown structural patterns relationships about which it cannot directly speak.Aphorism 59, by way of example, "says" something about the uselessness ofa wooden step that has not been hollowed out by wear. If, however, we

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analyze the structural relationship inscribed within this "absolute" metaphor,we come to an understanding of this text as a metaphorical enciphering inparticular guise of a general problem relating to the relationship of an indi-vidual to a community. Viewed from its own perspective, a step which isnot a link between other steps, thus functioning as a bridge from one point toanother, appears to be wholly useless. The particular "metaphor" manifestsstructurally this general problematic. One might be tempted to relate thismetaphor to Kafka's "unused" Judaism or to the uselessness of a life in whichintense individuality estranges one from any form of community. But thetext itself gives no reasons why it should be restricted to these interpreta-tions; indeed, to do so would be tantamount to limiting this text to thestifling referentiality which Kafka explicitly condemned in metaphor and sopainstakingly sought to avoid. Wittgenstein's claim about the linguistic "im-age," then, is valid for this text, as it is for the other aphorisms whichemploy suggestive metaphor. "Das Bild kann jede Wirklichkeit abbilden,deren Form es hat" (7V, 2.171, emphasis added). In these metaphoricalaphoristic texts Kafka, like Wittgenstein, turns to a Gestalt conception ofstructure in order to show the structure of his internal dilemmas, suggestingmetaphorically what cannot be expressed in direct referential terms.89 Con-forming to Kafka's conception of an ineffable internal transcendent, thesetexts seek to hint at the essence of this internal transcendent by manifestingits Gestalt structure in the structure of the text itself. The virtue of suchsuggestive metaphor is that it communicates, while compromising neitherthe individuality of the author's internal command, nor the individuality ofthe reader. In other words, it allows for individual associations with thestructure of the internal individual both in the creative and receptive spheres.

Kafka's programmatic statement expressed in September 1917, at theinception of his aphoristic period, describing the artistic goal he set forhimself at this time should be understood in the context of the argumentsmade above.

Zeitweilige Befriedigung kann ich von Arbeiten wie "Landarzt" noch haben, vor-ausgesetzt, daß mir etwas Derartiges noch gelingt (sehr unwahrscheinlich). Glückaber nur, falls ich die Welt ins Reine, Wahre, Unveränderliche heben kann. (T,534)

If the goal of Wittgenstein and the logical positivists was to discover thepure, true, unchanging structures of logic as they operated in language and in

89 Kafka was a student at Prague University when Christian von Ehrenfels, thefounder and propagator of the theory of Gestalt in Austria, taught there. On thedissemination of the concept of Gestalt in Austrian letters, see William Johnston,The Austrian Mind, pp. 146 & 154; on Kafka's probable awareness of the conceptof Gestalt, see Peter Neesen, Vom Loumezirkel zum Prozeß: Frank Kafka und diePsychologie Franz Brentanos, pp. 15 & 124-31.

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the world, then Kafka sought in his aphoristic phase to communicate thepure, true, unchanging structures of his existence, employing suggestivemetaphors to show their essence.

The relevance of this literary practice for the evolution of Kafka's para-bolic style will be taken up in the final chapter of this investigation. The nextchapter is concerned with an examination of the various sources throughwhich Kafka might have become aware of the applicability of aphoristicexpression for his own artistic endeavors. This will help us explain anddescribe the proximity of Kafka's aphorisms, and of his "aphoristic" solutionto the crisis of communication, to those of his contemporary Austrianaphorists, as well as to other representatives of the aphoristic tradition inGermany.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Kafka and his Aphoristic Precursors

"Jeder Künstler ist von Ändern beeinflußt worden undzeigt die Spuren dieser Beeinflussung in seinen Werken;aber was er uns bedeutet, ist doch nur seine Persönlich-keit. Was vom Ändern stammt, können nur Eierschalensein. Daß sie da sind, mögen wir mit Nachsicht behan-deln, aber unsere geistige Nahrung werden sie nicht."Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen

The validity of analyses of "influence" and "source" studies has justifiablybeen called into question by contemporary literary theory. With the adventof conceptions of literary reception, however, the entire issue of influencehas been reintroduced, albeit on a theoretically more substantial and sophisti-cated level. The positivistic conception of literary "sources" tended to viewcreative writers as the looters of cognitive store-fronts: ideas were madeavailable in the texts of prior writers much as if they were consumer goodslaid out for perusal in display windows; one needed only make off quietlywith the treasured find. This smacks, if I may be permitted to remain withinmy somewhat irreverent conceit, of a Platonic idealism gone rowdy: ideasare objects that can be possessed, they are easily transferrable without altera-tion from one "owner" to another. Looking for a more positive metaphor,one might present "source" ideas as a kind of olympic torch, passed on fromwriter to writer as they carry on and reaffirm the traditions of the past.Regardless of which metaphor one chooses, the basic conception remains thesame: ideas are somehow born eternal and unalterable, made available to betransported through history by means of literary (and other) texts. The ideasthemselves remain ideologically "pure" and "true," never in need of criticalrevision, or indeed, of interpretation.

To be sure, I have rhetorically overstated the issue here, but, it seems tome, with some justification: for what is constantly suppressed in positivisticanalyses of "sources" is precisely the very basic act of interpretation inherentin the appropriation by one writer of "ideas" expressed by another. Thosefamiliar with the course of Kafka-scholarship might be surprised by thepersistence with which positivistic approaches have been able to assert them-selves in this area. This is largely due to the intimate intertwining of litera-ture and life in Kafka's works. Yet as much as reconstruction of Kafka'sintellectual life - to the extent that any form of "authentic" reconstruction ispossible at all - has contributed to scholarship on Kafka, it remains insig-nificant as long as problems of interpretation are bracketed out where this

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process of transferral is concerned. German hermeneutical theory, and theaesthetics of reception which it spawned, reintroduce conscious acts of in-terpretation into the question of "influence" studies. Most importantly, thesetheoretical directions problematize the very moment of transferral in whichone author is "influenced" by another: the moment of reception is deter-mined, after all, as much by the interpretations of the receiver as by what isreceived. The hermeneutical dialectic of mutual interaction and interpretive"play" of horizons is fundamental to an adequate theory of influence asreception. In such a conception "influence" flows in two directions: from thetext to the reader, as in traditional notions of influence; but also from thereader to the text, so that each reader confronts a different version of the text,one whose significance is altered, so to speak, in every act of reception.

Only in the context of an aesthetics of reception can one discuss thepotential "influences" on Kafka's conception of nature and purpose ofaphoristic discourse and on his aphoristic style. In each instance where such"influence" is sought, one must remain cognizant of the fact that Kafka inturn "influences" each of those whose influence we seek on him. This im-plies that at the moment Kafka begins to be integrated into the tradition andhistory of aphoristic expression in Germany, as this study attempts to ac-complish, the horizon of that tradition and history itself begins to change. Inother words, Kafka is not merely the heir to this tradition, but simultaneous-ly a reverse benefactor; for given the horizon of his aphoristic writings, theaphoristic texts of his predecessors take on new meanings. I have chosen thephrase "aphoristic precursors" to designate this intricate and delicate dialecti-cal relationship obtaining between Kafka's aphoristic production and thehistory and tradition of the aphorism to which he had access. I thus apply theword "precursor" in the sense introduced by Jorge Luis Borges in hismemorable essay "Kafka and his Precursors."

In the critics' vocabulary, the word "precursor" is indispensable, but it should becleansed of all connotations of polemics or rivalry. The fact is that every writercreates his own precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past as it willmodify the future.1

Borges, of course, is most concerned with the extent to which Kafka hasaltered our understanding of writers of the past. To the degree that this istrue, all those who wrote prior to Kafka are his precursors. In other words,with regard to the interpretive horizon of the critic of Kafka, all literature

' Jorge Luis Borges, "Kafka and his Precursors," Labyrinths: Selected Stories andOther Writings, ed. and trans. Donald A. Yates, et al., New Directions Paper-book, 186 (New York: New Directions, 1962), p. 201.

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takes on a new significance in relation to Kafka's texts. On another level,considering Kafka as the reader and critic of other writers, his readings areshaped by his own person and his own literature. These two interpretiveplanes justify a dual approach to the investigation of Kafka and his aphoristicprecursors: on the one hand, the work of aphorists, for whom no evidence ofreception on Kafka's part can be documented, can be examined with an eyefor the dialectic of mutual creation and determination obtaining betweenKafka's aphorisms and those of his aphoristic predecessors; on the otherhand, one can investigate concretely Kafka's reception of aphoristic writingsand writers in an attempt to understand the motivations and strategies be-hind his aphoristic impulse through interpretations of his acts of reception.

In these two possibilities are outlined the two directions in which theanalyses of the present chapter will proceed. Kafka's reception of the apho-risms and aphoristic methods of such writers as Kierkegaard, Pascal, Fried-rich Hebbel, and Karl Kraus will be documented and examined. Parallel tothis we will attempt to orient Kafka's aphoristic production in the history ofthe aphorism as form, referring to such aphorists as Lichtenberg andNietzsche, for whom questions of reception on Kafka's part cannot be con-cretely demonstrated, and where, hence, questions of "influence" remainspeculative, rather than strictly receptive.

I. Aphorism and Autobiography:Self-Observation and Self-Projection

Kafka's predilection for autobiographical documents has frequently beenremarked upon. However, it has commonly been overlooked that in sig-nificant instances the autobiographical works for which Kafka displayed themost interest tended toward the application of aphoristic discourse in theirattempts at self-portrayal. Since its very inception in the Sudelbiicber ofLichtenberg, aphoristic expression in the German tradition has been associ-ated with the tendency toward "Selbstbeobachtung," or objectification ofthe subjective. Kafka's aphoristic "sources" tended for the most part toreflect this predilection for self-observation, and this, not surprisingly, hassignificant consequences for his reception and ultimate application ofaphoristic expression. While Kafka's reception of certain collections ofaphorisms occurs quite early in his life - in 1904 - the dimension of self-portrayal which permeates these early "sources" finds profound expressionin Kafka's aphorisms composed between 1917 and 1920. The Oktavhefte, ofcourse, are intimately related to Kafka's diaries, and they demonstratenumerous traits which align them closely with autobiography in the form of

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the diary.2 The pervasiveness of diary-like self-expression in Kafka'saphoristic notebooks provides us with an initial fixed point in our attempt toorient his aphoristic production in the tradition and history of aphoristicexpression. However, instead of generalizing at this point about the relation-ships between aphorisms and "diary," we shall begin with a concrete exami-nation of Kafka's responses to the earliest aphoristic works he read, all ofwhich fall into the category of aphorism and autobiography.

The earliest documentable contact that Kafka had with a collection ofaphorisms is his reading of the "Sprüche" - this is the word Kafka uses todescribe them - of Marcus Aurelius. In a letter to Oskar Pollak from January1904, Kafka depicts the tremendous effect that these dicta had upon him.

Ich schiebe den Marc Aurel zur Seite, ich schiebe ihn schwer zur Seite. Ich glaube,ich könnte jetzt ohne ihn nicht leben, denn schon zwei, drei Sprüche, im MarcAurel gelesen, machen gefaßter und straffer, wenn auch das ganze Buch nur voneinem erzählt, der mit klugem Wort und hartem Hammer und weitem Ausblicksich zu einem beherrschten, ehernen, aufrechten Menschen machen möchte. Aberman muß gegen einen Menschen ungläubig werden, wenn man immerfort hört,wie er zu sich redet: "Sei doch ruhig, sei doch gleichgültig, gib die Leidenschaftendem Wind, sei doch standfest, sei doch ein guter Kaiser!" Gut ist es, wenn mansich vor sich selbst mit Worten zuschütten kann, aber noch besser ist es, wenn mansich mit Worten ausschmücken und behängen kann, bis man ein Mensch wird, wieman es im Herzen wünscht, (ßr, 25-6)

Kafka describes in positive terms the effect that these "Sprüche" had on him,making him "gefaßter und straffer," that is, serving as a kind of spiritualsustenance. Yet while praising the impact of "zwei, drei Sprüche," he simul-taneously has some reservations about the overall tenor of the book. Kafkaobjects to the self-control and apparent self-determination with which Au-relius mastered his own life through words: he is sceptical of this use oflanguage ("sich vor sich selbst mit Worten zuschütten") as a defense againstone's own self-detrimental impulses. Such language is self-dialogic, i. e. usedby the self to communicate with the self, and employed as a form of re-straint, as a defense against one's own weaknesses. Thus, as the examplesKafka supplies demonstrate, it is a language of imperatives directed at theself. On the other hand, Kafka recognizes a use of words that is quite differ-ent and even more valuable: one in which words are "worn" as jewels or asornaments, functioning not merely to restrain the impulses of the self, but toactually transform the self. No longer a form of entrenchment against nega-tive assaults by the self on the self, language now functions as a medium forshaping the self according to the desires of one's heart - language as a means

2 See Hartmut Binder, Kafka in neuer Sicht, p. 79; Binder relates the Oktavhefte toKafka's diaries and he notes that these texts mark a new phase in the "Auseinan-dersetzung .. . mit sich selbst."

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for self-transfiguration. While perceiving both of these possiblities in Au-relius' dicta, Kafka was most profoundly impressed by the option of self-transfiguration through language; and his portrayal of the effect of thesedicta upon him implies that this transformational power seeps through to thereader of these texts in the act of reception. Kafka, after all, describes himselfas one who is transformed, made "gefaßter und straffer," through this act ofreading.

In Kafka's reception of this, his initial source of access to the discourse ofthe aphorism, we discover his concrete response to, and appraisal of, mod-ified versions of what I have designated as the aphorism of impression andthat of epiphany. The first defines aphoristic expression in its ornamentalaspect - the attempt to use language as a mask for projecting images orvisions of oneself. The second describes the aphorism in its critical aspect -language applied as a tool for critically dismantling impulses inherent inothers or in the self. In Kafka's reception of Aurelius' dicta, both drives areperceived to have the self as object, one functioning as a means of self-projection, the other as self-restraint. As Kafka's final statement with regardto Aurelius' dicta indicates, he held the second possibility to be "good," yetthe first to be even "better." However, the most significant aspect of Kafka'sconcluding remark is the manner in which it is formulated. The generality ofthis statement, abstracted from this particular act of reception, and its rhetor-ical and apodictic power lend it an air of the aphoristic. Freed from thecontext in which it occurs, it could easily stand as an aphoristic utterance inits own right. Among the structural devices it applies, parallelism and inten-sification are typical of aphoristic expression, and in this instance they serveto highlight the contrastive conceptions of the uses of language which Kafkapresents here. The reception of Aurelius' "Sprüche," then, extends wellbeyond the conceptual for Kafka and into the realm of the stylistic: in hisown recorded reception of these texts his style betrays the subliminal influ-ence of the rhetorical power and control of Aurelius' dicta. In other words,in his own receptive commentary on these aphoristic writings Kafka can becaught in the act of (unconsciously) imitating their aphoristic style.

One scholar has made the claim that in general Kafka was affected moreby the style of the things he read than he was by their content.3 In the aboveexample this assertion seems to hold. But one must add that content is notinsignificant to Kafka. Indeed, it would be more correct to say that heconceives content and style in essential interrelation to one another, and that- at least in instances where the writing is authentic, i. e. where style andcontent are mutually compatible and complementary - to reproduce the style

Franz Kuna, "Rage for Verification: Kafka and Einstein," On Kafka: Semi-Cente-nary Perspectives, ed. F. Kuna (London: Paul Elek, 1976), p. 87.

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of a writer is tantamount to reproducing the substance of his writing. Thishypothesis, while perhaps not generally applicable to every individual act ofreception carried out by Kafka, is certainly valid for his reception of texts ofaphoristic character. The previous example, combined with the examplesthat are yet to follow, will clearly demonstrate that the assertion made byMalcolm Pasley, to the effect that one cannot speak of literary "sources" forKafka's writing because he was influenced more by the physical conditionsof the act of writing than by the conscious manipulation of literary models,cannot be upheld.4 At the very least one must admit that every act of recep-tion has a conscious and unconscious component. While Pasley to someextent is justified in his assertion that Kafka's writing process was steered byunconscious drives, there is no reason to exclude factors of unconsciouslyaccepted reception within this category. Indeed, Kafka's remarks about Au-relius' dicta provide a clear instance in which the conscious conceptual re-sponses to the texts and their substance are complemented by an unconsciousreceptivity to the form and style in which they are composed.

These unconscious, formal influences which derive from the receptive actare of special significance for Kafka, since, as he himself once indicated, hewas particularly susceptible to the style of things he read: he tended toimitate their style, especially when writing in response to them. In a letter toOttla from 1919 (BO, 66), Kafka made the exceedingly minor change ofcrossing out the word "allerdings" and substituting for it the word "aber."5

He makes the following parenthetical commentary in response to thischange: "Nebenbei: dieses überschriebene 'aber' ist ganz interessant, es istoffenbar wie auch das Mit-Bleistift-schreiben eine Nachahmung Deiner Art. . ." (BÖ, 66). He continues by explaining that certain phrases which regu-larly occur in Ottla's letters strike him as being typical of her style; anddespite the fact that they are "gutes Deutsch" (BO, 67), Kafka understandsthem as translations from the Czech. On the one hand this points to Kafka'shypersensitivity where matters of written style are concerned, a sensitivitythat sees translations from the Czech in phrases that are nothing but "goodGerman." This implies, in addition, Kafka's imaginative ability to project aconception of the writer into the texts that he reads, even when they areletters from his sister. Moreover, and most importantly, we witness howKafka diagnoses his own unconscious temptation to imitate not only traits ofOttla's style, but also the physical properties of the act of writing itself(manifested in the desire to write in pencil rather than pen, a trait characteris-

Pasley, "Der Schreibakt und das Geschriebene," p. 15.See Hartmut Binder's commentary on this letter in his edition of Kafka's corre-spondence with Ottla, BO, 187.

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tic of Ottla's letters).6 This process, which was probably present in each andevery one of Kafka's acts of reception, is especially obvious in his reactions tothe aphoristic texts he read. Unconsciously, as we will continue to see, heappropriates the discursive method of the aphorism as employed by some ofhis aphoristic precursors.

By far the most transparent example of this is evident in Kafka's responseto the diaries of Friedrich Hebbel. Alone Kafka's intense interest in thesedocuments is of central importance for our investigation, for these diariescomprise one of the most voluminous collections of aphorisms by any writerof German since Lichtenberg. Kafka owned these texts in the four-volumecritical edition put together by Richard Maria Werner.7 Moreover, as MaxBrod reported (FK, 99), these diaries ranked among Kafka's most belovedbooks. Some of the reasons for this become transparent if we examine Kaf-ka's commentary made upon his first complete reading of these texts. Likethe reception of Aurelius' "Sprüche," Kafka's response to Hebbel'sTagebücher can be found in a letter to Oskar Pollak, again from the year1904, and written a mere two weeks or so after the reading of Aurelius.Kafka's reactions to Hebbel's aphoristic diaries must be cited here at somelength so that both his enthusiasm as well as the style and substantive tenorof his remarks come to the fore.

[I]ch [habe] Hebbels Tagebücher (an 1800 Seiten) in einem Zuge gelesen, währendich früher immer nur kleine Stückchen herausgebissen hatte, die mir ganz ge-schmacklos vorkamen. Dennoch fing ich es im Zusammenhange an, ganz spiele-risch anfangs, bis mir aber endlich so zu Mute wurde wie einem Höhlenmenschen,der zuerst im Scherz und in langer Weile einen Block vor den Eingang seinerHöhle wälzt, dann aber, als der Block die Höhle dunkel macht und von der Luftabsperrt, dumpf erschrickt und mit merkwürdigem Eifer den Stein wegzuschiebensucht. Der aber ist jetzt zehnmal schwerer geworden und der Mensch muß inAngst alle Kräfte spannen, ehe wieder Licht und Luft kommt. Ich konnte ebenkeine Feder in die .Hand nehmen während dieser Tage, denn wenn man so einLeben überblickt, das sich ohne Lücke wieder und wieder höher türmt, so hoch,daß man es kaum mit seinen Fernrohren erreicht, da kann das Gewissen nicht zurRuhe kommen. Aber es tut gut, wenn das Gewissen breite Wunden bekommt,denn dadurch wird es empfindlicher für jeden Biß. Ich glaube, man sollte über-haupt nur solche Bücher lesen, die einen beißen und stechen. Wenn das Buch, daswir lesen, uns nicht mit einem Faustschlag auf den Schädel weckt, wozu lesen wirdann das Buch? . . . Wir brauchen aber die Bücher, die auf uns wirken wie einUnglück, das uns sehr schmerzt, wie der Tod eines, den wir lieber hatten als uns,wie wenn wir in Wälder verstoßen würden, von allen Menschen weg, wie einSelbstmord, ein Buch muß die Axt sein für das gefrorene Meer in uns. Das glaubeich. (Brt 27-8).

6 See Binder's remarks about this phenomenon in the "Editionsbericht" to thiscorrespondence, BO, 221.

7 See Klaus Wagenbach, "Kafkas Handbibliothek," Franz Kafka: Eine Biographieseiner Jugend, p. 257.

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As is typical of Kafka, it is the life he finds depicted in these documentswhich makes the greatest impression on him. The metaphor of the cavemanwho encloses himself in his cave suggests various things. On the one hand itmight be interpreted as an indication that Kafka felt the proper response tothese diaries would be to lock himself away and initiate similar reflections onhimself and his life. This is implied as well in one of the later metaphorsemployed by Kafka - that feeling of being banished to a forest far away fromall other human beings. The pangs of conscience of which Kafka writes,then, would spring from comparison of one's own life and activities withthose described by Hebbel. The "prodding" and "biting" of these diariesconsists for Kafka in the demands that they force him to place on himself;above all, this is the demand to create through writing a life that is so high asonly to be perceptible by means of a telescope. The death of a dear friend andthe suicide to which Kafka refers are actually one and the same: they suggestthe metaphorical death of the former self and the subsequent establishmentthrough language of a new, rejuvenated or transmogrified self. Thismetamorphosis would not, strictly speaking, entail a transformation of theempirical self, but rather its transfiguration into a literary self. Such transfor-mation presented itself to Kafka in the dicta of Aurelius and in the aphoristicdiaries of Hebbel. The ax that would free Kafka's "frozen sea" would alsopermit the inception of a creative literary flow in which the textualization,the making-literary of the self could occur.8 In this sense it is not so muchHebbel's life, but rather the textualization, i. e. the bringing into written textof his life that most impressed Kafka.

One of the most prominent stylistic-formal features of Hebbel's self-textualization - self-stylization, if you will - is the use of aphoristic dis-course. As we have seen, the aphorism came into some currency in theAustrian Jahrhundertwende in part out of the desire to stylize and mask theself; and we recall Kafka's remarks with regard to Aurelius' aphoristic "or-namentation" of the self. These earliest collections of aphorisms with whichKafka had contact seem to have reinforced in him a notion of the aphorism asan expressive form exploited for self-projection and self-textualization.

Kafka's written response to Hebbel's diaries also includes its ownaphoristic stylization: the intensity of Kafka's emotional response is demon-strated in the series of metaphors with which he attempts to give substanceto his sentiments. But even more telling is the apodictic and paradigmaticallyaphoristic statement with which Kafka's description concludes: "ein Buch

On the images of "frozen sea" and "flow" as metaphors for Kafka's creativeenergies, see Sokel, "Frozen Sea and River of Narration: the Poetics Behind Kaf-ka's 'Breakthrough'," Newsletter of the Kafka Society of America, 7, no. 1 (June,1983), pp. 71-9.

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muß die Axt sein für das gefrorene Meer in uns." Once again, this remarkcould be lifted out of context and viewed as an independent aphorism. Itcontinues the tendency toward expressive, descriptive metaphors endemic tothis passage as a whole; yet here we discover a combination of concision,generalized formulation, and imperative diction which is characteristicallyaphoristic.

We must keep in mind that in the response to Hebbel, as well as in thereaction to Aurelius, Kafka himself is perpetrating his own strategies of self-sty lization; for his responses are recorded not as meditations intended onlyfor the self, but rather are contained in letters to his friend Pollak. Suchstylization of the self is not necessarily restricted, of course, to those exam-ples cited here. On the contrary, as Sokel has argued, all writing for Kafka,whether in letters, diaries, or specifically as literary text, was a response tothe desire to stylize the self.9 What is significant in the cited letters to Pollak isthus not the general phenomenon of self-stylization, but rather Kafka's tend-ency, in imitation of the aphoristic self-textualizations that he was reading,to apply aphoristic diction in his own attempts at self-textualization. Kafka,of course, was struggling at this time to find his own literary voice - and thusto establish his "literary" self - so that his almost automatic imitation ofmodels that impressed him is not too surprising.10 The restriction of thisrather flamboyant epistolary style to the letters addressed to Pollak has led tothe thesis that in them Kafka was making overtures to a respected friend.11

While I am inclined to subscribe to this hypothesis, I would add that Kafka'sstyle was further influenced by the aphoristic aspects of the material he wasreading at this time. In this early period Kafka, through the examples cited,came to associate the rhetorical power of aphoristic diction with attempts tostylize and textualize the self.

Hebbel's Tagebücher remained significant documents for Kafka well be-yond this initial reading in 1904. As an entry in Kafka's own diaries makesclear, he returned to these documents in 1910, the year in which, not coinci-dentally, Kafka himself began to keep a diary on a regular basis. OnNovember 7 of that year Kafka heard a lecture on Hebbel given by PaulWiegler (cf. T, 25). This event apparently stimulated Kafka to re-read thediaries that had impressed him so much six years earlier; and slightly over a

Sokel, Tragik und Ironie, p. 8.See Wagenbach, Franz Kafka: Eine Biographie seiner Jugend, p. 104; Wagenbachsurmises that the style of Kafka's letters at this time reflects his imitation of thestyle of writing typical of the magazine Der Kunstwart. Binder denies the validityof this thesis, Kafka-Handbuch, I, 266-7, and I view the hypothesis I am develop-ing in this section as an alternative to Wagenbach's claim.See Binder, Kafka-Handbuch, l, 266.

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month later, on December 16, 1910, Kafka makes reference to one of theentries in Hebbel's Tagebücher: "Hebbel lobt Justinus Kerners 'Reiseschat-ten'. 'Und solch ein Werk existiert kaum, niemand kennt es'" (T, 28). HereKafka cites entry no. 1651 from Hebbel's diaries; he was apparently seized bythe substance of Hebbel's remark, as well as by the pointedness of its formu-lation. Kafka, as is clear from the passages quoted from the letters of 1904,placed supreme emphasis on the reception of literary works; he is moved andaffirmed in this belief by Hebbel's claim that a literary work which is notknown, i. e. not read, not "constituted" in an act of reception, might as wellnot exist. This remark, while extremely telling in the context of Kafka's laterrequests that his own manuscripts be destroyed, is peripheral in the presentcontext. Much more relevant is the apparent influence that Hebbel's diarieshad on Kafka during his re-reading of them in 1910. Indeed, as a remarkrecorded on the very same day as the reference to Hebbel indicates, hisTagebücher were of seminal importance in shoring up Kafka's resolve stead-fastly to keep a diary of his own.

Ich werde das Tagebuch nicht mehr verlassen. Hier muß ich mich festhalten, dennnur hier kann ich es. Gerne möchte ich das Glücksgefühl erklären, das ich von Zeitzu Zeit wie eben jetzt in mir habe. Es ist wirklich etwas Moussierendes, das michmit leichtem angenehmen Zucken ganz und gar erfüllt und das mir Fähigkeiteneinredet, von deren Nichtvorhandensein ich mich jeden Augenblick, auch jetzt,mit aller Sicherheit überzeugen kann. (T, 28)

Kafka lauds the beneficent effects of keeping a diary, claiming that it offersthe opportunity for him to "hold himself fast" and to convince himself,despite his omnipresent self-doubts, of his literary capabilities. The image oftaking hold of oneself through the act of writing is one which recurs oftenfor Kafka in similar contexts. It alludes here to the possibility of self-defini-tion and of struggle against one's own worst impulses, a tendency that wedocumented in Kafka's response to Aurelius' aphorisms. Hebbel's diariescertainly contributed to Kafka's confidence in the usefulness of the diary as ameans for self-expression. Yet even more telling for our context is a moresubtle reception of HebbePs diaries on Kafka's part which occurs at this time.For it is on the very next day, December 17, 1910, that Kafka composes thefirst independent aphorisms attributable to him.

Zeno sagte auf eine dringliche Frage hin, ob denn nichts ruhe: Ja, der fliegendePfeil ruht. (T, 29)Wenn die Franzosen ihrem Wesen nach Deutsche wären, wie würden sie dann erstvon den Deutschen bewundert sein. (T, 29)

Since we have previously discussed these texts, there is no need to concernourselves with detailed analyses here. My point in citing them again is toindicate the influence Hebbel's diaries, and in particular their aphoristic

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character, had on Kafka once again in 1910. Especially the second text, withits playful reference to the French and German rivalry, could have been aproduct of HebbePs pen; and, in fact, this theme is by no means foreign toHebbel.12 It thus seems indisputable that Hebbel's model was of formativeinfluence both on Kafka's conception of the benefits and purposes of keepinga diary, as well as on purpose and style of his initial aphoristic impulse.

If Hebbel's Tagebücher provided a primary source of access for Kafka tothe traditional styles, forms, techniques, and themes of aphoristic expres-sion, then characterization of these texts can provide us with a first haltingorientation of Kafka's aphoristic impulse within the range of possibilitiesendemic to this genre. One could, in a sense, scarcely think of a better sourcefor an introduction to the traits of aphoristic expression than Hebbel'sdiaries, for among the aphorisms included in this collection one can find allthe various forms, devices, tropes, and themes which are commonly associ-ated with the aphorism. Rudolf Bauer has provided detailed analyses of theaphoristic types that occur in these volumes, and his work need not beduplicated here.13 The most prominent trope employed in HebbePs apho-risms, according to the statistics worked out by Bauer, is metaphor orsimile, evident in nearly half of these texts;14 but other rhetorical figures suchas parallelism, antimetabole, and devices such as word-play and paradox areamply evident in HebbePs aphorisms as well. In other words, in Hebbel'sdiaries Kafka was treated to a potpourri of aphoristic forms, and it is prob-able that Hebbel's model had formative influence on form and structure ofthe aphoristic texts that Kafka composed throughout his life, including theaphorisms of the Oktavhefte and those in the collection "Er."

I will attempt to underscore the potential relationships between Kafka'saphorisms and those of Hebbel by juxtaposing selected texts from eachauthor. I must emphasize, however, that this juxtaposition is not intended toimply that particular texts by Kafka were somehow directly influenced byindividual aphorisms in Hebbel's diaries. My point remains that HebbePsaphorisms served Kafka as a kind of general introduction into the traditionalstructures and applications of this genre. Indeed, it seems to me that suchbroad and generalized "influence" is ultimately of more significance thanparticularized influences of one text on the production of another. Further-more, the following juxtaposition functions as an initial demonstration ofthe fact that Kafka's aphorisms do not occur in a literary-historical vacuum,as has commonly been assumed; rather, they participate in an unconscious

See, for example, entries 188, 3153, 3171, and 4510 in Hebbel's Tagebücher.Rudolf Bauer, "Die Kunstform des Aphorismus in Hebbels Tagebuch," Diss.Vienna 1939; see esp. pp. 152-70.Bauer, p. 166.

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dialogue across historical eras with the aphoristic texts of other writers, aphenomenon that is especially prevalent in this genre.

Vogel und Käfig sind für einander. Aber der Mensch will keinen anderen Käfig, alsdiese Welt. (Hebbel, no. 330)Ein Käfig ging einen Vogel suchen. (Kafka, aph. 16)Das Komische ist die beständige Negation der Natur. (Hebbel, no. 99)Das Böse ist der Sternhimmel des Guten. (H, 90)Die Individualität ist nicht sowohl Ziel, als Weg, und nicht sowohl bester, alseinziger. (Hebbel, no. 491)Es gibt ein Ziel, aber keinen Weg; was wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern, (aph. 26)Die Welt: die große Wunde Gottes. (Hebbel, no. 2663)Baum des Lebens - Herr der Lebens. (H, 101)Es gibt eine Bewegung, dem Abgrund zu, so schnell, daß man sie so wenig mehrbemerkt, wie die der Erde. (Hebbel, no. 5615)Einer staunte darüber, wie leicht er den Weg der Ewigkeit ging; er raste ihnnämlich abwärts, (aph. 38)"Die Sonne geht unter!" heißt es. Die Sprache hält sich gern an die Erscheinung.(Hebbel, no. 5716)Die Sprache kann für alles außerhalb der sinnlichen Welt nur andeutungsweise,aber niemals auch nur annähernd vergleichsweise gebraucht werden, da sie, ent-sprechend der sinnlichen Welt, nur vom Besitz und seinen Beziehungen handelt,(aph. 57)

The thematic similarities which come to light in this juxtaposition reflect theparticipation of both authors in a common aphoristic tradition: reflections ongoal and path, freedom and confinement, good and evil are constants in thework of most aphorists. Moreover, such formal devices as the pseudo-definition and the implied analogy are standard and popular techniques in thetradition of aphoristic expression. Furthermore, the texts cited above displaythe presence of some shared intellectual attitudes, scepticism about the effica-ciousness of language, and the sense of a polarity between appearance andessence.

It is on a general level that Hebbel's Tagebücher help us to elucidateKafka's aphoristic notebooks and aid in a specification of their character vis-a-vis the history of the aphorism as form. The most significant shared mate-rial between Hebbel's Tagebücher and Kafka's Oktavhefte is the combina-tion of diary-like self-reflection, recorded impression, and poignant aphoris-tic utterance. This quality aligns the aphoristic production of both theseauthors closely with that of Lichtenberg, whose Sudelbücher display identi-cal tendencies. In the case of Hebbel, at least, it is known that he prizedLichtenberg's reflections and that, in fact, it was his reading of Lichtenberg'snotebooks that impelled him to keep his own diary.15 Although Kafka him-

Bauer, p. 108; cf. also entries 656 and 3805 in Hebbel's Tagebücher, where refer-ence is made to Lichtenberg.

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self most likely never read Lichtenberg's aphoristic notebooks - Kafka nevermentions Lichtenberg - he remains an indirect "precursor" through themediative vehicle of HebbePs Tagebücher. This preliminary orientation ofKafka's aphoristic production in the history and tradition of the aphorism,then, views Kafka's texts in relation to the self-analytical, diary-like applica-tion of aphoristic discourse in Lichtenberg and Hebbel. Kafka's aphorisms,like those of these "precursors," serve their author as vehicles to self-analysisin the form of "Selbstbeobachtung," i.e. objectification of the subjective.This includes, of course, the options of brooding self-critique and creativeself-projection or self-definition alike. Simultaneously, Kafka's aphoristicnotebooks, like those of Lichtenberg and Hebbel, serve as a space whereobservations about other persons and on the condition of humankind orsociety can also be recorded. This is markedly different from the polemicapplication of the aphorism by such authors as Nietzsche or Kraus. InKraus's case, for instance, the aphorism tended to evolve as a subsidiaryform within the context of his polemical essays, or they developed out of his"glosses" on current events. In both cases, Kraus employs the aphorism forits rhetorical impact and its pervasive irony.

The introspective quality of the aphorisms of Lichtenberg, Hebbel, andKafka distinguish them also the from "Fragmente" of the German Roman-tics. Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel do not turn their aphoristic gazes inwardtoward the self, but rather toward the examination of intellectual issuesshared by a particular community of thinkers. Rather than self-analysis in thestrict, individual sense, or empirical observations of the sort described withthe term "Menschenbeobachtung," the Romantics were concerned onlywith a spiritual, i. e. intellectual reality. The "social" quality of this Romanticaphorism, with its emphasis on "symphilosophic" communication, is absentin the aphoristic texts of Lichtenberg, Hebbel, and Kafka. Kafka's closestcontemporary whose aphorisms betray the social aspect reminiscent of theRomantic fragment is Hofmannsthal, who, in his Buch der Freunde, con-sciously presented his aphorisms in a contextual dialogue with the texts ofother aphorists.

The textual environment in which Kafka's aphorisms occur in the years1917-18 is thus crucial not only for a characterization of the texts themselves,but also for an understanding of their place in Kafka's overall literary evolu-tion. One of the primary faults of Brod's edition of the Oktavhefte is that itprovides only a fragmentary picture of these notebooks and their functionfor Kafka; for many of the longer texts were removed and placed amongKafka's fragmentary stories in Brod's edition. This tends to obscure thenature of these notebooks insofar as it hinders our recognition that the Ok-tavhefte, more than diaries and introspective meditations, also containnumerous literary sketches. This is one more element that demonstrates the

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proximity of these notebooks to those of Lichtenberg and Hebbel. In all ofthese "works," aphoristic remarks are interspersed with introspective medi-tations, astute observations, and literary fragments, giving these notebooksthe character of sketchbooks. In Kafka's case we must keep in mind that hedid not sort the aphorisms out of these notebooks until three years after theircomposition, and that this process of sorting and revision never actuallyculminated in a "polished," publishable collection of aphorisms. These texts,then, like the reflections of Hebbel and Lichtenberg, were never put into a"final" form; they thus tend to be sudden insights, momentary thoughts,experimental ponderings, or reflective meditations by the individual forhimself; not objective, systematic, dogmatic philosophical guidelines, noreven the elements of a personal "Lebensphilosophie."

While I have emphasized the close proximity of diary and aphorism forKafka, I do not wish to leave the impression that the intermingling of diary-like self-reflection and aphoristic discourse in Kafka's Oktavhefte can betaken as evidence for the factually autobiographical or personal-philosophi-cal character of the aphorisms. On the contrary, it is precisely the drivetoward objectification of the subjective - and this implies self-projection, butnot necessarily honest self-assessment - that is fundamental to these texts.What Kafka admired in Aurelius' "Sprüche" and in Hebbel's Tagebücher wasabove all the kind of portrayal of the self which they allowed. This implies acertain degree of self-control, of restraint applied to one's personal pro-clivities, as well as self-projection, self-ornamentation, and self-masking ofthe sort associated with the impressionistic aphorism. It was, above all, thediscovery of a voice through which one could effectively write the self,through which Kafka could write Kafka, that impressed him in these worksand in their aphoristic character. Self-recognition for Kafka was never di-vorced from this dimension of self-control, combining self-mastery withcreation of a new self.

Vollständiges Erkennen seiner selbst. Den Umfang seiner Fähigkeiten umfassenkönnen wie einen kleinen Ball. Den größten Niedergang als etwas Bekannteshinnehmen und so darin noch elastisch bleiben. (T, 275)

This diary entry describes the intertwining of self-recognition, self-control,and, moreover, self-defense. Self-recognition is portrayed - we have alreadynoted the use of a similar image in a like context ( , 28) - as a coming-to-grips with oneself in a concrete and literal sense: encompassing one's abilitiesin such a manner that, like a ball, they fit into one's hand. In this sense theycannot only be "grasped," but actually manipulated. In recognition andcontrol of one's abilities there resides the potential for warding off defeat andfor remaining "elastic" - again a quality of a ball. It is no coincidence thatimages of "grasping" and manipulating recur repeatedly in the context of

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self-recognition: Kafka's form of self-manipulation also had to do with thehand and the act of grasping - I mean, of course, the grasping of a pen, notthat of a ball, and the mastery of the self by means of mastering the pen. Anelement of such manipulation is evident in this very text; namely, in theapplication of the third-person pronoun where one expects the first-person,confessional form. Taking the text purely on the level of its linguistic charac-teristics, it is not possible to decide definitively whether Kafka is referring tohimself or is making an observation about some other "third" person. Thissame tendency is evident in Kafka's "Er"-aphorisms, as well as in numeroustexts from the Oktavhefte for which the following two are representativeexamples.

Sein Ermatten ist das des Gladiators nach dem Kampf, seine Arbeit war das Weiß-tünchen eines Winkels in einer Beamtenstube, (aph. 34)Er läuft den Tatsachen nach wie ein Anfänger im Schlittschuhlaufen, der überdiesirgendwo übt, wo es verboten ist. (aph. 67).

The tendency toward objectification of the subjective is manifest in thedistanced objectivity of the third-person form. While such a technique isuncommon in the aphoristic tradition in general, such aphorisms do occur inthe work of those writers whose reflections tend toward the intermingling ofdiary and aphoristic utterance. The best examples of such "er"-aphorismscan be found in Lichtenberg's Sudelbiicher, where they are not uncommon.

Er urteilt nach dem jedesmaligen Aggregatzustand seiner Empfindungen. (J 482)Er pflegte seine obern [und] untern Seelenkräfte das Ober- und Unterhaus zunennen, und sehr oft ließ das erstere eine Bill passieren, die das letztere verwarf. (B67)Er hatte zu nichts Appetit und aß doch von allem. (B 3; cf. also J 5, J 158, J 170)

Both Kafka and Lichtenberg combine the ostensible objectivity of the third-person form with the freedom of metaphorical exposition. Through thiscombination these texts assume an almost parabolic generality which,through contrast with the particularizing thrust of the pronoun, evokes atension between specific and universal. The use of this uncommon aphoristictype by both Kafka and Lichtenberg underscores those similarities in thrustand motivation in their aphoristic production that I outlined above.16 Con-sistent with the use of this aphoristic type is the potential for self-stylizationwhich Kafka recognized as one of the central achievements of those aphoristswith whose work he became familiar early in his creative life.

There is yet one further documentable source through which Kafka cameto associate aphoristic utterance with stylization of the self: these are the

Gerhard Kurz has also pointed to the fact that this particular aphoristic type alignsKafka with Lichtenberg, Traum-Schrecken, p. 36.

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"Aussprüche Napoleons" which Kafka read in the fall of 1911 ( , 105).Kafka owned a copy of this work,17 and it is among the collection of booksfrom Kafka's personal library that recently turned up and are now held at the"Forschungsstelle für Prager Deutsche Literatur" in Wuppertal.18 RobertRehlen's extensive introduction to this volume makes a great deal out ofNapoleon's mastery over language, his ability to use language in order toaccomplish concrete ends, and his capacity to seduce others into sharing hisopinions on the basis of his rhetorical command of the word.19 Rehlensummarizes in glowing and emotional terms Napoleon's manipulation oflanguage for the accomplishment of seemingly impossible ends:

[U]m das Unmögliche zu erreichen, muß er mit glühenden Worten die Möglich-keiten so weit hinauspeitschen, daß eben im Jagen nach dem Phantom am Hori-zont von jedem Menschen, an den die Botschaft mit gerichtet ist, alles erreichtwird. (p. 14)

It is irrelevant whether these comments have any basis whatsoever in fact;significant here is merely that Kafka read and reacted to these remarks, asmarginal marks in the text indicate.20 Kafka must certainly have been im-pressed by this depiction of Napoleon as one who could extend the realm ofthe possible by the mere use of words. Napoleon here is exemplary for thoseindividuals who do not solely relate to the world through language, but whoactually shape and create their reality by means of words.21 This attitude, as Ihave argued, is representative of those aphoristic texts with which Kafkacame into intimate contact. It is my contention that a similar attitude ofmastery over the self through language is relevant for the aphorisms of theOktavhefte, as well as for Kafka's subsequent aphoristic production.

The correlation of fragmentary forms of discourse and autobiographicalinvestigation is suggested by Kafka himself in a fragment that was probablywritten in 1920, at the time of his return to the aphorisms of the Oktavhefte.

Das Schreiben versagt sich mir. Daher Plan der selbstbiographischen Untersu-chungen. Nicht Biographie, sondern Untersuchung und Auffindung möglichst

17 Wagenbach, "Kafkas Handbibliothek," p. 259; Wagenbach claims that Kafkaowned the second edition of this work, published in 1916, but in fact Kafkapossessed the first edition printed in 1906.

18 I am indebted to Jürgen Born and to Hans-Gerd Koch for their kindness in allow-ing me to examine Kafka's copy of Napoleon's Aussprüche while I was researchingKafka's manuscripts in Wuppertal.

" Rehlen, "Einleitung," Berühmte Aussprüche und Worte Napoleons von Corsika bisSt.Helena (Leipzig: Julius Zeitler, 1906), pp. 1-25; here esp. pp. 2; 13-4.

20 The text is marked both in pencil and in ink. The pencil marks were certainly madeby Kafka, as one can easily conclude from the substance of the marked passagesthemselves, whose relevance to Kafka's life is obvious in each instance.

21 See also p. 15 of Rehlen's introduction.

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kleiner Bestandteile. Daraus will ich mich dann aufbauen, so wie einer, dessenHaus unsicher ist, daneben ein sicheres aufbauen will, womöglich aus dem Mate-rial des alten . . .(/ / , 388)

Kafka's autobiographical "investigations" are called forth by an interruptionin his capacity to write; they thus represent a kind of ersatz for his fiction.Kafka implies that these "investigations" will lead him back to "DasSchreiben," i.e. that they will allow him to reinitiate a period of literaryproductivity. These "investigations," he emphasizes, will not take on theexpository, totalizing form of "biography"; rather they will concentrate onthe isolation and discovery of small "elemental components." By means ofan analytical dismantling of the self into such elementary fragments, Kafkahopes ultimately to be able to achieve a reconstruction of the self, but one inwhich the self is altered in the process of this reconstruction. It is preciselysuch self-analysis and self-reconstruction which Kafka was trying to ac-complish in his aphoristic fragments, and the "plan" which he mentions inthis passage may indeed refer to the aphoristic project Kafka was undertak-ing. As we will see in our discussion of Kafka's reception of Pascal andKierkegaard, in their aphoristic methods Kafka discovered a procedure forcritical dissection of the self; Kafka terms Kierkegaard's method "aufbauendeZerstörung" (//, 125), a phrase which points to the dialectic of analyticaldestruction and textual reconstruction as described by Kafka in the contextof his autobiographical "investigation." "Constructive destruction" thus re-fers to a specific procedure for dealing with the self, one in which analyticaldismantling of the self into constitutive fragments is prerequisite for a crea-tive reconstitution of the self. These two movements, self-deconstructionand self-reconstruction, are thus individual moments of a dialectical processin which Kafka, through the fragmentary textual medium of aphoristic dis-course, attempts a transfiguration, re-constitution, or textualization of theself.

Two further texts from the Oktavhefte which allude to the manipulative"grasping" of the self support this hypothesis, and they demonstrate howimages of grasping and manipulation occur in conjunction with the prob-lematics of self-critique and self-transformation.

So fest wie die Hand den Stein hält. Sie halt ihn aber fest, nur um ihn desto weiterzu verwerfen. Aber auch in jene Weite führt der Weg. (aph.21)

We have already commented on two other instances (7~, 28; T, 275) in whichKafka associated the image of grasping something in the hand with thenotion of self-control and self-definition. If we read the related image in thisaphorism in a similar way, then the text can be interpreted along the lines ofthe relationship of control over language as reflective of control over one'sworld. The paradox on which Kafka's text focuses is that the firmness of the

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hand's grasp does not betoken attachment and possession, but rather thewish to throw the stone an even greater distance. In a sentence which doesnot seem to follow on the initial exposition, Kafka then identifies this dis-tance with the "way." This "way" is not the religious path to salvation, butrather simply the direction of movement prescribed by the self in the act ofthrowing the stone. This toss is portrayed as random in all respects exceptfor the fact that it is determined by the hand that carries it out. The "path"appears as a potential which evolves out of the act of grasping. As I havealready argued, this act of grasping relates to the grasping and control ofKafka's pen; wielding the pen and throwing the stone are methods for pro-jecting paths and potentials for the self. This self-projection through literaryexpression, implying control and stylization of the self, is an essential aspectof Kafka's aphoristic production in the Ziirau period and later.

The association of self-grasping and self-exposition, the dialectic of auto-analysis and auto-projection, is in evidence in another text from the thirdOktavheft in which the image of holding the self in one's hand is explicitlyassociated with self-control or "getting hold of oneself."

Schwäche des Gedächtnisses für die Einzelheiten und den Gang der eigenen Welt-erfassung - ein sehr schlechtes Zeichen. Nur Bruchstücke eines Ganzen. Wie willstdu an die größte Aufgabe auch nur rühren, wie willst du ihre Nähe nur wittern, ihrDasein nur träumen, ihren Traum nur erbitten, die Buchstaben der Bitte zu lernenwagen, wenn du dich nicht so zusammenfassen kannst, daß du, wenn es zurEntscheidung kommt, dein Ganzes in einer Hand so zusammenhäist wie einenStein zum Werfen, ein Messer zum Schlachten. Andrerseits: man muß nicht in dieHände spucken, ehe man sie faltet. (H, 71)

Two elements of this meditation are significant in terms of Kafka's apho-risms: the fragmentary nature of Kafka's "Welterfassung"; and the desire tograsp the self in a compact, "manipulable" form. In the first of these mo-ments Kafka bemoans his inability to disclose the world in any but fragmen-tary form; in the second moment he hypothesizes that this deficiency isactually attributable to the inability to "gather" the self in a manageableform. As a stone for throwing, this compacted self relates to the drive forself-projection; as a knife for butchering it alludes to critical self-dissection.The aphorism as textual form is relevant to both of these impulses;moreover, it is "fragmentary," as are Kafka's fragments of the world, and itallows for "compaction" of the self into constituent parts. Self-mastery istaken as a prerequisite for any satisfactory comprehension of the world, aswell as necessary for any attempt to pro-ject the self into a new direction.

The intermeshing of self-recognition, self-control, and self-projection isexpressed in a further entry from the third Oktavheft.

Erkenne dich selbst, bedeutet nicht: Beobachte dich. Beobachte dich ist das Wortder Schlange. Es bedeutet: Mache dich zum Herrn deiner Handlungen. Nun bist

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du es aber schon, bist Herr deiner Handlungen. Das Wort bedeutet also: Verkennedich! Zerstöre dich! also etwas Böses - und nur wenn man sich sehr tief hinab-beugt, hört man auch sein Gutes, welches lautet: "Um dich zu dem zu machen, derdu bist." (H, 80)

Kafka takes issue with the identification of self-recognition with self-obser-vation, claiming instead that self-recognition entails mastery over one's ownactions. This mastery includes self-destruction as well as self-creation; forself-creation, according to this text, takes place as part of a dialectic whichrequires self-destruction as its initial position. This text describes a circlewhich moves dialectically from self-recognition (self-mastery) to self-de-struction and returns to a self-recognition that is dialectically sublated as thecreation of the "self that you are"; i.e. of the self you cause yourself to be.The dialectical process described in this text presents a paradigm of theprocess by which Kafka, in the aphorisms of the Oktavhefte, was attemptingto attain "self-recognition" of this creative, self-projective sort through liter-ary activity. His appropriation of aphoristic expression in this endeavor wascertainly motivated by recognition of a similar application of aphoristic ex-pression in the aphoristic works which he had read early in his creative life.

Through his reception of the aphoristic texts of Aurelius, Hebbel, andNapoleon, Kafka had access to documents through which he could becomefamiliar with the structure, form, themes, and compositional strategies ofthe aphorism, on the one hand, and come to recognize the assertiveness andrhetorical power of this genre as one discursive possibility for the literarycontrol and projection of the self. Long before he was introduced to theaphoristic methods of Pascal and Kierkegaard, Kafka had sufficient oppor-tunity to assess and assimilate both the critical-analytical, and constructive-transformational potentials of aphoristic discourse. Pascal and Kierkegaard,of course, also helped shape Kafka's awareness of the expressive capacities ofthe aphorism; indeed, it was the reception of their texts which served as thetemporally most immediate impulse for Kafka's employment of the apho-rism in 1917. It is to Kafka's response to these two thinkers that we nowmust turn our attention.

II. Pascal and Kierkegaard: Scepticism and Critical Method

Pascal's name appears in Kafka's diaries as early as January 1914 ( , 350), butthe reference does not make clear whether Kafka was actually reading thePensees at this time. However, on August 2, 1917, just a few weeks beforethe aphorisms begin to become a dominant form in the third Oktavheft,Kafka records in a diary entry his reaction to Pascal's meditations.

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Pascal macht vor dem Auftreten Gottes große Ordnung, aber es muß eine tiefereängstlichere Skepsis geben, als diese des [ein Wort unlesbar] Menschen, der sichmit wunderbaren Messern zwar, aber doch mit der Ruhe des Selchers zerschnei-det. Woher die Ruhe? Die Sicherheit der Messerführung? Ist Gott ein theatralischerTriumphwagen, den man, alle Mühseligkeit und Verzweiflung der Arbeiter zuge-standen, mit Stricken aus der Ferne auf die Bühne zieht? (T, 522)

This ambivalent reception of Pascal merits close attention. While expressingunrestrained admiration for Pascal's self-dissection, Kafka simultaneouslyquestions the calm with which Pascal carries out this project. This calm,Kafka suggests, derives from the firmness of Pascal's belief, his unwaveringfaith in God. Kafka questions not only the security of this faith, but also thevery nature of a God whose timely appearance for the act of salvation can beaccepted and even predicted. Pascal's scepticism appears to Kafka to beneither profound nor fearful enough to count as true scepticism, since it ismollified by faith. Kafka derides this God as - quite literally - a deus exmachina, a God who is wheeled onto the stage at the crucial moment tobring resolution and salvation. A reflection from the fourth Oktavheft, writ-ten in early December of 1917, can be construed as a response to this concep-tion of a "timely" arrival of God.

Der Messias wird erst kommen, wenn er nicht mehr nötig sein wird, er wird ersteinen Tag nach seiner Ankunft kommen, er wird nicht am letzten Tag kommen,sondern am allerletzten. (H, 90)

First one general comment about this text. It is characteristic of Kafka'saphorisms on "religious" subject matters that traditional conceptions aredevalued or even perverted: this "deconstructive" act is, as has been pointedout, one of profound scepticism with regard to all beliefs. Thus Kafka'smethod in these texts evidences the deep scepticism which he expected ofPascal, but did not find. The above text is patterned around a structure ofexclusion similar to those already seen in other aphorisms. Salvation is aconception which is necessarily bound up with the condition of living in aworld that languishes in its "unsaved" state: once the messiah comes, salva-tion is no longer necessary; but, from the perspective of the world, it alwayscomes too late.22 One might conceive this arrival of the messiah on the lastpossible day in terms of the bureaucratic complications so common in Kaf-ka's works: the promised arrival will indeed occur, but at the very lastmoment, and only when it will no longer be of use. Kafka's scepticism,"deeper and more fearful" than that of Pascal, allows him to envision a Godwho cannot be pulled onto stage until the curtain has already fallen. Theprimary difference between Pascal and Kafka, then, is that whereas Pascal

Cf. the similar reflection from November 30, 1917, H, 88 f.

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writes from within traditional religious conceptions, Kafka writes againstthem, following the contra-dictory, re-evaluative drive of the aphoristwhich is grounded in absolute scepticism.

Kafka's praise of Pascal is directed neither at the substance of the latter'smeditations, nor at his faith, but rather specifically at his method, his self-dissection "with wonderful knives." Pascal's method, needless to say, isitself quintessentially aphoristic and non-systematic, emphasizing the con-flict of contradictions, interweaving and playing off against each other logicand faith, reason and intuition. Pascal is hence of great significance for Kaf-ka's turn to aphoristic expression at this time, for Pascal's model, as Kafkahimself admits, provided him insight into the exemplary critical manner inwhich the aphorism could be applied as a tool for self-analysis and introspec-tion. Kafka constantly associated aphoristic expression with a rewriting ofthe self in which self-projection is dialectically interwoven with self-analysis.While the previous aphoristic texts which Kafka had read had especiallyimpressed upon him the protective aspect of aphoristic expression, in PascalKafka recognized the incisive critical potential of the aphorism. Self-exami-nation of the sort practiced by Pascal is a pre-requisite for the self-projectionaccomplished through the medium of language. Sceptical examination, inother words, is a parallel phenomenon to creative experimentation. Thus it iswhere Pascal himself ceases to be critical and falls into faith - where, indeed,he ceases to be an aphorist as sceptic, the role the aphorist typically assumesin the German tradition - that Kafka's admiration for him ends. Pascal isimportant for Kafka not as a religious thinker, but rather as a scepticalanalyst, as one who employs aphoristic expression for the purpose of merci-less self-examination.

Pascal, subject to the paradox that informs much of aphoristic expres-sion, found himself applying the principles of reason and logic in his ar-gumentation, while arguing in fact that reason and logic are insufficienttools. His thought thus is located in that "Grenzland" between intuition andreason which is characteristic of the aphorist. Pascal, moreover, is also acritical aphorist in the sense of being one who questions and deconstructsaccepted values: in his aphorisms he practices, in his own words, 'Tart defronder, [de] bouleverser les Etats, et d'ebranler les coutumes etablies, ensondant jusque dans leur source, pour marquer leur defaut d'autorite et dejustice."23 Yet Pascal simply did not carry this sceptical attitude far enoughfor Kafka; in his own aphorisms from the Oktavhefte Kafka attempts consis-tently to adhere to this sceptical attitude of the aphorist.

23 Pascal, Pensees, ed. Francis Kaplan (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1982), p. 164;further references are from this edition and will be cited in the body of the textwith the abbreviation Pa.

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The similarities between Pascal's Pensees and Kafka's aphoristic reflec-tions go much deeper than simply the commonality of their aphoristicmethods and the general attitude of critical scepticism. Still, I do not wish topostulate a mono-directional influence of Pascal's reflections on Kafka'saphorisms; rather, I would say that especially in this case, and in keepingwith the notion of "precursors" presented above, the work of these twothinkers is mutually illuminating. Knowledge of Kafka's aphorisms throwsinto relief aspects of Pascal's meditations that otherwise might simply bepassed over. Once again my purpose in bringing out relationships betweenthe aphoristic writings of these two authors is to demonstrate on a broadlevel Kafka's general familiarity with the forms, themes, structures, andstrategies of aphoristic expression, and to document the avenues throughwhich Kafka had access to this tradition. In other words, if there are points ofcontact between Pascal's aphorisms and those of Kafka, then I would attri-bute this to their mutual participation in "aphoristics," in the method andpurposes of aphoristic expression itself, rather than to "influence" in a nar-row sense. Hence any discerned similarities do not imply an epigonal qualityin Kafka's aphorisms; on the contrary, they are merely symptoms of theprofound manner in which Kafka, from diverse sources, fathomed and ap-propriated the essential traits and tasks of aphoristic expression. This broadappropriation of the aphoristic method is what allows Kafka's aphorisms to"create" their own precursors.

A number of central themes from Pascal's Pensees are evident in Kafka'saphorisms. Among these are the problem of human self-interest (a constanttheme in the sentences of the French moralists), the dual condition ofhumankind, and the theme of human existence as diversion from authenticknowledge. We shall examine these last two motifs in some detail, since theyprovide us the opportunity to examine the epistemological aporia which islatent in Pascal's religious thought, thus permitting us to gain some insightson Kafka's couching of epistemological issues in the terminology of religiousmythology.

Pascal describes the human being as a "freak," and his condition in theworld as "novel," "monstrous," "chaotic," "paradoxical," and "prodigious"(cf. Pa, 235). This is due to the essential duality of humankind, whoseposition in nature is described as "un milieu entre rien et Tout. Infinimenteloigne de comprendre les extremes" (Pa, 154). Human beings are con-demned to "cet etat qui tient le milieu entre deux extremes" (Pa, 155). Thisfundamental duality defines the middle position of humankind, a positionbetween faith and reason, scepticism and belief. Absolute truth lies thusbeyond the reach of the human being, who nevertheless continually strivesto reach the unattainable. Of course, what Pascal describes here in religiousand existential terms is the epistemological situation of the aphorist in gener-

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al: aware that humankind is trapped in the position of mediator between faithand reason, between individual and universal, experience and abstractthought, the aphorist accepts and problematizes this situation. Kafka, likePascal, diagnosed the dual nature of humankind, portraying the human situ-ation in terms of the chaining of the human being to the realms of heaven andearth, "free" in each, but at home in neither sphere. Kafka's aphorismsrepresent his own coming-to-terms with this middle ground between selfand community, physical and spiritual worlds. The aphorism in the Germantradition evolved precisely as a manner of expression suited to exploringwhat Pascal calls "life half-way" ("la vie entre deux"), and which he terms"la chose du monde la plus fragile" (Pa, 109). Pascal is the first aphorist withwhose works Kafka had contact whose aphoristic method embodies this"transcendental moralism" in which the issues of integrative thought areproblematized in the very act of initiating mediation between conflictingspheres.24 It is conceivable that Pascal's example was decisive in raisingKafka's awareness of aphoristic expression as an implicit methodologywhich rejects the extremes of reason and faith and focuses on the endlessprocess of mediation between these extremes. This problematical position of"in-betweenness," as I have argued, was central to Kafka's life and helpedcondition his turn to the aphorism as a means of expression which takesaccount of, and reflects, this state of human "Dasein" between the "tree ofknowledge" and the "tree of life." Many of the techniques peculiar to Kaf-ka's aphorisms - his constant retractions, reversals, recursions, and diver-sions - manifest this will to remain in the tension of the in-between, refusingconclusion and dogma in favor of the ever-progressive "becoming" ofthought.

The theme of diversion as a human strategy for self-deception about thewretchedness of the human condition is likewise a motif that brings Pascal'sand Kafka's aphorisms into close proximity. Kafka addresses the fundamen-tal "evil" of diversion in general fashion in the following aphorism:

Böse ist das, was ablenkt. (H, 84)

Pascal's reflections on the theme of diversion do not share this aphoristicsuccinctness. Yet the motif is fundamental to the Pensees: Pascal devotes oneentire section of his ordered papers to this topic, and further references to itare scattered throughout his meditations. Pascal's thoughts on this theme aresummarized adequately in the following deliberation.

Neumann sees Pascal as the only representative of the French "moralists" whosethought is related to the "transcendental moralism" he perceives as characteristic ofthe German tradition of the aphorism, Ideenparadiese, pp. 58-60.

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Les hommes n'ayant pu guerir la mort, la misere, 1'ignorance, ils se sont avises,pour se rendre heureux, de n'y point penser. (Pa, 201)

All the activities of humankind, including the struggles of passion, war, andpolitics have the sole purpose of diverting the attention of the human beingfrom thoughts of its own wretchedness, mortality, and insignificance (cf.Pa, 202). Diversion, however, does not provide human beings with truehappiness, according to Pascal, because, coming from outside the self, itmakes one dependent and leaves one open to the disappointment caused byuncontrollable and unforeseeable chance or accident (cf. Pa, 202). Pascalbrings out this paradoxical aspect of human diversion in the following medi-tation on wretchedness.

La seule chose qui nous console de nos miseres est le divertissement, et cependantc'est la plus grande de nos miseres. Car c'est cela qui nous empeche principalementde songer ä nous, et qui nous fait perdre insensiblement. Sans cela, nous serionsdans l'ennui, et cet ennui nous pousserait a chercher un moyen plus solide d'ensortir. Mais le divertissement nous amuse, et nous fait arriver insensiblement a lamort. (Pa, 202)

One of Kafka's aphorisms, without specifically mentioning the problem ofdiversion, incorporates a similar paradox with reference to the issue of hu-man suffering in the world.

Du kannst dich zurückhalten von den Leiden der Welt, das ist dir freigestellt undentspricht deiner Natur, aber vielleicht ist gerade dieses Zurückhalten das einzigeLeid, das du vermeiden könntest, (aph. 103)

According to this reflection, the attempt to avoid misery, like diversion inPascal's meditation, proves to be a form of misery itself- ironically, the onlyform of misery that one can avoid. Yet Kafka's text, while sharing subjectand method - paradox - with Pascal's reflection, remains much morespeculative and less assertive than Pascal's. Kafka's hesitancy to state thisproposition in any but a hypothetical manner is evidenced in the use of thesubjunctive and by the word "vielleicht." This betokens Kafka's profounderscepticism and greater uneasiness when confronted with absolute assertions.His "deeper, more fearful" scepticism thus expresses itself in part in theformal tendency to mollify the rhetorical thrust of the aphoristic statementthrough such relativizing techniques.

If we return now to Pascal's meditation, we find that in his conceptionthe problem of diversion is intimately related to the issue of self-examina-tion. Pascal implies here that the value and purpose of human existenceresides in introspection and self-examination alone; the primary danger ofdiversions is that they distract one from this central task. Kafka's conceptionof the omnipresent "Motivationen" evolved by humankind to "revoke theknowledge of good and evil" (H, 103) is closely related to Pascal's notion of

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diversion. Kafka, we recall, maintained that the Fall from paradise cannot berevoked, but only "obscured" ("getrübt"), and he continues:

Zu diesem Zweck entstehen die Motivationen. Die ganze Welt ist ihrer voll, ja dieganze sichtbare Welt ist vielleicht nichts anderes als eine Motivation des einenAugenblick lang ruhenwollenden Menschen. Ein Versuch, die Tatsache der Er-kenntnis zu fälschen, die Erkenntnis erst zum Ziel zu machen. (H, 103)

Significant here is the proximity of Kafka's idea of "Motivationen," whosepurpose is the denial or falsification of the fact of human knowledge, toPascal's belief thaj diversion is the process by which humankind avoids thenecessary activity of self-reflection. In both instances it is a question of theevolution of strategies which might insulate humankind from the terror ofknowledge. Both Pascal and Kafka move in their aphorisms toward a cogni-tive activity which accords with their parallel recognitions: Pascal initiates aprocedure of merciless introspection, examining himself as an individualwhose reflexes are somehow representative of humankind in general; Kafkaconcerns himself with the crises of human understanding as manifest con-cretely in his life and thought, and he investigates the problematical epis-temological situation of humanity through the hypothetical and experimen-tal medium of aphoristic expression.

Kafka's response to Pascal can be summarized in a few sentences. Aboveall Kafka admired Pascal's method of self-dissection, an inherently aphoristicmethod, while simultaneously questioning the calm and control with whichit was carried out: Pascal's self-butchery, as opposed to Kafka's, was justifiedand mollified by Pascal's faith in the Christian redeemer. Yet Kafka wit-nessed in Pascal's aphorisms the critical potentials of this form of expression,and he was confirmed in his sense that its methodology was appropriate torecognition and problematization of the "in-between" state of human exist-ence. The aphorism became indelibly associated for Kafka with a criticalquest for knowledge and self-knowledge, reinforcing the critical, self-analyt-ical position in the dialectic of "constructive destruction" manifest in Kafka'saphoristic "autobiographical investigations."

Critics have found themselves encouraged in their desire to attributereligious significance to Kafka's aphorisms by the fact that his reception oftwo inherently religious thinkers who employ an essentially aphoristicmethod, Pascal and Kierkegaard, parallels temporally the creation of theaphorisms in the third and fourth Oktavhefte. It is clear, however, in thecase of Pascal that Kafka specifically rejected the religious aspect of histhought. Kafka's reception of Kierkegaard moves in a similar direction. Inone of the most penetrating self-analyses of the Oktavhefte, Kafka calls

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himself a representative of the negative underside of his age, and in so doinghe consciously distances himself from the two most prominent Europeancommunities of belief, from Christianity and Judaism, the former rep-resented by Kierkegaard, the latter by the Zionists.

Ich habe von den Erfordernissen des Lebens gar nichts mitgebracht, so viel ichweiß, sondern nur die allgemeine menschliche Schwäche. Mit dieser - in dieserHinsicht ist es eine riesenhafte Kraft - habe ich das Negative meiner Zeit, die mir jasehr nahe ist, die ich nie zu bekämpfen, sondern gewissermaßen zu vertreten dasRecht habe, kräftig aufgenommen. An dem geringen Positiven sowie an demäußersten, zum Positiven umkippenden Negativen, hatte ich keinen ererbten An-teil. Ich bin nicht von der allerdings schon schwer sinkenden Hand des Christen-tums ins Leben geführt worden wie Kierkegaard und habe nicht den letzten Zipfeldes davonfliegenden jüdischen Gebetmantels noch gefangen wie die Zionisten. Ichbin Ende oder Anfang. (H, 120-1)

In this note, written on February 25, 1918, Kafka attempts to diagnose hisown insufficiency for life, and, curiously enough, he remarks that possessionof this quality makes him representative for the "negative" of his time. Heinterprets the absence of anything "inherited" from the positive of the age asthat which distinguishes him from Kierkegaard and the Zionists. The word"ererbt" is crucial here, for it directs our attention at Kafka's lament that heparticipates in no community and has no heritage. The "negative" of his age,in which Kafka so profoundly shares, is precisely this rootlessness, this lackof either forebears or offspring. Kierkegaard and the Zionists participate, nomatter how slightly, in the "positive" of the age - or, at the very least, in thatnegative which tends toward the positive - to the extent that they can inte-grate themselves into a "heritage" which lends them "hereditary" definition.The cryptic assertion with which Kafka concludes this meditation thusevokes this double isolation from any form of heritage: Kafka is "end"insofar as he is without physical or spiritual heirs; he is "inception" to theextent that he has no ancestors to turn to in order to search for precedents.He views himself, in other words, as without antecedents as well as without"post-cedents." Implied in the state of being "end" or "inception" is bothabsence of past and absence of future, lack of connection in either a backwardor forward direction. The allusion here, then, is to something essentiallyindividual and, perhaps, even individualistic. Yet at the same time Kafka hasmaintained that he lays some claim to being representative of his time, or atleast of its negative underside. The thrust of Kafka's reflection thus moves intwo mutually opposing directions, on the one hand bringing out his "rep-resentativeness," and on the other his lack of predecessors and followers.This conflict is resolved, of course, in the claim that Kafka is representativeof a time that itself has no heritage, a time that is either inception or end, orinception and end at once. To be a representative, however, implies a com-munity of sorts; here, however, this "community" is defined in terms of

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negativity, i. e. in terms of lack or absence. This identification of himself as a"representative" of this negative community of outcasts - the community ofthe communityless, formulated in its most paradoxical - signals a new rec-ognition on Kafka's part, one which, it seems to me, is intimately tied upwith the problematics and crises with which Kafka was trying to come togrips in the Zürau period, and which expresses itself, among other ways, inthe turn to aphoristic expression.

Stanley Corngold has argued that a second "helix" occurs in Kafka's lifelate in 1917, and he characterizes this turn as one in which Kafka comes tounderstand himself and his suffering as "exemplary," i. e. as testimony to therealization of a common being.251 want to make two brief points about thisbefore going on to follow up this problem in Kafka's reception of Kier-kegaard. First, it is necessary to recognize that this shift to the notion of theexemplary has profound repercussions in Kafka's literature, manifesting it-self in the move from perspectivistic to parabolic portrayal. This, in turn,hints at the fact that this turn to the exemplary is above all a turn in (self-)expression. In other words, this modulation to the exemplary bespeaks thatmove to projection and self-creation for which I have been arguing through-out. Secondly, and closely related to this, one cannot take this turn to theexemplary in Kafka to be simple and unproblematic; indeed, it is fraughtwith complexities. The reason for this is, I wish to argue, that for Kafka thequestion of the exemplary is paralleled by its very problematization: themediation between individual and universal in the form of the "representa-tive" is caught up in that process of recursion typical both of Kafka'sthought, and of the conceptual patterns of the aphorist in general. NeitherKafka's aphorisms, nor his parables from the same period, can adequately beassessed without taking account of this problematization of the exemplary, acrisis which came to a head for Kafka in the months during which he com-posed the aphorisms in the Oktavhefte.

Kafka's reception of Kierkegaard is persistently bound up with the issueof the exemplary on various levels. The most obvious of these, of course, isthat on which Kafka took Kierkegaard's life to be exemplary for the prob-lems he himself faced.26 Kafka was first introduced to the work of Kier-

Stanley Corngold, "Kafka's Double Helix," p. 523.Brian F. M. Edwards has emphasized that Kafka felt personally, but not necessarilyphilosophically close to Kierkegaard, "Kafka and Kierkegaard: A Reassessment,"GLL, 20 (1966/67), 218-225; on the relationship between Kafka and Kierkegaardsee further: Fritz Billeter, Das Dichterische bei Kafka und Kierkegaard: Ein ty-pologischer Vergleich (Winterthur: Verlag Pascal G. Keller, 1965); on Kafka's re-ception of Kierkegaard see especially Claude David, "Die Geschichte Abrahams:Zu Kafkas Auseinandersetzung mit Kierkegaard," Bild und Gedanke: Festschriftfür Gerhart Baumann zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Günter Schnitzler, et al. (Munich:Fink, 1980), pp. 79-90.

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kegaard in 1913, and on August 21 of that year he records the following notein his diary.

Ich habe heute Kierkegaards "Buch des Richters" bekommen. Wie ich es ahnte, istsein Fall trotz wesentlicher Unterschiede dem meinem [sie] sehr ähnlich, zumin-dest liegt er auf der gleichen Seite der Welt. Er bestätigt mich wie ein Freund. Ichentwerfe folgenden Brief an den Vater, den ich morgen, wenn ich die Kraft habe,wegschicken will. (T, 318)

The letter Kafka mentions is the one intended for Felice's father in whichKafka explains the virtual impossibility that he marry Felice, claiming that heis "nichts anderes . . . als Literatur und nichts anderes sein kann und will" ( ,318). Clearly, Kafka was not only drawing strength from Kierkegaard, butin a sense modelling himself on him as well. Thus even at this early dateKafka recognizes the similarity in their "cases," while yet being unable toaffirm unreservedly this similarity. Still, Kierkegaard's example was effec-tive enough at this juncture to lead Kafka to action, this action manifestingitself concretely in the letter to Felice's father.

When Kafka concerns himself intensively with Kierkegaard four yearslater the similarity of their "cases" is no longer a dominant factor.Significantly, Kafka's concern with Kierkegaard runs temporally closely par-allel to the composition of the aphorisms in the Oktavhefte. In October orNovember 1917 Kafka reports in a letter to Oskar Baum that he is familiarwith Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling (Br, 190); in January he writes thathe is reading further works by Kierkegaard (Br, 201); and in the same monthhe indicates that he has also read Either/Or (Br, 224). In March 1918 he re-reads Fear and Trembling and reads Repetition as well (Br, 235). Yet Kafka'sattitude on the Danish philosopher has undergone a tremendous transforma-tion by this time, as is clear from the following remarks recorded in a letterto Max Brod: "Die 'körperliche' Ähnlichkeit mit ihm [Kierkegaard], wie siemir eben etwas nach jenem kleinen Buch 'Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu "ihr"'. . . erschien, ist jetzt ganz verschwunden, aus dem Zimmernachbar istirgendein Stern geworden, sowohl was meine Bewunderung, als eine ge-wisse Kälte meines Mitgefühls betrifft" (Br, 235). As is commonly the casewith Kafka's metaphors, the one he chooses to describe the distance he nowfeels toward Kierkegaard is quite significant: the person with whom Kafkaonce inhabited at least the same side of the world is now a "star" whoseexample appears far away and unreachable. Not coincidentally, Kafka usedthe very same image in a letter to Oskar Baum a few months earlier, callingKierkegaard "ein Stern, aber über einer mir fast unzugänglichen Gegend"(Br, 190). This image brings out Kafka's ambivalence toward Kierkegaard,who is portrayed as a "guiding light," so to speak, but one whose guidanceleads over territory that for the most part is inaccessible to Kafka. Expressedin this image, then, is Kafka's desire for exemplary guidance, and his simul-

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taneous recognition that such guidance cannot be preferred him throughKierkegaard.

It would lead us too far astray to examine in detail the reactions toKierkegaard, especially to Fear and Trembling, recorded by Kafka in thefourth Oktavheft.27 While Kafka was certainly impressed by a number ofissues manifest in Kierkegaard's thought - the problem of indirect communi-cation and the issue of Abraham's condemnation to silence, the problemati-cal mediation between individual and universal which comes to light inKierkegaard's exposition of the parable of Abraham - I will restrict myselfhere to a discussion of issues relevant to the problem of the exemplary, andto Kafka's remarks on Kierkegaard's method.

Kafka's objection to Kierkegaard's portrayal of Abraham bears somesimilarity to the objection that Kafka voiced against Kierkegaard himself. Inthe letter to Brod from March 1918 quoted above, Kafka criticizes Kier-kegaard with these words: "den gewöhnlichen Menschen . . . sieht er nichtund malt den ungeheueren Abraham in die Wolken" (Br, 235-6). It is the"Positivitat" that Kierkegaard expresses in this work, a positivity that, likeAbraham, "ins Ungeheuerliche [geht]" (Br, 235), which disturbs Kafka. Theimage of an "Abraham in the clouds," of course, parallels the metaphor ofKierkegaard as an unreachable star; thus Kierkegaard's representation of anunreal Abraham, whose model means nothing to the ordinary human being,evokes Kafka's representation of Kierkegaard as an example that cannotelucidate his own situation. In this sense Kierkegaard and his Abraham rein-forced Kafka's impression of the absoluteness of the individual, its inaccessi-bility to generalization, its ineffability. The silence arising from the paradoxto which Abraham was condemned must have reinforced Kafka's convictionthat he was caught up in a paradoxical drive to express his inexpressible"inneres Gebot" (H, 111). At the same time, Kafka came to accept that hisown individuality implied lack of heritage, condemnation to the state eitherof "inception" or "end." He thus was forced to admit that he had access to noprior examples or models which might be relevant to his past life, or imitablein the future.

Kafka's characteristic penchant for biographical and autobiographicalwritings was predicated on his persistent search for models through whichby comparison he could explain and justify - this latter above all - his ownsituation and condition. In August of 1916, however, he admonishes himselfto give up this drive to compare himself with others. "Laß auch den unsinni-gen Irrtum, daß du Vergleiche anstellst, etwa mit Flaubert, Kierkegaard,

27 See David, "Die Geschichte Abrahams," for a detailed analysis of Kafka's notes onFear and Trembling.

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Grillparzer. Das ist durchaus Knabenart" (T, 511). This caveat is a firstsymptom of Kafka's problematization of the exemplary as it occurs in mostpoignant form in the aphorisms of the Oktavhefte. Kafka again found him-self inhabiting a lonely realm of the in-between: in-between the growingsense of his own absolute individuality, his existence without heritage aseither "end" or "inception," and the desire for identifiable examples, i. e. forprecedents and for a legitimizing framework or community. This problem,of course, runs parallel to the crisis of communication from the same period,itself predicated on the conflict between individuality and its communicationin the universalizing medium of language. The mediation between particularand universal, individual and any form of community whatsoever, remains acrisis of dynamic mediation, of recursion to, and reiteration of, the crisisitself, without resolution or conclusion.

Kafka's problematization of the exemplary - and his turn to the exem-plary, it seems to me, was never more than this - brings with it a problemati-zation of all forms of imitatio. This comes especially to the fore in theinstance of Kafka's reception of Kierkegaard, as a critique recorded in thefourth Oktavheft makes evident. Here Kafka writes of Kierkegaard:

Er hat zu viel Geist, er fährt mit seinem Geist wie auf einem Zauberwagen über dieErde, auch dort, wo keine Wege sind. Und kann es von sich selbst nicht erfahren,daß dort keine Wege sind. Dadurch wird seine demütige Bitte um Nachfolge zurTyrannei und sein ehrlicher Glaube, "auf dem Wege" zu sein, zum Hochmut. (H,126)

Any demand which requires that one follow words or example of an exem-plary individual, like the imperative "Gehe hinüber" of the wiseman in theparable "Von den Gleichnissen," is unfollowable: such an imperative repre-sents an act of tyranny; the self-righteousness in which it is grounded isnothing but "Hochmut." The problem of the exemplary, thus, is one man-ifestation of the problematical or ruptured interaction between the individualand the universal which was Kafka's central concern during his aphoristicperiod. The demand for imitatio is made through the medium of language,and language becomes the ultimate realm in which the conflict betweenindividual and universal is carried out and mediated. Kafka's rejection inthese crisis years of personal models for himself and his life bespeaks agrowing awareness of his own immediable - and thus also ineffable - indi-viduality, his isolation from all community, all heritage, and from any rele-vant models or "examples."

If Kierkegaard reinforced Kafka's problematization of the exemplary andthe crisis of mediation between particular and universal (along with its com-munication), then he also affirmed Kafka's approach to these dilemmas on amethodological level, as did Pascal. In the case of the latter, of course, it wasthe critical self-dissection which Kafka admired, while rejecting the faith that

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made it easy for Pascal to carry out. Kafka likewise rejects the "positivity" ofKierkegaard, but affirms his literary method. For what most interested Kaf-ka in Kierkegaard was certainly the manner in which the Dane portrayed inhis texts elements of his own life crises: Kierkegaard's objectification of thesubjective, his projection of the self into philosophical-parabolic guises,comprises the ultimate literary significance of his texts for Kafka. Kafka, forexample, praised the "Macht" of Kierkegaard's terminology and his haunt-ing "Begriffsentdeckungen" (Br, 238), and even wrote of the "Richtigkeitvon Kierkegaards Methode" (Br, 238). Kafka describes this method in thefollowing way: "zu schrein, um nicht gehört zu werden, und falsch zuschrein, für den Fall, daß man doch gehört werden sollte" (Br, 238). I inter-pret this as Kafka's commentary on Kierkegaard's manner of speaking outon his individual crises through textual masks that obscure the personalnature of his pain. Kafka recognized the "compromising" aspect in Kier-kegaard's writing, i.e. he realized that Kierkegaard's "Folterwerk" (Br, 238)was an instrument of self-torture, one which made Kierkegaard's personaldilemma a public matter. Kafka portrays Kierkegaard's texts as "screams"which are cloaked in a strategic obscurity which accounts for their essentialequivocality. His most admiring description of Kierkegaard's method isfound in a reflection from the fourth Oktavheft.

Neben seiner Beweisführung geht eine Bezauberung mit. Einer Beweisführungkann man in die Zauberwelt ausweichen, einer Bezauberung in die Logik, aberbeide gleichzeitig erdrücken, zumal sie etwas Drittes sind, lebender Zauber odernicht zerstörende, sondern aufbauende Zerstörung der Welt. (H, 125)

Kafka's description applies not only to the method of Kierkegaard, but tothat of the aphorist in general. The combination of logical proof and mys-teriously illogical "enchantment" is the hallmark of the aphorism in theGerman tradition, reflected in its tension between lucidly logical structureand obscure, opaque, elusive significance. Kafka admired in Kierkegaard'smethod, despite its "oppressiveness," this combination of enchantment andlogic, this "constructive destruction" so typical of the practices of the apho-rist. Kierkegaard's impact on Kafka, then, like that of Pascal, is primarilymethodological, reinforcing Kafka's appropriation of aphoristic expressionfor the "constructive destruction" of his own self.

Kafka's reception of the works of Pascal and Kierkegaard is certainlydecisive for his aphoristic production in the years 1917-18 and beyond. Thesignificance of these Christian authors lies, however, not in their religiousthought, nor in the model provided by their lives, but rather in the essential-ly aphoristic methods with which they accomplish self-analysis and literaryobjectification of the self. Through them Kafka came to realize the virtues ofa method which dissected "with wonderful knives," which constructed

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while destroying, which feigned conviction while spawning doubt, whichwas personal and intimate, yet ultimately objectified and equivocal. Thewritings of Kierkegaard, in addition, buttressed Kafka's sense of the prob-lematical conflict between the individual and the universal, corroborating hisconviction that this conflict ultimately manifests itself in a crisis of com-munication. The aphorism, with its characteristic problematization of theprocess of mediation between individual and universal principles, offereditself as an appropriate expressive form through which an attempt could bemade by which Kafka could come to terms with the conflict of mediationbetween individual and community.

III. Aphorism and Polemics: Karl Kraus

In the first two sections of this chapter we have investigated Kafka's recep-tion of aphoristic writings which approach the character of the autobio-graphical, betraying overriding concern with the self, its analysis, and itsportrayal. Within this broader context we have outlined the workings of adialectic of self-examination (self-critique) and self-creation (textualization ofthe self), each of these representing expressive possibilities inherent in theaphoristic texts to which Kafka responded. The aphorism divulged itself toKafka as a tool for introspective self-dissection, as well as for linguisticprojection, ornamentation - or transformation of the self through words - ofthe general sort associated with the aphorism of impression. Both of theseimpulses can be subsumed under the general category of "Selbstbeobach-tung," one of the primary tendencies of aphoristic expression. At the sametime, this "Selbstbeobachtung" which is so prominent in Kafka's aphorismsshould not be understood as "autobiographical" in the sense assumed bypositivistic literary analysis: self-examination and self-analysis in aphoristicexpression do not serve as simple "objective," impersonal, and honest self-assessments, but rather as incentives to transformation of the self through theaphoristic medium. We recall Kafka's commentary on the dicta of MarcusAurelius: "Gut ist es, wenn man sich vor sich selbst mit Worten zuschüttenkann, aber noch besser ist es, wenn man sich mit Worten ausschmückenkann, bis man ein Mensch wird, wie man es im Herzen wünscht" (Br, 26).One of Kafka's central concerns in the aphorisms, then, is the communica-tion and projection of the self "wie man es im Herzen wünscht." I havealready described the innovative strategy of "suggestive metaphor" evolvedby Kafka in the aphorisms for the communication of the "internal" self.What we must keep in mind is that Kafka's aphoristic pronouncements arealways tinged with the desire to re-create the self in textual form, i. e. toproject this self into an objectively effable expressive medium. "Selbst-

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Beobachtung," in Kafka's case, is never mere passive recording, but alwayscreative re-writing of the self.

While the tendency toward "Selbstbeobachtung" is most prominent inKafka's aphorisms, the aspect of "Menschenbeobachtung" is not whollyabsent. We must, however, understand "Menschenbeobachtung" both in thesense of observation of other individuals, and as observation on the condi-tion of humanity in general. When directed away from the self and towardsociety or the human world, aphoristic expression tends toward the criticaland the polemical, i. e. toward the critique of ideology and of human/socialpractice. Kafka was acquainted with the aphorism in this application at thevery least through the texts of Nietzsche. One scholar has tried to show thatKafka's aphorisms echo some themes present in Nietzsche's aphoristic writ-ings.28 However, there are no concrete documents which allow for an assess-ment of Kafka's direct reception of Nietzsche's texts, and thus the issue ofimpact, especially where the aphoristic method of Nietzsche is concerned,remains speculation. It is precisely the sym-philosophic, intellectual-com-munal quality of aphoristic expression which makes it difficult to localizepossible avenues of "influence," since many characteristic traits of aphoristicdiscourse are mediated either by the genre itself, or by a multitude of itspractitioners. The possible relationship between Kafka and Nietzsche willhence not be dealt with here, since we possess no reflections by Kafkadealing with the thought or works of Nietzsche which could serve as thebasis for an analysis of Kafka's Nietzsche-reception.29

There is, however, some evidence which indicates reception on Kafka'spart of the work of the most prominent contemporary aphorist of a critical,polemical bent, Karl Kraus. Indeed, Kraus perhaps outdid even Nietzsche inthe cultivation of the culturally critical aphorism, yet the possible relevanceof Kraus's aphorisms for Kafka's aphoristic production has never receivedscholarly attention.30

Two of Kraus's collections of aphorisms, Sprüche und Widersprüche andPro domo et mundo, appeared before Kafka's earnest concern with the formof the aphorism in 1917; the third collection, Nachts, appeared in 1918.There is, however, no evidence which indicates that Kafka was familiar withany of these works. Yet this fact in itself is not significant, for the aphorism is

28 Patrick Bridgwater, Kafka ana Nietzsche, pp. 22-8.29 On Kafka and Nietzsche, aside from Bridgwater's book-length study, see also

Ben Nagel, Kaßa und die Weltliteratur, pp. 299-327; Ralf Nicolai, "Wahrheit undLüge bei Kafka und Nietzsche"; and Sokel, Tragik und Ironie, pp.75ff.; for ageneral summary of scholarly assessments of the influence of Nietzsche on Kafkasee Binder's Kafka-Handbuch, I, 251-3.

30 It is surprising - but perhaps indicative - that in Bert Nagel's ambitious studyKafka und die Weltliteratur the name of Karl Kraus is never mentioned.

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such a fundamental aspect of Kraus's critical discourse that it is omnipresentin all his writings: the aphorism is, so to speak, a constituent element ofKraus's entire literary-polemical endeavor. In this sense, all of Kraus's worksare pointedly aphoristic, and familiarity with any of his texts necessarilyimplies familiarity with his aphoristic style.

Kafka first mentions Kraus in a diary entry from the year 1911. OnMarch 26 Kafka notes cryptically: "Früher Vortrag Loos und Kraus" ( , 52).The reference is to a lecture Kraus gave in Prague on the fifteenth of March, alecture which Kafka apparently attended.31 Unfortunately, Kafka's remark isso laconic as to give no information whatsoever either about his reactions toKraus's lecture, or about his impressions of the personality of the Viennesecritic. One is at first tempted to interpret this as a sign that the lecture madeno great impression on Kafka. Yet this would be especially surprising, givenKraus's renown as a moving and talented lecturer, and given Kafka's ownreceptivity to such dramatic performances. One might, for instance, take thefact that Kafka saw fit to mention this lecture at all - and over ten days after ithad occurred, at that - as a signal that it had made a more indelible mark.Kafka may, in fact, have wished to record his impressions, but found that thelapse of time between the experience and his attempt to record it had dulledand thus inhibited his reaction. By the same token, Kafka's irresponsivenessmay in part have been conditioned by the enmity which his close friend MaxBrod felt for Kraus. Just a few months after this lecture, in July 1911, Brodpublished a critical attack on Kraus in retaliation for the latter's parodisticcritique of Brod's novel Jüdinnen.32 Kraus, true to his nature, responded inkind to Brod's attack just a few days later.33 Prior to this time, however,Brod had been a great admirer of Kraus, whose influence among the Pragueliterati was quite extensive, as demonstrated by the frequency with which helectured in Prague, and by his impact on such writers as Willy Haas undFranz Werfel.34

Among the essays that Kraus read at the lecture attended by Kafka, thepolemical attack "Heine und die Folgen" is of special importance because of

31 On March 15, 1911 Kraus read at his Prague lecture "Der Traum ein WienerLeben," "Heine und die Folgen," "Desperanto," the "Antoniusrede" from his"Forumszene," and "Das Ehrenkreuz." See Die Fackel, no. 319/20 (April 1, 1911),where the program of the lecture is given.

32 Cf. Hartmut Binder, "Unvergebene Schlamperei: Ein unbekannter Brief FranzKafkas, "Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft, 25 (1981), p. 136.

33 Max Brod, "Ein mittelmäßiger Kopf," Die Aktion, no. 20/1 (July 3, 1911),col.622-25; Kraus's response appeared in Die Fackel, no.326-28 (July 8, 1911),pp. 35-6. Kafka, by the way, also composed a relatively extensive critique ofBrod's novel on the same day he mentioned the Kraus lecture, see T, 52.

34 On Kraus's impact on the writers of Prague, see Binder "Unvergebene Schlam-perei," p. 135.

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the plethora of aphoristic formulations which it contains. Indeed, parts ofthis essay were published as individual aphorisms, extracted from this great-er context.35 Consequently, an attentive listener - and Kraus apparentlycommanded only attentive listeners - would have become familiar with therhetorical verve and clever playfulness characteristic of Kraus's aphoristicmethod simply on the basis of such a lecture.

Despite the fact that ten years pass before Kafka again mentions the nameof Kraus in his letters or diaries, there is no reason to assume that Kafka hadno contact with Kraus's works over this span of time. Kraus, among otherthings, lectured in Prague somewhere on the average of twice a year; and hiscentrality in Austrian literary circles suggests that he was a figure whoseworks one simply could not ignore. Furthermore, the enthusiasm whichKafka expresses for Kraus's writings at later points in his life suggests thatthis affirmation was the result of familiarity with these texts over an exten-sive span of time. Kraus, in addition, was a leading figure in German-Jewishliterary circles of the period, and Kafka himself alludes to this in a letter toBrod from 1921, in which he writes of Kraus: "In dieser kleinen Welt derdeutsch-jüdischen Literatur herrscht er [Kraus] wirklich oder vielmehr dasvon ihm vertretene Prinzip, dem er sich so bewunderungswürdig un-tergeordnet hat, daß er sich sogar mit dem Prinzip verwechselt und anderediese Verwechslung mitmachen läßt" (Br, 336). At this time, at least, it isKraus's representativeness for German-Jewish literature which is foremost inKafka's mind. It was in reaction to his reading of Kraus's Literatur, oder manwird doch da sehn, found in this same letter to Brod, that Kafka formulatedhis insightful thoughts on the plight of the German-Jewish writer, a plightpredicated on the absence of an authentic language. Kafka maintains thatKraus recognized, or made apparent, the dilemma of these authors, a dilem-ma which Kafka describes in terms of three impossibilities, to which heinstinctively adds a fourth.

Sie [the German-Jewish writers] lebten zwischen drei Unmöglichkeiten . . .: derUnmöglichkeit, nicht zu schreiben, der Unmöglichkeit, deutsch zu schreiben, derUnmöglichkeit, anders zu schreiben, fast könnte man eine vierte Unmöglichkeithinzufügen, die Unmöglichkeit zu schreiben . . . (Ar, 337-8)

Kafka's immediate response to Kraus's text is composed of that mixture ofadmiration and critique which is characteristic of his reactions to Pascal andKierkegaard as well. Writing of Kraus's "magical operette," Kafka remarks:

Ich glaube, ich sondere ziemlich gut, das, was in dem Buch nur Witz ist, allerdingsprachtvoller, dann was erbarmungswürdige Kläglichkeit ist, und schließlich wasWahrheit ist, zumindest so viel Wahrheit, als es meine schreibende Hand ist, auch

35 See the aphorisms on Heine found in B W, 123.

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so deutlich und beängstigend körperlich. Der Witz ist hauptsächlich das Mau-scheln, so mauscheln wie Kraus kann niemand, trotzdem doch in dieser deutsch-jüdischen Welt kaum jemand etwas anderes als mauscheln kann . . . (Br, 336)

Here Kafka demonstrates his own critical sagacity. While moved by theextraordinary "physicality" of Kraus's truth, and appreciative of Kraus's"Witz" as well, Kafka nevertheless penetrates to the "pitiable wretchedness"of which Kraus the satirist is often guilty. In this sense Kafka's evaluationconfirms the common critical opinion which applauds Kraus's cause and thetruthful authenticity for which he campaigned, while objecting to the indis-criminate application of a satirical method which is "wretched" at least in-sofar as it maliciously attacks everything that enters its purview. More sig-nificant, however, is the fact that Kraus, his method, and his language areaccepted as prototypical for the German-Jewish writer in general. In thissense Kraus personified for Kafka the existential crises of the European-Jewish intellectual prior to the rise of fascism. Kafka is most interested inKraus as a representative of this generation of authors to which Kafka him-self belonged. His interest in Kraus's literature, moreover, is predicated onthe fact that it appears to be symptomatic of the literature of the German-Jews, and thus crucial for Kafka's writing as well. Kraus's polemics, hissatirical wit, and his pointedly aphoristic style were integral elements of this"characteristic" literary situation.

For the remainder of his life Kafka retained an outspokenly positiveattitude toward Kraus and his work. In June of 1922 Kafka requests of hisacquaintance Robert Klopstock that he send Kafka the next edition of theFackel when it appears. "Dagegen würde ich Sie wohl bitten, wenn eine neueFackel erscheinen sollte - sehr lange ist sie schon ausgeblieben - und sie nichtzu teuer ist, nach dem Durchlesen sie mir zu schicken, diese süße Speise allerguten und bösen Triebe will ich mir nicht versagen" (Br, 380). Kafka'swords not only betray the enthusiasm with which he read Kraus's journal,they imply as well that Kafka read the Fackel on a regular basis, since he wasaware that an issue had not appeared for some time. And Kafka's fascinationfor Kraus's journal never abated: as late as February 1924, just a few monthsbefore his death, Kafka wrote of "die . . . entnervenden Orgien" whichreading the Fackel elicited in him (Br, 477).36

This positive reception of Kraus and his literature occurs, to be sure, at atime well beyond that during which Kafka was centrally concerned with theform of the aphorism. Yet it remains likely that Kafka's familiarity withKraus and his works began much earlier and that this figure, who certainlymade an indelible impression on the contemporary literary-cultural scene of

36 For further references to Kraus by Kafka, see Br, 459 and 446.

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Austria, left an ineradicable mark on Kafka at a very early stage. Stylisticanalysis will demonstrate that the polemical manner of Kraus's aphorisms ismore or less foreign to Kafka's aphoristic texts; yet it is probable that Kafkaat least became aware of the critical, rhetorical power of this mode of expres-sion through the example of Kraus. Here, moreover, Kafka could witnessthe contra-dictory thrust of aphoristic expression, its destructive, de-con-structive impulse carried out with the ultimate aim of re-construction.

The intent of this chapter has been to document the various avenuesthrough which Kafka became acquainted with style, form, structure, andpurpose of aphoristic discourse. By examining his reception of certainaphoristic texts and writers, we have been able to evaluate Kafka's responsesto aphoristic discourse and assess concretely the functions he associated withit. While I have restricted myself here primarily to "sources" for whichdocumentable evidence of reception is available, this should not lead to theconclusion that these were the only aphoristic writings with which Kafkawas familiar. Indeed, Kafka is likely to have read some works of the Frenchmoralists, since editions of the maxims of Chamfort and Vauvenargues wereamong the books in his personal library.37 The main point here is thatKafka's access to the tradition of the aphorism came from various and di-verse texts, and this helps to explain the diversity of his own aphoristicproduction.

In order to summarize the phenomena and drives which Kafka came toassociate with the aphorism on the basis of reception of aphoristic writings, Ishall orient the ideas presented here around different interpretations of thenotion of "Selbstdenken," a concept that Paul Requadt connected to thethought of the aphorist in his seminal work on Lichtenberg.38 Viewed withinthe context of "Menschenbeobachtung," self-thought implies an inde-pendence of thought which allows the aphorist to stand outside of the humancommunity, criticizing and judging its actions and practices, its moral andpolitical stances. In other words, "Selbstdenken" here connotes the ability tothink for oneself, the capacity to make oneself autonomous of the structuresof tradition and custom. At the same time, within the rubric of "Selbst-beobachtung," self-thought can be taken to imply the tendency to reflectupon the self, making the self the object of one's cognitive critique. Finally,"Selbstdenken" can be taken as a manner of creatively thinking or re-think-ing the self, i. e. of projecting, transforming, and re-writing the self through

37 Wagenbach, "Kafkas Handbibliothek," pp.253 & 261.38 On "Selbstdenken" see Requadt, Lichtenberg, pp. 151-61.

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the textual form of the aphorism, productively exploiting its rhetorical force.All of these aspects of "Selbstdenken" are present in, and relevant to, Kafka'saphorisms, which display independent-critical thought, self-critique, andself-textualization. Kafka's aphoristic texts, then, represent his attempts at"Selbstdenken" in all these senses, as well as his striving for resolution of thecrises of integration and communication, the latter of these defined essential-ly as a crisis of self-portrayal.

In a letter to Ottla from 1919 Kafka defined "jedes selbstständige [sic]Denken" as the possession of enough courage to dare "den Sprung überDeinen Schatten" (BO, 63). His aphorisms from the period of 1917-18 andbeyond are exemplary of just such "selbstständiges Denken," of autonomousthought which not only derives from the autonomy of the self as individual,but is concerned with the self qua individual and the self qua element or partof a greater communal whole. In the Ziirau period, fraught as it was withpersonal crisis, Kafka most needed to turn to a form of "self-thought" thatwould permit him to leap over his own shadow - a leap that would, ulti-mately, be a salto mortale. Kafka's aphorisms are thus individual in thesignificant sense that they are concerned with the individual; at the same timethey participate in the tradition of aphoristic expression to the extent thatthey share profoundly in the themes, structures, forms, styles, and strategiescharacteristic of aphoristic discourse. As aphorist, Kafka participates in theintellectual community of aphorists; his aphoristic texts "create" their ownprecursors in the sense that they are defined by, and help to define, theheritage of aphoristic expression. The next chapter examines the participa-tion of Kafka's aphorisms in this aphoristic "heritage" on a concrete, formallevel.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Kafka's Aphorisms: Intratext and Intertext

"Das ganze erscheint zwar sinnlos, aber in seiner Artabgeschlossen." Kafka on "Odradek"(£, 155).

Kafka's aphoristic texts, because of their very aphoristic quality, have to bedealt with in such a way that a single text or sub-set of texts are not taken asrepresentative of the "whole" of Kafka's aphoristic production. The interre-lationship of aphoristic texts is not one in which the individual fragmentrepresents the others, and thus forms a kind of microcosmic "whole"; rather,the dynamics of the aphoristic group configuration is one characterized bycounterpoint, one in which texts supplement, correct, retract, and contradictone another. Moreover, one must be especially careful not to judge individu-al aphorisms as expressions of Kafka's "authentic" personal view of theworld or of the self. The aphorisms, in their very essence, are texts whichderive their vitality from the interaction and dialogue which they carry onamong themselves and with other texts in an aphoristic "heritage." Thisinteractive component must constantly be kept in mind. It obtains on twodistinct levels: that of the aphoristic texts of the given author, here Kafka,taken as a group; and that level on which a trans-historical dialogue with thetexts of other aphorists and with conventional wisdom (as verbal expression)is initiated. In what follows, I will refer to the first dialogic dimension as"intratextual," and to the second as "intertextual."

Throughout these analyses it is important to keep in mind that one of thepurposes of aphoristic expression is the explicit problematization of simpleconceptions of "truth." In this sense one of the aphoristic texts from theOktavhefte can serve'as a kind of methodological sign-post for the proce-dure to be followed here.

Geständnis und Lüge ist das Gleiche. Um gestehen zu können, lügt man. Das, wasman ist, kann man nicht ausdrücken, denn dieses ist man eben; mitteilen kann mannur das, was man nicht ist, also die Lüge. Erst im Chor mag eine gewisse Wahrheitliegen. (H, 343)

This text should not be treated as a programmatic statement, but rather as anindicator of the general direction, the general domain of issues, in whichKafka's aphorisms move. The text addresses, first of all, that problem ofcommunication which we have identified as central to the concerns of

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aphoristic expression. It further points to a more specific communicativeconcern in Kafka's aphoristic production; namely, to the iteration of the self,of one's authentic and essential being. Communication, "mit-teilen," how-ever, presupposes a standard of difference (distance, a breach) between thecommunicator and the matter to be communicated. In view of this, self-communication becomes possible only through an alienation of the self; atthis point, however, the self which is to be communicated is no longerimmediate and essential. Self-communication and self-analysis thus becomeself-projection, a sketching of the self projected into the objectified (andreified) realm of text. Confession, i. e. communicative expression in whichthe self is both communicating subject and communicative object, is alwaysalready lie. Yet Kafka proposes one alternative - to be sure, one which ispermeated with the reluctance of compromise - that he describes as "einegewisse Wahrheit," namely the "truth" of consensus, of the counterpoint ofvarious and diverse voices. The aphorisms embody better than any othertexts by Kafka the "dispersal" of a univocal authorial voice into diversevoices which make a "chorus" only when taken together. One could speakmetaphorically of a "diaspora" of narrative voice in the aphoristic texts. Therole of the critic, in this instance, is to combine the aphoristic voices into achorus - into many choruses: for indeed, the combinatory possibilities are, ifnot infinite, then certainly multiple.

To those who are dissatisfied with this, so to speak, "creative" choralenactment of "truth," one can only reply with Kafka that this is all we have.But perhaps one should not take the tone of resignation in the cited aphorismtoo seriously; in fact, a peculiar ambiguity in the attributive adjective"gewisse" with which Kafka modifies this choral truth hints at the over-throw of this resignation. The phrase "eine gewisse Wahrheit" can be inter-preted, on the one hand, to mean "a certain type of truth"; on the other hand,the adjective can be read more literally, in which case the phrase can beinterpreted as "a certain truth," "certain" here understood in the sense of"secure" or "sure." If we, following the method alluded to by Kafka, at-tempt to bring these seemingly dissonant statements into choral counter-point, then our critical rendition will sound something like this: we in factonly posses a certain measure of truth; but insofar as we accept this limitationplaced upon our ability to recognize truth, we attain a certain certainty.Truth, to move to a spacial metaphor, is not something that one can locateby putting one's finger on it; rather it is a general domain whose borders canmerely be circumscribed, and only to this extent can it be "defined."

In order to adjudicate the foregoing interpretation with the interpretivepractice it advocates, let us add some more voices to the chorus. The firstbelongs to the Kafka of the aphorisms, and thus the merging of these twotextual voices occurs in the "intratextual" dimension.

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Wahrheit ist unteilbar, kann sich also selbst nicht erkennen; wer sie erkennen will,muß Lüge sein. (aph. 80)

This text presents once again the crisis of truth as a crisis of self-recognition:the self-recognition of truth itself. Recognition, this text implies, to theextent that it must distance itself from the object recognized, also alienatesitself from the very ground of truth, thereby becoming lie. This text and thefirst one cited above are both thematically and structurally consonant withone another: both treat slightly different aspects of the problem of truthfulself-recognition, and both manifest in their presentation a congruous cogni-tive structure, that which we previously have designated as the structure ofexclusion. This structure is one of the most common cognitive patterns inKafka's aphoristic texts, and to the extent that texts have this structure incommon, they can be said to "perform" a consonant truth on this structurallevel.

Moving now to the intertextual context, we can bring these aphoristictexts by Kafka into relation with an aphorism from Wittgenstein's Ver-mischte Bemerkungen.

Man kann nicht die Wahrheit sagen; wenn man sich noch nicht selbst bezwungenhat. Man kann sie nicht sagen; - aber nicht, weil man noch nicht gescheit genugist. Nur der kann sie sagen, der schon in ihr ruht; nicht der, der noch in derUnwahrheit ruht, und nur einmal aus der Unwahrheit heraus nach ihr langt.1

A number of elements connect this text to Kafka's aphorisms relating totruth and lie. First, there is the absolutization of the duality between truthand untruth - one rests either in one or the other, not in both, and, above all,not in some third sphere that is neither truth nor untruth. Secondly, thesetexts are not concerned simply with questions about the recognition of truth,but rather with the problem of expressing it. Thirdly, this possessing/expres-sing of truth is presented as inevitably related to self-possession and self-control. At this point, however, comes the parting of the ways, for whileKafka insists on the aporia that one cannot express truth except from outsideof truth itself, and thus from the sphere of lie, Wittgenstein seems to allowfor the possibility that one is able to express truth from within its verydomain. Kafka's text makes such resolution appear impossible. Of course,our goal here is not to bring these texts into full accord; the purpose of thesejuxtapositions, rather, is to demonstrate the way in which Kafka's aphoristictexts participate in both intratextual and intertextual dialogues with "com-plementary" texts.

This complementarity or dialogic interaction among aphoristic texts onboth intratextual and intertextual levels can be highlighted through further

1 Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, p. 73.

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sets of examples. Each of the following three texts from the aphorisms Kafkacollected out of the Oktavhefte presents a contrast between concepts ofpossession and being.

Es gibt kein Haben, nur ein Sein, nur ein nach letztem Atem, nach Erstickenverlangendes Sein. (aph. 35)Seine Antwort auf die Behauptung, er besitze vielleicht, sei aber nicht, war nurZittern und Herzklopfen, (aph. 37)Das Wort "sein" bedeutet im Deutschen beides: Dasein und Ihmgehören. (aph. 46)

In Kafka's original version of aphorism 35 the word "Besitz" occurs in placeof the word "Haben," underscoring further the fact that these texts form aconceptual "community."2 Yet each text broaches the dichotomy betweenpossession and being in a unique fashion. Aphorism 35 begins by denyingthe very subsistence of "possession," claiming that all is "being." It goes on,however, to describe this omnipresent "being" in paradoxical terms: it is abeing which longs for non-being, a breathing that desires final breath andsuffocation.

Aphorism 37 takes a totally different approach to the juxtaposition ofpossession and being: here the text choreographs a dramatic scene in whichwe witness the response - trembling and a pounding heart - of an unnamedcharacter who is confronted with the assertion that he "possesses" but "is"not. Now aphorism 35, we recall, had explicitly denied the possibility of anysuch possession that precludes being, maintaining, in fact, the opposite ofthis. In other words, this second aphorism depicts a situation, the possibilityof whose occurrence the first text disavows. One could, of course, makevarious claims in an attempt to harmonize these two texts: for example, onecould conjure up the terminology of existential philosophy and maintain thatbeing is the authentic mode of existence, whereas possession is inauthentic.Viewed in these terms, the fear with which the fictional character of apho-rism 37 responds when admonished that he possesses, but is not, is a reactionto the recognition that he is leading an existentially false or "inauthentic" ex-istence. Yet this reconciliation can only be accomplished by an interpretiveinterpolation, the addition of terminology or fusion of Kafka's vocabularywith a conceptual horizon which extends well beyond the boundaries of thetexts themselves.

Aphorism 46 takes yet another tack on the problematical relationship ofbeing and possession, and it presents a position that is consonant with thoseof the previous two texts. Here the opposition between being and possessingis sublated through reference to the equivocality of language: "sein" as a verb

The original version of aphorism 35 reads: "Es gibt keinen Besitz, nur ein Sein, nurein nach dem letzten Atem, nach Ersticken strebendes Sein."

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means "to be"; as a possessive adjective it means "his." This aphorism thussimply makes a factual, if not commonly recognized, assertion about thepotential ambiguity of the word "sein." Its implications, however, remainsuggestively and provocatively open, allowing for any number of interpre-tive commentaries. On the one hand, the coincidence of conflicting mean-ings in the word "sein" could be taken as an explanation for the confusion ofthese two modes of existence, the ambiguity of the word reflecting thisconceptual confusion. Alternatively, we could take this ambiguity as indica-tive of an essential ambiguity in the states of possession and being them-selves. Read in this manner, the sublation of the opposition between theconcepts of being and possession in the word "sein" manifests an essentialidentity between these two modes. According to this interpretation, then,aphorism 46 overrides the distinction between being and possession that thefirst two texts presuppose.

Taken together, these three texts present fundamentally distinct perspec-tives on, and approaches to, a single issue. If in one case the priority of beingover possession is asserted, a second text dramatizes a concrete example inwhich the opposite holds, while in a third text these apparent oppositions arefused through an observation about the equivocality of the word "sein."Significant here is the recognition that individual aphoristic treatments of asingle problem neither corroborate one another, nor supplant one another;rather, they tend toward a relationship of supplementarity in the sense thateach adds a new perspective on the issue addressed, and together they ap-proach that "perspectivistic" objectivity programmatically defended byNietzsche (cf. Werke, II, 861). Both their experimental presentation of alter-native viewpoints, and their exploration of alternative strategies of expres-sion, are typical of the aphorist's method. Kafka, here a quintessential apho-rist, investigates possible states of affairs by asserting hypothetical pos-sibilities and recording independent observations. It is in this sense that thesetexts can be called "complementary" or "contrapuntal"; they do not explicit-ly conflict with one another, rather they, like individual voices in a choir, tocome back to Kafka's image for this multi-perspectival "truth," can be over-laid, combined in a conceptual counterpoint that is not uni-vocal. This no-tion of "truth" as the concomitance of incommensurate, but not mutuallyexclusive positions supplants for Kafka, as for the aphorist in general, anydogmatic notion of "truth" in which all voices sing in (ideologically) coordi-nated unison.

The method Kafka applies in aphorism 46, his turn to an examination oflanguage in an attempt to reconcile conceptual extremes, allows for correla-tion to the method of other aphorists, thus permitting us to shift our analysisto the intertextual level. An aphorism from Hofmannsthal's Buch derFreunde provides an apt text for comparison.

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Daß wir Deutschen das uns Umgebende als ein Wirkendes - die "Wirklichkeit" -bezeichnen, die lateinischen Europäer als die "Dinglichkeit," zeigt die fundamenta-le Verschiedenheit des Geistes, und daß jene und wir in ganz verschiedener Weiseauf dieser Welt zu Hause sind. (A, 75)

Regardless of the manner in which one interprets these two texts, we shouldbe able to concur on the similarity of approaches. In both instances languageis taken as symptomatic of profound and fundamental attitudes with whichwe engage the world and comprehend our existence in it. Analysis of lan-guage leads to analysis of the means by which we understand and deal withexistence. It is irrelevant for such analyses whether language is taken as adetermining force, a shaper of world-view, or simply as a reflection of it; thecorrelation between language and understanding - and that is what is at issuehere - is asserted and upheld in both cases. We are reminded of Fritz Mauth-ner's critique of language, or even of Freud's textualization of the dream inorder to provide the basis for an interpretive analysis which uncovers truthshidden deep within the unconscious. These associations, of course, place theabove aphoristic texts into a broader context than that of the textual andconceptual strategies of aphoristic expression.

These preliminary examinations are intended as a demonstration of themethod I am suggesting for an examination of Kafka's aphorisms. I considerthis interpretive procedure to be one both appropriate and adapted to thecharacter of the aphorism, insofar as this method attempts to take cognizanceof, and do justice to, the hypothetical, experimental character of aphoristicdiscourse, as well as to the interactional, dialogic dynamics so central to thisgenre. It would be inherently false to approach Kafka's aphoristic texts withdesigns of a totalizing interpretation. And while from certain literary-theoretical persepectives this assertion would be thought to hold for allforms of text, it seems to me to be most obviously relevant to the aphorismsince, as textual form, it consciously and emphatically denies totality andfinality. There are no final viewpoints for the aphorist; there are only variousfragmentary observations, hypotheses, or ruminations which, when taken asa dynamic group, can perhaps approximate something like a coherent "ob-jective" truth. But one can continue to add new "fragments" and new view-points ad infinitum, so that knowledge and understanding drop the mask offinality, becoming dynamic and open-ended interpretive incursions into the"world" and the "self." The interpretive strategy employed here seeks toconform with this "aphoristic" situation.

With this preliminary "discourse on method" in mind, we shall now turnour attention to examinations and discussions of Kafka's aphoristic texts.Our result will not be a systematic philosophy; rather we will seek to dem-onstrate throughout this investigation that Kafka's aphoristic texts con-form in structure and style to the qualities characteristic of this genre; and in

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this sense we will emphasize the fragmentariness of these reflections. I beginwith a discussion of Kafka's aphorisms in the context of the aphoristicnotebooks in which they were composed, focusing primarily on the distor-tion which these texts underwent based on their mediation to us throughBrod's edition. An examination of Kafka's compositional procedure, as it isevidenced in alterations and modifications that these texts underwent in theprocess of composition and revision, will support our view that in theseaphorisms, true to the nature of the genre, Kafka was more concerned withstylistic density and discursive technique than with the formulation of par-ticular conceptual/philosophical statements or ideas. The second section willtreat Kafka's aphorisms with a view toward the textual strategies and stylis-tic or structural devices which they employ, relating them whenever possibleto texts of other aphorists. Throughout, we will examine the interactiveintratextual aspect of Kafka's aphoristic texts on the basis of analyses of aselected group of aphorisms which deal with an identical theme.

I. Compositional History and Compositional Strategies of Kafka'sAphorisms

Kafka's most concentrated period of aphoristic production begins in October1917 and lasts until February 1918, during which time he composes the morethan 150 aphorisms that can be found in the third and fourth Oktavhefte?About two-thirds of these aphoristic texts are extracted out of the notebooksby Kafka in the fall of 1920, presumably between the months of August andNovember.4 At this time Kafka copied the aphorisms, which later becamethe so-called "Betrachtungen über Sünde, Leid, Hoffnung und den wahrenWeg," onto numbered slips of paper. He then subsequently put these textstogether in a typescript which may represent a preliminary stage for theirpublication.

At this point it is necessary to insert a few observations, some of whichare based on examination of the original notebooks, the numbered slips, andthe typescript. It is my hypothesis that Kafka returned to the Oktavhefte in

For the dating of the Oktavhefte see Malcolm Pasley and Klaus Wagenbach,"Datierung sämtlicher Texte Franz Kafkas," Kafka-Symposion, ed. Jürgen Born,et al. (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1965), pp. 76-80; these notebooks containnumerous dated entries, so there is no question about the accuracy of this chronol-ogy. The notebooks which Brod calls the third and fourth are actually the finaltwo, chronologically, in this series of eight notebooks.See Werner Hoffmann's brief history of the aphorisms from the Oktavhefte, Kaf-ka-Handbuch, II, 475; see also Chris Bezzel, Kafka Chronik, Reihe Hanser, 178(Munich: Hanser, 1975), p. 162, and Pasley/Wagenbach, "Datierung," p. 69.

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1920 with the express intention of gleaning texts from these notebooks thatmight be published in the form of a collection of aphorisms. There are anumber of indicators which point to such an intent. First, large portions ofthese notebooks, sometimes even entire pages, are crossed out. However,the texts that ultimately were collected on the slips of paper and on thetypescript were, for the most part, not crossed out in the Oktavhefte. It isclear that Kafka was not basing his selection merely on the characteristic ofaphoristic diction, for many well-wrought aphorisms are struck through andsubsequently left out of the numbered collection. It is impossible to discernexactly what principles Kafka employed in segregating some of the apho-risms from the others, since the "preferred" texts display neither contentual-thematic nor strict formal unity. It is my speculation that Kafka intended tocollect, and perhaps to publish, an artificially limited number of these texts:on the basis of certain evidence, some of which will only come to light in thecourse of this exposition, I assume that this number was the round figure ofone hundred. This supposition is supported, for example, by the fact that thenumbering of the aphorisms ceases with 109, and that in some instances verydiverse texts are collected together under one single number - this has anexplanation, as we will see shortly. Moreover, numerous aphorisms whichwere not taken over into the collection are nevertheless not struck through inthe notebooks, implying that they may perhaps have been held in reserve tobe added to the collection at a later time. In addition, some of the texts on thenumbered slips and in the typescript were themselves crossed out, andwould perhaps have been eliminated from the collection if Kafka had contin-ued his editing process.

At the time when he edited the notebooks and collected the individualaphorisms, Kafka made some revisions of these texts. In some instanceswords are changed, in others entire sentences are added.5 In addition, somelarger reflections were reduced to relatively small aphoristic texts. In suchinstances the portion of the larger text which becomes a part of the collectionis set off in brackets in the notebook, oftentimes with the surrounding pas-sages crossed out.

In contrast to this, the transposition of the texts from the numbered slipsof paper to the typescript was purely mechanical. Each text which is crossed

It is generally possible to discern beyond doubt whether revisions to texts wereadded at a later time, or whether they transpired during the process of compositionitself. For the most part this is true because in the notebooks each text was original-ly separated from others by horizontal lines which defined the spacial limitations ofthe original texts. In the instance of aph. l ("Der wahre Weg . . ."), for example,the concluding sentence of the final text is a revision that is squeezed in betweentext and horizontal line, thus presumably added in 1920 during the primary editingprocedure.

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through on the slip of paper is marked with an Kxx" in the margin of thetypescript. That the copying of these texts onto the typescript was a whollymechanical process is best demonstrated by the fact that obvious errors in thehandwritten versions of some texts are taken over into the typed copy. Thisis unquestionably demonstrated by the following example. The handwrittentext of aph. 39b reads like this:

Der Weg ist unendlich, da ist nichts abzuziehen, nichts zuzugeben und doch hältdoch [sie!] jeder noch seine eigene kindliche Elle daran . . .

The superfluous second "doch" goes into the typescript, where it then even-tually is crossed out. This indicates clearly that Kafka simply copied the textsword for word, without critical reflection, from the numbered slips of paperto the typescript.

With these comments we begin to get a first inkling of the problems and,indeed, distortions inherent in Brod's rendition of the aphorisms and Ok-tavhefte as presented in the Hochzeitsvorbereitungen volume. There are,among other things, minor discrepancies in the actual wording of some textsbetween the numbered slips of paper/typescript (these two are consistentwith one another throughout) and the wording given by Brod. In addition,some discrepancies arise between Brod's notation of texts crossed out in themanuscripts and those which actually are crossed out: in some instancesBrod claims that texts were struck through, where they in fact are not, and inother instances he fails to note that a text has been crossed out. Thesediscrepancies can easily be attributed merely to careless editing on Brod'span. They are, to be sure, minor problems, although they do put in questionthe rigor with which Kafka's texts as a whole were edited by Brod. How-ever, there are more shocking discrepancies which come to light when oneexamines Kafka's notebooks and manuscripts of the aphorisms in some de-tail.

Brod's edition of the aphorisms and Oktavhefte distorts the character ofthe relationship between Oktavheft and aphoristic manuscript. This distor-tion results from a single editorial practice: the substitution of the revisedtypescript version of each segregated aphoristic text for the original versionof the text as it appears in the notebooks. Since Brod went to the trouble toinclude both the aphoristic collection and the complete texts of the Ok-tavhefte in his edition, one wonders why he expended the considerableeditorial effort of inserting the revised texts in their proper places in hisedition of the notebooks. If he had spared himself this effort and remainedfaithful to the Oktavhefte, then scholars would be generally more aware ofthe considered attention Kafka gave to the revision of these texts. As it is,Brod's edition leaves the impression that the original texts from the Ok-tavhefte somehow occurred to Kafka in a final form, and that he took them

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up without alteration when selecting them out of the notebooks for theplanned collection.

One further distortion slips into Brod's edition as a result of this ques-tionable editorial practice: some texts which were specifically composed forthe aphoristic collection at the time Kafka returned to the Oktavhefte in 1920are falsely placed into the Oktavhefte in Brod's edition. It is a matter here ofeight texts, in each case the second entry under a single number where twotexts that are otherwise unrelated occur together. These are the second textsincluded in aphs. 26 ("Es gibt ein Ziel . . ."); 29 ("Das Tier entwindet. . .");39a ("Es wäre denkbar, daß Alexander der Große . . ."); 54 ("Mit stärkstemLicht . . ."); 76 ("Ein Umschwung . . ."); 99 ("Manche nehmen an . . .");106 ("Kannst du denn etwas anderes kennen . . ."); and 109 ("Es ist nichtnotwendig . . .").6 These texts, then, were not composed in 1917-18 at all,as Brod's edition leads us to believe, but rather in the fall of 1920. Thisexplains, among other things, why some of these texts also appear amongthe miscellaneous fragments in Brod's edition.7 These eight texts, then, werefirst composed in other notebooks and not in the Oktavhefte,9 This recogni-tion is an important one not merely because it drastically alters the date ofcomposition of these eight aphorisms; rather, it is significant as well becauseof what it indicates about Kafka's procedures in putting together the manu-script versions of the aphoristic texts. It is important to recognize that Kaf-ka's involvement with the aphorisms from the Oktavhefte was so intensiveduring the process of selection and revision in 1920 that he was spurred on tocreate further texts in a similar style. In general, the intensity of Kafka'sconcern with the revision of the earlier texts has been overlooked. This, inturn, has prevented scholars from assessing the profound role which theaphorism played in Kafka's literary production during the middle period ofhis creativity, from 1917 to 1920.

In the fall of 1920 Kafka was nothing less than obsessed with the aphoris-tic texts from the Oktavhefte. This is demonstrated, for example, by thetime and energy that he invested in the task of editing the notebooks in thefirst place, making handwritten copies of aphorisms on individual slips of

I will henceforth refer to these texts, in order to avoid confusion, as aphs. 26/2, 2972, 39a/2, 54/2, 76/2, 99/2, 106/2, and 109/2, indicating that they are the second oftwo individual aphoristic texts included under their respective number in Kafka'scollection.Compare, for example, H, 303 with aph. 26/2; H, 359 with aph. 29/2; H, 330 withaph. 54/2; H, 327 with aph. 76/2; H, 318 with aph. 99/2; and H, 318f. with aph.106/2.The texts, with the exception of aph. 99/2, can be found in the manuscript note-books designated as XLIII and XLVII by the present editors and holders of Kafka's"Nachlaß."

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paper, editing these texts a second time, and, in some instances, creating andadding new aphorisms to the collection, numbering the slips of paper, andfinally making a typescript of the texts. Further evidence of the manner inwhich these texts quite literally took possession of him and his thoughts atthis time can be found in references which Kafka makes to some of theseaphorisms in his correspondence with friends. The first example of thiscomes from a letter to Max Brod from August 1920. Kafka is responding toideas Brod set forth in his book Heidentum, Christentum, Judentum.

Am nächsten kommt man vielleicht Deiner Auffassung, wenn man sagt: Es gibttheoretisch eine vollkommene irdische Glücksmöglichkeit, nämlich an das ent-scheidend Göttliche glauben und nicht zu ihm streben. Diese Glücksmöglichkeitist ebenso Blasphemie wie unerreichbar, aber die Griechen waren ihr vielleichtnäher als viele andere. (Br, 279-80)

In this response Kafka quotes almost word for word the text of aphorism 69of the "Betrachtungen . . ."

Theoretisch gibt es eine vollkommene Glücksmöglichkeit: An das Unzerstörbarein sich glauben und nicht zu ihm streben.

Numerous conclusions can be drawn from this self-reference by Kafka.9 Onthe most superficial level, we can assume that Kafka had already begun toedit the aphorisms in the Oktavhefte by the time this letter was written inearly August (the letter is postmarked August 7, 1920). More importantly,the fact that he cites it indicates the extent to which he himself was carriedaway by the rhetoric of the remark. I consciously emphasize the "rhetoric"of the statement rather than its content, for there are signs which suggest thatKafka was more concerned with the manner of formulation, than he waswith the actual substance of the statement. The first of these is the fact thatKafka attributes this notion to Brod, rather than identifying it with his ownthoughts. This implies that Kafka did not assign any personal significance tothis idea, and thus he could freely associate it with the thoughts presented inBrod's book. Furthermore, Kafka undertakes some substitutions ofterminology when citing this formulation in the letter to Brod: The "Glücks-möglichkeit'' is now modified by the adjective "irdische," and "das Unzer-störbare in sich" has been replaced by "das entscheidend Göttliche." Presum-ably Kafka is adapting the statement to the terminology used by Brod in histreatise. But it is precisely this ability to adapt the formulation to a newcontext which alludes to the fact that Kafka was more enmeshed in thestructure of the formulation than he was attached to its content, to the

Binder also notes the echo of this aphorism in the letter to Brod, but interprets itssignificance in quite a different manner; see MuC, 89-90.

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Statement itself. By attributing this thought to Brod, Kafka demonstrates hisown distance from it. Yet he remained enthralled with the structure of theformulation, this structure presenting in paradigmatic fashion (i. e. as Ge-stalt) the problematical transition from theoretical recognition to practicalimplementation that was fundamental to Kafka's thought during the com-position (and, one might add, his own reception three years later) of theaphorisms. In other words, the content of this aphoristic remark - and I takethis to be representative of Kafka's aphorisms in general - was not a reflex ofKafka's personal "philosophy" or religious vision; its structure, however, atleast at the time of his own reception of these texts in 1920, remainedimprinted upon his mind.

A second reference by Kafka to one of the aphorisms can be found in aletter to Milena from fall 1920, presumable written in November. Kafka isapparently responding to a statement on Milena's part that "Foltern" is ofutmost significance to him and his literature.

Ja, das Foltern ist mir äußerst wichtig, ich beschäftige mich mit nichts anderem alsmit Gefoltertwerden und Foltern. Warum? Aus einem ähnlichen Grund wie Per-kins und ähnlich unüberlegt, mechanisch und traditionsgemäß; nämlich um ausdem verdammten Mund das verdammte Wort zu erfahren. Die Dummheit diedarin liegt (Erkenntnis der Dummheit hilft nichts) habe ich einmal so ausgedrückt:"Das Tier entwindet dem Herrn die Peitsche und peitscht sich selbst, um Herr zuwerden, und weiß nicht, daß das nur eine Phantasie ist, erzeugt durch einen neuenKnoten im Peitschenriemen des Herrn." (BM, 290)

Here Kafka quotes aphorism 29/2, a text which, as we now know, waswritten in the fall of 1920 and added into the manuscript of the aphorismsgleaned from the Oktavhefte. Again, the main point is that Kafka's referenceto this text in the letter to Milena indicates the extent to which the aphorismswere constantly present in Kafka's mind at this time; he was, so it seems,"enchanted" with their pithiness. To be sure, in this instance Kafka admitsthe centrality of the theme of torture for him and his life, and thus cites thisaphorism as a text which is representative of his thoughts on this matter. Yetas opposed to the aphorism he cited in the letter to Brod, the text of apho-rism 29/2 is not theoretical and abstract, but rather concrete, dramatic, andtending toward the parabolic. In this sense it reflects the "objectification ofthe subjective" that we have identified as a central thrust in Kafka's apho-risms. Moreover, the text functions as a metaphorical encipherment, as a"suggestive metaphor," to employ the terminology introduced here, to lendconcrete manifestation to what is in essence a structural problem: the identityof torture and self-torture, or the paradox that self-mastery expresses itself asself-subjugation. Kafka's concern in this text, according to his own state-ment, is with a particular "Dummheit," namely that of using torture to force

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someone to speak.10 In this aphoristic text, at least as he cites it in the contextof this letter, his own obsession with torture is identified with a form of self-torture whose goal is a kind of self-expression through which he hoped toattain self-mastery. This interpretation, which corroborates the thesis that inthe aphorisms Kafka is experimenting with a new form of self-expressionand self-projection (i. e. self-control), is justified primarily by the context inwhich the aphorism is cited by Kafka; nothing in the text itself would pre-vent a different interpretation in a different context. This seemingly endlesscontextuability of such Gestalt metaphors defines their multiple interpreta-bility. This, as I have argued, is predicated on a privileging of a structuralconfiguration which is manifest in an "uprooted" metaphorical "vehicle."

The above examples of auto-references by Kafka to certain aphorismsdocument the centrality of his concern with these texts in the fall of 1920. Atthe same time, the manner in which Kafka applies them in the individualcontexts helps support the assertion that structural principles and rhetoricalform take priority over statement or content.

At this point it is necessary to draw some general conclusions about thehistory and evolution of Kafka's aphorisms based on his considerable preoc-cupation with these texts in 1920. First of all, it is clear that the return to theOktavhefte in the fall of 1920 stimulated Kafka not only to consider publica-tion of some of the aphorisms from these notebooks, but also to createfurther texts of the same type. In the context of this recognition one generalremark is appropriate: namely, that in returning to his own aphorisms, re-working, and responding to them in further aphoristic texts, Kafka wasparticipating in an activity which is common to the aphorist: the re-digestionof, and confrontation with, aphoristic propositions written at an earlier time.Karl Kraus, for example, returned at times to his own texts - as well as to theaphorisms of others, of course - in order critically to take issue with previousaphoristic hypotheses.11 This point, however, is secondary to the more gen-eral insight that the Oktavhefte were of formative significance for Kafka aslate as the fall of 1920. In general, it seems to me, the seminal position ofthese notebooks in this middle period of Kafka's creative life has been over-looked. To be sure, the aphorisms have hitherto been accorded a centralfunction in Kafka's creativity, but, as I am arguing, for the wrong reasons. Ifthe aphorisms have commonly been considered to be Kafka's major attemptat self-portrayal in a non-literary (and hence "objective") form of expression- and I take Hartmut Binder's approach to these texts to be the most sophis-

10 As an aside, it is not insignificant that Kafka touches here once again on theproblem of transforming therory into practice when he emphasizes that the recog-nition of stupidity alone is of no use.

11 Cf., for example, BW, 215 & 362.

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ticated of such interpretations12 - I am attempting to emphasize, conversely,the extraordinarily literary nature of these texts, indicating that they evince anew set of textual strategies on Kafka's part for the stylization, textualiza-tion, and communication of the self, something that is omnipresent in hisworks. The texts of the Oktavhefte are paradigmatic for the new textualstrategies Kafka is employing beginning approximately in 1917. As we shallsee later, these strategies are present not only in the aphorisms of this period,but also in the parables composed at the same time.

Zbigniew Swiatlowski is one of the only scholars who has correctlyassessed the significance of Kafka's Oktavhefte for their author and theevolution of his literary art.13 According to Swiatlowski, the Oktavheftemark a break in Kafka's productivity in the area of the epic and inaugurate acreative "Phase, in der das Fragmentarische und die mit ihm gepaarte Refle-xion - freilich in einer stark von bildlichen Elementen durchsetzten Form -das Epische zurück- und schließlich sogar verdrängen."14 To be sure, thetendency toward the fragment is present even in Kafka's "epic" works, sothat Swiatlowski's dichotomy between the epic and the fragmentary can beaccepted only with some reservations. Yet it is in fact the case that from thetime in early 1917 when Kafka completed the stories that he eventuallypublished in the Landarzt volume, until 1922 when he began to work on DasSchloß,^ no major "epic" works were produced. During the period from1917 to 1920, perhaps even as late as 1922, the major texts composed byKafka are the aphorisms and parables of the Oktavhefte, the aphorisms ofthe collection "Er," written in January and February of 1920, the parabolicstories and fragments from this period, and the aphorisms and sketches fromthe miscellaneous fragments. Swiatlowski is thus correct in his claim that theOktavhefte mark the beginning of a new period in Kafka's creative produc-tivity, a period that must be examined more or less independently of thatperiod of creativity which precedes it.16 I would like to expand on Swiat-lowski's observations and, emphasizing the impact of the third and fourthOktavhefte on Kafka in the fall of 1920, define the period from September1917 to approximately November of 1920 as the span of effectivity of theaphoristic texts initially composed in the third and fourth Oktavhefte. Itdoes not seem to me to be far-fetched to designate this period as Kafka's

See Binder, MuG, 81, where he claims that the new phase of Kafka's concern withthe self marked by the aphorisms is explicitly non-literary.Zbigniew Swiatlowski, "Kafkas Oktavhefte' und ihre Bedeutung im Werk desDichters," Germanica Wratislaviensia, 20 (1974), 97-116.Swiatlowski, p. 97.Chris Bezzel views some of the fragments from late fall 1920 as possible "Vorstu-dien" to Das Schloß; see his Kafka-Chronik, p. 163.Swiatlowski, p. 98.

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"aphoristic" phase, for during this span of time the aphorism is one of thedominant forms in which Kafka creates. The other major form of this periodis the parable, but, as we shall see, this form is inherently related to theaphorism. Furthermore, Kafka's aphorisms are produced, with only a fewexceptions, almost exclusively during this period: the "Betrachtungen . . ."in 1917-18; the "Er"-aphorisms in early 1920; and the additional aphorismsfor the first collection, along with further aphoristic texts, in the fall of 1920.Kafka's concern with the form of the aphorism thus takes on much greaterdimensions than has previously been presumed, so that this middle period ofhis productivity can actually be defined in terms of the preoccupation withthe aphorism and with aphoristic discourse. Viewed in the manner suggestedhere, Kafka's aphoristic production becomes an integrated and more or lessunified phase in his literary production, occupying him primarily, and to theexclusion of epic texts, during the three-year period from fall 1917 to fall1920. The faltering beginnings of Kafka's concentrated interest in aphoristicform can be traced in the early Oktavhefte (notebooks 1, 6, 2, 5, and 8,according to the chronology worked out by Pasley and Wagenbach17); thethree periods of primary interest in, and production of, aphorisms - Sep-tember 1917-February 1918; January-February 1920; August-November1920 - are then the focal points of this more broadly defined integral periodof preoccupation with this genre.

This definition of an "aphoristic phase" in Kafka's literary creativityshould not seduce us into assuming that the aphorisms therefore are abso-lutely distinct from the other types of literature which Kafka produced.Indeed, the opposite is true; for if the aphorism was one of Kafka's primaryliterary concerns in this middle period of his creativity, then the questionwhich we have to ask ourselves is: To what extent did Kafka's occupationwith the form of the aphorism shape the evolution of his literature from theearly period of the perspectivistic stories to the late period of parabolicnarration? It will be the concern of the final chapter of this investigation tosupply some preliminary answers to this question. At present we need mere-ly recall that Kafka possessed an inclination toward aphoristic expressionthroughout much of his life; during the period designated here as his"aphoristic phase" the tendency toward aphoristic creativity simply came todominate Kafka's writing.

Having attempted to outline the seminal position of the Oktavhefte inKafka's aphoristic phase, I would now like to turn to an examination of thecompositional procedure by which the aphoristic texts of these notebookswere produced. This will be accomplished by means of a close scrutiny of

17 Pasley and Wagenbach, "Datierung," pp. 76-80.

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the evolution of some of these aphorisms based on observations derivedfrom examination of the manuscripts themselves. One objective of thisundertaking is to dispel the notion evoked by Brod's published version of theOktavhefte that the texts they contain somehow were instantaneously andflawlessly brought to paper. It is, of course, generally true that the manu-scripts of Kafka's stories and novels evince relatively few corrections oralterations. This is explicitly not the case where the aphorisms are concerned.On the contrary, Kafka at times labored over these texts, struggling to findthe most succinct, pointed - in a word, "aphoristic" - formulation. Thedeliberateness with which these texts were created should not, however, beinterpreted merely as an indication that Kafka was working in a much moreconscious fashion on these texts than was true for his stories, which seemedto spring up from deep within his psyche.18 One must still consider theaphorisms to be the product of epiphanic insights, of "Einfalle," as is oftencharacteristic of such texts. On the other hand, the "Einfall" is just one sideof the creative process which leads to the production of an aphorism, theother side being the deliberate and conscious concentration on condensed,rhetorical, pointed, often paradoxical formulation. The abundant and some-times radical alterations which Kafka made while composing or revising theaphorisms in the Oktavhefte should thus be interpreted as an indication ofthe essential concern of their author - as aphorist - for the painstakingstructuring of these thoughts, not for the precise communication of a givenand unalterable content.

In Brod's edition of the Oktavhefte Kafka's revisions of the aphorismsrarely show themselves. One example from the fourth Oktavheft, however,does survive in Brod's edition, and it is instructive insofar as the types ofrevisions Kafka undertook here are characteristic of the kinds of changes towhich he subjected the aphorisms in general.

Das Grausame des Todes liegt darin, daß er den wirklichen Schmerz des Endesbringt, aber nicht das Ende. (H, 122)

Kafka immediately re-works and re-writes this text so that it reads as fol-lows:

Das Grausamste des Todes: ein scheinbares Ende verursacht einen wirklichenSchmerz. (//, 122)

The revisions to which Kafka submits the initial text are marked by twogeneral trends: one toward compaction and condensation; the other towardthe intensification of contrast. The tendency toward extremes, almost to-ward exaggeration, which is typical of aphoristic discourse is signalled in the

See Pasley, "Der Schreibakt," p. 22.

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shift from the positive to the superlative form of the adjectival noun ("DasGrausame" - "Das Grausamste"). The grammatically complex transition ofthe original text, which inhibits the potential contrastive tension, is eliminat-ed in the revised text, to be replaced by a simple mark of punctuation (acolon). Finally, the first text must clumsily tack on the final clause "abernicht das Ende" in order to establish the contrast between the actual pain ofthe end and the non-finality or non-actuality of the end itself. The revisedtext condenses this contrast into the semantic conflict between the adjectives"scheinbar" and "wirklich," thus allowing the tension to express itself morepoignantly. The result of these transformations is a succinct and pointedaphoristic text which takes the common aphoristic form of the pseudo-definition. The effect of the aphorism derives for the most part from thetension arising from the intertwining of syntactic parallelism and semanticcontrast. Moreover, the statement is condensed into a single, syntacticallyrather simple utterance that carries persuasive, apodictic power. The"thought" of the initial text is altered in an unsubstantial manner; itsmedium, however, has been sharpened to allow it greater penetration. Onecould hardly find an example of textual revisions which could demonstratemore transparently that in the compositon of the aphorisms Kafka was fun-damentally concerned with the formulation of texts which were artfullystructured, dense, and rhetorically pointed.

The process which the preceding example allows us to witness occursmuch more frequently in Kafka's aphorisms than Brod's edition indicates. Inwhat follows we will analyze a series of examples which demonstrate therevisions some of Kafka's aphoristic texts underwent before they werebrought into the form in which we know them. The first text we will look athere belongs to the group of texts, examined above, which deal with theduality between being and possessing. First the final version of the aphorism.

Das Wort "sein" bedeutet im Deutschen beides: Dasein und Ihmgehören. (aph. 46)

The original version of this text in the third Oktavheft reads in the followingway:

Dasein und ihm-gehören haben im Deutschen die gleiche Bedeutung: ein Wort.sein.

Initially Kafka had written "bezeichnen" in place of the word "haben"; how-ever he then crossed it out and continued the text in the manner indicatedabove. In this original form the point of the text is still clear, but it lacks thepithiness and concentrated focus of the final aphoristic text, the double-meaning on the word "sein" stumbling out only at the conclusion. In hisrevised version Kafka introduces the double-entendre on the word "sein" atthe outset, without, however, giving away the actual paradox of this double

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meaning: this is then forcefully given at the conclusion of the text, the twocontrasting meanings being bound together by simple copula, heighteningthe contrast and the effect of the text. Some revisions - the change from"bezeichnen" to "haben" - occurred during the initial composition of thetext in the notebook. The major alterations were added a short time later, forKafka re-worked the original text on the following page of the notebook. Hethen copied this revised text without further alterations onto a slip of paperwhen he began collecting the aphorisms in 1920. We see from this example,however, that Kafka's occupation with the texts of the Oktavhefte wasintense enough in 1917 to demand the re-reading and re-working of textsshortly after their original composition.

The famous "Ziel"-"Weg" aphorism is another text which did not escaperevision. As we now know, this text does not appear in the Oktavhefte,rather it was first written in 1920. In its initial notation the text reads asfollows:

Es gibt nur Ziel, nicht Weg. Was wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern.

Kafka then proceeds to add the word "ein" above the line before the word"Ziel," and to cross out "nicht" and substitute "keinen." This revised versionof the original text is given by Brod in the section of miscellaneous frag-ments.

Es gibt nur ein Ziel, keinen Weg. Was wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern. (H, 303)

The final text as it appears in the aphoristic manuscript and the typescriptdisplays ostensibly only minor changes.

Es gibt ein Ziel, aber keinen Weg; was wir Weg nennen, ist Zögern, (aph. 26/2)

Aside from alterations in punctuation, the only correction is the supplantingof the word "nur" in the first clause of the initial version by "aber" in thesecond clause of the final text. This change, however miniscule it may seem,contributes significantly to the poignancy of the text; for in the initial text the"nur" anticipates the negation which is to come, thus reducing the antitheti-cal tension between the possession of a goal, but the absence of any meansfor attaining it. This final emendation is made when the text ist entered ontothe slip of paper which already held aphorism 26. This first entry is struckthrough twice, indicating perhaps that the new aphorism was intended toreplace it in the collection.19

" Brod indicates in his edition that aph. 26/2 was crossed out by Kafka, however,this is not the case, neither in the manuscript nor in the typescript version of thiscollection.

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Another example of Kafka's repeated emendation of the aphorisms isevident in the case of the first text of the collection. The entry in the thirdOktavheft reads:

Ich irre ab. Der wahre Weg geht über ein Dratseil [sie], das aber nicht in der Höhegespannt ist, sondern knapp über dem Boden.

The "aber" of the initial text is subsequently crossed out. The text originallyended here, as is indicated by a horizontal line drawn across the page under-neath it. At some later time Kafka then added in small script the sentence:"Es scheint eher zum Stolpern als zum Begehen bestimmt." This, in turn, isalso crossed out and revised to read: "Es scheint eher bestimmt stolpern zumachen als begangen zu werden." The individual slip of paper on which thisaphorism was eventually recorded has subsequently been lost. Brod, how-ever, gives the typescript version in his rendition of the "Betrachtungen

,1

Der wahre Weg geht über ein Seil, das nicht in der Höhe gespannt ist, sondernknapp über dem Boden. Es scheint mehr bestimmt stolpern zu machen, als began-gen zu werden, (aph. 1)

The personal assertion "Ich irre ab" which introduces - and presumablygives rise to - the original reflection is, of course, eliminated; for otherwisethe generality or universal applicability requisite of aphoristic expressionwould be compromised. Still, we witness quite transparently in the case ofthis text the movement from subjective experience to objective formulation- objectification of the subjective, as I have designated it. Yet it is mycontention that the personal reflexes which underlie the aphorisms are notthemselves significant, or at best significant for one interested solely in Kaf-ka's biography. For the literary scholar, it seems to me, it is much moreimportant to come to terms with the procedure of objectification itself,which transpires through a process of textualization. The alterations andemendations of the aphoristic texts we are examining, then, are not primari-ly of interest in their own right, but rather because of what they indicate tous about the text-strategic methods and goals which Kafka pursued duringthe different stages in the evolution of these texts.20

20 The critical edition of the aphorisms, which is scheduled to appear shortly, willpresumably answer many further questions about their nature. It must be empha-sized that my remarks are in no way intended as supplements to, or substitutes for,the commentary of the editors putting together the new critical edition; rather,they serve the specific and more narrow end of demonstrating that Kafka wasindeed concerned with the composition of "aphorisms" in a particular generic-textual sense, and not simply involved with the formulation of a "philosophy" or areligious doctrine.

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Aphorism 54 provides us with a good example of a text whose concep-tion apparently underwent radical shifts at different points. Curiouslyenough, when originally composing the text Kafka wrote: "Es gibt nur einesinnliche Welt . . ."; the word "sinnliche" was subsequently crossed out and"geistige" written above it. The entire text then read:

Es gibt nur eine geistige Welt, was wir sinnliche nennen ist das Böse in dergeistigen.

I assume that Kafka substitutued "geistige" for "sinnliche" while in the act ofinitial notation, for the remainder of the text can only logically follow oncethis change has been made. This suggests, then, that Kafka completelyinverted his first conception for this text, which presumably would havemaintained the opposite of what the final text states. In other words, insteadof the sensual world being inscribed (as evil) in the spiritual world, thespiritual world would have been encompassed by the sensual. The radicalityof such a shift points both to the "epiphanic" character of the initial aphoris-tic "Einfall," as well as to the spontaneity with which the original thoughtcan be drastically altered in the process of putting it down on paper. This isindicative of the essential flexibility inherent in these conceptions themselves:it is more a matter of finding the most nonconventional conception andcasting it m a succinct and challenging form, not a question of presentingbeliefs or "truths." Now Kafka was still not satisfied with this aphorism as itstood. Here is the final version of the text as it occurs in the aphoristicmanuscript and on the typescript.

Es gibt nichts anderes als eine geistige Welt; was wir sinnliche Welt nennen, ist dasBöse in der geistigen, und was wir böse nennen, ist nur eine Notwendigkeit einesAugenblicks unserer ewigen Entwicklung, (aph. 54)

The introductory statement is made more absolute by the substitution of"nichts anderes" for "nur"; the concluding statement diverts from this abso-luteness by providing a qualifying definition of what in the first statement ismeant by "evil." These absolutizing and relativizing (qualifying) movementswork at cross-purposes to each other. None of these emendations, inciden-tally, are made in the Oktavheft itself; rather they appear for the first time onthe individual manuscript slip of aphorism 54, and thus were probably writ-ten only in 1920 during the process of collecting these texts from the Ok-tavhefte. The revisions in this instance, especially the addition of the con-cluding clauses, are not very fortunate ones if we judge the text from theperspective of aphoristic form. The appended qualification of the concept ofevil simply digresses from the original statement, and in this way it weakensits potential impact. Yet this urge to qualify, to divert - indeed, to subvert -his own assertions is characteristic of Kafka and of his personal aphoristicstyle. In a sense this urge is completely in line with the diffidence and non-

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dogmatism which is always subliminally present in the aphoristic impulse.The paradox of aphoristic expression is perhaps precisely that it is mosteffective when it suppresses this subliminal urge, or when it disguises itbeneath a discursive structure calculated to be rhetorically emphatic. It thuscan be claimed that while Kafka's aphorisms correspond to the underlyingconceptual demands of aphoristic expression, they do not always stand up tothe formal demands of the genre, although, as we have seen in some of theexamples examined thus far, he was aware of the requirement of condensa-tion and of exaggerated tension in the structural shaping of effective apho-risms.

When revising the texts from the Oktavhefte Kafka often enough edited alonger meditation to make of it a more compact and effective aphoristic text.The derivation of aphorism 68, which in the notebooks occurs as a part ofthe following longer text, is an example for this.

Was ist fröhlicher als der Glaube an einen Hausgott! Es ist ein Unten-durch unterder wahren Erkenntnis und ein kindlich-glückliches Aufstehn.

The second sentence, which obviously functioned as an elucidation of thefirst, is crossed out in the Oktavheft and not taken over into the aphoristicmanuscript.21 The concluding statement ironizes the initial rhetorical ques-tion, making it clear that belief in a personal God represents mere naiveescape from "true knowledge"; but it is precisely the clarity of this explica-tion that makes the original form of the text "unaphoristic." The isolation ofthe rhetorical question, its freeing from the expletive context, leaves theanswer to the question open so that it remains interpretively undecidablewhether the text is to be taken as straight-forward and affirmative, or ironicand negative with regard to such personal belief. Both Kafka and Brod, itseems to me, were aware of this fact: Kafka removed the clarifying statementsimply because it clarified, and thus narrowed too strictly the interpretabilityand openness of the text, compromising its aphoristic quality; Brod, on theother hand, probably separated the two remarks in his edition because takentogether as originally composed the text presents too damning a commen-tary on the kind of belief that Brod would have liked to attribute to Kafka.

Kafka follows a similar procedure in the instances of other aphorisms.This is best demonstrated on the example of a text which, while reproducedin aphoristic form, does not find its way into Kafka's eventual collection.The reflection in question is Kafka's well-known deliberation on the impos-sibility of describing the internal world, a passage which we earlier examined

Brod's edition of the Oktavhefte reproduces the second sentence, but gives it as aseparate entry, so that the connection between it and the remark it follows isobscured.

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in some detail. In his conclusion to these musings Kafka ruminates about theineffectuality of psychology.

Zumindest deskriptive Psychologie ist wahrscheinlich in der Gänze ein Anthropo-morphismus, ein Ausragen der Grenzen. Die innere Welt läßt sich nur leben, nichtbeschreiben. - Psychologie ist die Beschreibung der Spiegelung der irdischen Weltin der himmlischen Fläche oder richtiger: die Beschreibung einer Spiegelung, wiewir, Vollgesogene der Erde, sie uns denken, denn eine Spiegelung erfolgt garnicht, nur wir sehen Erde, wohin wir uns auch wenden. (H, 72)

This notation occurs in the third Oktavheft, written on October 19, 1917.On February 25, 1918, four months later, Kafka was apparently re-readingthe third Oktavheft, for on that date he re-works the metaphor of psycholo-gy as a reflection in a mirror, shaping the idea into this aphoristic text:

Psychologie ist Lesen einer Spiegelschrift, also mühevoll, und was das immerstimmende Resultat betrifft, ergebnisreich, aber wirklich geschehn ist nichts. (H,122)

The superfluous qualifying clauses are deleted as the metaphor is extractedout of its original context. The simple metaphor of mirroring is extended toone of the reading of a script reflected in a mirror, an image which com-municates the difficulty of this act of reading. The text takes the typical formof the pseudo-definition, a technique frequently employed by Kafka. Kafka'scriticism of the practices of psychology is well known; however, it is sig-nificant that these critiques crop up most often in his aphorisms, for a similarattack on psychology and psychoanalysis is a characteristic theme in theaphorisms of Kafka's Austrian contemporaries. Psychology and psychoanal-ysis were among the favorite targets of Karl Kraus's aphoristic satires, forwhich these two examples can stand for many.

Psychologie ist so müßig wie eine Gebrauchsanweisung für Gift. (BW, 224)Psychoanalyse ist jene Geisteskrankheit, für deren Therapie sie sich hält. (BW,35l)22

Kafka's aphorism, of course, has little of the destructive glee typical ofKraus's critiques. However, a reflection from Egon Friedell's collection ofaphorisms, Steinbruch, is closer to Kafka's in approach, turning the processof interpretive inversion back onto the psychologist.

DER PSYCHOLOGWenn ich auf einem Berge stehe und von dort aus einen entlegenen Punkt fixiere,so sagen die Resultate meiner Beobachtung von diesem Punkt nicht übermäßigviel aus, wohl aber sehr viel von meiner Sehkraft, der Art meinens Standortes, der

22 For further aphorisms by Kraus dealing with this theme, see BW, 222; 348; 349;350; 351; 352.

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Atmosphäre, die mich umgibt. Mit anderen Worten: Psychologie ist die Wissen-schaft von der Seele - dessen, der sie betreibt.23

One of the ironies of this predilection among aphorists for the scathingcriticism of psychology and its methods is that the modern aphorism, sinceNietzsche, has in fact commonly been associated with the very interpretivepractices of psychology which aphorists enjoy lambasting. Indeed, thispsychological, self-scrutinizing aspect of the aphorism is already inherent inthe sentences of the French moralists. The proclivity of modern aphorists tocriticize the methods of psychology and psychoanalysis can be taken as akind of self-ironization of the aphoristic method on the part of the aphorist.Be that as it may, the satire of psychology is such a prominent theme amongaphorists that aphorisms on this subject are a requisite part of the repertoryof every aphorist, much like every comedian must have at least one joke thatis structured around the "I have some good news and I have some bad news"formula. In this sense I think one should take these critiques - Kafka'sincluded - cum grano salis. At any rate, Kafka's aphorisms on the theme ofpsychology, such as the one cited above and aphorism 93 ("Zum letztenmalPsychologie!") of the "Betrachtungen . . .," should be taken as further evi-dence of the participation of his aphorisms in the intertextual dialogue socentral for this genre, a dialogue which tends to focus on themes that areassociated by convention and by practice with aphoristic expression.

The same must be said of the tendency toward misogyny evident in someof Kafka's aphorisms, especially aphorisms 7 and 8. This is a prominentmotif in the aphoristic production of many aphorists - one need only thinkof Nietzsche and Kraus. But this proclivity was also reinforced in turn-of-the-century Austria by the sexual theories of Otto Weininger - himself, notcoincidentally, a writer of aphorisms. Aphoristic texts with a misogynousthrust can be found in the aphorisms of Schnitzler and Friedell as well. Infact, the misogyny typical of the aphorist was recognized as early as the1880's, for Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach exploits this theme in some of heraphorisms, turing it back on those who perpetuate it.24

The immediately preceding deliberations have begun to lead us to thesecond part of the analyses to be pursued in this chapter, namely the exami-nation of themes and structures of Kafka's aphorisms in light of those con-

Egon Friedell, Steinbruch: Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche (Vienna: Verlag derWiener Graphischen Werkstätte, 1922), p. 35.The following aphorism by Ebner-Eschenbach is a forceful example of this:"Eine gescheite Frau hat Millionen geborene Feinde: - Alle dummen Männer."Cited from the text of the aphorisms in the edition of her Werke, vol. 1 DasGemeindekind, Novellen, Aphorismen, ed. Johannes Klein (Munich: Winkler,1956), p. 875.

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ventionally manifest in the aphorism in general. Before we go on to thissection, however, it is important, by way of preliminary conclusion, to sumup some of the arguments presented thus far. We could, to be sure, scrutinizeany number of further examples of revisions and emendations which Kafkamade in the texts from the Oktavhefte, alterations accomplished with thepurpose of either transforming these reflections into aphoristic texts, or ofreinforcing their aphoristic poignancy. The revisions generally tend towardan increase in textual density and the heightening of the internal tension. Inour analyses of the final versions of Kafka's aphorisms we will find a plethoraof examples which evince the centrality of these two characteristics. We noteas well that Kafka upheld an almost continuous dialogue with the texts of theOktavhefte, reading and re-reading them long after their initial compositon,revising them, and ultimately shaping them as a group into the rough outlineof a numbered aphoristic collection. This obsession with revision is nototherwise characteristic of Kafka's writing process. This is an indicationamong many that the formal, structural, and technical elements of theaphoristic texts were foremost in his mind, both at the time of their compo-sition, and when he revised and compiled them in 1920. In the examinationof the revisions which these texts underwent, we have stolen a rare glanceinto the interior of the workshop of the aphorist. Kafka's creative procedurehere can be taken as exemplary of the procedure of the aphorist in general.We shall now concentrate on an examination of the structures, forms, andtechniques typical of his aphoristic production, relating them to the apho-risms of other writers when appropriate.

II. Form and Structure of Kafka's Aphorisms

In the preceding section we have argued for the integrity of Kafka's aphoris-tic period in the years 1917 to 1920. In keeping with this conception, exam-ples of Kafka's aphoristic texts will be drawn from all possible sources in thisperiod, including the aphorisms of the "Betrachtungen . . .," and of thecollection "Er," but also relying on Kafka's Tagebücher, the Oktavhefte ingeneral (especially the third and fourth), the miscellaneous fragments, andthe so-called Taralipomena zu der Reihe 'Er'." For the most part our con-cern will be with analyses of Kafka's "well-wrought" aphorisms. This is notmeant to imply that all of Kafka's aphoristic texts are of this sort: indeed, thiswould be unusual for any aphorist, not just for Kafka. In fact, as was arguedearlier, the very interspersing of finely-tuned aphoristic text with searchingmeditations, simple observations, and brooding self-reflections is one of thequalities that most clearly aligns Kafka's aphoristic notebooks with those ofhis "aphoristic precursors" in the German tradition. On the other hand, our

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emphasis here is on the stylization that Kafka's thoughts underwent duringthis period, and the relationships between the methods and manners of styl-ization apparent here and those conventionally manifest in the aphorism. Wemust keep in mind that the aphorism is one of the most stylized of all literaryforms, and this means that it is among the most conventional of genres, inthe sense that it relies on concentrated application of a certain set of tech-niques and rhetorical figures. This demonstration of the profound participa-tion of Kafka's aphorisms in the structural and stylistic conventions of thisgenre is intended simply to indicate that his aphoristic texts must be viewedwithin the context of this genre and its traditions; it does not seek to implythat Kafka's aphorisms are not original, creative, or inventive. Yet it must bekept in mind that a genre like the aphorism which depends so thoroughly onrhetorical conventions leaves a rather limited, if well-defined space for crea-tive play. Finally, it is hoped that an investigation into the forms and tech-niques preferred by Kafka while composing his aphorisms will permit anassessment of general inclinations in the creative thrust behind these texts;using the categories of aphoristic types derived from their relationships tocertain tendencies of thought (metaphorical, critical contra-dictory,analogic-mystical) as outlined in chapter one, Kafka's aphoristic productioncan then be oriented within this taxonomy.

One further caveat seems appropriate at this point. Although the analyseswhich follow are certainly "structural" in a broad sense, they are not struc-tural in the more limited literary-historical understanding of the word. Forwhile we indeed will concern ourselves with such questions as "form" and"structure" of these texts, these "analyses" are not carried out with a solelydescriptive purpose, implying that understanding resides in description. Onthe contrary, I have tried to emphasize throughout that the aphorism is atextual form which is explicitly self-conscious with regard to the act ofreception. The structures and techniques applied by the aphorist, therefore,can never be divorced from the effect which they might evoke. We arereminded that Kafka required of literature that it function as an "ax for thefrozen sea within us," and that he expressed this demand for the receptiveefficacy of literature in response to his reading of Hebbel's aphoristic diaries.In this context it is instructive to look at one of the few aphorisms on artwhich can be found among Kafka's aphoristic texts, for it can be read as astatement on the importance of the act of reception in the dialectical interplayof creative and receptive moments.

Unsere Kunst ist ein von der Wahrheit Geblendet-Sein: Das Licht auf dem zurück-weichenden Fratzengesicht ist wahr, sonst nichts, (aph. 63)

Art is depicted here not as an incorporation of truth, i. e. its adequate expres-sion in the creative work, but rather as a reaction to truth: art is not one with

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truth, it is but a response to truth, a being blinded by the "light" of truth.Since art itself cannot reproduce truth, the best it can strive for is the repro-duction of the effect of the experience of truth. The artist's reception of truth,then, produced in the work, is reproduced in the reception of the work bythe reader/audience. This conception of art, indeed, is typical of that held bymany of Kafka's contemporary Austrian aphorists: in the absence of a com-municative strategy by which truth can be represented in language, theaphorist, confronting truth, attempts to communicate a response to thisconfrontation through the aphoristic text. I have previously described thisprocedure in terms of the reproduction of the epiphanic insight which moti-vates the aphorist in the reception of the aphoristic text by its audience. Theact of reception was always central to Kafka's conception of art, and hisaphorisms share with the traditional aphorism the implementation of textualstrategies designed to evoke the greatest receptive effect.

This investigation into the techniques applied by Kafka in his aphorismswill build in part on recognitions and arguments made by Shimon Sandbankin his article "Surprise Techniques in Kafka's Aphorisms."25 Sandbank dis-tinguishes four types of "surprise techniques" which he groups under thecategories of "lexical," "metaphorical," "syntactic," and "logical."26 He alignsthe first three categories, arguing that all three function to explore the ambi-guities of language, and he describes the fourth in terms of devices whichfunction by deviating from the rules of logic. If all of this strikes us assomehow familiar, then that, at least, is no surprise technique. For whatSandbank outlines here for the specific case of Kafka's aphorisms is nothingbut an inventory of techniques commonly employed by the aphorism ingeneral. In his article Sandbank does not connect the occurrence of thesedevices in Kafka's aphorisms with traditional structures and techniques ofaphoristic discourse, and this will be our primary focus. However, he cor-rectly asserts that these techniques tend to serve an exploratory end, and hesketches some of the strategies by which these aphorisms uncover and ex-ploit the equivocalities of language.

I would like to appropriate Sandbank's categorization of Kafka's aphoris-tic techniques, making one slight change. Instead of grouping the first threetogether under the all-encompassing designation of techniques which ex-plore the ambiguities of language (for, actually, this description fits categoryfour as well), I want to suggest an association of "lexical" and "metaphoric"techniques, Sandbank's first two groupings, under the category of similarity

25 Shimon Sandbank, "Surprise Techniques in Kafka's Aphorisms," Orbis Litterar-um, 25 (1970), 261-74.

26 "Surprise Techniques," p. 262.

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(metaphor) as employed by Jakobson and as applied to aphoristic expressionin chapter one above. "Syntactic" and "logical" techniques, Sandbank's finaltwo groupings, I would then associate with contiguity (metonymy), againemploying the term in the sense introduced by Jakobson. The appropriate-ness of this re-categorization seems to me to be so self-evident as to makeany justification superfluous. The relevance of the distinction for analysis ofthe aphorism has already been brought out. It is significant only to recall ourbroad definition of the aphorism as a text which emphasizes and exaggeratesthe confrontation of metaphoric and metonymic relations, concentrating andfocusing them into a deliberately confined textual space. Each aphorismcarries out this conflict in a different way or with a differing variation andadmixture of the relational elements. If in our analyses of Kafka's aphorismscertain texts are taken to be representative manifestations of a particulartechnique, then this does not mean that the cited device occurs in isolationfrom other practices. Indeed, it is, as I hope I have made clear, precisely theinterpenetration of such devices that ultimately lends these texts theiraphoristic flavor.27

A) Lexical Features

This examination of the manipulation of lexical features in Kafka's apho-risms will be carried out on the basis of the analysis of a group of texts, eachof which shares a common lexical element. For this purpose I have decidedupon texts which employ the word or concept of "Glaube" in any of itsvarious manifestations, i. e. as noun, verb, adjective, etc. This choice, ofcourse, is by no means fortuitous. For one, the concept of "Glaube" isamong the most frequent motifs in Kafka's aphoristic texts, and it thusprovides a plethora of examples suitable for study. Furthermore, the ques-tion of "belief" is commonly associated with Kafka's aphorisms in relativelytraditional ways, and investigation of this concept thus allows for a disclo-sure of Kafka's own uncertainty and equivocality regarding "belief." Thus Ihope simultaneously to illuminate the manner in which Kafka explores andexploits semantic nuances through an examination of his applications of thisconcept, while simultaneously pointing to the problematization of tradition-al concepts of belief in the aphorisms. I hope, then, to further support mythesis that Kafka's aphorisms represent his experiments in the application ofa specific discursive method, and not the simple formulation of a narrowlydefinable set of "beliefs."

Sandbank, p. 273, admits that the four types of techniques he has attempted toisolate commonly overlap in Kafka's aphorisms, and that any given text maycombine techniques from any or all of the categories.

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The first text we shall look at in this context is aphorism 48 from the"Betrachtungen . . ."

An Fortschritt glauben heißt nicht glauben, daß ein Fortschritt schon geschehenist. Das wäre kein Glauben, (aph. 48)

This aphorism begins by establishing a pseudo-theme: it pretends to bemaking a statement on belief in progress. Thereby it initially diverts thereader's attention from the underlying central issue which concerns the text:an understanding of the notion of belief itself. Kafka makes "progress" theinitial object of belief simply in order to place the traditional meaning of"belief" into question. It is precisely because progress can scarcely be deniedthat it is not a proper object for belief: one can only believe in what has notoccurred, in what is not (yet). In other words, this text suggests that theconcept of belief is not applicable to the actual, to what has already beenachieved, but rather only to the possible, non-factual, or non-realized.Something that has been real-ized can no longer be an object of belief.Especially telling is the subtle way in which Kafka brings out this radicaliz-ing specification in meaning for the verb "to believe." The word itself occursthree times in the text, each time with a different semantic nuance. The firsttime it appears, "glauben" means something like "conviction," "lendingcredence" to something that has been irrevocably proven. The second clauseof the first sentence explicitly negates this conception of believing, itselfusing the word "glauben" in the looser sense meaning "to suppose" or "tothink." In the final sentence, "glauben" undergoes a metamorphosis on twolevels: first, and concretely, the verb is transformed into a noun - instead ofusing the more common noun "Glaube," Kafka employs the noun"Glauben," derived from the infinitive form of the verb; this transformationparallels the semantic shift in the word which Kafka is initiating. In its last,transmogrified occurrence, then, the word has been specified - one mightsay absolutized - in meaning: both previous meanings of "believing" arerejected, and a third semantic variation is proposed in which the word sug-gests something like "absolute faith." "To believe" in the sense of "to havefaith" implies neither belief in past events, nor supposition; rather it meansunflinching certitude in the face of the absolutely unknowable, unpredict-able, and unactualizable.

The foregoing analysis attempts to extend interpretively certain sugges-tions inherent in the underlying structures and nuances of Kafka's text. Itwould certainly be possible to relate the notion of belief implied in this textto the conception of faith put forward by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trem-bling, a text which, as we know, Kafka read numerous times, and at leastonce during his aphoristic period. Relevant as such a connection might be,it ultimately has the effect of universalizing the conception presented in this

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one aphoristic text, and thus of stripping it of the dynamism of meaning onwhich it, as aphorism, thrives. We will see over the course of this examina-tion that the implications apparent in the above text are corroborated bysimilar allusions in other aphorisms. This still should not lead us to acceptthis meaning for the concept of "Glauben" as permanent insight on Kafka'spart; rather we must confidently - if, in some cases, reluctantly - assert thateven this insight is relative to the attitudes held by Kafka at this time, as wellas to the perpetually relativizing move of aphoristic discourse. For the pur-poses outlined here it is enough to recognize that Kafka employs a subtleplay on the semantic nuances of the word "glauben" to structure thisaphoristic text. He is applying semantic play as a method of re-defining, orof "de-defining" and then re-defining, of destroying and re-constructing theconception of faith or belief.

A variation of this technique is found in another of the aphorisms whichaddress this issue.

Es kann ein Wissen vom Teuflischen geben, aber keinen Glauben daran, dennmehr Teuflisches, als da ist, gibt es nicht, (aph. 100)

We are confronted with a text which first appears to have the definition of"the devilish" as its central theme, yet which has the ultimate effect ofintroducing a semantic specification of the concept of "belief." This apho-rism is structured around the semantic contrast established between thewords "Wissen" and "Glauben"; knowledge and belief are presented assemantic opposites, the former relevant to what is extant ("da ist"), the latterto what is non-existent ("gibt es nicht"). Thus our interpretation of apho-rism 48 is corroborated, for here again the notion of "Glauben" is designatedas a form of consciousness directed explicitly at the non-certain, the non-factual, i. e. at that which is not (yet). "Glauben" comes to be identified witha kind of "Nicht-Wissen," with a Socratic approach to knowledge, or evenwith the "scepticism" of the aphorist, which is nothing other than doubt forthe sake of belief, or doubt as a method, as it was for Socrates. Not-know-ing, the uncertain, is implicitly set above dogmatic certainty, ideology, "be-lief" in the sense of conviction.28 Conviction, Kafka suggests, is not authen-tic belief; authentic belief, on the contrary, is precisely the lack of conviction,the absence of certain, factual evidence. We can better understand Kafka's

This hypothesis is further confirmed in aph. 62, which employs a similar methodas aph. 100, but which juxtaposes the concepts of "Hoffnung" and "Gewißheit"instead of "Glauben" and "Wissen." The text reads:Die Tatsache, daß es nichts anderes gibt als eine geistige Welt, nimmt uns dieHoffnung und gibt uns die Gewißheit, (aph. 62)I view the playing off of the words "Hoffnung" and "Gewißheit" as the centralfocus of the text.

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criticism of Pascal's certitude, examined in the previous chapter, in the lightof these reinterpretations of the concept of faith. As we recall, it was the verycertainty of Pascal's faith that Kafka put into question, evoking, in doing so,"eine tiefere ängstlichere Skepsis" (T, 522).

Numerous other aphoristic texts by Kafka circle around this conceptionof faith, approaching it from diverse sides and with various techniques. Atext from the third Oktavheft attempts to broach the issue by employing ametaphorical-analogical method.

Wer glaubt, kann keine Wunder erleben. Bei Tag sieht man keine Sterne. (H, 85)

If in the initial text we looked at in this context belief was juxtaposed to thenotion of progress, and in the second text contrasted with certainty inknowledge, in this aphorism it is played off against the conception of "mira-cles." Kafka begins with a statement that contradicts all our assumptionsabout the essential connectedness of faith and the miraculous: faith does notallow miracles, rather it precludes them. Instead of defending this controver-sial assertion by means of logical argumentation, Kafka provides us with anempirical fact of nature, inviting us to analogically apply the relationshipinscribed in it to that between faith and miracles, thereby persuading us byassociation of the "factuality" of the initial assertion. Faith is thus to bemetaphorically connected by the reader to the "light" of day; in this "light"of faith, miracles would be stars in a bright sky, and thus invisible. In otherwords, to the truly "faithful" there are no miracles because, so too speak, allof creation, or the very fact of existence, is miraculous, and thus there is nobasis on which to segregate the miraculous from the non-miraculous. Faithonce more is portrayed as a kind of absolute state which "outshines," to playwith the metaphor, all other attitudes. This, however, is not to claim thatKafka was possessed of such an all-radiant faith. Indeed, it is presented hereas a mere conceptual possibility - as an actuality it would no longer merit thedesignation of "faith."

At this point we shall briefly shift from the intratextual to the intertextuallevel and compare Kafka's last-cited aphorism with the following text byAlfred Polgar.

Kommentar zur Dichtung? Geister werden nicht besser sichtbar, wenn man Lichtmacht.29

While the subject matter treated by each of these texts is quite distinct, themethod of exposition is identical both with regard to the exploitation ofmetaphorical associations conventionally coupled with the phenomenon of

29 Alfred Polgar, Im Laufe der Zeit, RoRoRo Taschenbuch, 107 (Hamburg: Ro-wohlt, 1954), p. 16.

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light, and in terms of the inexplicit, "suggested" analogy by means of whichthe reader can "prove" for herself or himself the validity of the initial asser-tion or question.

Returning now to the intratextual level, we can consider a couple offurther examples of aphorisms by Kafka which deal with the issue of faith.Aphorism 87 is perhaps one of Kafka's most poignant texts on this subjectmatter.

Ein Glaube wie ein Fallbeil, so schwer, so leicht, (aph. 87)

This text derives its shock-effect form the audacious comparison of belief toa guillotine, a comparison that offends or affronts conventional wisdomabout the "glory" of belief. Significantly, whereas the previously citedaphorism associated faith with an all-engulfing radiance - certainly a moretraditional and less controversial metaphor - this aphorism employs an im-age which is both radical, and emphatically concrete. The image, however,allows Kafka to exploit the semantic ambiguities in the words "schwer" and"leicht," and, playing on the equivocalities that derive from the concrete andabstract meanings of these words, to underwrite his heretical comparison. Aguillotine blade is "schwer" in the concrete sense meaning "heavy," andbecause of its very heaviness it glides easily ("leicht"); a belief is "schwer" inthe intangible sense of "difficult," but once this difficulty is overcome, allelse is easy ("leicht"). Thus the relationship between "schwer" and "leicht"in the concrete instance of a falling guillotine blade is parallel to the relation-ship between "schwer" and "leicht" when applied abstractly to the conceptof belief: in both instances "ease" is a direct function of "heaviness"/"difficul-ty." Word-play provides a means for justifying, and elaborating on, anassociation which at first glance is contradictory and irreverent. Moreover,one is left with the haunting question of whether faith and the guillotineblade don't h^ve a good more in common than the text explicitly states: Isfaith somehow related to an instrument of execution? The text, of course,remains stimulatingly open with regard to this question and others that itevokes.

We have concentrated here on texts which take advantage of semanticambiguities to reinforce their persuasiveness and rhetorical effect; at the sametime, all these examples have been drawn from one thematic sphere. Manyof Kafka's aphorisms deal with the subject of "belief" in one way or another,without, however, employing such lexical devices. Since the strategies ofsuch texts are not relevant in the present discussion of lexical techniques,they will not be analyzed here. I will, however, cite a few of them for thesimple purpose of highlighting the claim that the subjects Kafka deals with inthe aphorisms are approached from various perspectives and with differingtextual strategies. We will find, for example, that the concept of belief is

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inserted into a diverse variety of contexts; in this process its different shadesof meaning, its ambiguities and equivocalities, become apparent.

Wenn man einmal das Böse bei sich aufgenommen hat, verlangt es nicht mehr, daßman ihm glaube, (aph. 28)Früher begriff ich nicht, warum ich auf meine Frage keine Antwort bekam, heutebegreife ich nicht, wie ich glauben konnte, fragen zu können. Aber ich glaubte jagar nicht, ich fragte nur. (aph. 36)Der Mensch kann nicht leben ohne ein dauerndes Vertrauen zu etwas Unzerstör-barem in sich, wobei sowohl das Unzerstörbare als auch das Vertrauen ihm dau-ernd verborgen bleiben können. Eine der Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten dieses Verbor-genbleibens ist der Glaube an einen persönlichen Gott. (aph. 50)Was ist fröhlicher als der Glaube an einen Hausgott! (aph. 68)"Daß es uns an Glauben fehle, kann man nicht sagen. Allein die einfache Tatsacheunseres Lebens ist in ihrem Glaubenswert gar nicht auszuschöpfen." "Hier wäreein Glaubenswert? Man kann doch nicht nichtleben." "Eben in diesem 'kann dochnicht' steckt die wahnsinnige Kraft des Glaubens; in dieser Verneinung bekommtsie Gestalt." (aph. 109)30

It is obvious from the richness and diversity of these aphorisms that Kafka'snotion of "belief" was not simple and stable. Many of the texts, of course,seem to reinforce each other; some appear to be complementary; others,finally, appear to be contradictory. However, to attempt to extract someuni-directional, centered, or unified conception of "belief out of these verydifferent texts is tantamount to suppressing the "chorus" in favor of a forced"unison." These texts must be taken together, allowing for their contrapun-tal dialogue; they experiment, each in its own way, with one and the samesubject matter, multiplying perspectives on a given issue. In much the sameway as lexical techniques help the aphorist explore the hidden meanings ofwords, this cross-referential dialogue among aphoristic texts permits theexploration of the significance of concepts.

The lexical techniques which Kafka employs in his aphorisms for anexamination of semantic difference are not exhausted by the examples giventhus far. Play with the possibilities - and impossibilities - of language is oneof the favorite pastimes of the aphorist. Language, for the aphorist, is not arepository of meanings that are somehow generated elsewhere and insertedinto signs, rather it itself is the source of meaning. Analysis of language thusfunctions as a kind of archaeology in which sedimented significances orassociations can be discovered under the stratified layers of the "cultured"languages. We have already witnessed Kafka's application of this procedurein the aphorisms which explore the ambiguity of the word "sein." This tacticis related to the semantic "experiments" considered in the above group of

30 For further aphoristic texts which refer to the question of belief, see aphs. 13 and75.

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aphorisms. These examples demonstrate, among other things, the reliance ofmeaning on context, and in this sense they point out the dependence ofindividual linguistic elements on their horizontal configuration, or, in otherwords, how relationships of contiguity affect the semantic values of words.

Kafka also employs other varieties of lexical techniques, for example theplay on words of like or similar stem. Here it is not a process of contextuali-zation which is initiated; rather words of similar or identical etymologicalorigin, or words which are phonetically similar, but otherwise unrelated, areplayed off against one another.

Der Lehrer hat die wahre, der Schüler die ionwährende Zweifellosigkeit. (H, 98emphasis added)

The "true" doubtlessness of the teacher and the "continuous" doubtlessnessof the student are subliminally conjoined through the similarity of wordstems. This play on words helps to buttress the humorous barb directed atthose who, with the haughtiness of the pupil, consider themselves to bemore "certain" than their teachers. The experience and knowledge of theteacher, the aphorism suggests, cultivate a "true" doubtlessness, i.e. onewhich is not continuous, but which recognizes the limitations of certainty.The technique Kafka uses here is a common one among aphorists. Hof-mannsthal applies it with relish in his aphorisms. Consider these two ex-amples from his Buch der Freunde.

Je mehr der Gelehrte oder Denker sich dem Künstler nähert, ohne ihn doch zuerreichen, ein desto bedenklicheres Phänomen ist er. (A, 44, emphasis added)Ein Ding ist eine unausdeutbare Deutbarkeit (A, 41)

Novalis employs a similar strategy in a fragment which Hofmannsthalincludes in his Buch der Freunde.

Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte und finden überall nur Dinge. (A, 77)31

Plays on words, of course, can be an interminable source of humor for thoseso inclined. Kafka's word-plays do not, as a rule, have the ironic, wittycharacter of those, say, of Karl Kraus. The following aphorism, however, isperhaps the most significant exception to this rule.

Verkehr mit Menschen verführt zur Selbstbeobachtung, (aph. 77)

At first glance this text appears to be just one more rendition on the theme ofself-observation which is common to Kafka's aphorisms and is present in thework of other aphorists as well. The pivotal point of this text, however, isthe repetition of the prefix "ver." The aphorism would make perfectly good

31 Cf. Novalis, Schriften, II, 412. Hofmannsthal slightly misquotes Novalis.

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sense if this prefix were deleted in its second occurrence: the text would thensimply state that intercourse with others leads to self-observation, instead ofseducing one into it. Yet the linguistic perseveration which, like a slip of thetongue (or of the pen), dictates the recurrence of the prefix with the verb"führen" also infuses the text with a new and more poignant layer of signifi-cance. The word "verführen," with its sexual undertones, automaticallyreflects back on the noun "Verkehr," lending it sexual implications which areotherwise not immediately present. The effectiveness of the text, ostensiblyjust a straight-forward criticism of introspection, rests in the play of mean-ings evoked by the repetition of the prefix. Kraus applies a similar technique- if to a much less serious end - in the following aphorism.

Vervielfältigung ist insofern ein Fortschritt, als sie die Verbreitung des Einfältigenermöglicht. (BW, 76)

Kraus's subject matter itself is considerably "lighter" than Kafka's, but headds to its humor by combining the play on prefixes with repetition of wordstems.

Before moving on to an examination of the use of metaphor in Kafka'saphorisms, I shall cite two more examples of aphorisms that apply word-play of different sorts as lexical devices. These examples will help round outour picture of lexical elements employed in Kafka's aphoristic texts.

Aussprache bedeutet nicht grundsätzlich eine Schwächung der Überzeugung -darüber wäre auch nicht zu klagen -, aber eine Schwäche der Überzeugung. (H,85)Daß noch der Konservativste die Radikalität des Sterbens aufbringt! (H, 334)

The first aphorism turns on the inherent similarity, yet significant difference,between the words "Schwäche," denoting a state of weakness, and"Schwächung," referring to a process of weakening. According to this text,there is nothing objectionable in the weakening of one's conviction throughthe act of expressing it; but the need to verbalize it is itself an indication thatthe conviction itself is a weak one. Thus the drive toward verbalization isportrayed, through the play on two words of a similar root, as a reflexdenoting lack of conviction. Aphorists, at least, would tend to concur withthe hypothesis that expression is by no means a sign of conviction.

The technique applied in the second text is quite different. Instead ofrelying on the identity of linguistic elements, as in the last set of examples, oron semantic identity, as in the first set, it is based on semantic contrast. ForKafka's generation the phenomenon of radical conservatism was just begin-ning to take shape in the West, and thus the words "radical" and "conserva-tive" could still be conceived as opposites. Kafka exploits this opposition,along with the broader meaning of "conservative" in the sense of "conserva-tional," to expose the contradiction that someone who is fundamentally

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"conservative" - Kafka uses the adjectival noun in its superlative form -might display radicality with regard to death, death here becoming a part ofthe semantically contrastive pair conservation - death. This is an example ofa text whose meaning seems quite arcane; however, by supplying contexts inour act of reception we are able to lend it significances relative to thosereceptive horizons. In this sense the text is obscure, yet perhaps quintessen-tially aphoristic.

This survey of lexical techniques in Kafka's aphorisms is not intended tobe a complete inventory; rather it serves simply as an outline in which thevariety of such elements in Kafka's aphorisms can be documented, their useassociated with the methods of other aphorists, and their text-strategic reper-cussions assessed in particular instances of interpretive application.

B) Metaphor

Questions regarding the metaphoricity of aphoristic expression are certainlythe most complex; this is true partially because of the omnipresence ofmetaphor in aphoristic expression, and because of the manifold guises inwhich metaphor can occur. The problem is further complicated by the inher-ent metaphoricity of language itself, and by the fundamental difficultieswhich arise when one tries to segregate spontaneous use of metaphor fromits more deliberate, considered, and "artistic" application. One quality whichdistinguishes the approach to metaphor characteristic of the aphorist frommore traditional approaches is an awareness, a self-consciousness of both thedangers and potentials of metaphorical association. In keeping with theaphorist's desire to shatter the ideological stagnation of language, reified orencrusted metaphors are rent asunder, conventional metaphors are transmut-ed through their application in daring new contexts. It is this desire to"transvalue" the significations of signs which helps explain the reliance of theaphorist on conventionally established themes, ideas, or issues; this reflects,so to speak, the mechanism of historical self-correction that is built into theintertextual and intratextual dialogue of aphoristic discourse. In the realm ofmetaphor this is reflected in the recurrence of "favorite" metaphors or im-ages which become a part of the common sphere of aphoristic expression.One of these is the metaphor of the tightrope. Let's compare Kafka's applica-tion of this image with its use in aphorisms by Kraus and Wittgenstein.

Der wahre Weg geht über ein Seil, das nicht in der Höhe gespannt ist, sondernknapp über dem Boden. Es scheint mehr bestimmt stolpern zu machen, als began-gen zu werden, (aph. 1)Die Kunst des Schreibenden läßt ihn auf dem Luftseil einer hochgespannten Perio-de nicht schwanken, aber sie macht ihm einen Punkt problematisch. Er mag sichdes Ungewohnten vermessen; aber jede Regel löse sich ihm in ein Chaos vonZweifeln. (BW, 231)

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Der ehrliche religiöse Denker ist wie ein Seiltänzer. Er geht, dem Anscheine nach,beinahe nur auf der Luft. Sein Boden ist der schmälste, der sich denken läßt. Unddoch läßt sich auf ihm wirklich gehen.32

Kafka's aphorism is the most radical of the three in its treatment of themetaphor, and in other respects as well. Both Kraus and Wittgenstein use itin a fairly conventional descriptive fashion, associating it with different situa-tions. Kafka, however, deflates the very metaphor itself, turning the tight-rope, symbol of human grace and the heightened art of the upright gait, intoa booby-trap intended to frustrate even the everyday act of walking. Theastringency of the text is intensified by the coupling of this deflatedmetaphor with the conventional religious-ethical metaphor of "the trueway." The true way is no longer portrayed as a path to salvation, but as oneon which at every step one is in danger of being tripped up. While blatantlymocking such traditional religious conceptions, Kafka's aphorism em-phasizes the incessant struggle faced by those who enter on the "true path."This same tendency is integral to Kafka's appropriation of religious ter-minology such as "evil," "sin," "the goal," "the good," and "the task."Without exception these ethico-religious "metaphors" are trans-valued orundercut in Kafka's aphoristic texts.

In general, metaphorical association allows the aphorist to constructstriking mesalliances between the levels of concrete and abstract, or to con-join concepts or phenomena which otherwise would not be seen in relationto one another. This, in turn, often effects a radical re-evaluation of one orboth of the elements involved. The following aphorism by Kafka is exem-plary of such associative mesalliance that effects contradiction of acceptedvalues.

Der Mensch ist eine ungeheuere Sumpffläche. Ergreift ihn Begeisterung, so ist esim Gesamtbild so, wie wenn irgendwo in einem Winkel dieses Sumpfes ein kleinerFrosch in das grüne Wasser plumpst. (//, 359)

The comparison of the human being to the surface of a swamp represents agrotesque transfiguration of the common self-image of humankind, steepedin self-aggrandizement and virtual self-apotheosis. Kafka extends this deflat-ing association into the absurd when he justifies this unusual analogy bycomparing inspiration in the human being to the plumping of a frog into aswamp. The excruciatingly detailed descriptive elements with which Kafkafleshes out this image lend it a concreteness that throws the misalliancebetween metaphorical vehicle and tenor into greater relief.

This technique of connecting the disparate and diverse is the cornerstoneof one of the most characteristic aphoristic types, the so-called pseudo-

Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, pp. 139-40.

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definition. The strategy of such texts is commonly the definition of someabstract notion or idea through its combination, by means of copula, tosome concrete image or situational configuration. In this sense it entails afusion of rudimentary combination (contiguity) and metaphorical associa-tion.

Unsere Kunst ist ein von der Wahrheit Geblendet-Sein: Das Licht auf dem zurück-weichenden Fratzengesicht ist wahr, sonst nichts, (aph. 63)Die Menschengeschichte ist die Sekunde zwischen zwei Schritten eines Wanderers.(H, 74)Das Böse ist der Sternhimmel des Guten. (H, 90)Liebe ist, daß Du mir das Messer bist, mit dem ich in mir wühle. (BM, 263)

While possessing a quality of the direct and specific, these texts yet tendtoward the unfathomable and "indefinable" - although they pretend to "de-fine." It is the fundamental simplicity and matter-of-factness of the syntacti-cal structure which lends these texts their conviction and ostensible indubita-bility. However, de-limitation and de-finition commonly revert to theiropposites in these typical aphoristic formulations. A few examples of relatedtexts by other aphorists demonstrate the commonality of method. The firstexample is by Fr. Schlegel, the second by Kraus, and the third by Hof-mannsthal.

Witzige Einfalle sind die Sprüchwörter der gebildeten Menschen. (KA, II, 170)Die Welt ist ein Gefängnis, in dem Einzelhaft vorzuziehen ist. (BW, 68)Die moderne Liebe ist schwache Melodie, überinstrumentiert. (A 26)

The methodological procedure which unifies all these very diverse textsneeds no explicit elucidation beyond what has already been said. These are,we hardly need be reminded, aphoristic texts par excellence. Specificallycharacteristic of Kafka's aphorisms is a tendency to begin with a simplepseudo-definition, as in the "Mensch"-"Sumpf text, and then go on toexplicate or describe the metaphorical association in more detail. This is areflex of Kafka's natural predilection for narrative: a dramatic scene or narra-tive description frequently evolve automatically out of an initial metaphoric-aphoristic statement.

Kafka's love-hate relationship with metaphor as trope has already beendiscussed. However, it is necessary to investigate in some detail the role ofmetaphor in his aphorisms in order to come to a more specific and individualcharacterization of his aphoristic texts and his aphoristic method. Onephenomenon that is essential to Kafka's literary technique in general is theinclination toward the absolutization of metaphor, the freeing of metaphoricvehicle from any particular and specifiable tenor. Metaphorical image has away of becoming not only independent, but of actually steering the coursewhich the text follows. I will restrict myself to citing one example of this.

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Er fühlte es an der Schläfe, wie die Mauer die Spitze des Nagels fühlt, der in sieeingeschlagen werden soll. Er fühlte es also nicht. (H, 121)

This text begins with an assertion: "he" feels something at his temples. Itthen shifts to the metaphoric mode, giving a simile to describe the manner inwhich "he" feels "it." Yet the simile proves to be inappropriate; since wallsare insensate, the wall cannot possibly feel the tip of the nail about to bepounded into it. The simile, however, is such a dominating force in the textthat its inappropriateness to the original assertion effects a negation of theassertion itself, so that the text concludes with a statement that stands indirect contradiction to the proposition stated initially. The aphorism returnsin negative, as it were, to its point of departure, the shift into the negativebeing induced by the simile: an element of the aphorism which apparently isemployed for mere explication or elucidation turns out in fact to have adetermining impact on the course of the text. While taking a position at thestructural center of the aphorism, the simile simultaneously hollows it out,collapsing it upon itself.

Other aphorisms might have served as examples of this technique;33 butthe cited text best demonstrates what I will call the "metaphoric turn" inwhich an ostensibly secondary metaphor (or simile) takes on primary andformative character in a text. This phenomenon is a sub-stage of the absolut-ization of metaphor insofar as it evinces the preeminence of metaphoricalvehicle over its tenor, or, indeed, manipulation of the tenor by the vehicle. Itis not a major step from this procedure to the application of what I havecalled Gestalt or "suggestive" metaphors. Indeed, the aphoristic text whichmost clearly points out the divorce of metaphorical vehicle from any tenor isaphorism 15, which is structured solely around a kind of "ruptured" simile,one in which the tenor of the comparison is left unexpressed.

Wie ein Weg im Herbst: Kaum ist er rein gekehrt, bedeckt er sich wieder mit dentrockenen Blättern, (aph. 15)

While Kafka's "suggestive metaphors" are unique in the history of theaphorism, they do have some formal precedents in this tradition. Even theruptured simile appears in the work of at least one other aphorist; namelythat of Lichtenberg.

Wie eine besoffene Fama. (F 1019)

This text occurs in isolation in Lichtenberg's Sudelbücher, without anyapparent stimulus, and with no defined referent. In Lichtenberg's case, how-

For texts that employ a similar "metaphoric turn," see, for example, H, 99 andaph. 14. This procedure is also evident in some of Kafka's parables, "Der Kreisel,"for instance.

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ever, one imagines him simply being carried away by the joy of the simileitself, rendering its stimulus or concrete reference irrelevant.

There is yet another aphoristic form peculiar, as far as I can see, toLichtenberg's Sudelbücher and Kafka's aphoristic notebooks. Here again thetendency toward the absolutization of metaphor, or creative play with thevery process of metaphorization, is manifest. Compare, for example, thefollowing texts by Lichtenberg and Kafka.

Ein Schluck von Vernunft. ( E 202)Eine ganze Milchstraße von Einfallen. (J 344)Ein Fisch der in der Luft ertrunken war. (J 469)Ein Sonnenstreifen Glückseligkeit. (H, 71)Die Lärmtrompeten des Nichts. (T, 523)Ein Käfig ging einen Vogel suchen, (aph. 16)

These aphorisms seem simply to celebrate the associative freedom of themind in its capacity for unifying the concrete and the abstract. At the sametime, they are divorced from any relational context which might lend them aparticular significance, and they thus incessantly throw the reader back ontheir internal tension between literal and figurative. The ultimate challengeof such texts is that they prompt our participation in their own metaphoricalplay, allowing the reader to derive relevance or significance appropriate toherself/himself in each individual act of reception.

The relationship of such aphoristic texts to Kafka's suggestive metaphorscan best be brought out if we look at one further group of aphorisms whichemploy a more "conventional" associative technique. One of the typicalaims of the aphorist,; we know, is to open up relational gaps which are left tothe reader to fill. One such device which requires application of associativepowers is the implicit analogical relation. This is a common aphoristic type.The following are some examples, the first two from Lichtenberg, the thirdfrom Kraus, and the final text from Hebbel's diaries.

Die Religionf:] eine Sonntags-Affaire. (L 368)Leib und Seelef:] ein Pferd neben einen Ochsen gespannt. (D 656)Die neue Schauspielkunst: Dilettanten ohne Lampenfieber. (BW, 100)Die Welt: die große Wunde Gottes. (Entry no. 2663)

Kafka employs an identical technique in the following aphoristic texts.

Baum des Lebens - Herr des Lebens. (H, 101)Die Menschheitsentwicklung - ein Wachsen der Sterbenskraft. (H, 123)Meine Gefängniszelle - meine Festung. (H, 421)

These texts are most closely related to the form of the pseudo-definition,with the significant difference that the explicit function of comparing orrelating the two elements, usually carried out by a word such as "ist" or

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"heißt" or "bedeutet," is suppressed and left for the reader to supply. Theefficacity of such texts derives from the fact that while they indirectly implyor suggest analogy, the phenomena which they present for comparison donot seem to be obviously related. Especially in the last two Kafka texts cited,a radical re-evaluation of the first element in the analogy is effected throughits association with the second term.

There is one further "conventional" associative-analogical techniquecommon to aphoristic expression which is relevant as a possible forerunnerto Kafka's suggestive metaphors. This is a type of text which simply recordsan observation about some natural phenomenon, inviting the reader bymeans of the evocativeness of the phenomenon itself, and its curious textualisolation, to relate it analogically to some other event, object, or phenome-non. A mere natural "fact" thereby becomes pregnant with possible associa-tive meanings. Of the following texts which exemplify this technique, thefirst is by Lichtenberg, the second by Kraus, the third from Hebbel'sTagebücher, and the final one by Kafka.

Die Schnecke baut ihr Haus nicht, sondern es wächst ihr aus dem Leib. (A 31)Schein hat mehr Buchstaben als Sein. (BW, 267)Eben weil er fliegen kann, kann der Adler nicht gehen. (Entry no. 2631)Kein Tropfen überfließt und für keinen Tropfen ist mehr Platz. (H, 99)

In all of these aphorisms the explicit stating of what seems to be an obviousfact charges the remark with an indefinable meaning, spurring the reader onto search for analogies to which the described relationship might fittingly beapplied. It is, more than anything else, the act of expression or textualizationitself which lends these statements their significance, for they seem to be self-evident, and thus not requiring direct expression. The implications of thisaphoristic technique are manifold: on the one hand, of course, an implicitpower is attributed to the process of textualization; on the other hand, it ispointed out that the seemingly self-evident must constantly be re-examined,and that such re-examination will inevitably disclose hitherto unsuspectedsignificances.

My hypothesis is that Kafka's suggestive (Gestalt) metaphors can beconstrued as a fusion of possibilities inherent in the different types of associa-tive analogies examined above. Suggestive metaphor displays, for example,an absolutization of image like that found in the final set of texts; in addition,it, like all the analogical texts examined above, expresses the demand foranalogical connection - a demand placed on the reader - requiring her/him tosupplement the text, or to turn up a tertium comparationis which will recon-cile its disparate elements. While we have previously examined the mannerin which Kafka's suggestive metaphors function, the analysis of two further

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texts which manifest this technique will help to underscore the relationshipbetween these innovative texts and the strategies of analogical associationemployed by the traditional aphorism.

Er frißt den Abfall vom eigenen Tisch; dadurch wird er zwar ein Weilchen langsatter als alle, verlernt aber, oben vom Tisch zu essen; dadurch hört dann aber auchder Abfall auf. (aph. 73)Leoparden brechen in den Tempel ein und saufen die Opferkrüge leer; das wieder-holt sich immer wieder; schließlich kann man es vorausberechnen, und es wird einTeil der Zeremonie, (aph, 20)

There is one major difference between these texts and the aphorisms whichpresent a simple factual phenomenon: in the case of Kafka's suggestivemetaphors the events expressed are not based on empirical observation,rather they are products of the author's phantasy. We observe here the firstmoves of a transformation of the reflective-meditative form of the aphorisminto fiction, i. e. into narrative. This, then, is the point at which a bridge isbuilt between the essentially non-narrative form of the aphorism and Kafka'sspontaneous narrative talent. An investigation of this connection will be thepurpose of our final chapter. At this point of our analysis it will be helpful torelate the process of associative analogy considered here to the problem ofself-projection and communication discussed in the foregoing chapters.

I have argued that Kafka's art was always an art of self-expression, butthat the drive toward self-expression was constantly undercut by a crisis ofcommunication. Kafka's self-expression in the aphoristic texts cannot beviewed in terms of traditional autobiography; nor should it be understood asa form of confession, for as Kafka himself claimed, confession is necessarilylie. The central issue for Kafka was the discovery of a mode of communica-tion of the self that would somehow bridge the gap between the individuali-ty of his experiences and the communality of communication. In otherwords: How can the absolutely individual become generally communicableto other absolute individuals? How can the experience of one individual berelated to the experience of other individuals without the danger of prevari-cation predicated on the universalizing, de-individualizing thrust of every actof communication? The answer to this, as I have already indicated, lies in theinscribing of the individual in a structural configuration which, by means ofassociative analogy, can, in the act of reception, be associatively applied toany experience of the receiving individual which has a similar structure. Theimmediacy of the individual experience is thus retained through its transla-tion into a Gestalt with which the reader can individually identify. It is not amatter of hermeneutically reconstructing the original "meaning" of thestructural configuration; rather it is a question of explicitly attributing to it apersonal, individual "significance" in the act of reception - the text then

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becoming an ax for the reader's frozen sea. Thus the suspension of themetaphorical tenor, an interruption of the process of "similarity" in the textitself, is supplemented by a metonymical relationship (a relationship of con-tiguity, a structural connection). This combination allows for the act ofassociation to be postponed, so to speak, until the moment of reception. Inother words, the suppression of similarity in the suggestive metaphor, cou-pled with the highlighting of patterns of contiguity, calls forth the postponedprocess of similarity in the moment of reception. In this sense it is appropri-ate to speak of these "suggestive metaphors" as metonymies;34 but one mustkeep in mind that it is the metonymical character of the texts, buttressed bythe suppression of similarity in the moment of production, which serves toproject the process of metaphorization into the act of reception. Thus themetaphorical function still has priority, it has merely been strategically dis-placed into the receptive end of the dialectic between production and recep-tion. This was, we recall, also the strategy of those conventional types ofaphoristic expression examined above.

The centrality of metaphor and associative metaphorical functions forKafka's art remains beyond dispute, despite his own protestations about thedeficiencies of this trope. In his suggestive metaphors, developed during hisaphoristic period, Kafka discovered a form of metaphor that seems to cir-cumvent these difficulties: metaphor could break loose from a stifling refer-entiality, a dependence on the objects of reality, and attain some autonomywhile still being communicative in a very particular sense. In the Gestaltmetaphors Kafka employs patterns of contiguity in order to fortify themetaphorical function of the text, which then takes effect in the moment ofreception.

Kafka's reliance on associative techniques in his aphorisms aligns hisaphoristic production with that of such associative aphorists as Lichtenbergand Hebbel. It is therefore not coincidence that the associative-analogicaldevices employed by Kafka are "prefigured" in the aphorisms of Lichten-berg, above all. This does not mean, however, that the function of similaritysuppresses that of contiguity in Kafka's aphorisms; indeed, as the example of"suggestive metaphor" clearly demonstrates, it is more a matter of the pro-ductive interpenetration of these functions in a text-strategic (and, in thegiven case, at least, reception-strategic) interaction. This, however, is tradi-tionally the goal of aphoristic expression, and Kafka's innovative Gestaltmetaphors accomplish this in a manner unique to the genre.

See Roman Karst, "Kafka und die Metapher," Literatur und Kritik, 180 (1983),474: "Das höchste Gesetz seiner [Kafka's] Prosa ist das Gesetz der Metonymie.Zwei prinzipielle Elemente dieses Tropus, Zugehörigkeit und Austauschbarkeit,prägen das Werk Kafkas."

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C) Syntactic Elements

The aphorism typically employs certain structuring devices commonly as-sociated with rhetorical figures such as parallelism, antithesis, or anti-metabole. Kafka's aphorisms apply such structures in more or less traditionalways, combining them with other elements to create the tension characteris-tic of the aphorism. Parallelism, for example, is combined with semanticopposition in this aphorism.

Müßigang ist aller Laster Anfang, aller Tugenden Krönung. (H, 89)

The subject of both clauses is identical, so that subject and verb can bedeleted in the second clause. The parallelism is underscored by identicalsyntactic configurations in the conclusion of each phrase, with semanticcontrast in the parallel nouns "Laster" and "Tugenden" working at cross-purposes to this congruity. Even the nouns "Anfang" and "Krönung," thelatter understood in the sense of "ultimate conclusion," are marked bysemantic contrast. We see here the extent to which parallelism and antithesisoccur in aphoristic expression as different aspects of the same phenomenon,for they invariably appear together. It is significant to note that syntacticalparallelism and semantic contrast are just two elements in this text amongmany. This aphorism could, for example, be viewed as a variant of pseudo-definition which is extended through syntactical parallelism. Moreover, thetext is explicitly contra-dictory, taking up and re-defining a proverbial ex-pression. Nietzsche exploits the same proverb in one of his aphorisms.

Müßigang ist aller Psychologie Anfang. Wie? wäre Psychologie - ein Laster?(Werke, II, 943)

By inserting the word "psychology" for that of "vice" in the proverb,Nietzsche implicitly - and then explicitly - associates psychology with vice.Kafka takes a different tack, constructing a semantically parallel phrasewhich contradicts the statement of the proverb. The effectiveness of Kafka'stext resides in the compression of so many devices into a radically limitedtextual space. The following aphorism by Kraus, like Kafka's text, demon-strates syntactic parallelism in combination with semantic contrast.

Ansichten pflanzen sich durch Teilung, Gedanken durch Knospung fort. (BW,111)

Antithesis occurs so commonly in tandem with structural parallelism thatthe two techniques can scarcely be segregated; the purpose of drawing suchparallels, paradoxically, is usually the presentation of difference. One can,however, perhaps speak of antithesis in the instances of the following apho-risms, the first by Novalis, the second by Kafka.

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Abstraction schwächt - Reflexion stärkt. (Schriften, II, 558)Das Negative zu tun, ist uns noch auferlegt; das Positive ist uns schon gegeben.(aph. 27)

While syntactic parallelism is evident in these texts as well, it serves merelyto throw antithesis into relief, highlighting the tension between each text'scontrasting clauses.

Antimetabole also is a form Kafka employs in his aphorisms, although itoccurs infrequently. An aphorism from the collection "Er" displays thisstructure.

Manche leugnen den Jammer durch Hinweis auf die Sonne, er leugnet die Sonnedurch Hinweis auf den Jammer. (BeK, 280)

Compare this text to the following one by Kraus, for example:

Das Weib nimmt einen für alle, der Mann alle für eine. (BW, 305)

The same type of structural changes are imposed upon each text in theprocess of moving from the first to the second clause: the subjects are re-placed with new ones, and objects in the predicate of the clauses are inverted.Kraus effects an ironic commentary on the contrasting sexual "ethics" ofwoman and man and on the "double" sexual standard; Kafka uses the struc-ture to invert the vision of theodicy, denying the "radiance" of the sun on thebasis of the existence of misery.

Such syntactical structures in Kafka's aphorisms obviously serve a second-ary function, as they do, indeed, for most aphorisms. Their role is onewhich is expressly "supporting," underpinning other techniques or devicesand contributing to the overall aphoristic effect or pointe. Nevertheless, thepresence of such devices in Kafka's aphorisms helps to bring out the relation-ship between these texts and those of the aphoristic tradition. Kafka is muchmore original as an aphorist where logical structures, rather than purelyrhetorico-syntactic ones, come into play.

D) Logical Structures

The phrase "logical structures" is in a certain sense a misnomer when appliedin conjunction with the aphorism, for in such texts it is oftentimes a manipu-lation or an undermining of strict logical structures which is at issue. Werecall here Kafka's description of Kierkegaard's method as one characterizedby the interpenetration of enchantment and logic. It is this rupturing ordisplacement of logical structures that has led to the general claim that para-dox is one of the central features of aphoristic expression. This is true, ofcourse, for Kafka's aphorisms as well. Yet, as we know, paradox in Kafka -especially in the aphorisms - often arises in the recursive form which Ger-

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hard Neumann has called "gleitendes Paradox." We have already analyzedthe manner in which such paradox operates in the example of one text. Inthis section we will attempt to distinguish sub-types of this Kafkan paradox.But before we begin this investigation, it is necessary to make some remarksabout other, more conventional manipulations of, or deviations from, logi-cal structure which are commonly exploited by the aphorist, or, at least, bycertain aphorists.

In the typology of aphoristic thought and methods, metaphor was con-nected to associative thought, and the predilection toward application ofpseudo-logical structures was related to the mystical thought of the Roman-tics. Most scholars who have dealt with Kafka's aphorisms have tended torelate them to certain mystical traditions.35 Yet in terms of their typicalstructures and forms, Kafka's aphorisms do not display the inclinationsfound, for example, in the aphorisms of such "mystical" aphorists as Novalisand Otto Weininger. The fundamental drive of mystical thinkers is theunification of the diverse, the sublation of difference in underlying identity,the reduction of multiplicity to oppositional polarity. Many aphoristicforms, including the pseudo-definition, for example, display this tendencytoward unification or identification of phenomena that are essentially differ-ent. Yet we have argued that such identification is commonly carried out inthe realm of metaphor, and that, moreover, identification ultimately servesthe end of breaking down accepted and unquestioned identifications. Inother words, re-construction often works toward the end of de-construc-tion. The mystical aphorist, on the other hand, employs aphoristic tech-niques in the search for overriding identities, identities that are considered toinhere in fact, and which are not merely the creative product of the associa-tive-analogical fancy as is true for metaphorical aphorists such as Lichten-berg. Here metaphor functions, as for Kafka, as a kind of experiment, as acreative hypothesis, not as an uncovering of essential identities.

A few examples will help to make this issue somewhat more transparent.We have already discovered that forms such as proportional analogy andtechniques which employ syllogistic logic are popular among "mystical"aphorists. Otto Weininger, perhaps the best example of a mystical aphorist,employs the proportional analogy quite often, the following texts serving asexamples that stand for many others.36

This is most true of the interpretations proffered by Werner Hoffmann; but theinclination of most scholars who view the aphorisms as manifestations of somereligious tendency in Kafka is to emphasize their relationship to mystical thinking.See the section on this question in my introductory chapter.Weininger's aphorisms are cited from the volume Über die letzten Dinge (Viennaand Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1904); all references will be noted in the textwith the abbreviation LD and the page number.

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Der Ekel verhält sich zur Furcht, wie die Lust zum Wert. (LD, 64)37

Wert: Licht = Licht: Feuer. (LD, 75)

In the second text Weininger goes so far as to substitute mathematical sym-bols for syntactic connectors. To be sure, the equal sign could stand as thesymbol of Weininger's aphoristic procedure, with oppositions and distinc-tions occuring only in the form of binary pairs, so that the world appears tobe divisible into two general principles, distinct from one another, but unify-ing all the elements they subsume. In keeping with this rage for equivalence,Weininger's pseudo-definitions remain within the realm of the abstract, rare-ly playing off concrete and abstract in their employment of metaphor.

Idiotie ist das intellektuelle Äquivalent der Roheit. (LD, 55)Der Wirbel ist die Eitelkeit des Wassers; und sein Kreis-Egoismus. (LD, 176)

The search for symbols and equivalences in Weininger's aphorisms, as in histhought in general, is a reflex of an extreme idealism, fashioned after thephilosophy of Schopenhauer, in which all objectivity is reducible to subjec-tivity. Weininger unmistakably expresses this in the following reflection.

"Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung" - daß dies ewig wahr ist und nicht widerlegtwerden kann, muß einen Grund haben. Alle diese Dinge, die ich sehe, sind nichtdie volle Wahrheit, sie verhüllen das höchste Sein noch immer vor dem Blicke. Alsich ward, verlangte ich aber nach diesem Selbstbetrug und diesem Schein. Als ichauf diese Welt kommen wollte, verzichtete ich darauf, bloß die Wahrheit zu wol-len. Alle Dinge sind nur Erscheinungen, d. h. sie spiegeln mir immer nur meineSubjektivität wieder. (LD, 56-7)

I have intentionally chosen the somewhat exaggerated model of Weiningerhere for the purpose of contrast. The sublation of the objective world in thesubjectivity of the individual, of course, is nothing but one overriding struc-ture of unification. One could scarcely imagine a thinker whose cognitivemethod is more contrary to Kafka's. I want to present two texts which I takeas exemplary for the distinction between the method of Weininger as mysti-cal aphorist, and that of Kafka as associative-experimental aphorist. The twotexts are similar enough to throw this diversity of method into relief.

Dankbarkeit und Rachsucht sind eines und dasselbe: es gehört zu beiden eineEmpfindung des Einzelmomentes als real: dankbar wie rachsüchtig ist der Sadist,nicht der Masochist. (LD, 71)Der Verzückte und der Ertrinkende, beide heben die Arme. Der erste bezeugtEintracht, der zweite Widerstreit mit den Elementen. (H, 87)

Weininger uncovers a tertium comparationis on the basis of which the oppo-sitions between gratitude and desire for revenge can be fused. Kafka, on theother hand, takes one and the same symbolic gesture as the expression of two

The entire aphorism is italicized in Weininger's text.

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opposing meanings: instead of working from the distinct to the identical,Kafka turns this around, working from the identical to the distinct, empha-sizing that a single "sign" can, depending on the contextual situation, haveopposite significations. Kafka, in other words, seeks antithesis in identity,whereas the mystical aphorist Weininger seeks identity in antithesis. In-geborg Henel has also pointed to this non-mystical aspect of Kafka'sthought, arguing that in Kafka unity is supplanted by an awareness of con-trast, difference, and distance.38

The drive of the mystical aphorist toward the discovery of unity and theeradication of difference can be observed quite clearly in the texts of Novalisas well. The following two aphorisms address in a programmatic fashionthis thirst for equating the disparate.

Auf Vergleichen, Gleichen läßt sich wohl alles Erkennen, Wissen etc. zurückfüh-ren. (Schriften, II, 546)Den Satz des Widerspruchs zu vernichten ist vielleicht die höchste Aufgabe derhöheren Logik. (Schriften, III, 570)

Novalis goes so far as to formulate the extirpation of contradiction as asupreme aim. His aphorisms, of course, practice this art of equation, ofunification, of absolute identity. In contradistinction to this, Kafka's apho-risms mutliply contradictions, rather than smoothing them out into iden-tities. Surely, one must avoid absolutizing this distinction between the ragefor identification and that for difference, since the aphorisms of the writersdiscussed here are neither mechanical, nor unidimensional. Still, the overalltendency of Kafka's thought in the aphorisms is toward differentiation of theidentical and complication of the simple. The point here is that this contrastof conceptual drives between Kafka and such mystical aphorists as Novalisand Weininger should help us set aside the connection of Kafka's aphorismsto a particular form of mystical thought. The fact is that all aphoristicthought is "mystical" in the sense that it presents a confrontation of thelogical and the irrational.

Kafka's rage for differentiation is nowhere better expressed than in theincessant retractions, recursions, negations, exclusions, and qualificationsthat have come to be taken as typical of his thought in general. These aremanifest in the logical structure of his aphorisms as well, and here againKafka's aphoristic texts display their independence from the aphoristic tradi-tion, i. e. their ability to operate in unique ways within the definitions of thisgenre. In what follows I will attempt to identify, and provide examples for,three types of "logical" structure that are especially characteristic of Kafka'saphorisms. I call these structures "retraction," "exclusion," and "preclu-

38 Henel, "Kafka als Denker," p. 63.

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sion." The borders between these different categories are, to be sure, some-what fluid; all are forms of self-negation that relate closely to one anotherand which tend to intermingle in Kafka's texts. However, such intermin-gling does not prohibit isolation of the individual structures for the purposeof analysis.

By retraction I mean something quite similar to what Martin Walser, oneof the first to study the logical structures of Kafka's texts, refers to with theterm "Aufhebung."39 Walser, however, sees this as an essentially narrativedevice according to which each action on the part of Kafka's protagonists iscancelled out by the environment in which they act. Walser, in other words,defines the tendency toward the negation of assertions in terms of a conflictbetween the individual and a hostile society. In the aphorisms this conflict isinternalized into the logical structure of the texts, so that an initial assertion issubsequently negated or retracted ("aufgehoben") in the same text. Apho-rism 103 will provide us with a first example of this structure.

Du kannst dich zurückhalten von den Leiden der Welt, das ist dir freigestellt undentspricht deiner Natur, aber vielleicht ist gerade dieses Zurückhalten das einzigeLeid, das du vermeiden könntest, (aph. 103)

The first two clauses of this aphorism express what seems to be a definitiveassertion: one can by nature withdraw from the sufferings of the world. Theword "aber," however, introduces a qualification of this assertion which, ifaccepted, negates the original statement: withdrawing from suffering is itselfsuffering; thus one cannot, in fact, withdraw from suffering, except perhapsby not withdrawing from suffering (for this is the only form of sufferingwhich one might be able to avoid). The initial assertion of the text is thereby"retracted" by the subsequent exposition. Rather than providing some en-lightenment on the dilemma of worldly suffering and its avoidance, the textpresents only contradiction and irresolution.

A second example of this structure, taken from the collection "Er," dis-plays the interweaving of retraction with a more moderate form of qualifica-tion.

Alles ist ihm erlaubt, nur das Sichvergessen nicht, womit allerdings wieder allesverboten ist, bis auf das eine, für das Ganze augenblicklich Notwendige. (BeK,285)

It is a rather simple matter to chart the logical course by which this aphorismdevelops: absolute assertion is followed by a single qualification of this asser-tion; this qualification, however, has the effect of totally negating the origi-nal statement and evoking a proposition which states the contrary; this, in

39 Martin Walser, Beschreibung einer Form, pp. 60-71.

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turn, is subjected to a single qualification which is so lacking in specificity("bis auf das eine, für das Ganze augenblicklich Notwendige") that it bydefault becomes an absolute qualification. At this point the text appears torevert back to its beginning; but even this is only apparent, for one is contin-ually led back through its circuitous logic. If in the traditional aphorismantithesis and contradiction serve to dislodge accepted, stratified "conclu-sions," then Kafka's figures of retraction and qualification go one step fur-ther; for they not only disavow conventional dogma, they disallow all finalconclusions, throwing the reader continually back into the play betweenoppositions and revisions, never allowing stasis at one or the other posi-tion.40 At the same time, it seems clear that this process of assertion andretraction verges on the exploding of the (traditionally) quite strict demandsfor formal closure made upon the aphorism. The traditional aphorism, whileconceptually subscribing to dynamism and incessant flux with regard tomatter and meaning (i. e. in both the physical and intellectual realms), stillpresents a text-system which is formally, if artificially, closed. In many ofKafka's aphorisms, especially in those applying the structure of retractionand qualification, the dynamic system has become absolute, so that closure isonly sketched, so to speak, by the limitations of pure opposition, by thepattern of assertion and negation and assertion, ad infinitum. The problem ofdynamism can no longer be contained, but threatens to rupture the aphoris-tic form itself.

In his examination of structures of paradox in Kafka, Shimon Sandbankhas studied such patterns of affirmation and negation in Kafka's texts ingeneral.41 Sandbank attempts to segregate three different patterns which hedescribes as "affirmation then negation," "affirmation and negation," and"affirmation therefore negation."42 The first category is identical to what Ihave called retraction, the second two seem to me to be insufficiently distin-guishable from one another, and my tendency is to view them as one and thesame structure, what I have throughout my investigation termed the struc-ture of exclusion. Exclusion, we recall, is the logical structure which definesKafka's epistemological dilemma as well as his crisis of communication. It isone of the most common structures in Kafka's aphoristic texts, and we havealready scrutinized a number of examples. Exclusion is characterized by theparallel subsistence of two spheres which are by definition mutually exclu-sive. It is inherent in the conflict of internal-external and defines the inacces-sibility of that which is "other" or outside of one's own strictly delimited

40 See Corngold, "Kafka's Double Helix," p. 528.41 Shimon Sandbank, "Structures of Paradox in Kafka," Modern Language Quarter-

ly, 28 (1967), 462-72.42 Sandbank, "Structures of Paradox," p. 471.

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realm. If I have identified retraction as a structure which manifests the prob-lem of dynamism which is fundamental to aphoristic expression, exclusioncan be associated with the dis-integral, fragmentary conception of realitythat is also formative for the "aphoristic" world-view. The structure ofexclusion manifests the problematical mediation between distinct realms. Iwill demonstrate this on the example of two aphorisms by Kafka. The first istaken from the collection "Er."

Er beweist nur sich selbst, sein einziger Beweis ist er selbst, alle Gegner besiegenihn sofort, aber nicht dadurch, daß sie ihn widerlegen (er ist unwiderlegbar),sondern dadurch, daß sie sich beweisen. (BeK, 282)

This text reads like a summary description of the fate of each and every oneof Kafka's protagonists: condemned to - and limited to - the reflex of self-assertion, one is ultimately defeated by the inimical self-assertions that occuraround one. We have here, in aphoristic form, a description of a heliumomnium contra omnes which is defined not by open aggression, but rather bythe mutual assertiveness of entities which have no connection or relation toone another whatsoever. The individual is the "completely other" whichcannot be mediated with other individuals. The world is pulverized intoisolated fragments whose pure isolation determines the mutual conflict oftheir self-assertions. An aphorism from the third Oktavheft presents one ofthe most striking formulations of this dilemma, and one which hints at itsrelationship to the issue of fragmentation.

Wirklich urteilen kann nur die Partei, als Partei aber kann sie nicht urteilen. Dem-nach gibt es in der Welt keine Urteilsmöglichkeit, sondern nur deren Schimmer.(H, 86)

Only the party involved, who knows the facts of the case inside-out, so tospeak, is truly competent to pass judgment; judgment, however, must bepassed objectively from without; yet those who are "without" no longerhave the "inside" information which would make a judgment possible. Thepossibility of judgment thus dissolves into mere "Schimmer" because of theincommensurability of insider and outsider. The very impenetrability ofsuch texts as this to definitive hermeneutical scrutiny is but one furthermanifestation of the mutual exclusivity of insider and outsider.43 Partiality,of course, is one of the primary issues with which aphoristics is concerned,and it traditionally concedes the influence of "partiality," or what JürgenHabermas calls "knowledge interests," in the acquisition of knowledge. Thisis expressed, for example, in the emphasis that aphorists from the French

43 Frank Kermode has elucidated the problem of insider-outsider in connection withobscure narratives and the position of the interpreter; see his The Genesis of Secre-cy: (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), esp. pp.4ff .

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moralists to Nietzsche have placed on the problem of self-interest and self-love. The connection to the issue of fragmentation is made in Kafka's apho-rism through the implications of the word "Partei." For a "party" is a part,i. e. a segment that has been divided, or parted, from a larger whole. Partiesare by definition partial, and to be partial means to be responsible to the partrather than to a whole. In the aphorist's world there is only partiality in thissense: there are only conflicting interests of partial relevance; there are onlymutually inimical parts or parties which defeat one another by assertingthemselves. The aphoristic collection, then, can be interpreted as a kind offormal-textual representation of the interest-group world in which all sub-suming unities have collapsed, be they of religious, political, or culturalnature.

The final logical structure of negation common to Kafka's aphoristictexts is preclusion. This structure is closely related to that of retraction, withthe difference that an assertion is not eliminated through us direct negation,but rather through removal of the prerequisites which make it possible. Inother words, preclusion describes a preempting of the foundational pos-sibilities on which an assertion is based, a pulling-the-rug-out-from-underits logical pre-conditions. The employment of this structure is not limited toKafka's aphorisms, but its frequency in these texts gives an indication of itscentrality for Kafka at this time. Let's begin, however, by looking at anexample aphorism by Karl Kraus which displays this structure especiallylucidly.

Der Anspruch auf einen Platz an der Sonne ist bekannt. Weniger bekannt ist, daßsie untergeht, sobald er errungen ist. (BW, 389)

The proverbial "place in the sun" can be found, but in the act of discoveringit the conditions which made it desirable are eliminated: accomplishment of atask automatically, and without bringing the promised reward, preempts thepurpose for attempting to accomplish it in the first place. Kafka's well-known aphorism about the Archimedean point has a structure identical tothe one in Kraus's text.

Er hat den archimedischen Punkt gefunden, hat ihn aber gegen sich ausgenützt,offenbar hat er ihn nur unter dieser Bedingung finden dürfen. (H, 418)

The conditions under which the Archimedean point can be found precludethe purpose which motivates the search for it: instead of being able to use itto move the earth out of its axis, it can only be employed against thediscoverer. The structure of preclusion thus is closely related to the dilemmaof theory and practice discussed earlier; what is possible in theory, provesitself not merely to be impossible in practice, but to be precluded by practiceitself. Here we find a structural manifestation of the problematical mediation

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between the realms of idea and experience, thought and reality, this alsobeing one of the central concerns typically portrayed in aphoristic expres-sion. Kafka's aphoristic rendition of the Atlas myth manifests this discrepan-cy between opinion (theory) and fact (praxis).

Atlas konnte die Meinung haben, er dürfe, wenn er wolle, die Erde fallen lassenund sich wegschleichen; mehr als diese Meinung aber war ihm nicht erlaubt. (H,107)44

The opinion permitted Atlas with regard to his possibilities for action has norelation to those possibilities as they might be realized in practice. Supposi-tion and actuality are separated by an unbridgeable gulf, and Atlas is caughtbetween conceptual possibility and actual impossibility, between thoughtand its realization, theory and practice.

In this final section we have concentrated on an analysis of the logicalstructures typical of Kafka's aphorisms. While these structures tend to beinnovative in terms of the conventional practices of aphorists, I have tried toemphasize the extent to which they must be seen as manifestations of theintellectual problematics which I have identified with "aphoristics," i. e. withthose issues which motivate the structures, forms, and purposes of aphoristicexpression. Thus I hope to have demonstrated that Kafka's aphorisms arenot merely "traditional" in terms of their structures and forms, but that they,to express it rather pointedly, deal aphoristically with the aphorism itself,experimenting and exploring new possibilities of expression which extend,but do not yet explode, the confines of the genre. The task of the next andfinal chapter will be an examination of the transcending of aphoristic formby means of its narrativization in the Kafkan parable. Before moving on tothis final investigation, however, it seems appropriate to make a fewconcluding remarks by way of summation of points made thus far.

We have sought to approach Kafka's aphorisms with a variety of meth-ods. I hope to have shown that intellectual-historical analysis of aphoristicsand the fundamental problems of Kafka's thinking, scrutiny of Kafka's re-ception of aphoristic texts and the work of his "aphoristic precursors," and,finally, textual and structural examinations of his aphorisms all converge onthe same plane: namely, the relevance of studying Kafka's aphoristic textswithin the framework of the specific literary genre of the aphorism, a genrewhich conforms to certain conventions and is founded on particular intellec-tual problematics. Above all, I hope to have brought sufficient evidence tolight which speaks against the identification of Kafka's aphoristic medita-tions with certain philosophical or religious positions contained in the "sub-

For further aphorisms which manifest the structure of preclusion, see aphs. 18 &84, and H, 348.

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stance" of the texts. On the contrary, the aphorisms communicate indirectlythrough their structure and through their (poetic) manipulation of language.Thus, they should not be conceived as texts which somehow are less "liter-ary" - and that means more authentic with regard to the views and beliefs ofthe person Franz Kafka - than any of Kafka's other written documents. Theaphorisms, in other words, must also be subjected to careful interpretation,but the results of such interpretation can never be taken to be absolute. Whilethe aphorisms are indeed related to the problem of self-expression or com-munication of the self, this is fundamental to all writing for Kafka. Thismeans that self-communication can never be divorced from self-projection,from fictionalization and textualization of the self. One of the options forself-communication with which Kafka experimented in his aphorisms wasthe technique of suggestive metaphor through which structures of the inter-nal experience of the individual are projected in Gestalt configurations whichallow free reference to individual situations that evince the same structure.Kafka's aphorisms thus have equal shares in the extremes of "impression"and "epiphany" outlined in my discussion of the aphorism in the AustrianJahrhundertwende: his concern is primarily with the self and with communi-cation of the self, but, as we have seen, self-recognition is never extricablefrom a dialectical process, the other side of which is self-projection. Yetwhile for Kafka the aphorism is a kind of verbal "mask," this mask-likequality is accepted not as a conscious goal, but simply as a necessary conse-quence of the act of self-communication. The critical thrust of the epiphanicaphorism is turned toward the self, and the reproduction of the epiphanicinsight in the act of reception effects insight into the receptive self, not intothe creator. Thereby a form of indirect communication is established whichcan speak intermedially from individual to individual, without betraying the"internal command" of either.

In addition to defining Kafka's reflections from the years 1917-1920 interms of the literary genre of the aphorism, we have provided a basis fororienting his aphoristic method within sub-categories of aphoristic thought.Kafka's aphoristic texts are most closely related to those of Lichtenberg andHebbel, both in the tendency toward self-observation and self-portrayal, aswell as in the proclivity for metaphorical-associative patterns and forms. Onthe other hand, Kafka's aphorisms appear to be farthest removed from thoseof mystical aphorists such as Novalis and Weininger, whose reflections re-main within the realm of intellectual abstraction, and for whom the estab-lishing of relationships and identities takes priority over the assertion ofdifference. In the mystical aphorism, differentiation is merely a processwhich is subordinated to the search for identity; at most, difference extendsinto a dualistic conception which ultimately serves the ends of identity interms of two opposing groups. Kafka's aphorisms, on the other hand, work

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against conceptions of identity and unity, emphasizing the disintegration ofthe whole into self-enclosed parts which defy re-integration on any level. Atthe same time, the antithetical, contra-dictory drive of the critical aphoristssuch as Nietzsche and Kraus is not absent in Kafka's aphorisms. Althoughthe tone of Kafka's texts is considerably less ironic, their barbs less pointed,the inclination toward destruction of established values is constantly present.This does not generally express itself in a parodistic tone in Kafka, however,as it does in the aphorisms of Kraus and Nietzsche.45 Finally, Kafka's partici-pation in the intertextual dialogue typical of aphoristic expression provideshim a manner in which he can, in the sphere of literature, strive toward anintegration of his individuality with an intellectual-textual community: hisaphoristic production becomes a fragment of a greater aphoristic dialogue, asingle text in the fragmentary collection of aphoristic expression that hasbeen carried out over centuries.

We now want to look at the possible relevance of the aphoristic model forthe structure and nature of Kafka's parabolic narratives, effecting on a for-mal-structural level the re-integration of Kafka's aphoristic period into theoverall complexion of his literature.

One of Kafka's few "parodistic" aphorisms takes up and subverts a Biblical motif:Wer sucht, findet nicht, aber wer nicht sucht, wird gefunden. (H, 94)

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CHAPTER Six

Aphorism and Met-Aphorism:The Relation of Aphorism and Parable in Kafka's CEuvre

The quarantine of Kafka's aphoristic writings from his "literary" produc-tion, which runs like a unifying thread through the history of Kafka-criti-cism, represents an interpretive-strategic move which allows for the rein-troduction of the aphoristic "statements" at a more elevated interpretive levelon which they assume the character of Kafka's meta-commentary on hisliterary aims and practices. This re-integration of the aphoristic and narrativewritings thus incessantly occurs on a thematic level: the "immediate," pro-grammatic statements which could not be turned up in Kafka's narrativeworks are supplied in retrospect through recourse to the aphorisms. WernerHoffmann's latest book on Kafka's aphorisms is paradigmatic for this proce-dure.1 Arguing that the Zürau aphorisms manifest Kafka's coming-to-gripswith religious issues, and that they present his belief in an "indestructible"human essence, Hoffmann goes on to follow this theme through the narra-tive texts from the period after 1918.2 Hoffmann, at least, pays attention tochronological issues, restricting application of the aphorisms to Kafka's lateworks, whereas most other critics have simply ignored this problem, assum-ing, so it seems, that as meta-commentaries the aphorisms must also bemeta-historical, and thus crystalizations of Kafka's true and unchanging at-titudes.

Not surprisingly, those scholars who emphasize the thematic or bio-graphical elements in Kafka's works are also those who argue most avidlyfor the irrelevance of questions of development and evolution in Kafka's lifeand literature.3 While Binder is correct in his claim that the themes of Kafka'sliterature remain relatively constant throughout his life (MuG, 383), his

1 Werner Hoffmann, "Ansturm gegen die letzte irdische Grenze": Aphorismen undSpätwerk Kafkas (Bern: Francke, 1984).

2 For a more detailed critique of Hoffmann's approach, see my review of his book,MAL, 19, No. 1 (March, 1986), pp. 118-20.

3 I am thinking in particular of Binder's position, described in my introductorychapter; see MuG, 383-96. To Binder's credit, of course, one must concede that heat least is aware that chronological issues can come into play; but he addresses thisproblem by attempting to relativize or neutralize historical problems where Kaf-ka's art is concerned.

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denial of formal change and development in Kafka's artistic practice is anuntenable position. To be sure, Kafka's literary development is not linear - itoccurs in historical disjunction and moves in fits and starts. Nonetheless,Kafka's text-strategic approaches to the stable themes of his writing areinvolved in almost incessant processes of change and creative experimenta-tion. This phenomenon has been aptly described by Henry Sussman, whowrites of Kafka's "almost systematic experiments into the nature of theliterary image" and describes Kafka's "ongoing enterprise" as an "explora-tion into the nature, setting, and effects of fictive language, and its relation tosuch philosophical constructs as reality, existence, and truth."4 The words"experiments" and "exploration" are of prime significance, since they implya constant attitude of questioning and of testing on Kafka's part, a continu-ous search for an adequate literary practice which, however, like the Castlein Kafka's like-named novel, is never attained. The sophistication, innova-tion, and receptive potency of Kafka's texts have obscured in some ways theincessant literary strruggle in which he was involved, his interminable questfor perfection in his artistic practice.

Kafka's aphorisms, while ostensibly "expository" texts which appear tobe at home only on the margins of the literary, are indeed profoundly literarytexts, and they represent one influential and consequential moment of Kaf-ka's experiments into "fictive language." The aphorisms are, as I have triedto show, fictions of the self projected through the formal and rhetoricalobjectivity of aphoristic discourse; but in this sense they are scarcely differ-ent, except in textual form, from Kafka's other fictionalizations of the self innovel, short story, letter, and diary. In other words, the aphorisms employdistinct techniques and strategies to come to terms with the communicationof the self, the omnipresent task of Kafka's literature. However, as it is thegoal of this investigation to demonstrate, the textual strategies manifest inthe aphorisms are also functional to a large extent in the Kafkan parable, aproduct of the same creative period.

A note from the miscellaneous fragments, probably written in 1920 whenKafka returned with renewed vigor to the creation of aphorisms, both indi-cates Kafka's awareness that he is composing within the parameters of aspecific textual form - which he terms "Spruch" - and expresses his associa-tion of the application of such "brief" or "fragmentary" discourse with thehonest desire to approach "truth."

Wäre nur einer imstande, ein Wort vor der Wahrheit zurückzubleiben, jeder (auchich in diesem Spruch) überrennt sie mit Hunderten. (H, 360)

Henry Sussman, Franz Kafka: Geometrician of Metaphor (Madison: Coda Press,1979), pp. 27-8.

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Kafka's parenthetical comment marks a stepping outside of the text in thevery act of composition, with the result that the text (or its statement) isturned against itself. While expressing the wish that someone - anyone -might be able to accomplish the feat of checking the articulation of truth atits threshold instead of overrunning it, Kafka adapts his own utterance to thisrequirement of brevity, and, simultaneously, undercuts even this modifiedpractice by declaring it a failure. Even in this compact aphoristic text, inother words, Kafka senses that he has overrun truth. The implication of thiscritique, taken to its most extreme, is that enunciation of truth by definitionentails overrunning truth; truth and expression are once again conceived asinherently incompatible. This returns us, of course, to the problematics ofcommunication whose centrality for Kafka's aphorisms, as well as for theaphoristic impulse of his Austrian contemporaries, has already been exam-ined. Still, Kafka's remark seems to embody a significant recognition: textual(or verbal) brevity is one possible strategy for an approximation of truth incommunication, this being the best that one can ever expect to attain. We arereminded, of course, of Mach's notion of "Denkökonomie," the principlethat truthful hypotheses occur in the most compact form possible. Kafka'svalorization of laconism is also reminiscent of the demand made by Witt-genstein and the Viennese logical positivists that language, if it is to attainvalidity, must be reduced as much as possible to its bare logical structures.Now the tactic in Kafka's fragmentary novels is in many ways the oppositeof such laconic expression: indeed, one might argue that they consciouslyportray the protagonist's constant overrunning of truth, and that the patternof circularity and displacement which these texts describe represents a calcu-lated textual move on Kafka's part for depicting such transgression of truth.In contrast to this, Kafka's aphorisms and short parables reflect an attempt -one which Kafka, in his overriding diffidence, certainly saw as a failure - torein in expression, to halt it, like the man from the country in the parable"Vor dem Gesetz," at the threshold of truth. Thus the sheer laconism ofthese texts, their lack of superfluous textual "baggage," is a significant com-mon feature, one to which Kafka attributed text-strategic value vis-ä-vis theproblem of adequate truthful communication.

Compactness, of course, is merely the most obvious, and hence mostsuperficial, formal (i. e. non-thematic) affinity between aphorism and para-ble. My aim in this chapter is to work out some of the profounder connec-tions between these two textual types, and to explore their interrelationshipsin the specific instance of Kafka's writing.

Various critics have suggested in oblique ways that aphorism and parableare related textual forms in Kafka's literature. Werner Hoffmann, for exam-ple, discussing the abundant use of metaphor in Kafka's aphorisms, writes:"Zuweilen sind seine [Kafka's] Aphorismen auf die Parabel hin angelegt, nur

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daß ihre Entfaltung durch die zur Kürze drängende Form gehemmt wird."5

Hoffmann fails, however, to follow up on this observation; in fact, as hisconcluding remark makes clear, he assumes that the strictures of aphoristicexpression make aphorism and parable essentially incompatible, and hethereby precludes any further investigation of the question. Kafka's sugges-tive-metaphoric aphorisms, however, prove this assumption false, for theyshow that aphoristic brevity and parabolic portrayal are wholly reconcilable.Ulrich Fülleborn, similarly, has noted that many of Kafka's aphorisms are"Gleichnisse" reminiscent of the Hebrew "mashal," the Biblical word con-ventionally translated as "parable."6 Scholars who concern themselves withthe study of the parable, and the related form of the fable, often intimate thatthese narrative forms are closely related to the form of the aphorism. In hisstudy of the modern German parable, Werner Brettschneider expresses theproximity of aphorism and parable in terms of the danger that in modernliterature the parabolic narrative threatens to be reduced to the non-narrativi-ty of the aphorism. "Immer entscheidender verengt sich die 'Geschichte',wird auf eine letzte Kurzform gebracht, bis sie in Gefahr gerät, das epischeGattungsgesetz zu verlassen und zur Metapher oder zum Aphorismus zuwerden."7 In a similar vein, Reinhard Dithmar writes of the modern fablethat it "steht vielfach in der Nähe des Aphorismus."8 In the specific case ofKafka, to be sure, it is the aphorism which is "in danger" of expanding intothe narrative form of the parable, a tendency which is in keeping withKafka's essential talent for narrative writing. Heinz Politzer, for example,specifically claims that the parable "Gib's auf" takes the form of an "apho-rism extended into an anecdote."9 It is this process of extension by means ofmetaphor to which the title of this chapter, "Aphorism and Met-Aphorism,"refers. The neologism "met-aphorism" is intended to suggest both that theKafkan parable goes narratively "beyond" the form of the aphorism, andthat it attains this narrative "beyond" through a metaphorical process ofextension: the parable is a "met-aphorism" arrived at through "metaphor-ism."

5 Werner Hoffmann, Kafkas Aphorismen, p. 122; cf. also his similar remark in theKafka-Handbuch, II, 480.

6 Ulrich Fülleborn, "Zum Verhältnis von Perspektivismus und Parabolik in derDichtung Kafkas," Wissenschaft als Dialog, ed. R. von Heydebrand & A. G. Just(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1969), p. 310.

7 Werner Brettschneider, Die moderne deutsche Parabel (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Ver-lag, 1971), p. 71.

8 Reinhard Dithmar, Die Fabel: Geschichte, Struktur, Didaktik. Uni-Taschenbü-cher, 73 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1971), p. 75.

9 Heinz Politzer, Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.Press, 1966), p. 2.

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As a first maneuver in our attempt to specify in detail points of structuraland formal contact between Kafka's aphorisms and his parables, it is helpfulto turn to matters of chronology. In the discussion of Kafka's aphoristicproduction I defined what I called his "aphoristic" phase, a period markedout on one end by the first halting aphoristic formulations in the earlyOktavhefte, culminating in the concentrated composition of the aphorismsin the third and fourth notebooks during the fall and winter of 1917-18, anddelimited on the other end by Kafka's return to the aphorisms of the Ok-tavhefte in fall of 1920 at the time he revised and compiled many of thesetexts for a collection. The composition of the aphorisms from the collection"Er" falls within this timespan, as does the creation, not coincidentally, of byfar the majority of Kafka's parables. This temporal overlap of Kafka's pro-duction of aphorisms and parables, however, is further corroborated if oneexamines more closely Kafka's literary production at this time: the periods ofmost intensive occupation with the aphorism - the years 1917 and 1920 - arealso the times during which Kafka writes most of his shorter parables. Onecritic has noted the significance of the year 1917 for the development ofKafka's late parabolic style,10 and it seems beyond doubt that the impulseswhich led Kafka to turn to this new form of narrative also motivated hisexperiments with aphoristic form.

Although a tendency toward the abstraction and generality typical of theparable is evident in most of Kafka's narratives, from "Das Urteil" and "DieVerwandlung" to the novels Der Prozeß and Das Schloß, the short form ofthe parable makes its first pronounced appearance in the stories Kafka pub-lished in 1919 under the collective title Ein Landarzt. Many of these texts,including "Die Brücke," "Der neue Advokat," "Eine kaiserliche Botschaft,"and "Ein altes Blatt" were first written down in the early Oktavhefte. All ofthe stories of the collection, with the exception of "Vor dem Gesetz," werecomposed in 1917. Numerous other parables were also first recorded in theOktavhefte, and Kafka's production in this genre culminates with the com-position of four of his best known parabolic stories which are interspersedamong the aphorisms in the third Oktavheft. These are "Eine alltäglicheVerwirrung," "Die Wahrheit über Sancho Pansa," "Das Schweigen der Sire-nen," and "Prometheus." As we know, immediately after the period ofproductivity which manifests itself in the aphorisms and parables of the thirdand fourth Oktavhefte, Kafka experiences a prolonged lull in his creativepowers. However, when he picks up his pen again in earnest in 1920, twoprinciple forms dominate his creative production: aphorism and parable. All

10 Ulrich Fülleborn, "Zum Verhältnis von Perspektivismus und Parabolik in derDichtung Kafkas," p. 309.

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of Kafka's remaining parabolic texts, except for "Der Aufbruch," "Gib'sauf," and "Von den Gleichnissen," were composed in 1920 when Kafka wasalso occupied with the reworking of the aphoristic texts. It is in this period ofrenewed productivity that Kafka writes, among other things, the parables"Poseidon," "Die Prüfung," "Kleine Fabel," "Der Kreisel," and "DerGeier."

While this brief summary indicates the precise chronological coincidenceof aphorism and parable in Kafka's oeuvre, it is necessary to examine thetemporal evolution of Kafka's parabolic texts as a function of their style inorder to comprehend the full impact of Kafka's experiments with aphoristicdiscourse on the form of his parables. Ingeborg Henel has pointed out thatKafka's aphorisms evolve at exactly, that time when his fiction is undergoingthe crucial shift from perspectivistic to parabolic narration.11 Fülleborn, wehave seen, also recognized the importance of the year 1917 for the break-through of Kafka's parabolic style.12 Neither Fülleborn nor Henel, however,tries to draw out the consequences of these observations, and thus the pivotalposition of the aphoristic writings in Kafka's overall literary developmenthas never been adequately assessed. In fact, Kafka's preoccupation with therhetorical, formally objective form of the aphorism marks a turning-point inhis evolution as a narrative writer. This shift in emphasis from the conscioussubjectivity of the perspectivistic narratives to the formal objectivity of theparable can be traced in some detail, as Walter Sokel has already shown.13

Kafka's explorations into the distanced objectivity of aphoristic discourseplay a fundamental role in this development.

The parable "Vor dem Gesetz," the first text that manifests the typicalcharacteristics of Kafka's parables, is unusual among these texts because of itsinitial contextualization in the novel Der Prozeß.14 While this parable, likeKafka's other parabolic texts, is anything but unequivocal, it does acquire aspecific relational significance to the narrative events of the novel through itsposition in this larger text. Its interpretability, thus, is initially restrictedsomewhat by its function as a "commentary" on the situation portrayed inthe novel. In fact, of course, the parable does not present a coherent com-mentary at all; instead it merely reiterates, in microcosmic, condensed form,

11 Ingeborg Henel, "Kafka als Denker," Franz Kafka: Themen und Probleme, p. 58.12 See Fülleborn, p. 309.13 See Walter Sokel, "Das Verhältnis der Erzählperspektive zu Erzählgeschehen und

Sinngehalt in 'Vor dem Gesetz', 'Schakale und Araber' und 'Der Prozeß': EinBeitrag zur Unterscheidung von 'Parabel' und 'Geschichte' bei Kafka." ZfdtPh, 86(1967), 267-300; my arguments are founded in part on ideas presented here.

14 The only other parable that shares this feature is "Eine kaiserliche Botschaft,"originally a part of the narrative "Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer."

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the circumstances of the novel.15 In other words, the parabolic insert merelyrepeats and re-enacts the hermeneutical dilemma faced both by Josef K. in hisattempts at coming to terms with the "Court," and the hermeneutical crisiswhich confronts the novel's commentators. In his explication of the parable,Josef K. comments on his own predicament, and to this extent he takes upthe posture of an objective interpreter of his own dilemma. This distancedreflection, however, remains without consequences for Josef K., who doesnot become any wiser as a result of this interpretive activity. In this sense theparabolic insert functions as a metacommentary on the novel only insofar asit drives home the futility of all of Josef K.'s attempts to arrive at essentialenlightenment. The relational parallelism between parabolic intertext andnarrative framework lends "Vor dem Gesetz" a function similar to that of theBiblical parable, which, at least in the case of the parables of Jesus, operatesas a sub-text embedded into the narrative about Christ's life and deeds.

When the parable "Vor dem Gesetz" is freed from this subordinate func-tion in the narrative framework of the novel, it is suddenly stripped of therelational background which grounds it. This has two significant and relatedeffects: on the one hand, its former operability as a - to be sure, drasticallylimited - metacommentary is invalidated; on the other, it now is, as it were,surrounded by "vacant space" where the former relational background con-textualized it, so that it now can freely be embedded into an infinite numberof new relational contexts in which it, following the laws af analogy, canfunction as an explicative commentary. The parable is, in other words,impoverished by this isolation; yet, paradoxically, this impoverishment pro-vides it with the possibility of an enormous richness of significance.

One characteristic of Kafka's subsequent parables that distinguishes themfrom their traditional antecedents is their lack of a concrete relational con-text; each is surrounded by a "vacancy" which functions as a space forinterpretive contextualization, encouraging each interpreter to "embrace"the text in a wholly individual way in each act of reception. In hermeneuticalterms, the applicative significance of the parables remains open, to be sup-plied in the course of the interpretive event.16 At the same time, Kafka's

This is a common feature of many of Kafka's shorter works as well; the turningpoint or conclusion of the story often presents a condensed, usually metaphoricalreiteration of the narrative circumstances. The best example of this is the aphoristiccommentary with which "Ein Landarzt" concludes: "Einmal dem Fehlläuten derNachtglocke gefolgt - es ist niemals gutzumachen" (£, 140). Far from "explain-ing" what transpires in the story, this remark simply summarizes it in a succinctand matter-of-fact manner: the inexplicable remains inexplicable.Cf. Wilhelm Emrich, Franz Kafka (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1965), p. 77, who alsosees the distinguishing mark of Kafka's parables as their "emptiness" of "back-ground."

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parables retain many of the textual features typical of the parabolic, qualitieswhich Heinz Hillmann summarizes as "eine gewisse vom Detail absehendeVereinfachung, Abstraktion, Allgemeinheit, Knappheit und Kürze."17 Thesecharacteristics, however, do not necessarily serve to distinguish Kafka's par-ables from his other narratives, and the most pronounced points of contrastare ultimately the diminutive form of the parabolic stories and their formalobjectivity, expressed, of course, in a narrative perspective which, in con-trast to the perspectivistic narratives, is distanced from, and external to, thenarrated circumstances.

It is this shift from internal to external perspective which Sokel has ana-lyzed in some detail, charting the gradual shift from subjectivity to objectiv-ity that accompanies it.18 He demonstrates on the example of the stories fromthe Landarzt volume how these texts display a gradual increase in narrativeobjectivity when examined in the chronological order of their composi-tion,19 and he suggests that Kafka's first-person narrative "Berichte" repre-sent a transitional stage between perspectivistic narration and the third-per-son objective narratives of Kafka's later period.20 This development is sig-nificant in our context because a similar increase in the objectivity of narra-tive stance can be discerned in Kafka's parabolic texts composed in theOktavhefte in 1917. With the exception of "Eine kaiserliche Botschaft," aparable which, like "Vor dem Gesetz," derives its third-person narrativeobjectivity from the fact that it is narrated within the framework of a largertale, the parables from the earlier notebooks employ the first-person form.The more strictly objective and distanced narration of the third person oc-curs for the first time in the four parables written simultaneously with theaphorisms in the third Oktavheft ("Prometheus," "Das Schweigen der Sire-nen," "Die Wahrheit über Sancho Pansa," "Eine alltägliche Verwirrung").Three of these parables appropriate traditional or mythological motiveswhich they, in the style of the contra-dictory aphorism, then radically sub-vert. The distanced objectivity of narrative stance evident in these texts isalmost totally absent in Kafka's earlier works. However, this perspectivereappears in many of the parables written in 1920 ("Das Stadtwappen,""Nachts," "Poseidon," "Der Kreisel," "Kleine Fabel"), so that this turn toformal objectivity appears to reflect the considerable influence of Kafka'sexplorations into the outwardly objective form of the aphorism.

17 Heinz Hillmann, Franz Kafka: Dichtungstheorie und Dichtungsgestalt, 2nd ed.,Bonner Arbeiten zur deutschen Literatur, 9 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1973), p. 165.

18 Sokel, "Das Verhältnis der Erzählperspektive zu Erzählgeschehen und Sinnge-halt," pp. 267-300.

19 Sokel, "Verhältnis," pp. 299-300.20 Sokel, "Verhältnis," p. 275; cf. also Hillmann, Dichtungstheorie und Dichtungsge-

stalt, p. 189.

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Kafka's move to a strictly objective form of narration in the parablescomposed in those periods in which he was also occupied with the composi-tion of aphorisms lends some support to the notion that his experiments withaphoristic discourse reflect explorations into discursive possibilities whichwill ultimately be applied in his fictional narratives. In fact, those aphoristictexts which I have termed Kafka's "suggestive metaphors" are the aphoristiccounterparts of the objectified parabolic narratives. These texts, as I havealready argued, mark the transition from aphoristic reflection to parabolicnarrative. This brings us, finally, to an awareness of a central element offormal convergence between aphorism and parable: the fundamental defini-tional feature of the aphorism, its productive tension between the rhetoricalobjectivity of its discursive posture and the free subjectivity of its content, isalso constitutive of Kafka's parabolic texts. Formal "closure" and contentual"openness," finality and infinity, intersect in both of these textual forms.Kafka's "open" parables, of course, are representative of the modern parablein general,21 a literary form which can be conceived as a narrative appropria-tion of the characteristics of aphoristic expression.

Kafka was continually dogged, as we have seen, by the conflicting re-quirements of artistic closure and indeterminate significance: it was throughhis occupation with aphoristic discourse that he finally discovered a literarypractice that would permit him to harmonize these distinctive aims. It is notuntil his later period, after the experiments with the aphorisms, that Kafkaevolves a consistent strategy which permits him to adjudicate his demand forformal closure in his fiction with the requirement that the text remain un-dogmatically "open." Thus only after 1917 did Kafka, in the words of J. J.White, find "ways of successfully closing 'without finality'."22 Parable andaphorism both derive an "air" of finality from their formal allusions to thedidactic forms of fable and proverb; they retain, so to speak, a formal rhetor-ical gesture of determinacy and closure, what F lleborn has called a "Sprach-gestus der Belehrung."23 But indeterminacy of content contrasts with theseformal indicators, so that the parables, like the open aphorism, avoid alldogmatic moralizing, while, at the same time, incorporating a linguisticgesture of dogmatism, of persuasive assertiveness, of didactic force. It is thistension between the promise of a definitive message and the withholding ofthe same which Frank Kermode has described as the simultaneous proclama-

21 For a good description of the nature of the modern "open" parable, see Richard M.Eastman, "The Open Parable: Demonstration and Definition," College English, 22(1960-61), 15-18.

22 J· J· White, "Endings and Non-endings in Kafka's Fiction," On Κάβα: Semi-Centenary Perspectives, ed. Franz Kuna (London: Paul Elek, 1976), p. 159.

23 F lleborn, p. 294.

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tion and concealment characteristic of the parable.24 In the present context itcannot be emphasized enough that this same double movement is fundamen-tal to the open aphorism of the German tradition, so that it was one of thefew established literary forms capable of transmitting to Kafka the effective-ness of this strategy. Surely Kafka recognized the appropriateness of thisdouble-move for the issues central to his art. It is in this sense, then, thatKafka's experiments with the form of the aphorism can be construed asstructural and formal etudes which were requisite for the maturation of hisnarrative art.

At this point in the exposition of the argument it is felicitous to turn tosome more general considerations about the relationships between aphorismand parable in modernist literature, without, however, losing sight of Kaf-ka's literary practice as manifest in his aphoristic and parabolic texts. To besure, definitions of the modern parable, at least, have been shaped more byanalyses of Kafka's parabolic texts than vice versa, so that most of ourobservations on the character of the modern parable are relevant to Kafka'sparabolic fiction.

There has been considerable debate among scholars regarding the posi-tion of the modern parable vis-a-vis its traditional, principally Biblical ances-tor. For the most part, the traditional parable has been classified under therubric of didactic literature of the sort best exemplified in the Aesopian fable.Thus the traditional parable has been designated as a " Lehrparabel," and themodern parable, where all didactic intent is absent, has been called a "Vor-gangsparabel."25 This differentiation corresponds closely to the formal dis-tinction drawn above between "closed," definitive, contextually secured par-able, and "open," indeterminate, infinitely interpretable parable. Somescholars, however, have been quick to point out that such distinctions cannotbe drawn on a rigorously historical basis, since even traditional Biblicalparables can be shown to exploit textual opacity and "openness." FrankKermode, by way of example, views indeterminacy as one of the textualstrategies exploited in the Biblical parable to effect a segregation of "insiders"from "outsiders"; narrative obscurity thus functions as a form of consciouscensorship which restricts "understanding" to those who, because they are apart of the covenant, can bring the "correct" interpretive horizon to bear onthe text. The insiders, then, have the information which allows them to passfrom the manifest surface of the text to its latent, interior significance, whilethe outsiders can never pass beyond its manifest surface.26 Kermode employs

24 Frank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative.(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), p. 47.

25 Norbert Miller, "Moderne Parabel?," Akzente, 6 (1959), 211.26 Frank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, pp. 2-9.

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terminology borrowed from Freud's analyses of the dream-text to describethe superficial and internal dimensions of hermeneutical understanding withregard to parabolic narratives. Klaus-Peter Philippi uses the phrases "Bild-hälfte" and "Sachhälfte" to refer to these same levels of manifest and latentsense in parabolic discourse, emphasizing that the parable presents merelythe "Bildhälfte," leaving the "Sachhälfte" to be divined in the act of interpre-tation.27 Whereas Kermode argues that membership in a covenant suppliesthe keys to the fathoming of latent sense, Philippi, following the positiontraditionally taken by Biblical hermeneutics, claims that the latent sense iscomprehensible only within the historical context in which the parable wasinitially embedded.

The modern parable can be distinguished from its traditional counterpartby the fact that it knows no "insiders" - it consciously and automaticallyrefuses or relativizes all attempts to derive a latent sense from the manifesttext. If for Philippi and Biblical hermeneutics history has merely eroded thelatent sense that originally was an integral part of the parable in its historicalcontext, the modern parable is born, so to speak, as a historical orphan,withstanding all attempts at definitive contextualization which would dis-solve the manifest text into latent sense. In other words, lacking any univer-salizing or communalizing "covenant," every attempt at "translating" man-ifest text into latent sense ultimately throws the interpreter back onto the"Bildhälfte": the image, the text, refuses to disappear behind the interpretivecommentary. In this sense the modern parable can be said either to reject anylatent sense, or to embrace all serious efforts to uncover a (but not the)hidden meaning. The first of these options is effectively portrayed in Kafka's"Von den Gleichnissen" where the parabolic demand that one "cross over"from manifest to latent sense is shown to be inherently unfollowable. Theoption of unlimitied interpretability, which is the complement to this im-penetrability, is depicted in the exegetical permutations of the parable "Vordem Gesetz" profferred by Josef K. and the Chaplain. In both instances theparable takes on the character of an insoluble riddle, of an oracular statementwhose meaning, which one is driven to divine, remains inscrutable. Thisoracle-like quality, we recall, has also been attributed to the aphorism, and itis assoicated with the Hebrew mashal as well, the traditional parabolic formmost commonly viewed as the closest relative to the modern or Kafkanparable.28 Both mashal and open parable - and their relationship to the

27 Klaus-Peter Philippi, "Parabolisches Erzählen," DVjs, 43 (1969), 309; cf. alsoBrettschneider, Die moderne deutsche Parabel, p. 10.

28 On the connections between parable and mashal, see Kermode, p. 23; Brettschnei-der, p. 53; on the mashal as the model for Kafka's parables, see Brettschneider,p. 52; Fülleborn, p. 310.

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initiative aphorism should be clear in this respect - are concerned with thepresentation of possibilities rather than certainties, with the posing of ques-tions rather than the supplying of answers.

Wo Frage, Chancen, Möglichkeiten durch einen Vorgang versinnlicht werden,bleibt die Form offen. Beispiel und Deutung bleiben Wesenselemente, doch siezielen auf Diskussion, Frage und Denkanstoß hin: statt Gewißheit Zweifel, stattErkenntnis Agnostik, statt Predigt Konfession eines Suchenden, wofür Kafka dasbewegendste Beispiel ist.29

Brettschneider's summary description of the open parable could also serve asa characterization of the initiative aphorism as it evolved out of FrancisBacon's theoretical model. Kafka's parables, as Brettschneider justifiablymaintains, are paradigmatic examples of the modern "open" parable. Thisrecognition has become a commonplace in Kafka-criticism. However, theparallel recognition - namely, that Kafka's aphorisms are paradigmatic ex-amples of the initiative "open" aphorism - has up until now been successful-ly repressed by Kafka-scholarship.

In what follows I will, for the sake of convenience, refer to the "modern"open, oracular, riddle-like form of the parable simply as "parable" (adheringto the practice applied throughout of designating the initiative aphorismsimply as "aphorism" in those instances where further distinction was notnecessary); the closed, didactic form of this genre will be termed the "dog-matic parable," a phrase I have chosen because of its parallelism to Bacon'sdistinction between initiative and dogmatic methods.

Our investigation has thus far uncovered a number of significant pointsof contact between aphorism and parable. These are, above all, the provoca-tive intent of parable and aphorism; the related demand for completion orhermeneutical application realized in the act of reception; the opposition to,contra-diction of, or operation outside of, traditional or ideological value-systems or knowledge interests. To these traits constituted primarily in theinterpretive event we can add certain textual or structural features such as thecentrality of paradox, the insistence on metaphor, an exaggerated tensionbetween closed form and open significance, and the conscious exploitation ofthe productive interplay of principles of linguistic contiguity and similarity. Iwill address each of these issues individually in order to arrive at a moredetailed picture of the nature of the modern parable and its coincidence withthe form of the aphorism. I will refer briefly to Kafka's parables throughout,and then close my investigation with a thorough structural analysis of theparable "Auf der Galerie" that will attempt to lend concrete substance to thetheoretical arguments presented here.

Brettschneider, p. 68.

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Distinctions between the open and dogmatic parable have commonlyrelied either consciously or unconsciously on matters of textual reception, onthe interaction between the text and its reader/audience. In my discussion ofthe nature of aphoristic discourse I termed this interaction the text-externaldialectic of the aphorism, and I analyzed what I called the aphorism'sstrategies of involvement. This same dialectic, manifest in identical strategiesof involvement, can be discerned in the discourse of the parable. Provocationof the reader into active participation in the process of constituting meaningis, of course, operational in the dogmatic parable as well. Here, however, theparticipation of the audience is enlisted for didactic ends: the "disciples"thrive on the illusion that they have created a meaning which, in fact, hasactually been supplied for them. In this instance the audience merely dis-covers the latent sense that lies under the textual surface. Hence to formulatethe participation which the modern parable requires of its reader simply interms of completion, as, for example, Philippi does,30 does not really get tothe heart of the matter. Similarly, to characterize the provocativeness of theopen parable in terms of its tendency to pose questions instead of providinganswers is not accurate enough to draw a clear distinction between open anddogmatic parabolic strategies. Even the dogmatic parable poses a question;the difference, however, is that in the final analysis its question turns out tobe a rhetorical one, programmed to evoke a particular answer.31 It is moreprecise to conceive of the "questioning" aspect of the parable as a "putting-into-question," i. e. as a provocation which, like that of the aphorism, de-mands a confrontation with the given and accepted, or requires that onechallenge fundamental assumptions, destroying the stable ground on whichone stands.32 Thus the parable, like the aphorism, provokes in such a waythat it unsettles; it unbinds the secure, questions the obvious, and doubts thegiven. Its purpose is not persuasion, nor is it dissuasion perpetrated withsome particular aim in mind; rather it seeks what we might term "a-sua-sion": the undermining and abandoning of any and all dogmatically fixedpoints, the ovethrowing of systems of secure beliefs and knowledge inter-ests, destabilization of the static in the name of productive dynamism.

Contradiction and critical, sceptical questioning, hence, are the functional

30 Philippi, p. 316.31 The "questioning" aspect of the modern parable is emphasized by Erwin Wäsche,

Die verrätselte Welt: Ursprung der Parabel: Lessing - Dostojewski) - Kafka. Deut-sche Studien, Bd. 28 (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1976), pp. 15 &21.

32 Cf. Brettschneider, p. 9; John D. Crossan, "Parable, Allegory, and Paradox,"Semiology and Parables: An Exploration of the Possibilities offered by Structuralismfor Exegesis, ed. Daniel Patte, Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, No. 9(Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1976), p. 260.

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principles behind the provocativeness of parable and aphorism. In literary ortext-strategic terms this contradictory thrust expresses itself in theundermining of expectations, be these expectations predicated on generalconventions of social or intellectual interaction, or expectations that havebeen programmed by patterns in the text itself.33 Kafka's mythological para-bles manifest in exemplary fashion the subversion of expectations con-ditioned by cultural tradition. His Poseidon, for example, in the parable ofthe same name, is no longer a glorified divinity who rules over the seas, butmerely a frantic bureaucrat so swamped with work that he has never evenseen the waters he ostensibly controls.34 Regarding expectations evoked bystructures and patterns internal to the text itself, our analysis of "Auf derGalerie" will demonstrate how the textual composition of this parable isstructured in such a way as to establish in the reader the expectation ofcertain patterns which the text, in a subtle set of reversals, calculatedlydisappoints. At evidence in this parable, and in many other modern parables,is a form of textual reversal which does not merely invert, but which initiatesa continuing "revolution" in textual sense; a kind of interpretive circularityof perpetual motion is introduced into what at first appears to be a static andarchitechtonic textual system.

While contradiction of established values and the undermining of textual-ly programmed expectations serve to unmoor standard referential contexts,opening up "vacant" space to be filled in the act of reception, it is crucial tokeep in mind that in open aphorism and parable this dislodging of the stabledoes not occur for particular ideological ends. Aphorism and parable arenotoriously and consistently contrary; they are sophistic insofar as they seekto argue for argument's sake. This problematization of any stable position -indeed, of the very possibility of "positions" per se - clearly differentiatesinitiative aphorism and open parable from their dogmatic, didactic counter-parts. This distinction can best be approached through an analysis of theapplicative function as it operates in the interpretive event. It is preciselytheir didacticism which lends dogmatic parable and fable a pronounced ap-

33 On the importance of the disappointing of expectations for the parable, see Cros-san, "Parable, Allegory, and Paradox," p. 253, and also his study The Dark Inter-val: Towards a Theology of Story (Niles, Illinois: Argus Communications, 1975),p. 66.

34 Much has been made of this contra-dictory stance in Kafka's parables, and it neednot be taken up again here; see, for example, Theo Elm, "Problematisierte Herme-neutik: Zur Uneigentlichkeit in Kafkas kleiner Prosa," DVji, 50 (1976), 489 & 497;Dietrich Krusche, Kafka und Kafka-Deutung: Die prohlematisierte Interaktion,Kritische Information, 5 (Munich: Fink, 1974), pp. 20, 94, & 97-8; Dieter Hassel-blatt, Zauber und Logik: Eine Kafka Studie (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft undPolitik, 1964), p. 128.

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plicative function; after all, they seek either to reinforce or to alter the beliefsand actions of the individuals who enter into an interpretive interaction withthe text, bringing them into line with some defined general standard. This isthe sense in which dogmatic parable, like the integrative aphorism, tendstoward moralization; and just as the movement from individual belief touniversal standard is problematized in the initiative aphorism, the modernopen parable also puts into question the very encompassing force of thisintegrative movement. The dogmatic parable and aphorism, then, whenthey are optimally effective, would evoke the same applicative response ineach reader, eliminating individual difference. Initiative aphorism and openparable, in contradistinction to this, highlight and perpetuate individual dif-ference by allowing - demanding - personal or individual reactions in eachseparate act of reception. There is no longer a stable, totalizing "meaning"which functions as the latent thread that ties together the diverse in a har-monious community; a singular "meaning" gives way to multiple, infiniteapplicative "significances," each constituted in a singular act of reception andinterpretation. Each reader is encouraged to refer the text to that relationalcontext which is applicable to her/his individual circumstances. The samereader, presumably, could draw varied significances from a single text inhistorically different readings. Stability and centeredness are supplanted byfluidity, flux, and difference; the text is ec-centric, it leads the reader out ofthe center and promotes the diffuse.35 W. H. Auden has described thisindividuality of interpretive response called forth by the parable, claimingthat the interpreter can "only reveal himself . . . What he writes will be adescription of what the parable has done to him; of what it may do to othershe does not and cannot have any idea."36 Robert Funk also confirms that the"openness" of the parable refers to its applicative openness in the hermeneu-tical sense, emphasizing that a static, crystalized tradition produces closure ofmeaning and limitation of application, this ultimately bespeaking a loss ofhermeneutical potential and productivity.37 Roy Pascal has expressed anidentical view with regard to the Kafkan parable, maintaining that it "hasinnumerable applications and the reader tests its truth against other types ofexperience through which a familiar and understood world suddenly reveals

35 On the destabilizing aim of the open parable, see Eastman, "The Open Parable,"p. 18

36 W. H. Auden, from The Dyer's Hand; quoted by William G. Doty, "The Parablesof Jesus, Kafka, Borges and Others," Society of Biblical Literature: 1973 SeminarPapers, ed. George MacRae (Cambridge, Mass: Society of Biblical Literature,1973), II, 121.

37 Robert W. Funk, "The Parable as Metaphor," Language, Hermeneutic, and WordGod (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 133-6.

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unexpected disorder and threats."38 Kafka's turn to the forms of the apho-rism and the parable, then, represent different, yet intimately related, at-tempts to problematize traditional interpretive conceptions that rely on de-terminacy of meaning and commonality of significance.39

If the aporia of hermeneutical understanding, the impossibility of recon-ciliation between general stable "meaning" and individual fluid "signifi-cance," can be associated with any single outstanding textual strategy orlogical structure endemic to both aphorism and parable, then this is certainlythe form of paradox. We have already discussed the importance of paradoxfor Kafka's aphorisms and indicated the characteristic recursiveness of Kaf-ka's "gliding" paradox which, by almost inconspicuously deviating frompure inversion, effects a perpetual motion which marks out an interpretivespace between oppositional elements, refusing to rest at one or the other ofthe opposing poles. Kafka's parables, and the modern parable in general, arefundamentally concerned with the space of this recursive paradoxicality, this"gap" which, in the words of Heinz Politzer, they "perpetuate . . . in aninsoluble dilemma."40 Politzer insists on the centrality of paradox for themodern parable, and especially for its Kafkan manifestation, and he suggeststhat the distinction between the modern, enigmatic parable and its traditionaldidactic counterpart is the supplanting of the latter's didactic message byparadox in the former.41 Alwin Baum likewise points to the intrinsic integri-ty of parable and paradox in Kafka's parables.42 Hence where the dogmaticparable presents mediation between individual and general, between con-crete portrayal ("Bildhälfte") and abstract understanding ("Sachhälfte"), themodern initiative parable shrinks from such mediation. John Crossan distin-guishes myth and parable on the basis of just this feature, asserting that mythmediates between seemingly irreconcilable opposites, establishing the possi-bility of reconciliation, whereas the parable creates irreconcilability wheremediation seemed self-evident.43 He goes on to claim that it is essential to theparable that it challenge the principle of reconciliation itself.44 Now it isprecisely such refusal of reconciliation which Gerhard Neumann posits as thedefinitional characteristic of the transcendental-moralistic German aphorism.In both parable and aphorism paradox is the textual feature or logical struc-

38 Roy Pascal, Kafka's Narrators: A Study of his Stories and Sketches (Cambridge:Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. 161.

39 Cf. Theo Elm, "Problematisierte Hermeneutik," pp.492 & 498.40 Heinz Politzer, Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox, p. 86.4! Politizer, p. 85.42 Alwin L. Baum, "Parable as Paradox in Kafka's Erzählungen," MLN, 91 (1976),

1332.43 Crossan, The Dark Interval, pp. 47-55.44 Crossan, The Dark Interval, p. 57.

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ture which points to and underscores this problem of incommensurabilityand irreconcilability. While the dogmatic parable is intent on equalizing andadjudicating, on "setting equal" as implied in the word "Gleichnis," theradicalized initiative parable insists on difference through the structures ofparadox and deviation; it opens up and preserves a rift which interferes withthe smooth transferral of meaning and disrupts simple acts of communica-tion.

While paradox is the logical feature most frequently associated withaphorism and parable, metaphor is the poetic trait most fundamental to itsdiscourse. The phrase "Bildhälfte" in reference to the manifest text of theparable hints at the centrality of metaphorical image; in fact, the parable istypically viewed as an "extended metaphor" or, emphasizing the narrativeaspect of the genre, "eine in Szene gesetzte Metapher."45 While bothdogmatic and open forms of the parable rely heavily on the principle ofmetaphor, there remains a quintessential difference in the function and oper-ation of their metaphoricity: whereas the didactic parable seeks to exploit theprocess of metaphorical transferral between vehicle and tenor, harnessing theenergy of this process in order to effect transferral in the reader/disciple whothen will correctly move from image to its doctrinarily sanctioned "mean-ing," the open parable seeks to thwart and disrupt this operation of transfer-ral. It accomplishes this through what has come to be called an absolutizationof metaphor: the metaphorical vehicle asserts its independence from anytenor or reference. Henry Sussman aptly characterizes this metamorphosis ofthe metaphorical function in Kafka's literature, and his remarks apply to themodern parable in general. "For Kafka, the metaphor does not transportsignificance from vehicle to tenor; it resides in the between-space linking yetseparating the most incongruous parts."46 "Absolute" metaphor, paradoxi-cally, actually functions as a neutralization of metaphor, i. e. as a refusal ofmetaphorical transferral and metaphorical trans-reference.47 Such abortedmetaphor, as Sussman's remark makes clear, buttresses and re-enacts therepression of reconciliation and interruption of mediation which paradoxeffects in the logical structure of the parable. In this sense we discover thatmetaphor and paradox, the two central principles operational in parabolictexts, work in tandem to halt mediation, confining one to the "between-space," the no-person's land between concrete image and abstractable mean-

45 Alwin Baum, "Parable as Paradox," p. 1332, and Norbert Miller, "Moderne Para-bel," p. 202, respectively.

46 Sussman, p. 33.47 This quality has led to the assertion that Kafka's "absolute" metaphors are not

metaphors at all, but rather "metonymies"; cf., for example, Roman Karst, "Kafkaund die Metapher," Literatur und Kritik, 180 (1983), 472-80, esp. p. 474.

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ing. We recall at this point the crisis of the in-between which Kafka experi-enced in all its intensity in the year 1917, i.e. at the time when he began towork intensively with the forms of aphorism and parable. Kafka's responseto his own crisis, then, is to experiment with two textual forms which insiston the neither-nor and both-and space of the in-between, problematizingreconciliation and mediation in their structural devices and textual strategies.This space-between is marked off by the intersection of paradox andmetaphor in these texts, by the confluence of aborted logic and abortedmetaphor.

The preceding discussion has led us back to the concepts of contiguityand similarity, metonymy and metaphor, which, freely applying the dichot-omy expounded by Roman Jakobson, we previously incorporated into ourdefinition of the operation of aphoristic discourse. It was my contention thatthe aphorism can be designated as a textual type which presents in concen-trated form the interplay of, or conflict between, metaphorical andmetonymical principles. I would now like to extend this definition to includewhat I have termed Kafka's "suggestive" or Gestalt metaphors, as well as hisparabolic texts. The interplay between principles of contiguity and similaritymanifests itself in these texts in the interaction of "gliding paradox" anddisrupted or disruptive metaphor. Applying Jakobson's terminology, we candescribe this recursive paradox as a form of contiguity disorder, uprootedmetaphor as a kind of similarity disorder. What is unique about Kafka'sparables and many of his aphorisms is that these two "disorders" occursimultaneously, and it is their interaction which constitutes the effectivenessof these texts. I will now try to describe in more detail the nature of thehermeneutical effect of this conjunction of deformed contiguity and disrupt-ed similarity.

In his essay on the role of metaphor in the parable, Robert Funk main-tains that metaphor plays a strategically disruptive role, subverting and thusmodifying tradition, shattering "the conventions of prediction in the inter-ests of a new union, one which grasps the 'thing' in relation to a new 'field,'and thus in relation to a fresh experience of reality."48 In this conceptionmetaphor sets into motion a productive meditative dynamism in which thegiven, prosaic, and commonplace is newly contextualized and thus lent asense of the uncommon and unknown.49 By locating the effect of metaphorin the relating of "thing" to a new "field," Funk obviously is implying arelational function which comes into play in the moment of reception. Pro-

48 Robert Funk, "The Parable as Metaphor," p. 139.49 I am consciously alluding once again to Novalis's definition of the power of

"romanticization" in order to evoke the interdependence of aphoristic-parabolic"provocation" and hermeneutical theory as evolved by the German Romantics.

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gress in human knowledge, Funk believes, occurs only by means of defor-mation and destabilization of the traditionally (ideologically) accepted andgiven; metaphor is the primary instrument in this struggle against the static.But if metaphor, even in its traditional form, is "subversive" to the extentthat it can freely establish new relations, then the disrupted, uprooted, or"absolute" metaphor common to modernist poetics is not merely subver-sive, but anarchical; this is because it unleashes an enormous interpretive po-tential, a potential which is unguided by the text, and which thus can berealized at different moments of reception in ever-different concrete ways.As Funk describes it, metaphor "endeavors to let the next one see what theprevious one saw but to see it in his own way. As a result it opens onto aplurality of situations, a diversity of audiences, and the future. It does notforeclose but discloses the future."50 Funk, with good reason, is not willingto abandon that balance between creative and receptive "steering" of theinterpretive act which is typical of hermeneutical theory and practice; hencehe emphasizes the communicative nature of the parabolic-metaphoricendeavor. The issue of communication, of course, is central to Kafka, and italso figures prominently in the evolution of aphoristic expression, and itsapplication. What Funk describes in terms of the transferral of a personalinsight in such a way that it takes on personal significance for the reader inthe act of reception, I have, in my discussion of the aphorism of epiphany,portrayed as the transferral of the epiphanic experience from the creator tothe reader of the text.

Kafka recognized throughout his life the danger of metaphor, this dangerlying precisely in the potential "anarchism" of metaphorical abandon. Funk,likewise, in his characterization of the role of metaphor in parabolic dis-course, is aware that "anarchistic" metaphor runs the risk of upsetting thedelicate hermeneutical balance between textual production and textual recep-tion which defines the limits of communication; thus he insists that theparable embodies an interplay between an effort to stabilize discourse inrational terms, and an equal and opposite effort to deform and destabilizeit.51 Translating this conception of balance into the terminology employedhere, we can summarize Funk's insight with the claim that in the modernparable metaphorical rupture is counterbalanced by structures of contiguity.Thus the productive interplay of "metonymic" and "metaphoric" principlesis essential to the hermeneutical effect of the parable, as it is for the aphorismas well. This strategic struggle between contiguity and similarity has anexplicit purpose which is realized in the moment of reception; it strives for a

50 Funk, pp. 142-3; cf. also p. 151.51 Funk, pp. 141-2.

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communicative transfer which remains totally undogmatic, allowing for an"understanding" which is both shared and personal, communal and individ-ual.

Scholars have typically remarked that the parable, aside from its relianceon metaphor, is equally dependent on strict and clearly discernible struc-tures. This requirement accounts for the general sense that the parable avoidsdetailed, mimetic description - it is "fraught with background," to citeAuerbach's memorable phrase. This demand for reduction to simple struc-tures or formulae is prominent in Brettschneider's summary of the "Sprach-gesetze" of the modern parable: "Aussparen, Weglassen, den überquellendenStoff auf Formeln und Gleichungen zurückführen, antinaturalistisch undverfremdend - Gesetze, deren Analogie zu denen der modernen Wissen-schaft nicht zufällig ist."52 Henry Sussman has suggested a similar associationof parabolic discourse with the methods of modern science or mathematics,characterizing Kafka's parabolic stories from the Landarzt volume onwardas "sketches [that] have the elegance of precise geometrical proofs."53 AndSussman's provocative description of Kafka as a "geometrician of metaphor"summarizes succinctly the confluence of reduced structure and metaphoricalextension that is typical of his parabolic texts and of aphorism and parable asgenres. Yet we must keep in mind that the "logic" of Kafka's geometry isitself "flawed," avoiding such neat structures as pure opposition or pureparadox; just as his application of metaphor is "deviant" in its own way.

The notion of "modelling" has often been applied to describe the mannerin which patterns of contiguity function in the parable.54 The concept of the"model" allows for an analysis of the productive interplay between contigui-ty and similarity that is characteristic of the parable, as well as for an exami-nation of the distribution of similarity and contiguity functions betweencreative and receptive moments of the hermeneutical endeavor. The conflu-ence of horizontal structuring and vertical reference in the parabolic modelcan be illuminated by a consideration of the original meaning and function ofthe "symbolus."55 Originally a "symbolus" was an object or token dividedup and distributed among the members of a sect, community, or otherdefined group. While possession of a fragment of the symbolus "represents"

Brettschneider, p. 71.Sussman, p. 27; cf. also Wäsche, p. 50.See Doty, "The Parables of Jesus, Kafka, Borges and Others," p. 130; Karl-WernerMahler, "Eigentliche und uneigentliche Darstellung in der modernen Epik: Derparabolische Stil Franz Kafkas," Diss. Marburg 1958, pp. 34-5, 46, 56; Hillmann,pp. 163-4.The relevance of this concept for the parable has been pointed out by Alwin Baum,p. 1332, who, however, draws different conclusions from this relevance than I dohere.

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membership in the group, this membership is in fact proven only by thepart-to-part or part-to-whole contiguity of the fragment to the other frag-ments that constitute the whole. In other words, the individual piece onlysignifies membership once a synechdochal or metonymic relationship dem-onstrates its role in the composition of the whole. Each fragment thus"signifies" only once it has been closed off in the structure of the whole. Inmuch the same way the "fragments," i. e. the individual elements, of aparabolic text do not signify independent of their order within the textualwhole. The metaphorical or significational function of the parable, hence, issubordinate to the pattern of structural modelling that is manifest in the text:as in Kafka's suggestive metaphors, coherent structural or Gestalt patternsare the prerequisite for the proper functioning of that process of analogicaltransferral which allows the communication of a structural essence that canbe variously fleshed out in each act of reception or interpretation. Whereasallegory, to take a relevant counter-example, subordinates contiguity to thereferential function so that each allegorical element carries its "meaning" inand of itself, in the parable signification of the individual elements is deferredin favor of configural definition, so that signification occurs only after thestructure has been constituted. In other words, whereas in allegory verticalsignification takes precedence over horizontal contiguity, in the parable thisorder is reversed, and this allows the parable to signifiy as a structure, i. e. asa Gestalt configuration: signification rests in the constituted structural whole,not in the individual part.56 This deferral of signification until the structurehas been constituted allows for the. "multi-valency" of the parabolic text; theonly requirement which new interpretive or applicative significances mustfulfill in order to demonstrate their validity is that of commensurability ofstructure: the structure of the applicative context must be congruous withthe structure exemplified in the textual model, just as the structure of theparable "Vor dem Gesetz" reiterates the structure of the novelistic context inwhich it initially occurs. Gestalt contiguity remains a constant throughout allappropriate interpretations. The individual elements which fill out the struc-ture are mere place-holders or mathematical variables: the substitution of onevariable in the place of another effects a change in "values" for all the othervariables in the parabolic "equation." Parabolic "Gleichnis" takes on thecharacter of a parabolic "Gleichung": and it is this structural equation, thisGestalt model, which allows for variability of application while at the sametime assuring that interpretation is guided or steered, keeping at bay thethreat of the anarchical and non-communicative.57

56 The preeminence of horizontal over vertical relations in the operation of the para-ble has also been emphasized by Funk, p. 147, and Mahler, pp.34-5.

57 Roy Pascal has pointed out the relevance of this process of structuration for Kaf-

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Parabolic discourse, according to Erwin Wäsche, reflects a "Kompromißzwischen dem Sprechenmüssen und dem Nicht-mehr-Sprechenkönnen,"58

and this comment illuminates the parallel positions of aphorism and parablewith regard to the crisis of communication, a crisis which Kafka described interms of the drive to express what was inherently inexpressible. I havealready argued that Kafka's "suggestive" metaphors, as they occur in manyof the aphoristic texts, evolve as an attempt at resolving this crisis of com-munication. In the period in which he concerned himself primarily with thetextual forms of aphorism and parable, Kafka, to quote Ulrich Gaier, "founda language which [could] speak from essence to essence, reality to reality."59

This dialogue from individual to individual that is not compromised by thedepersonalizing aspect of communication is accomplished by the exploita-tion of Gestalt patterns, of structural contiguity, for an essentially metaphor-ical end: the preeminence of contiguity over similarity in the constitution ofthe text evokes operations of similarity in the act of reception. In this in-stance, however, individual textual elements no longer signify independentof their relationships to the textual whole, and signification occurs throughthe process of structural analogy. The suggestive metaphors of Kafka'saphorisms clearly form the cross-over point between the reflective, medita-tive discourse of the aphorism and the narrative, fictional discourse of theparables. In general the Kafkan parable, as I hope I have demonstrated,retains structures, strategies, and intellectual presuppositions indicative of histurn to aphoristic expression. Indeed, the aphorism provided Kafka with apractical discursive model through which he could come to understand therelevance of the strategic textual interplay between contiguity and similarity,metonymy and metaphor, "logic" and "enchantment." His experimentswith the form of the aphorism reached fruition in the adoption of its textualpractices for application to the narrative discourse of the parable.

The final task remaining for this investigation is to supplement with apractical example the foregoing theoretical exposition of the Kafkan parableand the relevance of the strategies of aphoristic discourse in its textual opera-tions. It would take us too far beyond the confines of the present study toattempt a detailed investigation into the concrete overlaps between Kafka'saphoristic and parabolic texts. At best I can adumbrate in summary fashion afew points that seem particularly relevant in the context of our examinationof Kafka's aphorisms.

In my discussion of the logical structures typical of Kafka's aphoristic

ka's parables, claiming that Kafka's purpose in composing these texts "was tocreate a model for many situations" (p. 161).

58 Wäsche, Die verrätselte Welt, p. 49.59 Ulrich Gaier, "Chorus of Lies: On Interpreting Kafka," GLL, 22 (1968-69), 295.

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texts, I indicated the recurrence of three patterns - retraction, exclusion, andpreclusion - which, while common to Kafka's aphorisms, are notcharacteristically found in the texts of other aphorists. These structural orlogical patterns, not coincidentally, also figure prominently as structuralmodels in Kafka's parabolic narratives. Exclusion, for example, isparadigmatically in evidence in Kafka's parable on parables, "Von denGleichnissen," portrayed in the absolute incommensurability of the oppos-ing positions of "parable" and "reality." The dialogue which concludes thistext, far from mediating these positions and bringing resolution, servesrather to reinforce the irreconcilability of the two positions: the dialogicpartners cannot talk to, but only past one another.60 The parable "Einealltägliche Verwirrung" is structured primarily on this principle of exclusionand incommensurability, projected into the dimensions of time and space.

The structure of retraction is exemplified in the parable "Das Schweigender Sirenen"; for while this text explicitly purports to supply "Beweis . . .,daß auch unzulängliche, ja kindische Mittel zur Rettung dienen können" (H,78), it concludes with an "appendix" which directly and consciously con-tradicts this "proof."

Es wird übrigens noch ein Anhang hierzu überliefert. Odysseus, sagt man, war solistenreich, war ein solcher Fuchs, daß selbst die Schicksalsgöttin nicht in seinInnerstes dringen konnte. Vielleicht hat er, obwohl das mit Menschenverstandnicht mehr zu begreifen ist, wirklich gemerkt, daß die Sirenen schwiegen, und hatihnen und den Göttern den obigen Scheinvorgang nur gewissermaßen als Schildentgegengehalten. (H, 79-80)

According to the appendix it is not naive faith in his "Mittelchen" (H, 78)that saves Odysseus, but rather his tactical insight and slyness. By shiftingperspectives the appendix proposes a conclusion which, due to its contradic-tion of the supposed "lesson" of the text, forces a re-reading that admits ofthis new interpretation. Yet the two interpretations remain irreconcilable,and thus they indeed do overtax the synthesizing powers of "Menschenver-stand." This refusal of synthesis, however, calls forth an interminable pro-cess of interpretation, an activity which then occurs in the space marked offby the opposing interpretations suggested by the text.

Preclusion also occurs frequently in Kafka's parables, the best examplesbeing perhaps "Kleine Fabel" and "Der Kreisel." In the former text, forinstance, the solution to the mouse's dilemma (the ostensibly shrinking sizeof the world) is profferred in the same instant as it becomes irrelevant: thecat asserts "Du mußt nur die Laufrichtung ändern" (BeK, 121), and thenpromptly eats the mouse. Similarly, in the parable "Der Kreisel" (BeK, 120)

60 Dietrich Krusche believes that in Kafka's works dialogue is always a sign of suchirreconcilability; see Kafka und Kafka-Deutung, p. 53.

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the philosopher is obsessed with the spinning top, desperate to discover thesecret of its motion; as soon as the top begins to spin, however, he picks it upto examine it, dispelling its magic and turning it into a "stupid piece ofwood." His own attempt to examine and understand the phenomenon of thespinning top precludes and nullifies the very possibility of such understand-ing.

I have made brief reference to the parallel occurrence of these typicalstructures in Kafka's aphorisms and parables solely in order to point outsome of the concrete moments of structural overlap. In order to indicate inmore substantial detail some of the profounder coincidences between thetextual strategies of Kafka's aphorisms and those of his parables, I will ana-lyze one parabolic text, "Auf der Galerie," highlighting the operational inter-play between structural, contiguous elements and principles of metaphor orsimilarity.

Auf der Galerie

Wenn irgendeine hinfällige, lungensüchtige Kunstreiterin in der Manege aufschwankendem Pferd vor einem unermüdlichen Publikum vom peitschenschwin-genden erbarmungslosen Chef monatelang ohne Unterbrechung im Kreise rund-um getrieben würde, auf dem Pferde schwirrend, Küsse werfend, in der Taille sichwiegend, und wenn dieses Spiel unter dem nichtaussetzenden Brausen des Orche-sters und der Ventilatoren in die immerfort weiter sich öffnende graue Zukunftsich fortsetzte, begleitet vom vergehenden und neuanschwellenden Beifallsklat-schen der Hände, die eigentlich Dampfhämmer sind - vielleicht eilte dann einjunger Galeriebesucher die lange Treppe durch alle Ränge hinab, stürzte in dieManege, riefe das: Halt! durch die Fanfaren des immer sich anpassenden Orche-sters.Da es aber nicht so ist; eine schöne Dame, weiß und rot, hereinfliegt, zwischen denVorhängen, welche die stolzen Livrierten vor ihr öffnen; der Direktor, hinge-bungsvoll ihre Augen suchend, in Tierhaltung ihr entgegenatmet; vorsorglich sieauf den Apfelschimmel hebt, als wäre sie seine über alles geliebte Enkelin, die sichauf gefährliche Fahrt begibt; sich nicht entschließen kann, das Peitschenzeichen zugeben; schließlich in Selbstüberwindung es knallend gibt; neben dem Pferde mitoffenem Munde einherläuft; die Sprünge der Reiterin scharfen Blickes verfolgt;ihre Kunstfertigkeit kaum begreifen kann; mit englischen Ausrufen zu warnenversucht; die reifenhaltenden Reitknechte wütend zu peinlichster Achtsamkeit er-mahnt; vor dem großen Saltomortale das Orchester mit aufgehobenen Händenbeschwört, es möge schweigen; schließlich die Kleine vom zitternden Pferde hebt,auf beide Backen küßt und keine Huldigung des Publikums für genügend erachtet;während sie selbst, von ihm gestützt, hoch auf den Fußspitzen, vom Staub um-weht, mit ausgebreiteten Armen, zurückgelehntem Köpfchen ihr Glück mit demganzen Zirkus teilen will - da dies so ist, legt der Galeriebesucher das Gesicht aufdie Brüstung und, im Schlußmarsch wie in einem schweren Traum versinkend,weint er, ohne es zu wissen. (£, 140-1)

I have chosen this text as the object of analysis in part because its structuralorganization is so prominent. For this reason its reliance on patterns ofcontiguity, its organization according to rather strict structural parameters,

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is easily "discernible. At the same time, the precise descriptive detail of thetext demonstrates unmistakably that reduction to a structural configurationis not necessarily accompanied by a banishment of realistic-psychologicaldetail, as has sometimes been maintained.61 In fact, the combination of realis-tic descriptive detail and pronounced configural contiguity tends to reinforcethe hermeneutical complication of the text even further, since the interpreteris tempted to analyze this detail with an eye for possible subtle significancesor "keys" to an understanding. In this sense mimetic portrayal, which Jakob-son, as we know, associated with the contiguity function, both supports thelinearity of the text, and threatens to rupture this linearity at the momentwhen individual details are assigned metaphorical or referential significances.This is the phenomenon that Eastman refers to as "instability of detail" inparabolic discourse, arguing further that this has the ultimate effect of block-ing "final verification of any one hypothesis" because of the opacity andirreducibility of these details.62 In this parable by Kafka, then, simplicity or"neatness" of structure by no means bespeaks textual superficiality; on thecontrary, the web of entanglements becomes all the more dense and impene-trable as the detailed, objective description increases. The parable thus dis-plays on this level the contrast between formal, structural "elegance" andinternal involution that is characteristic of aphoristic discourse: the inter-preter, led to expect a structure with neat and orderly corridors, is graduallythrown into a hermeneutical maze of unfathomable complexity. I will high-light in my analysis this contrast between external structural clarity andinternal opacity in order to underscore its commonality with the similarcontrastive tension essential to aphoristic discourse.

Kafka's parable evokes a sense of formal simplicity primarily by means ofthe linearity of its syntax. Both paragraphs evolve in almost perfect syntacti-cal parallelism to one another, each consisting of a single sentence composedof a series of paratactically arranged clauses which leads up to a hyphen; atthis juncture each paragraph introduces the "Galeriebesucher" and describesin a concluding remark his reactions to the narrated circumstances. Thisstructural parallelism, however, is offset by a number of explicitly contras-tive elements: the first paragraph is narrated in the subjunctive mood, thesecond in the indicative; the narrated events, while superficially identical inboth paragraphs (the same circus event is the subject of each), have radicallydifferent emotional moods, the first appearing ugly and vicious, the secondbeautiful and uplifting. The contrast between subjunctive and indicativemoods, of course, suggests that the primary opposition obtaining betweenthese two narrative descriptions is that between dream and reality, fiction

61 Hillmann explicitly makes this claim, pp. 163-4; 170.62 Eastman, "The Open Parable," pp. 17 8c 18, respectively.

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and fact. The "fictional" narration is marked by the total subordination ofthe rideress to both her untiring public and her merciless boss, her passivityunderscored by the use of the passive voice ("getrieben würde"); the "factu-al" narration brings out the independence of the rideress and the fawningadmiration of director and public alike. In the "fictional" account the womanis "hinfällig" and "lungensüchtig"; in the "factual" account she is "eineschöne Dame" whose superiority is without question. In "fiction" she ismastered and controlled by a "Chef"; in "fact" she is guided and protected bya "Direktor." The din of the orchestra, ventilators, and applause isomnipresent and unceasing in the "fictional" account; in the "factual" ver-sion there is an abrupt silence which accompanies the great finale of her act.Contrast within the realm of semantics and in "mood" of narration clasheswith the parallelism of structure. The latter encourages us to seeksimilarities, the former, however, insists on differences. Eventually, how-ever, difference seems to become a dominant force, and its subtle manifesta-tions are discovered even in the otherwise similar linearity of structure: thenarrated events and observations of the "fictional" account are separatedsimply by commas, so that they run together in a stylistic imitation of theoppressive regularity and interminability of the depicted situation; the indi-vidual events of the "factual" account are separated by semi-colons, so thatthe narration again stylistically parallels the circus event, pausing after eachsuccessfully completed task, breathless with awe. The second paragraph, as aresult, has a much slower tempo than the first, despite seeming identity ofstructural and syntactical organization.

Stylistic and structural features in Kafka's parable thus tend to fall intothe general categories of parallelism and contrast, similarity and difference.These, we recall, are the two drives most representative of the oppositionaltendencies of Kafka's aphorisms, and we were able to observe how Kafka'srevisions of the aphoristic texts generally served to strengthen the tensionbetween these opposing drives. The effect of this opposition is the totaldisorientation of the reader, despite the fact that the text seems to beestablishing easily followable paradigms. "Auf der Galerie" disappoints andsubverts all the expectations which it takes such care to establish. This con-scious diversion from its own established patterns can best be witnessed inthe reaction of the "Galeriebesucher" to the narrated events in the differentparagraphs. In the first his response appears consistent with the horror of thescene: propriety demands that one actively put a stop to this insensitiveexploitation which is as senseless as it is ceaseless. We are then led to expectthe same kind of consistency in response to the "factual" events, but thereaction of the "Galeriebesucher" does not seem to follow logically: Whatreason is there for answering the beauty, artistry, and human concern whichthis narration portrays with despair and tears? This deviation from patterned

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expectations suddenly throws the text off center, and from this point onwardone is reduced to surmising about the possible motivations for this inexpli-cable response. One questions the psychological make-up of the"Galeriebesucher"; or one wonders about the implied "sociology" of the twoscenes; ultimately one is tempted to overturn the distinction between the"fictional" and the "factual," speculating that the "beautiful" events must "infact" be fictitious since only this can explain the reaction of the observer.These questions and speculations are encouraged by the text, and they can beextended ad infinit urn.

Thus far I have concentrated primarily on elements of contiguity in thisparable, emphasizing how contrast and parallelism interrelate in such a wayas to simultaneously program and disappoint certain expectations in thereader. Deviation from established patterns serves to obscure the interpretivetrack that otherwise seems so clear and easy to follow. If we now examinethe role of metaphor in this text, we will find that it also functions in such amanner as to establish and then deviate from particular patterns, opening upan ever-widening interpretive rift. There are only three explicit uses of fig-urative language in this parable: the comparison of the clapping hands tojackhammers in the first paragraph; the description in the second paragraphof the director's feelings for the rideress as those normally reserved for amuch-loved relative; finally, the comparison of the psychic state of the"Galeriebesucher" to that of a "heavy dream." Now the first two metaphorshave identical relative positions in their respective narrative contexts, yetthey stand in striking opposition to one another: in the "fictional" narrationthe comparison occurs in the indicative mood, the concrete "reality" of thefigurative comparison being highlighted by the use of the word "eigentlich";in the "factual" narration the metaphorical reference is the only elementgiven in the subjunctive mood as an "unreal" comparison. The "mood" ofeach metaphor, in other words, directly contrasts with the dominant"mood" of the passages in which it is embedded. This leads to the hypothesisthat perhaps the interpreter is justified in undertaking a radical reversal ofsignifications, one in which "figurative" language becomes an unmistakableindicator of an essential factuality hidden beneath the appearance of non-figurative language. In other words, we are tempted to view thesemetaphors as "peep-holes" into the true underlying circumstances maskedby the dominant narrative discourse: figurative becomes non-figurative, fic-tional becomes factual, factual becomes fictional. We experience once againhere that radical overturning of the text and its interpretive possibilities thatwe discovered above; the more one scrutinizes the text, the farther away ittakes one from determinate meaning - it becomes increasingly more"undecidable."

The final simile "wie in einem schweren Traum versinkend" corrobo-

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rates and underwrites the reversal of fact and fiction suggested by the othermetaphors. The parallelism of syntax in the final statement of the text makesclear that "im Schlußmarsch" and "in einem schweren Traum versinkend"are the elements related by the comparative "wie." This means, however,that the final march of the purportedly "real" events is being compared to aheavy dream, suggesting once again a reversal in the values "factual" and"fictional" or "reality" and "dream." While one, as we see, can compileconsiderable evidence which would support arguments for such an interpre-tive reversal, this still does not bring determinate meaning into the text.Instead it merely presents us with a problematization of fact and fiction,truth and lie, reality and dream. The beauty and elegance of the text, like thebeauty of the circus events, are quite deceptive, and the interpreter ends uptrapped in an oppressive interpretive cycle like that of the circus equestrian, aprocess that only ceases when it is brought to a halt from without. The textcombines strategies of anticipation, deceptive simplicity, diversion, and in-version to subvert the expectations it establishes, opening up an interpretivefield in which every answer leads to new questions; an endless process ofinterpretive "play" is called forth in which the players are free to make theirown hermeneutical moves within the limits prescribed by the structuralconfiguration of the text.

It is especially difficult to form conclusions for a work that has argued forthe productivity of the inconclusive. My investigation of Kafka's aphoristictexts, like the preceding examination of the parable "Auf der Galerie," tendsto provide analyses rather than interpretations; in this sense its purpose hasbeen to suggest possible approaches to, and manners of understanding, Kaf-ka's aphoristic and parabolic texts which do justice to both their structuraldefinition and their internal openness. Hence I have sought to avoid"conclusive" interpretations of these texts, while simultaneously trying tofollow a coherent critical methodology. Kafka's aphorisms, I hope to haveshown, are "partial" in the sense of being fragmentary: they do not fittogether into a system of belief or a cogent "philosophy," rather they are"unified" solely by their discursive practice, and this links them with Kafka'sparabolic narratives as well. With the aphorisms Kafka begins a series ofexperiments into textual strategies and literary practices in which, paradoxi-cally, the fragmentary and "partial" (in both of its significances) is exploitedfor the ends of communication and impartiality. In the aphorisms Kafkalearns, among other things, how formal closure can merge with opennessand indeterminacy of meaning; he discovers a manner of objectified textualcommunication which neither betrays the creative individuality of the pro-

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ducer, nor the interpretive individuality of the reader. While my own inves-tigation into the function of the aphoristic in Kafka's writing has taken onanything but aphoristic form, its aim is decidedly aphoristic. I desire aboveall to have opened up some new horizons for the study and understanding ofKafka's aphorisms, while indicating the integral role they play in the overallprofile of his literature. Ultimately, then, I hope that my text, like theaphorism, will find a formal close which merges into an openness of under-standing.

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