constitutional law--citizenship & suffrage

8/11/2019 Constitutional Law--citizenship & Suffrage

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MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, digested

GR # L-21289, October 4, 1971 (Constitutional Law, Citizenship, Naturalization Qualification and

Disqualification)

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire,

claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino citizen. Solicitor

General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not

automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same does not

possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has proven that

she does not suffer any disqualification there under.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized.

HELD: Yes, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina

provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines (Sec. 15 and 4, CA 473).

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC, digested

GR # 87193, June 23, 1989 (Constitutional LawRecovery of Citizenship)

FACTS: Private respondent questioned petitioner governors candidacy and election for being null andvoid ab initio due to his alienage. Petitioner governor contends that his active participation in the

elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, and restored him of his

Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a naturalized American effectively

recovers his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: No, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. Citizenship once lost

may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by direct grant by law (CA 63) which was not

invoked by the petitioner.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

Posted by kaye lee on 1:40 PMGR # L-21289, October 4, 1971 [Naturalization - Qualification and Disqualification; CA 473]

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire,

claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes

the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer on the latter

Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the qualifications required for applicant for

naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino

citizen.

RULING:

Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto,

provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually

passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be

allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino

citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate

child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching

maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountanta

profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a

Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under

prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching

the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was

in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years

after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be

relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/08/moy-ya-lim-yao-vs-commissioner-of.htmlhttp://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/08/moy-ya-lim-yao-vs-commissioner-of.html


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HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with

the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and its way beyond the

allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was

extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be extended any further). Chings special circumstances cant be

considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and

a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didnt give

any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess its simply because he

never thought hes Chinese not until heapplied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing

Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is

to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest

civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply

glossed over.

Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,

JR., respondents.

En Banc

Doctrine: citizenship

Date: July 30, 1991Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,

Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of

Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,

Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of NorthernSamar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied

by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from

China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought

from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish

colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong

Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino

cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan meta natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to

Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared

and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,

Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of

where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for

naturalization on February 15, 1954.


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On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15,

1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final

and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of

naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing

his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices

of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went

to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since

employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in

the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of

his family in Manila.

In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status

as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the

Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's

citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.

The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was

precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon

reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to

perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in

accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippinecitizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected

citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation

where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-

born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine

citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status

to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the

age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask

for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born

citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would beamended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already

having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for

one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in

election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here

in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature

taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his citizenship

after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity,therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and

void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

Co vs. Electoral Tribunal

G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein

respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second

district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ongs father was


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only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ongs residence qualificationsince Ong does not own

any property in Samar.

ISSUE/s:

1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;

2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and

3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.

RULING:

1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,

returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident

use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the

power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an immigrant from China was declared

a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent

then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence,

there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a

natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence

which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private

respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'

imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the

present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Co v. HRET

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Co ran for Congressman of the 2nd District of Samar. Private respondent Jose

Ong, Jr. was declared winner. Although Ong's mother is a natural born-Filipina, his father was only

naturalized as a Filipino when the respondent was already nine years old. Given these facts, petitionercontends that Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore disqualified from being elected

Congressman.

Issue: WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Ruling: Affirmative. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he

was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected

Philippine citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such. The petitioners argue that the respondent's father

was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court

cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and

at this very late date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship

may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

Political Law NaturalBornRequirement Requirements to be a Congressman

Bengson and Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2ndDistrict of Pangasinan. They were running forCongress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a Quo

Warranto proceeding in the HRET alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence

he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the

winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is

defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship when he

enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines.

Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of RA 2630 which

provides that Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting

commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the

United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution

expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to performany act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.

HELD: Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to

perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the

term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform

any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth

without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship . In respondent Cruzs

case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United


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States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Moreover,

repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost

his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he

was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former

status as a natural-born Filipino.

TECSON VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161434, March 3 2004

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of

candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the

forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth

to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of

candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his

mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the

son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered

voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the

Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any

act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme

consider as viable is the fact that the death certificateof Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn wasthe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the

age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo

Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should

be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his

death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not

substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the en masse

Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of

private respondentFernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20,

1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those

whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

FACTS:

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due

course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in

truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,

and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his

Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the

allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior

marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no suchprior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the

citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987

Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of

the case.

ISSUES:


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1) Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?

2) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

RULING:

1) It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in

turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a

Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him

from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of

Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo

would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that

San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other

evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have

benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of

Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935

Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons

whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that

he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in

violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

2) No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction

of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-

President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto

proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or

unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a

post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the

second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-

election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,

paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the

qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER,vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly

misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural

Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe

was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme

Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for thepresidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or

"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of

"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided

that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."


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Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death

certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that

having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other

evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of

residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"

that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzoscitizenship would have extended to his son,

Allan---respondentsfather.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a

Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935

Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus,

the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the

assailed marriage had no bearing on respondentscitizenship in view of the established paternal filiation

evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that

he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in

violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Mercado vs Manzano [307 SCRA 630]

Posted byPius Morados onNovember 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Local Government Code)

Facts: Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified

from running for any elective local position.

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice

mayor of the City of Makati.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification.

The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution, dated May 7, 1998, granting the petition and

ordered the cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the

election held on May 11, 1998.Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes

cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Private respondent opposed

contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998

was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that

Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

Issue: WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective office of the Vice-Mayor

when respondent is disqualified.

Held: Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor

an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City

who cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately

disqualified by final and executory judgment.The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings

before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice

mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private

respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner

had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to

intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the

election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the

disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a

Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,

and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for an

elective local position under par 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160.

MERCADOV.MANZANO307SCRA630(1999)

G.R. No. 135083Facts:

Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati

Ci ty during the May 11, 1998 elections.

A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano is an

American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent.
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COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on

May 7, 1998 on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local

Government Code from running any elective position.

Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even

after the election.

The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was opposed by

the private respondent.

On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the decision of

the COMELEC's Second Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vice

Mayor of Makati.

Pu r su an t t o t h e r e so l u t i o n r e n d e r e d by t h e C O M E L E C e n ban c , o n A u g u s t 31 , 1998 ,

the bo ard o f canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.

Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc

and to declare private respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.

Issues:1. WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he wasnot an or ig inal partyin the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.

2. WON dual cit izenship a ground for disqual i f ication?3.WON there was a val id election

o f c i t i ze n shi p?

Reasons:

1.Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File

Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and

petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective

loca position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification

proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Mercado

since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene at that

stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from6 of R.A. No.

6646 or theElectoral Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for

disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELECenbanctoresolvepetitioners

motionforinterventionwastantamounttodenialofthemotion,justifyingthispetition for certiorari.

2.

NO. Invoking the maxim

dura lex sed lex

, petitioner contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Loca lGovernment Code (which

declares as disqualified from running for elective local positionThose with dual-citizenship),

Congress has

command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold

elective office.

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out ofcircumstances of bir th or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more

states. Dual allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a person

simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an

issue because a person who has this raises a question of which states law must apply to him/her,

therefore posting a threat to a countrys sovereignty. Hence, dual citizenship in the aforementioned

disqualification clause must mean dualallegiance.Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not

fall under this disqualification.3 .Y es , th er e wa s a v al id el ec ti on of cit iz en sh ip . I t sh ou ld

suf fi c e th a t up o n fi l i ng o f c er ti fi ca te s fo r candidacy, such persons with dual citizenship have

elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondentscertificate of

candidacy, he made these statements under oath on M arch 27 , 1998 :

I am a F i l i p i n o c i t i zenNatu ra l -bo r n . I am n o t a pe r man e n t r e s i d e n t

of, or immigrant to, a foreign country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. Iwill support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and

allegiance theretoThe fi l ing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce

his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.

Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED

Republic vs. dela Rosa

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440

and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under

the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath


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of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed

a petition for naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of the Philippines. The respondent

Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and

petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the

last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. On January 14,

1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on

January instead of having it on March, " where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the

May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on

February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G.

FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting

upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen After receiving a copy of the

Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme

Court.

Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and

therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered

to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once

this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs. The proceedings of the trial

court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the

scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the

petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner

took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period

In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of

Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and

proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense,

Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but

that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to

American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto which

is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.

HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino.He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US

citizenship, that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or

repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine

citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a

foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent

violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The

qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the

people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly

believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application

when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he

must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other

state.

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.

The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the

ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was

naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law

era.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other

qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under

Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by

actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws

of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and

the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63


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as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of

Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual Citizenship

Labo Doctrine

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for

quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that

he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an

Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that

even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost

when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts

that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should

not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace

Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was

naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It

was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He

did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he waslisted as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is

inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore

allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely

a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a

Filipino through an act of Congressnone of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not

overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even

unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by

electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The

electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at

least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as

mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be

declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest

number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed

right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a

winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively

declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective

offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that

office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared

elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the

legal votes cast in the election.

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU VS. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, super digestedGR # L-83882, January 24, 1989 (Constitutional Law Citizenship, Express Renunciation)

FACTS: In the case at bar, herein petitioner, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen, applied and

renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while still a citizen of the Philippines, petitioner also declared

his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality in

commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of ones Philippine citizenship acquired

through naturalization.

HELD: Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioners

Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence, express renunciation was

held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or

implication.

NOTA BENE: Under RA 9225 (effective August 29, 2003), the mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is no

longer deemed an express renunciation of foreign citizenship in order to run for public office. The

candidate for public office with dual citizenship must (1) take an oath of allegiance and (2) execute a

renunciation of foreign citizenship. However, the foregoing requirements do not apply to natural-born

Filipinos before running for public office.

Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. L-83882, Jan. 24, 1989
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FACTS:

Petitioner is a Portuguese national who acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization. However, despite

his naturalization, he still applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport and declared his nationality as

Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to

inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced his

Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as

a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport. To the mind of the court the

foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioners Philippine citizenship

acquired through naturalization.

Political Law Election Laws Right of SuffrageExtension of Voters Registration

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the

registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December

27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. TheCommission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged

grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million

youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of

Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular

election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in

the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters

registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of

the voters registration.

HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA

8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular

election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is nota mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws

to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,

orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election

activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one

which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent

circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the

prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings

that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the

additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of

voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voters list; and

then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time,the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special

registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth

voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached any

actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the

voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their

pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons,

which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting

Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participatein absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void

because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one

year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;

That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates

insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-

president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to

do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

HELD: No.


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There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines

within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and

resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is

concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who

executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines

for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute

the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to

include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that

way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation

of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred

to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

MACALINTAL VS COMELEC

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine

Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting

Act of 2003)1suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in

the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and

appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or

permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their

intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the

Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for

national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the

constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for

President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act

No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and

Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the

COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?HELD:

In resolving the issues , the application of the rules in Statutory Construction must be applied

All laws are presumed to be constitutional

The constitution must be construed as a whole

In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such meaning must be deduced

from the discussions of the members of the constitutional commission.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, atleast eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators

and party-list representatives.

which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which

enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to

a foreign country;

c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense

punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been

found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not

having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified tovote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years

after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments

issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and

processes prescribed by the Rules of Courton execution of judgments;

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she

executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that

he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years

from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not

applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of


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the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her

permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent

authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service

establishments concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no

longer insane or incompetent.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or

permanent residentwho is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent

residence in another country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin. However,

same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as

he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the

constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must

establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is

required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system

for absentee voting.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4,

Article VII of the Constitution?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-

president, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

. . . . . . . . .

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the

outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the

Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the

scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections

therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or

countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the

Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 4 . . .

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of

each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Uponreceipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the

day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of

Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due

execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall

have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a

majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

. . .

Such provison gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for

president and vice-president.

It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of theConstitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and

party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-President.41

The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it

necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-

presidency.

clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every

election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as

aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and

vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the

Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting

Act of 2003and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates forpresident and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

C.Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission,

the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3)

countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be

allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:


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a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy

voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other

foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of

constitutional commissions.

The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of

Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries

for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they

require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not

confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be

allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A.

No. 9189.48Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into

the independence of the COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for

being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

constitutional law--citizenship & suffrage

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