Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, September 17, 1974En Banc (all Justices wrote their opinion)Petitioners are: Ninoy, Mitra, FACTS: According to Chief Justice Makalintal: These nine cases are all about the petitions forhabeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained unlawfully by the military by virtue of Proclamation no.1081 dated September 21, 1972 through the President exercising his powers he assumed by virtue of Martial Law. The petitioners were arrested pursuant to Gen. Order no 2 “for being participants or for having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force…” (September 22, 1972).The provision of the 1935 constitution reads “the President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces in the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”  Art VII Section 10(2) Accdg to Castro, J.: On Sept 21 1972, the country was placed under Martial Law. From Sept 22 to 30, petitioners were arrested by the military authorities and detained, some at Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame. They aver that the arrest and detention were illegal having been effected without valid order of a court of justice. Writ of habeas corpus were directed by the Court directing respondents to produce the bodies of the petitioners in Court. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, answered that such arrests were legally ordered by the President pursuant to Proclamation of Martial Law as “participant or as having giving aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power and to take the government by force.” Hearings were held on 26 and 29 September and October 6. Meanwhile, some of the petitioners, with leave of Court, withdrew their petitions, others were released from custody under certain restrictive conditions. Voltaire died after his release, the action was deemed abated. Only Diokno AND Benigno Aquino was still in military custody (September 9, 1972—the date of the supposed promulgation of the nine cases.) On September 11 1972, the petitioner Diokno was released. Eleven members voted to dismiss Diokno’s petition as being “moot and academic” except Castro, who find Diokno’s derogatory imputations grave and highly insulting. On August 23 1973, petitioner Ninoy filed an action for certiorari and prohibition with this Court, alleging that on 11 August 1973 charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearm were filed against him, that his trial held on August 27, 29, 31was illegal because the proclamation of Martial law was unconstitutional and that he could not expect a fair trial because the President could reverse any judgment of acquittal by the military court and sentence him to death. “Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2” On the other hand, December 28 1973, Jose Diokno filed a motion to withdraw his petition filed in his behalf, imputing the (1) delay in the disposition of the case, (2)that the decision of the Court in the Ratification cases contrary to the Court’s ruling that the 1973 Constitution was not validly ratified and (3) the action of the members of the Court taking an oath to the new Constitution and which becomes a different court in which he filed his petition. Diokno asserts that “a conscience that allows man to rot behind bars for more than one year and three months without trial—of course, without any charges at all—is a conscience that has become stunted, if not stultified..” and “… I can not continue to entrust my case to them; and I have become thoroughly convinced that our quest for justice in my case is futile.” Issue(s): 1.Whether or not this court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation no1081. Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or justifiable in character?Ruling:YES. Five justices held that the question is political and should not be determined by court. (Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino) Fernandez adds that as a member of the 1973 Convention he believes that “the as a member of the Convention, they have put an imprimatur on the proposition of the validity of a martial law proclamation…” Barredo believes that political question are not per se beyond the court’s jurisdiction, judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being all-embracing and plenary but as a matter of policy should abstain from interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation. Esguerra finds that the declaration

of martial lawis final and conclusive upon the courts. Antonio finds that there is no dispute as tothe existence of a state of rebellion and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise of the president under the 1935 Constitution to declare martial law.Four on the side of justiciability: Castro, Fernando, Teehanke and Munoz Palma. The constitutional sufficiency may be inquired into by court and would thus apply the principle laid down by Lansang although the case refers to the power of President to suspend habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability in Lansang is there distinguished from the power of judicial review and is limited to ascertaining whether the President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of the act. The Test is whether in suspending the writ of habeas corpus, the president he did or did not acted arbitrarily (bias, capricious).Applying the test, the Justices find no arbitrariness in the President’s proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. The bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, with regards to the existence of a state rebellion in the country, had not disappeared but had even worsened. The question of the validity of the Proclamation no 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution (Art XVII. Sec 3 (2)) that “all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after … the ratification of this Constitution.” The political or justifiable question controversy has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question which was overwhelmingly voted upon by a majority of voters, even between 15 and 18 years of age in affirmative: “Under the 1973 Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under martial law?” ***If you want a more “nakaka-nosebleed” facts of the Case, refer to page 326 up to 336…2. Whether or not the petitions for writ of habeas corpus should be suspended contending that the proclamation of Martial Law was unconstitutional. YES. The petitions should be dismissed with respect to petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation: to suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof.RULING SUMMARIZED (Castro):1. That the proclamation of Martial Law in September 1972 by the President was within the 1932 Constitution2. That because the Communist rebellion had not been abated and instead the subversion had proliferated throughout the country, the imposition of martial law was an “imperative of national survival.” 3. That the arrest and detention of the persons who were “participants or gave aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force” were not unconstitutional nor arbitrary4. That subsumed in the declaration of martial law is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus5. That the fact that the regular courts are open cannot be accepted as evidence that rebellion and insurrection no longer imperil the safety of the state6. That actual armed combat has been and still raging in parts of Mindanao, Bicol and Cagayan7. That the hosts of doubts with respect to the validity of the ratification and effectivity of the 1973 Constitution has been dispelled by the national referendum of July 19738.that the issue of the validity and constitutionality of the arrest and detention of all the petitioners and of the restrictions imposed upon those who were freed, is now foreclosed by the transitory provision of 1973 CONSTITUTION (Article XVII Sec 3 (2)) which validates all acts made by the President.**Habeas Corpus- the purpose of the writ is to inquire into the cause or reason why a person is being restrained of his liberty against his will and if there is no legal and/or valid justification shown for such restraint the writ will forthwith issue to restore to that person his liberty or freedom.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE CASES

CERTIORARI n. (sersh-oh-rare-ee)- a writ (order) of a higher court to a lower court to send all the documents in a case to it so the higher court can review the lower court's decision.-a writ of superior courts to call up the records of an inferior court or a body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity COLLECTIVEBARGAINING AGREEMENT- refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries.FRINGE BENEFIT- means any good, service or other benefit furnished or granted in cash or in kind by an employer to an individual employee (except rank and file employees as defined herein) such as, but not limited to, the following:(1) Housing;(2) Expense account;(3) Vehicle of any kind;(4) Household personnel, such as maid, driver and others;(5) Interest on loan at less than market rate to the extent of the difference between the market rate and actual rate granted;(6) Membership fees, dues and other expenses borne by the employer for the employee in social and athletic clubs or other similar organizations;(7) Expenses for foreign travel;(8) Holiday and vacation expenses;(9) Educational assistance to the employee or his dependents; and(10) Life or health insurance and other non-life insurance premiums or similar amounts in excess of what the law allows.

Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.

The Court held that ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental,

not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people -these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.

SUPREME COURTEN BANCG.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969ACCFA vs. CUGCO, ACCFA v. Cugco, 30 SCRA 649 MAKALINTAL, J.The ACCFA filed two separate appeals by certiorari from the CIR decision dated March 25, 1963 (G.R. No. L-21484) and the order dated May 21, 1964(G.R. No. L-23605) as affirmed by the resolutions en banc, of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), in Cases Nos. 3450-ULP and 1327-MC, respectively.*** Only one decision was rendered since the parties and the principal issues involved in both cases are practically the same.FACTS:Background of the Parties1. The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a government agency created under RA No. 821 (as amended).

2. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA No. 3844) signed into law by the President on August 8,1963.3. The ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA) are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA). They are referred to in the cases as the Unions.Background of the CasesG.R. No. L-214841. On September 4, 1961, ACCFA and the Unions entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year from July 1, 1961. 2. A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. They declared a strike on October 25, 1962 which was ended on November 26, 1962 when the strikers voluntarily returned to work.3. On October 30, 1962, the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against the ACCFA (Case No. 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: A. Violation of the CBA to discourage the members of the Unions to exercise their right to self-organization;B. Discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions;C. Refusal to bargain.4. The ACCFA presented the following defenses: A. Lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the caseB. Illegality of the bargaining contract;C. Expiration of said contract; andD. Lack of approval by the Office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for therein.5. The CIR, in its decision dated March 25, 1963 ordered the ACCFA:1. To cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization;2. To comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on September 4, 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance;3. To bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants.6. The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc.7. The ACCFA then brought an appeal by certiorari.G .R. No. L-23605  1. On March 17, 1964, the Unions filed a petition for certification election with the CIR (Case No. 1327-MC) to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the employees of ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, on 19 March 1964, EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration.2. The ACA denied that the Unions represented the majority of the employees in the ACA and alleged that: 

A. The petition was premature;B. The ACA was not the proper party to be notified and to answer the petition; andC. The employees and supervisors could not lawfully become members of the Unions, nor be represented by them.

3. In its order dated May 21, 1964, the CIR certified "the ACCFA Workers' Association and the ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and supervisors, respectively, of the Agricultural Credit Administration." The said order was affirmed by the CIR en banc in its resolution dated August 24, 1964.4. On October 2, 1964 the ACA filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with urgent motion to stay the CIR order of May 21, 1964.5. In a resolution dated October 6, 1964, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for ³lack of adequate allegations´ but later reconsidered when the ACA complied with the formal requirement stated in the said resolution and ordered the CIR to stay the execution of its order.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions.

2. Whether or not the Unions can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA and whether or not the CBA between the petitioner and the respondents is valid;

3. Whether or not there is a legal and/or factual basis for the finding of the respondent court that the petitioner had committed acts of unfair labor practice.

4. Whether or not the fringe benefits are already enforceable, as stipulated in the CBA.

HELD:1. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions.These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent”. Under this traditional classification, such constituent (governmental) functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty. Ministrant (proprietary) functions, on the other hand, e.g. promote the welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people, are optional on the part of the government.However, the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of economic forces.Land Reform Code Sections 113 to 118, inclusive, invest the ACA with certain rights and powers not accorded to non-governmental entities. The implementation of the land reform program of the State by the ACA according to RA No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality.The appointing authority in respect of the officials and employees of the ACA is the President of the Philippines, pursuant to the provisions of Section 79(D) of the Revised Administrative Code.2. The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA.EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA.The collective bargaining powers in the respondent Unions cannot be recognized within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and hence cannot be granted their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units.The Unions are not entitled to the certification election. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L-21824). The said right to strike is contrary to Section 11 of R.A. No. 875, which provides:SEC. 11.Prohibition Against Strike in the Government-The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.3. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of SC ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the CIR dated March 25, 1963, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned.4. The position of the ACCFA in regard to the question of fringe benefits provided for in the CBA is thatthe said fringe benefits have not become enforceable because the condition that they should first be approved by the Office of the President has not been complied with.

Under Section 3, Article XIV, of the CBA, the same "shall not become effective unless and until the same is duly ratified by the Board of Governors of the Administration." Such approval was given evenbefore the formal execution of the CBA but with the proviso that "the fringe benefits contained therein shall take effect only if approved by the office of the President.” The condition is, therefore, deemed to be incorporated into the agreement by reference.

NOTE: On July 24, 1963 the ACCFA Board of Governors ratified the CBA but with the express qualification that the same was "without prejudice to the pending appeal in the Supreme Court...́ The Office of the President approved the payment of the CBA¶s agreed upon fringe benefits.

The Supreme Court held that insofar as the fringe benefits already paid are concerned, there is no reason to set aside the decision of the CIR, but that since the respondent Unions have no right to thecertification election sought by them nor, consequently, to bargain collectively with the petitioner, no further fringe benefits may be demanded on the basis of any collective bargaining agreement.The decisions and orders appealed from are set aside and/or modified in accordance with the foregoing pronouncements. No costs.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.Zaldivar,J., concurs in the result. Separate OpinionFERNANDO, J., concurring:The decision reached by this Court represents a clear tendency not to be necessarily bound by our previous pronouncements on what activities partake of a nature that is governmental. Of even greater significance, there is a definite rejection of the "constituent-ministrant" criterion of governmental functions, followed in Bacani v.NACOCO. There is again full adherence to the basic philosophy of the Constitution as to the extensive and vast power lodged in our government to cope with the social and economic problems that even now sorely beset us. Our decision today does not pass upon the rights of labor employed in instrumentalities of the state discharging governmental functions.The Constitutional Convention saw to it that our fundamental law embodies a policy of the responsibility thrust on government to cope with social and economic problems and an earnest and sincere commitment to the promotion of the general welfare through state action. It would thus follow that the force of any legal objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights or to statutes organizing public corporations that may engage in competition with private enterprise has been blunted. Unless there be a clear showing of any invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, their validity is a foregone conclusion.The opinion of Justice Makalintal contains this footnote: "It must be stated, however, that we do not here decide the question ² not at issue in this case ²of whether or not a labor organization composed employees discharging governmental functions, which is allowed under the legal provision just quoted, provided such organization does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike, may petition for a certification election and compel the employer to bargain collectively with it for purposes other than to secure changes or conditions in the terms and conditions of employment."

PVTA vs. CIR, July 25, 1975Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Court of Industrial Relations. Ponente: FernandoFACTS: Appeal by certiorari. This case is concerned with the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. Dec. 20, 1966, private respondents filed a petition wherein they are seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act. No.444. Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay the same (minus what was already paid). Hence, respondents filed a petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No.444.ISSUE: Whether the PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No.444.

HELD: RA No. 2265 also provides a distinction between constituent and ministrant functions which the Chief Justice points out, is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.” The court affirms that the motion for reconsideration be denied. The contention of petitioner that the 8Hour Labor Law does not apply to them does not deserve any consideration.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, Dec 13, 1916 Ponente: Trent FACTS: This case is one of trusteeship. $400,000 was paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by Spain for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad (institution under the control of the church), the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give the former $80,000 of the relief fund in 4 installments. Petitions of various persons, including heirs of those entitled to allotments, prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and to pay the same with interest. Defendant appealed as funds have been exhausted on jewelry loans.ISSUE: Whether the loan on Monte de Piedad was charity for an ecclesiastical pious work, and if the government is the proper authority to the cause of action towards this case (who may sue to recover this loan?).HELD: If such loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities. The Philippine government as a trustee towards the funds could maintain action for there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. These principles based upon the foundation of a principle of public policy. The judgment appealed is affirmed.

Nadeco Development Company vs. TobiasFACTS: Appeal taken by plaintiff, Nadeco, represented by its agent, the Philippine National Bank, from an order of the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on grounds of prescription. In complaint, plaintiff seeks to recover from Jose Yulo Tobias the sum of P6,905.81 under a promissory note. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon grounds that the action upon which complaint is based had prescribed more than 10 years ago. Plaintiff argues that it is erroneous as the statute of limitations does not run against the plaintiff because it is an instrumentality of the government. Plaintiff cites Monte de Piedad case.ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff can exercise sovereign powers and can invoke the exemptions thereof?HELD: Plaintiff does not exercise sovereign powers and can not invoke the exemptions thereof – it is an agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business functions, apparent from its Organic Act (Commonwealth Act 182, amended by CA 311), which says: “shall be subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as they are not inconsistent” MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appelleevs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant(58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)FACTS: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the child’s welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. ISSUE: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased.RULING: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that “the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his

work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.” With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan KehFACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).ISSUES: The court resolved three issues:1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.RATIO: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to

refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.Summary of ratio:1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

U.S. vs. Dorr (2 Phil 332)FACTS: The defendants were convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon Sec. 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission which punishes any person who shall "utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the U.S. Government or the Insular Government of the Phil. Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the unlawful authorities x x x". The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom". The article mentioned about the "foolish work that the Civil Commission is doing all over the Islands" referring to the appointment by the latter of natives which were referred to as "insurgents" and "rogues" to important Government positions.ISSUE: Whether the publication constitutes an offense under Sec. 8 of ACT. No. 292

HELD: NO. The term "government" as employed in ACT No. 292 of the U.S. Philippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government. The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the U.S., and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these islands. The form of Goverment by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are instructed with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute. Adapted. Note on the case: Administration means the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of the government are for the time being (entrusted.)

Laurel vs. Misa Topic: Treason Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil. 856 FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff 75 Phil 875August 20, 1946Tuason, J.

FACTS:• Outbreak of the war against Japanese invaders• Ramon Ruffy, Prudente Francisco and Andres Fortus, petitioners herein, were the Provincial Commander, a junior officer and a corporal of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro, respectively• Japanese forces came to Mindoro which made Ruffy’s troop retreat to the mountains and organized a guerilla outfit called the Bolo Combat Team or the Bolo Area• Civilians Jose Garcia, Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan also became members of the Bolo Area• Petitioners were promoted: Ruffy was named the Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area, Dinglasan became the Finance Officer, Garcia was named Captain while Adeva and Francisco were named 3rd Lt. and 2nd Lt, respectively• Change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected relieving Ruffy of his position by Capt. Beloncio• Capt. Beloncio was allegedly slain by petitionersISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committedHELD: Yes, petitioners were still subject to military law at the time the offense was committed. The Court ruled that members of the Armed Forces were still covered

by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws relating to the Armed Forces even during the Japanese occupation. The act of unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in defiance of the 95the Article of War, held subjects liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, petitioners were officers of the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, operating under orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the US Army. Aside from that, and in response to petitioners’ argument that courts-martial have no jurisdiction over the case, the Court ruled that courts-martial do have authority, being agencies of executive character. Petition is denied.Dissenting Opinion: Perfecto, J. The fact that enemy occupation does not relieve petitioners from their sworn duties as well as from the punishment they must incur for their conduct is affirmed. However, petition must be granted on the grounds that final judgments should come from the Supreme Court who has the authority to review, revise, reverse or modify judgments.

PEOPLE V. PERFECTOG.R. No. L-18463FACTS: The plaintiff appellee filed the case against Gregorio perfecto defendant/ appellant and editor of the newspaper La Nacion of violating article 256 of the Spanish penal code and was found guilty in the municipal court because of publishing a defamatory article against the members of the Philippine senate. When information was filed in the municipal court of the city of manila the editorial in question was set out and defendant was again found guilty in the court of First Instance Manila. The higher court considers perfecto’s statements to be contemptuous therefore ruled that the punishment of for contempt of non judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American Principles. Ministers of the crown have no place under the American flag.ISSUES: Whether or not article 256 of Spanish penal code is enforceable over Philippine laws. HELD: Gregorio Perfecto was acquitted due to the effect of change from Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines on Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code where it is general principle that the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Furthermore article 277 otherwise known as Philippine Libel Law will take place over 256 Spanish Penal Code for a reason such as section 13 provides that “All laws and parts of laws now enforced, so far as the same maybe in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed.

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION114 SCRA 77FACTS:1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal.4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11,1963.5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.” 7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated, among others, Art. 14, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.ISSUE:

1. Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?

2. Is he guilty of violating Art. 14, par 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce?HELD:1. Article 14 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or

assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.2. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental, organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including law on public officers and elections.Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce prohibiting certain public officers from engaging in business activities in political in nature and has already been abrogated with the transfer of sovereignty from Spain, to the US and later to the Republic of the Philippines.Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to respondent, Judge Asuncion.In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the CA, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.