Samillano vs NLRC

Spouses Samillano were hired by private respondent on 1981 and the other on 1983. On Oct. 2, 1990, Conrado Samillano was transferred from his position as Traffic Supervisor to the Technical Dept. of SSB . His wife was likewise transferred to the AM production Dept. from her former position as cashier.

Due to these transfers, the spouses Samillano filed complaints, one for ILLEGAL DEMOTION and the other for ILLEGAL DISMISSAL contending that they were terminated without any lawful cause

Respondents contends that the spouses Samillano MISAPPROPRIATED funds and committed ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION.

Petitioners on the other hand contends that they were dismissed because they had reported the violations of the labor laws by the respondents UNDERPAYMENT OF SALARIES AND OTHER BENEFITS

An inspection of the DOLE found out that there were deficiencies in wages and other benefits given to employees. It was also determined that meetings were conducted by the respondents with their employees seeking a compromise of the unpaid benefits.

Labor arbiter found out that the dismissal of the spouses IS ILLEGAL bec the alleged misappropriations were not substantiated.

On appeal, NLRC REVERSED the findings of the Labor Arbiter. It contends that the dismissal is VALID though it ordered the respondents to INDEMNIFY petitioners for the violation of their due process.

ISSUE: WON Petitioners were denied of their right to due process

HELD: YES

The twin requirement of notice and hearing were not observed.

According to the SC, the notices/memoranda to petitioners requiring them to answer the charges against them were only meant to provide a SEMBLANCE OF COMPLIANCE with the DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT. In other words, there is CIRCUMVENTION OF THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT.

Dismissal of the spouses was due to LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. According to NLRC, the dismissal is VALID anchoring it’s decision on the alleged irregularities where the spouses were involved. These IRREGULARITIES according to NLRC were sufficient to make out a case out of LOSS of CONFIDENCE.

Said irregularities allegedly involving petitioners were enumerated in An Updated Report dated 17 August 1990 submitted by the Finance Department Business Head Janice Procianos and various letter-memos to petitioners as well as the audit report dated 17 September 1990 submitted by Domeciano Adaya.

However, as pointed out by the SC, the clear import of said audit report is the necessity for a further investigation and verification.

There is thus no evidence on record to show that any further investigation and verification were done by private respondents. What is apparent is that petitioners were made to answer charges of misconduct based on suspicions which lacked adequate basis.

While the law and this Court recognize the right of an employer to dismiss an employee based on loss of trust and confidence, the former's evidence must clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which the loss o f trust and confidence in the employee is based.

Conclusions of the Respondents were unsubstantiated and baseless.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered:

1. DECLARING the dismissal from employment of petitioners NULL and VOID;

2. ORDERING private respondents to pay petitioners' separation pay at the rate of ONE-HALF (1/2) MONTH salary for every year of service; and

3. ORDERING private respondents to pay petitioners full backwages from date of illegal dismissal to the finality of this decision.

Stolt-Nielsen vs NLRC

Eduardo Monsales is an employee of STolt Nielsen. His 10 year stay in the company earned him an award (1988) for DEDICATED SERVICE in stolt Nielsen.

On, Oct 1988, a contract was effected employing Monsales as an ENGINE FITTER ON BOARD Stolt Crown Vessel for a period of 10 MONTHS commencing on Dec 1988. Contract provided that Monsales would receive:

monthly basic pay of 525 dollars fixed ot pay of 250 dollars and longevity pay of 60 dollars with leave benefits (6 days per month)

On board the vessel, he inquired to CAPTAIN ERKIAGA (SPANISH) about the change in his job detail and that if his transfer has been communicated with SNMSI. The latter answered in the affirmative.

On his restday (Sunday) he was ordered by the captain to clean the deck cargo tank using “toline” which is a toxic substance detrimental to the respiratory system. He complied with such order eventhough HE WAS NOT PROVIDED A MASK.

Due to his exposure to said chemical, he felt dizziness and pain in his chest. Because of this, he was not able to report to work. He informed his physical condition to First Engineer Juan J. Ruiz about his physical condition but the latter was not able to relay said info to the captain nor to the physician on board.

Monsales’ failure to report to work was interpreted by the captain as an ACT OF DISOBEDIENCE and immediately ordered him, along with some other seamen, to report on deck "within five minutes" to clean up the deck cargo tank. He tried but he was not able to make it. The incident was entered in a log book.

Because of this incident, he was REPATRIATED TO THE PHILIPPINES. Upon arrival, he went to see a physician and there he found out that he was suffering from bronchitis.

When he went to the bank to get his salary for the months of Jan and Feb 1989, he learned that his salary were not remitted by the petitioner. He then filed for ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION before the POEA which ruled in favor of him.

POEA ordered petitioners to pay Monsales (US$5,616.00) salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract, (US$499.20) unremitted salary and (US$2,250.00) fixed ot pay.

On appeal, NLRC AFFIRMED POES DECISION.

ISSUE: WON Monsales was denied of his right to due process

HELD: YES>

SC ruled that it is not enough that Monsales was "advised of his infractions and given the opportunity to explain his side" after he had supposedly "refused to assist in the berthing and unberthing maneuvers," and that when he refused to clean the cargo tank, the "pertinent portion of the CBA on mutual assistance was read to him." 19 The procedure was far short of the legal mandate.

There must be proper notice and hearing. In a case, the court held that it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or through a representative.

Petitioners call attention to the "mutual assistance" proviso of the collective bargaining agreement; viz:

Sec. 6. Mutual assistance shall be exercised by all officers/ratings regardless of rank and position assisting each other in the working of the vessel both in engine room, deck and tank cleaning included. (sic)

As has been so correctly pointed out by the POEA, however, the above provision, falling under the general item, "Working Hours," is primarily for properly computing extra compensation, and it is not intended to coerce, compel, or force the crew members to perform jobs other than what they have been contracted for.

In his case, private respondent was made to perform various tasks other than his contractually assigned work from the very moment he boarded the vessel.

Garcia vs NLRC

Sometime in September, 1990, petitioner Rey O Garcia was hired by private respondent Mahal Kong Pilipinas, Inc. (MKPI) to review and edit articles, new items, literary contributions, essays, manuscripts, and other features to be published in the Say Magazine and other publications owned by private respondent.

On March 16, 1992, petitioner's employment was terminated. At that time, he was allegedly receiving a monthly salary of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00). Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent with National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Summons were thereafter duly served on private respondent to appear for a mandatory conference to be held on April 29, 1992

On the appointed date, private respondent, represented by Necy Avecilla, sought a postponement of the conference. The motion was granted and the date for the conference was reset to May 8, 1992.

On May 8, 1992, private respondent failed to appear prompting the Labor Arbiter to again reset the date of the conference to May 27, 1992 with a warning that failure to appear and to submit its position paper on the said date will be deemed a waiver of its right to be heard and to present its evidence.

On May 27, 1992, both parties appeared. Petitioner filed an amended complaint, a copy of which was served on private respondent in open court. By mutual agreement of the parties, the filing of their respective position papers as well as the next hearing was scheduled on June 9, 1992.

On said date, private respondent again failed to attend. It however, filed a letter requesting for the postponement of the hearing. Petitioner vigorously objected and instead moved that private respondent be declared in default and that he be allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Said motion was granted and petitioner was given one (1) week to submit his position paper and documentary evidence after which the case was to be considered submitted for decision.

On August 13, 1992, Labor Arbiter Nieves V de Castro rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner Rey Garcia directing respondent to reinstate said Garcia with full backwages of 24k (march to aug 1992).

On September 10, 1992, private respondent received a copy of the said decision. However, instead of filing an appeal therefrom, private respondent, through its company president Michael G. Say, wrote yet another letter to the labor arbiter expressing suprise and disappointment over an allegedly erroneous decision.

no appeal was filed from the said decision, hence, the same became final and executory

On November 25, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for preliminary injunction with respondent NLRC which then treated the unverified letter of Michael Say (chief exe of say magazine) as an appeal. It also decided that the case be remanded for reception of evidence.

ISSUE: WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in treating the letter of Michael G. Say as an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

HELD: YES

Article 233 of the Labor Code clearly provides that Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.

Furthermore, Section 3(a), Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

Clearly therefore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. 6 Failure to conform with the rules regarding appeal will certainly render the judgment final and executory, hence, unappeasable.

In the case at bar, no appeal was taken within the reglementary period of 10 days upon the receipt of the decision. Neither was a CASH OR SURETY BOND posted by the private respondent.

ON DUE PROCESS:Private respondent's asseveration that it has been denied due process is likewise untenable. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, 8 or as applied to administrative proceedings, and opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 9 What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. In the case at bar, private respondent was given ample

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The NLRC Resolutions dated January 14, 1993 and March 10, 1993 are hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 13, 1992 is DECLARED to have become final and executory. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Lumiqued vs Exenea

Arsenio P. Lumiqued, regional director of DAR, was dismissed by Fidel Ramos on May 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

Said dismissal was due to Lumigued’s charges. First, he was charged MALVERSATION OF FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. He allegedly committed at least 93 COUNTS OF FALSIFICATION by padding gasoline receipts. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46

In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules."

Lastly, he was charged with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.

Said complaints were to DOJ.

Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.

Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability.

To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 1989.

In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.

On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently becausethe investigation had already been terminated.

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, 10 finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.

The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.

In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were "altered." 18

Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.

Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. 19 On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.

ISSUE: WON in administrative proceedings, does due process require that a party be assisted by a counsel.

HELD: no

The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.

Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

Also, the committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumigued of his right to counsel. He was repeatedly appraised of his option to secure the services of counsel.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, 40 the Court said:

. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Note: Charges against Lumigued are DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

Atienza vs Comelec.

Atienza et al questioned the installment of Mar Roxas as the new LP president on the ground that the composition of the National Executive Council (NECO) was not properly convened. They likewise questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the meeting. Atienza’s allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienza’s allies.

. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings20 and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.21

ISSUE: WON Atienza et al’s right to due process were infringed upon when they were expelled from the party.

HELD: NO

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006.