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Chapter 8: Due Process of Law

Due Process: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Due process continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application. It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.

Justice Frankfurter: the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.

Due Process is a guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the government, whether committed by the legislature, executive, or the judiciary.

PERSON

The due process clause protects all persons, natural as well as artificial.

Natural persons include both the citizen and the alien. Villegas v. Hiu Chong: the Supreme Court annulled a city ordinance requiring aliens to obtain a work permit from the mayor as a pre-condition for employment, holding that while it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.

Artificial persons like corporation and partnerships are also covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is concerned. Reason: both are creatures of law and the life and liberty of persons are derived from it.

Deprivation: to take away forcibly, to prevent from possessing, enjoying or using something. It connotes a denial to right of life, liberty or property.

LIFE

Understood as the integrity of the physical person. It is not permissible for the government to deprive the

individual of any part of his body, and this is true even if it be as punishment for a crime.

LIBERTY

Mabini: liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong. Liberty is not an unbridled license; it is liberty regulated by

law. A person is free to act but he may exercise his rights only in such manner as not to injure the rights of others. The individual as a creature of society should be prepared to surrender part of his freedom for the benefit of the greater number in recognition of the time honored principle “salus populi est suprema lex”

PROPERTY

Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It includes all things - real, personal, tangible, intangible - that are within the commerce of man.

One cannot have a vested right to a public office because this is not regarded as property.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property. The inquiry is whether or not the law is being enforced in accordance with the prescribed manner but whether or not; to begin with, it is a proper exercise of police power.

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To be proper, the law must have a proper governmental objective (interest of the public instead of particular persons)

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Which hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

Requisites of Procedural Due Process in Judicial Proceedings: o There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed

with judicial power to hear and determine the matter.o Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person

of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.

in personam: acquired by the court when the defendant voluntarily appears in court or through the service of summons upon him.

in rem or quasi in-rem: jurisdiction is derived from the power it may exercise over the property. Notice by publication is sufficient in these cases. The reason is, the property is presumed to be in the possession of the owner.

The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. o Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its

own evidence submitted by the other party. Due process is not violated where a person is

not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard.

APPEAL: the right to appeal is not essential to the right to a hearing. Except when guaranteed by the Constitution, appeal may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion.

If the law permits appeal and it is denied, it is a denial of due process.

Under Article VIII, Sec 5 (2):

1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Requisites of procedural due process:

1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 3. The decision must have something to support itself. 4. The evidence must be substantial. 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the

hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7. The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties of the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

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Chapter 9: Equal Protection

Equal Protection: requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Substantive equality is not enough but it needs to e applied similarly to all.

Persons Protected: available to all persons, natural and juridical; however artificial persons are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable by citizens, such as the right to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public utilities. Aliens are comprehended in the guaranty (but with limits).

Classification:

What the law contemplates is equality among equals. The legislature is allowed to classify subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.

Classification: defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

Requirements for the classification:

1. It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law. 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only. 4. It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Chapter 10: Searches and Seizure

Scope of protection: available to all persons including aliens, whether accused of a crime of not. Artificial persons are likewise entitled to the guaranty although they may be

required to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of the police power or the power of taxation. As a rule, their premises cannot be searched nor may their papers and effects be seized except by virtue of a valid warrant.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and may be invoked only by the person entitled to it. The right to be left alone extends not only to the privacy of one’s home but also to his office or business establishment, including the papers and effects that may be found there.

Requisites of a Valid Warrant:

1. It must be based upon probable cause. a. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances

antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.

b. Consists a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently string in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense.

c. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff: Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

d. The rule of probable cause is it needs to refer to only one specific offense as expressly provided in Rule 126, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. a. Derived from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and

therefore may not be limited, much less withdrawn by the legislature.

b. The word judge is interpreted in its generic sense and includes judges of all level.

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3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. a. Rule 126, Section 4b. The evidence offered by the complainant and his witness

should be based on their own personal knowledge and not based on mere information of belief.

c. Hearsay is not allowed. d. The affidavits, to be considered, should be drawn in such a

manner that the affiant could be charged with perjury if the allegations contained therein are found to be untrue.

4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. a. The constitution requires that the place to be searched or the

persons or things to be seized be described with such particularity as to enable the person serving the warrant to identify them.

b. The person sought to be seized should be identified by name. If the warrant is issued without a name or against any person, it is unquestionably void.

c. Thus the name John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is unknown is insufficient and illegal but it will satisfy the constitutional requirement if there is some description personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused.

Properties Subject to Seizure: Under Rule 26, Section 2, the following are subject to search and seizure:

1. Property subject of the offense2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the

offense3. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing

an offense.

Return of the goods, although illegally seized, may not be ordered by the court.

Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence

Articles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence. It is a constitutionally affirmed rule in Article III, Section 3(2) which provides that such evidence shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Warrantless Searches and Seizures:

There are instances when a search or seizure may be validly made notwithstanding noncompliance with the requisites mentioned above. The following circumstances are:

1. When a person has in fact just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence;

2. When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested committed it;

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made only within the permissible area of search, or the place within the immediate control of the person being arrested.

Chapter 11: Liberty of Abode and Travel

Caunca v Salazar: Whether or not a maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced by an employment agency, which was then detaining her,

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for her transportation from the province. The SC ruled that the petitioner’s liberty to abode and travel was sustained and her detention was declared unconstitutional.

Sec 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

Purpose: to further emphasize the individual’s liberty as safeguarded in general terms by the due process clause. It includes the following

4. right to choose one’s residence5. to leave it whenever he pleases6. to travel wherever he wills

Section 6 is a specific safeguard of these rights and is intended to underline their importance in a free society.

Limitations: According to Section 6, liberty of abode and travel can be limited upon lawful order of the court and the right to travel by the requirements of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.

Rubi v Provincial Board:

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered  by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as

appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: “With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,” was challenged.ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power,  And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in

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general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”

Villavicencio v Lukban:

Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already

out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Ruling: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person

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who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Salonga v Hermoso:

Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to compel Hermoso of the Travel Processing Center to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel to Salonga. This is not however the first time that Salonga filed such a complaint and this issue is considered moot and academic. The Soc-Gen, in his reply, has already indicated that the certificate was indeed issued and that there should be no cause of action. The issuance of the certificate is in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance – this is to avoid such similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the Court’s effort and time.

Manotoc v CA

Facts: Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house).  He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses.  Such was granted.  However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake.  6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza,

President and VP respectively.  He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities.  Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges.  He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: WON petitioner’s constitutional right to travel was violated.

Ruling: NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.  The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts. 

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel.  He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad.  He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: “The liberty of abode and of changing the same… shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court….”  According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on

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bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

Service Exporters Case

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. 

Issue: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

Ruling: “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."  As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution  does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.Right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security, public health or public order, as may be provided by law.

An order temporarily suspending the deployment of overseas workers is constitutional for having been issued in the interest of the safety of OFWs, as provided by the Labor Code. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to “afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.

Marcos v Manglapuz

Facts:The petitioner are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the

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implementation of the president’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling: Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of discretion in determining that return of former president Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to returned to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated power of the president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the president to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Chapter 12: Freedom of Religion

Religion: defined as any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc, often involving a code of ethics and a philosophy. In Aglipay v Ruiz, religion is defined as: a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.

Aglipay v Ruiz:

Facts: The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for

the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress

Ruling: No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

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The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Religion in the Constitution:

Article III, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Article II, Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Article VI, Section 28. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Article VI, Section 29. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Section XIV, Section 4 (2). No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.

Section XIV, Section 3 (3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.

Separation of Church and State:

Rationale: to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and this avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective jurisdictions.

The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.

Everson V. Board of Education: the establishment clause simply means that the state cannot setup a church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion, that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group or vice-versa.

There will be no violation of the establishment clause if:

1. The statute has a secular legislative purpose2. Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances

nor inhibits religion

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3. It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

Garces v Estenzo:

Facts: Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.

Issue: Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.

Ruling: Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a

waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

(1) Intramural Disputes: outside the jurisdiction of the secular authorities. These are questions that may be resolved by the religious authorities only. Whatever dogma that is adopted by the religious group cannot be binding to the State if it is in contravention of its valid laws.

Fonacier v CA:

Gonzales v Archbishop of Manila:

Religious Profession and Worship: two-fold: freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief.

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(1) Freedom to Believe: Religion is a matter of faith. Everyone has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on one’s Belief: Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society.

American Bible Society v Manila:

Facts: American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila

American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953

To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees under protest. American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:

a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax

b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in question. Trial Court dismissed the complaint. American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles?

Ruling: No, under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayor’s permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Society’s business is not among those enumerated. However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation. 2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:

i. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books   

ii. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but

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where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance

The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail dealer has to pay per annum. As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.

Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purseUnder Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code, Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed.

The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible Society’s free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance

Facts: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

Issue: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

Ruling: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue

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and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

The test to determine which shall prevail as between religious freedom and the powers of the Sate is the test of reasonableness.

Gerona v Secretary of Education:

Facts: Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, and recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.  As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional?

Ruling: DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

4. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid

of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

5. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

6. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in

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said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

Ebralinag v Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and DECS Department Order No. 8 which stipulated compulsory flag ceremonies in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They allege that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who

refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag. However, things took a turn for the worst. In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public schools." 43 students were subsequently expelled after refusing to sing. The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses. The petitioning students filed on account of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in violating their due process and their right to education. They alleged for the nullity of the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of petitioners from their respective schools, prohibiting respondents from further barring the petitioners from their classes, and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their respective schools. They also prayed for a TRO. On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court. The OSG commented on the defense of the expulsion orders and claimed that the flag salute was devoid of any religious significance and the State had compelling interests to expel the children.

Issue: Whether school children who are members of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private),

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for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Ruling: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right and a duty to prevent. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities. Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, assuming that such unity and

loyalty can be attained through coercion, is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all.” We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.

German v Barangan:

Facts: German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Barangan and his underlings from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacanang. And considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who was wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they

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were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacanang.

Issue: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion?

Ruling: In the case at bar, German et al are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow the German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the manner that German et al impress. Such manner impresses “clear and present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to worship.

Dissenting OpinionsJ. Fernando -  It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.J. Teehankee -  The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No

verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence.

Religious Tests

The constitutional provision against religious tests is aimed against clandestine attempts on the part of the civil government to prevent a person from exercising his civil or political rights because of his religious beliefs.

In re Summers: a person was denied admission to the bar because of his inability to take in good faith an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois which contained a provision requiring service in the militia in times of war.

People v Zosa: Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4, Article II—The state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty  of the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty, the State may call  all citizens to render military or civil service.