confronting bureaucratic capture

SPECIAL ARTICLE

september 7, 2013 vol xlviii no 36 EPW Economic & Political Weekly52

Confronting Bureaucratic CaptureRethinking Participatory Planning Methodology in Kerala

K N Harilal

I thank M A Oommen and P S Vijayshankar for their valuable remarks on an earlier draft. The errors in the paper remain my own.

K N Harilal ([email protected]) is at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

The peoples planning programme in Kerala is under

threat of a bureaucratic capture with government orders

and guidelines from above subduing the process of

participatory planning. This paper proposes overhauling

the methodology of planning from below to put the

experiment back on track. This will involve demystifying

and debureaucratising the planning process and

strengthening participatory spaces. However, the

enthusiasm for maximising participation should not be

at the expense of the right to be critical. Peoples

participation is not a substitute for expertise in

development planning. Participatory planning has to

make maximum use of the expertise within the

government and outside it without compromising on

accountability and responsiveness to the people.

In a press conference held on 3 November 2011, the mayor of Thiruvananthapuram City Corporation, K Chandrika, expressed concern over the delay in receiving the district planning committees (DPC) approval for the corporations budget proposals for the fi nancial year 2011-12. We submitted proposals for the approval of around 765 projects in August. There are just four months left in this fi nancial year, which means that we might not be able to complete many of these projects in time, she said.1 Thiruvananthapuram Corpora-tions story is not an exception; it is shared by most local gov-ernments (LGs) in Kerala. And not just in 2011-12, but in most years in the recent past. Planning generally takes six to seven months, leaving hardly fi ve to six months for implementation. LGs are rendered helpless by a highly complicated and heavily bureaucratised methodology for plan formulation and appro-val. The magnitude of resistance posed by the web of regula-tions should be obvious to any observer they run into hun-dreds of printed pages and several volumes.2

What Partha Chatterjee (1997: 82-103) has famously said about planning in India has become true of the peoples plan-ning experiment in Kerala planning as politics has given way to planning as (an) instrument of politics. According to Chatterjee, the Indian state assiduously maintains the sphere of planning as a preserve of experts, mostly economists and technocrats, keeping it far removed from political contesta-tions. Planning is projected as a sphere above politics, only to be used as an instrument of the state in furthering its twin objectives accumulation and legitimisation. In contrast, peo-ples planning was launched in 1996 with the express intent of deepening democracy by demystifying and debureaucratising planning at the local level, defi ning it as a sphere of the local people and, hence, of politics (Isaac and Franke 2000: 33-52). However, the bureaucracy appears to have overreacted to the prospect of political competition and the entry of non-experts and the uninitiated into planning by making the rule books for local plans several times more stringent and cumbersome than those at higher tiers of government.

Bureaucratic capture happens when the bureaucracy, and the regulatory apparatus it administers, drifts from its original mandate of facilitating participation to that of discouraging it. Instead of facilitating it, rules and procedures discourages par-ticipation by making it cumbersome, diffi cult, and ineffective. Instead of participatory spaces disciplining the bureaucracy, under conditions of bureaucratic capture, the bureaucracy dis-ciplines participatory spaces, and participation is reduced to

The web version of this article corrects a few errors that appeared in the print edition.

SPECIAL ARTICLE

Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 7, 2013 vol xlviii no 36 53

an exercise in legitimisation. In other words, planning degen-erates into an instrument of politics.

The positive impact of peoples planning, especially in deep-ening democracy, can hardly be exaggerated (John and Jos 2002; Heller et al 2007). But, as recent research testifi es, the Kerala experiment is deviating from its original goals (GOK 2009). Most importantly, participation has stagnated or even declined in terms of numbers as well as quality (Sudhakaran 2006). Tightening of the rule book and multiplying govern-ment orders has not helped improve the quality of local plans and projects either (GOI 2006: 101-28). If anything, the decen-tralisation has had a dampening effect on the mobilisation of local taxes (GOK 2011); the system of keeping accounts has not been made transparent (Oommen 2005; GOK 2009); it has not been able to check corruption (Widmalm 2008: 132-73); it has failed to integrate schemes across different tiers of govern-ment (Kannan 2000), and so on the list of woes could go on and on. While local plans have fared well in the service sector and triggered some notable success stories in agriculture, their overall impact on the goods-producing sector has been rather dismal (GOI 2008; Harilal 2008; Mohanakumar and Vipinku-mar 2010). What is more disappointing is the inability to envi-sion the future, which is an inalienable quality of any planning exercise. In the absence of a fi ve-year plan or an alternative vision statement, local planning has been reduced to the prep-aration and implementation of annual plans.

It is this picture of general despair that provoked us to initiate a rethinking on the methodology of peoples planning in the state. Towards this end, the research unit on local self-govern-ments at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS-RULSG) or-ganised a dialogue using multiple forums, such as workshops, online debates, focus group discussions, and interviews with people from various walks of life, including elected representa-tives, government offi cers, experts, and activists. This paper may be seen as an outcome of the brainstorming that followed.3

Before dissecting the methodology of planning, we need to interrogate the idea of peoples planning at the local level, as we attempt to do in Section 1, to generate a clear understand-ing on its potential as well as limits in making democracy more effi cient, deep, dense, and meaningful. In Section 2, we attempt a critique of the methodology of peoples planning currently in vogue, and try to unravel the bureaucratic capture of peoples planning in Kerala. The primary purpose of this paper, however, is the search for alternative methodologies, which can restore the spirit of participation. Therefore, in the critique of the existing methodology, we make an attempt to outline the broad contours of an alternative approach.4 Even though the threat of bureaucratic takeover is real, it is no rea-son to be pessimistic if the present stalemate is viewed as an important phase in the struggle for deepening democracy.5

1 Democratising Democracy

The contagion of popular uprisings that the world is witness-ing now, given their geographical spread and far-reaching implications, could be seen as a major wave of democratisa-tion. But, as the strong presence of popular movements even in

established democracies of the west suggests, the present wave of democratisation is unlikely to be satiated by the promise of electoral competition. Can the role of people in a democracy be stretched beyond producing governments? Or, to put the classic question bluntly, is it possible for the people to govern? The hegemonic theory of democratic elitism will answer the question in the negative. The elite are unlikely to welcome mass politics or the growing participation of the people for its anarchic potential. According to elitist theory, if we defi ne sov-ereignty in a broad sense as the formation and determination of the general will, it is impossible for the people to govern. The elitist theory reduces the concept of sovereignty from a process of forming the general will to a process of choosing one of the competing groups of the elite to govern.

It is important to see why the scope of peoples participation is limited to that of choosing between the elites (Schumpeter 1980: 250-73; Pateman 1970: 1-45). The fi rst argument is a Weberian one, which considers administration to be too com-plex to be handled by the people. The second argument evokes the penetration of particular interests, which makes the for-mation of rationality through public discourse diffi cult. The third one, referred to as the mass society argument, cautions against irrational pressure by the masses on the political sys-tem. It is assumed that the rule of the elites will solve the prob-lem of administrative complexity, check the undue infl uence of particular interests, and protect values not shared by the masses. In this view, the lower the level of participation, the more enduring and resilient democracy will be.

It was the introduction of the concept of the public sphere that created a much-needed break in the democratic debate. Habermas reconciles the contradiction between the increasing complexity of public administration and participation by the people by separating public administration from the public sphere (1992: 27-79). The separation of the state and the public sphere, and the conceptualisation of the latter as a space for free discussion relieves participation from the curse of admin-istrative complexity. According to Habermas, within the boundaries of the public sphere, actors can acquire only infl u-ence, not political power.

The infl uence of a public opinion generated more or less discursively in open controversies is certainly an empirical variable that can make a difference. But, public infl uence is transformed into administrative power only after it passes through the fi lters of institutionalised proce-dures of democratic- opinion and will formation and enters through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking (1996: 371).

However, representatives of the third wave of democracy, especially scholars from Latin America, who stand for more direct participation, criticise Habermas for not offering a proper connection between reason and will. According to Avritzer (2002: 50), a mechanism stronger than infl uence is required to connect the public sphere to the political system. Avritzers idea of participatory publics, built around the expe-rience of Latin American countries since the 1980s, is an attempt to innovate such a stronger connection. Participatory publics add two elements to the public sphere a public forum and accountability. A public forum provides the public sphere

SPECIAL ARTICLE


with the capacity to foster deliberation and thus increases the chances of arriving at consensus/decisions. Participatory budgeting in Brazil is a good example of participatory publics, where deliberative bodies play a role in arriving at decisions as well as in monitoring their implementation (Baiocchi 2003).

Participation and Autonomy

Participatory publics, however, do not replace administrators or experts; they represent a midway between participation and complex administration. Participatory institutions ventur-ing into running the administration are likely to be exposed to the risk of getting co-opted into the administrative hierarchy as its appendage. They will lose their autonomy and critical edge, and cease to be a part of the public sphere.6 An impor-tant point to be emphasised in the context of our critique of the Kerala experience is the need to preserve the relative auton-omy of the participatory forum so that it retains the right to dissent and criticise.

Kerala has a long and illustrious history of democratisation movements, which goes far beyond establishing electoral com-petition. The history of public action in Kerala is well docu-mented (Sen 1996; Ramachandran 1996). People have come together on umpteen occasions to put pressure on the state to not only break redundant rules and make new ones, but also to implement them without fail. In the process, they created in-stitutional arrangements that sit on the boundary of the state and public sphere (participatory publics) for ensuring respon-siveness and accountability. Democratic movements in Kerala did not resist the temptation to participate in local and regional governments for the fear of co-option. What they vowed to do instead was to combine participation and struggle (bharana-vum samaravum) so that there was immunity to co-option.7 The tension between participation in government and the need to carry on the struggle against the state has been an im-portant feature of Keralas experiments in democratic politics.

It may be noted that participation, in spite of its many vir-tues, entails some costs. It may not be the fi rst best route in all instances in terms of effi ciency. Yet, it is considered desirable for its intrinsic value it augments the quest for development as freedom (Evans 2002). The process of preference formation on public goods is as important, if not more important, as the preferences themselves. As a matter of fact, an environment of collective action and public discussion is required for people to make informed preferences.

The virtues of participation, however, do not offer valid rea-sons to downgrade representative structures of democracy or to valorise direct democracy. This note of caution is important in the context of the tendency in the literature, especially in policy circles of international development agencies, to eulo-gise local and participatory structures of democracy while denigrating representative institutions and higher tiers of gov-ernment. This will result in overburdening local participatory institutions with unrealistic expectations, while allowing higher tiers of government to shirk responsibilities. It is such eventualities that transform participatory planning from its high position as a process of politics to an instrument of politics.

We have to note the following points in this connection. First, the contradiction between participation and representa-tion is more imaginary than real; representation is unavoid-able even at lower tiers of government, and participation, as the history of public action in Kerala proves, is possible even at higher levels of government. Second, LG activities might have negative or positive externalities that might spill over into neighbouring localities (Mookherjee 2004: 5-25). All costs and benefi ts of such externalities need not always get into the deci-sion-making process of an LG, especially when the people af-fected are outsiders. In such cases, intervention from higher tiers of government may be required. Third, LGs are con-strained by the absence of scale in many of their operations (ibid: 22-23). They are also defi cient in institutional capacities to deal with issues involving scale economies. For instance, higher tiers of governments are better suited to maintain and coordinate professional groups related to public health, public works, irrigation, drinking water, and so on.

Fourth, on account of increasing external integration, many aspects of life that are apparently local are increasingly falling beyond the reach and control of LGs. In most areas of economic activity, the rules of the game are set at higher levels of gov-ernment, and, in some cases, at the level of supra-national agencies, so that LGs are rendered helpless or can only hope to make the best out of externally set games. In short, in plan-ning for local development, a global sense of place is r equired, which is constituted by economic, social, cultural, and political relations, and fl ows of commodities, information, and people that extend far beyond a locality (Giles and Stokke 2000). Any attempt to underplay the contextuality of place, ignoring national and trans national economic and political forces, will only help foist unrealistic expectations on local demo cracy, while at the same time exonerating the state and transnational power holders. Last, but not the least the ten-dency to essentialise and romanticise LG also has the danger of downplaying local social inequalities and power relations.

2 Participation: From Theory to Practice

The tension between the idea of democracy and its practice is mainly played out in the sphere of participation. The peoples planning experiment in Kerala is best seen as an episode in the larger struggle for deepening democracy, with an obvious f ocus on enhancing the space and scope for participation. Here, the larger question of democracy whether people can govern is confronted at the level of local development plan-ning. When participatory planning was launched in 1996, it did not have any model to emulate. The campaign tried to learn by doing and successfully evolved a methodology of par-ticipatory planning, which had undergone many changes over the last 15 years. Here, we attempt a critique of the methodol-ogy, focusing mainly on the version currently in vogue, an out-line of which is presented in Table 1 (p 55).8

The unjustifi ably long process of making and sanctioning local plans is the most telling evidence of a bureaucratic capture. As the data on DPC approval of LG plans in 2011-12 clearly show, even as late as in August 2011, only 34% of the

SPECIAL ARTICLE


LGs had received the DPC proceedings permitting them to start plan implementation.9 The city corporations, including Thiru-vananthapuram, were still waiting for DPC clearance. Even at this stage, there were LGs that had not yet submitted their plans to technical advisory groups (TAGs). Obviously, the time that goes into plan formulation is greater than the time available

for implementation. Data for earlier years reveal an almost s imilar pattern.

The lag in plan formulation is refl ected in the data on plan expenditure (Table 2). However, the shortfall in plan expendi-ture is particularly worrying in the case of the special compo-nent plan (SCP) and the tribal sub-plan (TSP). An equally im-portant problem related to plan expenditure is its bunching in the last quarter of the year. Table 3, which presents data on plan outlay and expenditure till the end of November 2011, is self-explanatory in this regard. While the expenditure in state government plans reached 30%, LGs were lagging behind at 17%. As the experience of previous years shows, the expendi-ture levels improve and reach respectable levels at the end of the year. In the central and state government plans, bunching of expenditure refl ects a payment problem than the actual

execution of work, whereas with LGs, the approval of plans as well as their implementation is delayed beyond half the year. Needless to say, the economic activities the planners wish to infl uence are mostly year-round ones that cannot wait till the last quarter.

In Figure 1, all the three graphs, representing month-wise expenditure of development funds of LGs for 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10, were close to fl oor level till the end of the year before exploding to touch the roof in the last few months, es-pecially in March. It is alarming that the expenditure achieved in March alone was as high as 65% of the total annual expend-iture in both 2008-09 and 2009-10. Most LGs are constrained to rush through the implementation process, lest they be blamed for forfeiting the plan grant-in-aid. This results in questionable implementation practices, quality and effi ciency defi cits, corruption, parking of funds with autonomous imple-mentation agencies, complaints from the public, and audit objections (GOK 2006).

The signs of bureaucratic capture are seen more vividly when we dissect the process of plan formulation into its com-ponent phases (Table 1). The planning process up to the TAG/DPC phase takes around four months. This is clear from the data on submission of plan documents to the TAG in 2011-12 the cumulative proportion of LGs that submitted their plan proposals was 20% up to the end of June, 76% till the end of July and 84% in August. It took two to three more months for

Table1: Stages of Planning Prescribed during Eleventh (2007-12) PlanSerial Number Phase

I Taking Stock : Detailed Review of Development

Re-constitution of working groups and sector-wise reviews by them

II Preparation for convening grama sabhas (village assemblies)

Preparatory interaction with stakeholder groups

III Grama sabha meetings

General and subject group meetings

IV Watershed planning

Introducing watershed dimension into local level planning

V Preparation of approach paper and development report

Consolidation of the outcomes of earlier phases

VI Preparation of Draft Annual Plan for the LG

Allocation of Plan funds and preparation of plan document

VII Development seminar Seminar at LG level with wide participation to discuss the draft plan

VIII Incorporating suggested changes in the annual plan Effecting changes in allocation and other parameters if suggested

IX Preparation of development projects Conversion of project ideas into project documents

X Finalisation of the Plan for DPC approval

LG council meeting for finalising the plan

XI Technical Appraisal by Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs)

Procedural and technical vetting

XII DPC approval

DPC meeting

XIII Issue of DPC proceedings Formal approval to use plan funds

XIV Plan implementation and monitoring

Source: Government Order, GO (MS)/128/2007/LSGD, 14-05-2007 (KILA 2009 d: 41).

Table 2: Plan Expenditure of Local Governments in Kerala (percentage of outlay)Type of LGs General SCP TSP Total

2001-02 2009-10 2001-02 2009-10 2001-02 2009-10 2001-02 2009-10

Grama panchayats 68.27 79.70 46.27 61.91 45.94 67.71 63.25 73.61

Block panchayats 71.90 81.70 44.74 81.08 54.50 84.48 62.21 81.65

District panchayats 54.04 71.24 38.60 69.41 51.84 74.46 48.91 70.79

Municipalities 64.46 79.50 35.54 64.98 25.00 52.85 59.80 75.29

Corporations 57.15 73.83 19.69 48.84 0.00 0.00 50.18 66.15

Total 65.84 78.40 42.59 65.56 49.57 72.72 59.93 73.85

Source: Government of Kerala, Economic Review, various years, Kerala State Planning Board.

Table 3: State and Local Plans Outlay and Expenditure 2011-12 (Rs in crore)Category Outlay Expenditure Expenditure till Expenditure till up to November November 30 November 2011 2011 (%) 2010 (%)

State PlanState plan schemes 9,435.95 3,152.15 33.00 38.00

Local governments (grant-in-aid)

Village panchayat 1,412.11 249.37 18.00 36.00

Block panchayat 333.74 83.39 25.00 36.00

District panchayat 342.64 54.54 16.00 34.00

Municipalities 306.17 43.44 14.00 36.00

Corporations 179.39 13.84 8.00 25.00

Total LGs 2,574.05 444.58 17.00 33.00

Total state plan 12,010.00 3,596.73 30.00 37.00

Figures are subject to changes and corrections.Source: Central Plan Monitoring Unit, Government of Kerala.10

Shar

e

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2007-08

S t b N b D b

Figure 1: Share of Month-wise Expenditure in Total Plan Expenditure

Source: Sulekha, Information Kerala Mission, Government of Kerala.

2008-09 2009-10

Apr

il

May

June July

Aug

ust

Sept

embe

r

Oct

ober

Nov

embe

r

Dec

embe

r

Janu

ary

Febr

uary

Mar

ch

SPECIAL ARTICLE


TAG vetting, DPC approval, and issue of DPC proceedings. That 20% of the LGs submitted their plans to the DPC before July suggests that there is scope for saving time during the initial stages. But the initial stages involving grama sabhas, develop-ment seminars, and working groups are indispensible because they have a bearing on participation. Avoidable delays occur mainly after the submission of plan proposals to TAGs. This phase has more to do with overseeing and disciplining of LGs from above than plan formulation as such. We shall come back to the TAG phase later when we discuss alternatives to the present methodology of planning.

More direct evidence of bureaucratic capture is to be seen in the government orders related to LG plans. The Kerala Insti-tute of Local Administration (KILA) has done a commendable job in putting together all the orders and circulars in fi ve vol-umes running into more than 1,200 pages. A critical reading of the text of a sample of LG orders will help us understand the phenomenon of bureaucratic capture. We take the widely discussed EMS housing programme for illustration. We found as many as 14 government orders/circulars pertaining to the programme, each one promising that further clarifi cations will follow. The language of the orders is linear, unidirectional, and clearly undemocratic. The power structure they signify is so unequal that it leaves no trace of agency to LGs, except committing their resources, including borrowed funds, for the programme. An important point of decision of the programme was the selection of benefi ciaries, which left no space whatsoever for LGs. Norms for identifying the eligible as well as the steps to pursue the norms were given from above. LGs were required to appoint verifi cation teams, and super check teams, but the constitution of the teams was specifi ed from above.

The idea that everything is best decided from above stretches far beyond what is suggested here. Formats for receiving ap-plications and preparing the list of benefi ciaries, fi ve-digit codes to be used to identify benefi ciaries, and so many other seemingly trivial things were decided and given as commands from above. What happens when such a comprehensive regime of power varies its commands too often? It is not surprising that representatives as well as offi cials at the local level found it humiliating.11 LGs were even denied the freedom that line departments usually give their fi eld offi ces.

Many Complicated Orders

It would be interesting to see why the government orders re-lated to LGs show a tendency to multiply in number and get so complicated in content. Some important factors can be easily traced. First, some of the orders were meant to demarcate areas of jurisdiction among different tiers of government, ne-cessitated by the decentralisation that was newly introduced. Second, there is an element of pedagogy in the language used and the descriptive style adopted in the orders that tend to make them uncharacteristically long and voluminous. This is obviously meant to help newly elected representatives and vol-unteers. However, it turned out to be counterproductive in many contexts. For instance, illustrations regarding procedures

were interpreted as mandatory steps to be followed in plan for-mulation. There were also instances where the audit team in-terpreted the government orders in a literal sense, overlooking the spirit of capacity building. Third, the LG orders were mech-anisms meant to communicate central and state government priorities, especially guidelines meant to prevent local elite capture, pertinent to the devolved funds. Fourth, for want of other viable mechanisms, government orders were used as in-struments for coordinating different agencies. Fifth, unlike the fi eld offi cers of departments, LGs and local people provided prompt feedback, frequently necessitating revisions and amendments. A more important reason that we wish to high-light from the point of view of a possible rethink on the meth-odology of participatory planning is the overlap between par-ticipation and administration.

As a perusal of government orders and guidelines indicate, they tend to become too rigid and complex when partici-patory institutions are entrusted with the responsibilities of public administration, especially execution of government progra mmes. In peoples planning, unlike in the participa-tory publics of Brazil, participation is not restricted to delib-eration and ensuring of accountability. On the contrary, par-ticipatory institutions are stretched beyond policymaking, prioritisation and monitoring, and entrusted with the res-ponsibilities of public administration such as preparing project documents and estimates (working groups), technical vetting and issuing technical sanction (TAG/committee system), selecting benefi ciaries (grama sabhas), and executing work (benefi ciary committees).

Once participatory institutions are incorporated into the state machinery, and entrusted with government work, it is only natural that they will be subject to the discipline of gov-ernment rules. It is also obvious that such participatory insti-tutions will be made accountable and answerable to higher-ups in the bureaucracy. In the process, participatory institu-tions may lose their right to demand accountability and be critical. Instead, they will fi nd themselves at the receiving end. The case of benefi ciary committees, which were entrusted with the job of implementing projects, such as construction of buildings, roads, and canals, help prove the point. It was diffi -cult for genuine benefi ciary committees to survive in the envi-ronment of elaborate administrative controls and commands related to execution of work and payment, let alone red tape and corruption. The system ultimately failed because fake committees far outnumbered genuine ones. Such benefi ciary committees tended to pre-empt local vigilance groups that kept a watch on the quality of work executed. The distinction between citizens, who are entitled to raise questions, and the state machinery, which is responsible for providing answers, was blurred and perhaps reversed.

The mix up of participation and administration has impor-tant consequences. First, participatory spaces lose their defi n-ing features such as autonomy and the right to be critical. Second, experts/offi cials are alienated and freed from respon-sibility. These two points, which are interrelated, can be illustrated with the example of participatory management

SPECIAL ARTICLE


in a local public health centre (PHC). The local people who participate in management cannot take over the professional responsibilities of the doctor. If they do, the doctor cannot be held responsible for their actions. At the same time, the professional expertise of the doctor need not be a barrier to making her/him responsive and accountable to the people. The example of the PHC and the doctor can be extended to a lot of other cases.

It needs to be emphasised that peoples participation is not a substitute for expertise or experience in development plan-ning. The Weber/Schumpeter argument of administrative complexity we discussed cannot be ignored. We are living in a world of increasing specialisation, and accumulation of spe-cialised knowledge and expertise in every area. A people who value democracy should evolve the art and appropriate mech-anisms to hire experts and harness knowledge without com-promising the canons of popular sovereignty. Coming to the third point, the overlap between participation and administra-tion makes fi xing responsibility and making the system accountable nearly impossible. Fourth, such an environment perpetrates corruption. The way out is to free participatory spaces from those of public administration.

Participation without Execution

Such a shift in the methodology of planning will strengthen participatory spaces as well as the system of administration. The way out for citizens is not taking over the burden of ad-ministration on their shoulders. Local people cannot take on the responsibility of constructing all buildings, bridges, and canals. Neither can they directly run the local school and the PHC. They can take part in participatory spaces to ensure that their priorities are properly articulated, respected, and imple-mented in the most appropriate manner. Citizens and partici-patory spaces will continue to partake in imagining future development, identifying development needs and problems, reviewing past interventions, deliberating alternative solu-tions, making public opinion on prioritisation, and above all demanding responsiveness and accountability. If the state machinery does not respond, the people will have no option but to further strengthen participation. They can also resort to other forms of collective action.

Such activities of the local people and participatory institu-tions need not be constrained by annual plan cycles. Develop-ment planning is a continuous process. People and partici-patory bodies have the right to imagine the future of the re-gion, consult experts, revisit and revise their vision, make de-velopment perspectives, and make model development pro-grammes and projects. In grama sabhas and working groups convened as part of the annual plan cycle, they can insist on and help in translating public opinion into detailed project documents and development plans. Such activism of the peo-ple need not result in any dilution of the responsibility of the administrative agency/offi cial concerned; it will need to be re-sponsive as well as accountable to the preferences expressed by the partici patory institutions. Its prime responsibility will be to develop viable and technologically sound project

proposals, and own and implement them, besides being trans-parent and answer able to the people. The administrative hier-archy should also ensure that project proposals are vetted and issued technical sanction, alongside owning up responsibility of the technical sanction.

Even though there will be teething troubles, once such administrative practices are in place, it will free the participa-tory spaces from the tyranny of government rules and regula-tions, besides saving time.12 This can be illustrated by going back to the DPC/TAG phase of the planning cycle, which we re-ferred to as the disciplining phase that accounts for more than two months of the long planning process. A cursory compari-son of LG plans with the state plan will help clarify the point. The line departments are supposed to submit their plan pro-posals for the coming year to the state planning board around September to November every year. After consultations at var-ious levels, the state plan is fi nalised by the cabinet and pre-sented to the legislative assembly, along with the annual budget, in March. The departments can start implementing programmes right from the start of the fi nancial year, as and when they are given administrative and technical sanction. In the state plan, detailed administrative and technical vetting of individual projects and the issue of technical sanction are sep-arated from the process of plan formulation and approval. These are seen as tasks related to implementation. The plan is not withheld for want of technical clearance for any particular project, however important it is. In the case of LG plans, it is the opposite administrative and technical vetting of projects precedes implementation.

The TAG/DPC phase is expected to ensure that local plans fulfi l two important requirements. First, that the LGs follow the prescribed norms and procedures in making the local plans, and second, that the projects are technically sound and viable. The fi rst task at the DPC level is unavoidable for ensur-ing horizontal and vertical integration of development plans, which might assume more importance once district plans are a reality. But the responsibility of ensuring technical soundness of projects is best left to experts and the administrative ma-chinery.13 Moreover, following the model of the state plan, de-tailed technical vetting can be shifted to the implementation stage. Finalisation of the plan does not have to wait till the last project is given technical clearance. It would save two to three months in the plan cycle because implementation can com-mence as soon as the plan is approved. Technically complex projects may take more time to begin but they will not hold back implementation of other projects, for which technical sanction may be given quickly.

This change might make it possible to complete the entire process of plan formulation before the beginning of the plan year. Bunching of implementation activities in the last quarter means LGs are in no position to go through the processes of plan formulation, such as convening grama sabhas, before the beginning of the new plan year. Once plan implementation is more evenly spread out, LGs can go by the pattern followed by the state and central governments and prepare the plan in advance. If done in this manner, LG plans can be integrated

SPECIAL ARTICLE


with LG budgets and presented in March, which incidentally has been a long-pending suggestion for improving local governance in the state.

Plan Formulation and Limits of Decentralisation

While LGs perform relatively well in the infrastructure and service sectors, their track record in the goods-producing sec-tor, especially industrial activities, is rather weak. They have not been particularly successful in creating sustainable liveli-hood opportunities (GOI 2006, 2008). It is not that LGs have not made an effort they are bound to pay special attention to the productive sector because of stringent state government guidelines on minimum allocation of plan funds to the produc-tive sector. But, as the fact that the government had to impose such a condition shows, and as LG leaders harp on in most meetings, they are at a disadvantage in the productive sector.

The microenterprises supported by LGs are characterised by poor survival rates. In this area, it is diffi cult to locate model LGs or enduring individual units. The collapse of the Mancheri model that came up during the Ninth Plan period, which was widely hailed for its positive features, and the poor track record of LGs in general convey important lessons on the limits of decentralisation. In the case of industrial activities, the infl uence of structural factors such as scale economies is much more pervasive and all the more challenging when it comes to organising support for producers. Many complementary activi-ties such as organising marketing networks, infrastructure development, credit, research and development support, or

brand-name development are beyond the reach of lower tiers of government. Higher tiers of government are better posi-tioned to take up such roles to help LGs successfully intervene in the productive sector. In the absence of such support, it is not realistic to expect many success stories from the petty commodity producers that LGs endeavour to support.

Local planners can, however, imbibe valuable lessons from their experience, which is marked by success as well as high failure rates. Green patches are seen in areas least affected by structural factors such as scale economies, advertisement intensity, or brand-name loyalty. Farming and dairy, for instance, have a high number of success stories. Admittedly, even such sectors suffer from structural issues such as scale, although on a less intensive level. Development interventions in such areas succeed when producers are extended organised support to overcome structural barriers. The support extended by the Kudumbashree Mission to womens neighbourhood groups, the Vegetable and Fruit Promotion Council of Kerala (VFPCK) to vegetable farmers, and the state-level paddy pro-curement programme to paddy growers is worth mentioning. The way out is to improve the methodology of planning, per-haps with the help of district plans, to have sustained inter-tier cooperation and coordination.

Further, LG intervention, especially the package of assist-ance extended to producers, is typically confi ned to the below the poverty line (BPL) category. This is widely reported as a factor constraining LG intervention in the productive sector because the benefi ciary units more often than not lack

Decentralisation and Local GovernmentsEdited by

T R RAGHUNANDAN

The idea of devolving power to local governments was part of the larger political debate during the Indian national movement. With strong advocates for it, like Gandhi, it resulted in constitutional changes and policy decisions in the decades following Independence, to make governance more accountable to and accessible for the common man.

The introduction discusses the milestones in the evolution of local governments post-Independence, while providing an overview of the panchayat system, its evolution and its powers under the British, and the stand of various leaders of the Indian national movement on decentralisation.

This volume discusses the constitutional amendments that gave autonomy to institutions of local governance, both rural and urban, along with the various facets of establishing and strengthening these local self-governments.

Authors:

V M Sirsikar Nirmal Mukarji C H Hanumantha Rao B K Chandrashekar Norma Alvares Poornima Vyasulu, Vinod Vyasulu Niraja Gopal Jayal Mani Shankar Aiyar Benjamin Powis Amitabh Behar, Yamini Aiyar Pranab Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee Amitabh Behar Ahalya S Bhat, Suman Kolhar, Aarathi Chellappa, H Anand Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo Nirmala Buch Ramesh Ramanathan M A Oommen Indira Rajaraman, Darshy Sinha Stphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal M Govinda Rao, U A Vasanth Rao Mary E John Pratap Ranjan Jena, Manish Gupta Pranab Bardhan, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Abhirup Sarkar M A Oommen J Devika, Binitha V Thampi

Pp xii + 432 ISBN 978-81-250-4883-1 2012 Rs 695

Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltdwww.orientblackswan.com

Mumbai Chennai New Delhi Kolkata Bangalore Bhubaneshwar Ernakulam Guwahati Jaipur Lucknow Patna Chandigarh Hyderabad Contact: [email protected]

SPECIAL ARTICLE


minimum viability scale. LG plans should perhaps have a broader scope than typical anti-poverty programmes. In priority areas such as food security, the defi nition of benefi ci-aries could be broad based to include producers who can at-tain minimum viability conditions. This, in general, should be the approach to economic activities with benign externalities, such as conservation of paddy land, protection of sacred groves, or a private project proposing to use solid waste to produce energy.

It is quite unusual for governments, at any level for that mat-ter, to complain about excess supply of resources. But such complaints are common among LGs, especially in the area of the SCP and TSP. There are instances of LGs such as the Kozhikode Corporation surrendering TSP funds back to the state government. The problems discussed in the context of LG intervention in agriculture and industrial activities are more severe in the case of the SCP and TSP. Landlessness or inade-quate possession of land makes agriculture and allied activi-ties unviable for many SCP and TSP benefi ciaries. In industrial activities, the general limitations are also applicable to the SCP and TSP. This issue assumes added importance because LGs are penalised for expenditure shortfalls in the SCP and TSP by cut-ting down their general purpose funds. Such shortfalls and compensation from general purpose funds leave many LGs with very limited space to plan projects in the general seg-ment. In our opinion, the root cause of the problem is the struc-tural constraints that limit the capacity of lower tiers of gov-ernment to formulate viable SCP and TSP projects. Such struc-tural barriers are best addressed at higher levels of govern-ment. Therefore, the state government should either scale down the proportion of SCP and TSP funds earmarked for LGs, or come up with an effective support mechanism to make their projects sustainable.

Conclusions

An assessment of the methodology of participatory planning cannot ignore the system that existed before its introduction. Almost everything related to development administration that comes up for decision in participatory planning now was ear-lier decided by line department bureaucracies, that too through non-transparent processes. Local governance was eventless and noise free. That it has suddenly become a contested terrain, embedded in debates and collective action, is a sign of successful democratisation. The experiment no doubt has resulted in commendable expansion of the democratic space, in terms of electoral competition as well as more direct ave-nues of participation. Nonetheless, signs of participation fati-gue and bureaucratic capture are too obvious to be ignored.

There are objective limits to decentralisation that constrain LGs in their efforts to live up to the expectation of the people. This comes out quite sharply in the case of their inability to create livelihood opportunities for the people, especially in the goods-producing sector because of structural reasons. The dis-tribution of powers and responsibilities across different tiers of government, and the methodology of planning, ought to be made more sensitive to the limits faced by the lower tiers. In

many areas of their activity, especially in the case of livelihood support programmes, LGs cannot do well without appropriate support from higher tiers of government. This is particularly true in the case of the SCP and TSP. The methodology of plan-ning, therefore, should ensure better inter-tier cooperation and coordination.

The more important challenge is bureaucratic capture that bogs down participatory institutions and LGs with innumerable rules, regulations, and procedures. The present bureaucracy-infested methodology of planning that delays implementation till the last quarter of the year cannot be sustained. Though there are many reasons for the proliferation of restrictive rules and excessive disciplining from above, the overlap between participatory spaces and public administration stands out. The regulations tend to multiply and become more restrictive when participatory institutions stray into the realm of public administration. The way out is to have a clear dividing line between participation and public administration. Such a divi-sion will only help the cause of democratisation. It will help participatory institutions retain their autonomy and right to be critical, which are important in making LGs responsive and accountable to the people.

Citizens and participatory spaces will continue to partake in imagining future development, identifying development needs and problems, deliberating on alternative solutions, helping formulate projects, forming public opinion on prioriti-sation, reviewing development intervention by different tiers of government, and above all demanding responsiveness and accountability. In other words, participation can be extended well beyond the production of governments. But participatory institutions will not take over public administration or replace experts/administrative agencies.

The dividing line between participation and administration will also help address the problem of alienation of experts and make the system more accountable. The criticism of adminis-trative complexity cannot be set aside easily. Instead of replac-ing experts and absolving them of responsibilities, participa-tory planning should strive to make the maximum use of ex-pertise within the government as well as outside without com-promising on the principles of accountability and responsive-ness to the people. A people who value democracy should evolve the art and appropriate mechanisms to hire experts and harness knowledge without compromising on the canons of popular sovereignty.

Notes

1 The press conference was covered by most newspapers the next day. The City Corporation and many other LGs later requested the government to extend the period of implementation by three months. The crisis on ac-count of delays has worsened in 2012-13.

2 The Kerala Institute of Local Administration (KILA 2009a, b, c, d, and e) has compiled all relevant government orders and circulars pertaining to decentralisation in the state till then.

3 We organised two state-level workshops and several village-level meet-ings, apart from interviews with several key informants. We have also ben-efi ted from an online discussion ([email protected]). We are thankful to the participants for their valuable suggestions.

4 For a detailed presentation of the alternative methodology, see Harilal (2012).

5 It would be nave to assume that the state, especially since its neo-liberal

SPECIAL ARTICLE


turn, will tolerate signifi cant progress towards democratisation. As Chatterjee (1997) has shown, it will evolve strategies to overcome such challenges to accumulation. But, it is equally nave to imagine that the war for de-mocracy will be so easily lost, particularly in a region such as Kerala, known for the its rich history of democratisation movements. For a relevant critique of Chatterjees arguments, see Mannathukkaran (2010).

6 Avritzer (2002: 51-53) speaks about the dan-gers of confl ating deliberative decision-making with public administration. He also emphasis-es the need to protect the autonomy and inter-nal complexity of the administrative realm.

7 Bharanavum samaravum can be translated as ruling and struggling. This was the strategy employed by the left in Kerala. The communist party used to mobilise people against the government even when it led the state government.

8 Important features of the methodology prac-tised during the Eleventh Plan period, which we analyse in the paper, are available in a gov-ernment order, GO (MS)/128/2007/LSGD, dat-ed 14 May 2007. Notably, the state government has recently introduced some changes for the Twelfth Plan period. An account of the meth-odology used during the initial years (Ninth Plan) is in Isaac and Harilal (1997).

9 The data on submission and approval of LG plans used in this study were collected from the local self-government department, Govern-ment of Kerala.

10 Data on plan expenditure are not published. The CPMU prepares reports (unpublished) to facilitate reviews within the government. Our source is CPMU review reports.

11 What embarrassed them the most was frequent changes in the list of benefi ciaries because of changes in the norms. They found it very diffi -cult to explain such changes to people and con-vince them.

12 This is the practice in the state government. But such a shift at the LG level presupposes pre-paratory changes such as a reduction in the number of projects, strengthening of the local administrative set-up, better coordination with line departments, and so on.

13 Absence of role clarity has affected the quality of LG projects. But, as the experience so far proves, TAG vetting is unlikely to improve the quality of projects. It is diffi cult for TAGs to verify thousands of projects that reach the DPC in time. Over time, therefore, TAG vetting has become a ritual.

References

Avritzer, Leonardo (2002): Democracy and the Pub-lic Space in Latin America (Oxford: Princeton University Press).

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo (2003): Participation, Activ-ism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment in Archon Fung and Erich Olin Wright (ed.), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, Real Utopias Project IV (New York: Verso), pp 45-76.

Chatterjee, Partha (1997): Development Planning and the Indian State in Byres J Terence (ed.), The State, Development Planning and Liberali-sation in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 82-103.

Evans, Peter (2002): Collective Capabilities, Cul-ture, and Amartya Sens Development as Freedom, Studies in Comparative Internation-al Development, 37 (2), pp 54-60.

Giles, Mohan and Kristian Stokke (2000): Partici-patory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism, Third World Quarterly, 21 (2), pp 247-68.

GOI (Government of India) (2006): Evaluation Re-port on Decentralised Experience of Kerala, Programme Evaluation Organisation, Report 195, Planning Commission, New Delhi.

(2008): Kerala Development Report, Planning Commission (New Delhi: Academic Founda-tion), pp 443-458.

GOK (Government of Kerala) (2006): Ten Years of Panchayati Raj in Kerala: A Rapid Assessment Study, Kerala State Planning Board, Thiru-vananthapuram.

(2009): Report of the Committee for Evalua-tion of Decentralised Planning and Develop-ment, Kerala Institute of Local Administra-tion, Thrissur.

(2011): Report of the Fourth Finance Commis-sion: Part I, Government of Kerala, Thiru-vananthapuram.

(various years): Economic Review, Kerala State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram.

Habermas, Jurgen (1992): The Structural Transfor-mation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: Polity Press).

(1996): Between Facts and Norms: Contribu-tions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democ-racy (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Harilal, K N (2008): Redesigning Local Govern-ance in India: Lessons from the Kerala Experi-ment, in Saito Fumihiko (ed.), Foundations for Local Governance: Decentralisation in Compar-ative Perspective (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag), pp 75-92.

(2012): Participatory Planning as an Instru-ment of Politics? Rethinking the Methodology of Local Level Participatory Planning in Kera-la, RULSG Occasional Papers 2012: 1, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Heller, Patrick, K N Harilal and Shubham Chaud-huri (2007): Building Local Democracy: Eval-uating the Impact of Decentralisation in Kera-la, India, World Development, 35 (4), pp 626-48.

Issac, Thomas T M and K N Harilal (1997): Plan-ning for Empowerment: Peoples Campaign for Decentralised Planning in Kerala, Economic & Political Weekly, 32 (1-2).

Issac, Thomas T M and R W Franke (2000): Local Democracy and Development: Peoples Cam-paign for Decentralised Planning in Kerala (New Delhi: Leftward).

John, M S and Jos Chathukulam (2002): Building Social Capital through State Initiative: Partici-patory Planning in Kerala, Economic & Politi-cal Weekly, 37 (20).

Kannan, K P (2000): Peoples Planning, Keralas Dilemma, Seminar, 485, January, pp 92-97.

Kerala Institute of Local Administration (2009a, b, c, d and e): Decentralisation of Power: Gov-ernment Orders and Circulars, Kerala Insti-tute of Local Administration, Thrissur.

Mannathukkaran, Nissim (2010): The Poverty of Political Society: Partha Chatterjee and Peo-ples Campaign in Kerala, India, Third World Quarterly, 31 (2), pp 295-314.

Mohanakumar, S and Vipinkumar (2010): The Limits to Agricultural Development under De-centralised Governance in Globalised Market: A Case of Kerala, Working Paper 156, Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur.

Mookherjee, Dilip (2004): The Crisis in Govern-ment Accountability: Essays in Governance Re-forms and Indias Economic Performance (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Oommen, M A (2005): Twelfth Finance Commi-ssion and Local Bodies, Economic & Political Weekly, 40 (20).

Pateman, Carole (1970): Participation and Demo-cratic Theory (London: Cambridge University Press).

Ramachandran, V K (1996): On Keralas Develop-ment Achievements in Jean Dreze and Am-artya Sen (ed), Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 205-356.

Sen, Amartya (1996): Radical Needs and Moder-ate Reforms in Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen (ed.), Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp 1-32.

Schumpeter, Joseph A (1980): Capitalism Socialism and Democracy (New Delhi: S Chand).

Sudhakaran, M N (2006): Peoples Campaign for Planning in Kerala: A Study of the Participa-tory Methodology of Planning and Implemen-tation, PhD thesis, Mahatma Gandhi University.

Sulekha: Information Kerala Mission, Government of Kerala, available at www.plan.lsgkerala.gov.in viewed on 9 April 2012.

Widmalm, Sten (2008): Decentralisation, Corrup-tion and Social Capital: From India to the West (Los Angeles: Sage).

EPW 5-Year CD-ROM 2004-08 on a Single DiskThe digital versions of Economic and Political Weekly for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 are now available on a single disk. The CD-ROM contains the complete text of 261 issues published from 2004 to 2008 and comes equipped with a powerful search, tools to help organise research and utilities to make your browsing experience productive. The contents of the CD-ROM are organised as in the print edition, with articles laid out in individual sections in each issue.

With its easy-to-use features, the CD-ROM will be a convenient resource for social scientists, researchers and executives in government and non-government organisations, social and political activists, students, corporate and public sector executives and journalists.

Price for 5 year CD-ROM (in INDIA) Individuals - Rs 1500 Institutions - Rs 2500

To order the CD-ROM send a bank draft payable at Mumbai in favour of Economic and Political Weekly.

Any queries please email: [email protected]

Circulation Manager, Economic and Political Weekly

320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013, India

/ColorImageDict > /JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict > /JPEG2000ColorImageDict > /AntiAliasGrayImages false /CropGrayImages true /GrayImageMinResolution 300 /GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleGrayImages true /GrayImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /GrayImageResolution 300 /GrayImageDepth -1 /GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2 /GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeGrayImages true /GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterGrayImages true /GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /GrayACSImageDict > /GrayImageDict > /JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict > /JPEG2000GrayImageDict > /AntiAliasMonoImages false /CropMonoImages true /MonoImageMinResolution 1200 /MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleMonoImages true /MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic /MonoImageResolution 1200 /MonoImageDepth -1 /MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeMonoImages true /MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode /MonoImageDict > /AllowPSXObjects false /CheckCompliance [ /None ] /PDFX1aCheck false /PDFX3Check false /PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false /PDFXNoTrimBoxError true /PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true /PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfile () /PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier () /PDFXOutputCondition () /PDFXRegistryName () /PDFXTrapped /False

/CreateJDFFile false /Description > /Namespace [ (Adobe) (Common) (1.0) ] /OtherNamespaces [ > /FormElements false /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles false /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /LeaveUntagged /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ]>> setdistillerparams> setpagedevice

confronting bureaucratic capture

Documents