conflicts and commitment obligations

North American Philosophical Publications

Conflicts and Commitment ObligationsAuthor(s): D. W. HaslettSource: Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 345-362Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40441391 .

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CONFLICTS AND COMMITMENT OBLIGATIONS

Public Affairs Quarterly Volume 18, Number 4, October 2004

D. W. Haslett

I. Introduction

Debt: Alan borrowed $1 ,000 from Bertha on the understanding that he would pay her back by today, for otherwise she will be unable to go on her long-awaited ski- ing trip with her friends. But the only way he can pay her back today is to steal the money from Rollo Rich, a billionaire, which Alan is confident he can do without being caught. Thus Alan is faced with a conflict between these two obligations: (1) the obligation not to take what does not belong to him, and (2) the obligation to pay his debts on time.

of these two obligations should be given priority does not appear to be a difficult question. Surely Alan should give priority to the obligation

not to take what does not belong to him. The difficult question, the question to be investigated here, is why, exactly, it should be given priority.

Consider two additional conflict cases.

Transplant: Dr. Addison has five patients, all of whom will die unless they receive an organ transplant. But the only way in which she can get the organs she needs in time is by killing Bebop, a healthy young man visiting a friend at the hospital, and transplanting his organs into them. Thus Dr. Addison is faced with a conflict between these two obligations: (1) the obligation not to murder, and (2) the obligation to do what is best, medically, for her patients.

CD Player: Ford Motor Company has agreed to place a huge order with Ace Audio for Ace's latest model of car CD player, provided that Ace's tests show this CD player to have a bump tolerance of at least 1 10 bonics, ten bonics more than sufficient for almost all driving conditions. Unfortunately, the tests show it to be three bonics short, and Ace desperately needs this huge order to stave off bankruptcy. The only way that Alden, the employee responsible for getting this order for Ace, can still get it is by falsifying the test results, a deception he is certain will not be detected. Thus Alden is faced with a conflict between these two obligations: ( 1 ) the obligation not to deceive, and (2) the obligation to fulfill his job responsibilities.

345



346 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY

In each of these three cases, the obligation that will probably result in the most overall well-being if given priority is obligation (2). In Debt, $1,000 is probably far more important to Bertha than to the billionaire, Rich. In Transplant, the continuation of five lives will probably result in more overall well-being than the continuation of just one life. And in CD Player, saving the jobs of Ace's employees and protecting the investments of its shareholders by staving off bankruptcy is probably more important than these three extra bonics of bump tolerance. Yet even though, in each case, it probably results in the most overall well-being to

give priority to obligation (2), commonsense morality tells us that, in each case, priority must nevertheless be given to obligation (1). Let us refer to the dominant

obligations in these cases - the ones that, according to commonsense morality, should be given priority - as the "group 1" obligations. They are the obligation not to steal, the obligation not to murder, and the obligation not to deceive. And let us refer to the subordinate obligations - the obligation to pay one's debts, the

obligation of physicians to do what is best for their patients, and the obligation of employees to fulfill job their responsibilities - as the "group 2" obligations.

An individual, A, is faced with conflicting moral obligations if and only if A must do either X or not X, and doing either one constitutes, or necessitates, the violation of a moral obligation. This definition of conflicting obligations may, however, give rise to a paradox of sorts. When, through no fault of our own, we are faced with what would appear to be conflicting moral obligations, it may well be that if we choose the morally right alternative, then we cannot be said to have done anything wrong, which in turn may mean that we therefore violate no obligation. And if so, then a conflict of obligations as defined above would, strictly speaking, be impossible, since the morally right alternative would not constitute, or necessitate, the violation of a moral obligation. So let it be under- stood throughout this discussion that, whenever we speak of conflicting moral obligations, what is meant is either conflicting moral obligations, or what would be conflicting moral obligations except for the fact that the morally correct choice allows one to avoid violating any obligation. Moreover, to avoid begging any questions, we shall assume that moral obligations have no exceptions already built into them that are for the sole purpose of preventing what otherwise would be conflicting moral obligations; call them "dedicated conflict-resolving" exceptions. Thus, for example, we shall assume that the obligation of employees to fulfill their job responsibilities does not have an exception already built into it solely for preventing conflicts with the obligation not to deceive. We shall not, however, assume the absence of all exceptions to moral obligations, just dedicated conflict-resolving exceptions. Accordingly, we shall not assume the absence of exceptions such as the one for self-defense, and the one, discussed in section VI, for preventing serious harm. Both of these exceptions can, at times, prevent what otherwise would be conflicting moral obligations. But since they also apply to cases in which there would not otherwise be conflicting moral obligations, they do not qualify as dedicated conflict-resolving exceptions.



CONFLICTS AND COMMITMENT OBLIGATIONS 347

The morality of conflicting obligations is, roughly, as follows. A person faced with conflicting moral obligations would be blameworthy if he had deliberately created the conflict in the first place. Say that, on the day before Alan's debt to Bertha was due, he had spent his last thousand dollars on a stereo system for himself, thereby knowingly creating the conflict. He would then be just as blameworthy as he would have been if he had still had the money to pay Bertha back on time (and thus there was no conflict), but he simply refused to do so. On the other hand, if a person is faced with conflicting obligations through absolutely no fault of his own then, assuming he gives priority to the right obligation, he avoids blameworthiness altogether. So in Debt, for example, assuming that the conflict of obligations arose through not fault of Alan's, he avoids blameworthiness altogether by correctly giving the obligation not to steal priority over the obligation to pay his debts. But he remains obligated to pay the debt as soon as he can. Finally, if a person faced with conflicting obligations gives priority to the wrong obligation, then he will be blameworthy for having violated the obligation which did not get priority, perhaps even as blameworthy as he would have been had he violated it in the absence of any conflict. In Debt, for example, if, by stealing Rich's money to pay Bertha back on time, Alan thereby wrongly gives the obligation to pay his debts priority, he will be blameworthy for having violated the obligation not to steal. Morality requires that he instead give the obligation not to steal priority. But why? And, in our three test cases, what, if anything, do the group 1 obligations, the ones with priority, have in common that distinguishes them from the group 2 obligations, the ones that do not have priority?

II. Misleading Distinctions

An answer to the question about what distinguishes the group 1 obligations from the group 2 obligations might go something like this. The group 1 obligations are ones that require us not to make some sort of harm occur, while the group 2 obligations are ones that require us not to allow some sort of harm to occur. So the crucial distinction is between making and allowing. This answer works best in the case of Transplant. Here the group 1 obligation, the obligation not to murder, requires Dr. Addison not to make Bebop die, while the group 2 obligation, the obligation to do what is best for her patients, requires Dr. Addison not to allow her five patients to die. It is less clear, however, that this answer would work in the cases of Debt and CD Player.

Moreover, answering this question in terms of the making / allowing distinction faces still another problem, that of clarifying this distinction. Let us look, briefly, at one attempt at clarification - namely, Jonathan Bennett's influential attempt at clarifying the distinction between making some result, or upshot, U, happen, and allowing it to happen.1 The difference, he says, is that, in the case of making U happen at time i, there are relatively few alternative movements that the agent could have made that would have resulted in U at t, while in the case




of allowing U to happen at time t, there are relatively many alternative movements that the agent could have made that would have resulted in U at t. If, for example, Dr. Addison makes Bebop die at t by a lethal injection in his arm, there are relatively few alternative movements that she could have made that would have had this same upshot. But if, by reading a book rather than saving the five patients in need of a transplant, Dr. Addison allows the five patients to die at i, there are many alternative movements she could have made that would have had this same upshot; she could instead have taken a walk, shopped, clipped her toenails, and so on, and on, and on.

There are criticisms of Bennett's analysis.2 But let us not pursue these criticisms here since, even if his analysis does indeed prove successful, and even if, in terms of it, we can answer the question about the difference between the group 1 and the group 2 obligations, we are then faced with the most important question yet, the question of justification. How, by making use of this distinction, can the priority of the group 1 obligations be shown to be justified? Why, in other words, should the making / allowing distinction have any moral significance? Bennett himself concludes that, once this distinction has been clarified, we can see that it does not in fact have any moral significance. As Bennett puts it, this distinction

obviously has no moral significance: if someone moves in a way that causes or makes probable some bad upshot, nobody would think that the moral status of his conduct depends on how many other movements by him would have done the same.3

If Bennett is correct about this distinction having no moral significance, then perhaps commonsense morality is simply wrong about not making Bebop die having priority over not allowing the five patients to die. It would not be the first time that a feature of commonsense morality had been shown to be without justification. But moral intuitions about which obligation has priority in cases like this are so strong and widely held that for them to be without justification is unlikely. Let us not, therefore, try to distinguish between the group 1 and the group 2 obligations by recourse to the distinction between making and allowing. And, for similar reasons, let us not try to do so by recourse to the other, closely related distinctions commonly found in the literature, those between harming and failing to benefit, killing and letting die, acts and omissions, and negative and positive obligations. Trying to distinguish between the group 1 and the group 2 obligations by recourse to any of these distinctions probably serves only to conceal the real reasons for the priority of the group 1 obligations. To understand the real reasons, we must, it is argued here, distinguish between them in a different way altogether - a way to which we shall now turn.




III. Commitment and Noncommitment Moral Obligations

Let us distinguish between the group 1 and the group 2 obligations in terms of the distinction between commitment and noncommitment obligations. Commit- ment obligations delineate that, and only that, which, in a particular case, we are morally obligated to do, or not do, as the result of a commitment we have made. The paradigm case of a commitment obligation is being morally obligated by a promise we have made. Not every commitment we make gives rise to a promise, only ones we make to others by certain social conventions, such as conventional uses of the word "promise" or the equivalent. Most commitment obligations obligate us to do, rather than not do, something, but not all. For example, if John promises Mary not to crash Mary's party, then crashing Mary's party is something John is thereby obligated not to do. Although our obligation to keep our promises may be the paradigm case of a commitment obligation, morality recognizes many other types of commitment obligations. For example, the obligation to pay our debts and the obligation to adhere to our contracts are both commitment obligations. And commitment obligations include the many so-called role or relationship obligations found in morality, such as the obligation of physicians to do what is best, medically, for their patients, the obligation of lawyers to provide the legal representation sought by their clients, and, in general, the obligation of employees to fulfill their job responsibilities. If, however, we interpret "promise" broadly enough, most commitment obligations may be seen as variations of a basic obligation to do what we have, explicitly or implicitly, promised to do. Debtors may be seen as having promised to pay their debts, parties to a contract may be seen as having promised to fulfill its terms, physicians may be seen as having promised to do what is best, medically, for their patients, and so on.

But at least one important commitment obligation cannot normally be inter- preted as an obligation to keep a promise: namely, the obligation to take care of one's children. In some cases, such as in adopting a child or becoming a foster parent, the commitment that obligates one to take care of a child is indeed made in a standard, promise-like fashion. In most cases, however, it would be stretch- ing the concept of a promise beyond recognition to interpret this commitment as resulting from a promise. Contrary to how promises are normally made - that is, by certain communicative behavior - this commitment is normally made by becoming pregnant or impregnating, behavior that, according to social conventions, creates the presumption of a commitment to the future child. The parties to a pregnancy, if they do not desire to be thus committed, may then rebut this presumption. Until the fetus is a person with a right to life, the presumption may be rebutted by having an abortion; thereafter, it may be rebutted by, say, giving the child up for adoption or to foster care. So, although the pregnancy that gives rise to the presumption may not be voluntary, the commitment that results nevertheless is voluntary since this presumption is rebuttable.




Afoncommitment obligations, on the other hand, include all moral obligations that are not commitment obligations. As such, they include the obligation not to murder, the obligation not to rape, the obligation not to cheat, the obligation not to steal, the obligation not to use physical force upon another without permission, the obligation not to deceive, and so on. One difference between noncommitment and commitment obligations appears to be something like this. Distinct, concrete acts that a noncommitment obligation prohibits or requires can always be specified. For example, the noncommitment obligation not to murder prohibits, along with innumerable other distinct acts that we can specify, the act of shooting the President of the United States through the heart during this year's State of the Union address. With a commitment obligation, on the other hand, distinct acts that it prohibits or requires cannot be specified prior to a binding commitment. We cannot, for example, specify any distinct, concrete acts that the obligation to keep our promises requires or prohibits that we do prior to our committing ourselves to keep a promise.

Although the obligation not to murder perhaps can, at times, involve a commitment, it nevertheless is a noncommitment obligation. Say that, because Amelia has grown tired of hearing her baby, Beatitude, cry, she deliberately lets Beatitude starve to death. This would commonly be classified as murder. If, by not offering to feed it, Amelia were to let some stranger's baby starve, a baby to whom she had made no commitment, her letting it starve would not count as murder. Her

letting a baby starve counts as murder only if it is one to whom she has made a commitment obligating her to care for it. Thus the obligation not to murder

appears to delineate at least one thing - namely, letting Beatitude starve - that Amelia is obligated not to do as a result of a commitment. But those things that the obligation not to murder obligates Amelia not to do include many things other than just things that she is obligated not to do as a result of a commitment. It also obligates her not to kill Beatitude, or anyone else, by shooting, stabbing, or

strangling, and the like, all of which are things that the obligation not to murder obligates her not to do independently of any commitments she may have made. Since it is therefore false that the obligation not to murder delineates only things that we are obligated to do, or not do, as a result of a voluntary commitment, it does not qualify as a "commitment" obligation as the term is being used here. By letting Beatitude starve to death, Amelia violates two obligations, her commitment obligation to care for Beatitude, and her noncommitment obligation not to murder. Alternatively and more clearly, letting a child die to whom one has an obligation of care could be classified not as murder, but simply as an enormously serious violation of this commitment obligation, a violation serious enough to warrant punishment as severe as that for murder.



CONFLICTS AND COMMITMENT OBLIGATIONS 35 1

IV. Why Noncommitment Obligations Should Have Priority

Returning now to our three test cases, why, in each of these cases, does the group 1 obligation have priority over the group 2 obligation? This can be explained, so it is argued here, by the fact that each of the group 2 obligations is a commitment obligation, each of the group 1 obligations is a noncommitment obligation, and morality gives noncommitment obligations priority over commitment obligations. There is not just a single reason for their having priority, but several reasons, each based upon generalizations that do not hold in all cases, but in most. Although none of these reasons may be sufficient justification by itself, taken together they justify a priority rule of morality prescribing that noncommitment obligations always be given priority - that is, always except, perhaps, in just one kind of case to be examined below (section VII). What then are these reasons?

To begin with, imagine what it would be like if, rather than a rule of morality giving noncommitment obligations priority, we adhered instead to a rule giving commitment obligations priority; call it the "inverted" priority rule. According to the inverted priority rule, if, in Debt, Alan cannot meet his commitment obligation to pay Bertha back on time without violating the noncommitment obligation not to steal, then, morally speaking, Alan must steal the money. And if, in Transplant, Dr. Addison cannot meet her commitment obligation to do what is best for her five dying patients without violating the noncommitment obligation not to kill an innocent person, then, morally speaking, she must kill an innocent person. So with the inverted priority rule we might, at any time, be required by morality to do such things as murder and steal. To be more exact, we might, at any time, be required by morality to do things that, absent the inverted priority rule, would count as murdering or stealing. Imagine, for example, being unable to meet your mortgage payments and therefore being morally required to, say, rob a bank and perhaps kill a few people to get the money. In general, with the inverted priority rule people would often be morally required to do things, such as kill and steal, that, typically, would have far worse effects upon both their own well-being and that of others than what they would have been required to do if, instead, noncommitment obligations had had priority. Furthermore, people would be far less secure against being harmed by others unexpectedly, and, to that extent, would have less control over their lives.

Moreover, consider people like Tony Soprano in the popular TV series, The Sopranos, people who have few moral qualms about viciously harming those who are not family members or loyal friends. Let us call such people "mobster" types. Given the inverted priority rule, mobster types might then be able to mitigate, or even eliminate, their blameworthiness for violating noncommitment obligations




that they secretly wanted to violate. Say that Tony Soprano wanted to kill a rival mobster, Jones. Were commitment obligations to have priority, Soprano might then be able to mitigate any blameworthiness for his killing Jones merely by promising to do something that he knew beforehand he probably would not be able to do except by killing Jones. If then it did turn out that he could not keep his promise except by killing Jones in violation of his obligation not to kill innocent people, he would be faced with a conflict of obligations in which he would be required by the inverted priority rule to give priority to his obligation to keep his promise. Thus he could claim that, due to this conflict, his killing Jones was

morally required. Moreover, if he could convince us that the conflict was neither foreseeable nor his fault, he would escape blameworthiness altogether.

Furthermore, giving commitment obligations priority might tend to cause even the most decent people to jump - prematurely - to the conclusion that the

only way to satisfy some commitment obligation is to violate a noncommitment obligation. Take, for example, Smith, a decent man determined to adhere to his moral obligations. Assume it is part of Smith's commitment obligation to his

daughter, Daisy, to provide her with a college education, but the most obvious

ways of getting the necessary funds are unavailable. No matter how hard he works, he cannot earn enough, his credit rating is not good enough to borrow from a bank, and Daisy, through a combination of work, loans, and scholar-

ships, is not able to come up with nearly enough on her own. The most obvious

remaining way of getting the money may then be to steal it. And if morality required that Smith give his obligation to his daughter priority over his obligation not to steal, then, even though other, less obvious, alternatives still existed, such as, say, borrowing from a distant, rich relative, Smith might nevertheless jump, prematurely, to the conclusion that morality left him no alternative other than to steal. The converse, however, is not true; it is not true that with, instead, noncommitment obligations having priority, people tend to jump, prematurely, to the conclusion that the only way to satisfy some noncommitment obligation is to violate a commitment obligation. Smith, for example, is not likely to jump to the conclusion that the only way he can satisfy his noncommitment obligation not to steal is by not sending Daisy to college. With the obligation not to steal, as with any noncommitment obligation, there are always many ways of satisfying it; instead of stealing, Smith can go to movies, scratch his head, read books, and so on (cf. Bennett). Given so many ways of satisfying the obligation not to steal, not sending Daisy to college is unlikely to strike Smith as a way to do so, a way that he may fixate upon prematurely.

Yet another reason for having noncommitment obligations be the ones with priority is this. A violation of a noncommitment obligation, such as the obligation not to steal, is normally done in secret; people, obviously, do not, if they can help it, openly steal from others. On the other hand, a violation of a commitment




obligation, such as the obligation to pay one's debts, rarely can be done in secret. In the case of not paying one's debts, violations will at least be known by those to whom the debts are owed. From the fact that those violating commitment obligations must almost always violate them openly, it follows that, generally speaking, they are more likely to be held accountable for the violations than those who secretly violate noncommitment obligations. So by having noncommitment obligations be the ones with priority in conflict cases - thereby, for the most part, requiring those faced with these conflicts to do what can only be done openly - a greater percentage of those faced with these conflicts will be held accountable for what they do than if, instead, commitment obligations had priority. Accordingly, a greater percentage of "victims" will end up being compensated.

Finally, the case of Debt suggests still another reason for having noncommitment obligations be the ones with priority. In Debt, Bertha deliberately assumed the risk of losing $1,000, while Rich did not. So as between, on the one hand, Bertha and, on the other hand, either Rich or some other equally innocent, un- suspecting person whom Alan might steal from to satisfy his debt to Bertha, who should be the one to bear the risk of losing $1,000? Surely it should be Bertha since, in so far as possible, people should not be able to shift the risks from their choices upon others, which, in this case, means that Bertha should not be able to shift upon others the risk from her choosing to loan Alan $1,000. But that, in effect, is exactly what she would be able to do if commitment obligations had priority, for then, when faced with the conflict in question, Alan, rather than allowing Bertha to suffer any loss, would be required to steal the money from some innocent person to pay her back. Moreover, if commitment obligations had priority, people making loans would have less incentive to make them responsibly. And with less incentive to make loans responsibly, more loans would be made to people who could not pay them back, thereby generating still more cases of conflicting obligations in which innocent people would end up having to bear the loss. Only by giving noncommitment obligations priority will the risks from loans, contracts, and other agreements remain on those who have chosen to make these agreements.

Of course not all those at risk from a failure to satisfy a commitment obligation have chosen to bear the risk. Although children are at risk from a failure of their parents to satisfy their commitment obligation of caring for them, they have not chosen to bear the risk. Thus, although the reason set out in the last paragraph for not giving priority to commitment obligations applies to most commitment obligations, it does not apply to this one. But, as we have seen, there will be other reasons that do apply. All the reasons we have considered, taken together, seem to point toward a priority rule of morality requiring that noncommitment obligations be given priority in every case.




V. False Counterexamples

It is not, however, difficult to think of cases that appear to be counterexamples to a priority rule requiring that noncommitment obligations be given priority in every case. Consider this case.

Drowning Child: Audrey, who has a summer job as a lifeguard at a large lake, spots a child drowning too far out for her to rescue by swimming. The only way she can fulfill her duty to rescue the child is by using, without permission, a boat that belongs to Boxwood.

It appears that, to save the drowning child's life, Audrey should give the commitment obligation to fulfill her lifeguard duties priority over the noncommitment obligation not to use, without permission, what belongs to another.

And not all cases in which it appears as if the commitment obligation should have priority are cases of life or death. Consider this case.

Urgent Letter: Alma, who is staying at Bonnie's Bed & Breakfast, has promised a friend to mail an urgent letter for him. But the only way Alma can get the letter in the mailbox in time to be mailed is by taking, without permission, a stamp that belongs to Bonnie, who is out shopping.

Here again it appears that, as between the commitment obligation to keep one's promise and the noncommitment obligation not to take what does not belong to one, it is the commitment obligation that should have priority. Thus these cases - and it is easy to think of others - appear to be counterexamples to a priority rule that gives noncommitment obligations priority in every case.

These are not, however, genuine counterexamples. In both of the above cases, serious harm can be prevented only if the agent acts contrary to what the obligation to respect property rights normally requires. And, as most people will agree, moral obligations have built into them an exception for just such cases as these, cases in which acting contrary to what the obligation normally requires is necessary for preventing serious harm. But if some case falls within an exception to what an obligation normally requires, then failing to do what the obligation normally requires does not count as a violation of the obligation. So if acting contrary to what the obligation to respect property rights normally requires would not, because of the exception for preventing serious harm, violate this obligation in these cases, then, in these cases, there is no conflict of obligations, and therefore they do not constitute counterexemples after all.

But perhaps this conclusion has been reached too quickly. To be sure, most people do recognize that obligations have, or should have, built into them an exception for preventing serous harm, and most people will readily grant that both Drowning Child and Urgent Letter fall within this exception. But here is the problem. Why do Drowning Child and Urgent Letter fall within this exception, while the three test cases with which we began, Debt, Transplant, and CD




Player, do not? After all, by acting contrary to what a noncommitment obligation would normally require in Debt, Transplant, and CD Player, serious harm could be prevented in these cases as well. Yet it seems clear that in none of these cases does the exception for preventing serious harm apply. Clearly it is not morally permissible to kill Bebop to save the five patients in need of a transplant no matter how serious the harm this prevents may be, nor should it be morally permissible for Alan to steal from Rich to pay his debt to Bertha, or for Ace to use deception to get the contract. But then what is the difference between these three cases and ones, such as Drowning Child and Urgent Letter, in which the exception does apply? To answer this question, we need to examine the serious-harm exception.

VI. The Exception for Preventing Serious Harm

The exception for preventing serious harm is difficult to formulate precisely. To see exactly how this exception might best be formulated, let us begin by taking a closer look at morality in general. Moral obligations delineate what morality requires that we do or not do, and obligations have rights correlated with them. We are obligated to pay our debts, and our creditors have a right against us that our debts to them be paid; we are obligated not to rape, and people have a right against us that we not rape them. The function of obligations, and the rights correlated with them, is to provide us with a certain "comfort zone" in which we can live our lives with reasonable security and trust in others. But there is more to morality than just rights and obligations. There are also good and bad values, such as kindness and unkindness, generosity and greed, compassion and callousness. As opposed to obligations, which delineate not the morally praiseworthy but the morally required, good values delineate not the morally required but the morally praiseworthy. And as opposed to obligations, good values do not have rights correlated with them; no one has a right to our kindness, generosity, or compassion. Finally, as opposed to obligations, to which we must adhere no matter what the consequences, values invite a consideration of consequences.4

Failing to exemplify a good value is normally not viewed as exemplifying a bad value, but as morally neutral instead and, as such, neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. Consider, for example, the case of Dinner. Betty Buffett, a neighbor of the Abbotts, has just come home from the hospital with a new baby and surely does not feel much like cooking dinner for her family; so it would exemplify good values, in the form of kindness, for the Abbotts to cook a dinner to take over to them. Yet the Abbotts happen not to do so. This does not mean that the Abbotts have exemplified bad values; it only means that, in this case, they happen not to have exemplified good values; that their behavior is, in other words, morally neutral. Likewise, Atkins' failure to exemplify generosity by contributing to some charity that has solicited his contribution by mail {Mail Solicitation) means only that Atkins happens not to have exemplified good values with respect to this particular charity; it does not mean that he has exemplified bad values and




is thus blameworthy. Failure over time ever to contribute to charity may, to be sure, constitute grounds for blameworthiness, but, generally speaking, any single instance of failing to contribute will be morally neutral.

Yet in some cases a single instance of failing to exemplify good values is not

just morally neutral, but does indeed constitute bad values and is thus blameworthy. If Betsy, Adam's neighbor, has gone into labor and, having no other way to be sure of getting to the hospital on time, asks Adam to give her a ride, but Adam refuses so that he can go to the movies instead (No Ride), then not only does Adam fail to exemplify good values, but his failure is hardly morally neutral; it exemplifies bad values. This then raises an interesting question: when, exactly, does failing to exemplify good values go from being morally neutral, as in Dinner and Mail Solicitation, to being bad values and thus blameworthy, as in No Ridel How, in other words, are cases in which failing to exemplify good values counts as neutral

distinguished from ones in which it counts as bad values? We need not, however, address this question here.5 For our purposes, all that is

necessary is that cases in which failing to exemplify good values should count as neutral and ones in which it should instead count as bad values can be distinguished, accurately, by most people most of the time. Given this, the exception for preventing serious harm should, so it is suggested here, be formulated as follows.

EXCEPTION FOR PREVENTING SERIOUS HARM: To prevent serious harm, an agent may deviate from what an obligation normally prescribes if

(1) deviating from what the obligation normally prescribes is very likely the only way that the harm can be prevented, and

(2) the person to whom this obligation is owed would exemplify bad values by refusing to consent to the deviation.

Here is how condition (2) of this exception works. Say that, hypothetically, the person to whom the obligation is owed were asked to consent to the deviation in question. Condition (2) is met if and only if this person's refusal to consent would be, not just a failure to exemplify good values, but bad values. It would, for example, exemplify bad values for Boxwood to refuse to consent to Audrey's using his boat to save the child in Drowning Child, and for Bonnie to refuse to consent to Alma's taking her stamp in Urgent Letter. Thus condition (2) is met in both of these cases. On the other hand, it clearly would not exemplify bad values for Bebop to refuse to consent to his vital organs being stripped from him to save five people in Transplant. Nor would it exemplify bad values for Rich, in Debt, to refuse to allow his money to be taken by Alan so that Alan could pay his debt to Bertha, or for Ford Motor Company to refuse to be deceived about the capaci- ties of Ace's new line of CD players. Thus, in Transplant, Debt, and CD Player, condition (2) is not met. It is because this condition is met in Drowning Child and Urgent Letter, but not in Transplant, Debt, and CD Player, that the former two cases fall within the scope of the exception, while the latter three do not.




VII. The Exception for Dependents

Consider next the following two cases.

Twinkies: Ann's daughter Beatrice, who has just turned ten, is seriously overweight. For her birthday, one of Beatrice's friends gives her twenty-five Twinkies (small, creamy cakes in cellophane packages). To prevent her daughter from gaining still more weight, Ann takes the Twinkies away from her.

Psychologically Fragile: Dr. Addison's patient, Bennington, has just regained consciousness after having been in a serious automobile accident and, upon see- ing Dr. Addison, asks her whether, while unconscious, his life had been in danger. In fact Bennington, while unconscious, had almost died. But Dr. Addison knows that he is still in such a fragile state psychologically that, if she immediately tells him the truth about how close he came to death, the shock might well hamper his recovery. So Dr. Addison does not tell him the truth.

Ann's taking the Twinkies away from her daughter amounts to Ann's giving her commitment obligation to care for her daughter priority over a conflicting noncommitment obligation not to take what does not belong to her. Most people, however, will agree that doing what is in her daughter's best interests by taking the Twinkies away is not morally wrong. If Ann does not take the Twinkies away, she will be wrongfully neglecting her parental duty of care. Beatrice is a dependent, and Ann is her caretaker. What is meant by a "dependent" here is not someone who is financially dependent, but someone who is mentally dependent, in that he or she is a young child, or mentally disadvantaged in some other way. So, in Psychologi- cally Fragile, because of his mental state, Bennington qualifies, temporarily, as a dependent as well. And most people will agree that, in putting her duty to care for her patient over her duty to tell the truth, Dr. Addison does nothing wrong by not immediately telling Bennington the truth about how close he came to death. Because of the vulnerability of dependents, commitment obligations to care for them do, and should, have a special weight that other commitment obligations lack, and the priority that noncommitment obligations have over commitment obligations should somehow be qualified to accommodate this special weight. We could simply say that noncommitment obligations are always to be given priority over commitment obligations, except for the commitment obligation to care for a dependent. This, however, will not quite do. Surely we do not want the obligation to care for a dependent to have priority over noncommitment obligations in so far as they apply to everyone, only in so far as they apply to the dependent in question. For example, in Twinkies we want Ann to give her commitment obligation to care for Beatrice priority over the noncommitment obligation not to take what does not belong to her only in so far as it prohibits Ann from taking what belongs Beatrice; not in so are as it prohibits her from taking what belongs to anyone other than Beatrice. With this in mind, let us formulate, finally, the priority rule being defended here as follows, a rule we shall call the "commonsense" priority rule.




COMMONSENSE PRIORITY RULE: Always give noncommitment moral obligations priority over commitment moral obligations, except for the commitment obligation to care for a dependent, which is to be given priority over a noncommitment obligation to the extent that the right violated by acting contrary to this noncommitment obligation would be that of the dependent.

Notice that, given how this rule is formulated, there is one noncommitment moral obligation over which the obligation to care for a dependent can never have priority - namely, the moral obligation to obey the (criminal) law. This is because the moral right violated by acting contrary to this obligation is a right that "the people," as a collectivity, have, not a right that any person, including the dependent, has as an individual.

The obligation to obey the law warrants a closer look. Consider the follow-

ing case.

Daughter's Wedding: The only way that Allison can catch the train in time to get to her daughter's wedding, which we may assume she has a commitment obligation to attend, is by driving a little over the speed limit, thereby violating her obligation to obey the law.

Thus Allison appears to be faced with a conflict between the noncommitment obligation to obey the law and her commitment obligation to attend the wedding, and, contrary to the commonsense priority rule, it appears as if the commitment obligation is the one that in this case should be given priority. Daughter's Wedding, however, is one of those cases in which, upon closer examination, it becomes ap- parent that the case falls under an exception to one of the alleged obligations - in this case, the obligation to obey the law - which means that there is no conflict after all. There are two candidates for being this exception. One is that, probably, the obligation to obey the law should recognize an exception for any aspect of law that people generally, including even law enforcement personnel, no longer take seriously, even though, technically speaking, it remains law. Arguably, driving just a little over the speed limit is just such an aspect of law. Alternatively, this case may qualify as falling under the exception for preventing serious harm formulated above. But, to qualify, condition (2) of this exception must be met, which states that the person to whom the obligation is owed would exemplify bad values by refusing to consent to the deviation from what the obligation normally requires. The problem is that, in the case of this particular obligation, it is owed, as we have just seen, not to any particular person, but to the people as a collectivity, and how can the people as a collectivity either consent or refuse to consent? Perhaps the best answer goes something like this. Judges serve as representatives of the people as a whole. Condition (2) is thus met if it is the case that a judge's refusal to consent on behalf of the people as a whole to the deviation in question would exemplify bad values, and here we are to assume that, legally, such consent is indeed at the discretion of the judge. If, on the other hand, Allison were driving enough over the speed limit to jeopardize the well-being of others, then neither of




these exceptions would apply. But, in that case, our intuitions offer no resistance to our concluding that the categorical obligation to obey the law should be given priority, just as the commonsense priority rule says.

VIII. The Utilitarian Priority Rule

For resolving conflicts between commitment and noncommitment obligations, the commonsense priority rule is superior to a rule which requires that we always give priority to whichever alternative will result in the most utility, a rule that we may call the "utilitarian" priority rule. Given that cases of extreme or urgent need are, typically, covered by the exception for preventing serious harm, cases of genuine conflict in which it really does maximize utility to give priority to a commitment obligation are relatively rare. But what about cases such as the ones with which we began this investigation, cases such as Debt, Transplant, and CD Player! These are cases in which it appears clear that the commitment obligation is probably the one that would maximize utility if given priority. Yet, as we have seen (section VI), since these cases do not meet condition (2) of the exception for preventing serious harm, they do not fall within the scope of this exception, which means the conflict of obligations in these cases is genuine and thus the commonsense priority rule does apply to them, thereby prohibiting us from giving the commitment obligations priority. Would not the utilitarian priority rule work better for cases like these, cases in which the utility advantage of giving the commitment obligation priority was clear? No, for these reasons. If morality invited people to give priority to commitment obligations in cases in which the utility-advantage of doing so was clear, then, given human fallibility, even fallibility about what really was "clear," people would end up, all too often, giving priority to commitment obligations in cases in which doing so did not maximize utility. And even if everyone were always capable of properly distinguishing the clear from the unclear, would we really want to be exposed constantly to having our organs suddenly stripped from us, having our money stolen from us by debtors, and having those with whom we do business deceiving us, as we would be if people were permitted to give commitment obligations priority in these kinds of cases? Surely any resulting gains in utility would not be worth the widespread uncertainly, insecurity, and anxiety to which this would give rise.

The superiority of the commonsense priority rule does not mean that the utilitarian priority rule should never be used for resolving conflicts of obligations Perhaps it should be used as a priority rule of last result, one for resolving conflicts in those and only those cases in which no other priority rule is applicable, cases such as where you must choose between paying back either the $ 1 ,000 you owe Rollo Rich, or the $1,000 you owe some poor, elderly widow. The superiority of the commonsense priority rule means only that the utilitarian priority rule should never be used for resolving conflicts between commitment and noncommitment obligations.




IX. Two Types of Noncommitment Obligations

Let us, in conclusion, examine still another, widely discussed, type of conflict. Consider a slightly modified version of Transplant - call it Transplant II - in which the person faced with the conflict is not a physician, but simply someone, Atwood, who just happens to be at the hospital at the same time that the five patients are in desperate need of transplants. Atwood, we shall assume, can either kill the innocent bystander, Bebop, knowing that Bebop's organs will then immediately get transplanted into the five patients thereby saving their lives, or he can refrain from killing Bebop, thereby letting the five patients die. Thus Atwood is faced with a conflict between either killing one person or letting five people die. Transplant II differs significantly from Transplant in just one way. As opposed to Dr. Addison, who is the patients' physician, Atwood has no commitment obligation to the patients. Thus the conflict with which Atwood is faced - that between either killing one person or letting five people die - cannot be resolved simply by appealing to the commonsense priority rule, since this rule applies only to cases in which the agent is faced with a conflict that does involve a commitment obligation. Our moral intuitions tell us, of course, that, in Transplant II, it is just as wrong to kill Bebop as in Transplant. But since we cannot explain these intuitions by appealing to the commonsense priority rule, how can we explain them?

For a satisfactory explanation, a final distinction among types of obligations must now be made. So far, all obligations that are not commitment obligations have been referred to here simply as "noncommitment" obligations. But an important distinction between two types of noncommitment obligations becomes relevant at this point. Among our noncommitment obligations are ones that require that we make up for wrongs we have committed, that, as best we can, we restore people we have wronged to whatever was their situation prior to our having wronged them. Say that, while trying just for fun to scare our friend who cannot swim, we rock, back and forth, the small boat in which we are all fishing, but negligently go too far and topple her into the water. Having thus wrongfully put her in need of aid, we are obligated to provide this aid. Likewise, if we recklessly crash our car into another person's car, we are morally obligated to pay for the damage we cause. Let us call obligations of this sort, which fall under the general category of noncommitment obligations, "restitutional" obligations. And, for convenience, let us create a term for the noncommitment obligations that remain after subtracting restitutional obligations from this category, these remaining obligations being those that prohibit murder, rape, trespass, deceit, theft, and so on. Let us call them "categorical" obligations. With respect to priority, restitutional obligations fall between categorical obligations and commitment obligations; categorical obligations have priority over restitutional obligations, and restitutional obligations have priority over commitment obligations. So if Alan, in violation of his categorical obligation not to steal, takes $1,000 from Rich, the restitutional obligation that




Alan then has to return the money he has stolen has priority over the commitment obligation he has to pay back the $1,000 he owes Bertha. Otherwise, the priority that Alan's categorical obligation not to steal has over his commitment obligation to pay Bertha back would be undermined.

Given this distinction between types of noncommitment obligations, why we give priority to the obligation not to kill Bebop in Transplant II can be explained - that is, if we help ourselves to a certain premise. Because of a role, such as parent, a job such as lifeguard, or a professional relationship, such as doctor, or some other thing to which we have obligated ourselves by a commitment, we often have commitment obligations which require that we aid others in some way. And because of some prior wrongdoing, we often have restitutional obligations which require that we aid others in some way. Finally, largely because the law "formalizes" certain commitment and restitutional moral obligations, the moral obligation to obey the law will at times require that we aid others as well. But here is the premise to which we shall help ourselves. Aside only from the moral obligation to obey the law, there are no categorical obligations requiring that we aid others; that is, none that are justifiable. All categorical moral obligations - ones such as those requiring that we not steal, not kill, not injure, not deceive, not rape, not trespass, and not cheat - are obligations requiring that we not do things; they are not obligations requiring that we do things for others, that we aid them.

Some may object to this premise by pointing out extreme cases of failing to aid. Consider, they may say, a case in which one can prevent a person approach- ing a sheer cliff on a foggy night from falling to his death merely by yelling a warning but does not bother doing so (Foggy Night), or a case in which one can prevent a small child from drowning in a shallow pool merely by lifting her out but chooses instead to finish one's dinner before it gets cold (Shallow Water). Surely, the objection may go, in extreme cases such as these, failing to aid is not just bad values, but violates an obligation. And, so it may be said, since the violation of such an obligation would not depend upon there having been a prior commitment or wrongdoing, this obligation would have to be a categorical one. The mistake committed by those who make this sort of objection is that of using degree of blameworthiness as the way, or one of the ways, that obligations are to be distinguished from values, their idea apparently being that if failing to do something is blameworthy enough, then failing to do it must be not merely bad values, but the violation of an obligation. But using, in this way, degree of blameworthiness for making the distinction is not appropriate. For one thing, this creates a hopeless line drawing problem. It makes more sense instead to hold that extreme cases of exemplifying bad values, such as the two cases above, can be just as severely blameworthy as the most heinous cases of violating an obligation.6

Given then the premise that, aside from the obligation to obey the law, there are no categorical obligations requiring that we aid others, we may conclude that, in Transplant //, Atwood has no moral obligation to aid the five patients in need of




a transplant. No law requires Atwood to aid them, he has made no commitment that morally obligates him to aid them, and he has committed no past wrong that morally obligates him to aid them Thus Atwood has no moral obligation to aid them. This then explains why our moral intuitions tell us that, in Transplant II, it is just as wrong to kill Bebop as it is in Transplant. In Transplant II, it is wrong to kill Bebop not because the obligation not to kill has priority over an obligation that conflicts with it, but because there is no obligation that conflicts with it. The

only candidate in this case for being an obligation that conflicts with the obligation not to kill would be some obligation requiring that Atwood aid the five patients. But, as we have just seen, Atwood has no such obligation. Aiding others often does, of course, exemplify good values. But obligations trump values.

Although the premise that, aside from the obligation to obey the law, there are no categorical obligations requiring that we aid others is controversial, good reasons exist for believing this premise to be justified. Since these reasons are set out elsewhere, they shall not be repeated here.7 Only this shall be said here in defense of this premise. Why it is morally wrong for Atwood to kill Bebop cannot be explained very well without this premise, which is yet another reason for believing it to be justified.

University of Delaware

NOTES

For helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I wish to thank Jeff Jordan, as well as these members of the Philosophy Reading Group at the University of Delaware: Fred Adams, Richard Hanley, Kate Rogers, and David Silver.

1. Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), chap. 6. 2. See, for example, Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The

Doctrine of Doing and Allowing," The Philosophical Review, vol. 36, no. 3 (July 1989), reprinted in Killing and Letting Die, 2nd edition, edited by Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), pp. 355-382. The latter anthology also contains other papers relevant to the making/allowing distinction, and to the question of which, as between conflicting obligations, should be given priority

3. Bennett, The Act Itself , pp. 102-103. 4. For more detail and a defense of these points, see D. W. Haslett, "Values, Obliga-

tions, and Saving Lives," in Morality, Rules and Consequences, ed. Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale E. Miller (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 71-104.

5. For an attempt to clarify this distinction, see Haslett, "Values, Obligations, and Saving Lives"; and D. W. Haslett, "Murder and the Exception for Fair Competition," Social Theory and Practice, vol. 29, No. 4 (October 2003), pp. 1-24.

6. For more detail than set out above in section VI about how the distinction between values and obligations should be made, see Haslett, "Values, Obligations, and Saving Lives," section 3.

7. These reasons are set out in Haslett, "Values, Obligations, and Saving Lives."



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