Conflict Reading List Prepared for DFID Conflict Advisers

Peter Uvin, Tufts University

May 2008

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Introduction

We are pleased to be able to offer this reading list to DFID conflict advisers, and to

other HMG staff and consultants working on conflict matters.

As you know, conflict was one of the key priorities that the Secretary of State for

International Development and his ministerial team stressed when they took up their

posts in mid-2007. This reading list aims to provide users with a comprehensive range

of materials covering the principal policy issues confronting us. Its aim is to help you

deepen your technical knowledge to help you in your work.

The list was initially started by GSDRC and was then further developed by Prof Peter

Uvin of Tuft‘s University, Boston and his colleagues. However, although they have

provided us with a very comprehensive list, inevitably it remains a work in progress as

the field of conflict studies is still relatively new and evolving.

The list comprises HMG policy documents, core readings and supplementary readings

grouped under headings and sub-headings relating to the technical competencies for

DFID‘s conflict advisers. For your ease of reference, we are providing summaries of

each of the core readings, and there are either abstracts or summaries for the

supplementary readings.

This reading list pack is part of a set of new professional development tools designed

and developed to support conflict advisers. These are aimed at equipping advisers with

the right knowledge, background and skills that they need to carry out their work to the

best effect. The tools include the new technical competency framework for conflict

advisers, a training guide, and new conflict courses that are being designed specifically

for DFID advisers. In view of the importance of cross-Whitehall working on conflict

matters, these training tools are being made available to colleagues in FCO, MOD and

Stabilisation Unit.

I hope that you find this product a useful and worthwhile resource. Feedback about the

list from users will be very welcome and will help us to improve the product. Please

send any comments you have to Darren Boyling, d-boyling@dfid.gov.uk .

Joelle Jenny

Deputy Head of Governance and Conflict Profession

Department for International Development (DFID)

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Acknowledgements

This list was developed by Prof Peter Uvin (Tuft‘s University, Boston) and his

colleagues. It is based on initial research by Zoe Scott (Governance and Social

Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)). All summaries were produced by the

GSDRC. All abstracts are author‘s own.

This reading list is available online at: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/conflict-reading-list

Summaries of documents should not be reproduced without permission from the

Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC).

Ordering Documents

Some of the materials recommended in this reading list aren‘t available online (for

instance book chapters and journal articles), but they can be accessed as follows:

DFID staff can obtain any of the materials contained on this list by contacting the

DFID e-Library, who can arrange for individual articles to be delivered via email, or

books to be delivered in hard copy. Further information on using the e-library is

available on insights: http://insight/eLibrary, or you can email the library with your

request at library@dfid.gov.uk There is no charge for using this service.

Public users with no alternative access can order documents through the British

Library for Development Studies‘ Document Delivery Service. Further details are

available online at http://blds.ids.ac.uk/ or by emailing docdel@ids.ac.uk.

Organisations in developing and transition countries can use this delivery service at no

cost.

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Contents

Part 1: Conflict Analysis

1. Theories of (the causes of) Conflict Escalation and De-escalation ....................................... 7

1.1 Economic and social causes of violent conflict .............................................................. 7

1.2 Political analysis (power relations, political systems and institutions, elections etc.) .. 25

1.3 De-escalation of violent conflict ................................................................................... 36

1.4 Human rights, international humanitarian law and other relevant legal standards ....... 43

1.5 The role of gender in conflict issues ............................................................................. 51

2. Tools for Conflict Analysis and Monitoring Conflict Escalation and De-escalation .......... 56

2.1 Conflict tools, methodologies, theory and practice, (Strategic Conflict Assessments and

other analytical tools) .......................................................................................................... 56

2.2 Techniques for monitoring and evaluation (of conflict escalation and de-escalation) .. 67

2.3. Conflict sensitivity of development programmes in Fragile States (theoretical focus) 71

3. HMG and International Conflict Architecture, Particularly UN and IFIs ........................... 86

Part 2: Conflict Prevention

1. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Sensitive Development ................................................... 96

1.1 Conflict prevention........................................................................................................ 96

1.2 Early warning and early response systems .................................................................. 104

2. Conflict Sensitive Design of Poverty Reduction Programmes .......................................... 107

3. Conflict-sensitive Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes Aimed at Preventing

Violence ................................................................................................................................. 115

4. Do no Harm and Similar Approaches................................................................................ 133

5. Role of State and non-state Actors in Promoting Peaceful Transformation, in Supporting

Country/state Resilience and in Building State Capacity ...................................................... 137

Part 3: Conflict Response

1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and Peace Agreements –

Formation, Implementation and Consolidation ..................................................................... 151

2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding ............................................................... 160

3. Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning ....................................................... 179

4. Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery ............................................. 187

5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants ........................ 192

6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence .. 202

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7. Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence

............................................................................................................................................... 213

7.1 Security sector ............................................................................................................. 213

7.2 Justice sector ............................................................................................................... 226

8. Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence

............................................................................................................................................... 239

Part 4: International Development System

1. Aid Instruments ................................................................................................................. 247

2. Development Effectiveness (Policy Coherence, Donor Alignment, Harmonisation) ....... 254

3. DFID‘s Governance Agenda and Competencies ............................................................... 267

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Part 1: Conflict Analysis

Contents

1. Theories of (the causes of) Conflict Escalation and De-escalation ....................................... 7

1.1 Economic and social causes of violent conflict .............................................................. 7

1.2 Political analysis (power relations, political systems and institutions, elections etc.) .. 25

1.3 De-escalation of violent conflict ................................................................................... 36

1.4 Human rights, international humanitarian law and other relevant legal standards ....... 43

1.5 The role of gender in conflict issues ............................................................................. 51

2. Tools for Conflict Analysis and Monitoring Conflict Escalation and De-escalation .......... 56

2.1 Conflict tools, methodologies, theory and practice, (Strategic Conflict Assessments and

other analytical tools) .......................................................................................................... 56

2.2 Techniques for monitoring and evaluation (of conflict escalation and de-escalation) .. 67

2.3: Conflict Sensitivity of Development Programmes in Fragile States (theoretical focus)71

3. HMG and International Conflict Architecture, Particularly UN and IFIs ........................... 86

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1. Theories of (the causes of) Conflict Escalation and De-escalation

1.1 Economic and social causes of violent conflict

Core readings

Beyond Greed and Grievance and not too soon

M Berdal (2005)

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Summary

Can civil wars be explained simply in terms of rebel greed? This essay from the

Review of International Studies reviews four books on the causes of civil war:

Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, The Political

Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, War Economies in a

Regional Context and, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism. These

reveal the concept of greed versus grievance to be unhelpful. Qualitative case studies

show that the processes of civil war are dynamic and context-dependent.

The ‗greed thesis‘ of civil wars stems from Paul Collier‘s work in the late 1990s.

Drawing on statistical data of civil wars since the mid-sixties, he concluded that

grievance-based explanations were wrong; the key to understanding the outbreak of

civil wars lay in greed and the quest for loot by rebels. This was an attractive idea for

policymakers because it simplified conflict. It had particular impact within the United

Nations. The books under review highlight the narrow focus of quantitative methods

and see polarisation of greed and grievance as too simplistic. This work has, however,

sharpened debate and encouraged qualitative and more historically informed research

into civil wars.

Several insights arise from the books reviewed:

Economic opportunities have not been the only or even the primary cause of

the armed conflicts studied. Rather, they interacted with socio-economic and

political grievances, interethnic disputes and security dilemmas in triggering

the outbreak of warfare.

Economics are, however, important. Non state actors and corrupt rulers have

been able to exploit opportunities presented by globalisation. These include

the deregulation of international markets and key industries and ease of access

to illicit markets.

Intra-regional economic, military, political, criminal and social links cut across

national borders and help sustain conflict. ‗Marginalised borderlands‘ are

areas that serve as reservoirs of violent resistance to the reassertion of the state

or ‗no-go areas‘.

Conventional wisdom suggests that diasporas (dispersals of populations from

their homelands) are predictors of civil war. Case studies show that diaspora

and migrant remittances can fuel conflict, but can also mitigate destabilising

socioeconomic divisions.

Evidence from Somalia challenges the notion of a conflict trap in which war

wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war. While government

has not been revived in Somalia, local and informal governance has seen

striking success in disarmament and demobilisation.

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There are implications for future work on the causes of conflict:

The dynamics of many contemporary civil wars can only be fully understood

by references to global and regional economic changes. Though these

sometimes originate in the 1970s and 1980s, they accelerated dramatically in

the 1990s.

The notion of ‗marginalised borderlands‘ is worthy of more research and

policy attention. External actors (including the UN in West Africa) need to

place ‗civil‘ or internal wars firmly within their wider regional context.

In conflict zones where aid has dried up, diaspora revenues may provide

essential resources to marginalised groups. Curtailing the flow of funds from

expatriate communities may increase conflicts by encouraging predation on

vulnerable civilian populations.

By focusing on recreating a strong centralised state, some interventions have

been misguided. International systems remain state-centric. Central

government and local governance should not be lumped together and local

polities and informal social pacts should be recognised.

Source: Berdal, M., 2005, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance and not too soon', Review of

International Studies, 31(4) pp. 687-698

Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link

N Gleditsch and I Nordas (2007)

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Summary

This paper from the International Peace Academy argues that climate change is likely

to lead to mass exodus from uninhabitable areas, placing significant burdens on

migrant receiving areas, although adaptation is more likely than armed conflict in the

absence of exacerbating political and social factors. Climate change warrants

consideration by the United Nations (UN) as a potential security threat. Responses

should include improving disaster preparedness, mitigating the risks of refugee flows,

supporting migrant receiving areas and a new UN international agreement on

migration.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presents a majority viewpoint

that recent temperature rises are unprecedented and hard to explain without reference

to human activity. Impacts on biodiversity, agriculture and water supply will certainly

alter patterns of consumption, production and settlement. It is plausible that violent

conflict could emerge as a result.

Long, uncertain causal chains from climate change to conflict lead policy advocates to

speculation. While it is impossible to assign credible probabilities to extreme

outcomes, preparation must be rooted in firm theoretical foundations.

Worst case scenario: Relatively abrupt changes in temperature could lead

wealthy nations to fortify their borders to preserve resources. Less fortunate

countries may initiate struggles over food, water or energy.

Best case scenario: A minority of scholars argue that the evidence for long-

term temperature rise is not enough to act at present. Human welfare would be

better served by health measures that promise to save thousands of lives at low

cost.

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Middle scenario: This assumes IPCC forecasts are correct and that a

substantial element of warming is due to human activities. Though

consequences may be less dramatic than the worst case scenario, action is

needed to preserve economic growth, meet basic needs and mitigate negative

effects.

Recommendations focus on what can be done to prevent environment-induced

migration leading to conflict:

Responding to environmental pressures and preparing for shifting settlement

patterns should be high on the UN agenda. Calling a special session of the UN

General Assembly would foster global dialogue.

Referring the matter to the Security Council would imply a wider

interpretation of security. The UN should face climate change as a crisis that

threatens the security of its member states and humanity, even if armed

conflict is not a major component of that threat.

Relevant policy measures include: Moving people from flood plains,

developing cleaner energy technologies, fostering efficient irrigation and water

consumption and improving shelters, disaster preparedness and response.

Locating refugees away from conflict zones and preventing infiltration of arms

into refugee communities would mitigate the risks of environmental refugee

flows. Productive employment would provide a meaningful alternative to

violence.

Dialogue with local communities would address economic and social concerns

in areas receiving environmental migrants. Steps may include preventing

discrimination in the workplace, ensuring access to services, revising

citizenship laws, promoting tolerance and facilitating civic awareness among

immigrant communities.

The UN needs a new international agreement on migration including legal

measures on the rights of migrants, refugees from combat zones and

environmental migration. The current UN Refugee Convention is outdated and

ambiguous.

Source: Gleditsch, N.P., Nords, R. and Salehyan, I. 2007, 'Climate Change and

Conflict: The Migration Link', Coping With Crisis Working Paper Series, New York:

International Peace Academy, New York

Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the

Twenty-first Century

T Gurr (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Fewer communal conflicts are being fought today than at any time since the early

1970s. What are the strategies that have brought about this trend? And how can the

more intractable conflicts be managed? This research, by the University of Maryland,

shows that a doctrine of international good practice is responsible for the resolution of

many conflicts. However, it argues that new strategies are needed to deal with the

threat of international terrorism. These should look at the root causes of terrorism and

establish effective responses to it.

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Between 1991 and 2004, the number of wars of self-determination has declined by

half. During that time, 20 separatist wars were settled by negotiated agreements and 23

others were halted by ceasefires and ongoing negotiations. Discrimination eased for

many minority groups. These trends can be explained by several factors. Since the end

of the Cold War the international community has moved from sponsoring proxy wars

towards promoting the accommodation of competing interests. International

management of communal conflict has reinforced domestic efforts at reducing

communal tensions. There is also a trend towards accommodation of communal

demands that have not yet escalated into armed conflict.

Relations between communal groups and governments have changed since the early

1990s because of a new doctrine of international good practice for managing

communal conflict. It has six principles: (1) the recognition and promotion of group

political, cultural and economic rights, (2) the recognition of the right of regional

minorities to sub-state autonomy, (3) the use of democratic institutions and power

sharing to protect group rights, (4) the use of mutual accommodation for managing

civil conflicts, (5) the use of international engagement to promote negotiated

settlements of communal conflicts and (6) the necessity of coercive intervention in

situations of gross violations of human rights.

Some parts of the world, where states and communal movements reject these six

principles, will continue to experience communal warfare and repression.

The new doctrine of managing communal conflict depends on whether it is

accepted by those whose conflicts are to be managed and on the ability of

regional and international organisations to implement it.

International and regional organisations are likely to pursue effective

preventive strategies in regions where Western powers have interests.

African and Asian conflicts are more resistant to external influence.

Regional organisations need to use all means at their disposal and should be

assisted to do so.

When preventive strategies fail, or are not pursued, the international challenges

become how to provide humanitarian aid and how to contain regional spillovers

of conflict.

Militant Islam poses a new and different threat, which comes not from states or

communal rivals but from dispersed terrorists who would wage war on the

West and its agents.

New strategies are needed for the new types of threat. Officials and experts at the

International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in 2005, proposed a

comprehensive response with three dimensions. These were:

Recommendations for long-term reduction of the root economic and political

causes of the conflicts that give rise to terrorism.

Specification of optimal strategies for policing, intelligence gathering, military

responses and control of terrorist financing.

An exploration of how the foundations of democratic governance can be used

as assets in the international struggle against extremism.

Source: Gurr, T. R., 2007, ‗Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing

Communal Conflict in the Twenty-first Century,‘ in Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., and

All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World,

Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 131-160

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Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link

R Kanbur (2007)

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Summary

How do poverty and inequality causally interact with conflict? While there is a general

view that poverty and inequality can lead to conflict, the nature of the links are less

well appreciated. This paper draws out the links based on the recent economics

literature and discusses their implications for policy. While inequality is a natural

concomitant of economic processes, particularly those driven by the market, its

implications for security emerge when unequal outcomes align with socio-political

cleavages.

The causality from poverty and inequality to conflict is ambiguous. Whilst violent

conflict is a feature of poorer rather than richer societies, wealth can provide the means

to conflict as much as take away the reason for it - the balance of forces is delicate and

country specific. A careful assessment of the intersection between economic outcomes

and social divisions is necessary in designing policies and interventions for growth and

poverty reduction.

Two factors are important to explain why low levels of tension escalate into group

violence: a background of inequality and sharp increases in inequality in directions that

play into other socio-economic factors.

The global trend on poverty is at too high a level of aggregation to explain the

incidence of conflict.

Increase in inequality within countries means richer individuals and richer

groups are getting richer faster than the poor - raising the prospect of group

tensions.

If conflict can be related to perceived and actual differences between groups

then it is the between-group component of inequality that is key.

Polarisation of society into groups with distinct identities can be a cause of

conflict on its own but this is exacerbated if in addition there are average

income differences between the groups.

A decline in national poverty can be accompanied by growing group tensions

as some groups do better than others in poverty reduction.

If processes of economic growth create group inequality this can engender

conflict sufficient to negatively affect the growth process itself.

There is not a one size fits all blueprint for action because of the historical and social

differences between countries that can underlay the potential for conflicts to develop.

Intermediate policy aims should attempt to:

Systematically reduce inter-group inequality between salient groups so that the

initial conditions are not favourable to conflict.

Build a thick set of associational links between groups, so that the inevitable

sparks that arise in the course of social and economic life do not ignite into

conflict.

Design economic policy packages that do not sharply increase inequality

across salient groups.

UN and international agencies should advocate policies that:

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Address structural cleavages by attacking discrimination and supporting

positive discrimination.

Support cross-communal associational life financially and politically.

Balance conventional economic efficiency with the need to maintain a balance

in cross-group income differences.

Source: Kanbur, R., 2007, ‗Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link‘, International

Peace

Academy, New York

Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict

H Kelman (1997)

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Summary

What insights can a social-psychological understanding of international conflict

provide? This United States Institute of Peace Press paper argues that psychological

factors are pervasive in international conflict and can help to explain certain

phenomena for which other approaches cannot adequately account. It explores the

social-psychological processes that generate and perpetuate conflict and, in turn, how

these can be reversed.

A social-psychological perspective enriches the analysis of international relations by

exploring the subjective factors that set constraints on rationality. It does this by:

opening the ‗black box‘ of the state as a unitary actor and analysing the processes

within and between societies that underlie state action; by broadening the range of

influence processes (and, indeed, of definitions of power) that play a role in

international politics; and by conceiving international conflict as a dynamic process,

shaped by changing realities, changing interests, and changing relationships between

the conflicting parties.

Social-psychological analysis can be particularly helpful in explaining why and how,

once a conflict has started, powerful forces are set in motion that promote the

escalation and perpetuation of conflict. Examples of forces perpetuating conflict

include the:

Formation of collective moods: public opinion on issues relating to a

protracted conflict is marked by shifts in collective mood. At different times

the mood may be optimistic or pessimistic, defiant or resigned, angry or

conciliatory.

Mobilisation of group loyalties: the arousal of nationalist and patriotic

sentiments by political leaders is a powerful tool in mobilising public support.

The display of national symbols evokes a strong emotional reaction that often

translates into automatic endorsement of leaders‘ policies.

Negotiation and bargaining processes: the norms governing political behaviour

in long-standing conflicts strongly encourage zero-sum thinking. As a result,

even when the parties have concluded that negotiations are in their own

interest, their actions inside and outside of the negotiating room often

undermine the process.

Formation of mirror images: when both parties, in mirror-image fashion,

perceive the enemy as harbouring hostile intentions in the face of their own

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vulnerability, their interaction produces a self-fulfilling dynamic. Under these

circumstances, it is difficult to discover common and complementary interests.

Resistance of images to contradictory information: conflict based interactions

– within and between the parties – inhibit the perception and the occurrence of

change in the other, and thus the opportunity to revise the enemy image.

Therefore the barriers to conflict resolution are strengthened by the escalatory, self-

perpetuating dynamic that characterises the interaction between conflict parties. To

overcome these barriers requires the promotion of a different kind of interaction, one

that is capable of reversing this conflict dynamic.

At the micro-level, problem solving workshops and similar approaches to

conflict resolution can help to encourage the parties to penetrate each other‘s

perspective, to differentiate their image of the enemy, to develop a de-

escalatory language and ideas for mutual reassurance, and to engage in joint

problem solving designed to generate ideas for resolving the conflict that are

responsive to the fundamental needs and fears of both sides.

At the macro-level, reversal of the conflict dynamic depends on the

establishment of a new discourse among the parties, characterised by a shift in

emphasis from power politics and threat of coercion to mutual responsiveness,

reciprocity, and openness to a new relationship.

Source: Kelman, H., 1997, 'Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict',

in Zartman, I.W. and Rasmussen, L. Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods

and Techniques., United States Institute of Peace Press, New York, pp. 192-237

Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Development: Policies to Reduce Inequalities

and Exclusion

A Langer (2007)

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Summary

What is the role of culture in violent conflict? Research on the causes of conflict has

focused on political and economic grievances. This paper from the Centre for Research

on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity relates conflict to horizontal inequalities

(inequalities between culturally defined groups). It identifies differential treatment and

recognition of groups‘ cultural practices and norms by the state as cultural status

inequalities. The most dangerous situations exist where all three dimensions of

horizontal inequality (HI) – socioeconomic, political and cultural status – run in the

same direction.

In many conflicts, political and economic issues are complemented by perceptions of

cultural discrimination, exclusion or inequality of treatment. Culture plays a

fundamental role in framing socioeconomic and political HI‘s, since it is a common

culture of identity which binds groups together. But the way different cultures are

treated by the state (and others) also forms an important HI. This can contribute to

group mobilisation independently of political or socioeconomic HI‘s or exacerbate

other factors.

There are three aspects to cultural status inequality:

Recognition of religious practices and observances: Official state religion,

state support for different religions, religious schooling and differing religious

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freedoms and rights contribute to inequality. Informal practices can also

privilege certain religions over others, even when the state is officially neutral

or secular.

Language and language recognition: The privileging of a language can signal

the dominance of those for whom it is a first language. Governments may

actively penalise the use of a minority language or designate a ‗national

language‘. Conflicts revolving around language have been notable in India,

where linguistic diversity has created status problems since independence.

Recognition of ethnocultural practices: State support for certain cultural

practices may be expressed in rituals of governance, recognition of customary

law, dress and appearance, national ‗heroes‘, festivals and holidays. State

attempts to remain neutral may be interpreted as de facto dominance of the

majority culture.

Cultural status inequalities are an important source of group mobilisation and

potentially violent conflict.

If the state attributes inferior status to certain cultural identities, members of

these groups are more likely to feel alienated from the state. They are also

more likely to mobilise along cultural lines to improve their groups‘ cultural

status.

Severe socioeconomic horizontal inequalities can persist for decades without

raising violent responses. But changes in cultural status inequalities can be

important in the politicisation of inequalities and can be a factor in group

mobilisation for violence.

The simultaneous presence of severe cultural status inequalities alongside

political and socioeconomic HI‘s represents an explosive situation. The

excluded political elites not only have strong incentives to mobilise their

supporters for violent conflict along cultural lines, but are likely to gain

support among cultural constituencies relatively easily.

Cultural status inequalities are potent triggers for group mobilisation because

of their inherent link to group identity. Symbolic events which reinforce

cultural status inequalities, such as the OrangeMarches in Northern Ireland,

can trigger group violence.

As mobilising agents, cultural status inequalities have direct resonance with

people. Environmental protests in Malaysia in the 1980ss generated little

mobilisation except where activists drew on ethnic discontent. The

relationship between cultural status inequalities and (violent) group

mobilisation can be more direct than other HIs because of the cultural

dimension of grievances.

Source: Langer, A. & Brown, G., 2007, 'Conflict Prevention and Peaceful

Development: Policies to Reduce Inequalities and Exclusion?', CRISE Working Paper

No. 41, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford

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'The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics': A Critique of Collier and

Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War

L Nathan (2005)

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Summary

Can recent cross-national statistical studies on the causes of civil war be trusted? The

most influential studies have been by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (C&H). This

paper from the Crisis States Research Centre argues that their research is filled with

empirical, methodological and theoretical problems that lead to unjustified

conclusions. They seek to ascertain the causes of civil war and the motives of rebels

without analysing civil wars and rebels.

C&H distinguish between political science, which relates rebellion to grievances, and

economic theory, which sees rebellion as motivated by greed. Statistical analysis leads

them to conclude that economic variables have more explanatory power than political

and social variables. Their findings have been reported in the media and cited in

governmental and international reports. But their unsubstantiated explanations of

results, incomplete, inaccurate and statistically biased data and analytical flaws

preclude an adequate understanding of the causes of civil war. The idea that

dependence on natural resources heightens a country‘s risk of war because it affords

rebels opportunity for extortion is not based on evidence; it is an inference drawn from

a correlation between the onset of civil war and the ratio of primary commodity

exports to Gross Domestic Product.

C&H‘s approach has numerous flaws:

To conduct a statistical analysis of the causes of civil war, C&H must find

numerical indicators for each of their variables. Many cannot be easily

captured numerically, leading to the use of arbitrary proxies.

In several cases, the proxies do not capture the relevant variable. Some

measures intended to test for opportunity could just as well be indicators of

grievance. Not one of C&H‘s variables entails an observation of rebel

behaviour.

Correlation does not imply causality. Relationships cannot be explained

without thorough investigation of context. The conclusions drawn by C&H

from their statistical analysis are speculative and based on untested

assumptions.

Problems of geographical scale, statistical bias and inaccurate and missing

data make C&H‘s study vulnerable to serious measurement errors and

artificial findings. As well as suspect interpretation, the correlations

themselves may be misleadingly false.

This critique is relevant to future attempts to analyse the causes of civil war:

Grievance and opportunity should not be seen as competing explanations for

rebellion. Opportunity can be created, seized, spurned or ignored depending on

motives and other causal factors.

C&H‘s quantitative method does not enable them to observe rebel behaviour

directly. They disregard evidence on the sources and cost of weaponry,

support from foreign governments, recruitment and financing of rebel soldiers

and documented cases of rebel extortion.

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C&H‘s information about the wars in their sample is similarly limited. They

do not examine the intensity and scope of the war, the way it is fought, events

leading up to it, rebel demands and popular support.

Limited to numerical data at the structural level, C&H ignore politics, history,

ideology, government decisions, regional contexts and repression. All are

critical to the causes and incidence of civil war.

In reality, civil wars have a range of different types of causes: structural

conditions, dynamic causes, catalytic events, actors‘ decisions and soldiers‘

motives. This framework highlights how narrow C&H‘s focus is.

Source: Nathan, Laurie, 2005, "The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics": A

Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War, Crisis States Development

Research Centre, Discussion Paper no. 11, London School of Economics, London

War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the Challenges of

Transformation

K Studdard (2004)

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Summary

What is the relationship between the regional dimensions of war economies and

peacebuilding in post-conflict situations? This report, published by the International

Peace Academy, argues that the failure to consider the regional dynamics of war

economies undermines peacebuilding efforts. Policy-makers should distinguish

between economic activities that pose a threat to peace processes and activities that

contribute to social and economic stability. Certain informal regional economic

activities that are presently ignored or criminalised should be incorporated into

peacebuilding and reconstruction strategies.

In the post-Cold War environment, the decline in superpower support has shaped the

self-financing nature of contemporary civil wars. Various actors have turned to the

exploitation of lucrative natural resources, illicit trade networks and informal

economies to support military efforts. Policymakers recognise that economic factors

may exacerbate and perpetuate civil conflict. However, little attention is paid to the

economic ‗spill over‘ or ‗spill into‘ effects of internal conflicts on neighbouring states.

A distinction is needed between informal regional economic networks that perpetuate

conflict and economic activities that contribute to peacebuilding efforts. A more

nuanced and complex understanding of the regional war economies should include the

following elements:

The combat economy, which exploits natural resources and illicit goods such

as drugs and small arms to sustain conflict and profit from war.

The shadow economy, which is motivated by the economic opportunism of

actors who thrive on the ability to operate outside the formal economy, but are

not necessarily committed to the pursuance of conflict.

The coping economy, which consists of individuals who seek to maintain a

basic level of economic subsistence in the absence of a functioning state.

The three-fold distinction between conflict, shadow and coping economies

simplifies a complex reality because war economies are intertwined and

coexist at various levels.

17

War economies are extremely resilient and rarely dissipate after the official

end of conflict. For example, ‗spoilers‘ that are marginalised by peace

processes continue to exploit weaknesses in the informal sector through

regional networks.

Shadow economies may become stronger in post-war situations if the state is

unable to govern effectively. In addition, members of the coping economy

often rely on war economies to provide for their economic and social

livelihoods.

Certain informal regional economic activities may contribute to social and

economic stability, including: shadow networks that can be incorporated into

the formal economy; natural resource industries; and informal economic and

trade activities, particularly traditional activities.

The failure to consider the regional dynamics of war economies undermines the

effectiveness of conflict management and peacebuilding efforts. Policy-makers should

adopt specific measures to integrate the regional aspects of war economies into post-

conflict strategies by:

Remedying the state-centric bias of peace processes by incorporating non-state

local and regional actors into peacebuilding efforts, particularly, actors from

regional formal and informal economies.

Devising strategies to deal with spoilers, which may involve co-opting spoilers

with a view to reintegrating them into the formal economy.

Improving regulatory effectiveness through region-wide economic

development programmes to address transnational shadow networks and

creating regional regulation that identifies the specific conflict commodities

that plague a region.

Addressing insecurity in borderland regions where marginalised populations

often rely on shadow activities for their survival. In the absence of formal

coping mechanisms, borderlands can be seized by those who resist peace.

Assisting war-torn societies to establish a functioning state with the capacity to

control its own finances, social programmes and institutional decision-making.

Recognising the limitations of donor policies that encourage minimal states.

Policies aimed at privatisation, foreign direct investment and deregulated

markets may have debilitating effects on peacebuilding.

Source: Studdard, K., 2004, 'War Economies in a Regional Context: Overcoming the

Challenges of Transformation', International Peace Academy, New York

The Inequality of Violence: On the Discovery of Civil War as a Threat to 'the

North' in the 1990s and the Debate over Causes and Solutions

S Woodward (2008)

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Summary

How has the new world order influenced Western understanding of economic

inequality and difference in the developing world? Poverty and cultural diversity have

emerged as two universalising explanations for violence in the contemporary world.

This paper traces the emergence of that school of thought and the study of civil war

which that critique is generating. There is an increasing distance between that research

and the public policies currently aimed at preventing or ending civil war.

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The interest, both public and academic, in armed conflict and civil war is being driven

by the security concerns of governments and citizens in the United States and other

wealthy, powerful countries of the North. The past 15 years have seen a transformation

in the perception of the poorer, less powerful countries of the South as a threat to

security in the North. The data do not support that view; warfare has been declining

since World War II – with the exception of wars instigated and led by the United

States.

The academic critique of the ethnic conflict and resource-predation arguments has not

only generated methodological advances but also our substantive knowledge about

civil war and political violence. Three trends are especially important:

A recognition that violence has characteristics of its own that cannot be

analysed in the same ways as politics in peacetime.

A search for alternative concepts and measures of inequality and cultural

difference.

A move to political explanations and an analysis of power.

However:

Political and criminal violence in the former East and the South remains

largely invisible in the study of conflict, separated from international relations

by sovereign borders.

Schools of thought that promote ethnic-conflict and economic causes do not

understand the violence of civil war.

The social relations of inequality are both economic (class) and cultural

(status) and the balance among these elements in a particular conflict depends

on the organisation of political power.

The processes leading to the breakdown in security and the mechanisms for its

restoration are little understood, still left to a security field that studies

militaries or a public policy world focusing on police.

Conclusions drawn from this paper include the following:

How political power shapes peoples‘ means and opportunities for satisfying

their material needs is particularly important.

The dynamic of power relations between the state and insurgents is beginning

to get the direct attention necessary in theory and research on civil war and

armed conflict.

Political factors turn out insignificant in quantitative studies because proxies

used to capture political factors are poorly measured.

Governments in developing countries are increasingly under US pressure to

develop capacity for the war on terror whilst public security within their

countries is increasingly deprived of financing.

Few ask why poor countries‘ export earnings are so high in natural resources

or how that gain is realised - the demand for such commodities and the market

links all come from the North.

Source: Woodward, S., 2005, 'The Inequality of Violence: On the Discovery of Civil

War as a Threat to "the North" in the 1990s and the Debate over Causes and Solutions',

Conference Paper, Conference on Difference and Inequality in Developing Societies,

April 21-23, 2005, American Political Science Association

19

Supplementary readings

Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political

Economy of Armed Conflict K Ballentine and H Nitzschke (2003)

Access full text online

Abstract

This policy report provides a synopsis of the key findings from case studies on the

political economy of armed intra-state conflicts, commissioned by the International

Peace Academy‘s program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW). These

findings offer lessons for improved policies for conflict prevention and resolution.

Source: Ballentine, K., and Nitzschke, H., 2003, ‗Beyond Greed and Grievance:

Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict‘,

International Peace Academy, New York

Greed and Grievance in Civil War

P Collier and A Hoeffler (2000)

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Summary

Are civil wars really caused by political repression, inequality, or religious and ethnic

differences? What roles do factors other than grievance play in rebellion? This paper

for the World Bank looks at the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars

during 1960-99.

Civil wars are now more common than international conflict. Of 25 armed conflicts in

2000, 23 were internal. Rebellion needs both motivation and opportunity. Political

science explains conflict in terms of motive. When grievances are sufficiently acute,

here is violent protest. Such grievances include inequality, oppression, religious and

ethnic tensions. A much smaller literature from economic theory models rebellion as

an industry that generates profit from looting.

Greed, not grievance, is the driving force, and opportunity is more important than

motive. The authors develop an econometric model for predicting the incidence of civil

wars, resting on the following factors:

Availability of finance. Dependence on primary commodity exports creates a

high risk of civil strife as rebels have opportunities for extortion. Diasporas

provide funding for rebel groups, and increase the risk of conflict renewal.

The cost of rebellion. Low income means there is less to lose by fighting.

Male secondary education enrolment, per capita income and growth rates have

statistically significant effects on conflict risk.

Military advantage. Dispersed populations, and mountainous terrain increase

the risk of conflict.

The risk of conflict is proportional to population. Opportunities increase with

population. Diversity also increases, but measurable aspects of this were not

found to contribute to civil war.

Ethnic tension. In the case of domination by one ethnic group, conflict risk

increases. This is the only grievance-based cause. Without a dominant ethnic

group, rebel cohesion becomes more costly and conflict risk goes down.

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Considering the opportunities for rebellion is more useful than using political,

grievance-based approaches. The economic model gives objectively verifiable

indicators, and is robust to a range of tests for outliers, alternative variable definition,

and variations in estimation method. Policy implications of this are implied, not stated:

Analysis of funding of rebels is crucial. Donors also need to consider how to

deal with and include diasporas to prevent conflict renewal.

Programmes that target male secondary education will reduce conflict risk by

increasing the costs of war.

Macro, meso, and micro level economic programmes will also reduce conflict

risk in this way. The reports findings may imply that wealth creation is more

significant than poverty reduction.

Where there is ethnic diversity, donor programmes should reduce or negate

dominance by one group.

Source: Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2000, ‗Greed and Grievance in Civil War‘, World

Bank, Washington DC

Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War

P Collier et al (2006)

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Summary

A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon

motivation and those that are built upon feasibility. This article from the Centre for the

Study of African Economies explores this distinction by analysing a comprehensive

global sample of civil wars between 1965 and 2004. The results substantiate the

‗feasibility hypothesis‘ which contends that where civil war is feasible, it will occur

without reference to motivation.

The defining feature of a civil war is large scale organised violence on the part of a

rebel army. In most circumstances, the establishment of a rebel army is prohibitively

expensive and extremely dangerous. The relatively rare circumstances in which

rebellion is materially feasible are therefore likely to constitute an important part of

any explanation of civil war. The article‘s ‗feasibility hypothesis‘ proposes that where

rebellion is materially feasible, it will occur, whilst the factors that explain rebel

agendas or grievances are incidental to the explanation of civil war.

The core results of previous analyses survive. Economic characteristics, such as the

level, growth and structure of income, matter. However, in the present analysis, three

new variables are included that have unambiguous interpretations:

Countries not under the French security umbrella: Between 1965 and 2004,

the former French colonies of Africa faced a risk of conflict of 2.9 per cent

(given the estimated coefficient), while they would have suffered a civil war

risk of 7.6 per cent if they had all the same characteristics except that of being

Francophone.

The proportion of young men in the population: A doubling in the proportion

of males aged between 15-29 increases the risk of conflict from 4.7 per cent to

31.9 per cent.

The proportion of terrain which is mountainous: War start observations are

characterised by a higher proportion of mountains (20.87 per cent) than

peaceful observations (15.71 per cent).

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These variables all have substantial effects. Two hypothetical and similar countries

without and with all these variables faced a respective risk of 0.5 per cent and 52.8 per

cent of civil war. These findings have a number of important implications for

policymakers:

Economic development remains critical for reducing the incidence of civil war

More attention needs to be paid to the feasibility of civil war, as opposed to

the grievances of the involved parties

International trade in primary commodities carries particular risks and so

warrants special measures, such as the Kimberley Process

If the incidence of civil war is to be reduced, it will need to be made more

difficult.

Source: Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D., 2006, 'Beyond Greed and Grievance:

Feasibility and Civil War', CSAE Working Paper Series, no. 10, Centre for the Study

of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford

Inequality and Conflict: A Review of an Age-old Concern

C Cramer (2005)

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Summary

What are the links between inequality and conflict? This United Nations Research

Institute for Social Development programme paper gives an overview of the main

currents of thinking in this field, and highlights the empirical weakness of the majority

of claims made. It goes on to argue for a relational analysis, and emphasises the role of

late development in understanding inequality and its consequences.

Claims about links between inequality and conflict are linked to different underlying

approaches to understandings of the origins of conflict. These links are not always

explicit, and this lack of clarity may lead to a problem of how elements of different

fundamental approaches may be combined.

There are three particularly useful ways of distinguishing between theories of violent

conflict:

(i) Theories prioritise either the role of contingency, or of inherent propensities

to violence

(ii) Theories are divided between ‗deprived-actor‘ explanations and ‗rational

actor‘ explanations

(iii) Theories emphasise either behaviour, ideas or relations.

Neoclassical economic theories of conflict are also notable, representing one strand of

rational-actor theory. They are somewhat inconsistent and allow for varying

distributional arguments.

Many claims have been made about the relationship between inequality and conflict,

generally based on looking for observable event regularities on the basis of

multicountry samples. This tests cross-sectional distributional data against the

incidence of various forms of violence. These claims tend to suffer from significant

empirical weaknesses.

Studies have found a linear relationship, arguing, for example, that inequality

harms growth by causing political instability. Other studies posit curvilinear

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relationships, which can take the form of a ‗u‘ or an inverted ‗u‘, exactly

mirroring each other.

Others emphasise local inequalities, and others claim inequality is not a

significant variable. There is also a distinction between those emphasising land

inequality and those emphasising income inequality.

The empirical problems with this kind of quantitative analysis are extreme.

Rankings among countries in terms of conventional inequality data are often

driven by variations in the quality, coverage and treatment of the data.

It is also difficult to empirically analyse violent political conflict: Reporting of

violence during conflict can suffer as systems that would record deaths often

break down, and there are also complications of interest.

There are also problems of how to classify events such as ‗civil wars‘, and

variations in classification can lead to substantial differences in the results of

regressions. It may also make sense to analyse a wider range of phenomena of

violence.

This leads to the conclusion that there are no grounds for accepting any ―event

regularity‖ across countries, that the pursuit of such claims is unlikely to be successful

and that the methodology is inappropriate. Instead, it is worth looking into the

processes, mechanisms and relations that generate inequality.

Hirschman proposed the working of a ‗tunnel effect‘ whereby envy was

suppressed as greater inequality gave information about social change that

could be interpreted as a signal of hope.

Stewart‘s idea of ‗horizontal inequality‘, meaning that between different

collective groups in society, emphasises the role of discriminatory social

relationships.

Tilly discusses tolerance for inequality, and inequality between social pairings

such as men and women, black and white being sustained by social

mechanisms and exploitation. In this approach, exclusion is not simply a

negative, but a relational factor.

However, even in these relational accounts the fundamental developmental

perspective is not emphasised. During development the fundamental

institutional arrangements of power and exploitation may be in flux and at

stake. They may be seen in class terms, although political mobilisation often

takes other identity forms.

Source: Cramer, C., 2005, 'Inequality and Conflict: A Review of an Age-old Concern',

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva

Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies

M Duffield (2000)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the relation between globalization and the development

of protracted internal and regionalized forms of conflict in the South. In particular, it

analyzes what can be called war economies in terms of them being adaptive structures

based on networked forms of parallel and trans-border trade. Although globalization

has not caused war economies, market liberalization has encouraged the deepening and

expansion of all forms of transborder activity. The extralegal mercantilist basis of most

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war economies gives them a number of shared characteristics. Apart from illiberalism,

these include a dependence on external markets for realizing local assets and,

importantly, as a source for all forms of essential nonlocal supplies and services. This

dependence raises the prospect of developing new forms of market regulation as a

structural means of conflict resolution. So far, this remains a relatively underdeveloped

area of inquiry.

Source: Duffield, M., 2000, ‗Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies,‘

In Mats Berdal and David M, Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas

in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 69-89

Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement

S Lischer (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

Violent conflict causes millions of people to flee their homes every year. The resulting

displacement crises not only create logistical and humanitarian nightmares, these crises

threaten international security and risk the lives of displaced people, aid workers, and

peacekeepers. Despite the dangers posed by conflict-induced displacement, scholars,

policy makers and international organizations usually have only a partial understanding

of these crises. Conflict-induced displacement consists of two main factors: 1) The

violence that caused the displacement and 2) The characteristics of the resulting

displacement crisis. Many observers fail to disaggregate each factor; rather lumping all

types of violence together or viewing displaced people as an undifferentiated mass.

This paper demonstrates that disaggregation of both concepts-causes of conflict-

induced displacement and characteristics of a crisis - is necessary to understand fully

the importance of displacement in international politics. The paper develops typologies

to analyze those concepts and discusses the implications for future research on

conflict-induced displacement.

Source: Lischer, S. K., 2007, ‗Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced

Displacement‘, in Civil Wars, vol. 9, no. 2 (June), pp. 142-155

What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?

M Ross (2003)

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Summary

What is the relationship between natural resources and violent conflict? What causal

mechanisms produce these outcomes? This study by the University of California

reviews recent cross-national econometric and qualitative studies. It suggests that

collectively they imply four underlying regularities in the relationship between natural

resources and civil war. There is a wealth of data on causal links in specific conflicts

but it is difficult to generalise. There are plausible theories behind each of the patterns,

though efforts to test them are still in their infancy.

Since the late 1990s, there has been a flood of research on natural resources and civil

war. There is little agreement on the validity of the resource-civil war correlation.

Quantitative studies of natural resources and civil war have been shadowed by

24

concerns about misspecification. The natural resource-civil war correlation could be

spurious: both civil war and resource dependence might be independently caused by

some unmeasured third variable, such as the weak rule of law. Several studies have

emphasised that we still know little about the processes that tie natural resources to

conflict. Observers often claim that resources have "fuelled" a given conflict but are

vague about how this occurred. General, cross-national studies often suggest causal

mechanisms but provide little evidence to back them up.

The process of resource extraction sometimes leads to low-level violence but these

low-level conflicts rarely lead to larger civil wars. Resource rents may increase the

desire of nascent rebels to capture the state, but not their ability to do so or even to

initiate a civil war. Rebel groups often face credit constraints: just because the value of

victory is high does not mean rebels can raise more money for arms and men. A

resource-rich government may also be better able to suppress rebellions. Oil

dependence and non-fuel mineral dependence tend to increase government spending on

the military.

The weight of the evidence available so far suggests several regularities. Not every

cross-national study fits these regularities. Nevertheless, they are the strongest findings

to emerge so far from this rapidly growing field:

Oil dependence appears linked to the initiation of conflict, but not conflict

duration.

There is some evidence that oil dependence (and possibly mineral

dependence) is more strongly associated with separatist conflicts than other

types of conflicts.

Gemstones, opium, coca, cannabis, and other lootable goods are not linked to

the initiation of conflict, but they do seem to lengthen pre-existing wars.

Timber's role remains untested.

There is no statistical evidence and very little case study evidence linking

agricultural commodities to either the initiation or the duration of civil war.

The claim that primary commodities are associated with the onset of civil war

is not robust.

Some of the differences in quantitative studies are due to variations in the ways

databases code civil wars. Reconciling these findings would help identify which of the

resource-conflict relationships are truly robust. Research that contributes to better

policies is needed. This includes:

Well reasoned arguments about what can and should be done to sever the link

between commodities and conflict must be systematically tested.

A comprehensive study of how civil wars in resource-exporting states may be

linked to other elements in the resource curse.

Testing how the physical qualities of a resource, and its geographic location,

influence the likelihood it will produce conflict.

Source: Ross, M., 2003, 'What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil

War?', University of California, Los Angeles

25

1.2 Political analysis (power relations, political systems and

institutions, elections etc.)

Core readings

Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors of and Dynamics of Instability

UK Cabinet Office (2005)

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Summary

What makes a country at risk of instability? This paper from the Prime Minister‘s

Strategy Unit looks at factors driving political, economic and social instability. These

include country capacity, risk factors, external stabilising factors and the feedback loop

of instability into risk factors. Evidence of instability reveals the importance of elites,

institutions and natural resources. The number and intensity of conflicts can and has

been reduced through short-term preventative measures, long-term economic

development and the creation of democratic political institutions.

Describing a country or region as unstable suggests the presence of political,

economic, or social upheaval. A simple framework can be used to structure analysis of

stability. This focuses attention on risk factors and the vicious cycle of conflict eroding

country capacity and thus reducing stability. In order to meet the challenges posed by

countries at risk of instability, we need to understand what drives political instability,

poor economic performance and violent conflict.

Long term factors like trade and geography and medium-term factors such as

political and economic institutions determine economic success and failure.

Political and economic institutions are shaped by the actions of elites.

Countries undergoing political transitions face a high risk of instability.

Constraints on ruling elites and the degree of public participation in polity are

important in determining political stability. Bureaucracies can help preserve

stability.

Economic development often precedes democracy but is not sufficient for it to

take root. This is partly due to natural resources. Petrowealth, for example, can

retard democratisation.

Poverty, fragile political institutions and recent violent conflict are all

associated with intra-state violence. Elites draw on group identities and

grievances to further their interests. Civil conflict breeds its own conditions by

criminalising the economy and weakening institutions that can mediate social

conflict.

Economic growth requires good quality political and economic institutions.

Institutions set the incentives for elites and constrain their behaviour so they

act in the interest of the majority.

‗Point source‘ natural resources (e.g. oil and minerals) can contribute to

economic stagnation or decline. While natural resources can have a positive

effect on growth, this is often outweighed by indirect misallocation effects and

indirect political economy effects.

Lessons emerge for conflict prevention and peacebuilding:

Instability depends on a complex chain of events and interactions. But

assessment and monitoring of risk factors enables early response. Increasing a

26

country's capacity to manage and adapt to change is at the centre of creating

stability.

In the short term, conflicts can be shortened and reduced in intensity through

preventative diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, and cutting financial flows

to protagonists.

In the long run, a twin-track approach of economic development and the

creation of democratic political institutions is best for conflict prevention.

While good policies are important for growth, long-term changes in income

levels are not achievable without strong political and economic institutions.

When faced with resource allocation decisions, the high risk of civil war in

post-conflict countries justifies a focus on preventing conflicts recurring.

While capacity is low in these situations, there is a greater opportunity to

reshape institutions.

Donors have sometimes proffered misleading advice by being inflexible over

the forms of institutional reform they will support. Donors may also have

induced instability through the timing of their support.

Source: Prime Minister's Office Strategy Unit, 2005, Countries at Risk of Instability:

Risk Factors of and Dynamics of Instability', Cabinet Office, London

Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War

J Fearon and D Laitin (2003)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

What factors lead to civil war? Is there a link between civil conflicts and ethnicity? In

contrast to traditional views, this paper from Stanford University argues that the

current prevalence of civil wars results from the steady accumulation of protracted

crises from the 1950s and 1960s onwards, rather than recent changes in the post-Cold

War world system. Moreover, issues such as poverty, political instability and weak

states contribute to the outbreak of civil wars as they favour rebel recruitment and lead

to corrupt counterinsurgency practices.

Between 1945 and 1999, there were over 127 civil wars - leading to a significantly

higher number of deaths and refugee flows than interstate conflicts. However, civil

wars have been given less attention than interstate wars. Ethnicity, political grievances

and the end of the Cold War have historically been cited as factors leading to civil

wars. However, civil conflict can be viewed in terms of insurgency that is

characterised by small, lightly armed groups engaged in guerilla warfare from rural

bases.

Civil conflict has emerged as a result of long-term trends and as an

accumulation of protracted tensions, rather than sudden changes in the post-

Cold War international system.

The existence of poverty, weak states, political instability and large

populations leads to conditions that favour insurgency and recruitment to rebel

groups.

Fragile states are unable or unwilling to control internal conflicts due to weak

local policing and corrupt counterinsurgency practices.

27

Ethnic and religious diversity does not necessarily lead to civil conflict in a

country, despite the fact that rebel groups are often mobilised along ethnic

lines during warfare.

There is little evidence that the absence of democracy and respect for civil

liberties and minority groups leads to the outbreak of civil war.

Further research is needed on the factors that lead to internal conflicts. Donors and

policy-makers should reconsider traditional assumptions about the factors that lead to

civil wars. This should include:

Understanding the structural conditions that give rise to insurgency such as

weak states and high levels of poverty.

Promoting democracy and respect for ethnic and religious minorities as

legitimate foreign policy goals, but at the same time, recognising that there

may not be an immediate link between these objectives and the prevention of

civil wars.

Funding anti-corruption measures in developing countries and encouraging

legal accountability within the military and police.

Making aid to governments fighting civil wars conditional on guarantees that

counterinsurgency practices will discourage the recruitment of militias by

rebel groups.

Monitoring the counterinsurgency policies of developing countries. Countries

which perpetuate civil war should be viewed as candidates for "neo-

trusteeship" under the United Nations or regional organisations such as NATO

and the European Union.

Reviewing existing trusteeships such as Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor to

improve internal coordination among the diverse actors involved in these

operations.

Source: Fearon, J. and Laitin, D., 2003, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,

American Political Science Review 97(1):75-90

The State and Internal Conflict

R Jackson (2001)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

What are the causes of contemporary international conflicts? How does current

perception of them affect international conflict resolution efforts? This paper by

Manchester University suggests that internal conflict is a 'normal' aspect of weak state

politics. It argues that conflict resolution must be focused on state reconstruction

activities, rather than on saving failing states. It also suggests that there are likely to be

many more internal conflicts that demand international action in the future.

Internal conflicts have their origin in domestic rather than systemic factors and involve

politically-motivated violence, primarily within the boundaries of a single state. They

can become a threat to international peace and security when the fighting spills over

into neighbouring states or refugee flows upset regional stability. Once confined to

'area studies', research into the causes and outcomes of internal conflicts has recently

emerged as an important focus of international relations. Today, internal conflicts are

conceived of as irrational outbursts of 'ethnic' hatred, or the breakdown of normally

peaceful political systems. However, internal conflicts are, in fact, located in the

28

structures of weak states and the actions of weak state elites, who may deliberately

engender conflict as a rational response to the internal and external demands brought

on by the intrusive processes of globalisation.

The weak state framework not only provides a more satisfying explanation of internal

conflict, but it has profound implications for conflict resolution.

Internal conflicts are now the primary security threat in international relations.

The international conflict resolution system, based as it is on diplomacy,

intergovernmental organisations, and international legal processes, is proving

inadequate for dealing with internal conflicts.

The present system is state-centric in focus and so poses formidable problems

for dealing with conflicts involving non-state actors.

It is also oriented towards the short-term goal of conflict management, rather

than the more durable long-term goal of conflict resolution.

The most important consequence of this approach is the frequent failure of

negotiated political settlements— conflict management—to prevent the

continuation or re-eruption of internal violence in the political life of weak

states.

Presently, Sudan, Angola, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Israel are in

the grip of post-settlement conflict. Bosnia, Georgia, Cambodia, Mozambique,

and Chad, exist in a precarious condition, perpetually on the brink of a return

to large-scale conflict.

It is now clear that what is required is an integrated approach which can deal with both

the manifestations of conflict (e.g. the violence) and its underlying cause—the weak

state.

Getting to the root of internal conflict involves reconstructing weak states and

weak state politics.

Clearly, such an approach entails the commitment of vast amounts of

resources, not to mention political will.

However, in the long run, such an effort would prove more cost-effective than

mounting numerous costly humanitarian interventions of the kind attempted in

Somalia and East Timor.

Although many of the strategies are already being tried in internal conflicts

around the world, they are being undertaken as adjuncts to diplomatic efforts,

and in a piecemeal manner.

As long as state reconstruction strategies are secondary to international

conflict resolution efforts in weak states, durable peaceful solutions will

continue to remain elusive.

Source: Jackson R., 2001, ‗The State and Internal Conflict‘, Australian Journal of

International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 65-81

29

Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-

first Century

E Mansfield and J Snyder (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Is democratisation to best way to promote peace? This research from the United States

Institute of Peace argues that the world would probably be safer if there were more

mature democracies but, in the transition to democracy, countries become more

aggressive and war prone. The international community should be realistic about the

dangers of encouraging democratisation where the conditions are unripe. The risk of

violence increases if democratic institutions are not in place when mass electoral

politics are introduced.

When authoritarian regimes break down and mass politics begin, democratic

procedures are likely to be manipulated by both rising and declining elites to rally

support from the newly empowered masses. Nationalist or other populist ideologies,

occurring at early stages of democratic transition, can lead to international and internal

violence. Incomplete democratisation occurring in the face of weak government

institutions undermines the state‘s ability to manage elite interests and newly

politicised mass groups. Political institutions are unable to resolve conflicts of interest

growing from demands for political participation, thereby creating the conditions for

violent conflict. Unless the state inherits strong political institutions at the outset,

turbulence is hard to avoid during the first step on the road to democracy.

Several key factors influence the tendency towards violence in transitional

democracies.

Democratising states are often initiators of war, not because war is popular with

the public but because domestic pressures create incentives for threatened elites

to inflame nationalist sentiment.

A weakening of the state‘s authority in the early stages of democratisation

deepens the political paralysis and leads to recklessness among the ruling elite.

Nationalism unites elites and masses, distracting attention from class divisions.

The masses, once mobilised by passionate nationalist appeals, are difficult to

control.

Premature electoral competition is often an occasion for violence and plays into

the hands of nationalist demagogues.

Unleashing Islamic mass opinion through democratisation might raise the

likelihood of war, since the institutional preparations for democracy are weak.

Although countries are more likely to go to war in the transition to democracy, this

does not mean that democratisation should be halted for the sake of peace. However,

proponents of democratisation should advance cautiously.

The timing of efforts to promote democracy should be carefully weighed. It

should focus on countries where conditions are ripe.

The sequence of transition should begin with institution building and end with

open electoral competition. This sequence is likely to minimise the undesirable

side effects of democratisation.

It is important to study states such as Britain and South Africa where

democratisation occurred without triggering nationalist mobilisation.

Where institutions are lacking they can sometimes be easily built, for example

in richer countries with high literacy and high citizen skills or where there is a

legacy of legal, administrative or journalistic institutions.

30

Source: Mansfield, E.D., J. Snyder, 2007 'Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging

Democracies Go to War in the Twenty-first Century', in Crocker, C., F.O. Hampson,

and P. All (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided

World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 161-176. United States

Institute of Peace Press

Political Underdevelopment: What Causes Bad Governance?

M Moore (2001)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

What are the causes of bad governance? Is political underdevelopment largely due to

the ways in which interactions with the ‗metropolitan countries‘ have shaped, and

continue to shape, poor countries? This paper from the Institute of Development

Studies argues that ‗bad governance‘ is made, not born, and ‗we‘ (in the North) play a

part in creating and maintaining it.

The political underdevelopment that is characteristic of much of the ‗South‘ largely

results from the ways in which states have been created and political authority shaped

through interactions with the wealthier ‗core‘ countries in the context of global

economic and political systems. Political underdevelopment stems, to a large degree,

from low levels of dependence of state elites on their own citizens. Poor world states

are relatively homogenous in their formal organisational characteristics. The

heterogeneity in the actual functioning of states stems largely from wide differences in

patterns of state-society relations.

The degree of dependence of states on citizens is the most significant element in this

pattern. Low levels of dependence of states on citizens are found in three main types of

circumstances. These circumstances overlap a great deal in practice, but are best

treated as separate for analytical purposes:

Where state elites enjoy strong external financial and/or military support even

when they are in conflict with many of their own citizens.

Where states are dependent on ‗unearned income‘. ‗Earned income‘ is when

the state has to put in organisational and political effort in working with

citizens to get its money. Unearned income generally comes from mineral

revenues or overseas aid.

Where state elites, and sometimes their challengers, have abundant resources

and scope to purchase supportive military force that can be used against their

own citizens.

In some countries it has been relatively easy in recent decades to exercise a

kind of state power by purchasing military force with the proceeds of sales of

valuable commodities on global markets.

The low dependence of poor-world states on their own citizens, in any of these forms,

is possible only because of the great political and economic inequalities between states

at the global level. Poor-world states have been created and shaped through

interactions with the wealthier and more powerful ‗core‘ countries. Several evident

policy implications arise from this:

31

Poor countries need to tax themselves more. There is no convincing evidence

that, on a country by country basis, increases in aid levels actually reduce the

effective tax effort.

However, it is clear that in aggregate governments of poor countries reap an

unusually low proportion of GNP in the form of taxes.

Doing something about that would also provide the (reliable) resources they

need to tackle poverty and deprivation.

There is a need for more effective restrictions on international arms sales and

on international purchases of commodities from ‗tainted‘ sources.

We should be less concerned with manipulating state institutions of poor

countries in the name of ‗good governance‘, and put more effort into creating

the environmental conditions that will encourage the emergence of more

productive state-society relations.

Source: Moore, M. 2001, 'Political Underdevelopment: What Causes Bad

Governance?', Public Management Review, vol. 1, issue 3, pp. 385-418.

Supplementary readings

State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure

M Ayoob (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its

aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of

course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has

become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in

Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United

Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defense and security organizations such as

NATO and the OSCE.

At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,

weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to

threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are

traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement

still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts

and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our

institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or

NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these

questions are addressed in this new volume.

Source: Ayoob, M, 2007, ‗State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,‘ in

Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict

Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace,

pp. 95-114.

32

On the Etiology of Internal War

H Eckstein (1972)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

Internal war" is a resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution,

rulers, or politicies; it is the genus of which revolution, uprising, Jacquerie, etc., are

the species. The historical literature on the causes of internal wars is chaotic because

historians have simply produced facts about any aspect of pre-revolutionary society

which intuitively seemed significant. The real significance of these facts can only

emerge from broader comparative studies. Such studies should be focussed on the

preconditions of internal war rather than the (inevitably unique) precipitants and on

changes in the elite holding power. Obstacles to internal wars must also be considered.

Only a theory comprehending both positive and negative forces will prevent piling up

of unrelated ad hoc theories and unhistorical disregard for special forces in particular

cases.

Source: Eckstein, Harry. ‗On the Etiology of Internal War,‘ in Anger, Violence and

Politics. Ivo Feierabend. Prentice Hall, 1972, ch 1.

Roots of Civil War: Tick ‘all of the above’

J Hanlon (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

More than two hundred wars have been fought in the past half century. Nearly all have

been civil wars, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, more than thirty civil

wars were being fought. The ―rules‖ of interstate war do not apply; each atrocity

provokes retribution, and civil war takes on a brutal dynamic of its own. Civil War,

Civil Peace challenges common but simplistic explanations of war, including greed,

gender, and long-standing religious or ethnic hatreds, which ignore that these groups

have lived together in peace for centuries. When a cease-fire is arranged, aid workers,

military personnel, diplomats, and others pour in from the United States, Europe, and

international agencies. Outside help is essential after a war, but too often, well-

intentioned interveners do more harm than good. A half of civil wars have resumed

after failed peace agreements. Each war is different, and there can be no intervention

handbook or best practices guide. Aimed at practitioners and policy makers, and

essential reading for students of war, humanitarian intervention, peace building, and

development, Civil War, Civil Peace provides a comprehensive examination of how

interventions can be improved through a better understanding of the roots of war and

of the grievances and interests that fueled the war.

Source: Hanlon, J., 2007, ‗Roots of Civil War: tick ‗all of the above‘. In Yanacopulos,

H. and Hanlon, J. (eds.), Civil War, Civil Peace. Open University in association with

James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens OH, pp. 72-94

33

The Ontology of Political Violence

S Kalyvas (2003)

Access full text online

Abstract

I discuss several conceptual problems raised by current understandings of political

violence, especially as they pertain to actions, motivations, and identities in civil wars.

Actions ―on the ground‖ often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts rather

than the war's driving (or ―master‖) cleavage. The disjunction between dynamics at the

top and at the bottom undermines prevailing assumptions about civil wars, which are

informed by two competing interpretive frames, most recently described as ―greed and

grievance.‖ Rather than posit a dichotomy between greed and grievance, I point to the

interaction between political and private identities and actions. Civil wars are not

binary conflicts, but complex and ambiguous processes that foster the ―joint‖ action of

local and supralocal actors, civilians, and armies, whose alliance results in violence

that aggregates yet still reflects their diverse goals. It is the convergence of local

motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil wars with their particular and

often puzzling character, straddling the divide between the political and the private, the

collective and the individual.

Source: Kalyvas, S.V., 2003, ‗The Ontology of Political Violence.‘ In Perspectives on

Politics, Vol. 1:3 (September), pp. 475-494.

Power, Social Violence, and Civil Wars

C King (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its

aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of

course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has

become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in

Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United

Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defense and security organizations such as

NATO and the OSCE.

At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,

weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to

threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are

traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement

still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts

and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our

institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or

NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these

questions are addressed in this new volume.

Source: King, C, 2007, ‗Power, Social Violence, and Civil Wars.‘ in Crocker, C.,

Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in

a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 115-130.

34

The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States

W Reno (2005)

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Abstract

In violent conflicts in places like Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, economic interests

have crowded out ideologically articulate mass-based social movements for reform or

revolutionary change to a degree that was not apparent during earlier anti-colonial

struggles. Some scholars offer a ‗looting model‘ of rebellion that explains the

predations of politicians and warlords but it is not clear why people who receive few

benefits from this – or even suffer great harm from them – fail to support ideologues

instead, or why self-interested violent entrepreneurs do not offer political programmes

to attract more followers. Yet some groups defy this ‗looting model‘. Explaining why

armed groups vary so greatly in their behaviour provides a means to address important

questions: is it possible to construct public authorities out of collapsed states in the

twenty-first century, or do local predations and global conditions preclude indigenous

state-building in these places? Why do social movements for reform there seem so

ineffective? What conditions have to be present for them to succeed? This article

considers the nature of rebellion in failing states, focusing on Nigeria to find clues to

explain variations in the organization of armed groups.

Source: Reno, W., 2005, ‗The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States‘,

Government and Opposition, vol. 40, no. 2 (spring), pp. 127-151

Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War

T Sisk (2008)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

No abstract available

Source: Sisk, T. D., 2008, ‗Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil

War‘ in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar

Peace Operations (Routledge, forthcoming in 2008).

Democratisation and Armed Conflict

M Soderberg Kovacs and T Ohlson (2003)

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Summary

What is the relationship between democratisation and armed conflict? What role can

development assistance play in relation to this? This paper by Uppsala University

seeks to challenge prevailing conceptions about the process of democratisation and to

analyse how that process relates to state building, institution-building, civil society and

the security sector. The focus is on the potential for political violence in the context of

democratisation processes. It concludes that there is a need for a general reassessment

among donors.

The recipe for transitions to democracy and liberalisation has up to now been a fairly

streamlined one, aimed at attaining the Weberian state model. However, recent

findings on democratic transitions suggest that there is nothing automatic about the

35

process of democratisation. The realisation of normative goals depends crucially on a

number of things, such as the presence of rule of law, general conditions for a mutually

reinforcing alliance between an entrepreneurial class, a vibrant civil society and a vital,

strong and proactive state apparatus. Success depends on whether or not the specific

conditions into which a process of transition towards democracy is introduced are

being taken into account. Consequently, the achievement of a responsible and

legitimate system of rule is a complex and hazardous process.

The nature of the problem of democratising weak states has several interlinked

dimensions:

While democracy is a method of resolving societal conflicts in a non-violent

manner, the route to it is a conflict-generating process.

The structural conditions for moving from democratisation to democracy are

often lacking in weak states. The conflict potential is entrenched in structurally

conditioned grievances.

If there is no harmony between a political culture and political structure, the

imposition of an alien political structure is doomed to fail.

The suggested political structure is simplistic and generalised, whereas the

political culture into which it is inserted has certain perverse and counter-

productive features.

Proposed structure and existing culture have to be modified to achieve success

in the transition to democracy. Such modifications are also conflict generating.

Systems of patronage constitute a formidable societal force. It is important to

make the positive elements part of the solution, rather than the key problem to

be eliminated.

There are powerful arguments for continuing assistance to the democratisation process.

However, donors must reassess how, with what purposes and with which effects, their

funds are spent.

The risk of generating counterproductive outcomes such as facade democracy,

autocracy or war must be minimised. It is dangerous to move to multi-party

elections too fast and to export a particular democratic structure.

The debate on whether the state or civil society should be supported in a

democratisation process should be terminated. It is necessary to support both.

Processes of decentralisation should only be supported under certain

conditions. A state apparatus that is an empty shell is pointless to decentralise.

Donors should seek to assist in curbing the negative effects of

neopatrimonialism, including political exclusion, rewarding loyalty instead of

efficiency and corruption.

The security sector and its role in the process of democratisation should be

effectively managed. The emergence of a just taxation system, improved

administrative capacities and the rule of law should be assisted.

The likelihood of successful donor support would increase immensely if there

could be more coordination and less chauvinism and ignorance among donors.

Source: Soderberg Kovacs, M. and Ohlson, T., 2003, ‗Democratisation and Armed

Conflict‘, Swedish International Development Agency, Sweden.

36

Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War

S Tarrow (2007)

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Abstract

―Inside Insurgencies‖? An odd title for a review of four books that deal with one of

the most wide-ranging, violent, and protracted forms of contentious politics the world

has known—civil wars. Should we not care more about their impact on citizens at

large, their effects on national politics, and their creation of instability in the

international system than on their interior lives? But think of the conflicts among

communists, anarchists and others in the Spanish Republic: They inhibited the

republic's capacity to resist the assaults of Franco's forces. No adequate understanding

of that country's civil war could have excluded these ―internal‖ relations.

Source: Tarrow, Sidney, 2007, "Inside insurgencies: politics and violence in an age of

civil war", Vol.5, No.3, September 2007, Perspectives on Politics.

1.3 De-escalation of violent conflict

Core readings

What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War

A Suhrke and I Samset (2007)

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Summary

It is often said that a country that has experienced civil war has a 50 per cent chance of

sliding back within five years. Indeed, the UN has used this figure in preparation for its

Peacebuilding Commission. However, the authors of this figure have since revised

their original estimate to 23 per cent. This paper examines the process whereby

academic findings become accepted wisdom and warns against the wholesale adoption

of such figures by policymakers.

In the UN system, forces favouring a stronger international peacebuilding regime

seized upon the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. In 2002, they published an

article which investigated ‗peace duration‘, defined as ‗the number of months since the

end of the previous conflict, or since 1945‘. It concluded that ‗shortly after a conflict,

on average, countries face a 50 per cent risk of renewed conflict during the next five

years‘. However, changes in definition and methodology can produce radically

different estimates. In such cases, we need to understand why this is so, what the

changes imply and which estimates, and in what form, are presented to policymakers.

If the figure expresses the average risk of recurrent war with the civil-war group

within a given period then a significantly lower figure is produced. Taking this

definition and using the same data set as Collier and his team covering the period

1960-99, the results are as follows:

Of the 49 countries listed, civil war did not recur at all in about half the cases

within the entire 40-year period

37

Of the remaining cases, a second civil war did occur in 12 countries but after

the first five-year period of peace. For example, after 1962, Algeria did not

experience another war until 1991

In only 13 cases did a second civil war recur within the first five-year period

giving a recidivism rate of around 26 percent.

Similar work by Barbara Walter using the same data set but for a longer period (1945-

96) also estimated a lower recurrence rate. She concluded that single wars rather than

recurrent conflict was the norm. Collier and his associates have continued to work on

civil war recurrence. Based on the changes in methodology and data in a 2006 study,

they estimated a recurrence rate of 20.6 per cent for the first four years after the

previous war had ended. In the revised version of the same paper two months later, this

figure came out at 23 per cent. Yet, these new figures have received little comment

even though changes in conclusions of this kind have important ethical and policy

implications.

Policymakers may not wish to know about the finer points of methodology, but

they do need proper caveats about the soundness and durability of a given

formula.

Findings should be interpreted with great caution in areas where little work has

been done and where a particular set of authors has dominated the agenda.

Researchers have a responsibility to present their methods and data for

evaluation and scrutiny by others. They also need to explain any divergence

between previous figures.

The lower figures produced by the revised data would point towards a less

intrusive model of international peacebuilding.

Source: Suhrke, A. and Samset, I., 2007, 'What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of

Civil War', International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 195-203

Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline

A Mack (2007)

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Summary

Why are there fewer conflicts today? This paper, published by the International Peace

Academy, reviews global trends in political violence since the end of World War II

and examines the decline in conflict numbers following the end of the Cold War. The

single most compelling explanation for the decline in conflict is the upsurge in

peacemaking and peacebuilding activities begun in the early 1990s by international

institutions, donor governments and civil society organisations.

The incidence of violent conflict has fallen rapidly following the end of the Cold War;

falling by some 40% between 1992 and 2005. There has also been a decline in the

number of genocides, wars between countries and military coups. This global pattern

has gone largely unnoticed in the media, much of the policy community and also parts

of the research community.

During the Cold War, armed conflict included wars between government and non-state

actors and extra-state wars of liberation from colonial rule. The overwhelming majority

of post-Cold War armed conflicts have been intrastate, or civil, wars.

38

Wars have become less deadly. The average number of battle deaths per conflict per

year was 38,000 in 1950 and 700 in 2005 – a 98% decrease. However, post-Cold War

civilian deaths, including humanitarian workers, account for 90% of total deaths,

compared with 50% in World War II.

International terrorism has altered the post-Cold War conflict landscape. After an

increase in international terrorism from 1968-1991 and a subsequent decline by the end

of the 1990s, there were four times as many terrorist incidents in 2004 as there were in

2000. Global incidence of domestic terrorism also increased dramatically over the

same period.

There are three major reasons for the post-Cold War decline in armed conflict:

The end of colonialism removed a major source of political violence from the

international system. Anti-colonial struggles were replaced in some cases by

struggles for control of the new post-colonial states, but many of these had

been resolved by the end of the 1980s.

The end of the Cold War removed another source of conflict – ideological

rivalry – from the international system. Washington and Moscow stopped

fuelling proxy wars in the developing world; the threat of war between major

powers vanished.

The single most compelling explanation for the decline in combat is the

substantial increase in missions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and

peace operations. The success rate of many of these missions has not been

impressive; however, even low success rates are an improvement over the

Cold War years when such activities were notable for their absence.

However, there are still substantial reasons for concern about current conflict around

the world:

A total of 56 conflicts are currently active.

With the exception of Sub-Sahara Africa, all other regions saw an increase in

conflict between 2002 and 2005.

A significant number of current peace agreements are certain to fail.

―Root cause‖ drivers of conflict, such as weak state capacity and extreme

social and economic inequality, remain unchanged or are worsening.

Peacemaking and peacekeeping operations remain under-resourced and risk

being overstretched.

Despite the decline in armed conflict since the end of the Cold War, there is no

room for complacency; it could be reversed in the near future.

Source: Mack, A., 2007, 'Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War

Decline', Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy,

New York

Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An Enquiry

C R Mitchell (2005)

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Summary

What is the relationship between conflict and change? How can an understanding of

this relationship help resolve conflicts? This paper from the Research Centre for

Constructive Conflict management sets out a framework for thinking systematically

39

about conflict and change. This distinguishes between change that: produces conflict,

exacerbates conflict, reduces conflict or resolves conflict. While protracted conflict

imposes numerous constraints, one universal factor can lead to change: the fact that

human beings learn and, through learning, change.

As the term ‗protracted conflicts‘ suggests, many deep-rooted social conflicts become

trapped in a repetitive pattern of interaction; usually the exchange of violent behaviour.

The conflict continues because it was there yesterday. In order to bring about changes

in the minds of decision makers and opinion leaders, they must be in an environment

where they can contemplate new ideas, innovative alternatives and realistic options.

Change can relate to conflict formation, escalation, mitigation or resolution.

Three aspects of change are important in generating conflict: The nature of the

change, the intensity of the change and the rapidity of the change. Major,

sudden, unexpected, rapid or irreversible changes are likely to have the most

effect on generating or modifying protracted conflicts.

Escalation refers to changes in the intensity and frequency of coercive and

violent behaviour. Other dynamics involved in the intensification of conflict

include: mobilisation, enlargement (pulling in other parties), polarisation and

dissociation.

Another dynamic of protracted conflicts is entrapment. Parties (especially

leaders) become trapped in a course of action than involves continuing or

intensifying conflict, with little chance of changing policy.

In theory, de-escalation, de-mobilisation, de-isolation, disengagement, re-

communication and de-commitment are conflict mitigating dynamics. There

will obviously be obstacles to the shift from an exacerbating dynamic to a

mitigating one.

There are four types of obstacles to change as a means of overcoming conflict:

Policy determinants, psychological determinants, social determinants and

political determinants.

Basic methods are suggested for bringing about change that is likely to lead towards

conflict resolution or transformation:

Changing leaders: ‗Regime change‘ seems to bring about more conflicts than

it resolves. But the change from one leadership group to another can bring in

individuals who are not as tied to past policies as their predecessors.

Changing leaders‘ and followers‘ minds: This is likely a problematic and

drawn out process. People do learn and change, especially if placed in an

appropriate environment. But conflicts are the worst environment for bringing

about changes in goals, interests and underlying beliefs.

Changing strategies, policies and behaviour: This is linked to changing

people‘s minds, but there is debate over what comes first. The public nature of

this behavioural component puts it centre stage in initial resolution efforts.

Conciliatory gestures are sought, communication channels opened and truces

negotiated.

Changing parties‘ environments: Some obstacles will be removed by major

structural changes in the parties‘ environment. These may change the

availability of whatever is in dispute, render it irrelevant, remove threats of

render other problems more pressing.

Tasks have to be carried out by a number of change agents working together

to overcome obstacles to resolution. These include monitoring, exploring,

unifying, developing skills, initiating and facilitating talks, providing

40

resources and legitimacy, reassuring adversaries and imposing any necessary

sanctions.

Source: Mitchell, C.R., 2005, 'Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An

Enquiry', Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin

Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve

Peacebuilding Operations

S Woodward (2007)

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Summary

A focus on ―root causes‖ of civil war would not improve peacebuilding interventions

and could even be counterproductive. This paper, published by the Journal of

Intervention and Statebuilding, disputes the explanation that interventions fail in part

because they fail to address root causes of civil war. The most pressing question for

peacebuilding missions is not why civil war occurs, but how we intervene and improve

on currently inadequate results.

A debate is now taking place among scholars about whether international interventions

in civil wars in the 1990s were successful. Interventionists argue that the recent decline

in armed conflicts is due to the increased use of peacebuilding missions. Realists argue

that while wars may have declined, armed conflict has increased. More peacekeeping

missions (including second-tour missions) are evidence that the problem is the failure

to intervene successfully.

Both sides are correct: A normative consensus on intervention now exists. The current

problem is inadequate intervention outcomes.

A major obstacle to addressing outcomes is the conventional explanation that the cause

of intervention failure is the failure to address the root causes of conflict. This

explanation has two difficulties: 1) it is so widespread that it prevents careful research

on intervention policies, practices and consequences and 2) it is probably wrong.

There are three reasons, based on academic research, why a focus on root causes of

conflict will not improve the outcomes and effectiveness of peacemaking

interventions:

Knowledge on the causes of civil war: Research in the 1990s argued that civil

war is caused, inter alia, by ethnic conflict, rebel movements seeking

economic gain and authoritarian rule. These arguments have had a significant

influence on development policies. While they have been discredited or

superseded by newer scholarship, the policy world has not adjusted to the

criticisms and newer research.

Causes vs. outcomes: emerging knowledge: New academic research argues

that two other aspects of war are more important than root causes: 1) changes

wrought by war itself (social, economic and the effects of violence), and 2) the

political arrangements necessary to settle power struggles and limit the use of

violence.

Motivations for intervention: Motivations for intervention are generally based

on ideology, national security, strategic and bureaucratic interests. They have

nothing to do with the causes of conflict and will always take priority.

Programme strategies, objectives and templates are pre-determined. Time

41

pressures abound; even practitioners interested in investigating root causes and

designing programmes to respond to them do not have the time to do so.

We have seen a substantial increase in our knowledge of the causes of civil war, the

politics of intervention and the consequences of current policies of post-war

reconstruction and stabilisation. The assertion of failure to address root causes of civil

war in peacekeeping processes is certainly amenable to examination. But international

intervention can be productive without confronting the invariably contested causes of

war; there is need for much more research on the causes of peace and their policy

implications.

Source: Woodward, S.L., 2007, 'Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using

Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Operations', Journal of Intervention and

Statebuilding, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 143-170

Supplementary readings

Post-Conflict Risks

P Collier et al (2006)

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Summary

What are the most important factors in determining the durability of peace in post-

conflict countries? This paper from the Centre for the Study of African Economies

(CSAE) reports on the results of a statistical study of post-conflict risks and the impact

of military, political, social, economic and temporal factors on peace. While post-

conflict political design of constitutional structures and elections may have intrinsic

value, they do not increase the probability of enduring peace. Rather, peace appears to

depend on robust external military assistance sustaining gradual economic recovery.

The predominant theory of conflict emphasises conditions that determine the feasibility

of rebellion as more important than motivation. The most important indicators of

feasibility of rebellion are low per capita income, slow economic growth and large

exports of natural resources. Yet current post-conflict policy addresses the risk of

return to conflict primarily through political design, implying that motivation -

grievances based on political exclusion - is the chief cause of conflict. If the feasibility

theory of conflict is applied to post-conflict situations, economic and military

instruments might be more important than political mechanisms in reducing the risk of

a return to conflict.

The lower the per capita income of the country at the end of the conflict, the

more likely it is that it will return to conflict. Economic development reduces

risks, but it takes a long time.

Peacekeeping expenditures significantly reduce the risks of further conflict.

Post-conflict elections neither increase nor decrease risk of conflict. During an

election year the society experiences a lull that is followed by a resurgence of

risk. Elections can also generate a misleading signal of calm.

The degree of democracy or autocracy has no significant effects on risks. In

fact, severe autocracy appears to be highly successful in maintaining post-

conflict peace.

42

The risk of a return to conflict during the first four post-conflict years is 23%.

During the subsequent six years it is 17%. For policy purposes, the entire post-

conflict decade faces a high level of risk.

These findings have a number of policy implications:

International post-conflict efforts should be concentrated disproportionately in

the poorest countries and should focus heavily upon economic recovery.

Elections should not be treated as a systemic solution to the problem of post-

conflict risk. They should be promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as

mechanisms to improve the chances for peace.

There are limits to how much past conflict situations can be a guide to the

future. Nevertheless, because post-conflict issues are so burdened with

ideology and political glamour, statistical analysis can be a useful antidote to

other influences on post-conflict policy.

Source: Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Soderbom, M., 2006, ‗Post-Conflict Risks‘,

CSAE Working Paper Series no. 12, Centre for the Study of African Economies,

University of Oxford, Oxford

True Worlds: A Transitional Perspective

J Galtung (1981)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Source: Galtung, J., (1981) ‗True Worlds: A Transitional Perspective‘, New York:

The Free Press, pp. 1-4, 19-24, 41-79.

Destructive Escalation

M Maiese (2003)

Access full text online

Abstract

Escalation refers to an increase in the intensity of a conflict and in the severity of

tactics used in pursuing it. It is driven by changes within each of the parties, new

patterns of interaction between them, and the involvement of new parties in the

struggle. When conflicts escalate, more people tend to become involved. Parties begin

to make bigger and stronger threats and impose harsher negative sanctions. Violence

may start, or if violence has already occurred it may become more severe and/or

widespread as the number of participants involved in the conflict increases, and a

greater proportion of a state's citizens actively engage in fighting. Destructively waged

conflicts typically involve great losses for one or more of the contending parties, and

tend to persist for a long time. To avoid these negative consequences, a better

understanding of the dynamics of escalation is needed.

Source: Maiese, M., 2003, ‗Destructive Escalation‘, Burgess, G. and Heidi Burgess,

H., (eds), Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, University of

Colorado, Boulder

43

1.4 Human rights, international humanitarian law and other relevant

legal standards

Core readings

International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: Similarities and Differences International Committee of the Red Cross (2003)

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Summary

What are the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law (IHL)

and international human rights law (IHRL)? This paper from the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains the main principles behind IHL and

IHRL, briefly outlining when and how they are applied, who is bound by them and

who is protected by them. Both IHL and IHRL strive to protect the lives, health and

dignity of individuals, albeit from a different angle.

While very different in formulation, the essence of some of the rules is similar, if not

identical. Rules of IHL deal with many issues that are outside the purview of IHRL,

such as the conduct of hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status and the

protection of the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. Similarly, IHRL deals with

aspects of life in peacetime that are not regulated by IHL, such as freedom of the press,

the right to assembly, to vote and to strike.

International humanitarian law:

Is a set of international rules, established by treaty or custom, which are

specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from

international or non-international armed conflicts.

Is applicable in times of armed conflict, whether international or non-

international.

Binds all actors to an armed conflict - it lays down rules that are applicable to

both state and non-state actors.

Imposes obligations on individuals and also provides that persons may be held

individually criminally responsible.

Aims to protect persons who do not, or are no longer taking part in hostilities.

Is supervised by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,

which ensures protection and assistance to victims of war, encourages states to

implement their IHL obligations and promotes and develops IHL.

International human rights law:

Is a set of international rules, established by treaty or custom, on the basis of

which individuals and groups can expect and/or claim certain behaviour or

benefits from governments.

Can be applied (in principle) at all times. Although, some IHRL treaties permit

governments to derogate from certain rights in situations of public emergency

threatening the life of the nation.

Lays down rules binding governments in their relations with individuals.

Does not impose specific duties on individuals but does provide for individual

criminal responsibility for violations that may constitute international crimes.

Has a supervisory system consisting of bodies established either by the United

Nations Charter or by the main IHRL treaties.

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Source: ICRC, 2003, ‗International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights –

Similarities and Differences?‘ Geneva.

Human Rights: A Source of Conflict, State Making, and State Breaking

M Lund (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

How can international legal standards for human rights be enforced during intrastate

violent conflicts? Can human rights violators be brought to justice after wars have

ended without causing more conflict? This research by the Woodrow Wilson Center

argues that the risk of intrastate conflict needs to be approached in a more

dispassionate, contextualised and multidimensional way. A higher priority should be

given to the desire for improved livelihoods and the need for security, instead of

instant democracy and civil and political rights.

Many developing countries have been caught in the global conflict between political

and economic patrimonialism and greater pluralism. Although most developing and

post-Soviet societies have democratised peacefully, new destructive conflicts have

arisen over the changes. Violence has occurred where the change from the old system

to a more pluralistic system could not be managed through existing or emerging

institutions. Differing human rights come into conflict with one another and the

discourse of human rights can contribute to violent conflict.

The weakness of the postcolonial and post-Cold War institutions in the countries

succumbing to conflict can be traced in part to a precipitous and often chaotic adoption

of democratic and economic institutions and policies.

Many of the states achieved statehood through the unilateral policy decisions

of more powerful states.

Hampered by debt, high oil prices and a lack of competitive exports, they

lacked the resources for governing through providing public services to their

populations.

Rather than being failed states, many are unformed nations - they have not

developed enforceable laws, constitutionally based institutions, national

markets and internalised cultural incentives for cross-societal cooperation.

Though liberal policies may eventually be beneficial, in the short run the shift

toward more political and economic openness has led to violent conflict.

These countries have not been given the time to develop a liberal state, which

is a distinct form of social order and is built up over time through a particular

choice of government policies.

The challenge for the international community is to reconcile competing notions of

rights as old orders are giving way to new ones, so that the tensions and disputes that

arise do not lead to the outbreak of violent conflict but instead lead to peaceful change.

Outside parties must avoid viewing conflicts as a clash of right versus wrong

rather than a clash of competing concepts of rights in a larger global process of

modernisation.

Well-intentioned advocacy for human rights on behalf of a vulnerable group

may put that group at greater risk by tempting more powerful forces to react.

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A gradualist yet activist approach to liberalisation is required involving more

money behind smart forms of economic and political development.

Prioritising social and economic rights and the protection of human life may

be more effective than promoting full democracy, especially if that means

violent upheaval.

Incentives for evolutionary change are likely to be more effective than forceful

intervention.

Individual countries need to be assessed as to how much conflict they can

manage successfully. A standardised approach should be avoided.

Source: Lund, M., 2006, 'Human Rights: A Source of Conflict, State Making, and State

Breaking', in Mertus, J.A., and J. Helsing (eds.), Human Rights and Conflict:

Exploring the Links between Human Rights, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, USIP Press,

Washington

Exploring the Intersection between Human Rights and Conflict

J Mertus and J Helsing (2006)

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Summary

What is the relationship between human rights and conflict? This book, edited by the

American University, brings together a range of views from authors in different fields

to analyse the complexities and dynamics of how the two are connected. Human rights,

humanitarian law and conflict resolution approaches prioritise individual human

dignity, humane conduct in war and the promotion of peace respectively. Whilst

sometimes these different priorities compete and tradeoffs are necessary, the book

considers ways that they can also complement one another.

Violent conflicts grow out of the quest for self-determination, demands for fair access

to resources and resistance to discrimination. Human rights abuses create cycles of

dehumanisation based on fear. The denial of human rights can engender and intensify

conflict and so can the demand for those same rights. The state‘s inability to protect

basic human rights and provide mechanisms for the civil resolution of conflict may

prompt groups to use force in pressing their demands.

There are three main schools of thought on the relationship between human rights and

conflict. The human rights approach stresses the importance of exposing the truth

about governmental abuses and bringing an end to injustices. The conflict resolution

perspective focuses on resolving, managing, preventing or transforming violent

conflict through mediation, negotiation or use of force. The humanitarian law approach

is concerned with the conduct of war and the protection of civilians during armed

conflict.

Viewed from these different angles, several important connections emerge in the

relationship between human rights and conflict.

If human rights abuses and injustice are buried, conflict resolution and

reconciliation will be undermined.

Truth and reconciliation commissions enable divided societies to reunite more

easily than courts.

46

Refugees can destabilise a region by upsetting social balances and changing

economic and demographic distributions and thereby precipitating new human

rights abuses.

Efforts to ensure effective human rights protections during the peace process

may run counter to the conflict resolution strategy. Human rights can become

a tool between groups competing for political power.

Neutrality may not always be possible in delivering humanitarian relief and

protecting human rights.

The different approaches share a commitment to maximising human dignity and

minimising civilian harm. The challenge is to integrate their perspectives in a way that

best responds to the nature of conflict.

For human rights and conflict resolution to complement each other, it is

important not to focus solely on respect for human rights while ignoring the

need to end violent conflict.

Human rights must be combined with efforts to produce a more productive

economy and a more legitimate and effective government.

Donors need to help develop the capacity of local institutions and governments

to provide and deliver humanitarian relief and protect human rights.

While force can be an effective means of preventing genocide, restraint should

be exercised in using armed force to respond to humanitarian crises. It is

dangerous for powerful states to act unilaterally.

The international community can help build civil society institutions, develop

justice mechanisms and fund human rights education. It must understand the

unique circumstances of each conflict.

Source: Mertus, J. A., and J. Helsing, 2006, 'Introduction: Exploring Intersection

between Human Rights and Conflict', in Idem (eds), Human Rights and Conflict:

Exploring the Links between Human Rights, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, USIP Press,

Washington

DFID Human Rights Review: A Review of how DFID has Integrated Human

Rights into its Work

L-H Piron and F Watkins (2004)

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Summary

What lessons can be learned from the UK Department for International Development

(DFID)'s human rights work in a range of sectors and initiatives, particularly at the

country level? How can human rights make a contribution to poverty reduction? This

paper from DFID's Reaching the Very Poorest Team in the Policy Division documents

DFID's human rights activities in a number of domains. It is designed to serve as a

reference document, and contains a number of practical recommendations.

Until the end of the Cold War, human rights and development were kept as separate

domains. From the late 1990s onwards, a number of international development

agencies and non-governmental organisations have attempted to integrate human rights

or have officially adopted human rights-based approaches to development. There is

now a large body of work integrating human rights into development policy and

programmes supported by DFID at the international, national and sectoral/thematic

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levels and in different country contexts, and an important constituency of DFID staff

developing innovative approaches and activities in this area.

DFID's experiences with human rights at central, country and sectoral level show that

human rights add value for poverty reduction at several levels:

Normative: They provide a normative framework at international, national and

regional levels and help to hold state and other actors accountable; aim to

transform state-society relations and put people at the centre of development

processes; make a unique contribution to policy debates and can lead to more

effective poverty eradication.

Analytical: They can help in setting development objectives and identifying

the causes and characteristics of poverty; emphasise power relations,

participation and related issues; provide a framework for identifying

obligations and provide tangible benchmarks to be achieved.

Operational: They provide standards for framing discussions that can

challenge the status quo; highlight the importance of linking supply and

demand-side initiatives; can influence the design of aid instruments to gain a

sharper focus on gains for the poor; help to put in practice an approach best

suited to the local context.

There needs to be greater coherence in DFID's work on human rights. The overall

policy framework and DFID's own human rights obligations should be clarified,

developing greater consistency of knowledge and application of human rights across

the organisation. DFID should also promote an aid coherence agenda across UK

government agencies, which puts human rights for all the centre of the impact of UK

policies on developing countries. Other specific policy recommendations for DFID are:

Develop mechanisms to learn better and more systematically from ongoing

activities (in particular in relation to country programmes, international

organisations and civil society).

Undertake reviews to synthesise knowledge to date in key areas.

Undertake work on human rights indicators and other ways of measuring

progress.

Prepare practical guidance for staff (including training, a 'live' resource,

effective support to country and policy teams, and ongoing learning with

external actors).

Develop more policy and research around economic and social rights, the link

between governance and the realisation of human rights for all and an

understanding of experiences with the implementation of conditionality.

Source: Piron, L-H. and Watkins, F., 2004, 'DFID Human Rights Review: A Review of

How DFID Has Integrated Human Rights into its Work', Overseas Development

Institute, Report prepared for the Department for International Development

Supplementary readings

The Laws of War on Land

G Aldrich (2000)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Source: Aldrich, G.H., 2000, ‗The Laws of War on Land,‘ in American Journal of

International Law, vol. 94, no. 1 (January), pp. 42-63.

48

Practical Guidance to Implementing Rights Based Approaches, Human Rights

Analyses for Poverty Reduction and Human Rights Benchmarks

E Filmer-Wilson

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Summary

To what extent are human rights being incorporated into development programmes?

How can a human rights-based approach best be developed? This report, by the UK

Government Department for International Development (DFID), brings together

material collated from development organisations in four key areas: practical guidance

on rights-based approaches, including case studies and checklists; analytical tools

which feature human rights for understanding the causes and characteristics of poverty;

human rights impact assessment; and human rights indicators to measure development

progress.

Because of different working contexts, development organisations vary in their

approach to human rights and to the human rights-based approach to development

(RBA). Some prefer tools and methodologies that focus on issues such as "global

governance" and "social accountability", which reflect and include key human rights

principles. Many bi-lateral development organisations recognise the potential

contribution of rights-based approaches and have formulated policy to reflect this.

However, most agencies are only beginning to explore ways to implement their rights-

based policy and have not yet developed their own tools. There is broad agreement,

from both the Donor and NGO community that a lot more work needs to be done at a

practical level. So far:

A few basic tools for human rights analyses of poverty have been developed

and are being used in the field.

These tools have helped staff to focus on the relationship between the right-

holders and duty-bearers in their poverty alleviation work.

Most development organisations have separated gender and social exclusion

from human rights and have produced specific tools for each area.

Human rights impact assessment is an area of increasing interest. Yet

assessment tools are only now being developed and pilot tested.

Almost no work has been done on the use of human rights indicators in

development projects.

No donor governments are yet using human rights indicators as a basis for

dialogue with recipient governments, although a number are exploring ways of

doing this.

Before human rights indicators can be used, a conceptual and methodological approach

to human rights indicators needs to be developed. Below is a summary of the key

recommendations from development staff on practical guidance for implementing a

RBA. Many of the guidelines included in this report are still at the pilot stage.

An integrated approach to human rights mainstreaming is needed: staff want a

single tool that includes gender, social exclusion.

Simply providing training designed to introduce staff to the RBA and its

implications, and then leaving people to get on with developing programmes

from a RBA, is not sufficient.

It is not possible to programme by just using human rights principles. This can

easily become very legalistic and dogmatic.

49

There need to be clear incentives to integrate a RBA. Staff performance

appraisals, for example, should reflect RBA.

Better co-ordination across portfolios is needed: strong linkages across

projects would bring great value.

Agencies could establish a standing RBA team, which would work to

mainstream human rights in the programme. To do this effectively, staff would

need sufficient resources and formal recognition of their roles.

Source: Filmer-Wilson, E., 2005, ‗Practical Guidance to Implementing Rights Based

Approaches, Human Rights Analyses for Poverty Reduction and Human Rights

Benchmarks‘, Report prepared for the Department for International Development

(DFID), London

Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols Original Texts

(1949)

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Abstract

The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are part of international

humanitarian law – a whole system of legal safeguards that cover the way wars may be

fought and the protection of individuals. They specifically protect people who do not

take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, chaplains, aid workers) and those who can

no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).

The Conventions and their Protocols call for measures to be taken to prevent (or put an

end to) what are known as "grave breaches"; those responsible for breaches must be

punished.

200 Wars and the Humanitarian Response

J Hanlon (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

More than two hundred wars have been fought in the past half century. Nearly all have

been civil wars, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, more than thirty civil

wars were being fought. The ―rules‖ of interstate war do not apply; each atrocity

provokes retribution, and civil war takes on a brutal dynamic of its own. Civil War,

Civil Peace challenges common but simplistic explanations of war, including greed,

gender, and long-standing religious or ethnic hatreds, which ignore that these groups

have lived together in peace for centuries. When a cease-fire is arranged, aid workers,

military personnel, diplomats, and others pour in from the United States, Europe, and

international agencies. Outside help is essential after a war, but too often, well-

intentioned interveners do more harm than good. A half of civil wars have resumed

after failed peace agreements. Each war is different, and there can be no intervention

handbook or best practices guide. Aimed at practitioners and policy makers, and

essential reading for students of war, humanitarian intervention, peace building, and

development, Civil War, Civil Peace provides a comprehensive examination of how

50

interventions can be improved through a better understanding of the roots of war and

of the grievances and interests that fueled the war.

Source: Hanlon, J, 2007, ‗200 Wars and the Humanitarian Response.‘ In Yanacopulos,

H. and Hanlon, J. (eds.), Civil War, Civil Peace. Open University in association with

James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, pp. 18-48.

International Humanitarian Law – Answers to your Questions

ICRC (2002)

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Abstract

This report defines international humanitarian law in answer to questions regarding its

origins, characteristics and implementation.

Source: ICRC, 2002, ‗International Humanitarian Law – Answers to your Questions,‘

International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (October).

Human Rights and Sustainable Peace

T Putnam (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What

strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty

commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements,

which are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for

millions of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.

Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which

international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive,

systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens

after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and

presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is

related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major

powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war.

Source: Putnam, T.L. (2002) ‗Human Rights and Sustainable Peace‘, in Stedman , S. J.

et al. (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder

CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, pp. 237-272.

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1.5 The role of gender in conflict issues

Core readings

Gender Equality and Civil Wars

M Caprioli (2003)

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Summary

What is the link between gender equality and civil war? This paper published by the

World Bank reports on a study measuring gender inequality against the occurrence of

intrastate conflict. Applying a number of theories on gender inequality and violence,

the study tested the hypothesis that the higher the fertility rate, the greater the

likelihood that a state will experience intrastate conflict. Results indicate that states

with high fertility rates are twice as likely to experience internal conflict as states with

low fertility rates.

Gender determines, inter alia, roles and power relationships. Women in all countries

suffer from some degree of gender inequality and discrimination and are subject to

varying degrees of exploitation, control, fragmentation and marginalisation. Extreme

and systematic inequality leads to political violence.

Structural violence (systematic exploitation that becomes part of the social order) and

cultural violence (including violent relations between men and women) create the

justification for violence. Gender is an integral aspect of both forms of violence, as it

forms the basis of structural inequality in all countries.

Nationalism is not gender neutral. Gendered nationalistic rhetoric has traditionally

framed gender roles: Briefly put, women are biological reproducers (group survival)

and men are defenders of the country (national survival). High fertility rates are

themselves a result of gender discrimination.

This study finds that gender inequality increases the likelihood that a state will

experience internal conflict. Fertility rate is highly significant: States with high fertility

rates are twice as likely to experience internal conflict as states with low fertility rates.

Other findings include:

A state with an at-risk minority is nearly three and a half times more likely to

experience internal conflict.

When the regime type measure isolates regimes in transition between

autocratic and democratic forms of government, these regimes are more likely

to experience conflict.

The state capability score is not significant, nor are GDP per capita and

average GDP per capita growth rate.

The most important implication of this study is the need to lower fertility rates in order

to improve the health of women and increase their ability to participate in paid labour.

This improved economic position will help women develop a sense of empowerment

and, ultimately, contribute to increased gender equality.

However, lowering fertility rates is only part of the larger problem of gender

inequality. Other recommended responses to the implications of this study include the

following:

52

Provide opportunities for women within state-level organisations and through

policies such as micro-level economic loans to women.

Develop state economic growth policies that target women.

Clarify the rights of women in international law and policy.

Enforce existing international law and policies on the protection of women‘s

rights within states.

Support the international tracking of women‘s rights and aggressively target

women‘s issues.

To better understand the link between gender inequality and violence, gather

and disseminate better measures of women‘s equality relative to men.

Source: Caprioli, M., 2003, 'Gender Equality and Civil Wars', World Bank Conflict

Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Working Paper No. 8. World Bank, Washington

Women, Peace and Security

United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force (2002)

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Summary

How does armed conflict impact on women? What role do women play in the peace

process? This study is an initiative undertaken in response to Security Council

resolution 1325 on women, peace and security adopted in October 2000. While it

shows that many positive steps have been taken to implement the resolution, women

still form a minority of those who participate in peace and security negotiations, and

receive less attention than men in post-conflict agreements, disarmament and

reconstruction.

In contemporary conflicts civilians are targets and as such have been subjected to high

levels of violence. The specific experience of women and girls in armed conflict is

linked to their status in societies. Where cultures of violence and discrimination against

women exist prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict. This study

draws on existing research and includes input from the UN and local international

NGOs. The challenge remains the full implementation of the landmark document that

resolution 1325 represents.

Changes in armed conflict over the last decade have affected women and girls:

Women are often viewed as bearers of cultural identity and become prime

targets of violence.

Women and girls are not only victims of armed conflict; they are also active

agents and participants in conflict.

Even where women and girls were actively involved in sustaining and

rebuilding local economies and communities throughout the conflict they are

frequently pushed to the background when formal peace negotiations begin.

Conflict may create space for a temporary redefinition of social relations, but

often does not change them fundamentally. Gains made are usually reversed

after the end of the conflict.

A focus on gender mainstreaming in conflict and post-conflict situations

involves recognising that women, girls, men and boys participate in and

experience conflict, peace processes and post-conflict recovery differently.

53

Women are often actively involved in informal peace processes, but are often

largely absent from formal peace processes.

The increased participation of women within humanitarian, peacebuilding and

peacekeeping operations is crucial if UN goals and mandates regarding gender

equality, non-discrimination and human rights are to be realised.

The United Nations and international agencies should:

Recognise the extent of violations of the human rights of women and girls

during armed conflict and take measures to prevent such violations.

Incorporate information on the impact of armed conflict and the impact of

interventions on women and girls, and on the roles and contributions of

women and girls in conflict situations into all training provided to staff.

Take steps to ensure that victims of gender-based and sexual violence and any

other forms of violence during armed conflict have the right to reparations for

damages incurred.

Prosecute all perpetrators of crimes of gender-based and sexual violence

directed at women and girls in situations of armed conflict, including UN

international and local personnel.

Ensure full involvement of women in negotiations of peace agreements at

national and international levels, including through provision of training for

women and women‘s organisations on formal peace processes.

Incorporate gender perspectives explicitly into mandates of all peacekeeping

missions.

Source: United Nations, 2002, 'Women, Peace and Security', Study submitted by the

Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), United

Nations, New York

Supplementary readings

Human Security and Peacebuilding Through a Gender Lens

H Hudson (2006)

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Summary

Why is it so difficult to translate an awareness of gender injustice into workable plans

for post-conflict reconstruction? Evidence shows that while women are largely absent

from formal peace negotiations, they do make a significant contribution at the

grassroots level. Yet this gender awareness has not been incorporated into practice.

This paper from the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) draws on African

feminism to argue for a balanced position between cultural relativism and a ‗one size

fits all‘ solution to this problem.

Under a people-centred approach to security, peacebuilding must be assessed in terms

of freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to choose. Both liberal feminist

approaches (which pursue equality) and standpoint feminism (which tends towards

gender stereotyping) offer unsatisfactory explanations of women‘s role in

peacebuilding. Alternative approaches can risk cultural relativism - an over reliance on

difference which weakens women‘s ability to speak for each other. Finding a balance

between these two extremes may offer an approach that is culturally relevant but not

54

deterministic. African feminists use the concept of ‗womanism‘, which emphasises

cultural context, the centrality of the family and importance of cooperation with men.

Examining the role of women in times of war and peace, particularly in African

countries, reveals that:

Though sexual violence is high during conflict, making assumptions about

women‘s roles, needs and priorities can reaffirm victimhood and ignore

context-specific factors. It is a myth to assume that women are not associated

with violence.

Gains made in gender relations during conflict are easily reversed in the

aftermath. Reconstruction and rehabilitation often implies going back to how

things were. The conflict to peace transition is therefore crucial, but also

complex.

Gender-related issues can threaten this transition. Women activists may be

preoccupied by human rights violations and basic service provision, leaving

warring parties to strike deals without them.

Gender perspectives are not systematically included in the planning,

implementation, monitoring and reporting of any area of peace and security

work.

The pursuit of gender equality is part of developing accountable, transparent

governance. Peace agreements brokered under the guidance of the West often

concentrate on civil and political rights, with human rights added as an after-

thought.

Progress has been made in developing a rights-based international framework that can

guide work in this area. The challenge is to translate policies into meaningful context-

specific action. Recommendations include:

The creation of an international women‘s agency within the UN. This should

overcome the UN‘s fragmented dealings with women‘s issues and women‘s

human rights.

The establishment of a Council of African Women Mediators comprising

women from civil society and women who no longer hold government

positions. Such a group could liaise between the African Union and the

African Women‘s movement.

Before negotiations, efforts should be made to increase women‘s participation

in peace talks, planning of demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration

(DDR) and determining governance and security structures.

Governments of societies in transition should ensure policies are firmly

grounded in a gender equality and human rights framework. It is important

that women are empowered in governance and citizenship and that women‘s

organisations are supported.

Source: Hudson, H., 2006, 'Human Security and Peacebuilding Through a Gender

Lens', DIIS Working Paper no. 2006/ 37, Danish Institute for International Studies,

Copenhagen

Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and

Voice

E King (2001)

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Access full text online

Abstract

"Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and

Voice" is a Policy Research Report by the World Bank focusing on gender issues and

their broad economic and social implications in developing and transitional countries.

The report examines the conceptual and empirical links between gender, public policy,

and development outcomes. The evidence presented shows that societies that

discriminate by gender tend to experience less rapid economic growth and poverty

reduction than societies that treat males and females more equally. To promote gender

equality, the report proposes a 3-part strategy emphasizing (i) institutional reforms that

promote equal rights for women and men; (ii) policies for sustained economic

development; and (iii) active measures to redress persistent gender disparities.

Source: King, E., 2001, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in

Rights, Resources, and Voice, World Bank Policy Research Report, New York:

Oxford University Press.

Women and War – An Overview

C Lindsey (2000)

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Abstract

This article aims to draw attention to the multifaceted ways in which women

experience armed conflict and, to a limited extent, to some of the activities of the

International Committee of the Red Cross to assist and protect women.

Source: Lindsey, C., 2000, ‗Women and War – An Overview.‘ In International Review

of the Red Cross, No. 839, pp. 561-579.

Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources

B Sorensen (1998)

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Abstract

Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources is a review of literature

dealing with political, economic and social reconstruction from a gender perspective.

One of its objectives is to go beyond conventional images of women as victims of war,

and to document the many different ways in which women make a contribution to the

rebuilding of countries emerging from armed conflicts. Special attention is given to

women's priority concerns, to their resources and capacities, and to structural and

situational factors that may reduce their participation in reconstruction processes. A

second aim is to shed light on how post-war reconstruction processes influence the

reconfiguration of gender roles and positions in the wake of war, and how women's

actions shape the construction of post-war social structures.

Source: Sorensen, B., 1998, ‗Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and

Sources‘, WSP Occasional Paper #3, Geneva: UNRISD.

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2. Tools for Conflict Analysis and Monitoring Conflict Escalation and

De-escalation

2.1 Conflict tools, methodologies, theory and practice, (Strategic

Conflict Assessments and other analytical tools)

UK Government Policy

Public Information Note: Drivers of Change

DFID (2004)

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Summary

How can donors improve their knowledge to support effective change in developing

countries? This note explains the Drivers of Change approach and its impact on the

Department for International Development‘s (DFID) policies and programmes. Drivers

of Change analysis recognises that institutional performance is important to

understanding change processes and how they impact upon the poor. It focuses on

formal and informal rules, power structures, vested interests and incentives within

institutions.

A single blueprint approach to Drivers of Change analysis is inappropriate. DFID

country offices were encouraged to ask themselves a structured set of questions about

the dynamics of pro-poor change. These were loosely grouped into one of six levels:

basic country analysis; medium-term dynamics of change, including policy processes;

role of external forces, including donors; links between change and poverty reduction;

operational implications, covering how to translate understanding into action; and how

DFID works, including organisational incentives affecting the retention of country

knowledge.

A conceptual model was developed to incorporate and better understand the interaction

between components affecting both positive and negative change. Agents can affect

structural features and vice versa. However, the impact of one on the other is mediated

through institutions:

Agents refers to individuals and organizations pursuing particular interests,

including political elites; civil servants; political parties; local government;

judiciary; military; faith groups; trade unions; civil society; media; private

sector; academics; and donors.

Structural features includes the history of state formation; natural and human

resources; economic and social structures; demographic change; regional

influences and integration; globalisation, trade and investment; and

urbanisation. These are deeply embedded and often slow to change.

Institutions include the rules governing the behaviour of agents, such as

political and public administration processes. They include the informal and

formal rules. Institutions are more susceptible to change in the medium term

than structural features.

Individual country studies and reports, in addition to a range of services, tools and

training courses, have enabled a critical mass of DFID country offices to adopt a

Drivers of Change approach. The reported benefits have included:

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Making explicit and challenging the assumptions behind current programmes.

Making clear the extent of ‗political will‘ for reform and determining the risk

this poses to a programme‘s success.

Prompting country teams to revise and extend programme timetables to take

account of the country context.

Identifying the role that non-poor groups have in change processes, including

collaboration with non-traditional partners.

Prompting a country team not to pursue a programme of work by providing

evidence that it is unlikely to succeed at present.

Enabling staff from different disciplines and backgrounds to debate and share

diverse perspectives. This has contributed to team building and goal sharing

and is anticipated to also strengthen the institutional memory of offices.

Source: Department for International Development, 2004, 'Public Information Note:

Drivers of Change', DFID, London

Strategic Conflict Assessments: An Initial Review

DFID 2005

Document is restricted to DFID only access – please contact e-library

Department for International Development, 2005, ‗Strategic Conflict Assessments: An

Initial Review‘, DFID, London

Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes

J Goodhand, T Vaux, and R Walker (2002)

Access full text online

Summary

The vast majority of serious armed conflicts today are not between states but are

internal or regional in nature. This makes conflict analyses complicated, but all the

more crucial for any intervention in a country experiencing conflict. How best to

proceed?

These guidance notes from the Department for International Development (DFID)

explain the principles and methodology of conducting effective strategic conflict

analyses (SCAs). DFID's SCAs have three key aims: to map out causes and trends in a

conflict; analysis of international responses to it; and development of future policy

options. An abridged example is given as an appendix to the guide, along with sources

of further information. SCAs should include international factors, risks and impacts of

development interventions, and suggestions for making policies more conflict-

sensitive. Flexibility is key: adapt SCAs to the end user's needs; be aware of the nature

and phase of conflict; identify particular actors and triggers which could cause latent

tensions to erupt into conflict.

A multi-leveled approach to SCAs is advocated because conflicts have multiple

structural causes, and actors and interests all may vary over time. Root causes can

become less relevant in protracted cases where the conflict itself has generated new

dynamics.

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A political economy approach is useful. Analyse the interests of those

involved in conflict and their motivations for continuing/desisting in terms of

'greed' (opportunities for predatory accumulation) and 'grievance' (negative

reactions from disadvantaged).

Analyse structures: underlying political, economic, military and social factors.

Analyse actors: specific interests, capacities, peace agendas and relationships

between them; also what incentives could encourage peace- making.

Analyse dynamics: long-term trends, triggers for violence, capacities for

containing conflict, likely future scenarios.

Conduct all of the above at local, national, regional and international levels

and determine key factors for each.

Map international responses in a similar fashion - different actors, even within

governments, often have different interests and their policies may undercut

each other in the field.

Analysis should not only describe the conflict situation itself, but also the relationships

between conflict and development or aid interventions. Typically, interventions work

around conflict, seeing it as an obstacle to be coped with. This considers the impact of

conflict on interventions, but not vice-versa. Instead they should work in conflict

ensuring that interventions do not inadvertently exacerbate tensions or on conflict

actively seeking to contain or end it. SCAs provide the basis for coordinating and

developing appropriate responses to conflict:

Determine whether existing interventions are likely to have a negative effect on

tensions through opportunities for greed and grievance.

Consider whether development funding is significant compared to other

finances and whether conflict actors are therefore susceptible to pressure.

Look for structural tensions such as poor governance or inequitable distribution

of development benefits which interventions could influence.

Share analysis, forge common approaches with other external actors, and aim

to sensitise them to conflict issues. An economic policy prescription may be

good in a general analysis, for instance, but could trigger conflict in a particular

situation.

Identify gaps in current responses and encourage better coordination amongst

actors.

Goodhand, J., Vaux, T., and Walker, R., 2002, 'Conducting Conflict Assessments:

Guidance Notes', Department for International Development, London

Core readings

Conflict Analysis

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)

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Summary

What is conflict analysis and why is it important? This chapter from the resource pack

Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace

Building places conflict analysis at the foundation of a conflict sensitive approach.

Without understanding the context in which interventions are situated, organisations

implementing them may unintentionally fuel conflict. While conflicts are too complex

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for a single process to do them justice, key features of analysis are conflict profile,

causes, actors and dynamics.

Conflict sensitivity is about understanding the context of interventions and acting upon

this understanding to maximise positive impacts. Conflict analysis informs conflict

sensitive programming, with particular relevance to the interaction between

intervention and context. It helps define new interventions and conflict-sensitise

existing interventions at the planning stage. It informs project set-up and decision

making at the implementation stage. At the monitoring and evaluation stage, conflict

analysis helps measure the interaction of interventions and the conflict dynamics in

which they are situated.

There are key questions within each area of analysis:

Profile: What is the political, economic and socio-cultural context? What are

the emergent issues? What conflict affected areas can be situated within the

context? Is there a history of conflict?

Causes: What are the structural causes of conflict? What can be considered

proximate causes of conflict? What triggers could contribute to the outbreak,

escalation or prolonging of conflict? What factors can contribute to peace?

Actors: Who are the main actors? What are their interests, goals, positions,

capacities and relationships? What capacities for peace can be identified?

What actors can be identified as spoilers and why?

Dynamics: What are the current conflict trends? What are the windows of

opportunity? What scenarios can be developed from the analysis of the

conflict profile, causes and actors?

Recommendations for good practice are based on consultations in Kenya, Uganda and

Sri Lanka:

Building capacity for conflict analysis may involve: Helping staff better

understand the context in which they work, prioritising and integrating conflict

analysis into established procedures and budgeting for conflict analysis.

Conflict analysis can be undertaken for a number of purposes: Promoting

participation, developing a strategy for engagement, decisions on further

project activities and project monitoring. These determine who conducts the

analysis: Members of the community, local project staff, national or

international staff.

When planning to use a specific conflict analysis framework, consider

strengths and weaknesses. Tools are not a substitute for detailed local

knowledge and should not stifle creative thinking. Organisations can

customise tools to specific needs, objectives and capacities.

Gather information from a wide range of sources and listen to many different

actors to broaden understanding of context. Not all information will be

available, reliable and unbiased. Research methods such as triangulation aim

to reduce such limitations.

Conflict analysis itself needs to be conflict sensitive. It is good practice to get

stakeholders on board early and avoid antagonising potential spoilers.

Source: FEWER, International Alert, and Saferworld, 2004, 'Chapter 2: Conflict

Analysis', Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance,

and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack, London

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Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational Challenges

S Sardesai and P Wam (2006)

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Summary

Understanding the social and economic factors that affect conflict improves the

effectiveness of development strategies and programmes. This paper, published by the

World Bank, examines the process of conducting conflict analyses and recommends

how they should be organised, applied and disseminated. Creating buy-in for the

analysis by country teams, use of local partners and dissemination of analysis findings

are key to executing an effective conflict analysis.

In a country affected by conflict, where stakes are high and the situation often fluid,

understanding social and economic contexts is critical to effective aid delivery.

Development organisations are now making a systematic effort to conduct conflict

analyses and integrate findings into their strategies and programmes.

A conflict analysis consists of: 1) the process by which the analysis is planned,

organised, conducted and applied; and 2) the content of the analysis, including its

thematic focus and scope. This study examined a number of completed analysis

processes and recommends ways to strengthen the organisation and application of the

exercise.

Key findings of the study are:

Most conflict analyses studied arose from need to better understand conflict

dynamics and improve the effectiveness of country strategy and programme

formation.

To acquire knowledge on conflict escalators and de-escalators, the analyses

used techniques such as desk research, expert input, workshops, studies and

fieldwork.

Single-agency analyses were usually conducted when there was a need for

quick and confidential analyses for internal use. However, multi-agency

analyses were increasingly the norm, leading to shared analysis and improved

understanding between participating agencies.

Local partners have increasingly been more involved in conflict analysis

exercises.

Use of analysis findings was weak in some cases due to limited country-team

buy-in and lack of follow-up by analysis teams. Analysis dissemination

appears limited, due to lack of strategy and resources.

Typical organisation and implementation challenges included time and

funding constraints, limited capacity, unstable and volatile security climates

and political sensitivities encountered in preparation of the analysis.

There are serious organisational challenges that should be addressed to prevent

problems during analysis implementation. It is important to:

Create buy-in for the analysis by a range of actors;

Select an analysis team that includes skills in conflict analysis, local expertise

and specific technical fields;

Forge a partnership between local and international partners and involve or at

least inform the host government of the exercise;

Consider the host government‘s sensitivities to conflict findings, i.e., focus on

factors rather than actors, if feasible;

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Prepare contingency plans to deal with volatile and fluid environments; and

Emphasise the need for dissemination of the analysis as part of a longer-term

process of promoting findings and encouraging their inclusion in programs and

strategies.

Use of conflict analysis has broader implications beyond a one-time-only

approach. In order to apply the conflict perspective into other programme areas,

it would be helpful to:

Establish conflict analysis exercises as the entry point in conflict-affected

countries; make the analysis operationally relevant.

Test and mainstream conflict impact assessments for development

interventions.

Use the conflict lens to strengthen country social analyses. Integrate a

systematic conflict perspective into studies such as poverty, participatory

assessments and livelihood analyses.

World Bank, 2006, 'Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises: Overcoming Organizational

Challenges?', Report No. 36446-GLB, 21 June 2006, The World Bank, Washington

DC

Supplementary readings

Conducting Conflict Assessments: Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka

J Goodhand (2001)

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Summary

Donors increasingly recognise the need to understand better the links between

development, conflict and poverty, and to design programmes that address the roots of

conflict. This report for the Conflict, Security and Development Group at the

University of London analyses how donors could improve their strategies in Sri Lanka,

where violent conflict has prevented the country from reaching its potential.

While the high-profile conflict between Tamil rebels and government forces was

concentrated in the northeast of Sri Lanka, the whole island has been affected by

militarised violence. Conflict has incurred huge costs in terms of physical, financial,

human and social capital. Yet most aid donors have not adequately considered the

interaction between their work and conflict. In countries like Sri Lanka, ignoring

conflict or regarding it as a disruptive factor to be avoided can exacerbate tensions.

There is a growing trend, particularly among bilateral donors, to explore the

possibilities of reducing or managing conflict. The donor community should learn from

positive examples where aid has supported reconciliation processes, and incorporate

these lessons into mainstream practice.

The key challenge for donors is to make their assistance more sensitive to conflict,

while amplifying the benefits of aid with a focus on conflict reduction. The report

identifies four factors that are important for working effectively in and on conflict:

Integrating conflict sensitivity. This includes developing a more balanced

approach to reform and transition processes, placing greater focus on social

safety nets and equity, and addressing regional imbalances.

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A politically informed approach. Donors should analyse the political system

and incentives of political actors, using this information to influence choice

and design of programmes.

A co-ordinated and comprehensive approach. Existing instruments should be

put to optimal use. Donors should aim to make their mechanisms more

complementary and to develop strategic co-ordination.

Long-term strategic engagement. Donors recognise the need for such an

approach, yet mandates and funding remain short term. They should switch

from supporting projects to sustaining strategies and processes.

A set of policy options is outlined for development actors in Sri Lanka. It is argued that

the international community should pay more political attention to the conflict, and

that donor governments should work to co-ordinate arrangements and share

information. Other recommendations for donors include:

Developing a tighter form of aid co-ordination within a strategic framework

approach. Models used elsewhere should be examined for their applicability to

Sri Lanka, and current initiatives assessed.

Developing a more co-ordinated and pro-active approach to lobbying on

conflict, humanitarian and human rights concerns.

Becoming more sensitive to conflict issues (particularly larger agencies).

Donors must determine what this means in practice for programmes.

Learning from the work of agencies operating in the northeast. Their efforts to

develop codes of conduct frameworks to ensure they do no harm and an aid

ombudsman are relevant to agencies in the south.

Amplifying the impact of programmes that focus on peacebuilding and

reconciliation. This includes strengthening initiatives to build a legitimate and

responsive state, and encouraging more open political debate.

Developing strategies, processes and linkages instead of focusing on projects.

Donors should map and assess the impact of current initiatives to draw out

their lessons. They should also share their conflict analysis.

Goodhand, J., 2001, 'Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka', Conflict

Assessments, Security and Development Group, University of London, London

Conflict Assessments: A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal and Sri

Lanka

J Goodhand (2001)

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Summary

The issues associated with addressing conflict through development and humanitarian

programmes have not yet been identified and analysed in a consistent way. This report

from the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London presents case studies on

Moldova, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Kyrgyzstan and develops a set of guidelines for the

conduct of Conflict Assessments. It argues that a range of policy instruments need to

be applied in a coherent and coordinated fashion to address conflict dynamics more

effectively.

Development and humanitarian programmes are increasingly implemented in

situations of latent or open conflict. However, there is insufficient understanding of the

risks associated with such programmes and their potential to prevent, mitigate or

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resolve violent conflict. Even where conflict issues have been identified and analysed,

this has not led to any generic guidance for working in conflict situations. Conflict

Assessment (CA) is a means of predicting and assessing the potential or actual impacts

of development assistance in the dynamics of peace and conflict. It is an overarching

term that includes strategic conflict assessment (SCA) and programme/project level

conflict assessment (PCA).

There is considerable scope to address conflict dynamics more effectively if different

policy instruments are applied in a coherent and coordinated fashion. However, this is

not currently the case.

The framework for development assistance and the hierarchy of priorities is

dominated by the market economy model and international financial

institutions. A few major donors have substantial leverage to steer overall aid

policy.

Although donor coordination mechanisms function in all four case study

countries, the frameworks designed to coordinate and deliver aid are under-

institutionalised and there is limited coordination at the strategic level.

The main donors tend to work "around"conflict (treating it as an impediment

or negative externality to be avoided), which often either exacerbates tensions

or means missed opportunities to mitigate or resolve violent conflicts.

A number of bilateral donors in each country are attempting to work more

effectively in (recognising the links between programmes and conflict and

making attempts to minimise conflict-related risks) and "on" conflict (making

conscious attempts to design programmes to do good).

There is a need to develop policy and practice that is more sensitive to conflict issues.

Donors need to appreciate and understand a number of factors, including:

The political impacts of aid need to be explicitly recognised as part of conflict

analysis.

Conflict is related to processes of enrichment as well as those of

impoverishment. Therefore, donors need to consider approaches which limit

the opportunities for greed.

The importance of timely and early intervention. Donors need to be more

attuned to local conditions and adapt their policies accordingly.

The breakdown of interventions capable of managing or mitigating violent

conflict is a critical factor. Donors need to identify and support processes and

structures that can facilitate a shift from violence to politics.

There should be a shift towards a greater emphasis on addressing the external

causes of conflict and supporting internal responses and solutions.

A critical challenge for the more conflict sensitive bilateral donors is to

influence the major multilateral donors and encourage them to take conflict

more seriously.

There is a need for coordination arrangements that enable international actors

to move towards joint diagnosis and joint prescriptions.

Source: Goodhand, J., 2001, 'Conflict Assessments: A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan,

Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka', Conflict, Security and Development Group, University

of London, London

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Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program

Development

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2004)

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Summary

What can international donors do to help prevent conflict? This paper from the United

States Agency for International Development (USAID) presents a conflict assessment

framework. It is designed to help USAID Missions gain a deeper understanding of the

causes of conflict and think about how to use development assistance more

strategically in order to address them. It emphasises the interactions between the

motives, means and opportunities for conflict, and recommends that donors take an

integrated approach.

Internal or civil conflicts have become the dominant mode of violence in the post-Cold

War era. While conflict can be an inherent and legitimate part of social and political

life, in many places the costs and consequences of violent conflict have become

unacceptably high. Increasingly, the costs of civil conflict are not limited to the

country where it is fought, but spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperity

across entire regions. Conflict also has a damaging effect on global stability.

Violent conflict disrupts traditional development. Many of the most important causes

of violence, such as a stagnant or deteriorating economy, weak or corrupt political

institutions, or competition over natural resources, are already at the heart of traditional

development assistance. However, although development and humanitarian assistance

programmes are increasingly implemented in situations of open or latent conflict, most

still do not explicitly incorporate a sensitivity to conflict in their design or execution.

Conflict is extremely complex. It happens when causes found at multiple levels come

together and reinforce each other.

Root causes shape motives or incentives for participating in violence. Many of

these factors feed into a strong sense of grievance, but greed is another

powerful reason for turning to violence.

Without the means or resources to organise and execute conflict on a wide

scale, widespread violence cannot be sustained.

Political and social institutions are the filter through which all other causes

have to pass. The opportunity structure for violence is deeply affected by the

relative strength and health of institutions.

Forces at the regional and international level are increasingly important, and

often reinforce internal causes.

If all these causes are in place, there will be windows of

Vulnerability, when particular types of events may trigger the outbreak of full-

scale violence.

Effective interventions must be based on consideration of how problems manifest

themselves at all levels, and how solutions can be strengthened or built at each of the

levels. International donors should:

Facilitate dialogue between and within groups.

Identify the economic agendas that sustain violence and work to raise the costs

of pursuing them, for example by encouraging partnerships between

multinational companies and local civil society groups.

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Assist the diversification of national economies that are heavily reliant on one

or two commodities, to remove the monopoly on economic opportunity.

Increase the number of economic options available to those population groups

at high risk of being recruited to support elites in executing violence.

Engage the private sector in conflict management.

Focus on civilian oversight of the security sector, community policing and

civil-military relations in pre-conflict settings.

Strengthen civil society's role in all areas of conflict management and

peacebuilding.

Carry out an analysis of how civil society groups are either reinforcing or

bridging lines of division, and support organisations that cross ethnic,

economic or political fault lines.

Source: USAID, 2004, Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis

and Program Development, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, United

States Agency for International Development (USAID), Washington DC

The Stability Assessment Framework

S Verstegen and L van de Goor (2005)

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Summary

Since the early 1990s the international community has increasingly recognised that

instability threatens security and development. Dealing with such situations is

unavoidable and many organisations struggle to deal with the complexity of both

problems and solutions. This paper by the Clingendael Institute and the Netherlands

Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlines a Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) to help

development agencies face these challenges. It provides an analytical tool for

developing an integrated policy response in a particular country.

The connections between security and development mean that development

organisations are taking on a larger role in conflict situations. The overall objective of

this role is to establish sustainable security, which has three main aspects: (i)

Governance: the state upholds the rule of law, provides equitable social service

delivery and is perceived as legitimate (ii) Security: The state holds the monopoly on

violence through democratically controlled security forces (iii) Socioeconomic

development: economic development, natural resource management and basic social

services are provided. Organisations need to apply an integrated approach that tackles

all three areas simultaneously.

The first step is to develop the terms of reference to customise the SAF to an

organisations' specific goals and expectations. The second step is to compose a draft

reference document, which includes mapping and analysing:

Indicator trend lines. This presents trends over time rather than a 'snap shot'. It

includes 12 indicators that capture and present social, economic, political and

military conditions in a concise, graphic format.

Institutional capacity. Five selected state institutions are analysed: the military,

police and corrections system, the judiciary, civil service and parliament.

Political actors. Individuals and groups can have a disproportionate effect in

driving change as spoilers or partners.

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Policy interventions. Existing networks, activities and approaches need

frequent evaluation and adaptation to fit changing conditions.

The document should make clear the linkages between these domains, discussing

important trends, indicators and actors, windows of opportunity, threats and

challenges.

The third and final step is the consolidation of the final reference document. Part two

mainly involves consultants but this stage is an inclusive process involving

international policy makers, staff members and local partners.

A workshop is most appropriate for developing conflict awareness and

response capacity. It is a good opportunity for dialogue and sharing

information with partner organisations and breaking through the factionalised

approaches of specialised organisations.

It will help build consensus around key issues and provide a platform to

address differences of opinion.

Organisations must think carefully about using the framework as a tool for

dialogue: discussing these issues with government and civil society can be

politically sensitive.

Developing a strategy for sustainable stability promotion will involve a more

limited number of participants from the staff of own and partner organisations.

There are three steps in this process: Prioritising core needs and actors;

identifying gaps, requirements and partners; identifying niches, defining

constraints and discussing options.

The various parts of the SAF can be used for: Stability assessment and context

analysis, as a tool for political dialogue, to develop conflict sensitive policy

and implementation schemes or to enable multi donor cooperation.

Source: Verstegen, S. and van de Goor, L., 2005, 'The Stability Assessment

Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and

Development', Clingendael Occasional Paper, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, The Hague

Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy Development

P Woodrow (2006)

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Abstract

This article reviews the status of RPP efforts in relation to conflict analysis, one of the

key areas for focused collaborative learning. RPP has been working with groups of

peace practitioners in the Balkans and Central Africa, trying out a variety of methods

for joint conflict analysis and moving from there into program strategies. The goal of

these activities, as with all of RPP‘s efforts, has been to increase the effectiveness of

peace programs. Preliminary results show promise for incorporating systems thinking

into more traditional methods of conflict analysis. RPP is continuing to work with

groups on making the link between good analysis and effective program strategies.

Source: Woodrow, P., 2006, ‗Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy

Development‘, Reflecting on Peace Practice, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects,

Cambridge.

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2.2 Techniques for monitoring and evaluation (of conflict escalation

and de-escalation)

Core readings

Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy

D Carment (2003)

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Summary

In anticipating state failure, effective response and accurate analysis are equally

important. But does the international community have an analytical basis for

generating good response strategies? This paper by Carleton University argues that

explanations of state failure are inadequate analytical tools for risk assessment and

early warning. The disparate analytical approaches constitute a useful tool-kit but there

is a gap in understanding between academics and practitioners. Future funding efforts

should emphasise the integration of analytical findings and the methodologies of

research programmes.

Debates on state failure have mainly focused on definitional issues, the strengths and

weaknesses of contending methodologies and evaluation procedures and the causes,

manifestations and processes of state failure. Much less attention has been paid to the

question of how to link theoretical insights to policy options. To date, states and

international organisations have done little towards the creation of working and useful

conflict prevention regimes at the regional and global level. While there is no lack of

rhetoric on the necessity of prevention, serious attempts to give organisations the tools

to put preventive systems into place are modest at best.

Understanding and responding to state failure requires a multifaceted, multilayered and

multi-actor methodology. This approach entails two levels of analysis - relative

performance measures and an appreciation of the dynamic processes of conflict. The

ramifications of such an approach are:

Policy preferences for solutions to state failure will depend on the explanations

we accept for their decay and potential collapse.

By emphasising the root structural causes (economic, social and political

composite indicators), the range of solutions expands to long-term,

developmentally orientated structural prevention.

By emphasising medium- and micro-level political configurations and

interactions, the range of solutions might include partition, power sharing,

democratisation or constitutional entrenchment of ethnic or minority rights.

It might also include more specific operational responses such as sanctions,

peace enforcement and long-term institution building.

Those who develop methodologies to assess the risk of state failure should be clear

about the array of political instruments available to provide an effective response.

Ultimately, anticipating state failure is a process-based approach requiring

sound analysis as well as an explicit connection to policy options for

preventive measures.

A process-based approach means that the method and format of applied early

warning is shaped directly by the operational focus of the process itself, in this

case preventative action as opposed to preparedness.

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All of these elements point to the relevance of basic policy analysis and

planning methods to close the warning–action gap.

Such methods incorporate the structuring of problems, the application of

appropriate analytical tools to solve these problems and the communication of

analysis and recommendations in a format useful to decision makers.

In short, policy planning is a type of decision-support procedure. Such an

approach requires that organisations have a better sense of their own

institutional needs and capabilities.

Such activities should have a built-in evaluative process or impact assessment

capability that will ensure self-monitoring and provide policy guidance. At the

very minimum, activity in an economically and politically fragile society

should not further destabilise that society.

Source: Carment, D., 2003, ‗Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and

Policy‘, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no.3, pp 407-427

Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-Conflict Settings

States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2006)

Access full text online

Summary

How does monitoring and evaluation (M&E) differ in post-conflict settings? This

report produced for USAID reviews recent experience, literature and lessons regarding

M&E in post-conflict settings, with particular emphasis on Iraq and Afghanistan. The

report‘s main aims are to clarify the unique features that distinguish M&E in post-

conflict settings and to present emerging best practices for responding to these

challenges.

The report identifies various constraints and challenges that USAID and its partners

face in enforcing sound M&E standards and practices in post-conflict societies,

particularly in those where the United States has major strategic interests.

Understanding these constraints is essential to the development of an effective system

that can realistically monitor performance of USAID-funded projects and programs.

The report documents ―best practice‖ examples in key sectors and sub-sectors that can

inform future performance M&E functions.

The failure to establish clear programmatic objectives is the biggest single obstacle to

effective M&E in post-conflict settings. There is almost always tension in post-conflict

programmes between pressures for immediate impact and reconstruction and the need

for longer-term capacity building and structural reform.

Tensions between sector-specific outcomes and outcomes relating to the

reduction of fragility often result in trade-offs between results relating to the

perceived effectiveness of the host government and its legitimacy.

Data systems are weakened, destroyed, or discredited in many post-conflict

situations, by their association with a deposed government.

The development of monitoring information and databases is complicated by a

lack of consistent place descriptors, reluctance to share security-sensitive

information, and absence of an agreed information integrator.

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Problems of institutional complexity are particularly difficult in post-conflict

settings given the larger than usual number of international agencies and the

need to coordinate across multiple types of implementing partners.

The focus on outputs is not in lieu of monitoring and assuring technical quality

in infrastructure.

Recent experience with M&E in post-conflict settings supports the following

conclusions on approaches that work—and work better with improved understanding

of how M&E approaches in post-conflict settings differ from normal M&E models:

Early development and approval of a strategy and results framework

contribute to strong monitoring, even in post-conflict environments.

Output indicators (rather than outcome indicators) are often effective and

legitimate monitoring measures during early efforts at stabilisation. Assessing

the quality of outputs is important.

Systematic tracking of public opinions and perceptions adds an important

dimension - given the emphasis in post-conflict settings on stabilisation,

recovery, and government legitimacy.

Establishing effective multi-sector (and ideally, multi-agency) databases is

critical for providing timely data.

Evaluation in post-conflict settings is most effectively viewed and

implemented in a broader perspective than the traditional evaluation model for

international development programmes.

High-level leadership is indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of

effective M&E in post-conflict settings.

Source: USAID, 2006, 'Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-Conflict Settings', produced

by Management Systems International for the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID), Washington, DC

Supplementary readings

Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction

C Cohen (2006)

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Abstract

The success of efforts to stabilize and reconstruct failed states and war-torn societies is

heavily dependent on proper assessment tools and reliable measures of progress.

Establishing an objective process for evaluating the challenges involved and evaluating

progress toward stabilization is vital for success in these interventions. The main

barrier to measuring progress is political, not conceptual. A system for measuring

progress requires clear and well-integrated goals that are based on an accurate baseline

assessment and are directly linked to strategic planning. Progress in stabilization and

reconstruction efforts should be based on the mission's ability to reduce the means and

motivations for violent conflict in a society and to build local and state capacity to

sustain peace.

Source: Cohen, C., 2006, ‗Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction‘,

USIP Special Report, Washington, DC: USIP.

70

An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices: Using Results-based

Frameworks in Fragile States

UNDG (2005)

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Abstract

The Transitional Results Matrix (TRM), also referred to as a Transitional Calendar or

Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), is a planning, coordination, and

management tool that national stakeholders and donors can use to better prioritize

actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile states. The TRM helps

launch a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) approach in these environments, either by

acting as an early framework to lay the groundwork for a PRS or, later, as a way to

operationalize poverty reduction strategies in low capacity countries.

Source: UNDG, World Bank, 2005, ‗An Operational Note on Transitional Results

Matrices: using results-based frameworks in fragile states‘, United Nations

Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank, Washington, DC

Post Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPIs)

World Bank (2004)

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Abstract

The Post-Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPI) ratings framework is designed to

measure change in countries that are eligible for exceptional post-conflict allocations

from IDA.

The PCPIs measure progress in critical aspects of post-conflict recovery. In many

instances the PCPI indicators are similar to, or cover the same areas as the CPIA (e.g.,

transparency and corruption in the public sector, or revenue mobilization). However, in

these areas, performance and the results that can be expected in an early post-conflict

setting may be different or less ambitious than in non-conflict situations. In addition to

indicators that overlap with the CPIA, the PCPIs measure progress in areas that are

critical for fragile transition processes, but are not captured in the CPIA—security;

demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; political and reconciliation

processes that are normally enshrined in post-conflict agreements; and reintegration of

displaced populations.

Source: World Bank, 2004, ‗Post Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPIs)‘, The

World Bank, Washington, DC

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2.3. Conflict sensitivity of development programmes in Fragile States

(theoretical focus)

UK Government policy

Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and

Development

Department for International Development (DFID) (2005)

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Summary

What is the link between security and development? What is the best way to achieve

both? This strategy paper by the United Kingdom Department for International

Development (DFID) outlines how DFID, through its commitment to fighting poverty,

can help tackle insecurity among the poor. It explains the complex connections

between security and development and sets out how DFID can build security by

working with poor people, their governments and international partners.

In today's world, security is a global need and countries must work together to achieve

it. Insecurity, lawlessness, crime and violent conflict are among the biggest obstacles

to achieving the Millennium Development Goals; they also destroy development.

Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict and

the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism.

2005 provides an unprecedented opportunity to make real progress in tackling some of

the most important challenges to our collective security and well-being, including

poverty, disease and climate change. Poor people cite safety and security as a major

concern; they say it is as important as hunger, unemployment and lack of safe drinking

water. They explicitly link security to personal security.

Given its importance to the well-being of the poor, physical security is a vital part of

reducing poverty.

DFID's role is to promote the security of the poor locally, nationally and

internationally, as part of their work in reducing poverty.

DFID contributes to post-conflict peace building and is strengthening its work

in fragile states. But reducing conflict and promoting poor people's security is

not yet a regular feature of programmes or partnerships.

This does not mean subordinating poverty reduction to short-term political

interests or to work on anti-terrorism.

Nor does it mean big shifts in the existing allocation of UK development

assistance – this will continue to remain focused on the world's poorest

countries and people. It means bringing poor people's security more squarely

into DFID's work.

Aid alone is not enough. Development cannot progress where there is

instability. The security community on its own cannot build the institutions

and opportunities necessary to prevent conflict.

There needs to be better collaboration between development, defense and

diplomatic communities to achieve respective and complementary aims.

It is important that conflict reduction and the security of poor people are considered in

bilateral and multilateral programmes. There are a number of ways to do this. These

include:

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Paying greater attention to the regional and global dimensions of conflict and

insecurity, as well as to countries that play a critical role in promoting regional

stability – or instability.

Considering security as a basic entitlement of the poor and re-focusing work

on governance to include more direct support for the security of the poor.

Integrating more elements of conflict reduction work into programmes.

Making more use of political and conflict analysis in programme design.

Engaging with a wider range of civil society organisations.

Responding as far as possible to requests from new countries for support in

implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Source: Department for International Development, 2005, 'Fighting Poverty to Build a

Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development', Strategy paper, DFID, United

Kingdom

Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States

Department for International Development (DFID) (2005)

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Summary

Why has aid not reduced poverty in fragile states? Why do donors need to work more

effectively in fragile states, and how should they go about this? This policy paper from

the Department for International Development (DFID) brings together the latest

analysis from DFID and others on how to make development more effective in fragile

states. It sets out some objectives and makes commitments about how DFID will work

differently in the future.

Fragile states cannot or will not deliver what citizens need to live decent, secure lives.

They cannot or will not tackle poverty. They are the most difficult environments in the

world and working with them is complex, costly and carries significant risks. As a

result, donors have often avoided aiding them or relied on humanitarian responses,

which do nothing to address chronic state weakness. An emphasis on rewarding

countries with relatively effective governments and stable macroeconomic policies has

led to further neglect of fragile states, and aid that has been given has often been

delivered badly.

Fragile states matter because poverty is so widespread; because they can destabilise

regional and global security; and because the costs of late response to crisis are high.

Aid has failed to reduce poverty in fragile states because there has not been enough,

the aid provided has been delivered at the wrong time and it has been delivered in

ineffective ways. However, there is significant potential to improve aid effectiveness in

fragile states, through:

Better early warning systems (and early response).

Understanding the political economy (the drivers of change approach).

Recognising the importance of regional relationships and institutions.

Combining aid with diplomacy, security guarantees, human rights monitoring,

trade policy, and technical assistance.

Better donor coordination, including establishing an international mechanism

to decide which donors do what and where.

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Support, in the first instance, for ˜good enough governance" - the minimum

institutions and capacity needed to get the job done.

The most urgent governance reforms are those that directly address aspects of state

failure with the greatest potential to increase fragility. Initial success on an achievable

reform package can be critical to the states legitimacy and to the political will that is

necessary to carry through further reform. Other policy pointers are:

Failure to protect people and their property, security sector reform, public

financial management, and improving service delivery are key areas.

Donor agreement on setting achievable objectives to reduce state fragility is

important to stop overloading fragile states with overly optimistic reform

programmes.

There are ways of increasing access to services through international or local

providers that do not undermine the state and may even strengthen it.

The starting point in delivering services in fragile states should be to

strengthen what works.

Approaches need to be flexible enough to ensure a smooth transition from

humanitarian to development assistance; supporting livelihoods is a very

effective means of doing this, and social protection measures can be

particularly useful.

There are times when it will be necessary to bypass the state altogether, but the

possibility of eventual transfer to the state, at least of the regulatory function,

needs to be built into programme design.

Source: Department for International Development, 2005, Why we Need to Work

More Effectively in Fragile States, DFID, London

Core readings

Development Aid: Conclusions and Paths for Reflection

P Uvin (1998)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

What was the role of development aid in the processes that led to genocide in Rwanda?

This study suggests that aid is both external to the political processes that caused the

genocide and constituent of them. It argues that all development aid is a form of

political intervention. Change should, therefore, be about a different vision of what

development is and how it is achieved.

It is difficult and artificial to separate the aid enterprise from the broader foreign

relations between Rwanda and Western countries. The mechanisms through which aid

interacted with structural violence and the blindness to its consequences are profoundly

ingrained in the institutional, ideological and political fundaments of the development

enterprise. Aid behaves in the same way throughout Africa, largely with the same

effects. Faced with the disintegration of

Rwandanese society, this paper argues that the development community should have

tried to rethink its mission and reorient its actions:

The development aid milieu did not react much to the human rights abuses,

racism and militarisation of society that were constitutive elements of the drive

to genocide, neither did the international diplomatic community.

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The military and diplomatic support to the regime by some countries

facilitated, if not encouraged, the forces of genocide to reach their final

conclusion.

Most Western aid agencies are legally obliged to act when faced with human

rights violations. Here, rhetoric and practice differ markedly, although they

may have considered that their support for democratisation and peace was

sufficient to end the human rights violations and racism.

If the international community had used aid conditionality to wrestle more

than small concessions from the Rwandan government, it is by no means sure

that it would have been successful.

Most development aid shared the ethnic biases or did not consider them

serious enough to warrant profound changes in the way the development game

was played.

With a few exceptions, aid was an active and willing partner in the

construction of structural violence in Rwanda, as it is elsewhere in Africa.

The notion of 'development' defined as economic growth mainly at the macro level is

meaningless if it can coincide with increases in inequality, disempowerment,

alienation, violence and frustration.

The concept of development should be broadened to one that includes the

eradication of features of structural violence.

Such a vision can be constructed but its widespread adoption in practice is still

a major challenge.

Apolitical development is not only ineffective but also oppressive and often

regressive.

If foreign policies of donor countries are unfavourable for development goals,

then people committed to development should try to modify these policies.

If there is no genuine, popularly based, clear alternative to the status quo,

external pressure for political change may only yield more of the same or even

exacerbate the situation.

Both negative and positive conditionality should be used, whereby aid

resources strengthen the social and political conditions for improved policies

rather than forcing governments to adopt such policies.

Source: Uvin, P., 1998, ‗Development Aid: Conclusions and Paths for Reflection‘, in

Aiding Violence: the Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Kumarian Press, West

Hartford.

The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict

P Uvin (2001)

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Summary

How can donors better use Official Development Assistance (ODA) to create

incentives and disincentives to reduce violent conflict and build durable peace? This

paper from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

presents the results of two workshops held in 1999, which reviewed case studies on

Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sri Lanka, and relevant policy

research. It argues that the most important issue is how to manage (dis)incentives so as

to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution.

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The end of the Cold War led to far-reaching political changes that culminated in a

great rise in civil wars, as well as a willingness by international donors to promote

democratic and peaceful change in those same regions. However, the context of deep

social divisions and weak governance in affected countries has meant an extended need

for humanitarian assistance and development aid, under extremely difficult conditions.

Incentives for peace refer to all purposeful uses of aid that strengthen the dynamics that

favour peace by influencing actors' behaviour; strengthening pro-poor actors'

capacities; changing the relations between conflicting actors; and influencing the social

and economic environment. Disincentives do the opposite: they strengthen and

encourage the dynamics that favour violence.

All aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives, for peace or for war, before,

during or after war ( regardless of whether these effects are deliberate, recognised or

not).

The issue is not whether or not to create (dis)incentives but, rather, how to

manage them so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-

violent conflict resolution.

Aid managers need to face up to the political nature of all aid. This involves

recognising that perceptions matter as much as facts in aid impacts.

Aid alone usually has limited capacity to determine the dynamics of violent

conflict; it is often weak compared to the range of pressures and interests

emanating from international, national, regional and local actors, both public

and private.

The impact of ODA on the dynamics of peace and violence in recipient

countries takes place within the broader, often volatile, environment of the of

the country's international relations.

Donors should work with non-ODA actors to develop a coherent and comprehensive

policy involving diplomacy, military relations, finance and trade. They should also

develop and implement innovative approaches to maximise and fine tune the capacity

of ODA to create (dis)incentives for peace for particular actors. Key components of

this will be:

The use of ODA in new domains, including politically sensitive areas such as

the judiciary and security.

Explicit attention to the way project design influences the dynamics of

violence and peace.

Investment in new kinds of knowledge and human resources for understanding

the histories and social dynamics of inequality, division and violence in

societies, and the role of external actors therein.

The creation of more decentralised decision-making, allowing for timely and

more locally-owned and coordinated responses to unfolding dynamics.

The targeting of incentives and disincentives for peace at all parties to

conflicts, including non-state and sub-state actors.

Development of explicit regional strategies.

An awareness that conditionality does not usually work. There are a range of

alternatives available including long-term constructive engagement, principled

behaviour and negotiated benchmarks.

Source: OECD, 2001, ‗The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict‘,

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Conflict

Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers, DAC Journal, vol. 2, no. 1

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The Development / Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing

Paradigms

P Uvin (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of development

thinking and practice. What should the relationship between development aid and

peace building be? This article from the Journal of Peace building and Development

presents and critiques a typology of seven ways in which this interaction has

historically been conceived.

Two key variables underlie the typology of the relationship between development and

peace building: (i) how far conflict matters are incorporated into development, and (ii)

how far the development enterprise engages in the political realm.

Seven ways of conceiving the relationship between development and peace building

are identifiable. These increasingly take steps away from the traditional development

paradigm:

Development by definition promotes peace (so simply more aid is required).

This causal link does not stand up to scrutiny.

Military conditionality. Threats of reduced aid to countries engaged in war

have persisted but been inconsistent. Significant competence in security sector

reform has been acquired by some donors.

Post-conflict assistance. This prioritises areas that had been off the

development agenda, such as governance and representation, justice and

security, prejudice and reconciliation. It may be too ambitious, broad,

scattered and unrealistic, due to shortages of resources and knowledge.

Ethically, problems include the cost of error borne by local people and a

potentially unrestrained licence to intervene.

'Do No Harm'. This practical approach highlights that aid resources can be

stolen and spent on weapons, aid can affect markets and inter-group

relationships, support civilians thereby freeing resources for conflict, and it

can legitimise people and agendas. This approach touches less on the root

causes of conflict.

Conflict prevention. This follows logically from earlier approaches, but

constitutes an enormous expansion of the development and uses an explicit

political lens. In terms of implementation, it matches the post-conflict agenda.

Human security. This focuses on the human dimensions of security such as

child soldiers, landmines and small arms, or more broadly, threats to lives,

livelihoods and dignity, stating 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'

are inseparable. This may find little support in military establishments and is

hard to measure.

Global system reform. This final level views rich countries' and corporations'

behaviour in the military, political and economic realms as having potential to

minimise conflict. It is an attempt to moralise all international relations. The

most radical arguments advocate structural reform of the world economy.

The intellectual and operational gap between development and security has shrunk

significantly. However, problems are caused by the weakness of the knowledge and

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ethical base on which this work rests, its breadth, paucity of resources and lack of

prioritisation mechanisms. Without changes, the new agenda may be only rhetoric with

continuing ignorance, inconsistency and irrelevance.

To avoid intrusiveness and political sensitivities, the reach of the international

community should be minimised but its impact maximised. The list of

objectives and domains of intervention must be limited by new mechanisms to

allow for appropriate choices to be made in each case.

Donors must take their engagements more seriously and behave more

consistently across cases. Control, accountability and assessment mechanisms

are needed.

This work needs to be more anchored in the societies involved, with greater

discussions, knowledge generation, transparency and local dialogues to guide

donor policy.

Source: Uvin, P, 2002, 'The Development / Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and

History of Changing Paradigms', Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, vol.1,

no.1

Supplementary readings

Aid and Conflict in Uganda

S Bayne (2007)

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Summary

Since independence, Uganda has experienced a history of conflict and violent

uprisings, including the ongoing insurgency in the north of the country. This paper

from Saferworld examines the extent to which armed conflict and violence are being

addressed through, and have been integrated within, development frameworks in

Uganda. It focuses primarily on the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of the

Government of Uganda (GoU).

Whilst the GoU and donors both recognise the need for the development effort to

address conflict and armed violence, they need to translate this recognition into

concrete action. The GoU‘s limited progress in this area may reflect its limited

capacity and lack of commitment to addressing the causes of conflict. It may also

reflect the limitations of using technical measures to address essentially political

issues. Notwithstanding, the PEAP provides a reasonable framework for integrating

conflict issues into the development process. Thus, the GoU, civil society and donors

must co-operate to ensure a coherent approach to addressing conflict throughout

Uganda through support to the PEAP.

Donor relations with the GoU are characterised by high levels of harmonisation with

the PEAP. Most donors align assistance with government priorities via budget support

and the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS). Meanwhile, donors are also seeking

to address conflict and armed violence within new development programmes and

strategies. Nevertheless, whilst conflict and security issues are recognised as a high

priority in the PEAP - with Pillar 3 dedicated to Security, Conflict Resolution and

Disaster Management (SCD) - there remain some issues of concern:

78

The GoU has established SCD as a new sector with a secretariat in the Office

of the Prime Minister. Some observers feel that this hinders the mainstreaming

of these issues across sectors.

Donors‘ decisions to provide most assistance via budget support reflect

confidence in the GoU. Concerns over democratisation and GoU commitment

to conflict resolution in the north call into question the basis for this

confidence.

The needs of conflict-affected areas in the north are addressed largely through

donor-funded projects separate from the PEAP. This risks undermining the

GoU‘s role in service provision and reinforcing perceptions of government

neglect there.

Donors are doing little to encourage the integration of conflict and armed

violence issues across sectors. Potential for conflict in areas other than the

north is not being adequately addressed due to the lack of a systematic

approach to conflict-sensitivity.

To address these issues, the GoU should make conflict prevention and peacebuilding

central to its poverty reduction strategies. It should build capacity to adopt conflict-

sensitive approaches to development, strengthen the coherence between different

government ministries on conflict and security issues, and undertake further research,

including a conflict assessment. Civil society should monitor progress in implementing

Pillar 3 of the PEAP. It should also engage in dialogue with donors, conduct research

and advocacy on conflict and development, and provide practical support to the GoU.

For their part, donors should:

Ensure that the GoU‘s approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding are

central to decisions on budget support to Uganda

Ensure that donor assistance strategies address the links between conflict,

armed violence and development and are informed by conflict analysis

Support efforts to implement Pillar 3 of the PEAP, by establishing the SCD

sector, mainstreaming actions to address conflict across sectors, pursuing other

entry points on initiatives to support the GoU, and evaluating the sustainability

of technical assistance

Strengthen joint analysis and monitoring of conflict and armed violence

among donors to inform assistance strategies, dialogue and programming.

Source: Bayne, S., 2007, 'Aid and Conflict in Uganda', Saferworld, London

Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi

J Brachet and H Wolpe (2005)

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Abstract

This paper notes eight principles to guide development assistance: (i) ―do no harm‖

particularly to avoid reinforcing or triggering conflict causes; (ii) make peace

dividends visible to the population; (iii) include short-term issues, especially the

restoration of security; (iv) limit the potential for mass mobilization; (v) address the

structural causes of conflict; (vi) address the perceptual and attitudinal legacy of the

conflict; (vii) ensure that development assistance is consistent and sustained; and (viii)

consider the regional context.

The paper reviews a number of development areas where there are opportunities to

incorporate the above principles.

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Source: Brachet, J., H. Wolpe, 2005, ‗Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The

Case of Burundi‘ Paper No. 27, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit,

Washington, DC: World Bank.

Aid Instruments in Fragile States

N Leader and P Colenso (2005)

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Summary

What type and mix of aid instruments are currently being used in difficult

environments? How can donors work more effectively in fragile states? This paper by

the UK Department for International Development describes the limitations of current

approaches to aid instruments and discusses the emerging understanding of their use

within fragile states. In addition, a selection of aid instruments that may be more

effective in achieving objectives in difficult environments is highlighted.

Donors need to work more effectively in fragile states to meet immediate needs,

support pro poor political reform and develop sustainable systems for delivering

services. The current approach to the selection of aid instruments emphasises: less

money, disbursing through projects, shorter time commitments and a shift away from

projects towards budget support as performance increases. However, this approach

does not fit with the variety of situations in fragile states and there are examples of

successful use of different aid instruments in such cases. Furthermore, it does not

reflect the research and understanding of aid effectiveness, specifically aid as a cost-

effective means of preventing conflict.

Donors should use an improved approach to the selection of aid instruments,

acknowledging that:

There is no single approach and a'one-size fits all' mentality should be

avoided. Working in fragile states requires experimentation and flexibility

based on local knowledge.

Risk can be reduced but not eliminated. Concerns over state legitimation and

fiduciary risk will be a determinant of the choice and use of aid instruments.

An approach is needed that acknowledges both high risk and high returns.

There is a need to think and plan programmatically from the outset and then to

work out implementation methodologies. Such programmes should involve

partnerships between the state, UN, civil society and the private sector.

Better frameworks are needed for improved coherence between security,

development and diplomatic interventions.

General principles of aid effectiveness should also be applied to fragile states.

Aid should be coordinated to be harmonised and aligned. Where there is no

commitment to poverty reduction, aid actors should seek to 'shadow align.'

Supporting political reform is difficult but possible. The choice of aid

instruments should be based on broader political strategies and a political

economy analysis of potential winners and losers.

Aid should be used appropriately to the context. There have been some promising uses

of aid instruments in fragile states so far. Overall:

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Budget support has been effective via trust funds in early stages of formation

and direct to government in more established post-conflict countries. Social

funds can strengthen local accountability and contribute to political reform.

Pooled funding can promote a more programmatic and long term approach and

reduce the tendency for projectisation. However, projects within a strategic

framework can demonstrate aid effectiveness.

Where there is state capacity but no commitment to poverty reduction off-

budget joint, national or regional programmes should be considered. Key

reformers in government should be supported.

Where there is both little capacity and commitment the focus should be on

local government, communities, civil society and the private sector.

Where there is commitment but little capacity a strategic framework should be

in place between government and donors covering political, security and

development aspects.

Source: Leader, N. and Colenso, P., 2005, ‗Aid Instruments in Fragile States‘, Poverty

Reduction in Difficult Environments Team Working Paper no. 5, Department for

International Development, London

Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International Cooperation: An Introductory

Overview T Paffenholz (2005)

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Summary

Peace and conflict sensitivity has successfully entered the mainstreaming agenda of

development donors and agencies and there has been a tremendous institutionalisation

and conceptualisation of the topic. In practical terms however, a co-ordinated system

for peace and conflict sensitive aid implementation remains a long way off. This

article, published in the the journal International Politics and Society, explores the gap

between rhetoric and practice and identifies some of the challenges ahead.

Peace and conflict sensitivity in international co-operation involves integrating the

peace and conflict dimension into development policies and programmes. Following

the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a major debate began amongst development actors

about the role of development in conflict affected areas. This largely political debate

then shifted to a tool-based discussion and in recent years, a variety of conflict

sensitive approaches have been developed, such as ‗Do No Harm‘.

The limitations of many ‗Do No Harm‘ activities have since become apparent. Without

a clear political strategy, donors have been unable to influence conflict situations in a

timely and constructive way.

In Nepal, despite 30 different conflict analysis reports and assessments, donors

have been unable to come up with a joint assessment that could lead to a joint

response.

In Sri Lanka, the many private aid organisations specially founded for tsunami

aid have no experience in international co-operation, and therefore no idea

about peace and conflict sensitivity.

The opposition party-controlled areas in the north and east of Sri-Lanka are

getting far less tsunami aid than the south because agencies there have to work

with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which takes longer. Most

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professional agencies are aware of this, but do not see any other way of coping

with these huge resource allocations.

In order to help improve the practice of peace and conflict sensitivity in international

co-operation, policymakers need to:

Politicise the debate around peace/conflict sensitivity. Peace and conflict are

political issues and this fosters the need for better co-operation between

diplomatic and development actors

Change from a tool-based strategy to a more holistic approach, which aims at

systematic peace and conflict sensitive programme management

Ensure more modesty in the debate on assessing the impact of peace-building

interventions. It is difficult to assess the impact of a single intervention on the

macro peace process in isolation

Invest in a good planning process. Donors should emphasise evaluations of

peace programmes and include funds for training courses in participatory

planning for peace partner organisations

Establish training partnerships with southern institutions to create ownership

and make use of local knowledge. A north-only agency and consultant drive

approach should be avoided

Standardise planning and evaluation guidelines. It would make sense for

researchers, governmental and non-governmental actors from the north, south

and east to develop standard guidelines in the context of an international

framework.

Source: Paffenholz, T., 2005, 'Peace and Conflict Sensitivity in International

Cooperation: An Introductory Overview', International Politics and Society, issue no.

4, pp. 63-82

Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities

F Stewart et al (2007)

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Summary

Severe horizontal inequalities (HIs), or inequalities among groups, are undesirable in

themselves and can lead to violent conflict. So, what can be done to reduce them? This

paper from the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity

(CRISE) reviews a range of policies which could contribute to reducing HIs in the

political, socio-economic and cultural status dimensions. Considerations of HI are

frequently ignored in policy-making, and need to become an important part of policy

discussions in multicultural societies.

Policies across all three dimensions can take either a direct or indirect approach

towards correcting group inequality. Relevant policies depend on the context and

hence a first requirement is a careful assessment of the nature and causes of HIs in the

particular society. If possible, policies should be adopted which reduce rather than

increase the salience of identities. Policies which correct HIs can be provocative,

leading to mobilisation (sometimes violent) by previously privileged groups, so that

caution is needed in design and implementation. The successful socio-economic cases

are shown to have tackled both social and economic inequalities, while success in

reducing political HIs requires political inclusivity at many levels of the political

system.

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HIs are most likely to contribute to conflict where:

They are durable and widen over time

Group boundaries are relatively impermeable, meaning inequalities are more

difficult to overcome

There are fairly large numbers in different groups

Inequalitites are consistent across dimensions, for instance where lack of

political power is combined with economic deprivation

Aggregate incomes are stagnant/slow growing and there is very little

improvement in the absolute economic and social position of deprived groups

Groups are sufficiently cohesive for collective action to emerge

Leaders emerge and are not co-opted into the ruling system, and government is

irresponsive or violently repressive.

Policies towards HIs need to be combined with policies to aid in the reconstruction of

economic and social infrastructure, demobilisation and economic growth.

Policies need to address political as well as economic/social HIs. Policies

which aim for equality of outcomes are likely to be more successful than those

only aimed at equality of opportunities or equality of resource access.

Policies may need to address discriminatory processes, directing assistance to

particular groups or introducing targets and quotas for education, land

distribution etc (affirmative action). Government action will have more effect

on HIs in the public rather than the private sector.

Policies should be designed to enhance efficiency and improve income

distribution to avoid the possibility of adverse impacts on efficiency and intra-

group equity.

Political HIs can be addressed through a federal constitution, addressing the

extent and nature of decentralisation, voting systems and elected assemblies.

Other areas for attention include seat reservation for particular groups, job

allocation within government, citizenship rights, the nature of political parties

and human rights protection.

Differences in cultural status or recognition can also be an important aspect of

group grievances which can potentially contribute to the emergence of violent

conflict. Multicultural societies can adopt a wide range of formal policies as

well as informal practices in order to mitigate perceptions of cultural

exclusion, discrimination or inequality of treatment among certain cultural

groups.

Careful attention also needs to be paid to the risk that affirmative action can

entrench ethnicity. In addition, policies to correct HIs can in themselves

provoke violence. In some cases action to correct political HIs may need to

precede economic action.

Source: Stewart, F., Brown, G., and Langer, A., 2007, 'Policies towards Horizontal

Inequalities', CRISE Working Paper, no. 42, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford

University

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The Implications of Horizontal Inequality for Aid

G Brown and F Stewart (2006)

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Summary

How should the reduction of horizontal inequalities (HIs) inform aid policy in

culturally diverse countries? This paper from the Centre for Research on Inequality,

Human Security and Ethnicity outlines the various instruments and outcomes of aid

policies aimed at addressing HIs. Drawing on case studies from Ghana and Nepal, it

argues that donors must make reducing HIs a more central objective by directing more

aid to heterogeneous countries and engaging in more policy dialogue with partner

governments.

HIs are economic, social and political inequalities between culturally defined groups.

Such disparities have direct consequences: a group‘s relative impoverishment can

impair individuals‘ self-perceptions and wellbeing. HIs also have instrumental

significance: they can reduce the efficiency of an aid programme and encourage

violent conflict.

Aid programmes that do not prioritise HIs may exacerbate them. Poverty reduction

programmes may succeed in more developed, urban areas, but fail to reach more

underprivileged groups. Aid initiatives may be distorted by the discriminatory

practices of governments or elites that fail to counter existing disparities.

There are several challenges and possibilities for aid programmes targeted at reducing

HIs:

Mapping HIs is complex: populations are sub-divided along a variety of

cultural lines and disaggregated data is often sparse. Aid organisations should

monitor the categories which coincide with the sharpest socio-economic

disparities and, in the absence of direct data, use regional or linguistic proxies.

Heterogeneous countries receive relatively less aid than homogeneous

countries: this pattern should be reversed to compensate for disadvantages

associated with cultural diversity. Countries willing to tackle HIs should

receive general budgetary support. Less willing governments should receive

conditional aid, project support directed at excluded groups or support for

other objectives, acceptable to the government, which would also assist these

groups.

In Ghana, the greatest inequalities exist, for historical and economic reasons,

between the poorer North and the richer South. Since aid accounts for a large

proportion of government expenditure, donors could have a big impact on

these disparities, but their policy statements make little reference to HIs.

Indeed, recent aid has exacerbated North / South disparities which may

promote future conflict.

In Nepal, the recent communist insurgency was driven by persistent socio-

economic and political HIs. Although donors have belatedly acknowledged

this and focused on HIs, earlier measures targeted at reducing these

inequalities might have averted conflict in a country heavily development on

foreign aid.

Aid can play a central role in reducing HI, especially in countries with heavy aid

dependence. Donors must acknowledge the importance of HIs and implement

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proactive policies to reduce these inequalities, even if it means trading off other

objectives, like short-term growth and poverty reduction:

Despite current rhetoric on country ownership of development strategies,

donors should be prepared to influence the development objectives of

governments unwilling to reduce HIs.

Donors should direct aid instruments like Poverty Reduction Budget Support

and Sector Wide Approach programmes towards addressing HIs.

Donors should encourage partner governments to prioritise HIs in Poverty

Reduction Strategy Papers and in policy dialogue.

A human rights and social exclusion approach to aid may support HI reduction

policies, but these strategies must be more precisely interpreted in line with HI

objectives.

Aid agencies should implement proactive policies to reduce HIs before they

become a cause for conflict.

Source: Brown, G. and Stewart, F., 2006, 'The Implications of Horizontal Inequality

for Aid', paper presented at WIDER Conference on Aid: Principles, Policies and

Performance, 16-17 June, Helsinki

Fragile States Strategy

USAID (2005)

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Summary

What factors should donors consider when identifying an approach to reverse decline

in fragile states? How do fragile states differ from those that are stable and able to

pursue development? This paper by the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) outlines a strategy for its engagement with fragile states. It

details how USAID can respond effectively by identifying strategic priorities, initial

directions for programming and a new management and administrative approach.

Fragile states occur where development and governance has failed, the consequences

of which can have a worldwide effect. USAID's fragile states strategy was developed

in response to addressing security issues, an increased interest in reducing poverty and

a need for greater contextual understanding. Based on an analysis of previous

experience and an identification of gaps in current responses to fragile states, USAID

have identified a more strategic approach.

This approach has four main aspects:

Analysing and monitoring the internal dynamics of fragile states. This will

enable an informed assessment of risk, allow strategic priority setting among

and within countries and more effective targeting of the sources of fragility.

Identification of priorities that reflect the realities within fragile states:

security, stability, reform and capacity of institutions. The uniqueness and

complexity of fragile states will call for a careful analysis of the context and

subsequently developing appropriate strategies.

Strategic programming focusing on priorities identified, sources of fragility,

both short and long term impact, appropriate measurement systems and

importance to US foreign policy. These will differ depending on whether the

state is vulnerable or in a crisis.

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Use of a fragile states business model to bring the vision to reality. The main

features include a more effective response in strategic planning, reporting,

budgeting, operational response and administrative procedures.

USAID has considerable experience in fragile states and has identified the following

key lessons from past experience and through identifying gaps in current responses:

Security is essential for progress within fragile states. USAID is currently

constrained by a number of security issues.

Weak governance is at the centre of fragility. USAID need to address this as

one of the sources of the problem. Weak institutions with limited capacity

contribute to weak governance, however, USAID tends to be focused on

policy reform rather than institution building.

There needs to be more research into what enables turnaround in fragile states

and the most effective role for the donor in the process.

An integrated analysis, response strategies and operations and shared

responsibility for decisions are required. An effective response to fragile states

requires a coherent relationship with agencies of the U.S. Government and

effective relationships with other partners.

Fragile states need a stable funding source but with flexibility in the

deployment of funds.

It is vital to have an early warning system to prompt a rapid response to fragile

states showing vulnerability.

USAID, 2005, ‗Fragile States Strategy‘, United States Agency for International

Development, Washington DC

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3. HMG and International Conflict Architecture, Particularly UN and

IFIs

Core readings

Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United

Nations Peacebuilding Commission

A Street and J Smith (2007)

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Summary

How successful has the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) been in its

first year of activity? What challenges confront the PBC? This report from ActionAid,

CAFOD and Care International UK assesses the first year of the PBC's work in Sierra

Leone and Burundi. It finds that the PBC's impact has been largely positive and well

received, but that important challenges remain.

In Sierra Leone and Burundi the PBC has made significant progress in overcoming

stakeholders' initial reservations and the problems of establishing its work. The PBC

has also experienced a number of challenges in delivering on its mandate and

objectives. The PBC should emphasise the Strategic Peacebuilding Framework (SPBF)

as a political instrument to facilitate commitment, consensus and action on confronting

governance-related challenges. To complement the political process, the Peacebuilding

Fund (PBF) should tackle gaps and challenges in peacebuilding efforts, rather than just

provide funds for existing strategies.

Conclusions on the PBC's work in Sierra Leone and Burundi include that:

The PBC has made an important contribution to Sierra Leone in terms of

international attention and financial support. Additional resources may be

mobilised due to PBC engagement, which is encouraging given the country's

chronic poverty.

The PBC and PBF have missed opportunities to maximise their effectiveness in

Sierra Leone. For example, the immediate focus on PBF money detracted from

the more important role of the SPBF.

Much of the PBC process in Burundi has focused on PBF funding, with

dialogue and strategic and political issues coming second. While this is

understandable, it is important that the PBC is involved in political processes

taking place in the country.

The PBC/PBF process has generally been useful in Burundi, with the

international community successfully implementing a shared vision of

progress. It was limited, however, in that it excluded Burundian civil society

and the political opposition.

The PBC focus on Burundi has the potential to provide an international

spotlight on the positive peacebuilding processes taking place. This could lead

to more donor funding, due to greater confidence, and the potential of foreign

direct investment.

The lessons learned from the PBC's experience in Sierra Leone and Burundi should

inform future PBC policies and operations there, and in future focus countries. The

PBC should:

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Sequence the SPBF and the PBF appropriately. In late post-conflict/early

development phases, greater emphasis should be placed on political strategy,

with PBF funding as an incentive to encourage political consensus;

Give greater attention to accountability, monitoring and follow-up.

Mechanisms and processes should be developed to assess genuine contributions

to peace, rather than project outputs, across programme and political levels;

Focus on the critical gaps and political challenges in peacebuilding processes.

The PBC's greatest potential to provide added value to peacebuilding efforts

lies in promoting political consensus and commitment to addressing difficult

issues;

Identify criteria for 'PBF only' scenarios. Criteria should be developed to ensure

that the use of PBF funding in early post-conflict stabilisation adds real value

and does no harm; and

Rethink the PBF timeframe. The one- to two-year period for PBF

implementation should be reviewed, since sustainable peace cannot be

achieved, nor impact evaluated, within this timeframe.

Source: Street, A., Smith, J. and Mollet, H. 2007. 'Consolidating the peace?: views

from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission',

ActionAid, CAFOD and CARE International

Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches

to Fragile States

S Patrick and K Brown (2007)

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Summary

Promoting security, good governance and recovery in weak, failing and war-torn

countries requires integrated, coherent approaches. Many international donors are

adopting ‗whole-of government‘ approaches that bring together their diplomatic,

defence and development instruments: the 3Ds. This report from the International

Peace Academy examines these approaches in seven leading donor countries. It argues

that policy coherence remains a work in progress.

Fragile states represent both the crux of today‘s development challenge and an

increasing source of threats to international security. Because building effective states

in the developing world requires addressing both development and security concerns,

there is a growing recognition that development agencies must ‗join up‘ with other

departments with comparative advantages and unique capabilities, particularly

diplomatic and defence ministries.

This study examines efforts to promote policy coherence toward fragile states by seven

donor Governments: the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, France, Germany and

Sweden. In looking at each country, the report attempts to glean insights into the

motivations, assumptions and rationales behind this new strategic reorientation.

Laudable strides have been made towards policy coherence in select countries.

However, the quest for coherence in donor policies toward fragile states has a long

way to go:

The concept of state fragility remains contested and controversial. There is

little consensus on what constitutes a fragile state, much less a common,

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government-wide strategic vision on priority objectives in weak and failed

states.

The development community remains deeply ambivalent about policy

coherence. Integrated approaches may garner increased attention and resources

for fragile states. However, they can subordinate the goal of poverty-

alleviation to short-term security imperatives.

There is a dearth of strong co-ordinating entities and dedicated funding

streams to address the specific challenges of engaging in fragile states.

Standing inter-agency units can help create a focal point for cross-

departmental collaboration within donor governments. However, they often

suffer from a lack of bureaucratic heft and dedicated resources.

Where advances have been made, these have often been in responding to

crises and assisting post-conflict recovery, as opposed to preventing state

failure and violent conflict to begin with.

The fate of fragile states will be shaped primarily by the commitment and capacities of

their own governments and citizens. By getting their own house in order, however,

donor governments may be able contribute to these efforts. Donors should:

Commit to open dialogue, both internally and with other donor governments,

about how to balance the multiple goals and objectives involved in working in

fragile states.

Develop a unified country strategy for each fragile state in which they plan to

engage. This strategy should drive a comprehensive assistance strategy, with

flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. A starting point for policy

coherence must be an institutionalised, integrated system for early warning

and assessment, and an evaluation of the impact of donor interventions.

Give high-level political commitment, guidance and departmental leadership

to advance this agenda within donor governments. Without buy-in at senior

levels, even well intentioned co-ordinating units or mechanisms can be

sidelined and proven ineffective.

Devote a greater share of foreign assistance to fragile states, as well as create

common pools to stimulate cross-departmental co-operation.

Ensure that the development of integrated fragile state policies within donor

governments does not preclude harmonisation of international efforts and

alignment with host government priorities.

Source: Patrick, S. and Brown, K., 2007, 'Main Findings and Recommendations' in

Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing "Whole of Government" Approaches to

Fragile States, International Peace Academy, New York, pp 128-141

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility

United Nations Secretariat (2004)

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Summary

The changes that have taken place in the world since the Millennium Declaration

demand that consensus be revitalised on key challenges and priorities. What are these

and how can they best be achieved? This report, by United Nations Secretariat, argues

that security, development and human rights must be advanced together, otherwise

none will succeed. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be met by 2015,

but only if all governments dramatically increase their efforts.

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There can be no security without development, nor can there be development without

security. Mostly importantly, there cannot be either security or development without

respect for human rights. The world needs strong and capable states, effective

partnerships with civil society and the private sector. It also needs agile and effective

regional and global intergovernmental institutions to mobilise and coordinate

collective action. The United Nations must be reshaped in ways not previously

imagined and with a boldness and speed not previously shown. The cause of larger

freedom can only be achieved by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among

states.

The last 25 years have seen the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty the world

has ever experienced. Yet dozens of countries have become poorer.

More than a billion people still live on less than a dollar a day. Each year,

three million people die from HIV/AIDS and 11 million children die before

reaching their fifth birthday.

The threats to peace and security include not just international war and

conflict, but terrorism, organised crime and civil violence. They also include

poverty, disease and environmental degradation.

These threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of

them can undermine the state as the basic unit of the international system.

A great deal has been achieved since 1997 in reforming the internal structures

and culture of the United Nations, but changes are needed, both in the

executive branch and in the UN's intergovernmental organs.

In 2005, a global partnership for development needs to be fully implemented. The

following are priority areas for action:

Each country with extreme poverty should begin to implement a national

development strategy bold enough to meet the MDG targets for 2015. Global

development assistance must be more than doubled.

The Doha negotiations should fulfil their development promise and be

completed by 2006. Debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt

that allows a country to achieve the MDGs without increasing debt ratios.

States should commit to an anti-terrorism strategy. The Security Council should

adopt a resolution on the principles relating to the use of force. Progress should

be made on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Member states should create an inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission

so that the UN can help countries complete the transition from war to peace.

The international community should acknowledge the responsibility to protect.

The human rights treaty bodies of the UN should be more effective and

responsive.

The Secretary-General will create a cabinet-style decision-making mechanism.

He requests Member States to give him the authority and resources to do this.

United Nations Secretary General, 2004, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared

Responsibility', Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change

Source: United Nations Secretary General, 2004, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared

Responsibility', Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change

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Supplementary readings

Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and

Practice

D Cammack and D McLeod (2006)

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Summary

What are the challenges associated with implementing the fragile states (FS) agenda?

This report commissioned by the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA)

outlines the FS agenda as it relates to international development and aid. It focuses on

the experiences of three key donors - the United States (US), the United Kingdom

(UK) and Germany - and explores the operationalisation of the agenda in Afghanistan,

Cambodia and Nepal. To date, implementation efforts have remained largely

uncoordinated and incomplete. Coherence and ‗joined-up‘ approaches are therefore a

priority for the wide variety of actors involved.

The term ‗fragile states‘ has no precise meaning. Fragility is variously defined in terms

of the functionality of states, of their outputs (including insecurity), or of their

relationship with donors. The international development community came to the

fragile states agenda from three different directions: (i) an emphasis on human security

and peacebuilding; (ii) a concern with poor development performance and state

effectiveness; and (iii) a belief that underdevelopment and insecurity are related.

These challenges are now combined in a new constellation, addressed in single

programmes, with a multitude of actors having to learn to plan and work together.

Moving the harmonisation and alignment agenda from theory to practice has been slow

and difficult for donors whose traditional way of working is based on self-motivated,

autonomous planning and independent projects.

The US is primarily motivated by guaranteeing national security.

Humanitarian and development goals have been subordinated since 9/11.

Countries that the government finds particularly threatening (namely

Afghanistan and Iraq) have seen funding levels rise dramatically.

The UK has deliberately maintained a division between its security and

development agendas. The former is pursued by the Ministry of Defence and

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the latter by the

Department for International Development (DFID). Nevertheless, DFID is

quite advanced in analysing the linkages between conflict, poverty and

governance.

Germany has peacekeeping as its central focus, on which the Ministry of

Economic Cooperation and Development has taken the lead. However, the rest

of the federal government appears sympathetic to the view that tackling

poverty via development aid is instrumental to combating instability.

There is little evidence that the FS agenda is being implemented with any consistency

in the field. In Afghanistan, for example, the failure of donors to support the

government has undermined the process of nation building. Nevertheless, donors are

keen to redesign their aid programmes to take account explicitly of state fragility and

conflict. In future, donors should:

Determine the causes of state fragility, develop a list of fragile states, and

adopt or design appropriate analytical tools to measure and monitor their level

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of fragility . This should result in interventions that tackle the perceived causes

of fragility.

Ensure that fragile states programming remains flexible and responsive to the

country context and to constraints acting on the international aid community.

Not all interventions are possible because actual conditions on the ground in

difficult working environments can undermine policy design.

Consider a list of practices that are common to good aid programming, as well

as some that are specific to working in fragile states. This might include, for

example, careful attention by both donors and domestic actors to prioritising

and sequencing interventions (including governance reforms) while

maintaining a realistic sense of what is achievable.

Source: Cammack, D. et al., 2006, 'Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey

of Current Thinking and Practice' ODI Report for the Japan International Cooperation

Agency, Overseas Development Institute, London

New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Peacebuilding, Protection, and the ‘War on

Terror’

R Gowan (2007)

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Abstract

In spite of the variety and complexity of the peacekeeping challenges experienced over

the last year, it is possible to identify a variety of strategic issues which may prove

―pertinent‖ to future peace operations. Some of these are potentially global in scope:

the consolidation of a broader concept of security in international affairs,

encompassing human security and an emerging responsibility to protect; a growing

recognition of the potential of long-term

peacebuilding and state-building as contributions to collective security; and the

centrality of the fight against terrorism to global security policy. Other factors—such

as the emergence of a new African security architecture, and Australia‘s deployment of

a series of missions in the Pacific—are regional, raising the question of whether

peacekeeping will now follow divergent patterns in different parts of the world. This

paper gives a brief overview of the operational and political evolution of peacekeeping

from the mid- 1990s to the present. It provides a detailed analysis of the conceptual

and normative context for current and future operations. It also maps regional trends in

the supply of and demand for peacekeepers.

Source: Gowan, Richard, and Johnstone, Ian, 2007, New Challenges for Peacekeeping:

Peacebuilding, Protection, and the ‗War on Terror,‘ International Peace Academy,

New York, March.

European Union Policy Approaches in Protracted Crises

T Mowjee (2004)

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Summary

What challenges face the European Union (EU) in developing coherent strategies for

protracted crises? This study for the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas

Development Institute (UK) examines the evolution of the EU‘s policy approaches in

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protracted crises. It finds that overlaps of responsibility between the Commission and

the Council, and within the Commission, have hindered the development and

implementation of coherent, comprehensive strategies.

The European Union has struggled with both policy definition and implementation

regarding protracted crises since the Commission‘s 1996 Communication on the links

between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). This adopted a continuum

approach to LRRD, although simultaneously acknowledging the difficulties of this

model in complex emergencies. None of its main recommendations were implemented.

The second Communication on LRRD in 2001 adopted a ‗continuum‘ approach –

meaning that different funding instruments were used simultaneously without uniform

patterns of chronological transition between them. A ‗road map‘ process for LRRD

was adopted, focusing on health and food security.

Problems have arisen because different services embrace the LRRD process to

different extents and give it different priorities. Other measures stemming from the

2001 Communication proposed or adopted by the EU to address LRRD in complex

emergencies are:

A narrower focus on immediate emergency needs for ECHO (the

Commission‘s humanitarian aid organisation)

The ‗Humanitarian Plus‘ programme, which uses EDF money for

humanitarian activities that support peace processes and preparing the ground

for development activities

The use of EDF funds for peacekeeping, particularly the Africa Peace Facility.

Money is to be used for non-military costs

A European Voluntary Humanitarian Corps to enable young Europeans to

participate in humanitarian aid operations. This has been opposed by

organisations within and outside the EU as dangerous and unprofessional.

LRRD has been an internal organisational issue for the EU, rather than a policy

adapting its relationship to other actors in protracted crises. Policy development has

been the product of bureaucratic pressure and wider political processes. Some of the

severe problems facing the EU are:

Overlaps of responsibility between the Commission and the Council, and

within the Commission, have hindered the development and implementation

of coherent, comprehensive strategies

There is a danger that the CFSP will subordinate aid to trade and foreign

policies, in opposition to the neutrality of the Commission‘s humanitarian

assistance

Security has been linked to development, but lack of clarity as to how the

goals for the use of military force can be applied has hampered policy

articulation

Conflict prevention (CP) has proved more successful, especially in the

Balkans. However, humanitarian aid is not used as a CP tool and

mainstreaming the process in other policy areas has been slow

It is likely that with the acquisition of 10 new countries, the EU‘s focus will be

on regional issues with aid directed at transition/middle-income countries in

Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Source: Mowjee, 2004, 'European Union Policy Approaches in Protracted Crises',

Overseas Development Institute, London

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Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Strengthening the United Nations

P Robert (2004)

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Summary

What is the effect of the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) on international efforts to

prevent conflict? Did CPP-funded measures mobilise more effective efforts by

international partners to tackle the conflicts in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or the

former Soviet Union? This study by the United Kingdom Department for International

Development (DFID) assesses the success of the "Strengthening the United Nations

(UN) Strategy" and makes recommendations on how DFID can improve its

contribution.

The UN Strategy under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) is an important

part of the Conflict Pools system. This agenda has been laid out in reports by Kofi

Annan, and by Lakdar Brahimi. The GCPP UN Strategy has been directed to securing

improvements against the benchmarks provided in these reports, though it has so far

concentrated most explicitly on the Brahimi report. Support for peacekeeping and

international policing has been among its main priorities. The UN strategy has also

been active in support of the UN Development Program (UNDP) strategic planning

and the special needs of women and children, issues canvassed in Annan's report.

The existence of the GCPP appears to have brought added value to UK support for UN

reform in the area of conflict prevention by bringing the three ministries together to

develop a joint UN Strategy. However, the Strategy:

Has not been developed on the basis of a well-developed set of intermediate

objectives, risk assessments, or timelines for achieving its objectives. It has

been affected by unclear procedures and by the absence of proper training.

Has not been the object of a wide discussion. Input from posts and officials

with specialist knowledge of UN agencies based outside New York has been

limited.

Arguably, has been no more successful than if the projects had been

implemented outside a GCPP framework. There is however considerable

potential within the CPP systems for more effective interdepartmental

collaboration.

Meant that projects are managed tightly and are resulting in good value for

money in terms of project-specific outcomes.

Could achieve more careful financial management if the key strategy

document itself was improved by being much more explicit in terms of

intermediate objectives, incremental steps and timelines for achieving

outcomes.

The UN Strategy should identify the full range of reforms needed and rank them

according to priority. It should then canvas the opportunities for the UK to make a

meaningful contribution to the highest priority issues.

There may be room to shift the balance toward the Annan recommendations.

There could be reappraisal of the share of GCPP money allocated in support of

peacebuilding compared with the share going toward preventive action.

The broader UN system should be taken into account in refining the Strategy.

Consultations on the strategy within HMG should involve more posts than is

currently the case.

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Geographic strategy managers should be consulted in shaping the UN

Strategy. UN training systems should be used to address the training deficit for

HMG staff working on the CPPs.

The GCPP Strategy should be reviewed in light of the overall aims of the UK

in relation to the UN.

A different allocation of staff resources and a different set of structures and

processes is needed than those in place at present.

It is difficult for the three Steering Group staff members to be able to deliver

the analysis, monitoring and review functions implied by the above findings

and recommendations.

Source: Robert, P., 2004, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Strengthening

the United Nations, Report prepared for the Department for International Development

Low-Income Countries Under Stress: Update

World Bank (2005)

Access full text online

Abstract

This report summarizes progress to date under the Low-Income Countries Under Stress

(LICUS) initiative, and priorities going forward.

Source: World Bank, 2005, ‗Low-Income Countries Under Stress: Update‘, Operations

Policy and Country Services, Washington, DC.

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Part 2: Conflict Prevention and Conflict-

sensitive Development

Contents

1. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Sensitive Development ................................................... 96

1.1 Conflict prevention ........................................................................................... 96

1.2 Early warning and early response systems ..................................................... 104

2. Conflict Sensitive Design of Poverty Reduction Programmes .......................................... 107

3. Conflict-sensitive Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes Aimed at Preventing

Violence ................................................................................................................................. 115

4. Do no Harm and Similar Approaches................................................................................ 133

5. Role of State and non-state Actors in Promoting Peaceful Transformation, in Supporting

Country/state Resilience and in Building State Capacity ...................................................... 137

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1. Conflict Prevention and Conflict Sensitive Development

1.1 Conflict prevention

UK Government policy

Preventing Violent Conflict

Department for International Development (DFID) (2007)

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Summary

How can government development agencies play a part in tackling the problems that

contribute to violent conflict? This paper by the UK Department for International

Development (DFID) seeks to show how DFID understands and responds to conflict

across the breadth of its work. It proposes to place a greater emphasis on resolving

conflict before it becomes violent, to make its response to armed conflict more

effective by improving its support to peace processes and enhancing the conflict-

management capacity of relevant bodies, and to make its development work more

‗conflict-sensitive‘. The paper includes case studies from Brazil, Indonesia, Colombia,

Uganda, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Afghanistan, Nepal, Sudan and Yemen.

Conflict is the pursuit of contrary or seemingly incompatible interests between

individuals, groups or countries and exists in all societies at all times. Conflict can be

managed peacefully and can be a force for positive social change. However, where

there is poor governance, conflicts are likely to become violent. The costs of violent

conflict range from the immediate toll on lives and property to development goals such

as improving education and health. All countries in the international community have

an interest in reducing violent conflict due to the consequent economic and security

benefits.

Although the number of violent conflicts has fallen in recent years, there are current

trends that may increase the risk of violence that should be dealt with at the

international level:

The scarcity of natural resources, compounded by greater environmental

degradation relating to climate change;

Migration, which both stems from and further compounds resource scarcity;

Abundances of resources such as oil or minerals that can create competition to

control profits that can turn violent; and

The availability of conventional weapons and small arms in particular, which

can make it easier for a conflict to turn violent.

Dealing with the mixture of underlying causes and immediate events that often trigger

conflicts often takes DFID into difficult, highly political territory. To minimise the

political risk involved in dealing with national governments and international

organisations, DFID works with other departments such as the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office. This paper sets out how to reduce violent conflict so as to

reduce poverty:

DFID will place greater emphasis on preventing conflict before it turns, or

returns, to violence. DFID will support local, national and international

mechanisms to manage and resolve disputes peacefully;

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DFID will make its response to armed conflict more effective by improving its

practical and political support to peace processes. It will also assist in building

the capacity of international and regional organisations and civil society, as

well as national governments, so that they can manage conflicts better. What

DFID does when conflict breaks out will be tied more closely to dealing with

the underlying causes; and

DFID will make its development work more ‗conflict-sensitive‘ through its

Country Government Assessments. It will develop better corporate approaches

and systems to support its work in countries affected by conflict. This will be

achieved by strengthening its staff capacity, expertise and deployability, and

by improving the way it assesses and deals with risk in planning country

programmes.

Source: DFID, 2007, 'Preventing Violent Conflict', UK Government Policy Paper,

DFID, London

Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability

and Improve Crisis Response

Prime Minister's Strategy Unit (2005)

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Summary

How can the UK improve its strategic approach to countries at risk of instability? This

paper from the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit outlines the challenges and risks of

instability. It identifies practical steps the UK Government can take to improve its

prevention and response strategies in partnership with other international actors. It

argues that more effective action will require common or aligned strategic approaches

across all countries and key international agencies.

Instability is likely to be part of the international landscape for the foreseeable future.

The cost of crisis is very high, especially in human terms, and insecurity around the

globe also affects our own security and prosperity. The international community

therefore needs to reduce the risks of instability, to prevent crises. Although it is

common wisdom that prevention is better than cure, the international community has

found it difficult to translate this into practice. Understanding the causes and dynamics

of instability means looking at three sets of factors: (1) A country's internal capacity

and resilience, (2) Underlying factors associated with instability, and (3) External

stabilisers.

Preventing crises means effectively managing risks. The focus on lack of political will

has obscured what can be done at earlier stages to reduce risks, such as investment in

country and international capacity. In addition:

Increased commitment and coherence of action is needed. A sophisticated

understanding of country situations; an increased scale of engagement;

sustained support; and coherent engagement across different types of actors

are all necessary.

Investment is needed to build country capacity, and the roles of all key

international and domestic actors need to be set out and aligned behind a long-

term agenda. It is especially important that incentives of domestic governing

and other elites be aligned with stability.

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Response to crisis should be improved by increasing multilateral capacities,

tackling conflict funding and improving peace support operations.

International responsibility should be increased in tackling drivers of

instability such as HIV/AIDS, nuclear proliferation and global warming.

A more effective approach to prevention will require a coherent government

and international system-wide response.

A wide range of international actors have roles to play, and these roles should

be defined by their respective capability and willingness to be involved.

There are a number of concrete steps the UK government should undertake:

It should continue developing the Instability Framework with a view to

disseminating it amongst partners. It should also be coherent in its policies

towards countries at risk of instability, making use of the 'Partnerships for

Stability'.

It should, with its partners, develop better methods for understanding internal

political dynamics; enhance support for the European Neighbourhood Policy;

and work with partners to better support the AU.

Creating a positive international environment is crucial: The UK should

continue its advocacy of the International Finance Facility; expand work with

the EU and IFIs to ensure the impact of trade reform on stability; and continue

to work towards a more comprehensive approach to HIV/AIDS.

It should increase support for UN efforts to set out norms to ensure that

foreign direct investment contributes to stability; work with partners to tackle

climate change; and ensure that policies on nuclear energy and proliferation

are aligned with stability concerns.

Crisis response will still be crucial: The UK should make the case for a

substantial increase in deployable troops for Peace Support Operations;

strengthen work with partners to improve early warning analysis and continue

work on a cross-departmental Generic Planning Framework to align activities.

Source: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2005, 'Investing in Prevention: An

International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response',

Cabinet Office, London

Core readings

Conflict Prevention: Policy and Practice in Search of a Theory

M Lund (2008)

Not published at time of writing – forthcoming in 2008

Source: Lund, M., 2008, ‗Conflict Prevention: Policy and Practice in Search of a

Theory‘, draft for publication as a chapter in Jacob Berkovitch, Viktor Kremenyk, and

William Zartman, eds., Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Sage Publications, London,

forthcoming in 2008.

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Prevention: Concept and Scope

B Rubin (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

Given the dramatic loss of life, the fallout in terms of refugees and other serious

problems, and the attacks that deadly conflict inflicts on our fundamental values,

preventing such conflict and the disorder it sows should be a much higher priority for

the United States, other governments, international organizations, and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). So concludes Barnett R. Rubin in Blood on

the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action.

Combining hard-headed commentary with expert analysis of recent deadly conflicts in

Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, Rubin shows that violence arises not

only from internal conflicts within poverty-stricken societies, but also from external

political manipulation and failures of global institutions. He explores other factors that

contribute to conflict and lead to violence, such as the demand for illegal drugs, weak

banking regulations that facilitate looting by corrupt rulers, arms trafficking by

terrorists, and the economic marginalization of entire populations.

Because the prevention of deadly conflict requires intervention in political conflicts,

preventive action must itself be viewed as political, with all the struggles and

compromises that entails. According to Rubin, the solution lies in coalitions of

international organizations, NGOs, and states prepared to take political action, and not

in a new ―institutional architecture‖ or ―global governance.‖

Source: Rubin, B., 2002, ‗Prevention: Concept and Scope‘, Blood on the Doorstep:

The Politics of Preventive Action, New York: The Century Foundation Press

Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building

B Wood (2001)

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Summary

Despite lessons learned and periodic policy and programme adjustments, the overall

performance by the international system in conflict situations remains weak and

inconsistent. This paper, published by the United Nations Development Programme,

discusses the link between conflict and development and recommends concrete ways

in which development cooperation can respond to conflict most effectively.

Development processes need to give primacy to the internal dynamics and potential of

societies they assist and recognise both the contributions and limitations of the

assistance they provide.

International actors in conflict prevention and peace-building situations face

increasingly common states of protracted conflict and instability, complex global

influences and lack of clear outcomes. They also face tough questions about how to act

in certain conflict situations and shifting political priorities about whether to act. In

addition, political and economic interests often prevail, despite the laudable objectives

of building peace and preventing conflict.

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The development perspective recognises that the goal is not the illusory ambition of

trying to prevent conflict altogether, but to prevent the slide into violent conflict.

Peace-building should not aspire to impart solutions for people in affected countries,

but to help them strengthen their capacity to create their own solutions. Development

cooperation needs to improve its flexibility and practices in order to recognise its limits

and maximise its contributions.

Specific areas of development assistance that link development to conflict prevention

and peace-building include, inter alia, economic development, improved governance

and public participation, strengthening the rule of law and respect for culture and

identity.

There are several situations that development cooperation can encounter in conflict-

affected countries. These situations range from ―normal‖ through conflict-prone, rising

tensions and violent conflict to transitions to peace and restoration of development.

Each situation calls for different a set of development responses.

Development cooperation could enhance its impact and effectiveness by conducting

thorough, consistent assessments keyed to specific country situations. Such an

assessment should include:

Analysis of the situation and needs for international support;

Identification of what types of development and other forms of assistance are

appropriate and should have priority in the specific type of situation;

Assessment of what types of relationship prevail within the country and

among the variety of international actors who are likely to be involved;

Acceptance that there are no simple formulas in these complex situations and

that hard choices need to be identified and confronted.

All partners in development need to recall the guiding principles of development

cooperation that provide the foundation for effective development policies and

programmes:

Maximise indigenous ownership; minimise dependency by supporting local

capacity-building.

Maintain engagement and trust; avoid making promises of aid that cannot be

delivered or sustained.

Seek to redress the dangers of violent conflict and mitigate its results; work for

respect for human rights.

Preserve a commitment to development values and goals; strengthen

coordination and coherence with other external actors.

Improve responsiveness and flexibility; learn about specific country situations,

lessons learned and good development practices elsewhere.

Promote development-friendly policies and practices in fields beyond

traditional development assistance, such as trade, finance and international

crime-fighting, which impact upon development and peace-building.

Source: Wood, B., 2001, 'Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention And Peace-

Building', Independent study prepared for the Emergency Response Division, United

Nations Development Program, New York

101

Supplementary readings

Executive Summary of the Final report on Preventing Deadly Conflict

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997)

Access full text online

Abstract

Three inescapable observations form the foundation of this report. First, deadly

conflict is not inevitable. Violence on the scale of what we have seen in Bosnia,

Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere does not emerge inexorably from human interaction.

Second, the need to prevent deadly conflict is increasingly urgent. The rapid

compression of the world through breathtaking population growth, technological

advancement, and economic interdependence, combined with the readily available

supply of deadly weapons and easily transmitted contagion of hatred and incitement to

violence, make it essential and urgent to find ways to prevent disputes from turning

massively violent. Third, preventing deadly conflict is possible. The problem is not

that we do not know about incipient and large-scale violence; it is that we often do not

act. Examples from "hot spots" around the world illustrate that the potential for

violence can be defused through the early, skilful, and integrated application of

political, diplomatic, economic, and military measures.

Source: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, ‗Executive

Summary of the Final report on Preventing Deadly Conflict‘, NY: Carnegie

Corporation of New York.

Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) (2001)

Access full text online

Summary

All development cooperation strategies and programmes must help societies to manage

tensions and disputes without resorting to violence. How can international donors best

promote peace-building and post-conflict reconciliation? A task force, established in

1995 by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, has produced detailed

guidelines covering the design and implementation of development cooperation for

conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery. Development cooperation must be

coherent, comprehensive, integrated and aimed at helping address the root causes of

conflicts.

Donors should nurture local conflict resolutions and not impose externally generated

solutions. Development agencies must encourage the broader inclusion of societal

groups, in particular women, in discussion and negotiation processes. Priorities for

post-conflict reconstruction include: Restoring internal security and the rule of law;

legitimising state institutions; improving food security and social services; and creating

the basis for broad-based economic growth. Assistance must be seen to benefit the

entire population rather than specific groups, such as refugees and ex-combatants.

Development assistance can help consolidate fragile peace processes by supporting

societal reconciliation, political development and physical reconstruction. Aid also

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risks aggravating competition between disputing parties by raising the stakes of

political control.

To avoid increasing tensions, donors should develop their ability to identify,

monitor and analyse the long-term underlying causes of conflict, the current

socio-political context and the impact of aid distributions

A society with well-balanced social and economic resources is better able to

manage tensions and avoid institutional and social breakdown than one

suffering destabilising conditions, such as extreme poverty and large socio-

economic disparities

Donor payments for 'protection services' provide incentives for factions to

maintain insecurity and ransom humanitarian aid

Excessive reliance on international NGOs may weaken the development of

effective governance and of problem-solving and self-governing capabilities

Donors must promote institutions and processes which will stimulate and

sustain democratisation within the state and civil society

Post-conflict reconstruction depends greatly on the participation of returning

refugees and internally displaced persons.

External assistance must build on rather than substitute national capacities, resources

and initiatives, using local ownership and building on in-country experience. Long-

term planning for assistance should be introduced early to promote self-reliance and

avoid creating dependencies on external aid.

Coherence and coordination between all policy instruments (diplomacy,

military, trade, development aid), based on their own comparative advantage,

must be encouraged on a national, international and multilateral basis

Effective aid cooperation requires a common strategic framework; flexible

resources and procedures; leadership among international actors; mechanisms

for operational consultation; and resources ear-marked for coordination

purposes

'Gender aware' aid strategies, recognising and responding to the different

vulnerabilities of men and women, can result in higher-impact and more cost-

effective assistance

Donors must avoid over-centralising aid to strengthen government institutions

if this lessens their dependence on local groups, making them less likely to

promote dialogue and cooperation

Early planning for demobilisation programmes can help them respond to

political developments and avoid delaying the implementation of the peace

process

Donors should encourage regional organisations to develop frameworks for

conflict prevention and peace-building and help them to act as a bridge

between the international community and the region's states.

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001, 'Helping

Prevent Violent Conflict', OECD, Paris

103

Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary

General

United Nations Secretary General (2006)

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Summary

While a culture of conflict prevention is taking hold at the United Nations (UN), an

unacceptable gap remains between rhetoric and practice. This progress report by UN

Secretary General Kofi Annan examines the current status of conflict prevention at

international and national operational, structural and systemic levels. All relevant

actors need to accept and act upon the principles of shared vulnerability and mutual

responsibility so that conflict prevention becomes a deeply-rooted norm embraced at

all levels of the community of nations.

While direct responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments, it is

also one of the UN‘s chief obligations. Despite the decreasing number and severity of

armed conflicts worldwide, the international community still spends vast sums of

money on conflicts that might have been prevented.

The late 20th century saw the development of an international legal framework,

including the International Criminal Court and a UN commitment to protect

populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity. A number of regional initiatives against violent overthrow of legitimately

elected governments were implemented and the importance of constitutions,

participatory elections, civil society and open communication and dialogue was

reaffirmed. National and international actors came together to address sources of

tension and the infrastructure of peace.

The UN has contributed to advancing the conflict prevention agenda through increased

efforts to engage all stakeholders in potential conflict areas and increased attention to

the root causes of conflict. Since 2003, it has undertaken missions in potential or actual

conflict areas in West and Central Africa, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Haiti, the

Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo and peacekeeping operations in Liberia,

Côte d‘Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi and the Sudan.

Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses still exist within the UN system, including:

A lack of intimate knowledge of political, cultural and geographic realities

Insufficient groundwork to build critical local relationships, trust and capacity

The lack of a conflict prevention strategy in existing co-ordination

mechanisms

Generally weak capacity for early warning, information collection and

analysis

A lack of full application of leverage with other actors to prevent armed

conflict

Inadequate and insecure conflict prevention funding.

In the interest of solidifying both intra-state and UN conflict prevention, Member

States should:

Address sources of tension more comprehensively, including issues of: natural

resources; trade; illegal narcotics; illicit flows of small arms, light weapons

and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; the spread of HIV/AIDS;

environmental degradation; and respect for human rights

Address corruption - a particularly insidious obstacle to good governance

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Adopt a more strategic approach to democracy building, elections and

constitutional capacity and recognise the potential of national dialogue and

consensus-building processes

Comply with international human rights, humanitarian and other legal

instruments relevant to the prevention of armed conflict

strengthen UN capacity to analyse conflicts and co-ordination among UN

departments

Avoid ending UN peace operations prematurely

Consider more creative, constructive use of sanctions as a conflict prevention

tool

Provide predictable UN conflict prevention financial support equivalent to a

percentage of the annual UN peacekeeping budget.

Source: U.N, 2006, 'Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of

the Secretary General', United Nations, New York

1.2 Early warning and early response systems

Core readings

The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive

Diplomacy

A L George and J E Holl (1997)

Access full text online

Summary

Obtaining early warning of crises is critical if preventive action is to have any chance

of success. This Carnegie Commission report highlights the need for more emphasis on

developing effective responses for preventive action. It argues that the design and

management of early warning systems should be intimately connected with the task of

responding to a warning. Rather than specific policy recommendations, the report

provides a conceptual approach through which to analyse the warning-response

problem. It also discusses how warning and response interact in policymaking.

Given the rapidly contracting nature of global interactions, unfolding crises are

increasingly knowable, yet frequently have not been prevented. Efforts to develop

improved warning indicators have often failed to link them with appropriate responses.

There is a need for intelligence analysts and policymakers to work within an integrated

―warning-response‖ framework. Early warning will not ensure successful preventive

action unless there is a fundamental change in attitude by governments and

international organisations.

Receptivity and response to warning are not only determined by the warning itself. The

expectations of decision makers and the rewards and costs associated with recognising

and correctly appraising an emerging threat may be more important:

Decision makers will often deter taking preventive action either because the

warning is not taken seriously or because it is taken very seriously but requires

a choice of unpalatable responses.

Early warning does not necessarily make for easy response as it often forces

policymakers to confront difficult decisions. Whilst the logic of warning

demands action, policymakers generally prefer to put off hard decisions.

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Difficult policy choices in a crisis may lead decision makers to discredit

information that contradicts existing expectations, preferences or policies.

Early warning indicators are often equivocal and subject to diverse

interpretations. Uncertainty regarding likely outcomes and the stakes

perceived to be at risk, along with an overload of potential crises, can result in

inaction.

As unambiguous warning is so difficult to obtain, policymakers must consider which

responses are useful and acceptable, even if the warning is equivocal. Once the

problem of warning is linked with implications for action, it becomes significantly

redefined:

Warning-response systems must consider the possible costs and expected

benefits of a response against the costs and benefits of inaction.

Trade-offs exist between costly responses that promise a great deal and more

modest but useful responses that do not pose large costs. This can be partially

addressed through a calibrated warning-response system in which the level of

readiness response increases with the level of warning.

A systematic and practical early warning system should be combined with

consistently updated contingency plans for preventive action that provide

leaders with a repertoire of responses.

Possible responses to warnings include: gather more information; reduce

vulnerabilities; reinforce commitments; engage in sustained dialogue; conduct

consultations; conduct decision rehearsals; clarify commitments to take action;

review contingency plans; and initiate formal negotiations.

Statements that missed opportunities occurred in cases of failure of preventive

diplomacy must be evaluated carefully to distinguish highly plausible from

implausible or barely plausible claims.

Source: George, A., Holl, J., 1997, 'The Warning-Response Problem and Missed

Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy', The Carnegie Commission on Preventing

Deadly Conflict, New York

Supplementary readings

Developing Early Warning Systems: A Checklist

Third International Conference on Early Warning: From Concept to Action (2006)

Access full text online

Abstract

This document aims to present a short, simple checklist of basic elements, actions and

good practices associated with effective early warning systems. It is intended to be a

nontechnical reference tool rather than an extensive ‗how to‘ list for the design of early

warning systems.

Source: Third International Conference on Early Warning: From Concept to Action,

2006, ‗Developing Early Warning Systems: A Checklist‘, 27-29 March 2006, Bonn,

Germany.

106

Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas

A Matveeva ( 2006)

Access full text online

Abstract

This paper is the first in the series of studies into issues in conflict prevention and

peacebuilding by civil society by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed

Conflict (GPPAC). It is based on a literature review, the author‘s experiences as a

practitioner and discussions held at the workshop with WANEP in Accra in February

2006. The purpose of this research is to close some gaps in methodological questions

and to highlight practical dilemmas involved in early warning / response initiatives,

extracting general lessons and points for reflection.

Source: Matveeva A., 2006, ‗Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and

Empirical Dilemmas‘, Issue Paper 1, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed

Conflict (GPPAC), Eurpoean Center for Conflict Prevention, The Hague.

107

2. Conflict Sensitive Design of Poverty Reduction Programmes

Core readings

Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing

Countries

C Cramer (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Violence is a means of communication. And its outcomes are not always purely

destructive. This research from London University argues that the study of war and

violence in developing countries provides understanding of development in general

and the shortcomings of traditional techniques for analysing it. The study of both war

and development need to proceed by means of a political economy approach rooted in

actual historical experiences.

The traditional liberal interpretation of war considers violence to be caused by the

distortion of the natural political and economic order. It is seen to be due to the narrow

vested interests of military elites. Barriers to market entry and the general lack of free

trade are also said to interfere with people‘s ability to pursue their natural inclination to

peaceful development. This traditional view sees the solutions to war as

straightforward. What is required is a project of political and economic liberalisation.

Furthermore, war is assumed to be exclusively negative in its economic consequences.

However, this interpretation of war is unsuitable for understanding and responding to

the violence and war that is prevalent in developing countries and integrated in various

ways into the world economy.

War and violence often provide an enabling environment for the accumulation

of wealth, social organisation and the institutional and technical change that

feed development.

Developing countries are urged to liberalise their trade regimes while Western

creditor countries continue their protectionism. Indeed, capitalist expansion

has always been based on protectionism, at least initially.

Violence and war are not exclusively a problem of the vested interests of

elites. They enable various agendas of political and social conflict and provide

employment for a large number of ordinary people.

Violence in poor countries is connected with actions taken by rich countries.

These include forcing unsuitable economic policies on these countries and

supporting military elite governments.

Contemporary violence is a phenomenon of class to the extent that it is bound

up with the transition to competitive capitalist economic organisation.

Although individual incentives for violence are important, they are not the

only reasons for joining conflicts. Furthermore, motivations are not always

restricted to individual material returns.

The traditional liberal argument is that economic growth brings peace. However if

growth is to bring peace, it requires regulation, a state capable of making effective

interventions both to stimulate growth and to shape its social and political character

and a set of institutions allowing for political voice and conflict.

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The challenge is to secure social and economic transformations while

minimising the destruction.

Where conflict has become violent it is important not just to minimise its

damage but to maximise any potential for positive change that might arise in

the course of that conflict.

Policy makers need to develop a broader range of possible interventions. UN

member states need to make more credible threats and regulate more

effectively corporations that profit from violence and war.

Greater incentives are needed for companies involved in developing country

transitions to encourage them to invest in sectors generating employment and

export revenue.

Source: Cramer, C, 2006, Conclusion in 'Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting

for Violence in Developing Countries', Hurst, London

National Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) in Conflict-Affected Countries in

Africa

A Evans, E Coyle and Z Curran (2003)

Access full text online

Summary

One in three Africans is directly or indirectly affected by violent conflict. Conflict

destroys lives, assets, infrastructure, social cohesion and education, posing major

difficulties for poverty reduction efforts. A briefing note from the PRSP Monitoring

and Synthesis Project at the Overseas Development Institute assesses the synergies and

trade-offs between poverty reduction strategies and conflict prevention strategies. In

particular it considers how governments and donors can best take advantage of the

synergies to promote long-term development.

The study includes case studies of countries currently or recently engaged in conflict,

and which are also engaged in or considering a PRSP. The PRSP approach generally

assumes a state with at least a minimal functioning capacity - political authority and

legitimacy, a commitment to peace and poverty reduction and the institutions and

climate for civil society engagement. These factors are often largely or entirely absent

in conflict-affected societies, so PRSPs must contribute to (re) building them, not just

enhancing them.

Conflict needs to be considered even after the cessation of hostilities - the

subsequent few years carry a high risk of the conflict re-igniting.

The relationship between conflict and poverty reduction can be counter-

intuitive. Violence can be the necessary catalyst for social change, and peace

settlements may sometimes entrench exploitative structures.

Similarly, poverty reduction strategies themselves may be incendiary - radical

changes to social structures need to be accompanied by care for people made

vulnerable by them.

There is a danger that in countries still in conflict, governments adopt the

PRSP process purely as a means to access concessional funds, with no real

commitment to peace or reducing poverty.

No donor engagement can have an entirely neutral political impact; aid may be

seen as reward for one or more actors, it may be diverted to fuel conflict

directly, or indirectly by freeing up internal resources.

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Inclusiveness of participation is hard to gauge in societies where there may

still be unresolved tensions - but all the more critical. It may also hampered by

tight government control over any debate.

The existence of conflict does not necessarily rule out engagement by donors, though

their priorities and the nature of their engagement vary. A proper analysis of the

political economic context is essential to deciding whether and how to engage.

The decision to engage is primarily political amongst bilateral and multilateral

donors - is the government committed to pro-poor policies? Will the PRSP

process be transparent and inclusive?

International financial institutions (IFIs) are constitutionally bound to consider

economic, not political issues, so until recently their strategies for conflict

situations have closely resembled those for other low-income countries

Closer coherence is urged, both between bilateral/multilateral donors and the

IFIs, and within individual agencies, where policy is often the result of tough

negotiations between actors with divergent interests.

Where it is too early for a PRSP, an intermediate phase may be possible -

offering diplomatic and humanitarian support, and encouraging political

dialogue on poverty with government and civil society.

In situations of localised or recently-ended conflict, state capacity may still be

too weak to deliver on PRSP strategies; non-governmental actors may be

considered as alternative delivery vehicles for the short term.

A PRSP can be an entry point, aiming for short-term reconstruction first, but

with a strategy for pursuing long-term goals when security is better

established.

Source: Evans, A. with Coyle, E. and Curran, Z., 2003, 'National Poverty Reduction

Strategies (PRSPs) in Conflict-Affected Countries in Africa', PRSP Monitoring and

Synthesis Project briefing note 6, Overseas Development Institute, London.

Supplementary readings

Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs Making a Difference?

D Booth (2004)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Does the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process represent a significant

change in approach to lending by international financial institutions (IFIs) and donors?

Has it increased national ownership and effectiveness of poverty reduction efforts?

This book, based on a study commissioned by the Strategic Partnership for Africa and

published by the Overseas Development Institute, examines these questions through

case studies of seven Sub-Saharan African countries (Benin, Tanzania, Malawi,

Mozambique, Mali, Rwanda and Kenya). It finds that, while there are some grounds

for optimism, full national ownership of the process has not yet been achieved.

The study shows that the PRSP process has contributed to bringing national poverty

reduction efforts into the mainstream. Ownership of the process is quite strong within

technocratic ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, although this is not often

shared by local government or regional agencies. However, political commitment to

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the PRSP process is highly variable, which poses difficulties where PRSP

implementation depends on overcoming political obstacles. The study also shows that:

PRSPs have greater potential as instruments of change where complementary

reforms, such as the introduction of Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks,

are already underway.

The PRSP process has had some qualified successes in creating new spaces for

domestic policy dialogue. These successes may be amplified in the second

round of PRSPs.

Most PRSPs have insufficient mechanisms for monitoring progress towards

final outcomes. Appropriate progress benchmarks could liberate countries

from external accountability and provide feedback into strategic debate.

Serious concerns remain where even PRSPs with a moderately high degree of

national ownership (such as Tanzania‘s) may not prove effective instruments

for poverty reduction.

The study also argues that PRSPs present an opportunity for a substantial

transformation of the aid relationship. While this will depend on improving the quality

of the national policy process, donor behaviour can also promote positive change.

Donors should:

Work with greater transparency and openness, to increase public trust and

maximise synergies.

Assist broad-based, consistent, long-term support to participatory policy

making.

Be prepared to take greater fiduciary risks if they are to realise the potential

developmental benefits.

Accelerate the harmonisation of performance frameworks and conditionalities

related to PRSPs.

Benchmark their own performance and agree definite timetables for the next

steps in the PRSP process.

Source: Booth, D. (ed), 2004, 'Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs Making a

Difference?', Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London

Strategic Framework for Engagement in National PRSs in Conflict-Affected

Countries

H McLean , L Evans, A Norton, L.H Piron and E Coyle (2003)

Access full text online

Summary

Violent conflict destroys lives, assets, infrastructure, social cohesion and education,

posing major difficulties for poverty reduction efforts. This strategic framework from

the Overseas Development Institute aims to help DFID country teams to analyse their

strategies. It explains how to analyse the country context, assess the opportunities,

risks and likely impacts of donor engagement, and how to design an effective PRSP

engagement strategy. Checklists of key considerations are provided to assist this.

Assistance to a conflict-affected country will almost always be positive to some extent,

but donors must be aware of the existing political dynamics, and how their own

involvement can create (dis)incentives for peace and poverty reduction. Analysis of the

context is the key to engagement, and is the central concern of this paper. Key points

are:

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The nature of the current involvement of DFID and other donors with the

country; the relationship between DFID and other donors.

The conflict and security situation: identifying underlying causes of conflict,

key actors and interests; assessing likely impacts of assistance on these

dynamics.

Government legitimacy, its role in the conflict and in wider regional

instabilities: does it have secure control over its territory? Does it respect

human rights? Political freedoms? Are there checks on executive power?

Government commitment to peace-building and poverty reduction: is it

addressing the legitimate concerns of its opponents? Are pro-poor policies

inclusive? Are they affected by corruption or vote-buying?

Institutional capacity: how sound is the country's economic management? Can

it collect and assess reliable poverty data? Can it translate this into sound anti-

poverty actions? At local/sector/central level?

Quality of the PRSP process: political and technocratic commitment; links

with other policy processes; quality of poverty diagnosis, civil society

participation; quality and relevance of strategy.

Based on this analysis, donors must develop a coherent strategy, balancing the risks

and needs of engagement - the risk of funds fuelling the conflict versus the need for

humanitarian assistance, for instance. Strategies will vary, and donors should be

prepared to seize opportunities as and when they arise. Some common strategy

guidelines include setting realistic objectives, building local capacity, not rushing, and

tailoring solutions to the phase and type of conflict. This then needs translating into

action:

Direct support for the PRSP unit or for consultations with civil society;

helping with diagnostic work; improving information and expenditure

management systems.

Improving the technical quality of the PRSP, with sensitivity to needs thrown

up by the conflict - it may require specific post-conflict rehabilitation

measures rather than "normal" anti-poverty measures.

Structural reforms must also be designed so as not to inflame existing

tensions: for example, when considering decentralisation, could the locations

of resources and regional power centres cause or exacerbate problems?

Influencing international financial institutions (IFIs) and other donors:

coordination can reduce administrative demands on the country; acting as

counterweight to the purely technical assessments of the IFIs.

Selecting aid instruments according to the capacity of the state and other

actors to deliver. Budget support builds local capacity, but in post-conflict

situations it is crucial that the population sees an early peace dividend.

If a PRSP is not appropriate yet, assistance can still be provided in the form of

humanitarian relief, diagnostic work, support for civil society, and initiating

dialogue about poverty.

Source: McLean Hilker, L., Evans, A., and Norton, A., with Piron, L.H. and Coyle, E.,

2003, 'Strategic Framework for Engagement in National PRSs in Conflict-Affected

Countries', attachment to PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project Briefing Note 6,

Overseas Development Institute, London

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Developing Poverty Reduction Strategies in Low-Income Countries Under Stress

(LICUS): Final Report

N Thornton and M Cox (2005)

Access full text online

Summary

This study is a rapid assessment of the experience of Poverty Reduction Strategies

(PRS) in LICUS to date, including a Synthesis Report and six case studies. It assesses

the applicability of the PRS approach in the LICUS context. It concludes that PRS

principles are applicable in LICUS, and should be progressively introduced as

conditions allow. However, experience to date suggests that Donor Partners should not

have high expectations of first-round PRSPs, but should view them as the beginning of

longer-term, iterative processes of change.

LICUS are a difficult environment for achieving poverty reduction, both because of the

weak institutional environment and because donor engagement tends to be limited and

politicised. There is no consensus on whether and in what circumstances to attempt

PRSs.

The PRS is an important instrument in LICUS for disciplining both donor and

government behaviour, wherever the government is willing and able to take on the

initiative. Where a PRS is not feasible, it may be possible to introduce some PRS

practices through other mechanisms, such as Transitional Results Matrices (especially

in post-conflict environments) or by pursuing 'zero-generation reforms' (in closed

political environments).

When implementing PRSs in LICUS there are a number of issues and potential

challenges that need to be considered:

The PRS approach is a complex package of government and donor practices,

which need to be introduced gradually into LICUS.

PRSs competes for time and attention with other agendas and political

priorities in LICUS. Whatever their technical merits, they may fail to change

actual government behaviour. There is a danger in LICUS that attention

becomes absorbed in producing strategy documents, to the exclusion of

implementation.

Ownership of the process needs to be built up gradually over time, with the

aim of mainstreaming the PRS approach into government practices.

Participatory processes need to be sustained beyond the completion of the strategy.

LICUS governments should be encouraged to develop permanent structures for

dialogue with social partners.

PRSs in LICUS should focus more on governance reforms and the institutional

requirements for poverty reduction. LICUS should identify a few key

governance reforms required to kick start PRS implementation.

Despite the difficulties, donors need to press ahead with donor harmonisation

and alignment around the PRS.

LICUS governments need to be supported with hands-on involvement from

donor staff, to reinforce the principles and benefits of the PRS approach.

Donors need to allocate enough staff resources in-country to support the

process.

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Source: Thornton, N. and Cox, M., 2005, ‗Developing Poverty Reduction Strategies in

Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS): Final Report‘, Agulhas Applied

Knowledge, London

Toward a Conflict-sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy : Lessons from a

Retrospective Analysis

World Bank (2005)

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Summary

The PRSP has become the primary tool for articulating a vision for growth and poverty

reduction in nearly 60 low-income countries. Some 15-20 of these countries are

affected by conflict, and other conflict-affected countries are still to begin the process.

In what ways do Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) in conflict-affected countries

take account of their particular contexts? To what extent have assessments of the

sources of conflict and the ways they interact with poverty informed the strategies?

This report from the World Bank aims to contribute to more effective poverty

reduction in countries affected by conflict by analyzing these questions.

The report presents key experiences from nine conflict-affected countries - Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Georgia, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and

Sri Lanka - as they developed their first PRSP. It assesses how conflict has been taken

into account in PRS participation, poverty diagnostics, policy actions, institutional

arrangements, and donor behavior. It analyses how groups that were socially excluded

or especially conflict-affected participated in the process and how the countries

planned to address sources of conflict and deal with the destructive consequences of

violence. It also asks how governments organised the PRSP preparations in divided

societies, and how international donors engaged with the process.

Based on lessons from the nine countries, the report makes several suggestions of how

to make PRS more effective in conflict-affected countries, including:

PRS participatory processes: systematically include war-affected groups in

socio-economic and policy dialogue; use media and strategic communications

to disseminate information on the PRS to remote and conflict-affected

communities, and channel feedback to policy levels to enhance the voices of

those most affected by conflict.

Poverty diagnostics: focus on a discussion of conflict-induced poverty, and

systematically integrate conflict analysis tools with poverty diagnostics to

undertake systematic analysis of the interrelationship of poverty, poor

governance, marginalization, and conflict.

Policy actions: use a ―conflict lens‖ to guide the selection, prioritization and

content of the policy actions, address underlying sources of conflict if feasible,

and assess and monitor the potential impacts of policy actions on the conflict

dynamics, for example, the distributional impacts of a growth strategy.

Institutional arrangements: consciously design arrangements on basis of

conflict factors, stress transparency and inclusion in design and

implementation, and devolve power and transfer resources to support the

implementation of PRSPs.

Donors: make concerted effort to prioritize country ownership over promotion

of own priorities, strengthen the country‘s capacity to ensure that conflict

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issues are carefully considered, and help create an environment that enables

countries to deal with conflict-related sensitivities.

A PRSP needs to be specific to the country context and flexible in responding to

changing circumstances:

Country specific: The most fruitful PRSP design is based on good contextual

analysis which includes specific conflict factors. The PRSP should draw on in-

country processes such as peace agreements, joint needs assessments, and

transitional results frameworks.

Nimble and flexible: The PRSP should allow conflict-affected and vulnerable

countries to respond quickly to changing situations by being flexible in their

design and implementation, and produce alternative implementation options

when changes render measures irrelevant. Flexibility should be seen as the

ability to develop unique and innovative methods not as a laissez-faire

approach.

Source: World Bank, 2005, 'Toward a Conflict-sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy :

Lessons from a Retrospective Analysis', Report no. 32587, World Bank, Washington

115

3. Conflict-sensitive Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of

Programmes Aimed at Preventing Violence

Core readings

Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners

M B Anderson and L Olson (2003)

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Summary

How can peace practitioners improve the effectiveness of their work? This book from

the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) offers clarifications on what does

and what does not represent peace practice. It aims to reinforce the dedication that so

many peace practitioners exhibit by presenting lessons learned through field

experiences. In addition, new insights are included to contribute towards more

effective peace practice.

The Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project involved over two hundred

international, national, and local peace agencies around the world, pooling their

experiences to learn more about peace practice. It is clear that not all good programmes

are peace programmes and that not all peace programmes are effective. The potential

of the wide range of efforts to promote peace is not being fully realised. So long as

people continue to suffer the consequences of unresolved conflicts, there is urgency for

everyone to do better.

If peace practice is to be improved, we first have to know how it is done now. The

RRP project found clear patterns in practice and identified specific gaps that

undermine effectiveness:

Though peace practitioners emphasise the importance of full and ongoing

context analysis, in many cases only partial analysis takes place. Practitioners

often overlook important aspects such as areas of consensus between opposing

sides, the wider regional and international context, and the results of previous

efforts.

All peace work can be mapped onto a four cell matrix that reveals the basic

theories or beliefs about how peace is achieved. Organisations too often stay

within one quadrant of the matrix.

Most peace agencies work with people who are comparatively easy to engage,

such as children and women. Few agencies ever reach beyond these actors.

Much peace practice is focussed on doing good rather than stopping bad.

There remains no agreement on what or how much needs to be built to create a

peaceful society. Ultimately, peace means different things to different people.

To improve the effectiveness of their work, individuals or agencies undertaking any

form of peace practice should consider the following questions:

How should we focus our work to be most effective? Effective peace practice

can remove the motivations and opportunities for waging war and strengthen

those factors which promote peace and justice. Context analysis should

highlight each side of this equation in ways that provide a reasonable and

accurate basis for programme design and implementation.

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How can individual programmes have wider impacts? Any individual peace

programme will have more impact if its effects transfer to other quadrants of

the four cell peace programme matrix.

Who needs to be reached for improved effectiveness? To end war or prevent it

through sustainable peace requires engaging with those who hold power and

those who must agree to the systems that sustain it, namely governments and

combatants or so-called hardliners.

Source: Anderson, M., and Olson, L., 2003, 'Confronting War: Critical Lessons for

Peace Practitioners', Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, The Collaborative for

Development Action Inc., Cambridge, MA

Institutional Capacity Building for Conflict Sensitivity

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)

Access full text online

Summary

How can practitioners begin the process of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into an

organization? All practitioners at all levels are both impacted by, and can impact, the

development of their institution‘s capacity for conflict sensitivity. This chapter from a

resource pack on conflict-sensitive approaches explores how to mainstream conflict

sensitivity in a systemic way, using a six-step framework.

Institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity means the ability of an organisation to

develop and use the sum of its human and organisational capital to minimise negative

and maximise positive impacts on the conflict dynamics of the environment/s where it

works. An organisation should aim to be conflict sensitive as it will increase the

effectiveness of its programming by minimising the risks to actors involved and

mitigating the risk of occurrence or escalation of violent conflict.

There are some very real institutional challenges that need to be addressed, even in the

most capable organisations, if conflict sensitivity is to become a reality in terms of

organisational strategy and operational practice. Five essential prerequisites include:

Institutional commitment: indispensable in making conflict sensitivity a

reality; without support from the top, organisational change will not happen.

Willingness to make changes in organisational culture and institutional

structures: such changes are likely to be needed if a conflict-sensitive approach

is to take hold.

Support for capacity development: this is needed to keep and build momentum

as a process for change in organisational culture and institutional structures

starts to occur.

Conducive external relationships: these are needed in the implementing area

and outside it.

Accountability mechanisms: which are needed to underpin and reward staff

and teams who incorporate conflict sensitivity in their daily practice.

Building on the above five key aspects, an organisation can begin the process of

mainstreaming conflict sensitivity including deciding whether a minimalist or a more

comprehensive approach is required. The six steps are:

Assess your organisation‘s institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity. There

are various aspects of the make-up of any organization that will impact on its

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ability to behave in a conflict sensitive manner. Grouping these aspects under

the prerequisites outlined above will help develop an understanding of the

existing capacity and opportunities for conflict sensitivity.

How, if at all, do the different elements of the organisation‘s capacity connect?

Some aspects of conflict-sensitive capacity may be well developed and others

less so. It is important to understand how these different aspects connect.

Reflect on one‘s own and others‘ experiences.

Reflecting on why and how others‘ experiences might or might not work for

one‘s own organization can provide useful insights.

In light of the results from the above step, identify the key opportunities and

possible challenges. What are the key needs for institutional capacity building?

Where do the key strategic and operational opportunities lie? How can these

opportunities be realised?

Prioritise, develop and implement a plan of action. Once the analysis phase is

over, it is important to link it to a plan of action.

Monitor and evaluate results and review plan of action. What impacts have the

capacity building steps had on your organisation? What went well, less well

and, most importantly, why?

Source: FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, ?Institutional capacity

building for conflict sensitivity,? Chapter 5 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive

Approaches, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, London

Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Sectoral Approaches

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)

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Summary

What is meant by sectoral approaches and how can conflict sensitivity be incorporated

into their development and implementation? This chapter from a resource pack on

conflict sensitive approaches argues that assistance to a country or sector will have an

impact (either positive or negative) on conflict risks and dynamics particularly in

countries which are affected by, or at risk of, violent conflict. It is therefore imperative

that this assistance be implemented in a conflict-sensitive way.

Sectoral approaches involve a partnership between donors and governments based on a

government-led national poverty reduction framework, within which there are

programmatic priorities for specific sectors (for example, health or education). Donor

assistance aims at helping the government to improve its performance generally, or the

performance of a specific sector or sectors. A conflict-sensitive sectoral approach is

one that is developed and implemented so as to minimise possible negative impacts

and maximise positive impacts on the context and its dynamics, and vice-versa.

Conflict sensitive sectoral approaches should be characterised by:

Stakeholder consultation, which is a core principle of sectoral and conflict

sensitive approaches and should take place at all stages. Consultation can:

bring to bear local perspectives on the plans for the sector in a particular

region; ensure it is informed by local realities; highlight any likely sources of

tension or insecurity; and suggest approaches to managing that tension.

An informed understanding of the overall context and its impact on the

development process in the country. This can be derived from a conflict

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analysis at the national level, preferably undertaken jointly by donors and

governments.

A shared understanding by donors and governments of the conflict issues

affecting a country in order to develop a conflict-sensitive partnership

environment at the national level. It also implies ensuring that this

understanding is informed by and reflects the perspectives of other actors such

as civil society and local governments.

Integrating conflict sensitivity at the sector level at all stages – assessment and

planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. This is dependent

on a conflict-sensitive approach being applied at the national level.

In implementing conflict-sensitive sectoral approaches, practitioners should bear some

wider lessons in mind:

A conflict-sensitive sectoral approach requires an understanding of the context

not only in the development, implementation and evaluation of the sectoral

approach itself but also in developing the national strategic framework.

Sectoral approaches have been adopted in post-conflict settings but it is

equally important to ensure that sectoral approaches are conflict sensitive in

situations of peace. Insensitive interventions can reinforce or exacerbate the

potential for violent conflict (for example, resettlement schemes that alter the

ethnic balance of a region and the access of different groups to resources).

Conflict sensitivity should not be restricted to the ‗obvious‘ sectors (military,

justice and police) - it needs to be integrated across all areas of activity, since

development assistance in any sector can have an impact on the context.

Many of the principles underlying sectoral approaches – local ownership,

capacity-building, participation, inclusiveness, accountability, coordination –

are also among the key principles for conflict-sensitive practice. Sectoral

approaches have the potential to contribute positively to the context if

undertaken in a conflict-sensitive manner.

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Integrating Conflict Sensitivity

into Sectoral Approaches', Chapter 4 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive

Approaches, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, London

Applying conflict sensitivity at project and programme level

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld (2004)

Access full text online

Summary

How does designing and implementing projects and programmes in areas where

conflict exits or threatens differ from more straightforward development contexts? This

chapter of a manual by FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld gives specific

tools and approaches for incorporating conflict-sensitivity into project and programme

planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

Where aid is delivered in conditions of actual or latent violence even simple activities

such as vehicle purchase, training beneficiaries, and employing staff can have a

damaging effect on establishing or building peace. It is essential to follow the principle

of ‗do no harm‘ and be aware of the causes of actual or potential conflict, the

likelihood and severity of further conflict, and the capacity to work with partners to

reduce conflict or the potential for it. This conflict sensitivity is needed at planning,

119

implementation and M&E stages of the project/programme cycle in situations where

conflict exits or threatens.

The key aspects of conflict sensitivity in the project/programme cycle are that it

includes the additional elements of Conflict analysis at the planning stage. This

ensures that interventions do not exacerbate violence but serve to build and

consolidate peace.

Close scrutiny of the operational context at the implementation stage through

regularly updating the conflict analysis, and adapting project/programme

activities and processes accordingly.

Introducing an understanding of conflict actors, profile, causes and dynamics into the

traditional M&E process. This identifies required adjustments to projects or

programmes and ensures that the intervention has as positive an impact as possible on

conflict dynamics. Conflict-sensitive M&E is in its early stages of development

Conflict-sensitivity is needed at all points along the spectrum of conflict, from

structural violence to violent conflict, regardless of whether the project or programme

is for humanitarian aid, peace-building, or development. Key aspects to consider in

making projects and programmes conflict-sensitive are:

Incorporating conflict analysis into the assessment stage of project/programme

design can be done either by linking it to a separate needs analysis or by

integrating both into one tool. The first approach is easier to update and gives

an in-depth conflict analysis. The integrated approach saves time and resources

and makes project/programme design more inter-related.

Conflict analysis can be used to define an intervention, or to make a pre-

defined intervention conflict-sensitive

Key steps for conflict sensitive planning are defining the objective, defining the

process, developing indicators, linking the intervention to risk scenarios,

preparing contingency plans and designing a conclusion/exit strategy

The key elements of implementation are incorporating conflict-sensitivity into

management, monitoring, and adjustment. Considerable flexibility is needed,

and it may even be necessary to change fundamentals such as

project/programme approach

Issues of security and safety, trust, participation, transparency and

accountability are prime considerations during implementation.

Key steps in M&E are deciding when to monitor or evaluate, designing the

M&E process, collecting and analysing information, and

recommending/redesigning. M&E is often difficult in conflict conditions, and

there is not always a direct causal link between the intervention and its context.

FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, 'Applying conflict sensitivity at

project and programme level,‘ Chapter 3 in Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive

Approaches FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, London.

Third-Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach

T Paffenholz (2005)

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Summary

How can the Peace for Aid approach help to address the questions surrounding the

debate on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)? This Berghof Research

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Centre for Constructive Conflict Management paper moves on the PCIA approach and

debate by presenting Aid for Peace. The Aid for Peace approach is a multi-purpose and

multi-level process that facilitates the planning, assessment and evaluation of peace as

well as aid interventions in conflict situations.

The widening development of the PCIA debate has ensured that it is difficult to define.

For a basic understanding it is necessary to distinguish between PCIA approaches such

as aid and peace interventions and project, programme and policy level approaches,

among others. There are also a number of open questions about PCIA. For example, is

a unified methodology/framework for PCIA needed or not? Is the purpose of PCIA

technical or political? Is it a Northerner‘s assessment tool or a Southerners‘

peacebuilding tool? Is it only useful for aid or also for peace interventions? How can

we define criteria and indicators for monitoring and assessing effects of interventions?

The Aid for Peace approach – a set of unified and inclusive methodologies that can be

used by a broad range of different actors for all sorts of interventions – provides an

answer to most of these questions. For example:

A unified framework is useful since it represents a common starting point for

all actors. Opting for a set of methodologies and a sequence of process steps,

avoids an overly rigid format and allows for the different needs of different

actors. Therefore, the approach can be used by Northerners and Southerners,

peacebuilders and development actors.

By breaking down the either/or decisions that dominated previous phases of

the PCIA debate, the approach is useful to interventions with different

purposes (namely development and peace) and on different levels (project,

programme, policy).

With respect to criteria and indicators to help better assess the effects of peace

building and development institutions, there is a wealth of criteria to be found

in the existing literature. These have been further developed and incorporated

into the Aid for Peace approach.

The Aid for Peace Approach will require further dissemination and development.

There also remain a number of challenges for the application of the PCIA debate to the

evaluation of peacebuilding interventions.

There should be more investment into planning as the current debate focuses

too much on evaluation of peace efforts. There should be more discussion

about better planning procedures for peace interventions that create the

conditions for good monitoring and evaluation.

It is difficult to assess the effects that project interventions have on a wider

peace process. In order to bridge this ‗attribution gap‘ it is advisable to

formulate standardised result-chains for frequently implemented types of

projects, and to disseminate these models together with participatory planning

methods.

Evaluation and impact assessment in peacebuilding needs to make more use of

existing knowledge. The field of peacebuilding can benefit from the ideas,

models and insights gathered in related fields such as policy analysis and

development practice.

It seems more promising to work towards a common standard in planning and

evaluation of peacebuilding interventions. Governmental and non-

governmental organisations should work together on such standardisation in

an international network.

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Source; Paffenholz, T., 2005, 'Third-Generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace

Approach', Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin

Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Activities: Toward DAC Guidance

M Anderson and D Chigas (2007)

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Summary

The past decade has seen growing numbers of governments and organisations devote

resources to interventions intended to avert or end conflict. How can these be

evaluated? This report from CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) represents a

step in the development of practical evaluation guidance. Scope, conflict analysis,

impacts, skills and tools all need to be considered. Next steps should include donor

experimentation with evaluations, an annual review of evaluations and a policy review.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions are efforts that adopt goals and

objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace. They are usually focused on

a particular conflict zone; an area affected by serious intergroup violence. This

definition helps distinguish between ―conflict-sensitive programming‖ and conflict

prevention and peacebuilding.

Areas and issues relevant to evaluation of these interventions include:

Scope: Policies or programs designed to make a difference to the driving

factors of conflict are legitimate subjects for evaluation. Donors may also wish

to examine the impacts on peace of interventions not originally intended to

address conflict.

Conflict analysis and theories of change: Just as conflict prevention and

peacebuilding activities should be based on analysis of driving factors and

actors within a conflict, so should evaluation.

Impacts: Preoccupation with the ‗remoteness‘ of impacts can divert attention

from assessing programme effects (intended or not). Evaluations should take

account of individual and cumulative impacts in the short and long term.

Evaluation as an intervention: Because they occur in the context of conflict,

evaluations are effectively interventions in the conflict. Evaluators lacking

conflict sensitivity and appropriate expertise may do harm.

Methodology, skills and tools: While there is no one right methodology,

inclusiveness, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods and ethical

standards are useful principles. Teams need knowledge of the conflict

prevention and peacebuilding field, of evaluation methods and conflict-

sensitive style of working.

Joint evaluations and partner country roles: Involving several donors or

programmes can generate a fuller picture of impacts. The role of partner

countries in evaluation depends on the potential for bias and potential impact

of government involvement.

Next steps for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development -

Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) have implications for other

organisations:

Producing draft guidance: Feedback from this report will be incorporated into

a subsequent guidance document.

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Donor experimentation with evaluations: Draft guidance could be used as a

basis for a concerted effort by donors to evaluate as many conflict prevention

and peacebuilding programmes as possible over the next two years. This

should include individual, joint and cumulative evaluations.

An evaluation of evaluations: Accumulated evaluations could provide a basis

for a comparative evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding

evaluations. This could reveal what kinds of evaluation have proved useful

and which process and methods produced those lessons.

Annual reviews of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations: To

facilitate learning, the OECD/DAC could convene an annual session to

examine a set of evaluations from the previous year.

Policy review: Over time, the review of interventions will provide evidence to

inform a review of the policies of individual donors, as well as OECD/DAC

policies.

Source: OECD-DAC, 2007, 'Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention

and Peacebuilding Activities: Toward DAC Guidance', A Joint Project of the DAC

Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and DAC Network on

Development Evaluation, Paris

Supplementary readings

A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of

Development Projects in Conflict Zones

K Bush (1998)

Access full text online

Abstract

This study does not seek to develop the definitive evaluation tool for assessing or

anticipating the impact of development projects on the peace and conflict environment

within which they are set. The uniqueness of each project and the fluidity of their

environments conspire to frustrate attempts to impose a rigidly uniform framework.

Rather, this study develops an approach to guide our interpretation and assessment of

the impact of the widest range of development projects in a more systematic manner

than is currently the case. At this early stage in our efforts to develop a clearer

understanding of the nexus between development, underdevelopment, violent conflict,

and peace, this study is a call for more self-consciousness in the formulation,

implementation and evaluation of our development initiatives in regions characterized

by potential, latent, or manifest violence. PCIA is meant to empower individuals and

institutions both to understand better their work, and, more importantly, to induce the

changes necessary to amplify the positive impacts and to minimize negative impacts on

the peace and conflict environment.

Source: Bush, K., 1998, ‗A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

(PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones‘, Paper No. 1, The Peacebuilding

and Reconstruction Program Initiative & The Evaluation Unit, International

Development Research Centre, Ottawa.. See also the Berghof Handbook for Conflict

Transformation Dialogue Series on PCIA.

123

The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play

C Church (2002)

Access full text online

Abstract

Currently evaluation is an ad hoc process conforming to the needs of the moment and

limited by lack of skills, understanding and resources. As a result, INCORE has

undertaken a pilot project seeking to examine the current state and utilisation of

evaluation in conflict resolution interventions. A conflict-specific framework has been

developed to integrate the different aspects of an intervention that can be evaluated.

Source: Church, C., J. Shouldice, 2002, ‗The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution

Interventions: Framing the State of Play‘, Londonderry: INCORE.

The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions – Part II: Emerging Practice

and Theory

C Church (2003)

Access full text online

Abstract

This paper is the result of the second phase of the UNU/INCORE1 research project on

the evaluation of conflict resolution interventions. Phase Two of this project saw a

meeting convened of 24 individuals from around the world who are actively engaged

with issues related to conflict resolution and evaluation. Held in Northern Ireland, July

4-5, 2002 this meeting/workshop sought to advance the discussion around a number of

the questions and challenges raised during the original research. Throughout the two

days of intensive discussions four themes were identified as crosscutting through a

number of these questions and challenges. This paper not only captures the essence of

the discussion around these emerging themes but also aims to further develop the

issues through

research and analysis.

Source: Church, C., J. Shouldice, 2003, ‗The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution

Interventions – Part II: Emerging Practice and Theory‘, Londonderry: INCORE.

Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict

Transformation Programs

C Church (2006)

Access full text online

Abstract

This manual addresses the many challenges faced by conflict transformation

practitioners in their attempts to measure and increase the effectiveness of their work

with practical tips and examples from around the world.

Source: Church, C., M.M. Rogers, 2006, ‗Designing for Results: Integrating

Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs‘, Washington, DC:

Search for Common Ground.

124

Promoting Institutional and Organisational Development: A Source Book of

Tools and Techniques

Department for International Development (DFID) (2003)

Access full text online

Summary

What models, tools and techniques are available to analyse and review institutional

development? Compiled for the Department of International Development, this paper

outlines some of the key tools used in DFID's own institutional work, including a

framework to encourage discussions between the various stakeholders involved in the

institutional reform process.

The source book incorporates tools covering institutional analysis and diagnosis,

review and design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Most are either

simple models or checklists designed to work through the key issues of institutional

reform. They have rigorous theoretical underpinnings and are based on experience of

what works. None of the tools is intended to be a blueprint. All have their strengths and

weaknesses and should be adapted to reflect local contexts.

A number of tools and techniques address the initial stages of analysis, focusing on the

overall institutional framework and context:

The assessment of institutional capabilities: Provides a structured approach for

asking questions, analysing results and identifying critical institutional issues.

Impact analysis: Is useful for identifying objectives and predicted areas of

impact for follow-up evaluation and helps build stakeholder commitment to

reform through reaching consensus on objectives.

Change forecasting: Makes predictions based on the particular historical,

political, cultural and economic context, including the effects of donor support

and engagement.

The 7-S framework: Describes interdependent variables to examine an

organisation's internal dynamics.

SWOT analysis: Assesses an organisation in terms of internal strengths and

weaknesses and external opportunities and threats.

The organisational elements model: Is designed to demonstrate the

relationship between organisational efforts, results and external payoffs to

show linkages between all elements of the process from inputs through to

outcomes.

Problem tree analysis: Establishes the hierarchical relationship between cause

and effect by illustrating the linkages between various issues contributing to an

institutional problem.

Having assessed the institutional framework and the organisation within its

institutional context, further tools and techniques are available to design, implement

and monitor and evaluate:

Benchmarking contributes to a culture of openness, learning and continuous

improvement within and between organisations.

The risk management matrix analyses the likelihood of an adverse outcome

and the associated scale of impact.

Business process re-engineering involves the fundamental review and redesign

of an organisation's business processes.

125

There are various approaches to change management which all include the key

elements of change vision, change strategy, commitment and leadership,

capacity and culture.

Force field analysis is a technique for analysing the forces that help or obstruct

change and the Burke-Litwin model provides a link between an assessment of

the wider institutional context and the nature and processes of change within

an organisation.

Stakeholder management identifies the individuals or groups who will be

affected by changes or have the ability to impact on the change process.

The European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence

Model provides a framework for assessing all aspects of performance which

make an organisation successful, including measures for evaluating the impact

of change.

Source: Department for International Development, 2003, ‗Promoting Institutional &

Organisational Development: A Source Book of Tools and Techniques‘, DFID,

London

Nepal Country Assistance Plan: Monitoring in a Fragile State

Department for International Development (DFID) (2005)

Access full text online

Summary

The DFID Nepal Country Assistance Plan (CAP), published in February 2004, aims to

reduce poverty and social exclusion and help establish the basis for lasting peace. To

this end, CAP commits DFID Nepal to developing improved, locally accountable and

transparent systems for monitoring progress. This DFID paper describes the main

elements of the CAP Monitoring Framework (CAPMF), setting out how DFID Nepal

(DFIDN) proposes to monitor the operating environment for development activities

and measure progress towards outputs.

The new CAP Monitoring Framework (CAPMF) is designed to supplement the

Nepalese government‘s Poverty Monitoring and Analysis System (PMAS) launched in

May 2004. PMAS - not yet fully operational - will use both input/output and

outcome/well-being indicators, gathering data from management information systems

in sector ministries, public expenditure tracking, and periodic surveys.

The MF will form a comprehensive picture of programme performance and viability of

CAP objectives, addressing the specific monitoring needs for a country in conflict.

Complementing conventional project cycle monitoring, CAPMF will strengthen the

quality of decision-making at programme and strategic level, providing rigorous

evidence of impact on poverty and social exclusion. The MF is also designed to

rebalance DFIDN‘s effort between programme design/monitoring and between

activity/outcome reporting.

CAPMF findings will be reviewed both throughout each year, and annually. An annual

report will be disseminated widely amongst Nepal‘s development community.

Strategic direction and priorities for the following year will be agreed and integrated

into the programme. The MF comprises three main components:

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Conflict Impact Monitoring: A programme-based monitoring system to track

deliverability at an activity level. Quarterly surveys will be analysed for

project and staff risk, identifying overall trends across DFIDN‘s portfolio.

Livelihoods and Social Inclusion (LSI) Monitoring: DIFDN will produce bi-

annual reports analysing the impact of programmes on poor and excluded

groups, assessing changes in assets and access to services; voice, influence and

claiming rights; the ‗rules of the game‘ (based on socially defined identity) in

legal, policy and institutional processes. The bi-annual data will influence

future strategic priorities.

Context Monitoring: Assessing changes in the broader operating environment

for development in Nepal, incorporating the resources above with Embassy

reports, budgetary trends, fiduciary risk and other sources.

There is a need for continuing and robust analysis of the Nepal context, both in relation

to the conflict and also in relation to the wider politics of a state with weak institutions

and currently without democratic government. Context analysis is not to become the

basis for political conditionality, but to assist DFIDN in adapting aid instruments

appropriately in order to achieve greatest impact. A small group has been established

to monitor the following specific areas for contextual analysis:

Maoist tolerance of development activities: monitoring the possibility of

increased attempts to control or extort resources from the programme.

People movement: monitoring the incidence of forced relocation, possible

indications of worsening in the conflict signaled by increased migration.

Additionality and ability to monitor: monitoring donor support, and the

resources allocated by government to support the Poverty Reduction Strategy,

plus independent monitoring of programme performance on behalf of donors.

Rule of Law: monitoring the current culture of impunity in relation to human

rights abuse.

Ability to Deliver: monitoring the impact of conflict on community access and

security of staff, and how this affects the viability of ongoing programmes.

Fiduciary risk: monitoring the public sector and tracking progress in anti-

corruption and reducing fiduciary risk overall.

Source: Department for International Development, 2005, ‗Nepal Country Assistance

Plan: Monitoring in a Fragile State‘, Department for International Development,

London

Working ‘in’ and ‘on’ War

J Goodhand (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Individuals working ‗in‘ or ‗on‘ war cannot be considered as neutral actors because

their decisions have an impact on war itself. This chapter from a book, published by

the Open University, argues that those who intervene in conflict situations need to

think of themselves less as project managers and more as change agents who

understand and influence the conflict. Interveners need to look beyond the traditional

project-based approaches and engender a strategic shift from ‗development as delivery‘

to ‗development as leverage‘.

127

Practitioners have traditionally concentrated on their role as project managers and

focused on ‗what they can control‘, rather than addressing broader issues such as what

they can understand and influence. Logical framework planning tools and other

management systems create an illusion of control in rapidly changing circumstances.

These initiatives are important, but they may, paradoxically, undermine an

organisation‘s capacity to operate responsively in a situation of violent conflict,

especially if they lead to rigidity and a growing focus on internal processes, rather than

the external environment.

Development agencies‘ approaches to conflict include:

Working around war: This is a ‗conflict blind approach‘ which treats war as a

constraint on development. Donors work around war because they have limited

mandates or because their policies narrowly define security in terms of security

of investments or commercial contracts, rather than human security and

structural stability. Working around war is not good practice.

Working in war: This approach acknowledges the war and tries to mitigate war-

related risks and minimise the potential for programmes to exacerbate violence.

This may involve the use of codes of conduct, operating standards and robust

coordination mechanisms.

Working on war: Involves an explicit focus on programmes that address

conflict prevention, management or resolution. The few agencies that have an

explicit focus on war tend to support work on reconciliation and human rights

issues through civil society groups.

Practitioners should promote conflict-sensitive approaches by ‗working in war‘ or

‗working on war‘, depending on their mandate and context. This requires new levels of

analysis, particularly around the decision-making process, which is shaped by political

context, organisational environment and individual agency. In relation to this, key

policy implications are:

Practitioners intervening in highly political contexts will be perceived as

political actors. They must consider their own position in the political context

and the extent to which they can create political space or room to manoeuvre.

Practitioners need to consider the capacities and interests of their own

organisation and the wider institutional environment in which they operate.

Organisational matters (funding, capacity and management) force pragmatic

choices based on what is possible rather than upon what is desirable.

Practitioners are often viewed as the unwilling agents of wider political and

institutional interests. However, experience suggests that individuals do have

agency and that practitioners have the capacity to make a difference despite

organisational and political constraints.

Stakeholders should undertake systematic, shared and transparent conflict

analysis. Improved analysis does not necessarily guarantee better outcomes, but

it is a basic precondition for those aiming to work ‗in‘ or ‗on‘ violent conflict.

Practitioners must be able to convert analysis into practice. The risk-

opportunities matrix – which highlights the war-related risks for the

organisation or programme and peacebuilding opportunities – may be useful

tool to develop responses that are appropriate in different types of contexts.

No single approach will work in all conflict situations. The ‗do nothing‘

approach must always be retained and assessed, particularly in a high risk-low

opportunity scenario where the harm-benefit ratio may be high.

128

Source: Goodhand, J., 2006, ‗Working ‗in‘ and ‗on‘ War‘, in Civil War, Civil Peace,

Yanacopulos, H. and Hanlon, J., Open University in association with James Currey,

Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, OH.

Preparing to Intervene

J Goodhand (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Contemporary wars have exposed profound weaknesses in the way international

agencies conceptualise and respond to violent conflict. This chapter from a book,

published by the Open University, argues that conflict sensitivity should represent a

minimum standard for practitioners intervening in areas affected by open or latent

conflict. Violent conflict is less about breakdown, and more about reordering and

transformation, therefore practitioners must address organisational and relationship-

building challenges in their response.

Conflict-blind approaches are ineffective for contemporary humanitarian, relief and

development operations. Practitioners should adopt a peacebuilding lens by working

‗in‘ or ‗on‘ war, rather than working around war. ‗Working in war‘ refers to how

practitioners can minimise the negative effects of their actions. It involves a mix of ‗do

no harm‘ and ‗conflict-proofing‘ an agency‘s operations (reducing risk and deciding

when an agency should withdraw if the risks are too great). ‗Working on war‘ means

supporting peacebuilding efforts to strengthen peaceful coexistence and decrease the

likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violence.

There are three main categories of international response to violent conflict, loosely

described as loyalty, voice and exit.

Loyalty: involves leaving things as they are. Practitioners adopt a loyalty

response because they believe that they can do little to change the wider

institutional environment.

Voice: involves modifying the existing approach. This approach recognises

the wider political and institutional constraints, but tries to create ‗room for

manoeuvre‘ to generate positive changes and to widen the range of choices

open to practitioners.

Exit: involves rejecting the orthodox approach or proposing an alternative.

Some agencies have opted for exit strategies and seek to work outside the

system because they disagree with certain types of intervention (for example,

in Iraq) or because their room for manoeuvre seems to be shrinking.

The short-comings of the international response to violent conflict has led to a process

of ‗reordering‘ within the international aid system. ‗Voice‘ and ‗exit‘ offer the best

means for reconceptualising how we respond to war and more importantly, why we

respond. In addition to a new conceptual framework, working effectively ‗in‘ and ‗on‘

war requires a stronger emphasis on organisational and relationship-building

challenges by:

Fostering the right kind of relationships with stakeholders by building up

structured and ad hoc patterns of alliance and cooperation. Practitioners must

develop excellent networking, negotiation and brokering skills to

accommodate the increasingly complex web of actors involved in the

international aid system.

129

Interacting with multiple organisations and forging different kinds of working

relationships characterised by varying degrees of coordination, collaboration

and sometimes confrontation.

Fostering relations with ‗unlike-minded‘ actors, which is one of the principal

differences between working in war zones and working in development

settings. This requires a fine balance in terms of talking to rebel groups (or

rogue governments) without legitimising or being co-opted by them.

Evaluating the impact of peacebuilding efforts to judge the success of

activities underway and to minimise the possibility of fuelling or prolonging

conflict. There is a range of tools available such as: the ‗do no harm‘

framework, the peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) and the benefit-

harm analysis.

Developing peace-auditing methodologies to assess the capacities of

organisations to work effectively ‗in‘ or ‗on‘ war. A peace audit should

involve multiple stakeholders to set the criteria (particularly in relation to

programming, organisation and relationships) and assess the agency.

Source: Goodhand, J., 2006, ‗Preparing to Intervene', Civil War, Civil Peace,

Yanacopulos, H. and Hanlon, J., Open University in association with James Currey,

Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens OH

Ten Steps to a Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System

J Kusek and R Rist (2004)

Access full text online

Summary

Governments and organisations face increasing internal and external pressures to

demonstrate accountability, transparency and results. Results-based monitoring and

evaluation (M&E) systems are a powerful public management tool to achieve these

objectives. This handbook from the World Bank presents a ten-step model that

provides extensive detail on building, maintaining and sustaining a results-based M&E

system.

Results-based M&E systems can help build and foster political and financial support

for policies, programmes and projects and can help governments build a solid

knowledge base. They can also produce major changes in the way governments and

organisations operate, leading to improved performance, accountability, transparency,

learning, and knowledge. Results-based M&E systems should be considered a work in

progress. Continuous attention, resources, and political commitment are needed to

ensure their viability and sustainability. Building the cultural shift necessary to move

an organisation toward a results orientation takes time, commitment and political will.

The ten steps to building, maintaining and sustaining a results-based M&E system are

outlined below:

A readiness assessment should be conducted to determine whether

prerequisites for a results-based M&E system are in place. It should review

incentives and capacity for an M&E system and roles, responsibilities and

structures for assessing government performance.

Outcomes to monitor and evaluate should be agreed through a participatory

process identifying stakeholders‘ concerns and formulating them as outcome

statements. Outcomes should be disaggregated and a plan developed to assess

how they will be achieved.

130

Key performance indicators to monitor outcomes should be selected through a

participatory process considering stakeholder interests and specific needs.

Indicators should be clear, relevant, economical, adequate and monitorable.

Baseline data on indicators should be established as a guide by which to

monitor future performance. Important issues when setting baselines and

gathering data on indicators include the sources, collection, analysis, reporting

and use of data.

Performance targets should be selected to identify expected and desired

project, programme or policy results. Factors to consider include baselines,

available resources, time frames and political concerns. A participatory

process with stakeholders and partners is key.

Monitoring for results includes both implementation and results monitoring as

well as forming partnerships to attain shared outcomes. Monitoring systems

need ownership, management, maintenance and credibility. Data

collection needs reliability, validity and timeliness.

Evaluation provides information on strategy, operations and learning.

Different types of evaluation answer different questions. Features of quality

evaluations include impartiality, usefulness, technical adequacy, stakeholder

involvement, value for money and feedback.

Reports on the findings of M&E systems can be used to gain support and

explore and investigate. Reports should consider the requirements of the target

audience and present data clearly.

Findings of results-based M&E systems can also be used to improve

performance and demonstrate accountability and transparency. Benefits of

using findings include continuous feedback and organisational and

institutional knowledge and learning.

Good results-based M&E systems must be used in order to be sustainable.

Critical components of sustaining M&E systems include demand, clear roles

and responsibilities, trustworthy and credible information, accountability,

capacity and incentives.

Source: Kusek, J., and Rist, R., 2004, 'Ten Steps to a Results-based Monitoring and

Evaluation System', World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and Evaluation for Conflict Zones

T Paffenholz (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This guidebook provides conceptual thought and practical support. It leads both

practitioner and academic reader through a planning and evaluation process that helps

the user to better design development, humanitarian and Peacebuilding interventions in

conflict prone areas of the world. Written for a broad readership, Aid for Peace leads to

the creation of an appropriate policy, project or program design for working in conflict

zones.

Source: Paffenholz, T., Reychler, L., 2007, Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and

Evaluation for Conflict Zones, Portland: Nomos.

131

Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning for Fragile States and Peacebuilding

Programs, Practical Tools for Improving Program Performance and Results

R Sartorius and C Carver (2006)

Access full text online

Summary

How can organisations implement fragile states peacebuilding (FSP) programmes with

realistic development outcomes that can rapidly adapt to changing circumstances? This

guide from Social Impact aims to increase the effectiveness of FSP programmes

through more systematic approaches to Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (ME&L).

Stronger ME&L enables agencies and communities to understand what is effective,

how to consolidate best practice and how to increase accountability to stakeholders.

Monitoring is an assessment of how programmes are progressing towards planned

targets, activities and objectives, using mostly quantitative data. It asks ‗are we doing

the programme right?‘ Evaluation is a periodic assessment of the relevance,

performance, efficiency and impact of a programme. It asks ‗are we doing the right

programme?‘ and ‗how can we do it better?‘ ME&L leads to better programmes,

deeper learning and increases accountability, whether to donors or the affected people

or communities. ME&L in fragile states needs to be swift, safe and highly practical for

making management decisions in often unsafe and difficult-to-access environments.

FSP programmes may cover a broad range of objectives. These may range from local

governance and legislative reform to confidence building, advocacy, protection of

human rights, media strengthening and reintegration of ex-combatants. They require a

similarly broad range of ME&L tools that will be practical in very challenging,

politically volatile and rapidly changing environments.

Over past the 10 years there has been a good deal of innovation and learning

about performance and evaluation in FSP, with many examples of ME&L

good practices emerging from around the world. One example is the Cognitive

Social Capital Assessment Tool, which measures trust within and between

communities.

There is a need for ME&L approaches that assess programmes with ‗soft‘

objectives such as trust building. Evaluation approaches for traditional

development programmes are inadequate for such objectives. Instead, highly

context specific approaches are required to take into account perspectives that

are meaningful to the local groups on whom interventions centre.

Promising innovations have occurred in participatory ME&L (PME&L),

which emphasises collaborative analysis, action-learning and empowerment.

Such approaches are well suited to FSP, but to be most useful they must be

adapted to specific contexts and conflict situations.

Some recommendations are made for using this guide:

The guide can only offer a snapshot of promising ME&L approaches in a

rapidly changing field. Organisations using such approaches must continually

innovate and self-reflect so that more is learned about how programmes can

become most effective.

Involving local and community members in ME&L will enable them to

become better equipped to manage peacebuilding and transition activities. By

working with monitoring experts, local staff and community members can

gain critical skills for assessing progress and improving results. This can be

part of a legacy that donors and NGOs leave behind.

132

The ME&L guide will make the greatest contribution towards better quality

programmes if it is used throughout each stage of a programme‘s life cycle.

The guide can strengthen an organisation‘s strategic plan, programme and

project designs, and implementation through better ME&L.

Source: Social Impact, 2006, 'Monitoring, Evaluating and Learning for Fragile States

and Peacebuilding Programs, Practical Tools for Improving Program Performance and

Results', Social Impact, Arlington, Virginia

133

4. Do no Harm and Similar Approaches

Core readings

Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War

M Anderson (1999)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

How does the micro level of warfare relate to the macro level? What is the appropriate

relationship between outsiders and insiders in conflict areas? This study analyses the

experiences of aid workers in order to understand the challenges faced by development

agencies in conflict settings. It argues that aid should not be a substitute for the will of

governments to deal with violent warfare. Nevertheless, international agencies need to

find a way of insisting that appropriate political actions are taken, while remaining

nonpolitical in providing aid.

Civil wars provoke the most complex domestic situations in any country. Outside

forces sometimes perpetuate internal wars. Neighbouring countries pursue their

interests through policies and direct subsidies of money, weapons and fighters. The

world's larger socio-political and economic arrangements also shape crises that occur

within countries.

Furthermore, when international aid is given during violent conflict, it becomes a part

of that conflict. The role of aid workers, operating as foreigners in these situations and

taking responsibility for other people's welfare, is complicated and challenging. For aid

workers, civil wars pose the most complex moral as well as practical challenges.

But how do you bridge the gap between communities at war and the international

context in which civil wars take place? While there are no easy answers to this

question the following points should be born in mind:

Local actors are willing to accept outside involvement in their domestic

problems but only up to a point.

People in warring societies often invite outsiders‘ ideas and analyses of the

local situation.

There are advantages and disadvantages to the role of the outsider in a conflict

situation. He or she has an incomplete knowledge. On the other hand, he or she

is not partisan and can provide a different perspective.

Since aid has an impact on warfare, aid workers cannot avoid the responsibility

of trying to shape that impact.

The way in which they shape that impact represents outsider interference,

which means that aid workers can be accused of inappropriate action.

Aid may play a role in enabling people in war torn societies to gain the

international political assistance they need. This role will become increasingly

important as agencies and political forces interact in areas of unfolding crisis.

Clearly, it is better for aid to support non war attitudes and actions than to reinforce

and exacerbate conflict. Therefore, it is important to continue to learn how to play the

outsider role. Further experience is needed to determine how this is best done in each

134

setting, by different kinds of aid and by different aid workers. In the meantime, aid

workers should:

Try to identify local actors and local networks that can promote peace

Design their aid programmes to support local peacemakers and reinforce

positive networks

Question whether it is justifiable for outside actors to make judgements about

who or what is a local capacity for peace.

Be aware that making these judgments may constitute dangerous and

inappropriate social engineering.

Source: Anderson, M., 1999, ‗Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War‘,

Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA.

Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience

M B Anderson (2000)

Access full text online

Summary

How can aid workers in conflict areas prevent assistance from being misused to pursue

political and military advantage? This report from the Collaborative for Development

Action (CDA) assesses the presence and impact of the misuse of aid in projects in

Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, and provides lessons learned from workers in the

field. Understanding the contexts of conflict environments and applying a ‗Do No

Harm‘ (DNH) approach improves both delivery of aid and the chances for peace.

The DNH approach helps aid practitioners avoid misuse of aid and execute context-

specific programming. It includes analysis of: a) the specific context of the conflict; b)

dividers (sources of tension) between groups in the conflict environment; c) connectors

(shared attitudes, grievances and/or history) among groups; d) the local capacity for

peace; e) the aid programme‘s impact on dividers and connectors; and f) consideration

and choosing of programming options.

Aid resources can be misused or manipulated in a number of ways:

Targeting recipients can exacerbate conflict when one targeted sub-group

overlaps with another which is engaged in conflict.

The local staff hiring process can be seen as preferential.

Working through local partners can feed into inter-group tensions when

partnering organisations are partisan.

Decisions on goods and services provided, depending on the quantity

involved, can increase the potential for misuse.

The method of aid provision can significantly affect conflict among groups.

Aid can reinforce the illegitimate power of local authorities and their potential

for abuse of access to the aid project‘s goods and services.

To minimise the negative effects of aid provision, aid agencies should:

Include local representatives in the decision-making process, develop linkages

among sub-groups and redress substantive exclusions from the targeted

recipient list

Hire local staff from a range of sub-groups, institute a recruitment system and

vet hiring policies to assess potential perceptions about local staff hiring

135

Partner with organisations that cross group lines, work with groups from

different sides of the conflict and emphasise the project‘s neutral position

Provide aid to community-owned assets and community service organisations

and avoid giving aid to individually-owned entities

Include representatives of all sub-groups in programming decisions,

demonstrate transparency and commitment to community

Utilise people within the local governance system who concur with the

project‘s objectives and seek direct input from the public to broaden the

perspective of the project‘s programming beyond that of the local authority.

Source: Anderson, M., 2000, 'Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field

Experience', The Collaborative for Development Action Inc., Cambridge, MA

The Do No Harm Handbook (The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of

Assistance on Conflict)

Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) (2004)

Access full text online

Summary

How does development assistance interact with conflict? How can assistance be

provided without it being misused to pursue political and military advantage? This

handbook from the the 'Do No Harm' (DNH) Project offers a framework for addressing

these issues. It aims to help assistance workers deal more effectively with the

complexities of providing assistance in conflict contexts.

Whilst assistance can neither cause nor end conflict, it can be a significant factor in

conflict contexts. The DNH Project focusses on how those involved in providing

assistance can assume responsibility and hold themselves accountable for the effects of

their interventions. The DNH ‗Analytical Framework‘ was developed from the

programming experience of many assistance workers. It provides a tool for mapping

the interactions of assistance and conflict and can be used to plan, monitor and

evaluate both humanitarian and development assistance plans.

Those involved in DNH are often aware of the negative impacts of some of their

programmes, but see them as unavoidable. DNH is useful because it enables us to

identify a variety of programming options when things are going badly:

It prompts us to identify conflict-exacerbating impacts of assistance much

sooner than is typical without the analysis.

It heightens our awareness of inter-group relations in project sites and enables

us to play a conscious role in helping people come together.

It reveals the interconnections among programming decisions - about where

we work, with whom, how we see the criteria for assistance recipients, who

we hire locally and how we relate to local authorities.

It provides a common reference point for considering the impacts of our

assistance on conflict that brings a new cohesiveness to staff interactions, and

to work with local counterparts.

The framework is descriptive rather than prescriptive. It can also be used in other

ways, for example for Peace and Conflict Impact Analysis (PCIA). The framework has

seven steps:

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Identify which conflicts are dangerous in terms of their destructiveness and

therefore relevant for DNH analysis.

Analyse what divides groups. This is critical to understanding how assistance

programmes feed into, or lessen, these forces.

Identify how people might remain connected across sub-group lines despite

divisions created through the conflict. To assess the impact of assistance

programmes on conflict, it is important to identify and understand connecters

and local capacities for peace (LCPs).

Conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the assistance programme. For

example, where and why is assistance offered?

Analyse the interactions of each aspect of the assistance programme with the

existing dividers/tensions and connectors/LCPs. For example, who gains and

who loses from assistance?

Examine steps one to four and if assistance exacerbates inter-group dividers,

rethink how to provide the same programme in a way that eliminates its

negative, conflict-worsening aspects.

Once a better programming option has been selected, re-evaluate the impacts

of the new approach on the dividers and connectors.

Source: Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), 2004, 'The Do No Harm

Handbook (The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict)', The

Collaborative for Development Action Inc, Cambridge, MA

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5. Role of State and non-state Actors in Promoting Peaceful

Transformation, in Supporting Country/state Resilience and in

Building State Capacity

Core readings

Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace

Transitions

S Cliffe, S Guggenheim, and M Kostner (2003)

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Summary

What is the best way forward for post-conflict reconstruction? How can it become a

foundation for sustainable development? This paper by the World Bank discusses the

role that community-driven reconstruction (CDR) projects play in promoting local

involvement. It looks at the experience of Timor-Leste and Rwanda and suggests that

CDR is an instrument of choice for post-conflict reconstruction.

The impact of violent conflict on a country‘s economy and society is profound and

multiple. It can be as highly visible as smashed buildings, maimed civilians, and burst

water mains. But the impact can also be invisible, such as happens with the collapse of

state institutions, the spread of mistrust in government and pervasive fear. In both

cases, needs are immense and urgent. However, only if both types of effects are

addressed adequately and simultaneously can post-conflict reconstruction lay the

foundation for a return to normalcy.

CDR has two principal objectives: (i) speedy and cost-effective delivery of

reconstruction assistance on the ground and (ii) building a governance structure that

stresses local choice and accountability. Community-driven reconstruction applies the

methodology of community-driven development (CDD) to a post-conflict setting.

Local populations and local institutions are the key players in project planning,

execution and monitoring. CDR approaches thereby provide one key foundation for

sustainable development in the longer-term.

The basic premise for demand-led approaches such as CDR is that local

communities are in a better position to identify their needs and corresponding

actions than higher administrative echelons, higher societal structures or

outside partners.

CDR also supposes that for a large number of short-term reconstruction needs,

local communities possess the core skills, incentives, and unity to implement a

large range of projects provided they are given the resources and a

management support system.

Empowering communities to identify their needs, decide on projects to address

these needs, manage resources and contracts, monitor implementation, and

evaluate outcomes from the outset is a more robust model for sustainable

growth.

CDR involves two policy choices: decentralisation and participation, which

aims to build a partnership between the population and the administration

around local planning and project implementation.

CDR projects have two key design elements: they support the democratic

selection of local community councils and they provide resources in the form

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of block grants directly to community councils such that they can plan and

manage their own reconstruction priorities.

In order to move from CDR to CDD, the elements outlined below need to be in place

when the reconstruction phase nears completion.

Local development structures that partner the population with the

administration need to have become a going concern. But, rather than

remaining outside of the government‘s formal structure, local development

councils should be an integral part of local government responsible for

community development.

They would also need to collaborate closely with local institutions charged

with political and administrative affairs. Capacities need to have been

strengthened beyond the community councils.

Broad-based capacity building that is tailored to local development needs has

the added benefit of providing community members with skills that enhance

their own development potential.

To sustain a community driven approach in the longer-term requires fiscal

decentralisation.

Annual block allocations should be made from the government‘s budget to the

communities‘ development budget (in addition to any possible donor funding.

Decentralised entities should also be entitled to levy taxes to ensure a steadier

stream of funds to finance community development plans.

Source: Cliffe, S., Guggenheim, S., Kostner, M., 2003, Community-driven

Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions, CPR Working Paper No.

7, Social Development Department, World Bank

Signposts to More Effective States: Responding to Governance Challenges in

Developing Countries

M Moore (2005)

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Summary

For decades, the development community has made unrealistic demands for poor

countries to build ‗best practice‘ institutions, with little understanding of the capacity

required to manage complex processes of change, or of the impact of donor

interventions on existing local incentives and relationships. Given the limited success

of transferring institutional models from rich to poor countries, should donors take

more account of the informal relations that underpin them? This paper, from the Centre

for the Future State, addresses how public authority in developing countries can best be

reshaped and reconstituted to meet the challenges of poverty reduction.

Effective public institutions evolve through a political process of bargaining between

the state and organised groups in society. Many developing countries have formal

institutions of representation, accountability and administration built on OECD

models. But they lack legitimacy and effectiveness because they were not forged

through a political process of state/society negotiation, and are not supported by socio-

economic structures that encourage organisation around broader, common interests.

For reasons explored in the research, the incentives for many developing countries to

engage with organised groups in their own societies are relatively weak. This in turn

reduces the opportunities and incentives for groups to take collective action. As a

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result, too many governments are still failing to deliver basic services and are

unresponsive to the needs of many poor and politically excluded people.

Key findings emerging from the research include:

Taxation really matters for accountability. State-society bargaining over tax is

central to building relations of accountability based on mutual rights and

obligations, rather than patronage. Recent changes in the fiscal environment

could encourage taxpayers to mobilise around broader, common interests, with

positive outcomes for governance.

The state itself helps to create the incentives and opportunities for different

groups to organise. The interaction of state and society over time can enhance

the effectiveness of both. Anti-poverty programmes and participatory

institutions can be designed in ways that encourage different groups to

organise. This suggests more scope for agency and for constructing common

interests than is commonly supposed.

It may be a long time before many poor countries can put in place effective,

accountable public institutions. But new forms of collaboration are emerging

between the state and citizens to provide services, often in unconventional

ways that blur the boundaries between public and private actors. Policymakers

should be more open-minded in their search for effective approaches to service

delivery.

Some implications for policymakers include:

External actors should pay much more attention to the impact of all their

actions on local state – society relations. In particular, they should give much

greater urgency to action to restrict the access of political elites in poor

countries to military support and rents, by outlawing corrupt business

practices, reducing opportunities for money laundering, controlling the

marketing of conflict diamonds and small arms, and encouraging measures

such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Taxation needs to be treated as a governance issue, not just a fiscal issue.

More public debate is needed about links between tax and spending, and more

honesty about the problem of aid dependency. Decisions about aid modalities

need to be more sensitive to local context.

The way state institutions are designed and public programmes negotiated and

implemented can provide incentives and opportunities for collective action,

including by the poor.

Civil society programmes need re-thinking, with much more recognition of the

diversity of interest groups, and the ways in which state and society are

mutually reinforcing.

Overall, there is a need to think less normatively about what ought to be

happening, and much more politically and historically about what is actually

happening, and how to build on what is already working.

Source: Institute of Development Studies, 2005, ‗Signposts to More Effective States:

Responding to Governance Challenges in Developing Countries‘, Institute of

Development Studies, Brighton

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Fostering Citizen Collective Action in Post-Conflict Societies

P Uvin and S Cohen (2006)

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Summary

How do NGOs contribute to civil society development in post-conflict environments?

What role should the donor community play? This paper from the Woodrow Wilson

Centre describes the challenges involved in civil society development in post-conflict

Rwanda and Burundi. It concludes that in order to be successful, the donor community

must find more effective and constructive means of supporting citizen opportunities for

local learning and bargaining within the framework of the law. Promoting a culture of

citizenship is crucial to effective civil society promotion.

It is assumed that investments in strengthening civil society not only help to prevent

the outbreak of violence but also to deliver services and promote democracy. But

strategies for civil society–building come up against problems of state resistance,

internal divisions within and among the local NGO community, low internal

democratic values and the generalized failure of networks. The record of success in

promoting and supporting local organizations is poor.

In Rwanda and Burundi, the international development community engaged in civil

society development in three broad areas: Subcontracting aid to local-partner NGOs;

Promoting grassroots organizations; and Supporting local NGOs mainly in the human

rights field as tools for democracy. These efforts were made difficult by (among other

things) distrust, social division, the concentration of development communities in

capital cities and grassroots organizations being associated with elite interests.

There are four deeper reasons for the poor record of success in promoting and

supporting local organisations:

The societal context for development work is extremely complex and

challenging, and so oftentimes agencies overreach and establish over-

ambitious targets.

Project aid is a very weak tool for broad development –it is often short term,

typically inflexible and bureaucratically and paperwork driven.

Civil society building is politically very sensitive and difficult. Despite the

neutral and apolitical rhetoric, the goals of most development projects are

political in nature and often local NGO partners are selected based on their

opposition to a government—all nationals are smart enough to recognize this

and act accordingly.

Development partners often fundamentally misunderstand the domestic

dynamics of civil society development. A simplistic understanding of what

local organizations do and of their political characteristics undermines project

success.

The complex task of building a civil society extends beyond funding ―nice‖ local

NGOs. Building a civil society requires processes that allow people at all levels of

society to engage in collective action, learn to build their own capacities and act as

citizens.

What is needed is a transition from a set of highly personalized relationships,

in which individuals and organizations seek access to ad hoc benefits as

clients, to a system of transparent, institutionalized relationships.

Civil society–building should focus on creating capacities for citizenship

through the provision of opportunities for social bargaining and social learning

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within post-conflict societies. Efforts should be go beyond capital cities and

more inclusively engage poor communities and individuals.

A concrete civil society strategy should create incentives for poor people to

engage in collective action as citizens rather than as clients of either political

power-holders or the development machinery. Such a strategy would be

structural, medium term and cut across all fields of development.

A healthy dose of scepticism regarding best practices is needed. Most amount

to little more than platitudes. Every local context is different and ―best

practices‖ are often not generally applicable to distinctly different situations.

Source: Uvin. P., 2006. 'Fostering Citizen Collective Action in Post-Conflict Societies',

in What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States?, Occasional Paper

Series, Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington, DC

Understanding Armed Groups

S Williams and R Ricigliano (2005)

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Summary

How can a third party understand an armed group well enough to be able to assist

constructively in the establishment of a peace process? This Conciliation Resources

article aims to provide starting points and helpful signposts that intermediaries can use

in this difficult but essential task. Understanding means more than having information

about a group. It means developing a deeper knowing of a group and some ability to

predict what it does.

In the world of violent conflict, parties in dispute do not usually have a shared system

for resolving their dispute and consequently there is generally an accepted need for

what is referred to as a ‗peace process‘. Authority and legitimacy are contested, and no

judge, court, tribunal, or bargaining process is acceptable to all sides. Hence there is

often an assumed need for a ‗third party‘, an individual or organisation outside of the

combatant groups, to assist in the establishment and management of the process.

The question of understanding armed groups involved two kinds of variables;

substantive (the information required) and procedural (the process of interaction with

groups in order to gather the information). Intermediaries need to be aware that:

Their task of understanding an armed group is affected by trust. If there is a

high degree of trust between an intermediary and an armed group, the amount,

quality and honesty of the information exchanged is much greater.

Their task is also affected by how they interact with an armed group. Once

engaged with the combatants, the intermediary becomes an actor in that

conflict system and has an impact (consciously or not) on the conflict

dynamics.

In gathering information, they need to pay attention to more than the spoken or

written positions of the parties. They must also be adept at reading actions and

the context within which armed groups operate. What the group does and says

about itself begins to describe and locate at least its aspirations or what it

believes suits its interests.

As with building trust, the understanding of whether a group is serious about

negotiating may need to develop over time, based on actions rather than

words. In general, what a group does is the best predictor of what it will do.

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Without understanding of an armed group it is difficult to identify common interests,

build confidence, or resolve differences. These are all vital steps in reaching an

agreement capable of ending violence and addressing the causes of conflict.

Much of an intermediary‘s success comes down to interpersonal and

contextual factors, which will be different in each conflict setting and even

each interaction.

Above all, it is crucial to remember that armed groups are dynamic

organisations whose strategies change in response to evolving circumstances.

Different elements in the group will enjoy prominence at different historical

moments, in response to internal tensions or external influences.

Intermediaries need to remember that their assessment of a group and its

attitude to political engagement is not definitive; at a different moment,

possibly with a different interlocutor, an intermediary with a different

approach may find openings that were previously undiscovered.

Despite attempts to define or systematise the task of understanding armed

groups, it is still a healthy mix of art and science.

Source: Williams, S., and Ricigliano, R. 2005, 'Understanding Armed Groups', Accord,

vol. 16, Conciliation Resources, London

Supplementary readings

Building Institutions in Post-Conflict African Economies

J Aron (2002)

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Summary

The role of effective state and private institutions in promoting investment and growth

is back on the agenda of multilateral agencies. Institutional reform in poor countries,

especially in post-conflict countries where institutions have been altered or destroyed,

is needed to encourage development and economic growth. Yet, how is it that

institutional reform can have a positive impact on development? How do institutions

influence growth and recovery in post-conflict countries? What are the constraints on

the effective reforms of institutions?

Following North‘s institutional framework (defined as a combination of both formal

and informal rules and how effectively they are enforced), this WIDER discussion

paper establishes that well-functioning institutions may promote development. Using

empirical evidence of cross-country analysis, it is argued that weak institutions

increase transaction costs and discourage investment and productive activity. This

finding lends force to the need for institutional reform. Effective institutional reform

requires the creation or restructuring of organisations that can implement the laws,

state regulatory arrangements to oversee these organisations, and a facilitating

environment for various private sector watchdog bodies. However, in practice,

institution building in African post-conflict countries, as in other developing countries,

may be very limited because of often-severe factor and funding constraints. The

capacity to change is dependent on the available human capital and other resources in

organisations.

In capacity-constrained countries, the desired scope of sustainable reform has to be

traded-off against limited domestic resources. While fiscal resources may be

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supplemented by foreign aid, it is far harder to reverse sharply depleted capacity in

post-conflict countries. Other findings include:

Institutions are neither malleable nor able to respond rapidly to institutional

incentives. Change will tend to occur incrementally

The degree of institutional development achieved prior to conflict in post-

conflict countries is crucial to the institution building process. Institutional

memory may be more easily resuscitated than created

In post-conflict countries with little left of either formal or informal

mechanisms (e.g. Somalia and Sierra Leone), partial reform may be achieved

in the short to medium term by enacting minimal transparent rules, rather than

expensive and time-consuming reforms

Levels of reform should be matched to capacity, so that in due course, deeper

reforms can be implemented

Under resource constraints, more complex law codes can evolve by

importation of tried and tested foreign law, but practical experience suggests

that, to be acceptable, these laws should be carefully adapted using local

expertise.

Research on practical policy interventions towards institution building is still at an

early stage. Yet, the paper draws important policy implications:

Policy prescriptions for institutional reform should take into account practical

constraints in implementation

In post-conflict countries, concerted institutional reforms may be more

effective than piecemeal reforms

The importance of domestic demand for reform has to be emphasised to gain

momentum for reform

It is important to highlight the simultaneous relationship between growth,

investment and institutions, since causality may move in both directions

Domestic civil organisations have to be strengthened to regulate the state‘s

actions during implementation of reforms.

Source: Aron, J. 2002, Building Institutions in Post-Conflict African Economies,

WIDER Discussion Paper DP2002/124, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki.

Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict Torn Societies: Civic

Organisations, Democratic Effectiveness and Political Conflict

R C Crook (2001)

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Summary

The effort to resolve violent conflict within societies cannot rest solely on non-

political, non-ethnic, non-identity based civil society groups, but must also accept the

role of cultural, ethnic and religious groups which may, on the surface, appear to seek

to divide the state. If these groups can be mobilised and managed through a system of

conflict mediation they may in fact contribute to facilitating peace and democracy

within the state.

This paper first discusses the concept of civil society organisations (CSOs), arguing

that it is necessary to go beyond a traditional definition based in behavioural terms,

concentrating on pluralistic groups cutting across interest groups, to include

sociologically defined groups based on common interests, ethics, ethnicity, religion

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and other communities. It then examines this argument with respect to two countries

which exemplify ethnic and religious division, but which differ significantly in the

degree and manner of this division: Namely Uganda and Bosnia.

Civil society incorporates all communal identities and associations, whether they be

based on community, family, ethnicity, tribe, religion, class, intellectual capacity,

politics, or whatever, and no matter what the source of the group it has the ability to

provide a positive role in pacifying and democratising society.

In discussing the nature of CSOs, the following points are highlighted:

CSOs are both in conflict and at the same time interdependent within society

They are defined through their relations with the state, the policies of which

they seek to shape and from which they hope to derive power and influence

Democracy is at heart a tension between the theoretical equality of all within

society, and the actual inequalities which individuals and groups seek to

address

Civil society groups can be divided into three main categories: Policy-oriented

elites; locally organised grassroots groups; and social/cultural bodies. These

operate in distinctly differing manners.

In application to the case studies it was noted that in both Uganda and Bosnia civil

society has been traditionally weak and partial. Both societies have adopted a similar

strategy - decentralisation - to resolve the competition within the main (in this case

ethnically) partial CSOs.

The strength and potential influence of CSOs are related to the depth to which they are

embedded within society, and whether the CSO cuts across interest- or community-

groups or unifies these groups and provides them with a mouthpiece, they are a part of

society and must be accommodated. Denying the role of CSOs which appear to

represent division but which have genuine support will be counter-productive.

Additionally:

A CSO does not need to be 'democratically constituted' to be a significant

actor, as CSOs represent the institutionalisation of methods of interaction

within groups and between the group and the state

The importance of any particular CSO is measured more in the support it can

mobilise (be that support from within society, or externally from the wider

international community) than its independence as an actor

The methods employed by the CSO will be dependent on how far the CSO is

accepted by the state and allowed to participate and negotiate, as well as on the

traditions of the constituency itself

Where popular and legitimate CSOs are denied a voice they are likely to

become increasingly confrontational, and perhaps violent

Both civic and 'uncivil' (divisive) groups must be given a voice if they are seen

within society as representative. The structure of state-society interaction must

reflect the reality on the ground.

Source: Crook, R.C., 2001, 'Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict Torn

Societies: Civic organisations, Democratic Effectiveness and Political Conflict', IDS

Working Paper no. 129, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.

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In Control of Their Future: Community-Led Reconciliation and Recovery

D Pottebaum and C Lee (2007)

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Summary

How can community-led reconciliation and recovery (CRR) programmes foster peace

among conflict-affected populations? What challenges confront such initiatives? This

working paper builds on lessons learnt in a CRR programme in Aceh, Indonesia to

establish general principles for effective CRR strategies. Strengthening leadership

capacity, reforming the mindset of war-torn communities and encouraging co-

operation between communities in conflict are central to the success of CRR

programmes.

CRR programmes aim to understand the systematic failures which are both caused by

and a cause of conflict, and to encourage warring communities to rediscover their

interconnectedness. The benefits of empowering communities to help formulate and

manage their own development policies have long been recognised. However, it is

difficult to transpose lessons learnt in community-driven development in stable

societies to initiatives in conflict-ridden countries. Communities in conflict often adopt

narrow, short-term perspectives in order to survive: they may be distrustful, violent and

unwilling to take proactive action. Wartime leaders may lack the skills or outlook

necessary to achieve reconciliation between conflicting parties.

CRR helps to transform the attitudes of populations in conflict and address the

challenges of peaceful transitions:

Communities are encouraged to replace the passive role they adopted during

wartime with active participation in recovery planning and resource

management.

Populations are encouraged to take a holistic worldview, taking responsibility

for the entirety of their social relations and local livelihoods rather than

following a fragmentary approach.

Effective leadership is strengthened through training and participation in the

recovery process.

Local organisational capacity is fostered to empower local leaders who may

otherwise be marginalised by government agencies and donors.

CRR comprises three main stages: 1) persuading communities in conflict to commit to

a common goal; 2) building trust between the parties; and 3) assembling leaders to

guide the recovery process. Several operational priorities are highlighted:

Adequate time, technical support and financial resources are required to build

trust between communities. Populations often find it easier to work through

third-party mediators (possibly originating from the local area), who should be

well-versed in local belief systems and comprise a large female component.

Leadership capacity is built through training and field-based events conducted

by all parties together and with the support of local leaders. Individuals receive

formal training in personal empowerment and transformational leadership, and

practical training in participatory planning, facilitation and communication.

District-level teams coordinate, support and monitor CRR work at the sub-

district level. Team building processes between community leaders from both

parties are conducted to foster common peacetime goals.

Regional leaders are trained to assist village leaders in the planning and

management of development activities. Cooperation between all sides of the

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conflict develops leadership skills, improves livelihoods and provides tangible

evidence of peace.

Strong, accountable village organisations are established through direct local

funding and training. Village planning is organised via a five-year economic

plan and implemented by all sectors of the community.

Recent CRR efforts in Aceh, Indonesia highlight the importance of village-

level leadership in consolidating peace processes and promoting community

confidence and hope. Lessons learnt include the value of a peace agreement;

safe access to conflict-affected areas; control by regional leaders over local

leaders; donor willingness to cede control to local leaders; and consistency of

programming across all areas.

Source: Pottebaum, D. and Lee, C., 2007, 'In Control of Their Future: Community-Led

Reconciliation and Recovery', Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop, 'Moving

out of Poverty in Conflict Affected Areas', 16 April, World bank, Washington, D.C

Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International

Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies

B Pouligny (2005)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

How should international agencies work with local civil society during peacebuilding

operations? This article from Security Dialogue analyses the relationship between aid

agencies and local NGOs and communities to identify problems in the way the

international community has traditionally undertaken peace operations. It argues that

international bodies need to reform their understanding of local civil society in order to

foster better local ownership of peacebuilding projects.

International agencies have recently sought to involve local NGOs in peacebuilding

programmes, but they have often underestimated the diversity of civil society in non-

Western contexts. Seeking to work with homogenous NGOs modelled along Western

lines, outsiders have often co-operated with local organisations which then become

patronage channels, disconnected from the concerns of their communities.

Western bodies have ―romanticised‖ local NGOs by overlooking their close links with

political groups. ―Invasions‖ of outside agencies during crises have weakened relations

between local and international NGOs, as outsiders‘ seizure of funding and symbolic

space marginalises the local groups.

There are six key problems identified in the approach international agencies take

towards local civil society:

International organisations neglect local knowledge during peacebuilding

interventions. They treat their arrival as a ―year zero‖, overlooking the role of

traditional practices in rebuilding conflict-ridden communities.

The international community misjudges the timing of its interventions. In

Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reduction in global aid after the war coincided

with a period of great difficulty for local NGOs.

International agencies impose inequitable demands on local NGOs during

funding and legitimisation processes. They require local civil society to attain a

level of accountability not reached by the international bodies themselves.

147

Reconstruction efforts prioritise formal political reform, but ignore substantial

meanings and identities. A rebuilt political infrastructure is hollow without

thought given to underlying cultural values.

Outside interventions deprive the state of its capacity to cultivate shared

purpose by placing faith in the ―invisible hand‖ of civil society.

International organisations seek to achieve stability in the short- to medium-

term but fail to strive for a long-term resolution, addressing the painful

processes of social transformation.

Various recommendations are made:

Outsiders must develop a community-oriented approach to local populations to

understand the complex changes in post-conflict societies. They should

identify local individuals who might act as agents of change.

Systems should be instituted to analyse the socio-political context of the local

community and monitor the impact of international agencies on local civil

societies.

All field workers should have clear guidelines outlining how conflict has

caused change in local social organisation and values.

The preparation, ongoing training, monitoring and psychological support of

international practitioners should be prioritised.

International NGOs should change the way they see themselves. They should

regard their role as unobtrusive mediators in the peacebuilding process and job

descriptions and assessments should reflect this.

Outsiders‘ accountability towards the local population needs to be improved

by the adoption of performance assessments and sanction systems.

Source: Pouligny, B., 2005, 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:

Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies', Security

Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 495-510

Multi-donor Support to Civil Society and Engaging with 'Non-traditional' Civil

Society

F Tembo and A Wells (2007)

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Summary

Do multi-donor support mechanisms scale up and enhance the effectiveness of civil

society engagement with the state? This paper from the Overseas Development

Institute (ODI) analyses multi-donor support models and partnerships with ‗non-

traditional‘ civil society. The decision to move from bilateral to multi-donor support of

civil society organisations (CSOs) involves a trade-off between direct donor

management of project administration and politics, and leaving civil society advocacy

to run its own course.

This study is a response to the current lack of systematic analysis of different

approaches to supporting civil society, including which models work best in different

contexts. It includes a review of 25 Department for International Development (DFID)

programmes in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Most multi-donor civil society support programmes are now managed by

intermediaries: international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), CSOs, local

148

foundations and community funds. Non-traditional CSOs include, among others, social

movements, political factions, faith-based groups and private sector and local

government associations. Strategies to reach out to non-traditional CSOs include

experimental funding to identify stronger organisations, selecting intermediaries who

have worked with non-traditional groups, brokering different funding mechanisms, and

differentiated grant-making to CSOs with limited management capacity.

There are a number of management and programme issues related to both CSO-driven

programmes and use of non-traditional CSOs:

Intermediaries may not have the same capacity as donors to mediate civil

society-state relations and absorb the inherent political risks.

The use of foundations needs to be carefully managed in fragile states, where

legal frameworks are often applied differently to donors, INGOs and local

CSOs.

Individual donors may continue to exert influence over programme priorities

and management, skewing accountability away from the CSOs.

Transition to a multi-donor system demands substantial short- to medium-term

investment of donor resources to resolve organisational and administrative

issues.

While non-traditional CSOs can be effective, donor funding/reporting

arrangements may impose formal structures on weakly institutionalised CSOs,

undermining their informal organisational dynamic.

A number of additional issues warrant further study, in particular in fragile states

contexts:

Intermediaries: the intermediary-CSO relationship, including the issue of

intermediaries acting as advocates; development of community funds as a step

beyond donor or INGO management; the role INGOs play once fund

management has transitioned to local intermediaries; engagement with private

foundations who have worked with mass-based organisations; and small grants

mechanisms as an instrument for coalition building.

Intervention design: quantitative comparison of transaction costs of multi-

donor and bilateral approaches; the potential for cost reductions by working

with smaller groups of donors; measurement of impact on accountability; and

sector-based approaches to civil society support.

Non-traditional civil society partners: the role of civic engagement in

reforming formal accountability mechanisms and the possibilities of civic

engagement through informal channels and alliances.

Source: Tembo, F. et al., 2007, 'Multi-donor Support to Civil Society and Engaging

with 'Non-traditional' Civil Society: A Light-Touch Review of DFID's Portfolio',

Overseas Development Institute, London

Towards a New Strategy for Civil Society Building in Rwanda

S Unsworth and S Uvin (2001)

Access full text online

Abstract

Most discussion about civil society in Rwanda focuses on existing civil society

organisations and how to ―strengthen‖ them. The resulting interventions often reflect

donors‘ corporate policies and a normative view of civil society based on Western

models. The result is a narrow range of actions designed to address perceived problems

149

directly through capacity building, various forms of training including civic education,

sensitisation, etc. This can produce worthwhile results. But the drawbacks are that it

addresses symptoms not causes, is expensive, produces benefits at the micro level

which are hard to scale up, and tends to have higher level objectives which are over-

ambitious in relation to the resources and strategies deployed.

This paper steps back and seeks to understand the broader, more structural, longer term

dynamics (social, political, economic and institutional) which shape the opportunities

for collective action within Rwandan society. It also looks at the way in which the state

itself helps to determine the incentives (or disincentives) for collective action, and the

opportunities for a more ―institutionalised‖ relationship between the state and civil

society, based not on people as clients seeking access to ad hoc benefits, but citizens

claiming rights.

Source: Unsworth, S. and Uvin, S., 2001, ‗Towards a New Strategy for Civil Society

Building in Rwanda‘, DFID, Kigali

150

Part 3: Conflict Response: Peacemaking,

Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding

Contents

1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and Peace Agreements –

Formation, Implementation and Consolidation ..................................................................... 151

2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding ............................................................... 160

3. Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning ....................................................... 178

4. Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery ............................................. 186

5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants ........................ 191

6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence .. 202

7. Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence

............................................................................................................................................... 213

7.1 Security sector ............................................................................................................. 213

7.2 Justice sector ............................................................................................................... 226

8. Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence

............................................................................................................................................... 239

151

1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and

Peace Agreements – Formation, Implementation and Consolidation

Core readings

The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining

Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars

B Jones (2001)

Access full text online

Summary

International actors face recurrent challenges coordinating their efforts to implement

peace agreements to end civil wars. This InternationalPeaceAcademy paper identifies

strategic coordination amongst third-party actors as a critical element of successful

peace implementation. Incoherence and inconsistency in strategy can undermine the

viability or the effectiveness of implementation efforts. Strategic coordination is a

growing policy challenge due to the increasing proliferation of actors with overlapping

mandates, competitive relations and minimal accountability.

Strategic coordination is a critical to the capacity of implementers to stave off

opposition. Opponents of peace will tend to exploit divisions amongst implementers

and take advantage of confusion or disagreement. The ability of international actors to

meet the growing complexity of strategic coordination depends on their ability to

overcome three recurring challenges. These are: incoherence between the negotiation

and implementation phases of a peace process; divergence of strategies within a given

phase; and contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy.

The effectiveness of strategic coordination varies according to external conditions,

including: the difficulty of the implementation environment; the degree of commitment

of major and regional powers; and the correspondence of interests and objectives

among those powers:

Past cases show that specific features of the coordination mechanism employed

can help mitigate environmental constraints.

Strategic coordination of peace implementation will be easier where there is: a

clearly defined lead agency; continuity of third-party actors between

negotiation and implementation phases; and an established forum for policy

consultation amongst implementers.

Strategic coordination has been successful where implementation has been

guided by a lead state whose authority to establish priorities and resolve

disputes is recognised by other key implementers.

Although the lead state approach is unplanned by definition, positive past

experiences suggest it is an important alternative to United Nations (UN)

coordination.

Where the UN enjoys a central, authoritative role a Special Representative of

the Secretary General (SRSG) can provide important policy coordination. This

is best achieved where the SRSG is involved in both negotiation and

implementation.

Most cases of successful strategic coordination have featured "Friends Groups"

– the bringing together of key governments to ensure focus and commonality of

approaches.

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Without effective coordination by the UN, a comparable regional or international

organisation, or a lead state, the effectiveness of implementation efforts will be heavily

constrained:

Ideally strategic coordination should establish clear lead actors to set and

pursue priorities, provide consistency across phases and resolve disputes.

Neither the UN nor any other actor is currently equipped to do this.

The capacity of the UN to perform essential strategic coordination functions is

constrained by its own weakened authority, the proliferation of third-party

actors and competition between powers. This is unlikely to change substantially

in the near future.

The UN and other international actors have experimented with different models

of strategic coordination. Within the UN two distinct models have emerged: the

Strategic Frameworks Initiative and the Integrated Mission.

Recent efforts to enhance structures for strategic coordination on the ground

have been frustrated by: the number of actors involved; the limited acceptance

of the coordinating authority of the UN, or an analogous body; and the absence

of policy-coordination at headquarters level.

Source: Jones, B.D., 2001, 'The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing

Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars',

International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation,

Stanford University, New York

Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations

I Johnstone (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

The Center on International Cooperation‘s (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace

Operations is the most comprehensive report of its kind, examining more than forty

UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions in 2005 including the Darfur region of the

Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo among others. Its purpose is to inform

policy-makers, members of the media, academics and peace-keepers in the field as the

international community debates the growing role of peace operations around the

world.

Source: Johnstone, I., 2006, ‗Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations‘, Annual Review

of Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation, Boulder: Lynne

Rienner, pp. 1-17.

Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)

L Brahimi (2001)

Access full text online

Abstract

The United Nations (UN) was founded to save communities and nations from the

scourge of war. Yet, over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the

challenge, and can do no better today. Why has the UN failed? What can be done to

accomplish the UN‘s mission?

153

The report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General assesses the shortcomings of

the existing peacekeeping system and makes recommendations for change. Force alone

cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Member

states have to summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially and

operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace.

There is an urgent need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention

and peacekeeping, in both the long and short terms.

Findings from the report include:

Some UN operations in the past did not deploy into post-conflict situations but

tried to create them.

Factors that should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping include the

consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only for self-

defence.

Reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor has deeply damaged the

standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping.

The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most

critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new

operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain.

The current approach to funding and staff for peacekeeping seems to confuse

the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of

peacekeeping and other peace operations activities.

Gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede the effective use of modern

information technology in missions.

Policy pointers to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peace-

building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies

include:

Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN

contingents to cede the initiative of their attackers. Mandates should specify an

operation‘s authority to use force to stop violence against civilians.

A new information-gathering and analysis entity should be created to support

the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the

members of the ECPS.

The leadership of a new mission has to be assembled as early as possible at the

UN Headquarters, to participate in shaping the mission‘s concept of operation,

support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance.

Traditional peacekeeping operations should be rapidly and effectively

deployed. On-call lists of experts, military officers and police officers should

be created, and mechanisms to rapidly recruit civilian field personnel should be

put in place.

Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of

the UN, and therefore the majority of its resource requirements should be

funded through the regular budget of the Organisation.

Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) has to be created to plan new missions

and help them reach full deployment. Information technology has to be well

utilised to achieve the objectives.

Source: Brahimi, L. et al 2000, 'Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations', United

Nations, New York

154

The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments

W Zartman (2001)

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Summary

How can the timing of peace initiatives help to resolve conflicts? This Global Review

of Ethnopolitics article argues that parties resolve their conflicts only when they are

ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory

result are blocked. Practitioners need to take advantage of this ‗ripe moment‘ when it

exists, or help produce it, or stand ready to act on it when it does not exist.

The concept of a ripe moment centres on the relative parties‘ perception of a Mutually

Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimistically associated with an impending, past or

recently avoided catastrophe. The concept is based on the notion that when the parties

find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory, and

this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek an alternative policy or a way out.

Diplomatic memoirs have explicitly referred to ripeness through its MHS component

and they provide examples of when a MHS has brought parties to seek a way out:

Chester A Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa between 1981

and 1989, mediated an agreement for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from

Angola and of South African troops from Namibia, then to become

independent. It was only when military escalations ended in stalemate that the

position ‗ripened‘ paving the way for negotiation to begin.

Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs at the United

Nations (UN), also endorsed the necessity of ripeness in his mission to mediate

a peace in El Salvador. The conflict was ripe for a negotiated settlement only

when each side realised that they could not defeat each other and that its

persistence was causing pain that could no longer be endured.

In Yugoslavia, it took the 1995 Croatian offensive, coupled with NATO

bombing, to create a MHS composed of a temporary Serb setback and a

temporary Croat advance that could not be sustained.

Practitioners need to employ all their skills and apply the concepts of negotiation and

mediation to take advantage of the necessary but insufficient condition of ripeness.

Evidence suggests that perception of a MHS occurs either (and optimally) at a

low level of conflict, where it is relatively easy to begin problem-solving, or, in

salient cases, at rather high levels of conflict.

To ripen high level conflicts for resolution, practitioners must raise the level of

conflict until a stalemate is reached. Then further through the perception of

hurt, then to the perception of pain, and finally to create a perception of an

impending catastrophe. The ripe moment becomes the godchild of

brinkmanship.

A MHS can be a very fleeting opportunity, a moment to be seized lest it pass,

or it can be of a long duration, waiting to be noticed and acted upon. Failure to

seize the moment often hastens its passing, as parties lose faith in negotiating a

way out or regain hope in the possibility of unilateral escalation.

Unripeness should not constitute an excuse for second or third parties‘ inaction.

In the absence of a promising situation, either the ‗second‘ party that is alone in

feeling hurt or the third party should ripen or position themselves. Positioning

options include becoming an indispensable channel for negotiation.

155

Source: Zartman, I. W, 2001, 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and

Ripe Moments', The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 8-18

Supplementary readings

Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Women's

Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes

K Banaszak and A-M Goetz (2005)

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Summary

How and why should women be involved in peace processes? This paper from the

United Nations Development Fund for Women highlights the importance of involving

women at every stage of peace negotiations and gives recommendations for how this

might be achieved in practice. It argues that when approaching the task of ending war,

the stakes are too high to neglect the resources that women have to offer.

Women are major stakeholders in the resolution of armed conflict: as victims,

survivors and even wagers of war. Women have much to offer peace efforts: Women‘s

organisations persistently advocate for peace; women often build foundations for peace

negotiations and build ties amongst different factions; they bring a different

perspective to negotiations; their involvement can lead to long-term advances for

gender equality; and they can foster reconciliation and provide an example for society

to move forward. The international community is in a critical position to support

women‘s participation at the peace table, to build women‘s capacity as participants and

to ensure that women‘s needs and contributions are not overlooked.

The report gives a number of recommendations on how to amplify women's voices and

create an enabling environment to allow their concerns to be addressed:

Women are more likely to have an impact when they organise as women with a

common agenda for peace. The international community should encourage

female delegates to meet with women‘s organisations; facilitate exchanges of

information between national stakeholders and international partners; and

convene nationwide consultations of women.

Identifying strategic entry points for women early in the peace process is vital

to enhance their access to negotiations and impact on the accords.

Recommendations include: Advocating for a minimum 30% women‘s

representation in delegations; brokering meetings between women‘s groups and

negotiating parties for women to request representation; assisting women‘s

groups in awareness-raising campaigns.

Structures and mechanisms within the office of the facilitator can enhance the

integration of a gender perspective in peace negotiations. The facilitator can be

crucial in getting women to the peace table.

Training on the importance of a gender perspective should be offered to

participants in negotiations, and gender sensitive rules of procedure should be

encouraged. There should be gender balance and expertise within the

facilitation team.

Women require specific forms of support to maximise their participation in

peace negotiations. They must enjoy protection from security threats; sufficient

156

resources to maximise their efforts; political space in which to organise; and

access to decision makers.

There are also often important capacity building needs, and courses should

include: Conflict resolution and gender-sensitive peace building; thematic post-

conflict issues; political issues and organisational skills.

Women‘s involvement must be sustained during implementation. Women have

specific needs, priorities and strategies that must be included in the peace agreement to

guarantee their fulfilment during implementation.

There should be gender balance and expertise on the drafting committee, and

clear provisions in the peace agreement to ensure women‘s participation in

post-conflict mechanisms.

After a peace agreement has been signed, there are opportunities to maximise

women‘s participation in implementation and monitoring. The international

community should establish mechanisms to guarantee women‘s involvement

throughout the implementation phase. Key facets of the agreement, such as

timeframe and distribution of funds should make reference to gender issues.

The international community is often invited to verify fulfilment of steps in the

accords to help prevent a return to violence. Women must be involved in these

processes.

International commitments to gender equality in peace processes are in place.

Necessary political will should now be exercised through provision of

technical, financial and moral support.

Source: Banaszak, K. et al (ed), 2005, 'Securing the Peace: Guiding the International

Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes,'

United Nations Development Fund for Women

Leashing the Dogs of War

C A Crocker et al (2007)

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Summary

Is it possible to fight war and manage conflict at the same time? This book from the

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) explores the causes of conflict and the critical

role of conflict management in volatile political environments. Peacemaking and

conflict management are essential for creating a less divided, less conflicted world

despite the complexities and high odds against success. The international community

can check hostile adversaries of the international order and make peace at the same

time.

When the Cold War ended, many hoped for the beginning of a more peaceful chapter

in world history. However, sectarian violence in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle

East, the emergence of a more lethal, global brand of terrorism and a growing cultural

divide between Islam and the West have put pay to such aspirations. Meanwhile,

international norms and institutions are eroding, and a number of states are on the

verge of crossing the nuclear threshold.

A new kind of strategic political resource in international relations is needed to leash

the contemporary dogs of war. ‗Smart Power‘ effectively engages the multiple assets

and instruments of official and non-official diplomacy and military power. It is

157

attentive to the timing of mediated, negotiated interventions and the resources,

capabilities and strengths that different actors bring to conflict management. As such, it

merits consideration as a comprehensive conflict management mechanism.

The current international conflict landscape is characterised by:

Security challenges: a heightened sense of insecurity in the international

system; anti-Western sentiment; the emergence of authoritarian regimes in

Latin America and the Middle East; the growth of paramilitary organisations;

continued regional instability; and an increasingly permissive violent

environment.

Global conflict trends: a decline in global conflicts and their lethality; a shift in

the locus of violence; the increasing risk that nuclear technologies may fall into

the wrong hands; and an increase in outside intervention and conflict

management.

Role of coercive force: the recognition that while military and economic tools

may be essential, some challenges may respond to a blend of coercive power

and political-diplomatic initiatives, including conflict management.

The role of institutions: Increased engagement of international institutions,

regional and sub-regional organisations and small-state/non-state actors in

peaceful resolution processes.

The role of state building and democratic governance: the recognition that it is

no longer acceptable to allow failed states to flounder; discussion about the role

of outsiders in building effective democratic polities.

Framing the conflict management challenge: global frames of reference are

diverging; there is a declining degree of consensus on priorities for conflict

management.

Conflict management in a time of transition: major powers, international

organisations and non-governmental organisations are now re-defining their

roles in providing security for their citizens and constituencies.

In this context, it is important to recognise that:

Military force alone can not deal effectively with the problems of failed and

ailing states

The international community needs to apply conflict management and

prevention to failed states and those regions where intractable conflicts endure

Official and non-official diplomacy are important to building international

coalitions, mobilising political will, building internal capacity to handle

conflict, securing political legitimacy and promoting negotiation and mediation

of interstate and intrastate disputes

Consensus and the support of the international community, including non-

governmental organisations (NGOs), is an important component of effective

action.

Crocker, C., Osler Hampson, F. and Aall, P., 2007, 'Leashing the Dogs of War',

Introduction in Crocker, C., Osler Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds.) 'Leashing the Dogs

of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World', United States Institute of Peace,

Washington, D.C.

158

Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements

S Stedman (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What

strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty

commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements, which

are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for millions

of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.

Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which

international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive,

systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens

after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and

presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is

related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major

powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war.

Source: Stedman, S.J., 2002, ‗Introduction.‘ In Stedman, S.J. et al. (eds.) (2002)

Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder CO: Lynne-

Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-40.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines

Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2007)

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Abstract

This document aims to set out the guiding principles and core objectives of United

Nations peacekeeping operations as well the main factors contributing to their success

in the field. It also provides a basis for the development of training materials for

military, police and civilian personnel preparing to serve in the field. This document

was drafted in close consultation with field missions, Troop and Police Contributing

Countries, UN system partners and other key stakeholders. It also draws on seminal

documents such as "An Agenda for Peace", "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" and

"the Brahimi Report", as well as internal lessons learned materials, external research

and academic commentary.

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2007, ‗United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines‘, Consultation Draft 29 June

2007, United Nations, New York.

International Mediation

W Zartman and S Touval (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its

aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of

159

course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has

become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in

Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United

Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defence and security organizations such as

NATO and the OSCE.

At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,

weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to

threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are

traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement

still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts

and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our

institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or

NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these

questions are addressed in this new volume.

Source: Zartman, W, and Touval, S., 2007, ‗International Mediation.‘ In Crocker,

Chester, Osler Hampson, Fen. and Aall, Pamela. (eds.) Leashing the Dogs of War:

Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace, pp. 437-454.

160

2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

Core readings

Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?

M Barnett and H Kim (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

How is peacebuilding interpreted in meaning and practice? To what extent has it been

institutionalised? Peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions

designed to prevent armed conflict. This article, published in Global Governance,

surveys twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are active in

peacebuilding. It analyses how they conceptualise and operationalise their

peacebuilding mandate, along with mapping areas of potential concern. It finds that

most programmes have focused on the immediate or underlying causes of conflict, to

the relative neglect of state institutions.

Peacebuilding is increasingly institutionalised across the international landscape. An

impressive number of organisations use the concept to frame and organise their post-

conflict activities. However, there are critical differences among actors regarding the

conceptualisation and operationalisation of peacebuilding. There are even greater

divisions regarding the specific approaches that may achieve it.

Different agencies use a wide variety of terms related to but not necessarily

synonymous with peacebuilding. Some use the same term, peacebuilding, in slightly

different ways:

Different groupings clearly emerge: the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, UN

specialised agencies, European organisations and member states.

Although there are various reasons for differing priorities, organisational

mandates and networks are important parts of the explanation. This will heavily

influence an organisation‘s reception to, definition and revision of the concept

of peacebuilding.

Organisations are nested in structured relationships; those that are linked have

tended to converge on a consensus definition.

Different interpretations over the operationalisation of peacebuilding lead to

different strategies and priorities. The growing number of international

structures whose mandates include peacebuilding might easily mask essential

differences regarding the concept‘s meaning and practice.

There are three dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding: stability creation;

restoration of state institutions; and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of

conflict. To date there has been more focus on the kind of the state (the organising

principles that structure the relationship between state and society) being built, than the

degree of the state (its capacity to control society):

Some have argued in favour of a more sequenced and strategic peacebuilding

project that emphasises the establishment of security and stable institutions

before seeking liberalisation and democracy.

Agencies must focus more on creating state institutions that can deliver basic

public goods in an equitable manner. Although the state is not the only

161

institution that underpins stability, pursuing peacebuilding without an

institutional foundation is a recipe for failure.

How peacebuilding is implemented must be settled by recipient states

themselves, with support from international actors, rather than by bureaucratic

and political power.

Much of the interest in peacebuilding is at the level of rhetoric rather than

resources. There is a danger that it receives little meaningful financial and

political support relative to the costs of renewed conflict.

The proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission is mandated to help coordinate

the post conflict activities of relevant agencies. This is likely to both improve

the implementation of peacebuilding activities and clarify differences among

agencies.

Scholars and policymakers need to monitor which version of peacebuilding is

being institutionalised and ensure that alternative understandings are kept alive

to enable reasoned choices.

Source: Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., and Sitea, L., 2007, 'Peacebuilding: What

is in a Name?', Global Governance, 13, pp. 35-38

Ending Wars and Building Peace

C Call and E Cousens (2007)

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Summary

How effective are international efforts to build peace? This paper, published by the

International Peace Academy, assesses the status of international peace efforts and

highlights chronic weaknesses in peacekeeping processes. In recent years, international

and bi-lateral institutions have made efforts to fine-tune their peacebuilding processes.

However, systemic issues of international political will and attention, resource

allocation and a failure to recognise local contexts continue to affect the ability of

international and national actors to establish enduring peace.

Peacebuilding is defined as those actions undertaken by international or national actors

to institutionalise peace and a modicum of participatory politics that can be sustained

in the absence of an international peace operation.

While the number and intensity of wars has declined by roughly half since 1990,

between one-third and one-half of all ended conflicts revert to war within five years.

While there is increasing evidence that international involvement can be an important

factor in preventing recurrence of war, this evidence is correlative rather than causal.

The United Nations, international financial institutions and bi-lateral donors now

recognise that the intricacies of peacebuilding policies, planning and implementation

materially affect both the possibility of success and the cost of the failure of

peacebuilding. There has been a recent series of reform efforts to improve

peacebuilding apparatus.

However, both experience and scholarship point to a series of chronic problems in

international peace efforts, including the issue of state-building as an integral part of

peacebuilding. Whether external actors currently have the knowledge, tools, resources

or legitimacy to contribute to state-building is central to the question of the efficacy of

international peacebuilding.

Other problems include:

162

Will and attention: Peacebuilding efforts often suffer from short-lived, crisis-

driven attention spans and are prone to weaken in the medium-term, two to

three years after the ending of hostilities.

More adequate, flexible resources: International institutions and bilateral

donors have recently improved their allocation procedures for financial and

human resources; however, their budget processes are still slow and lack

flexibility. Inter-agency and departmental stovepipes within institutions cause

difficulties in prioritising among competing needs and adequately sequencing

international involvement.

Gaps in civilian capacity: While peacebuilding requires civilian expertise in

critical functional areas, local capacity is still largely inadequate.

Gaps in contextual knowledge: External actors generally do not recognise the

importance of country contexts. They tend not to engage local experts

knowledgeable about culture and context in programme planning and

implementation.

Evaluating state capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness: It is difficult for

international actors to develop reliable indicators of state effectiveness and

citizen polls to measure state legitimacy.

The future effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts will depend on whether the current

trend of decreasing armed conflict continues. An increase in proxy wars against

terrorists and other armed conflicts will fuel the demand for more peacebuilding efforts

occurring simultaneously.

Given the present status of peacebuilding policies and programmes, it is not at all clear

that we are anywhere close to having international policy machinery or instruments

that can reliably handle multiple high-profile peacebuilding operations successfully.

Source: Call, C.T., E.M. Cousens, 2007, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace?', Working

with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York

Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A Study of Peacebuilding and

the March 2004 Riots

D Chigas (2006)

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Summary

Did deficiencies in peacebuilding programmes contribute to the March 2004 riots in

Kosovo? This paper, published by Care International and CDA Collaborative Learning

Projects, reports on a study conducted in the aftermath of the riots to determine any

peacebuilding programme gaps that inadvertently contributed to the recurrence of

violence. While the riots should not be the only benchmark for assessing peacebuilding

in Kosovo, peacebuilding programmes need to re-consider their heavy focus on multi-

ethnicity as the core of their strategy.

While Kosovo embarked on a period of relative calm in the aftermath of the 1998-1999

civil war, heightened tensions continued between the Albanian and Serb populations.

In 2004, the combination of ethnic tensions, high unemployment and frustration over

delays in defining the status of Kosovo Albanians resulted in a four days of riots. The

violence resulted in 19 dead, 900 wounded and extensive destruction of property.

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International peacebuilding missions have been very active in Kosovo for several

years, implementing programmes in inter-ethnic dialogue, peace education, multi-

ethnic projects and institutions, democratic governance and capacity-building and the

media.

The following findings indicate that peacebuilding programmes did not contribute

significantly to prevention of inter-ethnic violence and missed the mark in a number of

programme areas:

Perceptions of improvements in inter-ethnic violence from 2002-2004 masked

the reality of a steady level of inter-ethnic violence during that time.

Contrary to expectations, communities with greater inter-ethnic contact,

whether in the form of business/economic ties or personal relationships, did not

experience less violence.

Intra-ethnic social networks were more important than inter-ethnic engagement

in preventing violence.

Peacebuilding programmes did not address key driving factors of conflict

and failed to transform individual ties into networks of civic engagement.

Rather than improving relations, the heavy peacebuilding focus on multi-

ethnicity and the returning Kosovo Albanians increased ethnic divisions.

Mono-ethnic areas of Kosovo, considered to be more extreme politically, did

not receive the same levels of assistance as more mixed areas.

Programmes did not engage many key people and areas and did not focus on

the ―hard to reach‖ population.

As Kosovo Albanians and Serbs continue to struggle to find ways to coexist,

peacebuilding programmes assisting them should consider the following

recommendations for revised strategies:

Shift programme focus. Re-think the attention currently paid to multi-ethnicity

and refugees and internally displaced persons, even while maintaining the

pursuit of democracy and European standards as a strong goal.

Deal directly with driving forces of conflict and identify ways to deal more

directly with political issues. This work would enhance the impact of work on

inter-ethnic tension in the medium-term, if not in the short-term.

Re-consider the targeting of areas and programme beneficiaries. Focus not on

targeting the ―easy to reach‖ people, but on facilitating their evolution into a

peace constituency. Identify innovators and informal leaders in communities

and target the ―hard to reach‖.

Transform individual ties into networks of inter-ethnic engagement that can

proactively resist violence. A critical mass of young people exists that can be

mobilised for violence. Develop a strategy that turns individual ties into

meaningful ―bridging social capital‖ that provides a counterforce.

Work with intra-ethnic networks on conflict issues. Intra-ethnic networks of

trust and reciprocity are likely to be more important than inter-ethnic relations

in preventing and mitigating violence.

Source: Chigas, D. et al., 2006, 'Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A

Study of Peacebuilding and the March 2004 Riots', CARE International and CDA-

Collaborative Learning Projects, Pristina

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Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications

L Kriesberg (2007)

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Summary

What are conflict resolution (CR) strategies and how do they benefit those involved in

wars? This chapter looks at the expanding field of CR in recent decades. CR offers

many strategies that are relevant for combatants as well as for the intermediaries trying

to mitigate destructive conflicts. CR ideas are increasingly influential and new

developments are largely a response to the changing international environment.

However, they are still insufficiently understood and utilised.

Conflict resolution is an area with a diverse range of practice, theory and research. In

the late 1970s the CR field was focused on negotiation and mediation. Practitioners

and theorists applied the CR approach to a variety of organisational, community and

national disputes. As CR workers turned to civil and international wars they gave

attention to ways in which intermediaries and partisans can reduce the intensity of

conflict and move towards negotiations for an agreement. In the later years of the Cold

War, attention was given to interrupting or avoiding destruction escalation, which

included enhancing crisis management systems. Recently, attention has been paid to

fostering constructive escalation and conflict transformation, for example in public

demonstrations to oust an authoritarian government. A major area of CR expansion is

aiding reconciliation between former enemies.

Although there is not a consensus about ideas and practices of CR, there are some

shared understandings about analysing conflicts and about how to wage or intervene in

them so as to minimise their adverse consequences and maximise their benefits.

Conflicts are inevitable in social life and often serve to advance and sustain

important human values including security, freedom and economic well-being.

Conflicts can become destructive of the values that they are trying to further.

Partisans blame each other for the bad things that happen in a conflict,

including their own conduct. Such self-victimisation reduces the ways to resist

the antagonists‘ attacks.

A conflict needs to be analysed to ensure that CR policies will be effective.

There needs to be information about the stakeholders‘ interests as well as

theoretical analysis.

The social construction of parties to a conflict is not as homogenous as might

appear. Adversaries wage conflicts within a larger social context. Intermediary

efforts can be initiated with subgroups.

Conflicts are waged by a mixture of coercive and noncoercive inducements.

Recent global developments, including the end of the Cold War, the impact of

technology on war-making and the role of non-state transnational actors, have changed

the nature of CR applications.

Collective engagement by outside parties which are seen to be legitimate is

crucial in averting destructive conflicts.

Multilateral agreements to reduce the availability of weapons to groups who

might use them in societal or international wars are important. Governments‘

unwillingness to sign such agreements should be addressed.

Acts by leaders of one side directed at leaders of the other side are particularly

important in the context of rapidly increasing channels of mass and

interpersonal communication.

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Attention should be paid to this new information and a high priority given to

responding to it.

To bring a destructive conflict to an agreed end, the adversaries need to believe

that peace will offer more than war.

Institutions and the rule of law are needed to implement and sustain

agreements.

Kriesberg, L., 2007, 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications' in Crocker, C.,

Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in

a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 455-476

Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies

J Lederarch (1997)

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Summary

How can peacebuilding adapt to the realities and dilemmas posed by contemporary

conflicts? This United States Institute of Peace Press article argues that building peace

requires a comprehensive approach. It provides strategic and practical approaches to

peacebuilding that help establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation and

which take seriously the immediate and deep-rooted needs of divided societies.

Peacebuilding faces systemic issues of how to deal with the production, transfer, and

ready availability of weapons for war making, which fuel and make possible an

extraordinary level of armed violence. For the most part, these are internal conflicts,

built around identity groups and often characterised as ethnic and/or religious in

nature. These are truly deep-rooted conflicts, which for us pose two central questions:

What conceptual framework is most useful for dealing with the structural and

psychological nature of contemporary conflict? What practical approaches and

activities have the greatest potential for moving these conflicts towards peaceful

outcomes? The answer might well lie in the development of a comprehensive,

integrative, and strategic approach to the transformation of conflict.

This approach is built on a conceptual framework composed of an

interdependent set of perspectives and activities identified as structure, process,

reconciliation, resources and coordination.

Structure is concerned with the systemic elements of how one approaches a

setting of protracted conflict.

Process brings into focus the long-term nature of the progression of conflict.

Reconciliation stresses that relationship, in its full range of psychological

dimensions, is central to transformation.

Resource focuses on the fact that although financial support is necessary, more

important is the development of new ways of thinking about categories,

responsibilities, and strategic commitment to peacebuilding.

Coordination emphasises the need to have specific mechanisms whereby the

above four components can intersect, interact, and cross-fertilise.

Several basics proposals lie at the heart of the framework and argument presented here:

The nature of contemporary conflict requires the development of theories and

praxis of the ‗middle ranges‘. Middle-range actors have the capacity to impact

processes and people at both the top and the grassroots levels. If mobilised

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strategically for peacebuilding, middle-range leaders could lay the foundation for

long-term, sustainable conflict transformation.

There is a need for ‗subsystem‘ strategies that link immediate issues within the

setting to the broader systemic dynamics within which the particular conflict

unfolds. The systemic issues must not be ignored but we cannot tackle these macro

issues from the sanctuary of intellectual discussion and broad international policy

statements.

Reconciliation is a central component of dealing with contemporary conflict and

reconstructing divided societies. Reconciliation provides a focus and a locus

appropriate to every stage of peacebuilding and is instrumental in reframing the

conflict and the energies driving the conflict.

Innovation is needed in approaching the core nature of deep-rooted conflict in

divided societies. To rebuild relationships, we must develop innovative ways of

providing space within which the emotional and psychological aspects of the

conflict can be addressed.

Coordination must be a central component in the effective implementation of a

comprehensive peacebuilding strategy and in the building of an infrastructure for

peace. This calls for not only an understanding of the larger challenge but also an

acknowledgement of the need for a multiplicity of roles, for multiple levels of

activity, and for diverse strategies and approaches.

Source: Lederach, J.P., 1997, ‗Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided

Societies‘, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press

At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict

J Lederach

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Summary

What is the relationship between liberalisation, institution building and peace in

countries that are just emerging from civil conflict. This study, from Colorado

University, examines the theoretical foundations of peacebuilding as a way of

diagnosing the practical problems in international operations between 1989 and 1999.

The study argues that while peacebuilders should preserve the broad goal of converting

war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, peacebuilding strategies need to

build effective institutions before liberalisation takes place.

The idea of peacebuilding, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, is based on the

belief that promoting liberalisation in countries that have experienced civil war creates

the conditions for a lasting peace. Democratisation is expected to shift societal

conflicts away from the battlefield into electoral politics. Between 1989 and 1990,

fourteen major peacebuilding operations were deployed. They all sought to build

liberal market democracies as quickly as possible. In all but three cases (Angola,

Rwanda and Liberia) large scale conflict has not resumed. However, the strategy of

political and economic liberalisation has increased the likelihood of renewed violence

in several of these states.

While there is evidence that well-established market democracies are less subject to

internal violence than other types of states, it appears that the transition from civil

conflict to a well-established market democracy makes a state particularly prone to

violence. Promoting democratisation and marketisation has the potential to stimulate

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higher levels of societal competition at a time when states are least equipped to contain

such tensions within peaceful bounds.

What is needed is a new type of peacebuilding strategy that begins from the premise

that democratisation and marketisation are inherently tumultuous transformations that

have the potential to undermine a fragile peace. The new strategy would minimise the

destabilising effects of liberalisation in several ways. Peacebuilders would:

Not immediately unleash political and economic competition

Not organise quick elections or economic ‗shock therapy‘

Manage the democratisation and marketisation process as a series of

incremental and deliberate steps

Delay the introduction of democratic and market reforms until a rudimentary

network of domestic institutions has been established

Immediately start building governmental institutions that can manage the

political and economic reforms.

This strategy may appear costly, time-consuming and anti-democratic. However:

The higher expense and longer duration must be weighed against the costs in

human lives and material resources that would follow a recurrence of large-

scale violence

If the strategy appears to delay the liberalisation of political and economic life,

it will achieve more durable peace in the long term

Implementing liberalisation too quickly, in the absence of effect institutions,

can counteract efforts to consolidate peace.

Source: Paris, R., 2004, ‗At War‘s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict‘,

Cambridge University Press, chapters 1 (pp. 13-39), 2 (pp. 40-51), 9 (pp. 151-178),

and 10 (pp. 179-211)

Constructing Sovereignty for Security

B Rubin (2005)

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Summary

Fragmentation and rivalry in the donor community constitutes as big an obstacle to

peacebuilding as divisions in war-torn countries. Would the creation of a multilateral

decision-making body as a counterpart for governments receiving aid help

international state-building efforts? This paper from the International Institute for

Strategic Studies supports the establishment of an inter-governmental Peacebuilding

Commission to oversee UN operations to rebuild states after conflict. This would

provide a useful institutional framework and deliver aid in ways that are accountable to

the global community and to reconstructed countries‘ citizens.

For centuries, stronger powers have intervened to establish politically acceptable forms

of order. The generalisation of the sovereign nation-state and the UN system has

altered the environment for latter-day state builders. While they may have differing

motivations, all face the problem of maintaining order and security in an increasingly

integrated global system. Operations must provide aid, war fighting, peacekeeping,

economic and democratic assistance, often without a coherent strategy. The

Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the UN Secretary-General‘s High-Level Panel

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on Threats, Challenges and Change would exercise authority over a Peacebuilding

Fund. This would be kept replenished in advance of operations and contain

unearmarked contributions. A Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN secretariat

would support the commission.

State formation consists of the interdependent mobilisation of three types of resources:

Coercion: The sovereign wields coercion, hopefully in the form of security

institutions, to exercise force over a territory. Key tasks in rebuilding a state

include dismantling irregular militias and building new security forces to enable

the state to exercise that coercion.

Capital: The acumulation of capital is needed to produce income to fund state

functions and services. Economic development, capital accumulation, revenue

collection and the suppression of untaxable, parallel economies all require

effective security forces. Strengthening fiscal capacity and protecting property

rights are also important.

Legitimacy: Symbolic and cultural resources legitimise the use of force and

induce people to comply voluntarily as citizens. State building operations aim to

make states more effective agents of control over their own territories. The

problem of ‗dual legitimacy‘ refers to whether this control is exercised by states

as sovereigns, or whether it is the result of external interests.

Implications relate to the politics of state-building:

Studies of state-building operations often try to identify ‗best practices‘ without

asking for whom they are best. Nonetheless, where goals are interdependent,

negotiation may lead to convergence among actors with different motivations.

The concepts of ‗exit strategy‘ and ‗sustainability‘ may converge in a mission to

build a legitimate and capable state. This requires transitional governance

institutions to establish an institutional framework for political contestation and

rule.

The Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office and

Peacebuilding Fund proposed by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges

and Change would provide such a framework.

The commission and Peace Building Support Office will also have to develop

appropriate strategic and operational doctrines for post-conflict state-building.

If donors and troop contributors treat the Peacebuilding Commission as just

another avenue for aid, it will not serve its purpose. Donor countries will better

serve their own needs by giving aid in ways that are more accountable to the

global community and the reconstructed country‘s citizens.

Source: Rubin, B.R., 2005, 'Constructing Sovereignty for Security', Survival, 47(4), pp.

93-106, Routledge, London

Reconstruction as Modernization: The Post-conflict Project in Afghanistan

A Suhrke (2007)

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Summary

How successful has the recent post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan been in the light

of historical experiences of similar reforms? This Third World Quarterly article argues

that the conflation of post war reconstruction with a broader agenda for development

and modernisation has brought out a wide range of tensions associated with social

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change. The entire project shows signs of severe contradictions that are adding to the

problems caused by the growing insurgency.

The framework for the post-Taliban reconstruction project was laid down in the UN-

sponsored Bonn Agreement of December 2001. The document contained all the main

elements of modernity as commonly understood – from the Weberian-type state to

more recent additions of social justice and women‘s rights.

Previous reform attempts had several implications for this new reconstruction project.

King Amanullah‘s reforms in the 1920s showed the importance of not overloading the

modernist agenda in relation to the coalition carrying it. President Daoud‘s reforms in

the seventies showed the importance of not excluding potential rebels from the

political arena. Finally, the experience of the People‘s Democratic Party of

Afghanistan (PDPA) from 1978 showed that foreign forces should not be allowed to

lead the war against a militant opposition.

These lessons seem to be casting a growing shadow over the present reconstruction-

cum-modernisation project:

The transnational modernising coalition is divided by different interests,

priorities and conflicting principles of legitimacy. It has a narrow Afghan base,

and the international component is huge and unwieldy (with some 60 countries

providing foreign aid, and 37 governments assisting in some military capacity

or other).

Among the Afghans several foci of contestation emerged. The most

fundamental challenge came from the militant Islamists – the Taliban and their

supporters – who opposed the entire project.

Another set of conflicts centred on the state-building agenda, which called for

change with respect to key areas of state power: revenue collection, the armed

forces, public administration and control over the illegal opium economy.

The reform agenda also raised hopes and fears, expectation and resistance in the

social and legal arena. Different visions of the good society collided and merged

with deep-seated power struggles, with women and social mores appearing as

emblematic issues.

Resistance to the Western-backed modernisation project could mobilise political

support by drawing on the discontent generated by the failure of the post war

project to bring rapid peace, order and prosperity.

How does the present modernisation project score in relation to the lessons from

previous modernisers?

Amanullah‘s experience has been forgotten as the present ambitious agenda

stands in sharp contrast to the fractious coalition on which it rests. The most

obvious result is a highly conflictual policy process with limited results.

The government has been more attentive to the lesson from Daoud. However,

the more President Karzai tried to co-opt potential rivals in the state

administration, the more he alienated members of his modernist coalition, who

advocated Weberian merit-based criteria for appointment.

In its most radical form, an inclusive policy would mean trying to strike a deal

with the Taliban. This has been impossible because the government, like the

PDPA before it, could not prevent foreign forces from fighting a war on Afghan

soil. The Taliban and al-Qaida are the enemy in a larger US-led war on terror,

and Washington has refused to negotiate.

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Source: Suhrke, A., 2007, 'Reconstruction as Modernization: The Post-conflict Project

in Afghanistan?, Third World Quarterly, 28:7, pp. 1291-1308

Supplementary readings

The Coherence of Democratic Peace-building

P Burnell (2006)

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Abstract

Recent attention has focused on the difficulties of establishing ‗coherence‘ between

humanitarian relief aid in complex emergencies and the objective of ending violent

conflict. This paper introduces a parallel problem: absence of total synergy between

making peace and building democracy. A widely held assumption in the international

community is that in post-conflict situations peace-building and democratization are

virtually synonymous; creating the conditions for the one does so for both, the two

processes will be reciprocal and mutually supportive. This suggests the policy issues

will be simple. But the reality could be very different. Choices have to be addressed

between requisites for peace and conditions for democracy; over the different

implications for peace of competing designs for democracy; and over the kind of

‗democracy‘ and its relation to other essential developments like state-building.

Source: Burnell, P., 2006, ‗The Coherence of Democratic Peace-building‘, Research

Paper No. 2006/147, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER.

Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the ‘Post-Conflict’

Challenge in Afghanistan

C Cramer and J Goodhand (2002)

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Summary

Peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan require a significant expansion of

institutionalised economic interdependence. This must build on existing patterns of

interdependence, despite these being forged in a war economy. The article argues that

an effective, centralised state, with a clear monopoly of violence, is necessary. This

argument challenges standard international policy paradigms of reconstruction and

points to an alternative basis for international engagement in Afghanistan.

The article is part of a special issue of the journal Development and Change, entitled

State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. Engaging the dynamics of war economies

is an important part of post-conflict reconstruction. There is a common belief that in

modern post-conflict situations appropriate economic development policies can

consolidate peace, based in part on the enhanced economic interdependence amongst

states in Europe after World War II. Underlying issues of structural change and capital

accumulation are often neglected, although war is the most common form of

contemporary capital accumulation: a centralised state is required to protect the poor

and structurally transform this primitive form of accumulation. While liberal

interpretations of war assume that its effects are always negative, other alternatives

emphasise the vibrancy of wartime entrepreneurship and spawning of new economic

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sectors. In analysing contemporary conflict, it is useful to remember that state

formation in Europe involved periods of protracted violence.

The article explores the role of centralised authority and state in the history of

Afghanistan, from the tribal confederacy of 1747 to present day, including the

incorporation of parts of Afghanistan in a ‗regional conflict complex‘: three themes

stand out:

The history of statehood reveals a non-linear trajectory of ‗punctuated

equilibrium‘.

Various state-builders have failed to sustain a monopoly of violence, to develop

wealth and welfare, to develop forms of representation and to develop

legitimacy (whether through tribalism, Islam or nationalism).

International aid has played an ambiguous or detrimental role with respect to

Afghan state formation.

The article appeals to international interveners to reflect on the history of state

formation in Afghanistan to avoid actions that lead to the repetition of existing

patterns:

A minimal liberal state is an inappropriate model, as is the common

compromise policy of promoting decentralised local governance structures.

The creation of a centralised, credible and effective state in Afghanistan is a

political, not a technical or capacity-building activity. The state must have

control over violence, and be able to make fiscal, regulatory and allocation

decisions.

Governance institutions must reflect and manage conflicting Afghan political

incentives. Political legitimacy is crucial: a key source of this is economic

growth, through an institutionalised expansion of economic interdependence.

A new role for the international community as international guarantor for the

Afghan state in the context of regionalised conflict, via strong United States

backing for the United Nations.

International aid must avoid discouraging the establishment of reciprocal

relations between the new state and its various interest groups.

Source: Cramer, C. and Goodhand, J., 2002, 'Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War,

the State and the "Post-Conflict" Challenge in Afghanistan', Development and Change,

vol. 33, no. 5, pp.885-909.

Transitional Governance: From Bullets to Ballots

DeGrasse, B.C., and C. Caan (2006)

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Abstract

Effective transitional governance is one of the most formidable challenges facing

reconstruction and stabilization missions in war-torn, failed states. Peace can be

sustained only when power is attained through political rather than violent means and

when government institutions are legitimate. Despite numerous interventions around

the world, establishing governance has too often been an elusive goal or an ephemeral

achievement. Attaining this objective can involve prolonging the intervention, as was

done in Bosnia, or repeating the intervention, as was done in Haiti. When the objective

to establish governance fails, the entire mission may collapse, as it did in Somalia. By

attending to the governance lessons from the past decade and a half, intervenors can

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identify and incorporate best practices into the planning and conduct of interventions to

help societies move from bullets to ballots effectively and expeditiously.

Source: DeGrasse, B.C., and C. Caan., 2006, Transitional Governance: From Bullets to

Ballots, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C

The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace

M Doyle (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This article focuses on the strategies adopted by the United Nations (UN) in order to

achieve its success in building peace. The strategies include peacemaking,

peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. The policy of multilateralism

adopted by the UN also contributes significantly to its success in fostering self-

sustaining peace. It is to be noted that the above-mentioned strategies reinforce the

other in a successful combination.

Source: Doyle, M.W., 2007, ‗The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace‘, Global

Governance, 13 #1, pp. 1-15

Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building

A Ghani, C. Lockhart and M. Carnahan (2005)

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Abstract

The first section of this paper delineates a framework which proposes a set of core

functions that a sovereign state must perform in the modern world. This functional

delineation provides a framework for the calculation of a sovereignty index through

which the sovereignty gap can be measured in a tractable fashion. Once this more

quantitative framework is in place, the progress of or decline in state capabilities to

perform each function severally as well as collectively can be assessed. Moreover, the

index would also allow an overall assessment to be made of whether the multiplicity of

interventions by a wide array of international actors is closing or widening the

sovereignty gap.

The second section of the paper outlines some of the constraints that exist in the

current international system. Mindful of these constraints, the paper then proposes a

reorientation of the international community‘s approach to fragile states through the

introduction of state-building or sovereignty strategies.

Source: Ghani, A., C. Lockhart, and M. Carnahan, 2005, ‗Closing the Sovereignty

Gap: an Approach to State-Building‘, Working Paper 253, Overseas Development

Institute, London

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The International Community and State Reconstruction in War-torn Societies

R Luckham (2004)

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Summary

What are the problems of state-reconstruction in war-torn societies? This paper from

the Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, examines the role of international

actors in the hugely ambitious project of rebuilding states after war.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, political stabilisation of the developing world has

become a security issue for Western Countries. Donors are now adopting more

interventionist policies towards state reconstruction. War is endemic in the developing

world. The roots of many conflicts go back decades, and there is a tendency for them

to re-ignite or perpetuate themselves over the long term.

"New" wars are more destructive to development and result in more civilian casualties

than previous Cold War conflicts. State collapse leads to a governance void, "the rule

of unlaw", and "societies of fear". This makes it difficult to reconstruct the state or

build peace. The traditional linear model of conflict progression as pre-, during, and

post-conflict, with attendant progression from relief to reconstruction and

development, is too simplistic. In reality, conflicts are more complex:

The role of the state varies enormously. Conflicts can be in response to

repressive regimes (Sudan), democratic governments that exclude minorities

(Sri Lanka), or be regional violence that infects "good" governments (Caucasus,

African Great Lakes).

Governance breakdown can be a result of conflict (DRC), or a cause of conflict

(Somalia).

Most conflicts do not "end". The political, social, and economic factors

sustaining them remain. Violence often continues after ceasefire in the form of

crime.

Governance failings contribute to violence. War, and its legacies, creates new political

realities. Reconstruction cannot therefore be a reconstitution of the state in its pre-

conflict form. Donors need to engage with different layers of political authority above

and below the state as well as rebuild central government. All forms of intervention

need continual interrogation of underlying moral and political principles. The

international community must also learn from previous errors. Furthermore:

Multilateral interventions are less likely to serve special interests than unilateral

ones, and are more likely to be perceived as legitimate.

If unilateral interventions are undertaken, they must be defensible on general

principles, and enjoy the consent of national stakeholders.

Peace agreements, reconstruction plans and constitutions need to emerge from

national stakeholders, not imposed by external actors. Peacemakers impose

plans surprisingly often.

There needs to be a better understanding of the trajectories, causes and impacts

of conflict, and an awareness of how they might re-ignite.

It is very difficult to devise broadly applicable good practice models. Rather,

there tend to be difficult choices to be made between potentially conflicting

goals. For example, security first versus popular consent and electoral

legitimacy.

Further choices include development and global justice versus global security

concerns or power sharing versus an effective developmental state.

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Such choices are as much political as technical options, and have to be

negotiated in each particular national context.

Source: Luckham, R., 2004, 'The International Community and State Reconstruction in

War-torn Societies', Chapter 1 in After Intervention: Public Security Management in

Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, Geneva

Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in

Afghanistan

H Nixon (2007)

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Summary

How can a sustainable, legitimate and effective state be established in Afghanistan?

As it moves from a transitional framework to a longer-term development framework,

insurgency, opium and popular discontent threaten to undermine progress and further

destabilise the country. This paper from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

(AREU) argues that while these threats require short-term action, sustainable solutions

depend on improved governance, which in turn requires realistic statebuilding goals.

Aid dependence, donor-driven assistance, limited state control over resources and

budget assistance all present difficulties for statebuilding in Afghanistan.

Statebuilding invlolves a transition from working around the weak state to working

with and through it as it strengthens. It requires taking decisions about collective goals

and must be led by the recipient society itself to be effective. Statebuilding also

requires managing the complex relationship between assistance and long-term

measures on one hand, and aid dependency and short-term measures on the other - the

‗statebuilding paradox‘. The relative failure to date of governance programmes to

strengthen and improve the capacity of the state is in part due to conflicts between

short-term political agendas and long-term statebuilding processes.

The relationship between statebuilding and international assistance in Afghanistan is

affected by the quantity, delivery and effectiveness of aid:

Aid quantity and direction has been largely determined outside Afghanistan,

limiting the country‘s ability to set priorities and weakening accountability and

incentives to reform.

The bulk of assistance has been delivered outside government control, through

the External Budget. Channelling more money through the Afghan treasury (the

Core Budget) would enable more effective accounting, co-ordination and

spending prioritisation.

Low and uneven government spending has resulted from planning and

implementation difficulties, overestimation and aid bottlenecks. Channelling

development money through the Core Budget presents the risk of unspent funds.

Unclear, inefficient and harmful External Budget assistance weakens the state‘s

capacity to retain qualified personnel and dilutes upwards and downwards

accountability.

Statebuilding assistance has further suffered from early reliance on pillars in

security sector reform, slow progress in public administration reforms,

inadequate subnational spending and conflicting short-term political and long-

term statebuilding agendas.

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Whilst the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and the

Afghanistan Compact represent an important shift toward a comprehensive and

strategic approach to security, development and governance, important issues still

require attention:

Strategies should be aligned with a realistic long-term state building agenda

incorporating more concern for fiscal sustainability and the interactions between

short- and long-term measures.

Actors should seek an appropriate and aligned balance of Core and External

Budget resources for public goods and service provision.

They should improve efforts to locate, build and transfer human capacity and

improve social accountability.

The Afghan government should prioritise the development of the full ANDS,

using the development of sector strategies as an anchor for this process.

The government should elaborate the sub-national governance strategy and

strengthen communication strategies within the state and between the state and

citizens.

Donors should increase Core Budget support, contribute to state capacity

development, improve External Budget by identifying the most effective

mechanisms and improve reporting. They should also explore ways to increase

multi-year commitments, both by examining their own procedures and using

multi-lateral channels.

Nixon, H., 2007, 'Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding

Paradox in Afghanistan', AREU Briefing Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation

Unit, Afghanistan.

Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States

M Ottaway (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Is institution building the best way of reconstructing collapsed states? What can be

done to avert failure in reconstruction efforts? This paper by the Democracy and Rule

of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace critiques the model of

state reconstruction currently adopted by the international community.

Multilateral organisations and bilateral donors have embraced an unprecedented

approach to collapsed states. Historically, such states simply disappeared through

conquest or dissolution. Now, war-torn states are expected to be rebuilt as functioning,

strong democracies within the same international borders through the intervention of

the international community. This external model of reconstruction rests on building

institutions which promote stability through checking the exercise of power. It is

contrasted with an internal model, where domestic actors produce change and which

hinges on re-establishing power.

External reconstruction is an attempted short-cut to democracy. Internal reconstruction

is closer to a historical process. It has no blueprint, and is less researched. Some

weaknesses of institution building for reconstruction are:

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The issue of power is unresolved. Newly developed institutions do not generate

authority and cannot curb the power of political factions. Elections achieve little

against entrenched power.

In practice donors are setting up organisations, not institutions. The usual targets

of donor efforts (parliament, judiciary, electoral bodies and so on) need setting

up afresh, and are not socially embedded.

Donors think in terms of transplanting best practices, not in terms of finding

solutions to locally perceived problems.

Institution building is usually undertaken prematurely. Donor requirements for

new institutions can be too demanding.

External actors often withdraw their power too soon. This removes the support

that buttresses fledgling institutions, resulting in failure.

Institutional solutions fail easily when countries are in the initial stages of emerging

from conflict. Donors must be prepared to make huge, sustained commitments backed

up by the threat of force to coerce factions to accept imposed best practices (Bosnia,

Kosovo). Neglect is a false economy, and will eventually cost the population (Rwanda)

or the international community (Somalia). Institution building is a good mechanism for

ensuring long term stability, and can work if donors:

Create mechanisms for generating power and authority before they begin to

build institutions. The use of force always plays a role in the restoration of

authority in collapsed states.

Set modest targets to avoid weakening fragile states by demanding too much too

soon.

Do not promote best practices prematurely, because they can become obstacles

to politically viable solutions.

Are careful not to encourage the institutionalisation of transitional, emergency

practices, as has happened in Rwanda with popular courts.

Source: Ottaway, M., 2002, ‗Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States‘,

Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 5

Short-term and Long-term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations

N Sambanis (2007)

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Abstract

Earlier studies have shown that United Nations peace operations make a positive

contribution to peacebuilding efforts after civil wars. But do these effects carry over to

the period after the peacekeepers leave? And how do the effects of UN peace

operations interact with other determinants of peacebuilding in the long run? The

author addresses these questions using a revised version of the Doyle and Sambanis

dataset and applying different estimation methods to estimate the short-term and long-

term effects of UN peace missions. He finds that UN missions have robust, positive

effects on peacebuilding in the short term. UN missions can help parties implement

peace agreements but the UN cannot fight wars, and UN operations contribute more to

the quality of the peace where peace is based on participation, than to the longevity of

the peace, where peace is simply the absence of war. The effects of UN missions are

also felt in the long run, but they dissipate over time. What is missing in UN

peacebuilding is a strategy to foster the self-sustaining economic growth that could

connect increased participation with sustainable peace.

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Source: Sambanis, N. 2007. The Long- and Short-term Effects of UN Peace

Operations. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Washington

The Logic of Conflictual Peacebuilding

A Suhrke (2005)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

What have been the experiences and lessons learned from reconstruction activities

which have followed wars over the past ten years? With recent events both in

Afghanistan and Iraq and frequent talk of on-going conflicts, this question has

preoccupied politicians, aid donors and the media as never before. After the Conflict

draws together the main issues and arguments on the subject into a single volume

emanating from the University of York's Post-war Reconstruction and Development

Unit (PRDU), renowned as the world's leading research center dedicated to the study

of the aftermath of war. Examining case studies from war and post-war reconstruction

scenarios around the world the book sets out a philosophy of reconstruction that has

emerged from extensive original research at PRDU, showing that solutions to

successful post-war reconstruction must be found locally, within the communities

affected by conflict rather than being imposed from outside, however well-meaning the

interventions. Other key insights include the need to understand the root causes of

different conflicts and the importance of fully integrated approaches, which harness the

skills of a broad range of professional disciplines. After the Conflict will prove an

invaluable resource for students of post-war recovery, conflict studies, development

economics as well as to academics, practitioners, aid managers and policy makers.

Source: Suhrke, A. and Strand, A, 2005, ‗The Logic of Conflictual Peacebuilding.‘ In

Sultan Barakat, ed.: After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the

Aftermath of War. London/N.Y.: I.B. Tauris pp. 141-154.

Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation

S Woodward (2002)

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Abstract

As a sub-field of conflict resolution, peace implementation has been more practiced

than studied. Unlike either conflict mediation or long-term peacebuilding, very little

analytical reflection has been devoted to the immediate challenges of implementing

peace agreements once they are concluded. Too often, those responsible for translating

these accords into meaningful action have had to proceed quickly, without either an

accurate map of the hazards of the war-torn terrain in which they find themselves or a

reliable plan for managing challenges when they do arise. At the most elementary

level, what has been missing is clear knowledge of those factors that make the

difference between successful peace implementation and failure, between the

assurance of peace and the resumption of

war.

That such analysis is needed, and needed urgently, becomes clear in surveying the

experience of the 1990s. In Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, and twice in

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Angola, the failure to get warring parties to live up to their peace agreements not only

restarted armed conflict, it also escalated the violence. The breakdown of the 1994

Arusha Accords in Rwanda led to a genocide of some 800,000 people: approximately

fifty times more deaths than had occurred in the 1990-1993 civil war. As all of these

tragedies suggest, the period immediately after the signing of a peace agreement is

arguably the time of greatest uncertainty and danger. It is also the time when most

peace

agreements fail. Improving our knowledge of the specific challenges of peace

implementation might help to improve the odds of success.

Source: Woodward, S.L. 2002, Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation. IPA

Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, International Peace Academy, New

York

Why State-building?

S Woodward (2006)

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Abstract

This workshop convened a group of scholars and policy practitioners to discuss Susan

L. Woodward's paper, ―Why State-Building?‖ Her argument is that the study and

practice of post-conflict reconstruction lacks consensus on the substance of what is

meant by the ―state.‖ This lack of a common concept of the state makes operations

more difficult. Particularly now, as an organizational basis for coordinated action

(such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission) is being developed, a common conceptual

and analytical framework is needed in order to define the core elements of state-

building and set priorities for policy implementation

Source: Woodward, S.L., 2006, Why State-building?: A report on the workshop held at

the Graduate Center, City University of New York, March 13.

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3. Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning

Core readings

Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations

U Kievelitz and T Schaef (2004)

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Summary

How can post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs) be enhanced? Generally, PCNAs

are jointly carried out by the UN and the World Bank, sometimes in conjunction with

other key donor agencies. This guide aims to support current efforts among these

agencies to further enhance their engagement in the PCNA by learning from available

experience. It draws strongly on material from recent needs assessments in Timor-

Leste, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Liberia.

Over the last decade, donors have attributed increasing importance to providing timely

and substantive support to post-conflict recovery and peace building. A large part of

this assistance is mobilised via international reconstruction conferences, at which

donors make pledges based on an overall assessment of post-conflict recovery needs.

Thus, the post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) has recently become a key entry

point for conceptualising, negotiating and financing post-conflict recovery strategies.

PCNAs are complex multi-stakeholder processes, which routinely take place under

extreme time constraints.

This guide treats the PCNA both as a methodology and a process:

As a methodology, the PCNA involves the technical assessment of recovery

needs and development of a post-conflict transition strategy.

As a process of consultation, negotiation and analysis, the PCNA provides a

platform for national and international actors to agree on joint priorities, define

their commitments and prepare their activities.

This guide aims to help make PCNAs more effective by systematising the analysis and

suggesting more efficient processes. In particular, it contributes to:

The definition of common minimum standards regarding quality, reliability and

inclusiveness of the assessment.

A fast-track professional response by the international community when

recovery planning becomes feasible.

Lowering the costs of PCNAs by promoting systematisation and

standardisation.

In terms of value added, the following results and impacts can be expected from a

PCNA of the type proposed in this guide:

Provides donors, national authorities, and non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and other stakeholders, with a comprehensive and fairly objective

estimate of needs.

High international visibility resulting in more substantial financial pledges for

recovery and reconstruction.

International consensus on recovery priorities leading to less program overlap

and more coherence between donors.

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Early focus on the roots of the conflict and measures to help overcome them in

the context of recovery and reconstruction.

Increased political momentum and support for the peace process and increased

legitimacy of the national authorities (conflict parties).

Establishment of a conceptual basis for an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy

Paper (I-PRSP), as well as World Bank and UN country strategies.

Source: UNDP, 2004, 'Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-

Conflict Situations', a joint project of the United Nations Development Program, the

World Bank, and United Nations Development Group, New York

Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act Together

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004)

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Summary

The term peacebuilding entered the international vocabulary in 1992 through the UN

Agenda for Peace. Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the

conditions, attitudes and behaviour that foster and sustain social and economic

development that is peaceful, stable and prosperous. This Utstein study of

peacebuilding was commissioned by the development ministers of Germany, the

Netherlands, Norway and the UK. It aims to improve the implementation of existing

policy. The empirical basis of this joint study is an illustrative survey of 336

peacebuilding projects implemented by the four original Utstein governments. In

addition to the survey the report contains studies of the peacebuilding policy and

activities of each country.

Peacebuilding uses a wide range of policy instruments, and peacebuilding activities fall

under four main headings. There are those which provide security, establish the socio-

economic foundations of long-term peace, establish the political framework of long-

term peace, and those which generate reconciliation. The Utstein governments have

learnt important lessons. For example, that peacebuilding must be responsive to

context and need and must be sustained for the long term. There has also been

recognition of a major need for coordination within and between governments and with

IGOs and NGOs. However, there are major strategic deficits in the peacebuilding

efforts of the four Utstein governments. In particular:

More than 55 per cent of the projects do not show any link to a broader strategy

for the country in which they are implemented.

Planning is based on relatively little analysis and there are important conceptual

confusions and uncertainties.

There are problems concerning the timing of financial flows and the unwanted

effects of the influx of resources into war-torn countries.

There is no known way of reliably assessing the impact of peacebuilding

projects.

Recommendations to correct the strategic deficit fall into three categories; policy

recommendations, evaluation recommendations and research recommendations:

Two strategic frameworks need to be adopted: one to assist in formulating

specific peacebuilding intervention strategies when the need arises; the other to

assist in formulating a general peacebuilding strategy for donors.

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Intervention strategies must be owned by those who implement them and the

regional context must also be incorporated.

Impact assessment should be shifted from the project level to the strategic level.

This will require a clear distinction between project outputs and impacts.

The evaluation community should discuss organising and coding project

archives.

Increased emphasis should be placed on joint evaluations by a group of donors

to promote strategic coordination and knowledge sharing.

More research is needed to find out how to correct the strategic deficit.

Source; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Towards a Strategic

Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act Together, Overview report of the Joint

Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda: The International Community

in Rwanda After the Genocide

P Uvin (2001)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Rwanda has emerged as one of the countries where the new post-conflict agenda is

being most strongly implemented, under extremely difficult conditions. This agenda

poses many deep, and unsolved, ethical questions for donors. This paper from Tufts

University analyses donor behaviour in relation to government and justice in Rwanda

and identifies the key problems associated with the new approach. It calls for greater

promotion of local dialogue and increased clarity and transparency in donor

engagement.

In recent years, international donors have begun to codify and implement a new post-

conflict agenda based on using aid to promote peace and reconciliation. Donors are

becoming deeply engaged in political and social matters that they have avoided until

now. Post-genocide Rwanda is one of the strongest examples of this trend. The work of

international donors has produced some significant achievements, but it has also raised

many unresolved ethical questions. As donors move towards the use of aid for conflict

prevention in general, these questions will have wider relevance.

Official policy documents do not acknowledge the major ethical questions raised by

this new agenda. They have hardly been discussed, and there are no tools available for

solving them.

Donors may and do differ radically in their assessments of the situation in a

country, and of the way to move forward.

When donor objectives and principles differ, who makes the choices about what

actions to prioritise and on what grounds?

The new agenda includes issues which are highly politically sensitive. Donors

are in a position to make life and death decisions with a high likelihood of error,

without the participation of those affected by the consequences.

When internal or local solutions emerge, they often do not conform to Western

ethical ideals or international legal principles. What are the criteria for judging

them?

182

Donors can only control the form, but not the substance of the institutions they

help build. The latter depends on deep, locally owned social and political

dynamics.

No matter how conscious donors are of the need to involve all groups and

segments of society in the dynamics of peace and reconciliation, in practice they

do not manage it.

The ethical and strategic challenges encountered in finding post-conflict solutions are

the extreme versions of those associated with all development aid. The difficult and

dangerous choices associated with this work must be recognised, and the process by

which they are made must be reformed.

In the short-term, donors must give more priority to promoting local dialogues,

listening to broad sections of people, stimulating local knowledge generation

and research, and finding means of making people's voices heard by those in

power.

There is significant room for increased clarity and transparency. DFID's

Principles for a New Humanitarianism are a good example of appropriate

guidelines.

In the longer term, the terms of engagement, both ideological and procedural,

between those in rich countries seeking social change and those in whose name

this change is sought must be rethought.

This must include a privileging of justice, dignity and empowerment

considerations at all times, as well as the creation of the same sorts of

accountability that donors are subject to at home.

Uvin, P., 2001, 'Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda: The International

Community in Rwanda After the Genocide', Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2

Supplementary readings

A Framework for Success – International Interventions in Countries Emerging

from Conflict

D Serwer and P Thomson (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its

aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of

course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has

become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in

Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United

Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defence and security organizations such as

NATO and the OSCE.

At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation,

weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to

threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are

traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement

still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts

and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our

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institutions—be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or

NGOs—capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these

questions are addressed in this new volume.

Source: Serwer, D., and P. Thomson. 2007. ‗A Framework for Success – International

Interventions in Countries Emerging from Conflict.‘ In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler

Hampson, and Pemela All (eds). Leashing the dogs of war: conflict management in a

divided world. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 369-387.

The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

E Zuckerman and M Greenberg (2006)

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Summary

Why do post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) programmes need to address gender

relations and equality? How can gender be ‗mainstreamed‘ in PCR interventions? This

draft conference paper by Gender Action considers gender, particularly the needs of

women, in post-conflict situations. PCR programmes commonly fail to recognise and

address gender issues. Investing in women and promoting gender equality are

necessary both for maintaining peace and achieving sustainable development.

Substantial research and activism on women‘s needs and participation in peace

negotiations followed the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women. United Nations

Security Resolution 1325 of October 2000 reinforced women‘s roles in defining peace

terms and peacemaking. However, there has been less focus on gender equality in

PCR. Donors and their partners in PCR often inadvertently reinforce gender

discrimination and disparities. This has negative impacts on the well being of women

and their families, on economic growth, and on opportunities for positive development.

Examples include:

Often only men are seen as ex-combatants and women who have also fought are

denied access to reintegration programmes

Employment training projects target male ex-combatants, even though in post-

conflict situations women are often household heads. The ―informal‖ and

―invisible‖ sectors are often ignored, as are issues such as childcare, family

responsibilities and cultural practices affecting women‘s participation

Conflict accelerates male rural-to-urban migration but agriculture programmes

tend to focus on male ex-combatants rather than women

PCR often fails to recognise and address violence against women within

households in post-conflict situations

International financial institutions frequently fail to take account of the gender

impacts of macroeconomic policies

Promotion of gender equality is important in any development intervention, but

essential in PCR. It must be undertaken in addition to ―women‘s projects‖ that focus

on women but do not change the society in which they live. The challenge is not

merely to empower women, but to engage all of society, including elder male leaders

and young men, to accept gender equality norms.

Recommendations are:

Careful gender analyses must be integrated into PCR, rather than simply being

‗added on‘ to development plans and projects

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Every post-conflict policy, program, and project design, implementation and

monitoring and evaluation must analyse and address gender issues, intervention

opportunities and gender derived benefits and costs

All social and economic data must be sex-disaggregated

Women and men should jointly make macroeconomic resource allocation

decisions

Critical numbers of women must be equal partners with men in the peace-

making process and in post-conflict decision-making. Male gender advocates

are also essential. Information about women‘s rights and gender equality needs

to be disseminated widely

Gender training is needed for women and men alike.

Source: Zuckerman, E., 2006, 'The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict

Reconstruction', UNU-WIDER Research Paper no 2006/62, United Nations

University, Helsinki

Review of the UK Government Approach to Peacebuilding

S Lawry-White (2003)

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Summary

What progress has the UK Government made on conflict reduction and conflict

prevention strategies since 1997? This paper, commissioned by the UK Department for

International Development (DFID), provides an overview of the UK Government‘s

approach to peacebuilding. It aims to provide implementation guidelines for what

works and what does not work in peacebuilding. It summarises government conflict

reduction and prevention strategy since 1997, and describes underlying principles and

the main strategies and mechanisms in use.

The UK‘s approach to conflict prevention appears to be based on the following

underlying principles:

There is a negative correlation between violent conflict and sustainable

development.

Personal safety is a precursor to development.

Democratic and representative systems of government and a rights based

society are necessary conditions for conflict prevention.

Coordinated interventions are required at multiple levels – from

intergovernmental to grass roots – and with a key role for the United Nations

(UN).

Delivery of UK conflict prevention goals relies on partnership with a variety of

institutions.

Front-loading of post-conflict investments reduces the chances of conflict

recurring.

Although the UK recognises a wide variety of security, political and social initiatives

that can contribute to conflict prevention, in practice UK interventions are governed by

a limited set of strategies. The three main strategies include:

Improving governance, which is seen as an overarching issue.

Related security sector reform initiatives; demobilisation, disarmament and

reintegration; defence diplomacy; small arms and light weapons reductions; and

humanitarian mine action.

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Peace processes.

Secondary strategies include establishing independent media, making the

international system more effective at improving conflicts, improving the role of

international business and international financial institutions and addressing

wars of abundance fuelled by the illegal exploitation of resources.

The paper highlights the following points about UK peacebuilding efforts:

The Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department was established in 1997 and

has spearheaded DFID‘s conflict related strategy and programming. Conflict

analyses is now being mainstreamed into DFID geographic departments and

country programmes.

The UK government recognises that each conflict is unique and DFID has

developed a Conflict Assessment Methodology, which has now been applied to

ten conflict situations.

The Conflict Prevention Unit was expanded in 2002 in order to enhance conflict

prevention resource management and to assist in the mainstreaming of conflict

prevention into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The Africa Conflict Unit in DFID has doubled its personnel over the past three

years, partly in order to support activities under the Africa Conflict Prevention

Pool (ACPP).

Security and reconciliation activities make clear links to peacebuilding.

However, investments in post-conflict socio-economic and reconstruction

projects typically record no peacebuilding intent. As a result, they are unlikely

to be evaluated for their peacebuilding effects.

The emphasis placed by the UK on coordination between actors and giving the

UN a central role indicates that the UK is striving to achieve horizontal

consistency between actors.

The Global Conflict Prevention Pool and ACPP have allowed the development

of more focussed thematic and geographical conflict prevention strategies, and

have fostered a degree of interdepartmental coordination that would not

otherwise have been achieved.

Source: Lawry-White, L., 2003, 'Review of the UK Government Approach to

Peacebuilding and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from UK Government Funded

Peacebuilding Projects 1997-2001', DFID, London

In Support of Peacebuilding: Strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment

UN/World Bank (2007)

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Abstract

An increasingly important element of the international community‘s engagement with

a country emerging from conflict is a joint process to assess needs and identify

priorities, used to anchor the mobilization of human and financial resources for

recovery and reconstruction. Over the last decade, donors have attributed increasing

importance to providing timely and substantive support to post-conflict recovery and

peacebuilding, and in this context Post Conflict Needs Assessments have been used by

national and international actors as an entry point for conceptualizing, negotiating and

financing a shared strategy for recovery and development in fragile, post-conflict

settings.

186

The United Nations and World Bank have undertaken a joint review of four years of

experience with Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) to identify lessons and

improve future exercises.

Source: UN/World Bank PCNA Review, 2007, ‗In Support of Peacebuilding:

Strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment‘, the United Nations and World

Bank, New York.

187

4. Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery

Core readings

Beyond the Continuum: The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises

A Harmer and J Macrae (2004)

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Summary

Until recently, assistance to countries in protracted crises was seen only in terms of

humanitarian aid. How has this changed? This review by the Overseas Development

Institute argues that there has been a shift in the linking of relief and development. It

suggests that policy has moved towards areas of shared responsibility. However, it

warns that humanitarian actors must communicate more clearly and fully the

distinctiveness of their experience in these environments and work with development

actors to explore common ground.

During the last five years, there have been strenuous efforts to improve the response to

crises. In the past, the lack of trust between the government and international

assistance actors has created difficult environments for the delivery of traditional

development assistance. However, there is a growing consensus that disengagement

from protracted crises, including conflict-affected and ‗failed‘ states, is no longer an

option. Development aid actors are no longer relying upon humanitarian aid as the

primary instrument for international aid engagement. They are expanding their

capacity to mobilise, coordinate and disburse resources, as well as set the policy

framework for interventions in protracted crises.

There is scope for much greater understanding across the humanitarian and

development communities regarding the determinants and dynamics of crisis, and how

these impact on populations and societies. However, there remains weak understanding

between the two communities with regard to their respective goals and operating

principles.

Policymakers in this area are working within complex, fluid political

frameworks. This makes formalisation of policy extremely difficult and thus

reduces the predictability of response.

The different levels of financing, co-ordination modalities and arrangements for

integration with politico-military actors reflect the high politics that lies behind

the more technical process of better ‗linking‘ humanitarian and developmental

action.

It is also difficult to trace accurately trends in funding flows, both in terms of

quantity and to determine what the money is spent on.

The current trend towards deeper engagement by the development community

in situations of protracted crisis is likely to continue.

While there has been progress in the disbursement of funds to organisations in

situations of post-conflict transition, there remain obstacles to engagement in

situations of ongoing conflict and chronic political/economic crisis.

It is likely that in situations of protracted crisis the predominant form of aid will

continue to be grants rather than loans. However, there is the potential for new actors,

in particular the World Bank, to play an increasingly assertive role in the coordination

of this aid.

188

Development strategies could be informed by the significant work that has been

done in the humanitarian sector on assessing and prioritising needs and in risk-

management in highly insecure environments.

Programming strategies for food security and broader issues of service delivery

could benefit from combined analysis of both developmental and humanitarian

perspectives.

The deepening of engagement by developmental actors in situations of

protracted crisis is coinciding with, if not being driven by, the increasing

securitisation of the aid agenda.

The nature of the development enterprise has always implied buttressing the

sovereignty of the recipient regime, as well as reflecting the strategic priorities

of donor governments.

This is in contrast to classical humanitarianism, which has sought to maintain a

position of neutrality with regard to the legitimacy or otherwise of all parties

(including the regime), and with regard to geopolitics.

Harmer, A. and Macrae, J., 2004, Chapter 1 in Beyond the Continuum: The Changing

Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises, HPG Report 18, ODI

Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges

M Lange and M Quinn (2003)

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Summary

Can the actions of Humanitarian Agencies (HA) go beyond the provision of emergency

assistance and contribute to long-term solutions? Current practice, based on reactive

and short-term programmes, makes successful interventions more difficult. It also rules

out any possibility for planning to make a long-term impact on the underlying causes

of conflict. This document by International Alert summarises current debates on

conflict, aid and peacebuilding and suggests possible actions to enhance the long-term

impact of humanitarian assistance. Based on the organisation‘s experience and

consultations with key stakeholders, it also introduces policy recommendations for

actors involved in emergency interventions.

If humanitarian assistance is to make a long-term impact on the underlying causes of

conflict a new approach to emergency interventions is needed. ‗Conflict sensitivity‘ is

the capacity of an organisation to: (i) understand the context (conflict) in which it

works, (ii) understand the interaction between its intervention and the conflict and (iii)

its capacity to act accordingly and avoid any negative impacts whilst maximising the

positive effects its intervention may have. This new approach is based on a widening

of the concept of human security on which humanitarian assistance is based. All threats

to the survival, daily life and dignity of human beings are included. At present, post

September 11th concerns of security, mostly associated with terrorism, are

constraining both the policy and practice of humanitarian assistance.

Incorporating a conflict sensitive approach to Humanitarian Agencies' planning and

programming can contribute to long-term peacebuilding efforts without putting at risk

the perception of neutrality and independence so relevant for HA. Other findings

suggest that a conflict sensitive approach:

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Requires HA to address policy, operations and capacity challenges. Issues such

as: conflicting government agendas, diversion of aid to belligerents and loss of

institutional memory constrain the positive impact of HA interventions.

Promotes HA to advocate for more comprehensive policies at an earlier stage.

Humanitarian assistance can move from short-term reactive responses to more

proactive and long-term efforts.

Requires more systematic information gathering and organisational learning

from past experience. Having a sound understanding of the root causes and

dynamics of the conflict can lead to more adequate interventions.

Calls for HA to make donors and international governments aware of the

damaging impact of conflict on great numbers of people. Advocacy efforts can

complement operations, securing funding and political support.

Humanitarian Agencies depend on donor policy and resource decisions to develop

their work. If they are to successfully engage in peace-building efforts, higher levels of

Donor – HA consultations are needed. Other recommendations suggest that donors

need to:

Develop a co-ordinated approach to conflict analysis and policy design.

Implement and evaluate a conflict sensitive approach. It is important that

conflict transformation goals are mainstreamed in intervention strategies.

Support the development of conflict sensitivity within Humanitarian Agencies.

Promote within different government agencies the development of a coherent

policy towards target countries. The impact on conflict of diplomatic, military,

trade and aid policies need to be assessed as a whole.

Develop downward accountability and closer bonds with NGOs and legitimate

local civil society organisations to enable stronger local ownership of the

process.

Source: Lange, M. and Quinn, M., 2003, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and

Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges, International Alert, London

Supplementary readings

Humanitarianism Unbound?

A De Waal (1994)

Access full text online

Abstract

The last three years have seen humanitarian organizations calling for military

intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere. Both relief agencies and

human rights organizations have vocally implored the United Nations, or individual

Western countries, to dispatch troops to strife-torn nations facing humanitarian

disaster. What is commonplace today would have been unthinkable even five years

ago. This paper examines the reasons for this extraordinary shift in the capacity of

humanitarian organizations to make these dramatic statements and asks whether the

analysis, capacity and accountability of these organizations matches their power. It

focuses on central and northeast Africa, a region that has the dubious distinction of

leading the world in the depth and complexity of its politically-caused humanitarian

emergencies.

190

Source: De Waal, A. 1994. Humanitarianism Unbound? African Rights, London

Introduction, Global Governance and the New Wars

M Duffield (2001)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Since the mid-1990s, changing perceptions of war and security have led to the

‗radicalisation of development‘. Aid policy has shifted from humanitarian relief

towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction to avert future violence. What

has triggered these changes? How has the nature of war changed since the end of the

Cold War? Can the new development agenda deliver security in the face of ‗new

wars‘? This introductory chapter of the book ―Global Governance and the New Wars‖

presents a critical reflection on the incorporation of war into development discourse.

Northern policy-makers now focus on the security threat of underdevelopment in the

South fomenting international instability through conflict, criminal activity and

terrorism. The merging of the development and security agendas has led to a new

political project, the ‗liberal peace‘, which seeks to transform dysfunctional and war-

affected societies into cooperative and stable entities.

Using a ‗systems‘ approach, a new system of global governance is identified. The

radical social transformation agenda is bringing together governments, NGOs, military

establishments and private companies in networks of strategic governance relations

that are increasingly privatised and militarised.

Other important findings are:

The changing nature of North-South relations involves a shift from hierarchical

and territorial relations of government to polyarchical, non-territorial and

networked relations of governance.

Changes in international trade during the last few decades have increased

Southern exclusion from formal trade, leading to an expansion of parallel and

shadow trans-border trade.

The ‗new wars‘ witnessed since the end of the Cold War involve networks of

state actors, social groups, diasporas and strongmen, and have created

‗innovative‘ forms of protectionism, legitimacy and entitlements to wealth.

In both liberal peace and the new wars, traditional distinctions between people,

army and government have been blurred, and new ways of projecting power

have emerged.

Interactions between the strategic complexes of liberal peace and the new wars

have involved accommodation and complicity, for example where relief

interventions have encouraged famine or fuelled conflict.

The author makes the following conclusions:

It is questionable whether the increasingly privatised and regionally divided

strategic complexes of liberal governance will be able to promote security that

is socially and geographically inclusive.

Increased attention is therefore needed in academic and policy circles to

understanding the new development-security terrain.

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To understand the organisational dynamics involved, it is useful to use a

systems approach, which focuses on interconnections, processes and self-

transformation.

Source: Duffield, M., 2001, 'Introduction, Global Governance and the New Wars', in

Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security, Zed

Books, London.

Service Delivery in Difficult Environments: Transferable Approaches from the

Humanitarian Community

C Laurence and L Poole (2005)

Restricted access text – DFID only

Source: Laurence, C. and Poole, L., 2005, 'Service Delivery in Difficult Environments:

Transferable Approaches from the Humanitarian Community', report to UK

Department for International Development (DFID).

Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues

United Nations (2004)

Access full text online

Abstract

The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the Executive Committee on

Humanitarian Assistance (ECHA) established a joint working group on transition

issues to respond to two sets of policy directives contained respectively under

ECOSOC resolution E/2002/32 and Action Point 14 in the report of the Secretary-

General (A/57/387/2002). The working group agreed to focus on processes of

transition from conflict to peace, while recognizing that the term ―transition‖ is applied

to different but often overlapping processes of transformation. This report details their

findings and recommendations.

Source: UNDG, 2004, ‗Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition

Issues‘, New York: United Nations Development Group and Executive Committee on

Humanitarian Assistance

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5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former

Combatants

Core readings

Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards

UNDDR (2007)

Access full text online

Summary

What are the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration standards

(IDDRS)? This paper acts as a guideline to IDDRS. In a peacekeeping context there

has been a trend towards complex operations that seek to deal with a wide variety of

issues rather than traditional peacekeeping. The IDDRS provide the UN system with a

set of policies, guidelines and procedures for the planning, implementation and

monitoring of DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context.

While the UN has acquired significant experience in the planning and management of

DDR programmes, it has yet to establish a collective approach to DDR, or clear and

usable policies and guidelines to facilitate coordination and cooperation among UN

agencies, departments and programmes. This has resulted in poor coordination and

planning and gaps in the implementation of DDR programmes. The IDDRS have been

drafted on the basis of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all the

departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved.

The changed nature of peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery strategies requires

close coordination among UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes. While

the IDDRS were designed with peacekeeping contexts in mind, much of the guidance

contained within these standards will also be applicable for non-peacekeeping

contexts.

The three main aims of the IDDRS are:

To give DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions based on

a clear, flexible and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR

activities.

To serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated

operational planning in Headquarters and at the country level.

To function as a resource for the training of DDR specialists.

The standards consist of 26 modules divided into five levels. Each IDDRS module is

intended to serve both as part of the overall IDDRS framework and as a freestanding

document.

Level one - introduction and a glossary to the full IDDRS;

Level two - the strategic concepts of an integrated approach to DDR in a

peacekeeping context;

Level three - the structures and processes for planning and implementation of

DDR at Headquarters and in the field;

Level four - provides considerations, options and tools for carrying out DDR

operations;

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Level five - covers the UN approach to essential cross-cutting issues, such as

gender, youth and children associated with the armed forces and groups, cross-

border movements, food assistance, HIV/AIDS and health.

Source: United Nations, 2007, 'Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration Standards', United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration Resource Center (IDDRS), New York

The UN DDR website offers numerous guidelines and tools for all phases and aspects

of the DDR process. See www.unddr.org and specifically

http://www.unddr.org/tools.php

Supplementary readings

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and

Guiding Principles

N Ball and L van de Goor (2006)

Access full text online

Summary

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes play a critical role in

transitions from war to peace and are integral to peacekeeping operations and post-

conflict reconstruction. Implementation of DDR programs, however, remains

problematic. This briefing note from the Netherlands Institute of International

Relations (Clingendael Institute) addresses some problems that practitioners will

encounter with DDR program design and implementation. Providing guidance

questions and an overview of lessons learned from recent experience, it recommends

that DDR be seen as part of a broader political process. DDR should be tailored to

local political and economic situations and be embedded within a comprehensive

framework for enhancing security, peace consolidation and economic recovery.

DDR is the process of demilitarising official and unofficial armed groups. It

incorporates arms control, disbanding non-state armed groups, reducing the size of

state security services and assisting ex-combatants‘ reintegration into civilian life.

DDR can help create an environment in which the overall peace process,

reconciliation, social and economic rehabilitation and longer-term development can

take root. DDR processes are, however, only able to influence a fairly narrow range of

political and security objectives:

DDR processes contribute to a level of security that allows the peace process to

advance. They also promote confidence-building among former warring parties

and non-combatants.

DDR processes cannot substitute for inadequate political will on the part of

warring parties to engage in a process to resolve their differences peacefully.

DDR processes cannot substitute for peace enforcement activities or longer-

term programs to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

DDR processes cannot prevent conflict from recurring, produce development or

guarantee ex-combatants‘ successful reintegration into civilian society.

Successful DDR processes require commitment from parties to the conflict,

agreement on a policy framework and an organisation to oversee DDR.

Additionally, they require an international commitment to the peace process.

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DDR must be seen as part of a political process of consolidating peace and promoting

stability, rather than as a technical activity. It should be tailored to the local political

context, institutional and human capacities and realities of economic life. Additionally:

DDR processes should be built on national leadership and responsibility. A

national program should guide the activities and donors should support this.

It is desirable to embed DDR in a comprehensive framework for enhancing

security, peace consolidation and economic recovery.

DDR processes should take into account a realistic appraisal of external support

for DDR as part of early planning. They should also take into account a realistic

assessment of problems and opportunities for implementation on the ground.

DDR processes must be very clear about the primary target group (male and

female combatants), eligibility criteria and types of benefits to be offered. These

must be communicated to all groups affected by a DDR process.

DDR processes require a centralised, integrated funding system, early funding

and evidence-based planning. Additionally they require monitoring and

evaluation on results-based outcomes, quantitative outputs and their political

and security impact.

Source: Ball, N. and Goor, L. van de, 2006, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles', Clingendael

Security and Conflict Programme, The Hague

Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

T Bouta (2005)

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Summary

Recent studies show the increasing extent that women operate as combatants in

(ir)regular armies in conflict. How can disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

(DDR) programmes become more gender-sensitised? This study by the Clingendael

Institute examines men and women's active involvement in warfare, their gender-

specific roles and gender relations within armies and discusses the challenges for DDR

programmes in targeting female ex-combatants.

Women joining armies, whether voluntarily or under duress, tend to have four different

roles – combatant, support worker, abductee and wife/dependant. DDR programmes

need to be made accessible to all women who joined armies during conflict,

irrespective of whether or not they took active part in combat or whether or not they

possess a weapon. DDR programmes need to respond to male and female combatants'

different economic, social and psychological reintegration needs. Finally, it is essential

to formulate clear monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Some key action points are:

The tracing and establishing of contact with all women in armies in advance of

DDR programmes in order to avoid self-demobilisation.

Ensuring that development assistance programmes target abducted women and

protect them against renewed violence from their male counterparts.

Utilising the momentum of disarmament camps to prepare women's and men's

return to civilian life and making both groups aware of their rights as civilians

in the post-conflict phase.

Linking of reintegration activities for ex-combatants with broader development

assistance activities for war-affected communities.

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Preparing communities for the return of male and female ex-combatants,

including countering the negative stigmatisation of women who joined the

military.

Creating links with existing informal community support structures (often led

by women) and providing adequate psychological counselling for all ex-

combatants.

National, international and other agencies should play an important role in

incorporating gender issues in the planning and implementation of specific DDR

programmes. Recommendations for planners, donors and policy-makers at

international level include:

Assessment of the legal, political, economic contexts of the DDR programmes

and incorporation of gender expertise as an essential element of any assessment

mission.

Deployment of women in peacekeeping operations and DDR processes by

troop-contributing countries.

Preference for weapons-in-exchange-for-development projects over weapons-

in-exchange-for-cash projects, allowing greater targeting of women.

Build on existing informal community support structures, including womens'

organisations and networks. Provide training to women's organisations to

participation in healing and reconciliation work.

Institutionalisation of special measures to ensure that female beneficiaries have

equal training and employment opportunities as a part of economic

reintegration.

Take into account women ex-combatants' limited access to land, relatively few

skills, restricted mobility and the strict division of labour they may face.

Source: Bouta, T., 2005, 'Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration', Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ―Clingendael‖, The

Hague

Young Soldiers: Why they Choose to Fight

R Brett and I Specht (2004)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

They are part of rebel factions, national armies, paramilitaries, and other armed groups

and entrenched in some of the most violent conflicts around the globe. They are in

some ways still children? yet, from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone to Northern Ireland,

you can find them among the fighters. Why?

Young Soldiers explores the reasons that adolescents who are neither physically forced

nor abducted choose to join armed groups. Drawing on in-depth interviews with the

soldiers themselves, the authors challenge conventional wisdom to offer a thought-

provoking account of the role that war, poverty, education, politics, identity, family,

and friends all play in driving these young men and women to join military life. They

also address the important issues of demobilization and the reintegration process.

International in scope, covering a variety of situations in Afghanistan, Colombia,

Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South

Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom, Young Soldiers concludes with a

196

discussion of the steps needed to create an environment in which adolescents are no

longer forced to "volunteer."

Source: Brett, R., I. Specht, 2004, ‗Young Soldiers – Why they Choose to Fight‘

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Introduction (pp. 1-8); chapter 1 (pp. 9-38), and

conclusion (pp. 121-136).

Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of

Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace

M Knight (2004)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

The process of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) of

former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or

failure of this endeavour directly affects the long-term peacebuilding prospects for any

post-conflict society. The exploration of the closely interwoven relationship between

peacebuilding and the DDRR process also provides a theoretical framework

for this

article, which aims to present an assessment of various disarmament, demobilization

and reinsertion (DDR) programmes planned or implemented in a

number of countries

over the last two decades. The assessment is conducted by focusing on three specific

DDR issues: disarmament as a social contract; demobilization

without cantonment; and

the relevance of financial reinsertion assistance. The majority of these initiatives

adopted a ‗guns–camps–cash‘ approach that seems to provide only a limited

perspective for dealing with a wide range of complex issues related to the DDR

process. Therefore, the article questions whether there is a need for a more

comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its

social, economic and political implications. In conjunction with the above-mentioned

consideration, disarmament in terms of a social contract is proposed as an alternative to

the current military-centred approach. Experience also indicates a tendency

towards the

inclusion of cantonment in the demobilization phase, regardless of whether it actually

can have some negative impacts on the DDRR process in

general. Subsequently, the

article questions such implications and possible approaches to demobilization without

cantonment. Finally, the article focuses on the effectiveness of cash payments during

reinsertion as an easier alternative to the provision of other

material assistance, since

this tends to be the most controversial aspect of the reinsertion phase.

Source: Knight, M. and Ozerdem, A, 2004, ‗Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to

Peace.‘ In Journal of Peace Research, 41(4): 499-516.

What Happens to Youth During and After Wars? - A Preliminary Review of

Literature on Africa and an Assessment of the Debate

K Peters, P Richards and K Vlassenroot (2003)

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Abstract

This report describes the current state of affairs with regard to the role and

position of child soldiers and of youth in general both during and after armed conflicts

197

in Africa. The authors review the literature, their own professional experience in the

field and place the problem of child soldiers in a wider context, making a number of

recommendations.

Source: Peters, K., P. Richards, K. Vlassenroot, 2003, ‗What Happens to Youth During

and After Wars? - A Preliminary Review of Literature on Africa and an Assessment of

the Debate‘ RAWOO Working Paper, October.

Youth and Conflict – A Brief Review of the Available Literature

M Sommers (2006)

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Abstract

Youth engulfed by conflict and post-conflict situations face circumstances that

substantially alter their lives and prospects. This makes effective programming for

them challenging yet vital. Drawing on extensive archival and internet research, this

short analytical literature review aims to illuminate key themes, trends, and promising

prospects for war-affected youth and the programs that aim to assist them.

The review will introduce debates over how the youth category has been defined and

whether youth should be seen primarily as passive victims of warfare, active threats to

peace, or as resilient survivors. Analysis suggests that while war‘s effects on youth are

complex, resilience is their most prominent shared characteristic. The implication of

this analysis on programming is significant because it casts youth as central

formulators of youth programming.

Source: Sommers, M., 2006, ‗Youth and Conflict – A Brief Review of the Available

Literature‘, Washington, DC: USAID (May).

Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of

Former Combatants in Colombia

K Theidon (2007)

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Abstract

A key component of peace processes and postconflict reconstruction is the

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. DDR

programs imply multiple transitions: from the combatants who lay down their

weapons, to the governments that seek an end to armed conflict, to the communities

that receive – or reject – these demobilized fighters.

At each level, these transitions

imply a complex and dynamic equation between the demands of peace and the clamor

for justice. And yet, traditional approaches to DDR have focused almost exclusively

on

military and security objectives, which in turn has resulted in these programs being

developed in relative isolation from the growing field of transitional justice and its

concerns with historical clarification, justice, reparations and reconciliation.

The author

draws upon research in Colombia, a case of great interest because the government is

attempting to implement mechanisms of reparations and reconciliation in a ‗pre-

postconflict‘ context, and to implement DDR on the terrain of transitional

justice.

198

Source: Theidon, K., 2007, ‗Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization

and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia‘, International Journal of

Transitional Justice, 1:66-90.

Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared

P Uvin (2007)

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Abstract

This report presents some findings about ex-combatants that are derived from a wider

study on masculinity and youth, partly sponsored by the World Bank‘s Multi- Country

Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). This study involved almost 400

Burundians from all walks of life, with whom I had lengthy conversations about

questions of development, peace, the future, their plans for themselves and their

children, and just life in general. Among those interviewed, there were 63 ex-

combatants. I pulled these results out and present them here separately in an attempt to

gain a better understanding of who these people are and how their return to their

communities has proceeded. This report will focus mainly on the ―reintegration‖ part

of the DDR program—not the ―DD‖ parts, which had taken place (or not) long before I

arrived. Evidently, this is a small sample of the entire MDRP target group of more than

20,000 ex-combatants nationwide. The results presented here, thus, are mainly

indicative of the specific places I worked in; more substantial research is required to

test their validity on a larger scale.

Source: Uvin, P., 2007, ‗Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left,

how they fared‘, Working Paper No. 3, Multi-Country Demobilization and

Reintegration Program, Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration

J Weinstein and M Humphreys (2005)

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Summary

Policy analysts have debated the organisational factors that contribute to successful

disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, but little is known

about the factors that account for success at the micro level. What are the individual

level determinants of successful demobilisation and reintegration? This research from

the Centre for Global Development finds that an individuals‘ prospects of gaining

acceptance depends largely on the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought.

There is no evidence that participation in internationally funded DDR programs

improves an individual‘s chance of acceptance by their families or communities.

The basic purpose of DDR is to re-establish a legitimate monopoly over the use of

force by the government and return former fighters to civilian activities. In post-

conflict situations where there is distrust and uncertainty such programs are fraught

with complexity. The literature on ‗lessons learned‘ from DDR programs is devoid of

any micro-level data that might explain why some individuals and not others are able

to reintegrate.

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This study explores individual, group, and community level determinants of

reintegration success and considers whether combatants have been accepted by their

families, found employment, rejected their faction as a political actor and accepted the

democratic process. The degree of acceptance by family and community is a key

indicator of a combatant‘s long-term prospect.

There is little evidence that women or young people faced a significantly harder

time gaining acceptance into civilian life after conflict.

The most important determinant of whether an individual was accepted by

family and community is the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought.

There is weak evidence that individuals who settle in communities that suffered

high levels of abuse during the war encounter more difficulty in gaining

acceptance from family and friends.

There is little evidence that participation in DDR programs increases the

likelihood of acceptance. Non-participants do just as well in the post-war

period. The findings suggest this is most likely because other factors are

facilitating reintegration.

To design effective DDR programs that contribute to peace-building, we need rigorous

research on the micro factors that explain why combatants reject their factional

affiliations, reintegrate into the community and the economy and embrace the post-war

political order.

Specially targeted programs to help female combatants do not have a solid

evidence base because in Sierra Leone women face no more difficulty

reintegrating.

Individual level factors like the combatants experience in the war matter more

than the socio-economic characteristics of former combatants.

Factors only measurable at the country level might be far more important in

determining the path for reintegration.

The design of DDR programs must employ methodologies that can account for

selection effects that operate at the level of the individual directly. The best

approach is the development of monitoring and evaluation systems that employ

some degree of randomized intervention.

Source: Weinstein, J., and Humphreys, M., 2005, 'Disentangling the Determinants of

Successful Demobilization and Reintegration,' Center for Global Development,

Working Paper Number 69, Massachusetts

Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-combatants in Disarmament,

Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes

S Willibald (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

What is the most effective form of aid for countries undergoing the immediate

transition from war to peace? Can direct cash transfers to ex-combatants be

successfully employed as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)

assistance packages? This Overseas Development Institute paper examines empirical

evidence of cash transfer programmes in West Africa. It argues that cash transfers can

indeed be a successful tool when used in the immediate ‗reinsertion‘, or post-

demobilisation stage of the transition process, provided they are properly administered.

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What is the most effective form of aid for countries undergoing the immediate

transition from war to peace? Can direct cash transfers to ex-combatants be

successfully employed as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)

assistance packages? This Overseas Development Institute paper examines empirical

evidence of cash transfer programmes in West Africa. It argues that cash transfers can

indeed be a successful tool when used in the immediate ‗re-insertion‘, or post-

demobilisation stage of the transition process. However, success depends on

appropriate choices on how to implement the cash transfer package. Inappropriate

implementation can have negative implications for local, national and regional security

and development.

Where cash transfers have failed, or have created negative side-effects, the evidence

suggests that factors beyond simply the use of money are more significant causes of

failure. The key factors to be considered in the management of cash transfers are:

payment location, eligibility criteria and the choice of who to target.

Ex-combatants (with the exception of child ex-combatants) do tend to use the

money they receive wisely. Nevertheless, there is a potential for corruption,

particularly at the commander level. Misuse and corruption can be reduced

through prior agreement on spending restrictions and eligibility criteria, backed

up by sufficient supervision.

The provision of cash to individual ex-combatants can create community

resentment, at least initially. Such resentment can be offset by clear

communication to community members of the objectives of cash transfers, and

through projects which help to re-integrate ex-combatants.

There is no evidence that cash transfers disadvantage female members of the

households of ex-combatants, and indeed the opposite seems to be the case.

However, inappropriate eligibility criteria could exclude and disadvantage

female fighters.

The choice of payment location carries local, national and regional security

implications. Delays in payment reduce the incentive to demobilise, and yet

cash transfers at the point of disarmament create a dangerous ‗cash-for-

weapons‘ image. Accurate information and timely delivery are crucial to

prevent frustration among ex-combatants.

There is a need for a regional approach to DDR programmes in order to limit

cross-border arms movements.

There is a need for a continued dialogue between aid organisations and donor and

recipient countries on the role of cash transfers in aid provision. The adoption and

success of such initiatives will depend largely on the willingness of these actors to

consider alternatives to traditional in-kind assistance. Existing empirical research

suggests that any potential disadvantages in the use of cash transfers in DDR packages

are surmountable. However this data is limited and further research is needed in the

following areas:

The impact of different management decisions, such as payment location and

eligibility criteria, on the success of cash transfer programmes.

Context-specific issues, which take into account the complex realities of each

country and conflict.

Detailed comparative analyses between the use of cash and other forms of aid.

This would help to identify where cash transfer programmes would be most

appropriate as a complement or replacement to other forms of aid provision.

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Source: Willibald, S., 2006, 'Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-combatants in

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes', Disasters, vol. 30, pp.

316-339

202

6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating

Risks of Violence

Core readings

Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework

D Crocker (1999)

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Summary

How should a society deal with past evils? In his paper, David Crocker develops a

normative framework with which a society can reckon with past wrongs. He aims to

show that there are crucial moral aspects in reckoning with the past and to clarify,

criticise, revise, apply and diffuse eight moral norms. There is not a recipe for all but

rather a framework for exploration to decide what is most important to accomplish and

what the morally best ways to do so are.

Many nations and some international bodies today are deciding what, if anything, they

should do about past violations of internationally recognised human rights. Crocker has

formulated eight goals that have emerged from worldwide moral deliberation on

transitional justice (TJ) and may serve as a useful framework when particular societies

deliberate about what they are trying to achieve and how.

A general framework shaped by lessons from a variety of contexts can encourage each

society reckoning with an evil past to realise as many as possible of the goals that

international dialogue agrees are morally urgent:

Without reasonably complete truth, none of the other goals of TJ are likely to be

realised.

Ethically defensible treatment of past wrongs requires that individuals and

groups responsible for past crimes are held accountable and receive appropriate

sanctions or punishment.

The rule of law is critical for any society dealing with an evil past.

One way of reckoning with past wrongs is by ―righting‖ them – by restoring

victims to something approaching their status quo ante (via compensation,

restitution or reparation).

An emerging democracy fails to make a sustainable transition unless it identifies

the causes of past abuses and takes steps to reform the law and basic

institutions.

In particular circumstances, the achievement of one or more goals would itself

be a means to the realisation of the one or more of the others.

A society reckoning with past wrongs, sometimes in co-operation with international

institutions should: consider what lessons it might learn from other societies; examine

its‘ own capabilities and limitations; set clear objectives for its efforts. And take into

account that:

There is no single set of policies that will be ethically defensible and practically

feasible - sometimes the best that can be done is to approximate one or more

goals initially or postpone them until conditions improve.

Strategies implemented solely under pressure and without proper attention to

relevant ethical questions are likely to be ad hoc, ineffective, inconsistent and

unstable.

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Different local conditions have a crucial bearing on the best that can be done in

particular contexts.

Source: Crocker, D.A. 1999. 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework',

Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, School of Public Policy, University of

Maryland, College Park, Maryland

Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity

P Hayner (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

This book is a profound exploration of truth commissions around the world, and the

anguish, injustice, and the legacy of hate they are meant to absolve. Case studies

include South Africa, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala.

Source: Hayner, P.B., 2002, ‗Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and

Atrocity‘, New York: Routledge.

Supplementary readings

A Scoping Study of Transitional Justice and Poverty Reduction

J Alexander (2003)

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Summary

In post-conflict developing countries, there is a frequent need to address human rights

violations committed during the conflict period. The mechanisms used for this purpose

include criminal and civil prosecution in domestic, foreign and international courts,

traditional justice processes, truth commissions, lustration/ vetting, reparations and

amnesties. These mechanisms are designed to achieve such goals as justice,

reconciliation and peace. Do they also have the potential to contribute to the goal of

poverty reduction?

This report for the Department for International Development (DFID) examines

‗transitional justice mechanisms‘ (TJMs) employed in post-conflict situations, with

reference to past and present examples. It explores the impact that TJMs may have on

achieving poverty reduction as primary among the United Nations Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs). Yet so far, poverty reduction has not been a stated aim of

TJMs, limiting their impact on this goal. To fulfil their potential in reducing poverty,

TJMs must go beyond their usual emphasis on civil and political rights to address

violations of economic and social rights. Reparations for the economic and social

consequences of human rights abuses should be prioritised. Through their impact on

key conditions such as political and social stability, and by enhancing security and

access to justice, TJMs can contribute indirectly to the goal of reducing poverty. More

directly, they can help alleviate material disadvantage, exclusion and vulnerability.

To be effective TJMs must form part of a coherent overall strategy, meet clear and

realistic objectives, and be relevant and legitimate to those they aim to assist. Analysis

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of TJMs in countries including Rwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone, South Africa, El

Salvador and Guatemala suggests that:

A combination of mechanisms may be necessary to produce the best results,

but efforts must be made to avoid gaps, co-ordinate the TJMs smoothly and

secure public understanding.

Many problems encountered by TJMs are caused by a lack of resources and

time commitment. A long-term view is required and external oversight is

essential to ensure accountability.

Transitional justice strategies must aim to conform to the relevant international

legal standards, although some consideration may legitimately be given to the

constraints of the post-conflict context.

Enforcement of the judgments, decisions and recommendations of TJMs is vital

to their success. Where they fail, there is a risk that tensions will be exacerbated

and the trust of victims in the state and/or international community will be

diminished.

International involvement in transitional justice has increased in recent years and can

directly or indirectly shape its design and implementation. Therefore, it can also help

boost the role of TJMs in reducing poverty. To achieve the best results:

International intervention should aim to complement domestic transitional

justice initiatives where possible, develop national capacity and increase

accountability.

Relating TJMs to poverty reduction may favour particular forms of justice that

bring individuals back into economic activity, including reparations for victims

or community service for perpetrators.

More attention should be paid to the perspectives of victims, with a greater

focus on vulnerable groups that make up most of the world‘s poor: women,

children, older people and the displaced.

Source: Alexander, J., 2003, 'A Scoping Study of Transitional Justice and Poverty

Reduction', Final Report for Department for International Development (DFID),

London.

Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of Developments in the

Search for Justice and Reconciliation

N Kritz (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

At the dawn of the 21st century, it is increasingly recognized that societies that refuse

to address the painful legacy of past abuses do so at their peril. The most vivid recent

demonstration of this lesson was the experience of the former Yugoslavia. In the name

of brotherhood and unity, the Tito regime prohibited any discussion of the brutalities

committed by Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks against one another during the World War II

period. The result was not brotherhood: accounts expanded into mythologies

transmitted from one generation to the next in each ethnic community and further

exaggerated along the way. This was exemplified by the mortality data for the

notorious Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia. By the 1990's, the story had

expanded: Croat nationalists claimed that 20,000 people died at the camp during the

war, mostly of disease; Serb nationalists insisted that up to a million people,

overwhelmingly Serbs, were slaughtered by the Croat Ustashe at Jasenovac. After the

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death of Tito, cynical nationalists were able to exploit this unresolved history of

atrocities to instil fear in each ethnic group and to manipulate them into new rounds of

violence.

A variety of approaches have developed to respond to past atrocities in ways that are

intended to facilitate justice and/or reconciliation. These include criminal prosecution

of perpetrators—before domestic, international and mixed courts—the imposition of

various non-criminal sanctions, truth commissions, and the provision of compensation

to victims of the abuses, each of which are examined below. The importance of dealing

with the demons of the past is now more broadly accepted: the challenge is to fine-tune

and better coordinate the options.

Source: Kritz, N., 2002, 'Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of

Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation', in Henkin, Alice H. (Ed.),

The Legacy of Abuse: Confronting the Past, Facing the Future, Aspen Institute, New

York University School of Law.

Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War

R Mani (2005)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

A peaceful future for post-conflict societies depends on their ability to build an

inclusive political community. Does transitional justice as it is currently practiced

facilitate reconciliation and inclusion? Experience to date suggests that transitional

justice measures do not fulfil the central intention of reconciliation. This paper from

the journal ‗Security Dialogue‘ proposes reparative justice as an alternative and

broader framework. The reparative justice approach aims to facilitate individual and

societal reconciliation towards the goal of regenerating an inclusive political

community.

Before political representation can be promoted in a post-conflict society, past

divisions of victims and perpetrators must be overcome. Reconciliation is a process

through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. It is a step

toward an ‗inclusive political community‘, where all people and groups participate in

rebuilding their society.

Transitional justice is a set of mechanisms which is expected to yield the by-product of

reconciliation between people and communities in addition to delivering some measure

of justice. The two preferred mechanisms of transitional justice are trials and truth

commissions. The recent experiences in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia

expose some of the difficulties with transitional justice trials.

The fundamental problem with trials and truth commissions is that they have the

unintended side-effect of being divisive. Truth commissions tend to focus on victims to

the exclusion of other groups, whereas trials focus exclusively on perpetrators. The

reconciliatory effect of truth commissions is uncertain, since the very nature of conflict

contradicts the existence of a single truth. Moreover, the desire to forgive and reconcile

with one‘s enemy is individual, and cannot be imposed.

Other problems of pursuing reconciliation through transitional justice include:

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The problems of political will and resources to implement trials, commissions,

reforms and recommendations.

The destruction of evidence in conflicts and the difficulty of finding and

providing evidence in chaotic post-conflict environments.

The weakness, destruction or corruption of the judiciary and scarcity of lawyers

to provide fair trials.

The difficulty of providing adequate witness protection and safe custody of

suspects.

Lack of agreement on appropriate punishment of war criminals.

The danger of a backlash and relapse into violence.

Reparative justice offers a more effective and suitable bridge between past and future

than transitional justice. Transitional justice is weighted in the past, as its main locus is

resolving the burden of past violations. Reconciliation through reparative justice is

turned towards making normal life possible in the future. Recommendations in the

spirit of reparative justice include:

Reconciliation can only stem from a form of justice that is inclusive and uniting

rather than exclusive and dividing. It should be permanent and incremental, and

survivor-oriented rather than perpetrator or victim centred.

Reparative justice would include all existing methods of transitional justice,

including trials and truth commissions. It would also return attention to the

neglected dimension of broader social practices of commemoration, healing,

education, meaningful apologies, acknowledgment and restitution.

Reparative justice would explore the ignored debate on punishment. It would

undertake alternative forms of punishment that might be more socially

constructive and might help rebuild fractured societal relations, in addition to

incarceration.

Reparative justice should not be seen as a panacea. It cannot in itself forge and

shape an inclusive political community. It will depend on considerable will on

the part of all political constituencies and consistent engagement by all parts of

society.

Mani, R., 2005, 'Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community After War', Security

Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 511-526

Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies - Approaches to Reconciliation

E Mobekk (2004)

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Summary

The issue of transitional justice in post-conflict societies has become increasingly

important in recent years. This paper from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic

Control of Armed Forces examines forms of transitional justice. It looks at truth

commissions, local courts and traditional methods of justice which have the greatest

potential for local ownership. It argues that local ownership is crucial to the success of

the post-conflict reconstruction process.

Reconciliation is the objective of post-conflict reconstruction processes but is often

vaguely defined. National reconciliation is achieved when societal and political

processes function and develop without reverting to the framework of the conflict.

Individual reconciliation is the ability of each human to conduct their life without fear

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or hate. The distinction is central because some transitional justice mechanisms

promote one type over another. There is a growing consensus of the nexus between

peace and justice. The justice debates infer that justice in the form of criminal

proceedings followed by punishment will not lead to reconciliation. However, certain

mechanisms of retributive and restorative justice can support reconciliation in

particular contexts.

Findings about the different forms of transitional justice include:

Truth commissions give a voice to the voiceless. However, recommendations

are often ignored. They are less politically sensitive because they are unable to

punish and can therefore be used to avoid issues of transitional justice. The lack

of accountability can undermine the transition process.

Civil society in numerous post-conflict societies has demanded trials and

retributive justice. Stability may be threatened if no action is taken.

Accountability must be established from the very beginning.

However, in some political situations trials are not possible. Local judicial

systems may be unable to handle the number of cases. Moreover, local trials

focus on the perpetrator not the victim and on individual guilt rather than

widespread abuse.

Traditional methods of justice are increasingly promoted as a means of

reconciliation and tools of conflict resolution.

However, they frequently deny the perpetrator a fair trial. Punishments can be

against international laws and standards. They are designed to deal with minor

crimes.

Three factors must be ensured in a post-conflict society, irrespective of the types of

transitional justice mechanisms that are implemented. Local ownership must be

assured. Needs assessments must be conducted prior to establishing or recommending

the types of mechanisms. The international community should make several options

available that can be implemented in a complementary manner. Specific

recommendations include:

Acknowledge truth as a difficult concept. Cover the truth commissions

extensively in the media.

Assess the use of amnesties and its consequences. Inform and educate civil

society as to what a truth commission can achieve and what its objectives are.

Local political willingness is essential for its success.

Reform the judicial system and the judiciary from the beginning. Establish ad

hoc solutions to address perpetrators of past human rights abuses, Develop an

international transitional law based on international human rights standards,

norms and laws.

Assess traditional mechanisms before encouraging their implementation.

Establish what level of crimes they can be applied to. Acknowledge the vast

variations between mechanisms and assess their viability.

Be aware of the potential effects on the judicial regime and public security

forces. Educate civil society that traditional mechanisms can be complementary

to formal judicial mechanisms so as not to undermine the reformed judicial

system. Implement the mechanisms consistently.

Mobekk, E., 2005, 'Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies - Approaches to

Reconciliation' in After Intevention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict

Societies - From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, eds. Ebnother, A and

Fluri, P., Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

208

Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda

B Oomen (2005)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

How does the fact that the justice process within Rwanda is so strongly conceived,

financed and driven by the international community affect its workings and

legitimacy? Never before was a process of justice so driven from outside, with

intensive donor involvement in domestic justice as well as the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It has become the forerunner of a wider trend towards a

judicialisation of international relations.

The good governance paradigm has redirected donor funds towards a range of legal

activities formerly considered the prerogative of nation states. This was driven by the

end of the Cold War, the 1990s impasse in development thinking, failing states and the

perceived neutrality of the law. In various countries and territories essentially governed

by outside forces, pre-fabricated justice packages like criminal codes are implemented,

and often are not merely transitional. In sovereign countries, western legal transplants

are promoted which open the way for a free-market economy.

In Rwanda, donors invested in five main categories: International justice outside

Rwanda, the domestic legal system, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission,

gacaca (customary courts) and other human rights initiatives. The fields of agriculture,

health and education became secondary.

The ICTR did produce some groundbreaking case law, but had the international

community as its audience, not Rwandan victims.

Individual donors engaged in diverse activities, alongside numerous

international NGOs and Rwandan human rights groups. Lack of coordination or

even outright competition emerged.

Bringing out the full truth does not always result in reconciliation. At times

Rwanda resembled a laboratory for testing legal approaches.

The image of a stable democracy post-genocide is superficial. Elections in 2003

were rigged, and new elites have reaped most economic benefits. Human rights

violations, disappearances, killings, and government involvement in war in the

Congo are concerning.

The government monopolised knowledge production of the history of the

genocide and made use of the justice process to entrench its power, particularly

in the gacaca.

The gacaca received wide international support but lack traditional authenticity

and fall short on true popular participation. The weekly meetings, intensive

trainings and radio broadcasts strengthen government control, and deflect

international attention from other injustices.

The importance of justice in Rwanda should not be negated, but true justice should be

done. The legal has been made subservient to the political. Even the most localised

processes are about tightening minority control.

By funding elements of the justice process in the context of increasing

oppression, the international community risks complicity. It may legitimise

many elements of injustice in Rwandan society today and allow the government

to use saved funds for defence purposes.

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This is part of a wider trend in Africa today towards shadow bookkeeping.

Nations comply with donor exigencies in terms of decentralisation,

democratisation and constitution writing, while the real politics takes place

elsewhere along different lines.

There has been a growth and globalisation of the justice sector in development

with its own experts, interests, dynamics and political economy. There is a

danger of losing sight of the original purpose and other ways to achieve it. A

minority of Rwandans prioritise genocide trials, highlighting improved living

standards instead.

Separating law from politics is impossible. An isolationist emphasis on law, in

an environment so concerned with politicising the institutions of government,

emphasises the culture of impunity.

Source: Oomen, B., 2005, 'Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of

Rwanda', Development and Change, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 887 – 910

Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone

R Shaw (2005)

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Summary

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), are increasingly viewed as a standard

part of any national post-conflict healing process. Can TRCs contribute to social

recovery? This paper, published by the United States Institute of Peace, investigates

Sierra Leone's TRC, which began its public hearings in 2003. It examines the

compatibility of the TRC with the local recovery strategy - a "forgive and forget"

approach. It argues that the TRC will be more effective if it builds on established

practices of healing and coexistence.

TRCs became popular during the Reagan era as a means of dealing with repressive

Latin American regimes. More recently it has been held that the public recounting of

memories of covert, state-sponsored crimes is deemed a redemptive process. TRCs

provide an opportunity for the previously silenced stories of victims to be publicly

acknowledged. The process of remembering is intended to avoid reoccurrence. TRCs

therefore rest on the premise that past atrocities must be confronted in order to face the

future.

Sierra Leone's TRC was popular among local NGOs and human rights activists, but

gained less support among the wider population. The TRC in Sierra Leone was not

well adapted to the local context. The 'forgive and forget' approach, or social

forgetting, which is the traditional and established local practice for recovery was the

most popular amongst the people. This approach had been used to reintegrate child

soldiers in the North. Verbal remembering has proved useful where state-sponsored,

clandestine human rights abuses have taken place, but in Sierra Leone, crimes and

killings were common knowledge as no attempt was made to conceal them in the first

place.

Wherever TRCs are contemplated, scepticism is encountered. These can be based on:

Fear of retaliation by the perpetrators of past crimes and worries of government

retribution.

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Concerns about the coexistence of different justice mechanisms (in Sierra

Leone's case the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone).

A discrediting of the assumption that TRCs give purportedly universal benefits.

The process of verbally remembering violence is problematic and largely based

on Western historical processes.

There will always be a need to document atrocities through first-hand accounts. This

can contribute to the development of stable national institutions. However, as Sierra

Leone's experience shows, specific considerations must be taken into account before

establishing a TRC:

TRCs can empower previously silenced survivors and are an important means

of establishing accountability after periods of covert state violence. But such

outcomes are unattainable in cases of overt crime and where there is no recourse

to retributive justice.

It is essential to gauge popular support for this type of healing process. The

views of all people should be taken into account, rather than instigating plans

based on the views of local politicians and NGOs.

Any process of healing is more effective if created in line with established

practices, rather than negating the value of cultural preference.

Recovery can in fact be undermined if external practices that seem to

vehemently oppose local tradition are thrust upon the population. In Sierra

Leone, communities were in fact divided over their views towards the TRC.

Shaw, R., 2005, 'Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from

Sierra Leone', United States Institute for Peace, Special Report, no. 130

The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Participation

in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda

P Uvin (2000)

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Summary

The formal justice system in Rwanda is failing to provide redress for the genocide and

massacres of 1994, despite heavy investment by the Rwandan government and

international donors. There is a need to speed up trials and improve their quality,

empty the country's overcrowded prisons and involve the population in establishing the

truth and promoting reconciliation. One solution may be offered by adapting gacaca, a

traditional mechanism of conflict resolution. But even this alternative is fraught with

contradictions. How can donors ensure that the system put into place maximises the

positive potential of gacaca and minimises its negative implications?

This paper examines the reasons in favour of gacaca and highlights the obstacles to its

efficient and equitable functioning. It warns donors that the decision to support gacaca

is highly political and offers clear advice on how to manage the process.

Gacaca potentially respects key conditions of fair trial and due process in an original,

locally appropriate form, and its limitations and constraints may be no less than the

current judicial system. Although gacaca enjoys widespread public support, its

legitimacy can be easily undermined and must therefore be clearly established to avoid

interference by (local) power-holders. Uvin proposes that donors adopt a policy of

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'critical support' with particular attention to fast, local, reliable and gacaca-specific

monitoring and subsequent joint action.

Other conclusions from the paper are that:

Gacaca could lead to an increase rather than a decrease in prison populations;

this might eventually require an amnesty once guilt was established.

Sensitisation to gacaca has so far been a top-down process; if reconciliation is to

be achieved in the long term, both development and judicial NGOs should be

involved in participatory work with the population.

A gender perspective is vital at all stages if women are to participate in the

gacaca process.

There are particular concerns about urban jurisdictions, where the basic social

conditions for efficient and effective functioning are not guaranteed.

The events of 1994 are not the only challenge for the justice system in Rwanda;

other problems must also be addressed, including crimes committed by the FPR.

Donors must co-ordinate their administration and policies. Critical financial and

political support for gacaca must be placed in a wider context and accompanied by

ongoing support for other programmes in Rwanda. Policy implications of this paper

are:

Central monitoring and management structures offer a means to deal with the

basic uncertainties of the gacaca experiment and to combat local abuses.

Investment in social services and primary and secondary education could be an

alternative to direct forms of compensation to genocide survivors as well as a

way of improving the lives of all Rwandans.

Uvin, P. 2000, 'The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of

Participation in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda', a discussion

paper prepared for the Belgian Secretary of State for Development Cooperation

Gender, Justice, and Truth Commissions

World Bank (2006)

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Summary

How have truth commissions (TCs) in societies emerging from conflict or repressive

regimes incorporated a gender approach to their investigations of human right

violations? What assistance could development actors, particularly the World Bank,

provide to such an approach? This paper from the World Bank analyses the degree to

which a gender-sensitive perspective was used in three TCs, in South Africa, Peru and

Sierra Leone. It argues that a gender approach can enhance the effectiveness of

reparations offered by TCs and prevent future conflicts, and that increased support

from international actors might strengthen TCs‘ engagement with such issues.

TCs are non-judicial mechanisms which investigate and report on human rights

violations during armed conflict or repressive regimes. They seek to heal social

divisions by documenting atrocities, determining responsibility, facilitating victims‘

participation and recommending reforms to prevent future violence.

The gender perspective has been incorporated into TCs relatively recently. This

approach entails distinguishing between the consequences of human rights violations

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for men and women. It aims to rectify women‘s traditional invisibility in peace

negotiations by recommending reparations accommodating women‘s views and needs,

as well as men‘s.

The three TCs – following the end of apartheid in South Africa, the hostilities between

the Shining Path and the Peruvian state and the armed conflict in Sierra Leone –

partially incorporated a gender-sensitive approach:

The South African TC‘s mandate did not identify women or gender-based

violations as specific subjects for investigation, although female commissioners

interpreted ―torture‖ as referring to gender-based violence. The TC ran

preparatory workshops and commissioner training to encourage women to

testify on human rights violations. Although no references to gender appears in

the report‘s main conclusions, one chapter focused on women‘s experience of

violence and the TC recommended human rights training in schools and for

legal personnel.

The Peruvian TC‘s mandate did not specify investigation of sexual crimes, but

did refer to ―human rights violations‖. The TC‘s gender-sensitive provisions

included: a statement stressing the importance of the gender perspective, a

special TC gender unit, training for investigators interviewing women and a

forum on women‘s role in the conflict. The report discussed gender roles,

women‘s participation in post-conflict peacebuilding and stigma suffered by

female victims of sexual violence and took a gender-based approach in its

recommendation plan.

The Sierra Leonean TC‘s mandate specifically referred to ―sexual abuses‖ in the

conflict. Its female commissioners prioritised gender violence by establishing

workshops for women‘s groups and special hearings for women. The report

documented human rights violations during the conflict and recommended

redressing women‘s marginalisation with reforms to the political, judicial, legal,

healthcare and educational systems.

TCs provide a fundamental basis for development in post-conflict societies. Their

capacity to restore social divisions could be enhanced by improved application of a

gender approach and international support:

As well as contributing to transitional justice, TC reports provide early analyses

of transition societies‘ social needs. With greater resources, the three TCs

surveyed could have offered more complete investigations of gender inequality.

The post-conflict Peruvian government adopted some reforms suggested by the

TC, but implementation and political will were often weak. International actors

could provide research, training and report-writing support, but also

implementation assistance through funding and loan conditionality.

As a contributor to human security and post-conflict reconstruction, TCs could

contribute to the World Bank‘s objective of poverty reduction. The World Bank

could help fund reparations and institutional reforms following TCs.

Source: World Bank, 2006, 'Gender, Justice, and Truth Commissions', The World

Bank, Washington

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7. Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in

Mitigating Risks of Violence

7.1 Security sector

Core readings

Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform

M Brzoska (2003)

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Summary

What are the strengths and weaknesses of developmental approaches to security sector

reform (SSR)? How is the concept of SSR changing, and how might it be developed to

enable better implementation? This paper from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic

Control of Armed Forces traces the origins of the SSR debate and surveys the

opportunities and challenges presented by reform. It argues that, while a

comprehensive and developmental approach to SSR is important, donor governments‘

inadequate coordination and competing objectives and recipient countries‘ resistance

have hampered SSR efforts.

With the growth in post-conflict development programmes since the end of the Cold

War, development practitioners have increasingly encountered and addressed security

issues. They have aimed to integrate SSR into wider poverty reduction objectives,

although this approach has been criticised for ignoring the underlying causes of

insecurity.

Early developmental SSR initiatives focusing on limiting military expenditure through

aid conditionality were replaced by an emphasis on policy dialogue and transparent,

accountable expenditure. The growth in post-conflict development work has focused

strategy on demobilisation, although the division of labour between peacekeeping

missions and development actors has been unclear. Development practitioners have

varying approaches to SSR:

SSR has been channelled towards poverty-reduction objectives since resources

are released through lower military expenditure and economic activity is

promoted through increased security and conflict prevention. However, hard

evidence of pro-poor outcomes of SSR is still sparse.

Other development practitioners prioritise security provision, even if it is

delivered by non-state actors. However, this ―security first‖ approach may work

to the exclusion of effective oversight of security services.

Another approach emphasises governance in the security services. This strategy

aims for civilian oversight, civil society monitoring, transparent budgeting and

professionalisation of the security sector. However, oversight can be

cumbersome and hamper security forces‘ short-term effectiveness.

Despite the development community‘s support of SSR, numerous difficulties exist in

prioritising and sequencing the elements of reform, and in implementing SSR. These

stem from lack of coordination and capacity among donors, insufficient certainty in

development actors‘ mandates and inadequate commitment from recipient countries:

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Donors often lack the financial and institutional capacity to institute SSR, since

many agencies have made cuts recently and few of their personnel have

experience of the security sector. SSR is resource-heavy since partial security

reform can be counterproductive.

Local ownership is key in an area as politically sensitive as SSR. However,

oppressive governments have little commitment to changing their security

forces, while strong reformist governments may resist donor intervention.

SSR requires cooperation from defence, foreign and justice ministries alongside

development agencies. However, there is often poor coordination owing to

cultural differences between ministries and conflicting interests – between

demilitarisation and arms exports, for example. An overarching SSR mandate

for development agencies or improved cross-cutting cooperation could enhance

the donor response.

Further research, involving the development of indicators to evaluate SSR and

analysis of SSR sequencing, should be undertaken to produce best practice

approaches. Local and international experts should jointly produce context-

specific reports on reform possibilities, linking broad SSR objectives with

realities on the ground.

Source: Brzoska, M., 2003, 'Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector

Reform', Occasional Paper no. 4, DCAF, Geneva

Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors

L Nathan (2007)

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Summary

Local ownership is imperative for successful security sector reform (SSR), although

the principle is frequently breached in practice. This paper, commissioned by the UK

Government‘s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, aims to contribute to operationalising

donors‘ policy commitment to local ownership of SSR. Incorporating planning and

diagnostic tools, it argues that SSR programmes must be flexible and responsive to

local actors and conditions. Local ownership must be the primary objective for

developing a process-oriented approach to SSR that empowers local actors, thereby

increasing the chance of long-term success.

Donor governments often impose their own models and programmes on local actors,

generating resentment and resistance. Local ownership means that reforms must be

designed, managed and implemented by local actors. Reforms often face multiple

obstacles and a protracted process of struggle. SSR requires a context of democracy or

democratisation, the technical and material capacity for sustainable reform and a

willing executive capable of exercising control over security services.

Country context is critical in designing reforms and determining appropriate donor

support strategies. Other important considerations include:

SSR is a democratic and democratising project that should aim to ensure

decision-making and governance in the security sector conforms to democratic

norms.

Project funding cycles of one to three years impose unrealistic timeframes and

focus on short-term results. Donors should regard SSR processes to be as

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significant as the content and outcomes of initiatives, and develop appropriate

timeframes.

Clearly defined cascading objectives that flow from overarching national goals,

through to security sector institutions and specific SSR programme objectives

improve the direction and cohesion of reforms.

Inclusive and consultative SSR design should distinguish between categories of

actor (decision-makers, implementing agencies, reform designers, advisors and

interested parties) and ensure they are properly engaged.

Incomplete or crude analyses that attribute potential obstacles solely to

incompetence and/or political resistance can be damaging. It is necessary to

distinguish between ideological, personal, organisational and structural

obstacles and the different strategies required to address them.

Long-term support for capacity-building on terms acceptable to local actors is the most

useful contribution donors can make to SSR. Such support could include:

Research support for parliamentary committees dealing with security, to help

develop their technical and comparative knowledge. Parliaments are forums for

open debate and building their capacity enhances oversight and executive

accountability.

Providing equipment and training to establish security policy and planning units

in relevant departments which can design, manage and monitor the SSR

process.

A small grants scheme for civil society activities focused on security, to enable

greater public participation and enhance the democratic process.

Funding for specialist training for drafting security legislation.

Comparative SSR exchange and study, including seminars, internships and

courses, to build the expertise and confidence of local actors.

Institutionalising the principle of local ownership in donor governments,

including incorporating local ownership and capacity-building as key objectives

in funding proposals and in reporting and evaluation requirements.

Source: Nathan, L., 2006, 'Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for

Donors', Paper prepared for the Department for International Development (DFID),

London

OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and

Justice

OECD-DAC (2007)

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Summary

How can the gap between policy and practice on Security Sector Reform (SSR) be

closed? This handbook from the Development Assistance Committee of the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) provides

guidance on how to operationalise its guidelines on SSR. Addressing the challenges

faced by all citizens to achieve personal safety, security and access to justice should be

the key determining factor in evaluating the success or otherwise of donor support

programmes.

This handbook is the main outcome of the 2-years Implementation Framework for

Security System Reform (IF-SSR) process. It has been designed by and for

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international actors working to address insecurity and support access to justice. It aims

to ensure that donor support to SSR programmes is both effective and sustainable. It

advocates an approach whereby the desired outcome and the context determine the

priority, nature and scope of the programme.

The political terrain needs to be prepared in partner countries and early investments

made in appropriate analysis. Generating public interest, understanding and

engagement in SSR is critical.

Experience shows the benefit of establishing an inception phase to an SSR

programme – it allows donors to build understanding of the context, to

effectively target support, and to assess where donor support adds value.

The process of identifying and fostering ownership requires continuous

attention. It cannot be assumed that ownership will be easily identifiable or

coherent at the point where international actors engage.

SSR programmes need to take a multi-layered or multi-stakeholder approach.

SSR objectives need to focus on the ultimate outcomes of basic security and

justice services.

The international community needs to move from ad hoc, often short-term,

projects to more strategic engagement.

Donors should aim to improve basic security and justice service delivery, establish an

effective governance, oversight and accountability system, and develop local

leadership and ownership of the reform process.

Technical inputs to SSR should be delivered and co-ordinated with a clear

understanding of the political nature of SSR and institutional opportunities and

constraints.

Assessment tools should inform the design of realistic, focussed programmes,

which can make significant contributions to supporting partner countries in

addressing the security and justice needs of all citizens.

Donors must work with partners to ensure that initiatives to support the delivery

of security and justice are conflict-sensitive and financially, institutionally and

culturally sustainable.

The international community should use appropriate instruments and

approaches for different contexts and should build support across the justice and

security system to ensure a more strategic approach to SSR.

SSR should be viewed as an integral part of the planning process for immediate

post-conflict situations and peace support operations.

The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR can be used to help place sub-sector

reforms in the context of system-wide needs.

Source: OECD, 2007, 'OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting

Security and Justice', OECD, Paris

217

Supplementary readings

Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Conflict-Affected

Countries

N Ball (2005)

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Summary

A safe, secure environment for people, communities and states is essential for

sustainable development and conflict mitigation. This article in Public Administration

and Development analyses the challenges confronting the achievement of democratic

security sector governance after conflict. Addressing these challenges requires

professional security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional

approaches. Local stakeholders must make hard decisions about priorities on the

availability of domestic resources and the costs and benefits of accepting external

assistance.

Politicised or ineffective security and justice systems can create instability and

insecurity. Attention to democratic security governance is particularly important in

conflict-affected countries that typically experience significant institutional

weaknesses and suffer from the enduring legacies of undemocratic politics. Efforts to

strengthen and restructure the state apparatus are severely hampered by competition for

power, lack of legitimacy of political leaders and lack of consensus over the country's

future.

To date, efforts to reform the security sector have concentrated primarily on

strengthening the operational capacity of the security forces, rather than strengthening

democratic oversight and accountability mechanisms. A country's focus on short-term

security needs is often the result of limited resources.

Strengthening democratic governance of the security sector involves developing and

implementing a legal framework, civil management and oversight bodies and viable

and accountable security forces. It also means ensuring that the institutional culture of

the security forces is supportive. The following tasks should be prioritised:

Strengthen the professionalism of the security forces, both in normative and

technical terms.

Develop capable and responsible civil authorities and civil society. Civil society

must ensure their operations are fiscally accountable.

Give high priority to rule of law; respect for rule of law must exist among

civilians and security force personnel.

Develop regional approaches to security problems to encourage countries to

work together and reduce tensions.

Democratic security sector governance can be expected to occur at a pace consistent

with overall democratic consolidation. National leadership must be committed to the

reform process. The principles, laws and structures of the reforms must be rooted in the

country's cultural, historical and legal frameworks. Processes should be consultative.

Furthermore:

Local ownership of the reform process is essential.

The highly political nature of strengthening democratic security-sector

governance needs to be factored into reform efforts. External actors must

understand the critical political relationships.

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Decisions about reform strategy and programming must be informed by a highly

nuanced sense of context, involving the adaptation of borrowed solutions.

The pace and content of locally-owned reform processes must be shaped by

conditions in the reforming country.

Situating reform efforts within a comprehensive, sector-wide framework has the

potential to maximise the impact of the reforms and to increase the efficiency of

resource use.

Source: Ball, N., 2005, 'Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

in Conflict-Affected Countries', Public Administration and Development, vol. 25, no. 1

Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform

Baly (2002)

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Summary

There is a growing consensus that security needs to be approached just as much from

the perspective of protecting individuals and communities from violence, as from the

degree to which defence spending crowds out development expenditure. It is important

to understand the composition of the security sector as a whole.

Aiming to provide practical guidance for DFID governance advisers and country

programme managers considering how to support the security sector, these guidelines

set out the key actors but focus more narrowly on the military, paramilitary and

intelligence services as well as the civilian structures responsible for their oversight

and control and the related institutional machinery that manages the security sector.

The various chapters explain the involvement of other donors and UK government

departments, diagnoses the situation and considers how to design an intervention.

Chapters 5 to 11 look in more detail at the seven main areas identified as likely entry

points for reform.

Important conclusions include:

To help recipient governments develop a wider reform strategy and to

strengthen political support for change, it is important to take a comprehensive

view of the overall reform process. Reforms must be set in the wider context

and start with an understanding of what the particular security sector is for.

However, caution must be exercised where the military is entrenched in the

overall fabric of the state or where a civilian government is relying on it to

maintain power

Security sector programmes will generally need to address two sets of issues:

The quality of governance and technical competence. Reform on one front but

not the other is unlikely to work. The answer is to set reforms internal to the

security sector in a wider reform programme that strengthens the appropriate

instruments within the civilian policy sectors

Entry points for reform need to be chosen according to local circumstances.

However, the guidelines have identified seven key areas: (1) Building public

awareness and engagement; (2) building strategic planning capacity; (3)

strengthening legal and constitutional frameworks; (4) strengthening civil

oversight mechanisms; (5) strengthening financial management systems; (6)

facilitating war-to-peace transitions; and (7) improving human resource

management.

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The sequencing of reform may well be difficult where reforms are politically sensitive

or the regulatory framework is weak. In many cases, the starting point may be to

address problems outside the security sector, relating to wider questions of

administrative capacity and political governance. With the military often being the

most developed of national institutions in many situations where security is

compromised, the main political challenges are identified as:

Disengaging the military from politics and other non-military roles

Redefining security roles and creating a civilian policy-making role so that

civilian policy sectors can contribute effectively to the formulation of security

policy

‗Re-professionalising‘ the military, and ensuring its restructuring and

demobilisation suits the new political environment

Managing relations with donors to ensure that international assistance is

consistent with national needs and priorities and does not undermine national

policy-making processes.

Baly, D. 2002, 'Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform', report for the

Department for International Development, London

Civilian Security

C Call and W Stanley (2002)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Abstract

Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What

strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty

commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements,

which are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for

millions of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.

Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which

international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive,

systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens

after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and

presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is

related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major

powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war.

Source: Call, C.T. and Stanley, W., 2002, ‗Civilian Security.‘ in Stedman, S. J. et al.

(eds) (2002) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder

CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, pp. 303-326.

220

Police Reform: Peacebuilding through 'Democratic Policing'?

G C Celador (2005)

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Summary

What role has police reform played in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Bosnia

and Herzegovina (BiH) since the Dayton Peace Accords? This article published in

International Peacekeeping assesses the internationally-led police reforms in BiH, and

specifically the minority police recruitment policy and the certification process for all

police officers. It argues that these programmes have failed to make the expected

progress, and questions the theory that the police can be changed before society

changes.

In most, if not all, societies affected by internal conflict, the police are characterised by

bias, intimidation and brutality. In the 1990s, police reform therefore became an

essential pre-requisite for the success of post-conflict peacebuilding missions. The

guiding paradigm for such reform efforts is ‗democratic policing‘. This is the idea that

the police are a service, not a force, characterised by responsiveness and accountability

and focused on the security of the individual rather than the state. BiH is one of many

examples that confirm this trend. The Dayton Peace Accords included the goal of

ensuring that Bosnian police forces operated in accordance with the best international

policing standards.

In many significant respects the internationally-led police reform efforts in BiH failed

to make the expected progress.

Although the police no longer engage directly in human rights violations, there

are still instances where they prove unable or unwilling to make redress in this

situation, especially in relation to minority returns victims.

Multi-ethnic police forces are unlikely to attract minority returnees to pre-war

areas when other key institutions and services are absent.

The emphasis on strict ethnic quotas could prove counter-productive for the

development of a professional and efficient police force.

In many cases, local authorities have either not initiated disciplinary or criminal

procedures against de-authorised police officers, or the resulting punishments

have been inappropriate.

The accountability measures introduced have not led to higher levels of popular

trust and confidence in the police and thus in the Bosnian state.

The attempts to use the police as a transmission mechanism for the values that

international actors want the whole of BiH to adopt have led to the undermining

of the basic functions of the police.

The experience with police reform in BiH raises questions over the theory that the

police can be changed before society changes.

Completely abandoning the multi-ethnic idea in the police forces is not a viable

possibility - this would send out a negative message and impact particularly

badly on minority returnees in some parts of BiH.

The ethnic quotas could be relaxed, starting with lower numbers of places for

minority police officers and then gradually increasing the number as and when

the number of minority returnees increased.

The problem of empty positions is having a negative impact on the effectiveness

of police work.

221

Socially-engineering the police according to democratic policing precepts may

help in transforming a society, but it cannot work in isolation from a broad

range of other social mechanisms.

Without changes in the broader social context, the theory that strong group

identities can be subsumed by an overriding, apolitical, professional police

identity remains unproven.

Overzealous civilian oversight might be counterproductive to the development

of a culture of accountability within the police.

Source: Celador, G., 2005, 'Police Reform: Peacebuilding through 'Democratic

Policing'?' International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 364-376

Security Sector Transformation in Post Conflict Societies

Cooper and M Pugh (2002)

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Summary

Since the end of the Cold War, the attitude of development organisations towards the

security sector has changed and personal security is now recognised as a key concern

of the poor in weak states. In addition, repressive or corrupt security structures can

undermine the stability crucial to maximising the benefits of aid programmes.

Consequently, a number of agencies have engaged with the issue of security sector

reform and the idea is now largely accepted as something broader than solely the

military.

This paper, from the Centre for Defence Studies, argues that wider and more

innovative reform – security sector ‗transformation‘ – would be a way of addressing

the issues of socio-political dynamics of civil-military relations, as well as taking

account of the political economy of conflict. It concludes with a number of detailed

recommendations that the UK might address and points out that, while in developed

states there are signs that policy coordination has increased, there is still a risk that

policy can be co-opted by special interest groups, notably military-industrial actors,

whose interests may not always coincide with security sector reform in conflict prone

societies.

Identifying the challenges to security-sector reform as: Resource manipulation,

weapon‘s proliferation, the emphasis on coercion in international interventions and the

diverse contexts of war torn societies, the paper delineates the role that transformative

strategies can play in preventing conflicts and promoting post-conflict peace building

as follows:

There is a substantial deficit in current security sector governance in post

conflict societies that necessitates going beyond reformism

For peace to be embedded, the objects of reform should not be confined merely

to the security sectors of target countries but should also incorporate the broader

global structures and agents that condition them

It implies an holistic approach to security which recognises the interconnections

between the security sector and other areas of the domestic, regional and global

arena, most notably the economy

Therefore, strategies on other issues, such as the economy or the environment,

might be implemented to complement rather than undermine transformation of

the security sector

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Further, a transformative approach would give greater weight to the

mobilisation of civil society to sustain peace and control militarisation than has

hitherto been the case.

To achieve its goals, the paper divides a range of policies into two categories:

‗Structural arms control‘ initiatives designed to effect change in regional or

global structures, such as tightening arms-export credits and licensing rules,

taxing defence sales and controlling conflict resources such as Diaspora funds

and non-military conflict goods such as diamonds

Initiatives aimed at generating socio-political safeguards against militarism

within states, such as the transformation of civil-military relations through

constitutional and capacity building provisions to establish the supremacy of

civil authorities and a separation of powers

It also outlines an alternative approach: To locate changes in security sectors

within a broader transformative framework and to rebalance economic

structures and the socio-political environment so as to reduce the incentives for

militarisation. Also to engage with a wider set of actors, issues and security

concerns in a manner that expands and empowers the ‗islands of tranquility‘ in

war torn societies.

Source: Cooper, N. and Pugh, M. 2002, 'Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict

Societies', Working Paper no. 5, Centre for Defence Studies, London.

Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional Perspectives

O Greene (2003)

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Summary

What is the added-value of regional or sub-regional approaches to security sector

reform (SSR) and conflict prevention strategies? This article, published in the Journal

of Security Sector Management, argues that the UK government and other donors

should assist in establishing or further developing regional and sub-regional SSR

programmes due to the cross-border nature of many security challenges. Equally,

donors should strengthen their ties with established regional mechanisms and

institutions to facilitate links between SSR programmes and wider conflict prevention

activities.

There is little consensus on the precise definition of the term ‗security sector‘. It

usually refers to those institutions and organisations allocated a legitimate role in the

use or threat of coercive force to deal with external or internal threats to the security of

the state and its citizens. Security sector reform aims to enhance the efficiency or

effectiveness of the security sector to meet the needs of national security or policing

priorities.

SSR and conflict prevention activities are inter-linked. SSR activities that aim to

improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the security sector indirectly contribute to

conflict prevention objectives. In addition, measures that enhance the democratic

governance of the security sector and ensure good civil-security sector relations

contribute to the building of a peaceful society in which conflicts can be pursued

without violence or fear of violence. Due to the transnational nature of many security

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challenges, a regional or sub-regional approach to SSR could represent a useful step

forward by:

Enhancing awareness and engagement on cross-border or sub-regional security

issues. This may lead to the development of SSR programmes that are designed

to address cross-cutting, transnational challenges.

Engaging with regional organisations in the development of SSR programmes.

This may be beneficial as regional actors often share a similar understanding

and approach to the legitimate role of various branches of the security sector,

such as civil defence or the military‘s role in policing.

Enhancing regional co-operation and confidence building. Geographical

proximity facilitates the sharing of experiences, lessons learned and the spread

of precedents.

Understanding that bilateral or sub-regional co-operation may enhance SSR

effectiveness through the provision of border guards and the promotion of

confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Ensuring that the adoption of regional approaches does not replace or lead to

inadequate analysis of specific national or sectoral SSR issues.

The UK government has taken a leading role in promoting security sector reform as an

integral part of its efforts to support conflict prevention and post-conflict

peacebuilding. The UK and other donors could assist in establishing or further

developing regional or sub-regional SSR programmes by:

Learning from the experience of established regional or sub-regional SSR

programmes. These already exist to a limited extent in sub-regions such as the

Stability Pact countries and NATO‘s Partnership for Peace (PfP).

Extending established regional or sub-regional SSR programmes to other areas,

particularly where regional institutions have already established relevant norms.

This includes sub-regions or clusters of states in Southern, Eastern and Western

Africa, ASEAN and Latin America.

Reviewing existing regional SSR programmes to identify gaps and opportunities

for extending assistance. For example, programmes to enhance police capacity

for combating transnational crime and terrorism are being developed in Africa

and ASEAN, however, these reforms have not been extended to other sectors.

Ensuring that regional approaches retain flexibility and a strong bilateral

dimension. Flexibility is essential to circumvent capacity problems and political

constraints in regional organisations.

Strengthening the link between SSR and conflict prevention. The UK should

develop mechanisms to enhance the contribution of SSR programmes supported

in the Conflict Prevention Pools to conflict prevention strategies.

Source: Greene, O., 2003, Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional

Perspectives, Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 1, No. 1

Reforming Civil-Military Relations

S Huntingdon (1995)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Source: Huntington, S., 1995, ‗Reforming Civil-Military Relations‘, Journal of

Democracy, 6(4): 9-17.

224

Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues

E Hutchful (1997)

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Abstract

In the 1970s and 1980s, Africa was the most militarised and conflict-torn continent in

the world. Civil wars, military coups, armed foreign interventions, ethnic conflicts, and

other forms of civil and political strife were commonplace. At the height of these

conflicts one-quarter to one-third of Africa's population were displaced and became

refugees. In the 1970s, military budgets and arms procurements in Africa grew at a

faster rate than in any other world region, before receding in the 1980s under the

impact of deepening economic recession. While these trends have not disappeared

altogether, Africa has witnessed a no less dramatic demilitarisation and

democratisation of its politics since the late eighties and early nineties. Peace accords

and elections have led to the end of civil wars in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique,

Ethiopia and Eritrea. Military governments have been removed in Mali, the Central

African Republic, Benin, the Congo, Ghana, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and, until

recently, Niger and Burundi. Authoritarian and one-party governments in the Ivory

Coast, Kenya, Gabon, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and

elsewhere have submitted themselves to elections and otherwise liberalised their

regimes.

Source: Hutchful, E., ‗Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic

Issues‘, African Security Review, 2, 1997

Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation

C McArtney and M Fischer (2004)

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Abstract

This issue of the Berghof Dialogue Series examines the arguments for engagement

with the security sector and provides an analysis of the dilemmas that arise and

suggestions for how they might be overcome.

Source: McArtney, C., M. Fischer, O. Wils (eds.), 2004, ‗Security Sector Reform:

Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation‘, Berghof Handbook for

Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series No. 2, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for

Constructive Conflict Management.

Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005)

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Summary

How do you foster through governance reforms a secure environment that is conducive

to poverty reduction and sustainable development? What are the key components of

security? These are questions that are addressed in this publication by the Development

225

Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD). The research suggests that the traditional concept of security is

being redefined. The document sets out the key concepts of security system reform

(SSR) and suggests ways to support it in developing countries.

Security from violence is fundamental to people‘s livelihoods and to sustainable

economic, social and political development. Security matters to the poor and other

vulnerable groups, especially women and children. Conflict-affected countries account

for a high proportion of those furthest from the Millennium Development Goals.

OECD governments now realise that ―the cost of neglect‖ – letting countries drift into

deep difficulties or become failed states – is far too high for people, nations and

international security. The overall objective of security system reform is to create a

secure environment. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: (1) the

ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate

conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed and (2) the

ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or

address security threats that affect society‘s well-being.

The SSR policy agenda covers three inter-related challenges facing all states: (1)

developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates

security and development policy and includes all relevant actors (2) strengthening the

governance of the security institutions and (3) building capable and professional

security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. The focus of security policy is

broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state stability and regime security to

include the well-being of their populations and human rights.

Security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably linked, which

opens the way to mainstreaming security as a public policy and a governance issue. In

this context, it is clear that SSR needs to be:

People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights

principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear.

Seen as a framework for addressing diverse security challenges facing states and

their populations through more integrated development and security policies and

through greater civilian involvement and oversight.

Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad

assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state.

Developed by adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform such

as transparency and accountability.

Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the

institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function

effectively.

There is now greater public scrutiny of security policy. State institutions involved in

providing security are being re-evaluated. For reforms to be successful, the following

policy goals should be taken into account:

The promotion of peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and

poverty reduction.

Whole-of-government approaches to SSR, which might entail necessary

institutional changes.

The facilitation of partner country-owned and led reform efforts.

226

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004, Security System

Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) Guidelines and Reference Document, Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

7.2 Justice sector

UK Government policy

Justice and Poverty Reduction: Safety, Security and Access to Justice for All

Department for International Development (2000)

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Summary

How important are justice systems for improving the lives of the poor? What

contribution can DFID make to bettering these systems? The aim of this paper is to

assist DFID‘s mission to improve the security and welfare of the world‘s poorest

people through improving their access to justice. It observes that the burden of crime

falls most heavily upon the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of society who are also

those least able to access the justice system. It also has a wider economic cost, as

resources are diverted from social welfare into policing, revenue is lost to invisible

trade, assets are damaged or stolen, and consequently investment is discouraged.

It is estimated that the cost of crime, both in lost assets and in revenue directed to law

enforcement, is around five per cent of GDP in the developing world, and fourteen per

cent in the developed world. The burden of suffering falls disproportionately heavily

on the poor, who are unable to enjoy the benefits of the justice system due to the

corruption of the police and the distance and expense of the courts. In addition:

States where the legal system and crime control are poor are unattractive to

investors and so economic growth suffers

Poor people tend to rely on customary justice systems rather than formal legal

ones, because they are quicker, cheaper and closer to home. However, they also

tend to be more partial and discriminatory

Proactive crime prevention is up to eight times more cost-effective than reactive

measures. Reducing youth unemployment, drug dependency or the availability

of firearms are examples of preventive measures

Traditional/customary legal systems account for eighty per cent of total cases.

They take better account of the needs of local communities, butter do not

always protect the rights of the poorest and most vulnerable members of society.

Because police forces, particularly in developing countries, often abuse their powers,

issues of transparency and accountability are as important as efficiency and efficacy.

Relevant and practical human rights training is essential, as are adequate budgets and

safeguards against political interference, and also investigative skills and equipment so

that cases can be based on evidence rather than confessions. In addition, DfID can help

governments improve safety, security and access to justice through (1) consultation

with interested parties; (2) sector-wide diagnosis of the problems to be addressed and

consequential sector- wide approaches to reform, including where necessary the

pooling of donor resources; and (3) targeting development assistance towards a

coherent set of objectives and policies to which the government is committed. Other

approaches include

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Law reform to reduce discrimination, promote public- interest litigation by

advocacy groups, paralegal assistance, legal aid and legal rights education

Making courts more accessible through the use of local languages and even

local magistrates, mobile courts, education for both judges and the wider public,

better co-ordination between courts and other agencies, and improving case-

flow

Passing sentences which put reparation before retribution, which are more

humane and cost-effective and also help decongest prisons.

Source: DFID 2000, 'Justice and poverty reduction: safety, security and access to

justice for all', Department for International Development publication, 2000

Putting SSAJ Policy Into Practice

Department for International Development (2001)

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Summary

Justice systems can play an important part in improving the lives of poor people. The

Department for International Development (DFID) can help improve these systems in

ways that are appropriate to the local culture and within available resources. But how

should safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ) policy be put into practice?

This guidance note, from DFID's Governance Department, looks at how DFID's

guidelines could be implemented, with the caveat that each case should be treated

individually and that the guidelines should not be read as a manual. All justice systems

are different and have many components. Justice matters to poor people. The impact of

theft, for example, is more severe if the victim is poor; and a lack of access to justice

fosters corruption. A new approach will provide DFID with comparative experience of

sector reform to help support national reform initiatives and to influence the agenda of

donor programmes.

Safety, security and accessible justice are of great concern to poor people. The

Government recognises this and is aware that in many cases formal justice systems fail

to protect them. Other findings include:

Because they lack security, poor people are less likely to invest in improving

their own futures

Efforts by the poor to escape from poverty are hampered by corrupt police and

judicial officers. The poor feel insecure about accessing government services

Respect for the law is reduced due to vigilantism and self-help policing

initiatives which citizens are forced into because of poor safety and security.

Corruption escalates because of lack of access to justice

SSAJ is vital for governance and development. Maintaining law and order is a

key government responsibility and part of the necessary framework for

economic and social development

The rule of law is linked to economic growth and investment. A well-

functioning justice sector promotes better lives for poor people whilst ensuring

the protection and promotion of economic and social, as well as civil and

political, rights

State power can be constrained by a strong independent judiciary.

228

Justice system reform is a neglected issue. DFID suggest two new elements of policy:

(1) Basing interventions on a sector instead of single institutions; and (2) looking at the

sector from the user‘s perspective - particularly the poor and vulnerable. In addition to

this:

Providing support to SSAJ issues is essential for those countries that are

involved in a Poverty Reduction Strategy process

An SSAJ strategy can play an important role in protecting human rights

The sector approach helps to find suitable entry points, such as the underlying

causes of problems common to justice sector institutions, which may be via an

intervention in another sector

Sequencing issues may need to be examined. For example, increasing the

supply of legal aid is pointless if judges are corrupt. Judicial corruption would

initially have to be tackled

In challenging traditional systems it is important that the positive aspects, such

as the combination of social support and social control, are not lost in

implementing changes

Penal reform could include: Providing alternatives to prison for minor

offenders; reducing pre-trial detention; improving prison conditions; and

moving towards a process of rehabilitation and re-integration.

Source: Department for International Development 2001, 'Guidance Note: Putting

SSAJ Policy into Practice', DFID, London.

Core readings

The Rule of Law in Conflict Management

N Kritz (2007)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

The nature of war has changed, with the majority now being intranational rather than

international. This research from the United States Institute of Peace argues that in this

context new tools are required to manage conflict and to make and maintain the peace.

Most important in this is the development of the rule of law. If diligently nurtured, rule

of law‘s contribution to accountability, conflict resolution, limits on power and the

processing of opposing views can reduce the likelihood of another civil war.

In recent years, 93 per cent of the major armed conflicts have been ethnic or religious

conflicts, disputes over self-determination or succession or violent political struggles

between opposing domestic political factions. The techniques that may have been

appropriate for resolving wars between states are often unable to bring reconciliation

between domestic adversaries who together must build a durable national union. In this

new scenario, establishing the rule of law becomes increasingly important, particularly

in the immediate postconflict construction of peace.

Rule of law imposes a network of institutions, mechanisms and procedures that check

sources of tension at an early phase, prevent any party from engaging in violent action

and offer fairness and openness.

The shift from international to intranational conflict affects the rule of law in several

ways:

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Many laws which were previously only used in conflict between states are

increasingly being applied to abuses in intrastate conflicts.

There is a greater acceptance of the universal jurisdiction over crimes - so that

crimes committed in one country can be prosecuted in another.

While state military forces receive basic instruction in the international rules

that govern their conduct, insurgent groups engaged in civil wars, to whom

these international rules of conduct now apply, do not receive any training.

Governments against which these groups are fighting are reluctant to have them

sign the Geneva Convention since it is seen to give them legitimacy.

While war between two states can be resolved without changes to the internal

laws or institutions of the warring parties, resolving conflict within a state

requires changes to assure each group that their interests will be protected

through non-violent means.

The rule of law incorporates many elements necessary to ease tension and lessen the

likelihood of further conflict. Those involved in postconflict peacebuilding and societal

reconstruction need to face the challenges associated with accounting for past abuses

and constructing a new constitutional order.

Courts should be set up as the main forum for the peaceful resolution of

disputes but should be part of a whole system of criminal justice, including a

law-abiding police force, prison system and criminal defence lawyers.

Truth and reconciliation commissions can complement criminal trials, serving a

different but vital function for societies in transition.

A balance is needed between legitimately removing individuals implicated in

repression from government structures and avoiding widespread political

purges.

Enabling society to participate in drafting the constitution means the process

will involve compromises in time, content and money but it can produce a

constitutional system that is more widely accepted and more supportive of

peace.

Local ownership is important. This requires new approaches based on local

decisions informed by outside advice.

Source: Kritz, N., 2007, ?The Rule of Law in Conflict Management?, in Crocker, C.,

F.O. Hampson, and P. All (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a

Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp. 401-424

Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict

R Mani (2005)

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Summary

Peace without justice is only a symbolic peace. But how can justice be restored after

conflict? This article from the journal Development argues that international

peacebuilders have sometimes imposed rather than proposed and facilitated solutions.

In order to rejoin peace and justice there must be a mutual agreement between

stakeholders in post-conflict societies: civilians and combatants, citizens and

governments, international peacebuilders and national recipients. The most important

dimension is the role of the local population.

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Restoring justice after conflict is as much a political imperative as a social necessity.

Political leaders will not make concessions or respect peace agreements unless

grievances have been addressed. Equally, the public will not trust authorities and invest

in peace unless their injustices are tackled. Yet, remarrying peace with justice after

conflict has torn them apart is a difficult task. It is rarely undertaken comprehensively,

producing inadequate results and often setting back the peace process itself.

Three distinct, interdependent dimensions of justice are relevant to building peace:

Rectificatory justice: This is rectifying the injustices that are direct

consequences of conflict including human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes

against humanity. Since 1945, there has been more deliberate targeting of

civilians. The need to address these violations is commonly referred to as

‗transitional justice‘.

Legal justice: Breakdown of the rule of law, political manipulation and

corruption in the legal system are common symptoms of conflict. These result in

a lack of legal redress for injustices experienced by the population.

Distributive justice: The structural injustices and distributive inequalities that

underlie the causes of conflict are often neglected. It is both the experiences and

perceptions of exclusion, rather than poverty or ethnicity in themselves, which

matter.

The task of restoring justice after conflict has been reduced to a preoccupation with

injustices related to the consequences of conflict. To lay the foundation for a lasting

peace, all three dimensions of justice need to be addressed.

Peacebuilding consists of a ‗negative‘ task of preventing relapse into violence

and a ‗positive‘ task of aiding recovery and removing underlying causes of war.

It is essential to respect the delicate balance between these two.

International rule of law programmes tend to ignore political ramifications and

fail to consider context or longer-term objectives. Incremental programmes

should embed the rule of law in justice and human rights and focus on longer-

term, more ambitious goals.

A single officially sponsored mechanism cannot resolve rectificatory justice

claims definitively; a combination of measures is required. Trials and truth

commissions target individual perpetrators and victims, whereas a broader

response will engage all survivors.

‗Reparative justice‘ is sensitive to the nature of offences and their impact on

victims, offenders and societies. It is also flexible in devising a suitable

combination of responses.

Donors continue to promote growth at all costs, with little attention to

distributive effects and the need to redress inequitable pre-conflict situations.

They should first redress past economic inequalities before policies of

generalised economic growth and development are implemented.

Mani, R., 2005, 'Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict',

Development, 48(3), pp. 25-34

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Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004)

Access full text online

Summary

How do you foster through governance reforms a secure environment that is conducive

to poverty reduction and sustainable development? What are the key components of

security? These are questions that are addressed in this publication by the Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD). The research suggests that the traditional concept of security is

being redefined. The document sets out the key concepts of security system reform

(SSR) and suggests ways to support it in developing countries.

Security from violence is fundamental to people‘s livelihoods and to sustainable

economic, social and political development. Security matters to the poor and other

vulnerable groups, especially women and children. Conflict-affected countries account

for a high proportion of those furthest from the Millennium Development Goals.

OECD governments now realise that ―the cost of neglect‖ – letting countries drift into

deep difficulties or become failed states – is far too high for people, nations and

international security. The overall objective of security system reform is to create a

secure environment. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: (1) the

ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate

conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed and (2) the

ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or

address security threats that affect society‘s well-being.

The SSR policy agenda covers three inter-related challenges facing all states: (1)

developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates

security and development policy and includes all relevant actors (2) strengthening the

governance of the security institutions and (3) building capable and professional

security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. The focus of security policy is

broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state stability and regime security to

include the well-being of their populations and human rights.

Security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably linked, which

opens the way to mainstreaming security as a public policy and a governance issue. In

this context, it is clear that SSR needs to be:

People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights

principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear.

Seen as a framework for addressing diverse security challenges facing states and

their populations through more integrated development and security policies and

through greater civilian involvement and oversight.

Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad

assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state.

Developed by adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform such

as transparency and accountability.

Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the

institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function

effectively.

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There is now greater public scrutiny of security policy. State institutions involved in

providing security are being re-evaluated. For reforms to be successful, the following

policy goals should be taken into account:

The promotion of peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and

poverty reduction.

Whole-of-government approaches to SSR, which might entail necessary

institutional changes.

The facilitation of partner country-owned and led reform efforts.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004, Security System

Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) Guidelines and Reference Document, Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

Supplementary readings

Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge

T Carothers (2003)

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Summary

The causal relationship between rule of law promotion, and economic development

and democracy is not as direct as it might appear but remains donors‘ rationale for

these activities. Is there a problem of knowledge concerning rule of law projects? What

should practitioners know when they promote these activities?

This paper from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace considers the

apparent lack of knowledge supporting rule of law projects in developing countries.

There is a surprising amount of uncertainty about the rationale for rule of law

promotion and what actually constitutes the ‗rule of law‘. There is limited knowledge

about how system changes occur and what long-term effects specific changes will have

on the development of the rule of law. Despite the amount of rule of law activity taking

place, the knowledge of individual practitioners tends not to be systemised or absorbed

by sponsoring institutions. The ‗lessons learnt‘ in official reports are frequently too

general and obvious. Appropriate reforms to aid programmes are often blocked by

agencies‘ underlying interests and incentives.

The common sense appeal of arguments supporting rule of law promotion is often too

simplistic and can be misleading. It is not clear that foreign investment is required for

economic development. In addition:

Whilst the rule of law and democracy are closely linked, reasonably democratic

states often have significant shortcomings in the rule of law

There is no proof that a state must have an established and effective rule of law

to attract investment. In fact, the presence of certain types of foreign investors

may contribute to the development of the rule of law through demands for

reform

Promoters tend to have a narrow outlook on what the rule of law is, focusing on

institutions, especially the judiciary, and having little interest in non-Western

forms of law, traditional systems of justice, or in some cases even civil law

A mechanistic approach is generally taken to developing rule of law, with

promoters trying to reshape key institutions to match those of countries

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considered to have the rule of law. In many countries, this encounters strong

resistance

The area‘s knowledge accumulation is hindered by its conceptual and practical

complexity; the particularity of each legal system; and the limited focus of

academics and lawyers on empirical research about rule of law programmes

Aid agencies tend to be poor at accumulating knowledge due to limited

resources being committed to evaluations; the frequent changing of personnel;

and a certain defensiveness within a context of doubts about the value of aid.

There is no proof that improvements in one part of the system will ‗spillover‘ into

other parts. It is not clear whether judicial independence improves the rule-of-law.

Other policy implications include:

Rule of law is not yet a field of activity, if such a designation requires a well-

grounded rationale; a clear understanding of the problem; a proven analytic

method; and an understanding of the results achieved

Donors know that rule of law projects may help economic development and

democracy, but do not know how strong the direct causal relationship may be or

whether similar resources targeted elsewhere might have had greater effects

The aid community should have a broader concept of what constitutes the rule

of law, considering, for example, the role of the legislature and executive, and

how citizens understand, use and value the law

It should not be presumed that change will happen once the right institutions are

in place, but rather when key people within the system want it to happen and are

given enabling assistance for them to carry out that change.

Source: Carothers, T. 2003, 'Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of

Knowledge', Rule of Law Series no. 34, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington, D.C.

Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative

S Golub (2003)

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Summary

This paper argues that, in integrating law and development, many multilateral and

bilateral development agencies overemphasise 'rule of law (ROL) orthodoxy', which

concentrates aid on 'top-down' support for state legal institutions and law reform. It

suggests an alternative approach, legal empowerment—the use of legal services and

related developments, to increase disadvantaged populations‘ control over their lives.

Legal empowerment builds civil society to provide pro-poor legal services and to

increase the capacities and power of the poor so they can better assert their rights, often

in the context of agriculture, health, gender, natural resources, and other 'non-justice'

sectors. As indicated by a growing array of quantitative and qualitative evidence, legal

empowerment contributes not just to governance and justice, but also to social

development and poverty alleviation.

As most prominently practiced by multilateral development banks, the dominant, ROL

orthodoxy paradigm concentrates on law reform and government institutions,

particularly judiciaries, to build business-friendly legal systems that presumably spur

poverty alleviation. But many bilateral and other development agencies similarly take a

top-down, state-centred approach in their law programs, albeit in pursuit of other ends.

234

The problems with the paradigm are not its various economic and political goals, per

se, but its questionable assumptions, unproven impact and insufficient attention to the

legal needs of the disadvantaged.

Legal empowerment represents an alternative, more balanced approach. It prioritises

civil society support but engages government where possible and does not preclude

important or even leading roles for dedicated officials and ministries. It also addresses

a central reality that ROL orthodoxy overlooks: in many developing countries, laws

benefiting the poor exist on paper but not in practice unless the poor push for laws

enforcement.

Legal empowerment is more than an alternative to the dominant paradigm; it should be

integrated into many mainstream socio-economic development efforts that generally

do not address ROL or the legal needs of the poor. It puts community-driven and

rights-based development into effect by offering concrete mechanisms, involving legal

services, to alleviate poverty, advance the rights of the disadvantaged, and make the

ROL more of a reality for them. So far, however, legal empowerment efforts mainly

consist of diverse civil society initiatives rather than deliberate donor programs. As a

result, it is under-appreciated and underused. The message for ROL development

practitioners is that they need to think less like lawyers and more like agents of social

change. Conversely, development practitioners in other fields could benefit from

thinking more like lawyers and human rights advocates. The changes in perspective

will create opportunities for using law to enhance development. Both groups should

also stop assuming that assistance to state institutions yields greater impact and more

sustainable outcomes than support for civil society. In fact, there are significant

arguments and evidence to the contrary.

Legal empowerment differs from ROL orthodoxy in at least four additional ways:

Attorneys support the poor as partners, instead of dominating them as

proprietors of expertise.

The disadvantaged play a role in setting priorities, rather than government

officials and donor personnel dictating the agenda.

Addressing these priorities frequently involves nonjudicial strategies that

transcend narrow notions of legal systems, justice sectors, and institution

building.

Even more broadly, the use of law is often just part of integrated strategies that

include other development activities.

Because research suggests that legal empowerment has helped advance poverty

alleviation, good governance, and other development goals, it merits

substantially increased financial and political support. Such assistance can be

provided:

As aid specifically directed at legal empowerment.

In conjunction with ROL promotion.

As part of mainstream socio-economic development work embracing such

fields as agriculture, education, gender, health, natural resources, and water.

Golub, S., 2003, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy. The Legal Empowerment

Alternative, Rule of Law Series Working Papers No. 41, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, Washington D.C.

235

Human Rights and Justice Sector Reform in Africa: Contemporary Issues and

Responses

Open Society Justice Initiative (2005)

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Summary

A strictly legalistic view of justice is inadequate to analyse the full extent of justice

sector reform in contemporary Africa. Proper assessment should include formal,

informal, national and international mechanisms. This collection of articles from the

Open Society Institute (OSI) demonstrates a holistic review of justice, including

localising universal norms, globalising local principles of access to justice and

promoting the link between justice, safety and security through the safeguarding of

accountability mechanisms.

Analysis of Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gambia, South Africa, Sudan and the Democratic

Republic of Congo raises specific issues concerning judicial reforms. These include

issues of national reform, equality and citizenship, international justice, transnational

remedies and the freedom of expression and information. In particular:

Elements of customary justice either co-exist with or have been incorporated

into formal justice systems in many countries, especially in rural areas where

formal justice systems are often not present.

Traditional and informal mechanisms of justice are extremely important because

of numerous limitations on formal justice in Africa.

The strengths of the formal and traditional systems need to be incorporated. In

Sierra Leone, the link is provided by community-based paralegal workers,

informed about formal legal systems.

Given that the right to citizenship is a prerequisite to other rights, it is important

to strengthen weak international norms on the granting and confiscation of

citizenship. National citizenship policies need to be opened for scrutiny, and

advocacy on the issue developed.

The three international tribunals currently operating in Africa need to focus on

compensation/reparation issues and give adequate attention to local conceptions

of justice.

More effort needs to be put into providing aid that takes into account good

developmental practice, and in defining the concept of national ownership.

The test for good practice should include the extent to which justice mechanisms are

made affordable to ordinary people, as well as guaranteeing procedural simplicity and

fairness and consistency with cultural expectations. It is important to avoid bias against

traditional marginalised groups (women, children etc), dispense justice in local

languages and produce outcomes that emphasise community-building, skills transfer,

restoration and reparation. In addition, justice sector reform requires:

Better planning and continuation of funding in order to ensure sustainable

interventions.

Re-conceptualisation of justice as a sector and not just a set of separate

institutions and co-ordinated work between institutions from state and the civil

society.

Greater understanding of the context for intended reforms, with the continued

promotion of national leadership but also political astuteness.

Provision of assistance not just to states but also to non-state actors, such as

customary systems of justice.

236

Improvement of donor habits and incentives through closer scrutiny of the ways

in which aid is delivered.

Source: Open Society Justice Initiative, 2005, 'Human Rights and Justice Sector

Reform in Africa: Contemporary Issues and Responses', Justice Initiatives, Open

Society Justice Initiative

Fighting Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?

M O‘Donnell

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Abstract

This chapter summarizes the literature on corruption, emphasizing the close links

between corruption, the rule of law, statebuilding and peacebuilding. It also reviews

the evolution of international anti-corruption policy and practice and examines

the applicability of general practice to post-conflict settings.

Source: O‘Donnell, Madalene. ‗Fighting Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?‘ Draft

chapter prepared for International Peace Academy edited volume, Civil War and the

Rule of Law, forthcoming

Rule of Law Tools in Post-Conflict

Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights States (2006)

Monitoring Legal Systems:

http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-

Monitoring_en.pdf

Mapping the Justice Sector:

http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-

Mapping_en.pdf

Vetting: an operational Framework:

http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-Vetting_en.pdf

Prosecution Initiatives:

http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-

Prosecutions_en.pdf

Truth Commissions:

http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/ruleoflaw-

TruthCommissions_en.pdf

237

Supporting Security, Justice and Development

C Stone (2005)

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Summary

An understanding of how insecurity and poverty are linked is increasingly informing

development assistance. How can assistance with policing and justice be strengthened?

This paper, part of a larger study commissioned by the UK government, draws together

lessons from the experiences of recent UK funded policing and justice programs in

seven countries: Afghanistan, India, Jamaica, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria and Sierra

Leone.

The UK's Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategy embraces reform of the military and

intelligence services along with police and other security and justice agencies. Its work

on Safety, Security and Access to Justice (SSAJ) includes policing, courts and penal

regimes, civil and commercial justice, and alternative dispute resolution. These

programmes are pursued on a holistic, sector wide basis, rather than focusing on

individual institutions. They proceed from an understanding that government

ownership and assessing the problems from the users perspective are fundamental to

success.

Assuring civilian oversight of uniformed services and advancing the security and

justice concerns of poor people and other vulnerable groups are difficult tasks in all

societies. The challenge is probably greater in countries experiencing armed conflict

(Nepal), of emerging from it (Sierra Leone, Afghanistan). In these countries, the

guidance on the pursuit of sector wide reform has been difficult to follow on the

ground. This is partly because of short-term funding arrangements, the confinement of

civilian leadership to silos and less expertise in sector-wide approaches amongst

development agency staff.

Ten lessons learned are identified from the UK's experience of police and justice

reform:

Design and implementation should integrate short-term work on community

safety with long-term organisational and institutional change.

Design and coordination processes should anticipate tensions within the security

sector, particularity between the army and the police.

Civil Society Involvement should be stronger in order to balance the focus on

the supply of security and justice with appropriate focus on the demand.

Improvements in safety and access to justice are assumed to contribute to

poverty reduction. The logic models created at the design stage and the

assessments conducted during implementation should be improved to

demonstrate those links explicitly.

Actual progress on human rights should be accelerated so that programs are less

likely to be set back by human rights abuses.

Gender issues should be mainstreamed.

Sector-wide co-ordination led by the partner government is a key intermediate

outcome, but the strategy for achieving this coordination should be reconceived

so that it develops more quickly and is less easily set back.

As part of UK programs, strong Whitehall co-ordination should be encouraged.

Co-ordination of UK departments and managers in country should be

strengthened.

238

Recruitment, deployment and retention of experts and managers should receive

greater attention.

Following on from these lessons, 15 specific recommendations for project implication

are made, including:

SSR and SSAJ should remain distinct programs, but be closer aligned.

Police and military advisers should develop more collaborative relationships to

encourage the same in institutions of partner governments.

A fully staffed SSAJ team should be established in the Department for

International Development (DFID).

A repository of good practice with civil society organisations should be

established centrally.

DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should establish a critical

incident review process to examine events leading up to and following any

serious violation of human rights.

The UK should commit to work on SSAJ and SSR in Middle Income Countries

that could serve as anchors of security regionally and globally.

Source: Stone, C. et al., 2005, 'Supporting Security, Justice and Development: Lessons

for a New Era', Vera Institute of Justice, New York

239

8. Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in

Mitigating Risks of Violence

UK Government policy

UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2004-2006

DFID (2004)

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Summary

The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a major

source of insecurity and poverty worldwide. This Department for International

Development (DfID) paper summarises the United Kingdom‘s policies and strategies

on SALW. The British Government‘s objectives regarding limiting the availability and

misuse of SALW focus on three areas: strengthening controls on supply; reducing

availability; and addressing demand. It recognises that these issues are complex and

inter-related, requiring action between states, intergovernmental organisations and civil

society.

SALW are generally considered to be weapons that can be used by one or two people.

The developing world suffers disproportionately as a result of SALW, although richer

countries are by no means immune. Production is highly decentralised globally. SALW

have many legitimate military and civilian uses. However, a lack of adequate

regulation has meant that significant quantities of weapons are diverted into the black

market, from where they are easily subject to misuse.

Stronger national, regional and international controls on small arms transfers are

critical to combating easy availability and misuse. The UK is committed to stronger

controls on SALW transfers and the systematic collection, management and

destruction of weapons:

The UK will work with others to achieve international consensus on stronger

controls on transfers of SALW and build capacity to implement effective

transfer controls.

Where control is lax, for example in relation to the activities of arms brokers

and the marking and tracing of weapons, the UK will support the establishment

of new global controls.

The UK will continue to seek opportunities to collect and destroy weapons and

ammunition, in partnership with others.

The UK will also continue to support efforts to systematically include weapons

and ammunition collection and destruction as integral elements of peace support

operations. This includes effective demobilisation, disarmament and

rehabilitation (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).

In partnership with others, the UK aims to develop coordinated policy and best

practice on these issues.

Controlling supply and reducing the availability of weapons is not enough – more

needs to be done to address the root causes of armed violence. Increasing

understanding of the motivations driving illicit gun use is essential for developing

targeted programmes:

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Reducing demand for guns requires long term sustainable development,

improved public security, heightened public awareness and increased alternative

livelihoods opportunities, including for ex-combatants.

Resolving the structural problems that underpin insecurity and violence is

essential.

In partnership with other agencies, the UK will support further research and

analysis into the impact of armed violence and arms availability on poverty and

development.

The UK will work to promote increased donor coordination on armed violence

issues, although this should not detract from stand-alone small arms control

programmes.

The UK will also work to comprehensively integrate armed violence prevention

and small arms reduction into its own development assistance and encourage

other bilateral and multilateral agencies to do the same.

Source: DFID, 2004, 'UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light

Weapons, 2004-2006', Department for International Development, London

Small Arms and Light Weapons: a UK Policy Briefing

DFID (2001)

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Summary

Small arms and light weapons are an enormous problem. They kill over 300,000

people every year, cause injury to over 900,000 people and affect millions indirectly

through the dislocation of communities and destruction of livelihoods. This official UK

policy briefing summarises the damage caused by small arms and light weapons and

outlines current UK initiatives to combat the problem.

There are an estimated 550 million small arms and light weapons: One for every 10

people on the planet. Small arms and light weapons are also cheap, durable, robust,

easy to manufacture and copy and have a long lifespan. It is difficult to achieve

effective controls: The manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons is

decentralised, and illicit transfers are believed to account for a significant proportion of

the global trade—a market which is thought to be worth over one billion dollars

annually. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons also has serious

development costs: Post-conflict reconstruction and political, social and economic

development are undermined, as are the security and stability of the country or region.

The UK Government has responded to this problem in the following manner:

It has set up a committee mandated to combat illicit trafficking, pursue a

‗responsible and transparent‘ policy on legal transfers, and promote the removal

and destruction of weapons

It is working towards securing agreements with the European Union (EU) and

Organisation for Security Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) and has pledged its

support for the UN‘s 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms

The UK Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme has said that it will be

working on practical programmes over the next three years to reduce the

volume of weapons in circulation

The UK has pledged its support for governments and civil society organisations

in affected regions in order to build political commitment and effective controls

241

The UK has said it will support the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) initiative to help countries develop their own weapons collection,

management and destruction programmes, by providing UK experts in this area.

Because the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a worldwide problem, it

requires a comprehensive, coordinated response at the local, national, regional and

global levels. General recommendations are that:

A comprehensive response should integrate the perspectives of defence,

development, foreign policy, law enforcement and trade and needs to work in

partnership with international institutions

Agreements to control small arms will have little impact unless they are

matched by efforts to collect, securely manage and destroy the weapons in

circulation

Peace accords must provide for demobilisation, disarmament and the

rehabilitation of combatants

Peacekeeping operations must make provision for weapons collection and

destruction

These measures will only be effective if they take place within the framework of

a programme for Security Sector Reform — the remodelling of the military

forces and structures appropriate to the legitimate defence needs of a country.

Source: DFID 2001, 'Small Arms and Light Weapons: A UK Policy Briefing',

Department for International Development, FCO, and Ministry of Defence, London

Core readings

Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development

Small Arms Survey (2003)

Access full text online

Summary

What effect does small arms violence have on development? How have development

agencies and governments sought to tackle small arms use? This chapter from a work

published by the Small Arms Survey analyses the social, economic and human cost of

small arms use around the world. It argues that such violence causes widespread

damage to developing societies, and outlines developmental responses aimed at cutting

demand for small arms, regulating their use and destroying surplus stocks.

Internal armed conflict and social violence, which includes criminal and domestic

conflict, is concentrated in developing countries, and incidences are rising. Recent

conflict, a history of state-led violence, high unemployment levels and growing

inequality may contribute to armed criminality.

The direct consequences of small arms use include the human and financial costs of

firearms casualties, while the indirect effects encompass the social, economic and

developmental harm caused by armed violence or its threat. It can be difficult to

monitor firearms use because crimes go unreported or figures are suppressed by

governments.

Various findings are made on the effects of small arms use:

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Social services and social cohesion can be affected by the threat and use of

firearms. School enrolment rates and educational performance may drop and

clinics may shut and face disruption to supplies. The prevalence of gangs and

child soldiers may cause breakdown in families and communities.

Economic activity can be hit by higher transport costs, deteriorating

infrastructure and disruption to trade and production. Foreign investment,

savings and tax collection are also impaired by violent insecurity.

Development programmes are distorted by the threat of violence. Rising

logistical costs and security threats can hamper access for agencies and even

force their withdrawal from deprived areas.

The rule of law can be undermined by the growing use of private security in

violent societies. Private security firms can increase the flow of small arms back

into society and exacerbate criminality, while higher security expenditure

diverts resources from more productive activities.

Tackling firearms misuse entails a partnership between governments, NGOs and

international actors. It involves a tripartite approach directed at addressing the demand

for firearms, increasing legal controls and destroying surplus weapons:

Demand can be restricted by demobilisation initiatives, public awareness

campaigns and ‗weapons for development‘ programmes undertaken by

governments and international agencies. Some NGOs have focused on wider

factors feeding the demand for small arms, such as unemployment and

insecurity.

Domestic oversight of small arms use and availability has been promoted

through international initiatives assisting governments to monitor firearms

imports. Development agencies and governments have invested in

strengthening police and judicial systems and reforming the security sector to

promote accountability.

Multilateral organisations have instituted weapons collection guidelines and

established disarmament programmes in partnership with national

governments. The success of these initiatives should be measured according to

their contribution to development, rather than the raw numbers of weapons

destroyed.

Donors should undertake better surveys to monitor the effect of small arms use

in order to develop improved interventions aimed at reducing violence as part

of a broader developmental strategy.

Source: Small Arms Survey, 2003, ‗Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small

Arms on Human Development‘, Chapter Four in ‗Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2003:

Development Denied‘, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Supplementary readings

Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence

Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, Department for International Development (2003)

Access full text online

Summary

Armed violence poses a significant obstacle to poverty reduction. So why have so few

development agencies dealt with the problem of small arms in their policies or

243

programmes? This report from the Department for International Development

discusses ways of integrating arms controls into development policy and programmes

and suggests that more needs to be done to encourage development organisations to

address this issue.

Small arms availability and use is a development issue but more needs to be done to

document its impact on poverty. Although many development programmes are

affected by armed violence, the links between weapons availability and poverty are not

well documented. Currently many agencies are wary of addressing small arms because

of mandate and resource constraints and insufficient knowledge of both the problem

and possible solutions. Efforts to engage development agencies on arms issues have

been limited and often the messages conveyed have seemed irrelevant to poverty

reduction. Engaging policy makers on armed violence is key, particularly those

responsible for developing Poverty Reduction Strategies, as these provide the

overarching framework for many donors‘ bilateral assistance. Although there is a clear

need and many opportunities for integrating armed violence reduction into

development assistance, there are also risks. To date, there has been limited

information exchange or co-ordination among development agencies on armed

violence issues.

More needs to be done to engage development agencies effectively.

Co-operation among development agencies on armed violence issues needs to

be strengthened.

Armed violence is particularly relevant to specific areas of development.

There are risks in integrating small arms controls into development assistance.

Governments and civil society in developing countries need to be engaged on

armed violence issues.

Small arms reduction measures need to be integrated into national development

policy frameworks.

The onus lies with the small arms community to develop evidence and tools for

development agencies, to demonstrate that in countries affected by the wide

availability and use of arms, poverty reduction can be best achieved through a

reduction in armed violence and improved human security. Furthermore:

Research should be commissioned that makes explicit the links between armed

violence reduction and poverty eradication, including achieving the Millennium

Development Goals.

Those engaged on small arms issues should develop best practice guidelines for

armed violence reduction programmes that are accessible to development

practitioners, and help development agencies to engage on armed violence

initiatives.

Co-operation between different parts of government and civil society should be

improved, to ensure that, where armed violence is a significant obstacle to

development, this is articulated in poverty reduction strategies.

More needs to be done to engage the international financial institutions,

particularly the World Bank, to ensure that armed violence issues are included

in development policy dialogues.

Armed violence should be included in conflict assessments and more should be

done to document examples of urban and rural development programmes that

have successfully addressed armed violence. Arms management issues should

be integrated into security sector reform processes.

244

Increased co-operation among development agencies is a high priority, and the

OECD Development Assistance Committee could play a role in improving co-

ordination of donor policies on arms issues.

Source: Department for International Development, 2003, 'Tackling Poverty by

Reducing Armed Violence: Recommendations from a Wilton Park Workshop', 14-16

April, DFID, London.

Shattered Lives: A Case for Tough International Arms Control

Amnesty International and Oxfam (2003)

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Summary

The uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms by government forces and armed

groups takes a massive human toll in lost lives, lost livelihoods and lost opportunities

to escape poverty. What action is required at international, national and local level to

control arms proliferation? In this report, Amnesty International and Oxfam argue that

governments can and must do more to control arms proliferation effectively. Better co-

ordination between governments is needed to address both the trade in arms and safety

at community level.

Every government in the world has a responsibility to control arms, both within their

borders and those they export. The world‘s most powerful governments – who are also

the world‘s biggest arms suppliers – have the greatest responsibility. The five

permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, Russia, China, UK and USA)

together account for 88 per cent of the world‘s conventional arms exports; these

exports contribute regularly to gross abuses of human rights.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001, some suppliers

have relaxed arms controls in order to arm new-found allies against ‗terrorism‘,

irrespective of their disregard for human rights and humanitarian law. Despite the

damage caused by arms, there is still no binding, comprehensive, international law to

control their export. Still, the 1997 Landmines Treaty saw the end of open trading in

landmines and the same combination of public pressure and sympathetic governments‘

action could secure an Arms Trade Treaty.

Civil society and governments need to work proactively and effectively together to

address the problems of arms at international, regional, national and local level to stem

the source of supply and address the root causes of why people possess arms in

insecure environments.

Governments must agree on the Arms Trade Treaty, preventing arms being

exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit grave

violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

Governments must develop and strengthen regional arms-control agreements, to

uphold international human rights and humanitarian law.

Governments must improve state capacity and their own accountability to

control arms transfers and protect citizens from armed violence.

Civil society and local government agencies are urged to take effective action to

improve safety at community level, by reducing the local availability and

demand for arms.

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Governments are acting too slowly to control arms. They must take urgent action in the

following areas:

International level: adopt the Arms Trade Treaty by the 2006 UN review

conference on small arms (through government lobbying in international and

regional forums); create new international instruments to prevent irresponsible

arms brokering, transporting, financing and foreign licensed production; provide

more funding for practical assistance for arms-affected countries.

Regional level: create/strengthen arms control, building on and inspiring work

at the national level. These controls should address the flow of arms, and reduce

widespread availability.

National level: ensure responsible use of arms by national security forces,

abiding by international standards; take swift disarmament/demobilisation

action when conflict has ended; establish independent justice mechanisms to

deal with human rights abuse; create/enforce legislation to control import,

export, transit, production, sale and use of arms; improve public information

about arms production, possession and transfer; work with civil society to

develop strict arms controls.

Local level, in collaboration with civil society: rebuild confidence in the

possibility of non-armed security (in part by reducing the quantity of arms in

circulation); provide assistance to victims of armed violence; develop

sustainable livelihoods as an alternative for those who depend on armed

violence for their living.

Source: Hillier, D., and Wood, B., 2003, ‗Shattered Lives: A Case for Tough

International Arms Control‘, Amnesty International and Oxfam, London

246

Part 4: International Development System

Contents

1. Aid Instruments ................................................................................................................. 247

2. Development Effectiveness (Policy Coherence, Donor Alignment, Harmonisation) ....... 254

3. DFID‘s Governance Agenda and Competencies ............................................................... 267

247

1. Aid Instruments

Core readings

The Choice of Financial Aid Instruments

M Foster and J Leavy (2001)

Access full text online

Summary

There are various forms of aid and ways of ensuring that it reaches its intended targets.

Which is most appropriate in a given situation?

This guide from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) provides policymakers

with matrices and explanatory notes to help determine the most effective way to

deliver aid. There are three levels of aid: macro support, sectoral or other sub-national

support, and support to specific projects. The choice depends largely on the degree of

consensus within and between governments and donors over spending priorities.

Where stakeholders are agreed, it makes sense to support the government's budget as a

whole rather than impose the additional reporting costs of targeted support. If aid

might be disbursed inefficiently or incompletely by a weak government, it may be

better to restrict aid to particular sectors or projects. Aid may be conditional on certain

policies, may be earmarked for specific purposes, or special disbursement and

accountability measures may be required. In practice, aid is frequently a hybrid of

these levels and obligations.

Macro aid can be balance of payments support, general budget support, or debt

relief; the latter gives least control - once granted it cannot be revoked, even if

conditions are not met.

Macro aid is appropriate when there is formal agreement between donors and

government over public policy, strong public expenditure management, and

when efficiency gains outweigh the specific benefits of targeted aid.

Similarly, sectoral support is appropriate when there is agreement over sectoral

policies, administration is strong and benefits are greater than with project

finance.

The 'sector-wide approach' (SWAp) is different: there is a single policy and

expenditure programme for a whole sector; all funding is channelled through

government systems; it should be encouraged as it is the most efficient and

sustainable mode of delivery.

Project finance is appropriate in weak policy environments: it can support civil

society in holding government to account, and may be the only way to deliver

aid effectively; good projects can also influence policy by 'leading by example'.

It is also appropriate when governments do not think donors should be involved

in domestic policymaking.

How far to impose conditionality is subject to similar considerations as above; they

must also be coordinated with other donors' conditions and have domestic backing.

Conditionality can help domestic reformers by committing government to

certain policies, but a heavy-handed approach can be counter-productive if

reformers are seen as foreign 'stooges'.

Besides the ethical considerations, policies implemented without domestic

support are less effective and sustainable than those with strong backing.

248

Domestic channels should be used where possible, though technical assistance

(TA) may be needed, especially in specialist procurement; where capacity is

weak, systems should be strengthened rather than bypassed.

When economic problems lead to failed conditions, withdrawing aid can

exacerbate the situation - but not withdrawing as threatened raises moral hazard

issues.

In theory, a government can reduce its spending in a sector by the amount of

funds earmarked for it, thus freeing up resources for other uses; in practice,

public spending is not that easy to exchange, and earmarking is effective.

'Poverty earmarking' as developed by Uganda avoids many problems: a base

level of domestic spending in a sector is determined and aid is earmarked for

spending above that level.

Foster, M. and Leavy, J., 2001, 'The Choice of Financial Aid Instruments', Overseas

Development Institute, London.

Supplementary readings

The Status of Sector Wide Approaches

A Brown, M Foster, A Norton and F Naschold (2001)

Access full text online

Summary

Increasingly, donors have switched from project-based operations in developing

countries to working within sector-wide approaches (SWApS). Here, all significant

funding supports a single-sector policy and expenditure programme, under government

leadership. This report, commissioned for a donor working group, summarises

experiences prior to 2001 and proposes ways to make the SWAp process more

effective.

At the time of the study, SWAps were at an early stage of implementation,

representing work in progress rather than a blueprint. In 2001, most SWAps had not

yet attained their goals but were moving towards them. Work was still underway, even

with well-established programmes as in Uganda, on integrating all sources of funding

and ongoing projects, making sector coverage more comprehensive, and developing

common procedures and greater reliance on government. Experiences from SWAps in

different countries showed progress in improving government-donor relationships,

building government capacity, tackling corruption and targeting services more

effectively to the poor. However, there were still many problems with the planning,

implementation and management of SWAps, which were reducing their effectiveness.

The report asserts that SWAps may not be appropriate in all situations and contains a

framework for assessing their relevance. Where they are in place, some general

observations can be made:

In some cases, donor efforts to direct programme design have led to rejection by

governments, who lack ownership over the SWAp.

Governments are often unable to hold donors to their commitments, making

budget dependence on them risky.

Donors are too demanding with regard to programme details and immediate

results, often because they do not trust the review process. Monitoring and

information systems are underdeveloped.

249

Civil society participation in formulating policies is low, as is the quality of

analysis of how SWAps could reduce poverty and their impact on it.

Transaction costs appear to increase, at least in the initial stages. This puts extra

pressure on overloaded ministries, which are expected to achieve and maintain

high levels of productivity.

Most disbursements still take place using donor project procedures. The

inability of the World Bank to provide direct budget support is a problem.

Recommendations are made to improve the design, implementation and management

of SWAps, as well as to measure their impact. Actors should:

Link agreed SWAp strategies to hard choices and concrete processes, such as

medium-term budget frameworks and civil service reform.

Recognise that policy change is ongoing, and put in place permanent analytical

capacity to support government. A focused annual review process should be

established, which may lower transaction costs.

Focus, in the case of donors, on delivering coherent and consistent messages

and giving priority to essentials. They should be aware of political contexts and

have realistic expectations.

Develop indicators and systems to monitor programmes, and gather more

information on problems of service delivery and access for the poor. Civil

society participation should be increased.

Address capacity shortages by introducing wider civil service reforms and

decentralising responsibility to district level. Corruption should be targeted with

effective sanctions.

Make financial procedures common across sectors and use the government

accounting system. Greater transparency, independent tracking and community

involvement can improve accountability.

Source: Brown, A., Foster, M., Norton, A., and Naschold, F. 2001, 'The Status of

Sector Wide Approaches', Working Paper No.142, Overseas Development Institute,

London

Sector Wide Programmes and Poverty Reduction

M Foster and S Mackintosh-Walker (2001)

Access full text online

Summary

How effective are sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in tackling poverty reduction

goals? What lessons can be drawn from current practice to improve their performance?

This report by the Overseas Development Institute analyses sector programmes in a

variety of countries, and gives an overview of how the current generation of SWAps is

addressing poverty concerns.

Poverty issues tend to be addressed more effectively in SWAps that specifically aim to

improve poor people‘s access to services. Most of the sector programmes reviewed had

this objective, except in agriculture where growth was a priority. Success is most likely

where efforts have been made to understand and tackle the constraints on poor

people‘s access to services. For example, in education, cost to parents has been widely

identified as a major barrier and reducing it is a key intervention. Governments must

also commit to expenditure that targets the poor and then protect that spending from

fiscal pressures. Overall, education sector programmes have raised primary school

250

enrolment, with a focus on the poor. However, evidence for the health sector is more

mixed.

The report cites case studies from Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Bangladesh, Zambia,

Ethiopia and Cambodia. Overall, there is growing recognition that merely increasing

the proportion of spending on primary services is insufficient. More focused efforts

must be made to overcome the problems that prevent poor groups from accessing

services. Other observations are that:

Private financing and private service providers are playing a more important

role in SWAps. For example, involving the private sector in higher education

can free up more public funds for primary.

Many countries are spending a high share of their education budget on primary

services, but in the health sector this can be more politically difficult to

maintain.

A key problem in health is that universal free provision of even basic services is

unaffordable. Charging fees has helped to overcome funding shortfalls, but this

is a barrier to utilisation by the poor.

Most countries are trying to expand insurance programmes as a way to boost

funding without excluding the poor, but these are at an early stage.

In some cases, reviews conducted during the SWAp process have produced a

sharper focus on poverty. In Uganda, the national Poverty Reduction Strategy

has had a positive impact on SWAps.

Improvements can be made to the implementation and management of SWAps so that

they tackle poverty more effectively. Experience to date suggests that:

Where funds are administered through local government, highly conditional

approaches can ensure they reach their target. Tracking studies have also helped

identify problems.

Decentralisation to facility or community level may increase accountability to

users, but local-level inequalities must be addressed to ensure that the

vulnerable are not excluded.

To evaluate and improve SWAps‘ effectiveness in reaching the poor,

administrative data needs to be supplemented with wider surveys. Monitoring

information should be made widely available.

Districts that cannot meet financial accountability criteria should not lose funds,

and poverty-relevant expenditure should be protected from cuts.

Attracting staff to work in rural areas is a common problem, but incentives have

been introduced to encourage staff to take up tough posts. Staff with lower

qualifications are also being used.

Programme management may be improved by introducing performance-related

assessment and greater accountability to the public.

Source: Foster, M. and Mackintosh-Walker, S. 2001, 'Sector Wide Programmes and

Poverty Reduction', Working Paper No.157, Overseas Development Institute, London

251

Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report

International Development Department, University of Birmingham (2006)

Access full text online

Summary

To what extent and under what circumstances is Partnership General Budget Support

(PGBS) an effective aid mechanism? This study for a large group of bilateral and

multilateral donors synthesises findings on the experience of PGBS from Burkina

Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam. PGBS is not a

development strategy in itself, but an approach that supports the development aims of

the partner country.

PGBS is a response to dissatisfaction with earlier aid instruments, and eschews

imposing external solutions through conditionality in favour of supporting

government-owned development. It is closely linked to the Heavily Indebted Poor

Countries (HIPC) initiative and the introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

(PRSP). There are high expectations of the instrument, which include: improved

harmonisation and alignment of aid, increased efficiency and effectiveness of public

administration, greater predictability of funding, and improved domestic

accountability. Analysis of the seven study countries found that PGBS was a relevant

response to each individual context. It has evolved and become more relevant in each

case over time.

PGBS has significant effects through financial empowerment, strengthening incentives

within government, and improving coherence and coordination among international

partners. Key findings of the study were:

Improvements in harmonisation and alignment in every case. However, there is

still significant scope for further harmonisation

Technical assistance was the least well integrated input

Political context was generally not well analysed and adapted to

The variety of international partners, their differing interests, and high

expectations make PGBS inherently complex to manage

PGBS supported increases in PRSP priority expenditures. However, better

poverty analyses of public expenditures are required everywhere

Budget support is not more vulnerable to corruption than other forms of aid.

Deciding whether PGBS is an appropriate modality is not a simple decision. It requires

assessing the size, scope, scale, design and role of the instrument. Variables may have

simultaneously positive and negative implications. PGBS is a long term exercise, and

requires donor stamina. Design and implementation must consider the interplay

between different aid modalities. It should reduce dissonance and exploit

complementarities between them. Although incremental approaches are best in

introducing PGBS, there is no standard evolutionary sequence leading to adoption. In

addition:

Objectives should be realistic and the central role of strengthening public

expenditure management should be kept in focus

Government systems should be utilised as early and as completely as possible

PGBS is vulnerable to political risk. Governments must both want and be able

to engage with partner agencies, and there needs to be basic trust

PGBS is more likely to be attractive to countries that are heavily aid dependent.

In these cases, macroeconomic stability and elementary fiscal discipline are

essential

252

There is scope for a limited number of sector focussed and more general PGBS

instruments to be mutually reinforcing. Aligning such budget support

instruments with different general/ sector orientations is an important practical

issue.

Source: International Development Department, 2006, 'Evaluation of General Budget

Support: Synthesis Report', IDD, University of Birmingham, Birmingham

CIDA Primer on Program-Based Approaches

R Lavergne and A Alba (2003)

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Summary

The expression ―programme-based approaches‖ (PBAs) is one that has emerged

relatively recently in the development world. What does it mean? And how does it

compare with other approaches? This analytical review by the Canadian International

Development Agency (CIDA) covers a wide range of PBA issues, exploring some of

the implications of this new vision for how aid agencies work. It suggests that the shift

from projects to PBAs is an important one with major implications for how the Agency

operates.

PBAs emphasise comprehensive and coordinated planning in a given sector, thematic

area of intervention, or national poverty reduction strategy (PRS). PBAs are intended

to support locally owned programmes of a developing country government or

institution that one or more donors have agreed to support. A programme is defined as

an integrated set of activities designed to achieve a set of outcomes in a relatively

comprehensive way. The programme may be a PRS, a sector programme, a thematic

programme (such as an environmental strategy), or the programme of a specific

organisation. A PBA is a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the

principle of coordinated support for a locally owned programme of development. The

approach includes several key elements:

Leadership by the host country or organisation.

A single programme and budget framework.

Donor coordination and harmonisation of procedures.

Efforts to increase the use of local procedures over time with regard to

programme design and implementation, financial management, and monitoring

and evaluation. PBAs need to be understood as highly dynamic.

The PBA concept is a flexible one that allows for a wide range of intervention and

reflects international trends in thinking about development cooperation. Ultimately, the

point of PBAs is to highlight a number of internationally recognised principles of aid

effectiveness, and to systematise their application in a coherent and consistent way.

This systematic approach to aid effectiveness principles translates into a paradigm shift

of far reaching significance. Taken together, all of these changes point to a vastly

different way of doing business under PBAs. Among the changes implied are as

follows:

A shift in preoccupation from ensuring the success of individual projects to one

of concern for the success of development programs at a higher level.

A shift from thinking about results that are attributable to CIDA‘s own efforts to

an approach based on joint accountability for outcomes achieved in partnership

with others.

253

Increased attention to issues of institutional development and a more

sophisticated approach to risk and uncertainty, based on dialogue and

partnership rather than donor controls and the progressive emergence and

flourishing of trust and confidence over time.

This in turn will have implications for staffing in donor agencies and for the

locus of decision-making, with a premium on continuity and field presence.

Source: Lavergne, R. and Alba, A., 2003, 'CIDA Primer on Program-based

Approaches', Canadian International Development Agency, Gatineau, Quebec

254

2. Development Effectiveness (Policy Coherence, Donor Alignment,

Harmonisation)

Core readings

Governance, Development, and Aid Effectiveness: A Quick Guide to Complex

Relationships

J Court (2006)

Access full text online

Summary

While most people agree that governance contributes to positive economic and social

outcomes, it is rare to find rigorous, systematic and comprehensive governance

assessments. This briefing paper, published by the Overseas Development Institute,

synthesises current thinking on the relationship between governance and development

and aid effectiveness. Use of improved assessment approaches would contribute to

more effective aid interventions, benefiting poor people in developing countries and

satisfying taxpayer concerns in donor countries about the cost of aid.

Governance consists of more than a narrow focus on government. It relates to the

public realm where state, economic and societal actors interact to make decisions.

Cross-country evidence indicates that better governance contributes to improved

investment and growth rates. More effective government, bureaucracy and rule of law

contribute to better economic performance and the personal and economic well-being

of citizens.

The main arenas of governance are civil society, political society, government,

bureaucracy, economic society and the judiciary. The practice of good governance

includes adherence to the universal principles of participation, fairness, decency,

accountability, transparency and efficiency. Assessing the status of governance in a

developing country poses challenges that are very different from other socio-economic

issues. First, there are few objective or "hard" indicators. Second, governance remains

a sensitive issue, making it difficult to collect data.

Governance assessments suffer from a number of shortcomings, including:

A lack of reliable, valid and comparable data on key governance concerns.

Inadequate information-gathering by donors on a country's current situation;

lack of focus on reforms that are politically feasible.

Insufficient linkage of assessment results to aid allocation and country

programming.

A team of researchers have developed a new, systematic approach to generating

comprehensive assessments that stresses accuracy and legitimate data

collection. The approach adopts a set of universal principles and focuses on key

arenas of the political process. It solicits the views of local experts and

stakeholders, generates qualitative as well as quantitative information and is

independently managed.

To develop more independent, rigorous and detailed governance assessments, donors

should:

255

Solicit input from local stakeholders during the assessment process and develop

local capacity to conduct such assessments.

Orient the level and type of aid according to specific country contexts.

Improve the clarity of both assessment findings and donor-recipient agreements

so as to avoid the start-stop approach to aid.

Support the maintenance of government, private sector and civil society

accountability to local stakeholders in spite of aid assistance.

Increase coordination among donors.

Be realistic about the time it takes for governance constraints to be overcome.

Source: Court, J., 2006, 'Governance, Development, and Aid Effectiveness: A Quick

Guide to Complex Relationships', Briefing Paper, Overseas Development Institute,

London

From Aid Effectiveness to Development Coherence in Fragile States

C Lockhart (2005)

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Summary

How can policy coherence be achieved in relation to fragile states? What are the

challenges, and what mechanisms are emerging to address them? This background

paper from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), prepared for the Senior Level

Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, focuses on coherence between

aid and non-aid policies of donor countries.

There is a growing recognition among donors that their core business is development

effectiveness, not just aid effectiveness. The impact of non-aid policies on

development outcomes is gaining ever-higher priority, and the emphasis is on securing

coherence across government departments. Just as lack of coherence can result in

contradictory outcomes, it is impossible to achieve certain policy goals without

mobilising a range of complementary outcomes. In the medium term, building the

effectiveness of the 'beneficiary' state is also central to a wide range of goals. All of

this is particularly relevant to fragile states.

Consensus does not yet exist on the means of setting precise objectives and on

designing policies and implementation mechanisms to reach those objectives that

ensure coherence across the different domains (security, diplomatic, development,

humanitarian, legal, trade, investment and migration).

Donor governments have tended to respond to fragile states with policies

generated separately by their different ministries; there are many examples of

incoherence resulting at a strategic level.

There are also many cases of donor support to projects which do not add up to a

coherent strategy; the whole is less than the sum of the different interventions.

When each part of the government proceeds in setting objectives and designing

interventions, potential conflict between different stakeholders in a government

system is unavoidable.

A number of initiatives are underway to promote better policy coherence at the

level of strategy and policy setting, project design and analysis in different

donor governments; it is too early to judge their impact.

256

It is not clear that greater coherence within a particular donor government or

within a domain will lead to a coherent approach at country level; on the

contrary, it may undermine inter-donor coherence.

To reach strategy coherence, there must be system-wide coherence, across different

actors and activities.

There must be agreement on a single strategic process between those actors, and

recognition that the perpetuation of competing or parallel strategies will

undermine this.

As part of a single strategic process, coherence is required in each of the

following levels: goal and objective setting; policy and implementation

mechanisms; analysis and monitoring mechanisms.

Actors with clear levels of authority must be afforded incentives to participate

in the strategic process, which may be anchored in a budget process, or in a joint

planning tool.

Transparency in accounting and record-keeping across all activities is important

to allow measurement of whether activity and expenditure is aligned with goals.

Sub-national fragility and cross-border issues require flexibility in analysis and

engagement; this can pose an organisational challenge to donors geared to

working with single nation-states.

Global issues are often central, so more creative ways of achieving coherence

with the United Nations Security Council and other global actors are needed.

Source: Lockhart, C., 2005, ‗From Aid Effectiveness to Development Coherence in

Fragile States‘, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London

Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery: Good Practice Papers

OECD (2003)

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Summary

How should donors and developing countries work towards co-ordinating practices to

ensure effective delivery of aid? These guidelines drawn up by the Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) offer a set of principles and ‗good practices‘ for all parties.

Their goal is to simplify and harmonise procedures, thereby reducing costs and

boosting progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.

Managing different donor procedures bears a high cost for developing countries.

Meeting multiple requirements employs a large proportion of their administrative

capacity and reduces ownership of their own development plans, among other

problems. In response, the DAC convened a task force and commissioned a survey of

developing countries‘ needs. This work culminated in a set of good practice papers on

how donors can improve their operational procedures with a view to strengthening

partner country ownership. The papers address six key areas: frameworks for donor co-

operation, country analytic work and preparation of projects and programmes,

measuring performance in public financial management, reporting and monitoring,

financial reporting and auditing, and delegated co-operation.

Each chapter contains detailed guidelines and examples of initiatives that are already

under way. The broad areas covered by the recommendations are:

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Good practices between donors and partner governments. This might include

greater reliance on partner government systems for administering aid or timing

missions, and should be agreed on and applied by all parties.

Good practices between donor agencies. The aim here is to prevent unnecessary

duplication of work: for example, one donor could entrust another to execute

tasks such as audits or diagnostic work.

Good practices within individual donor systems. This covers changes donors

can make to their own systems to reduce costs and strengthen partners‘

ownership.

Guidelines to address potential risks arising from harmonised procedures. These

emphasise the importance of adapting practices to local circumstances, building

capacity and using indicators to monitor progress.

The message for donors is that they should simplify and harmonise their procedures,

while attempting to align them in the medium-term with systems in partner countries.

Donors should also aim to be more transparent. Suggested improvements include:

Setting an effective institutional framework with partner governments that

should lead to greater sharing of objectives, clearer expectations, lower costs

and more predictable and transparent aid flows.

Rationalising the development and application of diagnostic tools, including

country analytic work, and the preparation of specific donor operations.

Planning and executing diagnostic reviews of public financial management in

the context of a government-led strategy for improvement. This should be

integrated with performance measurement and capacity building efforts.

Designing reporting and monitoring systems that avoid duplication and support

the priorities of partner countries.

Working towards the delivery of common financial reports that reflect all

project funds, as well as independent audits. Donors should co-ordinate their

requirements and align them with strengthened national processes.

Increasing delegated co-operation, whereby one donor acts on behalf of one or

more others. This should benefit all parties and be done in a way that supports

partner governments‘ leadership of the development process.

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003,

'Harmonising Donor Practices For Effective Aid Delivery: Good Practice Papers',

OECD, Paris.

Supplementary readings

Poverty Efficient Aid Allocations – Collier/Dollar Revisited

J Beynon (2003)

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Summary

What makes aid effective and what are the implications of this analysis for aid

allocations? Recent World Bank research has stimulated a major debate around these

issues. There is growing consensus among donors that ‗good‘ policy is a key factor for

aid effectiveness and should therefore be a criteria for allocation. This paper from the

Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit of the Overseas Development Institute re-

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examines the evidence on which those arguments are based, and analyses aid

efficiency over the 1990s.

The World Bank view is that aid only works effectively when governments pursue

particular policies, and that selectively allocating aid to better performers will lead to

more poverty reduction. However, the ‗aid-growth‘ model on which this thinking is

based has been challenged and recent research has identified other variables that could

affect its policy conclusions. While these require further analysis, micro-economic

evidence does confirm the view that policies are important for aid effectiveness. Many

donors have already responded to that message by moving to make their aid allocations

more performance-related. Aid effectiveness did increase during the 1990s, but

differences in donor performance suggest that there is still room for improvement in

allocations.

The paper summarises the main arguments and evidence generated by the

Burnside/Collier/Dollar ‗aid-growth‘ model underpinning the World Bank research,

together with those of its critics. It then subjects the Collier/Dollar aid allocation

models to a wider range of sensitivity tests. Key conclusions are that:

More aid should go not just to countries with better policy and institutional

environments, but also to countries recovering from conflicts and those facing

external shocks.

More research is needed, particularly on the issues of diminishing marginal

returns and absorptive capacity, the extent to which aid promotes reform, the

effectiveness of different instruments, and the implications for aid allocation.

The models highlight the potential for more efficient allocations, but sensitivity

testing shows higher variation in ‗poverty efficient‘ allocations at country and

regional level.

Testing also shows much more ambiguity in the desired direction of change for

country allocations, which reduces the models‘ value for policy makers.

Further development of the models is needed to incorporate other variables,

concerns about uneven regional trends in poverty reduction and the implications

of the Millennium Development Goals.

The World Bank has claimed that aid efficiency improved through the 1990s and this

finding is being used to help make the case for increased aid. Further analysis of

changes in aid efficiency shows that:

Efficiency improvements are mainly due to falling aid levels, plus some effect

from better policy performance – not to changes in the pattern of aid allocations

(although this requires careful interpretation).

There is much additional evidence from project evaluations and aid-growth

regressions to show that aid effectiveness has been improving, and the case for

increasing aid remains strong.

Multilateral donors are marginally more efficient than bilaterals. The African

Development Fund improved significantly in the 1990s to become the most

efficient and the European Commission is the least efficient.

Among major bilaterals, the UK improved substantially and is among the most

efficient, alongside Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Italy. Spain and the US

are among the poorest performers.

These differentials suggest that there is considerable room for donors to

improve aid allocations, although efficiency measures should be better informed

by the further analysis proposed in the paper.

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Beynon, J., 2003, ‗Poverty Efficient Aid Allocations – Collier/Dollar Revisited‘,

Economics and Statistics Analysis Unit Working Paper 2, Overseas Development

Institute, London.

Reforming the International Aid Architecture: Options and Ways Forward

S Burall and S Maxwell (2006)

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Abstract

This working Paper describes the characteristics and constraints of the current

international aid architecture. It also summarises the perceptions in partner developing

countries of the strengths and weaknesses of key bilateral and multilateral aid agencies

and the countries‘ perceptions of best practice features of aid agencies.

Source: Burall, S. and S. Maxwell with A.R. Menocal, 2006, Reforming the

international aid architecture: Options and ways forward. ODI Working Paper 278

(October).

Harmonisation and Alignment in Fragile States

K Christiansen, E Coyle and C Lockhart (2004)

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Summary

How relevant is the harmonisation and alignment agenda to difficult partnerships?

What is the experience of harmonisation between donors and alignment with recipient

government's systems and priorities so far? What lessons that can donors and other

external actors learn? This paper by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

explores the relevance of harmonisation and alignment for assistance in fragile states.

The report concludes that the agenda is of even more relevance in difficult partnerships

or fragile states and highlights the main obstacles. It goes on to outline specific policy

recommendations for external actors and donors.

DAC defines 'difficult partnerships' or fragile states as those low-income countries

with a lack of political commitment or weak capacity to develop or implement pro-

poor policies. The challenge of external interventions such as those by aid and other

actors is that an understandable approach of state avoidance by donors ultimately

undermining their own objectives. In the context of weak recipient state systems and

policies external actors are tending to generate a multiplicity of parallel, state avoiding

interventions. This in turn reinforces patterns of complexity and fragmentation of

actors and efforts on both the donor and partner sides. The very process of avoidance

however only serves to undermine and fragment state institutions further. In the

medium term it also mitigates against the development of any meaningful

accountability relationship between institutions and their citizens.

The paper found four main clusters of experiences of harmonisation and alignment

across a range of fragile states: strong country leadership; strong donor leadership;

weak country leadership and fragmented donors; and a further category of the 'most

difficult partnerships' which involve particularly isolationist regimes, severe concerns

around legitimacy, and/or wide spread levels of ongoing armed conflict.

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A number of common obstacles and issues were identified in 'fragile state'contexts:

Donors often have very different ideas about what the priorities are, particularly

in the absence of government leadership on policy prioritisation.

If political commitment is perceived to be lacking, donors tend to move state-

avoiding approaches. Donors seem to believe that policy alignment is a

necessary precondition for systems alignment. This assumption needs to be

revised.

The presence of humanitarian relief agencies in many fragile states has serious

implications for alignment. Their practice of state-avoiding approaches has

major institutional development implications for such states.

When there is weak capacity, donors and recipients particularly need to focus

on a very limited number of tasks rather than spread limited human, financial

and institutional capital. Not doing so is likely to undermine their own

objectives.

Further focus is required on developing appropriate country-level mechanisms

for ensuring coherence both between donor government departments (e.g.

across security, political, trade, development, humanitarian actors)and across

different intervening governments.

Some specific recommendations for moving towards improved interventions by

external actors in fragile states are set out:

Donors should undertake detailed and joint diagnostics of existing

country/national processes and systems. There is often an incorrect assumption

that there is 'nothing there'.

Donors activities should be aligned to all stages of the government's strategy,

policy and implementation cycle. The focus of processes is the national budget.

Such an approach requires changes in approach and actions by both the

recipient and donor. Where use of government systems is not possible, donors

should 'shadow align'. This means using the same timetables or rules as

government while not putting resources directly through systems.

In extreme situations where alignment is not possible, donors need to

harmonise. Harmonisation should focus on the creation of mechanisms that

enhance, not undermine, the emergence of country systems, policies, leadership

and ownership.

The selectivity and sequencing of interventions are critical. The number of

interventions should be very limited, prioritised and carefully timed to take

account of existing institutional capability and mobilise capacity.

Donors should support policymaking and aid management in partner

governments. This includes providing better incentives, training and twinning

opportunities as well as more effective technical assistance.

Progress with alignment and harmonisation should be monitored at the level of

impact, namely the country level. Donors should consider the range of elements

around the policy and budget cycle including their own and their implementing

agencies/NGO activities.

Source: Christiansen, K., Coyle, E and Lockhart, C., 2004, ‗Harmonisation and

Alignment in Fragile States‘, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, Report

prepared for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,

Development Assistance Committee ( OECD-DAC )

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Shifting Sands: The Search for 'Coherence' Between Political and Humanitarian

Responses to Complex Emergencies

J Macrae and N Leader (2000)

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Summary

The early 1990s saw an increase in calls to enhance the coherence of political and

humanitarian action. With a growing sense of mutual distrust from humanitarian and

political actors, this paper seeks to detail the findings of a six month study on the

politics of coherence, and particularly to understand the precise character of the new

relationship proposed between aid and politics in the post-Cold War era.

The study has focused on two donor governments (the UK and the Netherlands), as

well as analysing how the UN provided a means to operationalise and legitimise the

coherence agenda. To understand the implications of coherence in practice, four mini-

case studies were undertaken, on each in Serbia and Kosovo and two in Afghanistan.

The four case studies examined the extent to which the theory of coherence has led to

improved analysis of the political determinants of need in conflict affected countries,

and has reached the following conclusions:

At this basic level of information sharing, the gains have been minimal, which

reflects a weakness of existing information collection and analysis within the

political strand. It also highlights a need for humanitarian information systems

to adequately capture need

There is a strong trend towards the bilateralisation of humanitarian response,

bringing bilateral donors nearer to operational decision making, which has both

positive and negative implications

There is a need for sustained advocacy and public information in order to

generate a constituency for humanitarian action in donor countries

Humanitarian aid is a weak tool as part of an overall strategy of conflict

management, and attempts to use it as such undermine its effectiveness in terms

of relieving poverty and suffering.

The report makes recommendations to three types of organisation: Donor

governments, the UN, and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHAs),

which are as follows:

Donor Governments should increase investment in political analysis and

engagement in non-strategic areas; codify in law a commitment to guarantee the

principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian

assistance; review the trend towards the bilateralisation of Humanitarian

Agencies; and develop a range of aid instruments for engaging in these

environments, not just humanitarian assistance

The UN: The Secretary General should approve ECHA‘s recommendation that

will preserve the independence of humanitarian action from political

interference; strengthen the UN‘s capacity for producing independent political

analysis; and revive the Strategic Framework initiative on a global basis and

particularly in Afghanistan

NGHAs must articulate more clearly and consistently their institutional

relationships with, and understanding of ‗politics‘ in, recipient and donor

countries; they need to review their commitment to humanitarian principles and

agree mechanisms by which adherence to them can be enhanced; and they

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should increase investment in analysing global and country specific trends in

relation to humanitarian policy, to maintain critical engagement with official

donors and to develop an active constituency.

Macrae, J. and Leader, N. 2000, 'Shifting Sands: The Search for ‗Coherence‘ Between

Political and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies', Humanitarian Policy

Group Report no. 8, Overseas Development Institute, London

Aid Allocation and Fragile States

M McGillivray (2005)

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Summary

How can donors provide poverty reducing and efficient aid allocations, particularly in

relation to fragile states? This paper, written for the Senior Level Forum on

Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, summarises research on aid allocation

and effectiveness, with a particular focus on fragile states. It presents these findings in

the broader context of how aid is and should be allocated in developing countries.

The premise that aid is more effective in countries with better policies and institutions

has been a dominant force behind donor allocations. Aid can lead to higher growth in

these countries, allowing donors to maximise poverty reduction and make quicker

progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. However, there is an increasing

move towards selectivity, with donors concentrating more aid on poor performers. Aid

allocation to fragile states is a growing concern.

Historically, fragile states have received less aid relative to need and absorptive

capacities than most, and some - categorised as 'aid orphans' - have received far less

than others. In addition, fragile states have received the most volatile and unpredictable

aid flows. Aid to the most fragile states has typically been the most volatile.

Inconsistent aid allocation has exacerbated the problems of growth and poverty

reduction in these countries.

More aid needs to go to poor countries than currently does, but donors face some

challenges if aid allocations are to be poverty efficient in fragile states. Key points are:

Under-aiding or over-aiding can result from lack of donor co-ordination.

Aid orphans receive very little media and diplomatic attention, even though

there is a high risk of them falling into instability.

Conventional aid instruments can be problematic in fragile states.

Risk adverse donors do not invest in fragile states but the risk of non-

intervention is rarely considered.

The weak capacity and risk of instability in fragile states means that there is a

need for careful sequencing of reforms and donor engagement.

Only once a minimum level of capacity is reached can other infrastructure and

technical assistance be effective.

Donors need to resolve the co-ordination problem that leads to donor orphans and

excessive aid flows. Further considerations are:

The absorptive capacity constraints in fragile states should be urgently

addressed, such constraints can result in aid being harmful, reducing growth and

increasing poverty.

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The level at which aid becomes counterproductive needs to be clarified.

More aid could be provided to organisations that are not directly involved with

the government, such as NGOs, private corporations or independent service

authorities.

More research is needed into effective aid modalities and the optimal

sequencing of aid in fragile states. Investments in human capital, working with

civil society and the private sector, technical assistance and service delivery are

all appropriate at different stages of interventions.

The effectiveness of aid can depend on a range of different variables, but are not

given sufficient consideration by donors. For example, there is evidence that

structural vulnerability and political stability are important for aid to be

effective towards poverty reduction and economic growth.

It should be recognised that growth is not the only benefit of aid; other positive

impacts include the prevention of instability and conflict, improvements in

human rights and the promotion of human development.

Source: McGillivray, M., 2005, ‗Aid Allocation and Fragile States‘, World Institute for

Development Economics Research, UNU, paper presented at the Senior Level Forum

on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, OECD-DAC, 13th-14th January,

London

Aid, Incentives and Sustainability. An Analysis of Development Co-operation

E Ostrom, C Gibson, S Shivakumar and K Andersson (2002)

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Summary

Recent studies of development assistance programs conclude that despite tremendous

efforts and good intentions, aid has produced disappointing results.Does aid itself

create incentives that undermine sustainability? This study by the Swedish

International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) explores how the incentives

that arise in the system of development co-operation affect sustainable outcomes, and

recommends strategies to mitigate some of the perverse incentives often found in

development assistance systems.

This study introduces an institutional perspective on development co-operation that is

partly novel to SIDA and the rest of the aid community. Firstly, this perspective

highlights the role of incentives and increases our understanding of incentive problems

within developing country contexts as well as within the system of aid itself. Secondly,

it provides a method and tools for institutional analysis and evaluation of the

relationship between aid, incentives and sustainability. Finally, the study applies the

method empirically by initiating an analysis and evaluation of the incentive structure

and its causes within SIDA and five SIDA-supported projects in India and Zambia.

The study uses the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to

analyse the system of aid. The study finds that SIDA can contribute to more

sustainable outcomes through:

A more explicit and systematic understanding of incentive problems and their

institutional causes in local development contexts as well as those created by the

very system of development co-operation

The creation of incentives within SIDA that encourage individual and

organisational learning about sustainability

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The devolution of genuine ownership to the actual target population.

Incentives underpin aid effectiveness and sustainability. The following suggestions are

made to identify and mitigate perverse incentives and improve SIDA's mission

effectiveness:

A more explicit and systematic understanding of institutions and incentives

within particular organisational structures and mechanisms for transmitting this

knowledge.

Formalising an understanding of incentives in the system of aid through SIDA‘s

training modules thus fostering a keener awareness of project and program

design and implementation, yielding higher chances of success.

High rate of turnover of staff dealing with any one project and the lack of link

between career advancement and participation in sustainable projects result in

little incentive for involvement in a project after reassignment.

Identification and correction of perverse incentives require thoughtful analysis

before, during and after a project/program. Midterm formal evaluations are

particularly critical to improving sustainability.

All those affected by projects, particularly the beneficiaries, should be involved

in the evaluation of projects.

SIDA can help recipient countries increase their in-country ability to create and

analyse alternative forms of development and institution building based on

analyses of incentive structures.

Source: Ostrom, E., Gibson, C., Shivakumar, S. & Andersson, K., 2002, 'Aid,

Incentives and Sustainability. An Analysis of Development Co-operation', Swedish

International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), Stockholm

Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence and Development Cooperation

in Difficult Environments

R Picciotto et al (2004)

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Summary

What are the challenges of policy coherence and development effectiveness in fragile

states? This report by the University of London examines the operational challenges

posed by development cooperation in difficult environments and the responses adopted

by donor countries. It concludes that improved coordination in individual donor

countries is a necessary, but far from sufficient, condition for productive engagement

with fragile states. In order to achieve development results, donor countries and

development assistance agencies should join together to achieve coordination,

harmonisation and alignment.

Global poverty reduction remains the overarching goal of the development community

and the economic imbalances associated with globalisation continue to evoke deep

concern. But geoeconomics no longer dominates geo-politics in international relations:

security is once again a major preoccupation of policy makers. Yet, the intersection

between the security and development domains remains heavily contested and

concerns are widespread about the distortions that the 'war on terror' may impose on

development operations. A comprehensive policy change agenda is needed to deal with

the unprecedented complexity of the development problems faced by fragile states.

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A broader concept of policy coherence that embraces human security and global

stability would provide the framework for coordinated action. The 'whole of

government' practices pioneered by a few donor countries would be emulated. Process

improvements in donor countries would be accompanied by complementary adaptation

of strategies, programs and practices in line with the hard won lessons of experience.

Particular changes that need to be implemented include the following:

Expand the policy coherence agenda to include security objectives. Initiate a

participatory process designed to complement the Millennium Development

Goals with Millennium Security Goals.

Energise high-level political leadership to avoid development considerations

being sidelined in global policy making.

Formulate performance indicators for results-based assessments of policy

coherence for development in fragile states. Undertake harmonisation of

country typologies under the aegis of the DAC.

Merge the security and development agendas through collaborative policy

research and consensus building.

Emphasise multilateral solutions and emulate the good practices used by

Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and other donor countries to promote 'joined

up' government while pursuing donor harmonisation and coordination.

Design engagement strategies based on sound risk management principles and

disregard the 'conflict cycle'. Address the perverse consequences for

development that may flow from bringing together security and aid agencies.

Donors need to learn to work 'in' and 'on' conflict instead of 'around' conflict. They

need to:

Select the 'benign neglect' option only after due consideration of the

humanitarian and security consequences of inaction.

Adopt realism, a holistic and long term perspective, adequate fiduciary, social

and environmental safeguards, involvement of reform minded actors and

innovative approaches that nurture civil society and private sector participation.

Mainstream 'conflict sensitivity' criteria in macroeconomic policy advice, fiscal

policy and public expenditure reforms, poverty reduction strategy papers and

public expenditure reviews.

Privilege diplomacy, private investment, trade and security assistance over aid

in donor engagement in fragile states but provide sufficient aid to make the

other instruments effective.

Accord greater priority to conflict prevention, post conflict assistance and

security sector reform in donor country engagement strategies.

Replicate the special funding pools pioneered by Utstein. Reconsider aid

allocation principles and practices to take account of security considerations.

Source: Picciotto, R. et al, 2004, ‗Striking a New Balance: Donor Policy Coherence

and Development Cooperation in Difficult Environments‘, IPI/Global Policy Project,

London, UK

266

Financing and Aid Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations

S Schiavo-Campo (2003)

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Summary

What does the the international experience with post-conflict reconstruction tell us

about financing modalities and aid arrangements in post-conflict situations? Are there

a series of recommendations that emerge from the experiences of post conflict

countries? This paper written on behalf of the World Bank looks at the experience of

aid funds in four post-conflict environments. In a general sense a pre-requisite for post-

conflict reconstruction and effective financing, is the establishment and maintenance of

peace.

An identification of the contextual features of each conflict situation is mandatory for

an effective reconstruction strategy and the design of the financing and aid architecture

that is to embody that strategy:

Each case has its own unique contributing features. In East Timor external

assistance was affected by the absence of an administrative capacity, In Bosnia

political and administrative fragmentation conditioned everything.

Evidence from the four studies shows that a ‗useful checklist‘ of possible

checks can be identified, some are obvious and none are sophisticated, nor are

they necessarily prescriptive.

In a general context factors such as a clear mandate, working for genuine

partnership and proactive communication are important.

In terms of structure and design, to aid in reconstruction a Multi Donor Trust

Fund (MDTF) will be set up. An Aid Management Agency (AMA) will act as

the bridge between donors and the government.

A single umbrella MDTF will accomplish little to aid effectiveness however, if

its design is faulty or its provisions are disregarded by donors, or the security

environment is unstable.

If no donor contributes there is no MDTF. This tautology underlines the

necessity to focus on incentives for individual donors to join an MDTF.

In terms of policy, it seems the dynamics of the development business and short-term

urgencies typical of a post-conflict situation have often been allowed to prevail over

long term institutional objectives.

The most obvious, but perhaps important, recommendation is to tailor design

and sequencing of financial aid and aid coordination to the circumstances of the

specific case.

A balance between ‗outsider nationals‘ and ‗insider nationals‘ is very important

for sustainability. The balance must be found, however, by the countries‘ people

themselves.

Local organisations and NGOs should not be by-passed in post-conflict

reconstruction programmes. NGOs and local communities are often the only

ones capable of implementing activities on the ground.

Source: Schiavo-Campo, S., 2003, 'Financing And Aid Arrangements In Post-Conflict

Situations', World Bank, Washington D.C.

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3. DFID’s Governance Agenda and Competencies

UK Government policy

Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor

DFID (2006)

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Summary

In 2005, rich and poor countries promised more and better aid. Whilst there has been

progress, much remains to be done. This White Paper, by the Department for

International Development, sets out how the UK government will work with others to

deliver these promises. It outlines key commitments in relation to building states that

work for the poor, helping people get security, incomes and public services, tackling

climate change and reforming the international system.

The last two decades have seen dramatic progress in reducing poverty, but this

progress has been uneven. Africa will not meet any of the MDGs, and by 2015 over

90% of the world‘s poor will live in Africa and South Asia. Gender discrimination is

holding back economic growth and sustainable development, and one third of the

world‘s poor now live in fragile states.

In support of promises made in 2005, the UK government will concentrate its aid in

countries with the largest number of poor people, including middle-income countries.

It will work more in fragile states which are most off track with the MDGs, and give

greater priority to gender equality. It will also make sure that its wider policies create

an international environment that promotes development.

Efforts to eliminate world poverty are not only morally right, but will also create a

safer, more prosperous world. Eliminating poverty means tackling four main

challenges:

Good governance is essential to combating poverty. Governance is about

politics, or the way in which citizens and governments relate to each other.

Good governance requires state capability, responsiveness and accountability. It

means making politics work for the poor.

Countries need to do better at delivering security, incomes and health and

education for all. Security is a precondition for development and requires

effective states. Preventing conflict is better and more cost effective than

helping countries rebuild afterwards. Growth is the best way to reduce poverty,

and there must be better access to economic opportunities. Everyone must have

access to four essential public services; education, health, water and sanitation

and social protection.

Climate change threatens to derail development. Developing countries will need

support to adapt to its devastating effects on the water cycle, and developing

countries must be part of a future solution.

The international system must be improved and international problems need

international solutions. Developing countries must have a stronger say in how

the international system works. Multilateral organisations have a critical role to

play in aid delivery.

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To this end, over the next five years, the UK will:

Help to build states that work for the poor: by making good governance central.

A new ―quality of governance‖ assessment will guide how the UK gives aid.

Decisions about aid will also be based on partner countries‘ commitment to

poverty reduction. Corruption, bribery and money laundering will be tackled

internationally.

Help people have security, incomes and public services: by promoting peace

and security, supporting private sector development, investing in infrastructure

and agriculture and reforming international trade rules. DFID will commit at

least half of all future direct support for developing countries to public services.

Work internationally to tackle climate change: including creating incentives for

clean energy, helping developing countries to adapt and ensuring they are

involved in discussions about solutions.

Create an international system fit for the 21st century. This means UN reform,

more responsive international finance institutions, and supporting the growing

roles of regional organisations. It also means pushing for the OECD-DAC to

monitor and hold donors to account on their development commitments.

Source: DFID, 2006, 'Elminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the

Poor', White Paper no. 3, Department for International Development, London

Governance, Development, and Democratic Politics: DFID's Work in Building

More Effective States

Department for International Development (2006)

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Summary

An effective state is the single most important factor in determining whether

development progress occurs. This paper, published by the United Kingdom (UK)

Department for International Development (DFID), discusses the agency‘s approach to

governance development and how it works with partner countries and the international

development system. Governance work has moved beyond designing stand-alone

projects; it now seeks to address how power is held and in whose interests it is used.

Governance concerns the use of power and authority and how a country manages its

affairs. It determines the relationship between citizens and the state and involves a

wide range of organisations and institutions. Governance is country-specific, but also

shaped by the wider international environment.

Good governance requires state capability to get things done, accountability to citizens

and responsiveness to citizens‘ needs and rights. To that end, democratic politics is the

most effective way to address the issues of poverty and powerlessness.

Key to sustainable development is the ability of governance to reduce poverty. Good

governance improves the rights of the poor by reducing violent conflict and managing

disputes peacefully. It delivers essential public services even-handedly and effectively.

Good governance also reduces poverty by empowering citizens to realise their human

rights and addressing the issues of gender inequality, discrimination and social

exclusion.

DFID helps countries improve governance by:

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Employing specialists in the fields of governance, conflict, social development

and economics. DFID has increased its financial resources for governance

programmes from £85 million in 1997/8 to £322 million in 2005/6.

Focusing on the poorest countries and regions and working in increasingly

complex and difficult environments that present the biggest governance

challenges.

Improving its understanding of local context and using comprehensive

governance assessments to tailor programmes to a country‘s specific needs.

Forging strong partnerships with other UK government departments,

international agencies and local partners that draw upon additional skills,

perspectives and expertise.

Providing capacity building assistance to national governments, legislatures,

local governments, justice and security sectors and national oversight bodies.

Assisting civil society, political society, the media, trade unions and the private

sector. This non-state assistance increases the likelihood that improved capacity

will take root and thrive in all country sectors.

The major contemporary challenge for all donors is how to engage with power. The

focus is now about how power is used by both formal and informal institutions that

shape politics and policy.

Other challenges include:

To ensure that governance initiatives are based on a stronger, more nuanced

understanding of context.

To recognise that the most appropriate development models are led by the host

country.

To tackle global issues, such as international corruption and crime, climate

change and migration, that have a major impact on governance and

statebuilding in poorest countries.

To help developing countries embed the culture of democratic politics. This

requires that all groups accept the rules that bind societies together and see

themselves as genuine stakeholders in a fair and transparent political process.

DFID, 2006, 'Governance, Development, and Democratic Politics: DFID's Work in

Building More Effective States', Department for International Development, London

Core readings

Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned

Chr. Michelsen Institute (2004)

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Summary

Which democratic systems are most likely to be successful in different post war

contexts? What has been learned in the last ten years of peace building in countries

such as Guatemala and Afghanistan? This paper, from the Chr Michlesen Institute in

Norway, looks at the recent experience in internationally assisted transitions from war

to peace.

Governance is a process, not a product, a long-term perspective is necessary and social

engineering has distinct limits.

270

Post war situations include, but are not limited to: self enforcing, as a result of a

decisive victory (for example East Timor), mediated peace building, (for

example Bosnia), and conflicted peace building when the peace settlement does

not incorporate the defeated party (for example Afghanistan).

The most critical governance interventions include: constitution making and

design, watchdog institutions, truth commissions and criminal justice

procedures, local governance, security sector reform, elections and electoral

systems and political parties' support to human rights organisations,

empowerment projects and co-operation between divided communities.

While rapid results are seen as vital to maintaining the peace process, post

conflict governance measures require a long time frame. Restoration of

administrative infrastructures and human rights are early priorities.

Building trust is of central concern – either in the negative sense of absence of

threats of violence or in the positive sense of confidence in the post war order.

Reconciliation can take at least three forms, ranging from peaceful coexistence

to the comprehensive reconstruction of social bonds between victim and

perpetrator.

External actors need to be conscious of the dilemmas of ownership and assistance that

a post war situation presents. The dilemma is inherent in all aid activities, but is

accentuated in a post war situation by the imbalance in resources and administrative

capacity that typically exist.

Aid actors should be aware that they have their own interests and procedures,

which may conflict with a policy framework that emphasises the principles of

democracy, local self-determination and ownership.

A one-size policy does not fit all cases and aid actors need to adjust policies to

local types of post-war situations.

Promoting human rights is a confidence-building measure essential to

establishing a foundation for post-war democratic governance.

Accountability measures are necessary to secure democratic governance, but

accountability can take many different forms and structures. There is no

obviously ideal package or sequence.

Decentralisation has obvious advantages in post-war situations where the central

state is weak or remains contested, but must be balanced by a national structure.

Approaching security issues through non-conventional entry points can

encourage critical reforms in a difficult sector.

Source: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004, Governance Interventions in Post-War

Situations: Lessons Learned, Research Paper, UNDP & Chr. Michelsen Institute,

Bergen Seminar Series, held 5–7 May 2004

Review of DFID’s Governance Target Strategy Paper

M Khan

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Summary

The Target Strategy Paper (TSP) published in 2001 identified seven key governance

capabilities necessary for effective poverty reduction and the achievement of the

International Development Targets. This review from the Department for International

271

Development (DFID) focuses on the questions policy makers should be aware of when

developing governance reforms that can make an impact on poverty reduction.

The TSP is a sophisticated document drawing qualified conclusions from its reading of

the available theory and evidence on governance. However, this theory and evidence is

itself highly contested. Practitioners need to be aware of the limitations of the

established analysis.

Important insights include:

The focus on environmental and political conditions does not draw sufficiently

on the growing case study evidence. Some of the environmental and

redistributive capabilities that the TSP aims to achieve are overly ambitious for

poor countries. Many of the high growth developers would have failed on many

of these indicators.

The TSP identifies the capacity to run an open competitive system as an

important governance capability. However, whether democracy will be a spur to

the painful changes required to accelerate development depends on specific

factors in each country. The operation of democracy is often conditioned by

patrimonial political systems that use democracy to sustain traditional systems

of power.

The TSP ignores many of the structural drivers of corruption. Important types of

corruption in poor countries are driven by the need to achieve political

stabilisation and by the state‘s inability to protect property rights effectively.

These drivers are not affected by conventional anti-corruption measures

supported by development agencies.

The drivers of change studies that aim to enable DFID country offices to

identify entry points for reform at the country level are limited. This is because

they do not follow a common approach and vary considerably in their quality

and the relevance of their recommendations. The studies assume that the

governance priorities identified in the good governance approach are the right

ones.

Recommendations include:

The objective has to be to identify the conditions required to make democracy

compatible with pro-poor growth. Democracy should be a goal, not a condition.

Transformation strategies have to be devised that allow rapid growth in the

context of real democracy in developing countries, where patrimonial and

clientelist structures dominate.

Reform should identify the types of corruption that are most seriously

constraining development. Anti-corruption strategy could be made more

effective by thinking creatively about allowable influence and expenditures

within a regulatory framework that makes sense for the country.

We need a common framework to think through how we should identify policy

and reform priorities. We need to combine the country-specific approach with a

more pragmatic approach to identify the institutional capacities that are required

for accelerating growth.

It is important to have achievable goals. Reform efforts can be improved by

distinguishing between different types and goals of governance.

Donors should not contribute to the perception that environmental and

redistributive reforms are sufficient for achieving prosperity. Donors can

facilitate gradual moves towards difficult decisions by raising awareness, which

can initiate debates and political reconfigurations that make dynamic

transformations more likely.

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Source: Khan, M. 2005, 'Review of DFID‘s Governance Target Strategy Paper',

Department for International Development, External Review of Governance Target

Strategy Paper 2001

Britain's New White Paper: Making Governance Work for the Poor

M Moore and S Unsworth (2006)

Not available online (please see ‗ordering documents‘ section)

Summary

Has the White Paper lived up to its billing? In this article Mick Moore and Sue

Unsworth from the Institute of Development Studies review Britain‘s White Paper on

governance and development. The White Paper seemed to promise a serious

contribution to a long overdue discussion about how development really happens. This

article focuses on the main theme of governance and argues that the Paper goes a long

way in the right direction to achieving its promise, but with some missed opportunities.

The entire White Paper is action-oriented in substance and tone. There are no explicit

intellectual underpinnings to it. However, the content of Chapter 3 represents a marked

evolutionary spurt in donor thinking about the causes of and remedies for bad

government in poor countries. The behaviour of governments and businesses in rich

countries is part of the problem: they could and should do much more to limit the

damage they cause, often in ways that will benefit them too.

The White Paper maintains that:

Development is about far more than aid, and requires concerted international

action on a wide range of policy issues affecting developing countries.

Bad governance is often caused or exacerbated by the ways in which poor

countries interact with global economic and political forces, powerful richer

countries, and large trans-national private enterprises.

It does not take sufficient account of:

The way the international context for aid is changing, notably with the growing

profile of China in Africa.

The extent and depth of the governance challenge posed by the unprecedented

combination of deep inequalities between countries and ever closer ties.

The operational implications, both for aid relationships and for the design of

governance programmes, of the White Paper‘s own claim that ‗good

governance is about good politics‘.

The evidence - from research and donor‘s evaluations – of the limited impact of

e ‗capacity-building‘ in improving governance.

The authors support the White Paper‘s focus on what Britain can do to eradicate or

dampen these ‗international drivers of bad governance‘ and to encourage other

countries to do the same.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an excellent

example: primarily a British initiative, it has achieved wide international buy-in.

There are many similar opportunities for governments to work in tandem with

private sector interests to help curb corrupt and illegal practices.

Europe has a great deal of persuasive capacity: it can use co-ordinated

diplomatic and economic bargaining power to help change incentives faced by

rulers in poor countires.

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DFID is uniquely well placed to provide the interface between international

action and country level impacts. DFID specialist staff in country offices can

help inform and prioritise international action to change policies which

encourage bad governance in poor countries, drawing on their understanding of

how global factors play into local political processes and influence the

behaviour of economic and political elites.

Donors cannot for much longer expect to influence developing countries simply

because they provide grants. To have constructive influence in the longer term,

they will have to exercise it in more creative and diffuse ways.

Source: Moore, M., S. Unsworth, 2006, 'Britain's New White Paper: Making

Governance Work for the Poor', Development Policy Review, vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 707-

715

Supplementary readings

Aid Dependence and Governance

D Bräutigam (2000)

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Abstract

This study analyzes the political economy of aid dependence. Large amounts of aid

delivered over long periods, create incentives for governments and donors that have

the potential to undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions. These

incentives are not always acted on, but when they are, large amounts of aid may reduce

local ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, while fragmenting

budgets and lowering tax effort. Large amounts of aid, delivered to countries with

weak institutions create some of the institutional problems that lead to ineffectiveness.

In aid

dependent countries, donor agencies and foreign experts often take over many of the

critical functions of governance: substituting their own goals for an absent leadership

vision, using foreign experts and project management units in place of weak or

decaying public institutions, and providing finance for investments whose operation

and maintenance is neither planned for nor affordable. In these countries, aid has been

part of the problem. And longterm dependence on aid creates disincentives for both

donors and governments to change the rules of their engagement.

Source: Bräutigam, Deborah, 2000, ‗Aid Dependence and Governance‘. Stockholm.

How Good Must Governance Be?

A Goldsmith (2005)

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Summary

Governance is the current international development catchword and the contemporary

view is that good governance, highlighting transparency, accountability and

participation, should be established and expanded everywhere to boost development.

How much do open, rule-based institutions matter for development? Compiled for the

Quality of Governance Institute, Göteborg University, this paper reviews four

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historical case studies and raises questions about the efficacy of better governance as a

general treatment for slow growth or non-development.

Governance is defined as the decision-making procedures and behavioural conventions

in formal public organisations. Social science has always maintained that governance

has important consequences for the development performance of nation states. Open

civic institutions are seen as a catalyst because they create an environment where

honesty, hard work and entrepreneurship are rewarded. Those lacking in transparency

are believed to generate perverse incentives that are said to trap societies in poverty.

Making statistical observations across a large number of countries, empirical research

suggests that poor governance is detrimental to development and welfare while good

governance, including rational-legal public bureaucracies, judicial independence,

protection of property rights, common law and democracy, is advantageous. The study

of governance and development presents a range of methodological challenges, not

least that governance in the real world is neither black nor white, but a pallet of shades

of grey.

An examination of the United States reveals that there is little to show that rule-

based governance presaged economic modernisation, as opposed to being an

auxiliary or complimentary factor in the process.

Accounts of South Korea‘s rapid economic growth do not feature customary

good governance institutions as an important explanatory variable, given that

the state was an authoritarian, crony capitalist system during the

industrialisation drive.

Often presented as a poster child for how much institutions matter, all of the

institutional building blocks for growth were already in place in Mauritius

before the economic acceleration began in 1971.

Jamaica‘s institutional endowment approximates that of Mauritius, yet its

economy languished, hence it is difficult to blame standard governance factors

for the missing growth acceleration.

Whilst four cases can never be definitive, they do provide strong anecdotal evidence

that, whilst there are numerous reasons to welcome the hallmarks of good governance,

expecting such institutions to yield large development dividends still requires a leap of

faith. The case studies reveal that meritocratic bureaucracies, independent judiciaries

and honest elections are worthy goals in their own right, but setting them up did not

give an immediate jolt to development. Rather, economic development was more cause

than effect of governance.

Academics and policymakers need to refine formal models of testing the

relationships between governance and development, including the

interdependence among institutions and the developmental impact of some

institutions over others.

Until and unless the empirical picture is clarified, a multifaceted approach to

institution building might seem advisable for prioritising and sequencing

governance reforms.

Support should be focused on those institutions that matter most as a means of

developmental shock therapy, rather than of spreading resources across a

smorgasbord of governance reforms as international development agencies

often do.

Western donors should be wary of holding low-income countries to

unrealistically high standards for governance, which not even the United States

could approach until it became quite affluent.

275

Source: Goldsmith, A., 2005, 'How Good Must Governance Be?,' University of

Massachusetts, Boston

Good Enough Governance Revisited - 2007

M S Grindle (2007)

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Summary

Given limited resources of money, time, knowledge and capacity, what are the best

ways to move towards better governance in a particular country? This article from the

Development Policy Review argues that the concept of good enough governance falls

short as a tool to guide decisions in real world contexts. Rather the feasibility of

particular interventions can be assessed by analysing the context for change and the

implications of the content of the intervention being considered.

Good enough governance means that interventions thought to contribute to

development need to be prioritised and made relevant to the conditions of individual

countries. However, there is a gap between concept and practice - between the general

mandate to improve governance and the dilemmas facing those designing

interventions. This is particularly noticeable in addressing the conflict-ridden and often

illegitimate status of fragile states. Debates continue over the definition of good

governance and over measurement, indicators and inference.

Large cross-country analyses tend to find consistent correlations between

development and good governance. Country case studies, on the other hand,

tend to demonstrate that development is not dependent on ‗getting governance

right‘. Meanwhile, problem driven research accepts that governance is

important to development and addresses problems created for governance by

particular conditions.

Questions about statistical and historical inference remain unresolved. The

current agenda is additive rather than analytical, leaving practitioners with long

lists of things to do but little guidance on how to choose among them.

The World Bank, UNDP and DFID play a sensitive role in translating often

ambiguous research into the practice of good governance. While they have

contributed to misguiding practice, such organisations increasingly

acknowledge the importance of contextual realities and the content of

governance programmes.

Combining analysis of context and content can inform difficult choices on where to put

scarce resources to achieve better governance.

Two analytical frameworks can help identify interventions that are appropriate

for specific situations, one focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of states,

and one providing insights into the sources of change that might exist.

Governance objectives can be disaggregated into contributing characteristics,

such as effective police organisations and conflict resolution. Actions to achieve

these vary in practical application. Some take more time, some are

administratively complex, and some require more behavioural change.

Interventions to achieve the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) can also be

categorised in terms of factors that contribute to the ease or difficulty of their

achievement. Inevitably, uneven capacity will become increasingly apparent in

the effort to achieve some of the goals.

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Good political economy seeks ways of bringing analyses of context and content

to bear on the process of reform. Each phase of the reform process can be

viewed as an arena in which characteristics of the context and content of the

initiative come into play.

Source: Grindle, M., 2007, 'Good Enough Governance Revisited', Development Policy

Review, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 533-574

Governance and Conflict Management: Implications for Donor Intervention

B Latto (2002)

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Summary

Good governance means that conflict is more likely to be managed peaceably. This

paper for the Crisis States Programme argues that violent conflict may be avoided

where governance structures provide political redress and allow compromise,

moderation and inclusion. It then draws out implications for donors at both national

and international levels of governance.

Conflict is unavoidable, but the risk of violence is reduced where governance

processes allow differences and opposition to be managed constructively. The roots of

conflict are thought to lie in grievances resulting from social, economic and political

inequalities between groups (which may be ethnic or religious). Recent research has

focused on the need to understand economic motivations for conflict. Yet whatever the

cause, appropriate political arrangements can help to solve conflict without violence.

Many aspects of governance can play a part, including constitutional design and

political and justice systems. The optimal model will differ according to

circumstances, but experience suggests a set of principles on which to base donor

interventions.

If all countries with high levels of poverty and inequality are at risk from violent

conflict, donor aid should be sensitive to how it interacts with conflict management. In

this context, recent experience in states such as Fiji, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina

suggest that:

Early intervention to prevent conflicts escalating is crucial.

Where violent conflict has already happened, there is often a rare opportunity

for institutional change. Choices made during transition periods must be well

informed and aimed at reducing differences.

Sustainable solutions can only result from internal participatory processes and

should not rely too much on international financing.

Sudden shifts to Western-style multi-party democracy systems and economic

liberalisation may actually worsen political tensions.

Conflicting interests and power struggles could mean that even rational choices

have unintended consequences.

Instead of jumping to a new, unfamiliar system, it may be better to make limited

reforms to an existing system, which can evolve with time.

War economies are highly dependent on international trade networks. Thus action at

this level can be very effective. It also fits with a wave of opinion arguing that efforts

should concentrate on creating the environmental conditions necessary for peace,

rather than manipulating state institutions. Policy suggestions cover both international

and national interventions, however, and include:

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International sanctions, although these are not always successful.

Better regulation of global trade in commodities such as oil, diamonds,

hardwoods and narcotics, which often fuel violent conflict.

Regulation of the international flow of small arms, alongside a more effective

framework to crack down on money laundering and bribery.

At national level, consideration of whether integrative power sharing and

devolution could help manage conflict, and how changes to electoral systems

might produce more moderate, inclusive behaviour.

Enhancing state legitimacy by boosting the political role of civil society,

strengthening the media, increasing government transparency and working with

political parties to produce policies that reduce inequality.

Improving security and human rights through transitional justice methods, a

stronger judiciary, local policing initiatives and democratic control of the

military.

Source: Latto, B., 2002, ‗Governance and Conflict Management: Implications for

Donor Intervention‘, Crisis States Programme Working Paper No.9, London School of

Economics, London

How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?

M Moore (2007)

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Abstract

This paper summarises the policy implications of a growing debate about the

connections between taxation and the quality of governance in developing countries.

Taxation – or the absence of tax – impacts on the quality of governance through two

main channels. The first relates to the degree of dependence of governments on general

taxation for their financial resources. Many governments do not need to make much

tax effort because they have large non-tax incomes from oil, gas and mineral exports or

from foreign aid. State elites are then financially independent of citizen-taxpayers. This

changes the political incentives that they face, and the ways in which they seek to

obtain, use and retain power.

The long term consequences for governance are malign: state elites are less responsive

and accountable to citizens; and, depending on the sources of non-tax revenue, may

have less incentive to build up the political and organisational capacities of the state.

States are likely to be simultaneously arbitrary and weak. All else being equal, the

dependence of governments on general taxation has positive effects on the quality of

governance. But that relationship is not automatic. How governments tax also matters.

We cannot assume that, because they are fully dependent on taxation for revenues,

governments will be capable, accountable, or responsive. They may levy taxes

coercively, and thereby damage state-society relations and reinforce poor governance.

Public authorities in contemporary poor countries face some incentives to tax

coercively. Establishing more consensual taxation practices is an important practical

route to improving governance. Aid donors could play a more constructive role.

Source: Moore, M., 2007, ‗How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance‘,

Working Paper 280, Center for the Future State, Institute of Development Studies,

Brighton.

278

Striving for Good Governance in Africa: Synopsis of the 2005 African

Governance Report

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2005)

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Summary

What constitutes good governance in Africa? How can it be achieved and how is it

measured? This report is a synopsis of the Economic Commission for Africa‘s (ECA)

African Governance Report that aims to ascertain public perceptions of the state of

governance in the region. It highlights the pressing need for the implementation of a

bold and innovative programme to develop Africa‘s governance capacity.

The creation of capable states in which peace and security are guaranteed and sustained

is one of the most fundamental challenges in Africa today. This research gathers public

perceptions of governance across various African states. It highlights capacity deficits

and encourages the sharing of intra-regional experience and knowledge on the

challenges to good governance.

Overall governance is improving in Africa and the situation across the continent is

very different from a decade ago. However, considerable country variations are

evident, with some countries scoring consistently better than the average and some

consistently worse. The report finds positive trends towards creating capable states:

The trend to democratic transitions. Many African countries have evolved from

authoritarian or military regimes. Good governance is increasingly promoted by

states through a new social pact.

Elections have become the only acceptable basis for choosing leadership.

The trend toward greater political inclusiveness. Many countries are seeking to

ensure that the executive and the legislature reflect the profile of their

population in religious, ethnic, racial and regional terms.

The trend toward expanded voice and accountability. Citizens are more able to

participate in the political process and express their beliefs without fear of

retribution. In turn governments are more responsive.

The trend toward better public financial management and accountability. More

countries are running smaller deficits, managing their tax systems better and

improving fiscal transparency.

Capable states are however far from the norm in Africa and much remains to be

achieved especially in the quality of public sector management. A bold, cross-cutting,

comprehensive, Africa-led programme needs to be implemented, backed with

substantial funding from international development partners. This effort should address

the following ten priority areas to develop a critical mass of capacity in Africa:

Strengthening the capacity of parliaments to perform their core functions. Also,

deepening legal and judicial reforms.

Improving public sector management. Action should be country specific,

sustained and focussed on re-evaluating the role, size and organisational

structure of the public sector.

Improving the delivery of public services. Also, removing bottlenecks to private

enterprise, for instance through the protection of property rights and the

enforcement of contracts.

279

Tapping the potential of information and communication technologies for

promoting transparency, openness and knowledge exchange.

Fostering credible and responsible media. Additionally, maximising the

contribution of traditional modes of governance.

Confronting the governance dimension of HIV/AIDS, particularly on

institutional structures.

Getting partners to live up to their commitments on aid.

Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, ‗Striving for Good

Governance in Africa: Synopsis of the 2005 African Governance Report‘, UNECA,

Addis Ababa