conflic and social agency

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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Conflict and Social AgencyAuthor(s): Isaac LeviReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 5 (May, 1982), pp. 231-247Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026060 .

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYVOLUME LXXIX, NO. 5, MAY 1982

CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY*FORMAL analogiesbetweenriteriaorrationalndividualdecision makingand group or social decisionmakinghavebeen evident to many authors ever since Plato exploitedanalogies betweentheorganizationofthesoul and thestate n theRepublic in expounding his conceptionof Justice.Nonetheless,there s a widespreadreluctanceto acknowledge the existence ofgroups and institutions as agents. This leads to some bizarrejuxtapositions.Thus, neoclassical economistsare not noted fortheir ympathywithnotions ofgroup mind.Yet, n expoundingthetheory f con-sumerdemand, families reoften llowed to qualifyas consumers.Such consumers re taken, deallyat least,to bemaximizers f theirpreferences r valuations, subject to budgetary onstraints.Giventheindifferencemaps representing heconsumer'spreferencesndthebudgetaryonstraints,emandcurves re derived. uch analysisis not restricted o persons,but is intended to apply to any con-sumer, ncluding a family.Families make choices from ccessible

commodity undles,givenbudgetaryonstraints. heyare takentobe rationalpreferencemaximizers ike individualconsumers nd tohave preferencesepresentable y indifferencemaps. In this con-text,no distinctionbetween ndividualand social decisionmakingis drawn.Not only are corporationsoftenqualified legally to be persons;but corporations nd otherbusinessfirms re taken n both posi-*Work relatedto thisessay began while I was a fellow of the National Endow-

mentoftheHumanitiesand associate fellowofDarwinCollege,CambridgeUniver-sity.This work has received ubsequentpartial support from he National ScienceFoundation. I havebenefited romwritten ommentsbyAmartya en and extendeddiscussionswithPaul Lyon. JohnWatkins nd Ned McLennan have repeatedly e-mindedme of the mportance fphenomena like thatexhibited n the Allais para-dox. They wereright.0022-362X/82/7905/0231$01.60 ? 1982The JournalofPhilosophy, nc.

231


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232 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYtive nd normative heory o make decisions relative o informationavailable to them and to be subject to criticismdepending onwhether he decisions are intelligent iven their ims.It is well known that the high priest of Hacking's "heyday ofideas," Thomas Hobbes, spoke of the endowments nd actions ofthe "sovereign" in a manner neutral with respectto whether hesovereignwas a person,parliament, r citizenry. is individualismdid not preventhim fromdiscussinggroup agency.The bestknown effortn recentyears o apply canons of rationalchoice to social entities s that of Kenneth Arrow. AccordingtoArrow, ppropriate social groups are to be representeds seekingto maximize the welfaresof their citizens or, more accurately, omaximize some increasingfunction fthe welfares f their itizens.Arrow's concern and the concern of the participants n the debatethat followed his justly celebratedSocial Choice and IndividualValues focused hiefly n the relationsthatdo or should obtainbe-tween the valuations made by the individual citizens,whose inter-ests are to be promotedby society s represented y rankings f the"social states" or options some subsetof which are feasiblefor o-ciety, nd thesocial evaluationorpreference anking s representedbyanotherweak ordering f thesame social states.Among the social institutions o which Arrow thoughthis ap-proach mightapply are included marketsn which producers ndconsumers xchange goods leading to social states n whichgoodsare allocated to individuals in certainwaysand committeeswheredecisions are takenaccording to some voting mechanism.J. M. Buchanan has complained against Arrow hat"Votingandthe market, s decision making mechanisms,have evolved from,and are basedupon an acceptanceof, the philosophyof ndividual-ism which presumesno social entity."' He complains because hethinks hatArrow s committed o theexistence f suchsocial enti-ties when Arrowassumes thatthe rationality f decision-makingmechanismssuch as votingor the market should be assessed interms f whether ocial preferences maximizedwhere social pref-erence nduces a weak orderingover the feasible social states.Be-cause Arrowflouts ndividualism n this manner,his approach isdeeply flawed t the very utset.One response to Buchanan's objectionis toreject ndividualism.That is to say, one might oncede that ocial groups are sometimesagents in the sense that theymake choices to promotegiven ends

"'Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets,"Journal of Political Economy,LXII (1964): 117.


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 233and that their evaluations of options and the choices theymakemaybe assessedforrationality.

Buchanan, however,thinksthatArrowcannot,givenhis othercommitments,o so consistently,s thefollowingpassage reveals:Rationalityr irrationalitys an attributef the ocialgroup m-pliesthe mputationothat roup f n organic xistencepart romthat f ts ndividualomponents.fthe ocialgroup s soconsidered,questionsmayberaised elativeo thewisdom r unwisdomf thisorganic eing.Butdoes notthevery ttemptoexamineuchration-ality n termsf ndividual alues ntroduceogical nconsistencyttheoutset? an therationalityf the ocialorganismeevaluatednaccordance ith nyvalueorderingther han tsown?Thewholeproblemeems est onsidereds oneof the either-or"variety.Wemayadoptthephilosophical asesof individualismnwhich he ndividuals theonlyentityossessingndsor values. nthis aseno question f socialorcollectiveationality aybe raised.A socialvalue scaleas such simply oes notexist.Alternatively,emay dopt omevariantftheorganic hilosophicalssumptionsnwhich the collectivitys an independentntity ossessingtsownvalueordering.t s legitimateotest he ationalityr rrationalityf

this ntitynly gainst his alueordering116).Thus, accordingto Buchanan, there s nothing nconsistent rincoherentn attributingorganic existence"or agencyto a socialgroup such as a corporation.Such an agentmaybe understood obe makingdecisionsin a manner thatseeksto promote tsvalues.Buchanan's own metaphysicalpredilections re in favorof indi-vidualism. He does not acknowledge institutional gents-espe-cially in the case of groups participating n market xchange orcommitteevoting.But his criticismof Arrow s not directedpri-marilyto the ssue of the"organicexistence"ofsocial groups.His chargeis thatArrow'sprojectsuffers rom ncoherence.Heclaims thatthe"very ttempt" o examine therationality fgroupdecision making"in terms f individual values" introduces logi-cal inconsistency" t the very tart.Accordingto Buchanan, Arrow s not incoherentn attributingsocial preferenceankingsof social statesto social groups.That isin keepingwith the viewofsocial groupsas having"organicexist-ence" apart fromthat of theirmembers.The "logical inconsis-tency" mergeswhen Arrow eeksto representocial preferences afunctionof the preferences f citizensfor the same social states.SinceArrowmustdo this fhe is torelatehis analysistomarkets rcommitteeswho take decisions by voting,Arrowcan apply histheory o thesecases onlyat thecostof "logical inconsistency."


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234 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYBuchanan's critiqueofArrowraisestwodistinct ssues:(1) Should we attribute ationality o social groups?(2) When we do attribute ationality o social groups,mayweconsistentlyllow social preferenceo be a function f individualpreference?We have alreadyobserved hat venstudents fmarket conomiesattribute eliefs,desires,goals, values, and choices to families ndto firms nd, of course,governmentgents whichmaybe bureausrather hanbureaucrats) s well as topersons.No doubt themecha-

nismswhereby hedecisionstakenby such social agentsare to beexplained typically nvolvereference o the behaviorsof and, in-deed, sometimesthedecisions takenby individual agents and byother social agents). Perhaps group choices are redescribable scomplex processes nvolvingno otherchoices than thoseof per-sons.Butthisneednot detract rom hereality fsuchgroupchoicesanymore thantheredescribabilityf ndividualchoicesas complexneurophysiologicalprocessesdetracts rom hereality f ndividualchoices.Nor should redescribabilityn itself recludetheproprietyofsubjecting ocial choicetocanons of rationalitynymorethan tshould preclude the propriety f subjectingindividual choice tothe very ame canons.When we focus on characterizations f social groups in termsof theirbeliefs,goals, choices, and othersuch propositional atti-tudes,we are no moreconcernedwiththeunderlyingmechanismsthanwe are when we use such characterizationsf human agentsor,for thatmatter, fautomata. Perhapsdifferencesn the"hard-ware" should makea differencen theviewwe takeof theprinci-ples ofrationalpreference,elief, aluation,and choice;but,unlessa decisivecase is advancedthatthis should be so, it seemssensibleto seek an accountofrationalchoice,belief,preference,nd valua-tion whichis indifferento whether heagent s humanor not and,ifnot,whethert is automaton,animal, angelic,or social.The ontological sensibilities f some maybe offended y speak-ing ofgroupsas agents.But if they reprepared o attribute eliefs,values, and choices to groupsas well as to individualhumansandto think thatsuch values, beliefs, nd choices ought to be judgedby the same principles of rationalityas are applied to humanagents, theyare recognizingsuch social entitiesas agents in theonly sense thatmatters ere.Arrow's wn response o thecritiques fBuchananand of . M. D.Littleis curious in thisrespect.He contendsthathewas concerned


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 235with rules forarriving t social decisionswhich "may be agreedupon forreasonsof convenience nd necessitywithout ts outcomesbeing treated s evaluations byanyonein particular."2Arrow appears quite anxious to disavow commitment o groupmindsor social groups as organicbeings.Yet, accordingto his ac-count of social choice, groups do choose one from mong a setoffeasiblesocial states n an environmentnd, ifrational,do so in amannerthat s optimalrelative o a social preference hichweaklyorders he social states. n thisconnection,he citeswith approval acommentby Karl Popper: "Not a few doctrineswhich are meta-physical,and thus certainlyphilosophical, can be interpretedshypostatizationsfmethodologicalrules."3 Thus, forArrow,n so-cial choice we have choice withouta choosing subjectand prefer-encewithout preferringubject, ust as, forPopper, n sciencewehave knowledgewithout knowingsubject.I sympathizewith the response of C. R. Plott to Arrow'sma-neuverwhen he declaresthat t is "operationally"difficult o dis-tinguisheffortsmotivated romArrow'spoint of view from ffortsmotivatedfrompoints ofview thattreat ociety s an organicen-tity.4 lott's operationalistrhetorics questionable; but it is irrele-vant to the core of his observation.Any system,whether t isanimal, vegetable, or mineral, whetherit is an automaton, ahuman,or a groupof automataor humans,can qualify s an agentfor the purpose ofdiscussingrationalchoice (which is thecontextin which PlottdiscussesArrow'sviews) providedthatchoices,be-liefs,preferences,alues,and goals are ascribableto thesystemndprovidedthat t is appropriateto urgeconformityonormsofra-tional preference,elief, nd choice.To saythisdoes not implythat ll social groupsact as agentsorthat thosewhichdo do so all thetime.However,we cannotclaimmore for nimals, automata,or even human beings. havecharac-terized genthood in termsof the propriety f criticismfromthevantagepoint of normsof rationalchoice. I do nothave any inde-pendently pecifiablecriteriafor determining uch propriety; utwe do not need any to appreciatethehardcore of Plott's insight,which is thatwhenqualms about groupmindsareconstrued s anobjection to attributing gency to social groups, thentalk aboutsocial preferencend social choice should be avoided-at least in

2Social Choice and Individual Values (New York:Wiley,2nd ed., 1963),p. 106.3 The Logic of Scientific iscovery New York: Basic Books, 1959),p. 55.4"Path Independence,Rationalityand Social Choice," Economica, XLI (1973):1078.


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236 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYanysense in which such preference nd choice is subject to criticalscrutiny ynormsofrationality.Arrow nd those who followhimcannot have theircake and eat it. Retreating o thethirdworld isno moreacceptablein discussionsofsocial choice than t is in dis-cussions ofthegrowth fknowledge.5To this extent,Plott's view coincides with Buchanan's-andquite rightly o. But Arrowneed not have deniedagencyto socialgroups. Indeed,given his position, he should have done preciselytheopposite. Moreover, n doing so, he could still have defendedhimself gainst themain thrust f Buchanan's criticism, o whichwe now turn.Recall that thesecondand critical tep n Buchanan's critiqueofArrow s his denial that ocial preferencesifthere re social organ-ismshavingthem)can coherently e made todependon individualvalues. Buchanan thinks t a "logical inconsistency" o "attempt oexamine such [social] rationality n termsof individual values"(116). Clearly he is thinking f social agents who maximize valuesin a manner ndependent f the nterestsf thecitizens r subjects.Social agentsare tobe thoughtofas promoting heir wn interestsjust as individuals are to be thought of as promoting theirownpersonalconcerns.Some social institutions ndoubtedly eek to promotetheir wnselfish nterestsust as individuals do. Social agents, ike humanagents, can be selfishor, if other-directed,an be directed owardother ocial agents.But just as, at least on someoccasions,humanagents can seek to promote the interests nd welfareof otherhuman agents, so too, social institutions an seek to promote theinterests f human agentswho are somehowrelatedto the socialagents in question as citizensare. If there s no logical inconsis-tency n the one case, there hould be none in the other.Thus, it is not incoherent o regard society hatallocates com-modity bundles through a market mechanismas an agent. Themarketmechanism n operation provides procedurewhereby hesocietymakescertainkindsofsocial choices. Wemay ask two ques-tions about the way such choices are made: (a) Are the choicesmade in a mannermaximizingsome social preference?b) If theansweris affirmative,re the social preferences ependenton theinterests f theparticipantsn themarket?

'I have advocatedthinking f knowing subjects as comprising nstitutions uchas scientific ommunities s well as persons for some time, but most recently ndexplicitly in The Enterpriseof Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980),1.1-1.5.


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 237Arrow's impossibility theorem presupposes that affirmativeanswers maybe givento both questionsbut then goes on to assert

that the dependency f social preferencen the preferences f citi-zens cannot ointly satisfyeveral mportant onditions.Perhaps, as Buchanan suggests, there is nothing disturbingabout thisresult as it applies to theuse by societyof markets schoice mechanismsfor the distributionof commoditiesto con-sumers. n anycase, whether here s or is not something rouble-some about Arrow'sresult, hetrouble rises if t does) for ny so-cial agency seeking to maximize social preferences imed atpromoting ndividualwelfares nd not ust for uch agencies thatseek such ends through heuse ofmarketmechanisms.Moreover, odeclarethatArrow'sresultmisses themarkbecausesocial groupscannotbe takencoherentlyo be maximizers f socialpreferencesependingon individual values is no wayto neutralizethe mpactof Arrow'stheorem.Buchanan to the contrary otwith-standing,nothing n logic prevents ur takingsocial groups to beagents of the sort that seek to maximize just such preferences.Blanketrefusalto attribute gencyof thiskind to social groupsaspracticedby Buchanan is conceptual stonewallingwhich placesroadblocks n the pathof inquiry.6Insistingthat ocial institutionshould sometimes e recognizedto be agentsdoes not entail insensitivityo the differencesetweenpersonsand social institutions-especiallythe morally elevant if-ferences.Neither n unborn human fetusnor someonein coma isan agent subjectto criticalcontrolaccordingto canons ofrationalchoice. Yet, they re clearlyobjects of moralconcern; nd some ap-parently re preparedto insist that theybe treatedwiththe samemoralrespect s is to be accordedotherhumanbeings.Conversely,attributinggencyto animals, automata,or social institutions oesnotentail granting uch agentsthesamemoral concern nd respectwe accord human agents.Agencyis undoubtedlya morallyrelevant trait;but it is oneamong many.We should not be deterred rom crutinizing hede-cisions and aims of institutionswith the aid ofcanons ofrational-

6I should be noted in passing that Arrow's formalismforsocial choice can beapplied to the evaluations of theoptions of a person seeking perhaps because ofmoral conviction)to promotethe welfares fothers.Hence, even if Buchanan had(counter, n myview,tofact)beenright bout social agency,Arrow's nalysiswouldstillretain mportant pplicability. do not seek,however, odefend heapplicabil-ityof Arrow's nalysis in general.My concernhas been withthose contextswheregovernmental,orporate, r other nstitutional olicies are considered.


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238 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYity because of moral scruples any more than we should be pre-ventedfromdoing so by metaphysical ogma.

Nonetheless, ome ustifiable kepticism emainsconcerningAr-row's assumptionthat social groups are representable,t least onsome occasions,as maximizers f social preferences.ociety s pre-sentedwitha choice between ocial statesbelongingto some subsetS of a domain U of entertainable ocial states.According oArrow,societyhas a system f preferences hich inducesa weak orderingof the elements f U. Society's valuation oftheelements f S is therestriction fthatweak ordering ver U to the elements fS.Society s takento have as its goal the objectiveof promoting hevalues or welfares f ts "citizens,"wherethe "welfares"ofthe citi-zens are representable y weakorderings f the elements f U (and,hence, of S )-each citizenbeingassigned an ordering.The individualvaluations are usually differentankings ver thesame social states. Hence, to maximize accordingto one of theserankings s incompatiblewith maximizing accordingto another.In this way,social agents, ike personal agents,oftenfacedecisionproblems where the agent is committedto promotingdifferentvalues whichconflict n theway theyrank the feasibleoptions.Both in thefirst ditionand even more so in the secondeditionofSocial Choice and Individual Values,Arrow nsists hattheeval-uation of social statesor options society ught to use in determin-ing which optionsare admissibleshould be a weak ordering f theoptions or social statesand that the admissibleset should be re-stricted o thosewhich are optimal relative o thatweakordering.Thus, Arrowpresupposesas a conditionof rationalchoice thatconflictsof value be resolvedprior to choice. Hence, he sees theproblem presented o him as focused on resolvingthe conflictbe-tweenthe evaluations for heseveral itizens ccordingto some rulewhich determines, oreach "profile" of individual values, a socialpreferenceanking thatweaklyorders he domain U.It is well known, of course,how widespreadthe view is thatra-tional individual decisionmaking ought to maximize preferences.By preference' ere, do notnecessarilymeana ranking f alterna-tives withrespectto anticipated satisfactions. he individualmayhave taken nto account moral, political, economic,cognitive, ndaestheticvalues in makinga ranking.But precisely ecausehe maydo so and because these diversedesideratacan lead to conflictingrankingsofthe same alternativeswhen employed n isolationfromone another, the requirement hat preferences e maximizedrela-tive to a single rankingpresupposesthat uch conflicts e resolvedpriorto choice.


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 239Evenmoraltheorists, ho feigntodispensewiththenotionthatrational agentsshould maximizepreferencesn thegeneroussense

just indicated n favor fapproaches groundedon principlesof ob-ligationand permission, hare thesame outlook. In thefirst lace,if, n a givencontext f choice,a particular ption is held tobe ob-ligatory,t is presumably ankedoverthe other lternativesnd inthis sensepreferredver them.Second, if moralprinciplesconflict,appeal is typicallymade to second-order rinciplesthatarbitrateand prescribewhich options among those feasiblearemorally orlegally) admissible.For themost part,so I suggest,decision theo-rists nd moralists gree that,to be rationalor coherent t themo-mentofchoice,an individualagent shouldhaveironedout all con-flicts t themoment f choice,or, fnot,we should regardhis choiceas itself onstitutingn expressionof his resolutionof theconflict.Arrow's view ofrational social choice is no different,n thisre-spect,from eceivednotionsofrational ndividualdecisionmaking.On theotherhand, insofar s there s some reasonfor kepticismconcerningthe propriety f mandating thatconflictsbe resolvedpriorto choice in thecontext f individual decisionmaking, t be-comes at least entertainablehat uchskepticismhouldbe endorsedin connectionwith social decision makingas well.7Objection totherequirement hat ocietymaximizepreferencesepresentedyaweak orderingof social options along theselines should not beconfusedwithobjections, ike Buchanan's,whicharegroundedonpreconceptions oncerningwhen one can and whenone cannotat-tribute gencyto social institutions. his skepticism erivesfromdoubt concerning the conditionson rational choice,whether heagentis individual or social.The issue is not whether references,alues, and goals do or donot come into conflict.Nor is it whether t is rationalfor n agentto suffer rom onflict n his values. That value conflict ccursandconfronts ven rational agents is widely acknowledged.What isquestionable is whetherrational agents should have resolvedallconflictswhenfixingon a decision,so thatthey an claim thattheoption chosen is forthebest, ll thingsconsidered.The dominantview is thatrationality rohibits ecisionmaking underunresolvedconflict. mean to rejectthis view.Accordingto strictBayesians, deally rational agents maximizeexpected utility.To determine xpected utilitiesfor feasible op-tions,however, heagent mustbe in a position tomake udgments

'K. 0. Mayargued essentially long these ines in "Intransitivity,tility, nd theAggregation fPreference atterns," conometrica,XXII (1954): 1-13.


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240 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYof probability nabling him to assign probabilitynumbersto hy-potheses concerning consequences" of his options conditionalonhis implementing hem nd utilitynumbers unique up to positiveaffine ransformation)o thesehypotheses. n this way, theagent'sevaluation of his feasible ptionsin terms f expectedutilitywouldbe free fany conflict.A common source of skepticism bout strictBayesian doctrineconcerns the grounds on which probabilitynumbers re to be as-signed. Often t seems that,given the available evidenceand back-ground knowledge,there s no warrantforfavoring ne system fprobability udgments ver another.PersonalistBayesians dvocatepicking a system f udgmentsout of one's hat, often overingupthe arbitrariness f the procedurewith a display of rhetoric nd areminderthat one's judgmentsmust at least be coherent.Othersfollow in the footsteps f Harold Jeffreysnd Rudolf Carnap byseeking objective criteriaforconstraining probability udgment.Typically they tumble nto inconsistency r obscurantism.8The great statisticians,R. A. Fisher, JerzyNeyman,and Abra-ham Wald,who pioneered n the 1920s,30s, and 40s what weretobecome the dominant approaches to statistical heoryn thepost-war period, sought to avoid both paths. They thought hat,whentherewas no warrantformaking definiteprobability udgments,one should avoid making them-counterto the dvice of personalistBayesians.And they enied thatone could devisean inductive ogicso strong s to justifynumericallydefiniteprobability udgmentsin every ituation. They sought methods thateitherbypassedtheneed to use Bayes' theorem r displaced it.AndNeymanand Wald,bothof whomthought hat tatistical heory ught tobe viewed asa branch ofa theory fdecision making, ought waysand meansofmaking decisions under conditionswhere the injunctionto max-imize expected utility annot be obeyed because probability nfor-mation is lacking.These authors nsistedthat t is better oremain n a stateof un-resolved conflict-i.e., in suspense-concerning how to makeprobability udgmentsthanto resolve uch conflict rbitrarilyr tointroduceprinciplesof inductive ogic of questionable merit.Butwhenprobability udgment s indeterminaten this manner, alcu-lations of expected utilitymust also be indeterminate ven if theutility nformation vailable is precise. Thus, one option mightrank over another according to one probabilitydistribution,ndtheranking might go the otherway according to another. f there

'For a beautifully learexpositionof the troubleswith objectiveBayesianism, eeT. Seidenfeld, Why I Am Not an Objective Bayesian," Theory and Decision, xi(1979): 413-440.


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 241is no warrantfor favoring ne distribution ather han theother,theagentshould be in suspensenot onlyas to the merits fthetwodistributions ut also as to themerits f therival waysof evaluat-ing his feasibleoptionswithrespect o expectedutility.That is tosay,he should remain in a stateof unresolved onflict venwhenfacing a decision. Neyman and Wald, among others, suggestedcriteriaforevaluatingfeasible options to be used when considera-tion of expectedutility ails torender verdict-such as lookingatsecurityevels. I have sought to elaboratesuch an outlook myselfelsewhere.9Conflict n how an agent evaluates his options with respecttoexpectedutilityneednot be engenderedby indeterminacyn prob-ability udgment.Conflict n how theagent evaluatesthe "possibleconsequences" of his options (how he evaluateshis "utilities") canalso generateconflict n the appraisal of options with respecttoexpectedutility.An interestingllustration f this s furnished y an example in-troduced nto generaldiscussionbyMauriceAllais.10Mr. Unsure-thing is presentedwith two differentituationswherehe mustchoose between two options. In both situationsa ball is to be se-lectedfroman urn containing 100 balls of which one is red, 89white, and 10 are blue. In situation I, option A guarantees$1,000,000 egardless f the outcomeof the draw.Choosing optionB yieldsnothingifa red is drawn, $1,000,000 f a white s drawn,and $5,000,000 f a blue is drawn. In situationII, option C pays$1,000,000 fa red orblue is drawn and nothingotherwise,whereasoption D paysnothing fa red or white s drawnand $5,000,000 fa blue is drawn.

In both situations and II, the probabilities f possibleoutcomesare quite determinate.And so are themonetary ayoffs. he fol-lowing table sums up the pertinentnformation:1 89 10Red White BlueIA $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000B $0 $1,000,000 $5,000,000

C $1,000,000 $0 $1,000,000D $0 $0 $5,000,0009 n greatest etail in The Enterprise f Knowledge Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press,1980) and previously n "On Indeterminate robabilities,"thisJOURNAL, LXXI, 13(July 18, 1974): 391-418.'?"Le Comportement e l'hommerationneldevant e risque: Critiquedes postu-lats et axiomes de l'&ole americaine,"Econometrica,xxi (1953): 503-546.


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242 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYNoticethat heonlydifferenceetween hepayoffmatrices or it-uations I and II concernsthe case where a white ball is drawn.In

situationI, Unsurething eceives million whateverhe does, andin situation I he receivesnothing.According o theso-called"surethingprinciple" enunciatedby L. J.Savage" and implied bystrictBayesiandoctrine,Unsurething hould weakly prefer ption A tooption B in situation I ifand only ifhe weakly prefers to D insituation I.Allais reports hat the mostfrequent esponse concerningwhatUnsurething hould do in thetwosituations mong those who areprudent nd are so regardedbyothers s thatA be chosen in situa-tion I and D in situation I (527).The attractiveness f this verdict s widelyacknowledged,andevenSavage conceded tspull (103).AlthoughAllais's paper appeared beforeSavage's book, Allaisdoes refer o anotherpresentation f Savage's axioms and is quiteclear that he thinks hat thepredominant esponseto the twopre-dicaments ust described s in violation ofwhat was subsequentlycalled the"sure thingprinciple." 2

The predominantresponsewould, indeed,exhibit violation ofthesure-thing rinciple were t thecase thatUnsurething's hoiceofA in situation revealedhis strict reference orA overB and hischoice of D over C in situation I revealed his strict reference orD overC.Allais himself eclaresthathis own abstract efinition f ration-alityentails thatthe set of feasibleoptions should be weaklyor-dered, apparently so that the option chosen may be identified soptimal (518 and 522). That is to say, Allais insiststhat to be ra-tional an agentshould be free fconflict s tohow his optionsareto be ranked.And thisassumption implies that thepredominantresponse s in violation of thesure-thing rinciple.Observe,however, hat, fwe rejectAllais's assumption thatra-tional agents resolveconflict n theirchoice, thepredominantre-sponse no longermanifests iolation of the sure-thing rinciple;for t is at least entertainable hatUnsurething s in conflict s toThe proposed analysis ofAllais's problemshould be compared with thedifferentapproaches developed by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, ProspectTheory," Eco-nometrica, LVII (1979): 263-292, and by P. Gardenforsnd N.-E. Sahlin, "DecisionMakingwithUnreliableProbabilities,"unpublishedmanuscript." The Foundations ofStatisticsNew York: Wiley,1954): pp. 20-22.12Allais, op. cit.contains a characterization f Savage's "axiom ofindependence"and on pp. 527/8 explicitly tatesthat the example underconsideration hows the"pseudo-evident" haracter f Savage's axiom.


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 243how to rank A and B withrespect o expectedutility nd likewisewithrespect to C and D. Such conflict annot arise as a resultofindeterminacyn probabilityudgment.The probabilities re nu-mericallydefinite.But even if Unsurethingprefers 5,000,000to$1,000,000 o$0 and even f the marginal utility f moneydecreasesat ratessufficiento guaranteethatthe differencen value between$0 and $1,000,000 s greater hanthedifferenceetween 1,000,000and $5,000,000,Unsurethingmightbe in conflict s towhether heratioof the two differencess greater r less than 10/1.And if hewere n such conflict, henUnsurethingwould be in conflict lsoas towhether orankA overB orB overA with respect oexpectedutility nd would be in a similarconflictwith regard o C and D.Under thesecircumstances,UnsurethingmightchooseA overBbecause the"securityevel" or "worst possiblecase" is better orAthanforB. And he might hooseD overC eventhoughthesecuritylevelsare thesame because thesecondworstpossiblecase is betterforD thanforC. In thatevent,Unsurethinghas chosenA overBwithoutpreferring toB and has chosenD overC withoutprefer-ringD to C. Of course,A beatsB whenconsiderations f securityare takeninto account, and D beats C accordingto thesame fac-tors. But Unsurethinghas invokedthesecriteria nlybecause theconflict n his utilitiespreventshim from endering verdict on-cerninghis options takingconsiderationof expectedutility loneinto account. Thus, he does not preferA to B and D to C "allthings onsidered" at leastnot in a sense thatyields violationofthe sure-thing rinciple.In myopinion, the tradeoff etweengiving up the sure-thingprincipleand therequirement hatrationalchoice be underunre-solved conflict avorsgivingup the atter-countertoAllais's ownconclusion.'3 Of course, strictBayesians will refuse to abandoneither ondition, nsisting hatthe predominant esponsetotheAl-lais phenomenon illustrateshow vulnerable to fallacyeven thesanestofus areand how importantt is for ll ofus toreceive oodtraining n Bayesianrationality.The approach advocated here suggeststhat instruction n theBayesiancatechism s less thanurgent nd even,for omepurposes,

13 In Decision Analysis (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 968), pp. 82-85, H.Raiffaoffersn interesting ritiqueof Allais's example. He givessome striking r-guments mplyingthe untenability f thepredominant esponse.These argumentspresuppose thatrational agentschoose an option theymostprefer ccordingto aweak orderingrepresenting heirconflict-freealuation of the feasibleoptions.Raiffa's argumentsappear to me to be telling against someone like Allais whoshareshis assumptionthat rationalchoice ought to be free f unresolved onflict.Space does notpermitdetailed discussionof Raiffa's rguments ere.


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244 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYharmful.In particular, the predominantresponse to the Allaisproblemmay prove to be thesensibleresponse fter ll.

Given thatUnsurethingprefersmoremoney to less and giventhat his utilityfunctionformoney exhibitsdiminishingmarginalutility fmoney, hould he be required to decide whether heratioof the differencesn utility etweenreceiving million and receiv-ing nothing and betweenreceivingfivemillion and receiving nemillion s greater han, qual to, or less than10/1? erhapsthere reoccasions where he may have othervalue commitmentswhich canbe invoked to justify ome judgment on this matter.But it seemsabsurd to suppose that, o be rational, Unsurethingmust have suf-ficient ther ommitments hich, togetherwith analogues of prin-ciples of inductive ogic forutility udgment, suffice o renderverdict.And it seemsequally absurd to insistthat, n the absence ofsuch commitments, nsurething hould decide without ustifica-tion in orderto save his reason. He should be allowed to suspendjudgment.The conflict n value consideredhereconcernstherate at whichthevalue ofmoney ncreaseswith an increase n monetary ayoff.But it is widelyacknowledgedthat decision makersoftenfacepre-dicaments where thereare conflicts n value derivingfromcom-mitments o differentrofessional nd social roles, different oralprinciples or aesthetic values. Such conflicts an induce on thesame set of feasibleoptions different eak orderings. t seems nomoreacceptablehere to suppose that an agent will always be in apositionto ustify ne resolutionof theconflict veranotherbeforetakinga decision than t is in Allais's problem. Sartre's xample oftheson tornbetweenfilial devotionto hismother nd commitmentto theFree Frenchcause illustrates he point. Unlike Sartrehow-ever, contendthat t is quite as untenableto regardhis decision asa resolutionof the conflict s it is in Allais's problem.The sonneed not regard his decision to join the Resistance as for the bestall things considered.He could and, perhaps, should see thecon-flict n his values as unresolved venthough he had to take a deci-sion. The fact thatone conflict in Allais's problem)is pecuniaryand theothermoral does not seemespecially relevant.

I arguedoriginally that conditions ofrationalbelief,valuation,and decisionought to be applicable to all agents whether hey reanimal, automaton,human, or social. The discussion mmediatelypreceding upports hecontention hat gents need notbetray heirrationalityby takingdecisions underunresolved onflict.The ex-amples were taken fromdecision makingby personal agents but,


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CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY 245according to the first rgument, ught to apply to social agents aswell.

Ironically,Arrow's mpossibility heorem tself ffers compel-ling case forconcluding thatsocial agents may retaintheir ation-ality while taking decisions under unresolved onflict ust as per-sonal agentsdo.Arrow'srequirement fnondictatorship n "social welfare unc-tions" that pecifyhow conflictsbetween he values ofthe ndivid-ual citizens are to be resolvedin social preference recludes rec-ommending that societyfollow the practice of resolving conflictby adopting the ranking of some designatedcitizen.And his pro-scription gainst appealing to interpersonal omparisonsofvaluesprecludes dopting any otherrankingcompatible withPareto con-ditions,"independence"requirements, nd the condition that thesocialwelfare unction e defined or ll possible preferencerofiles.The neteffectftheseArrovian onditions s to ruleout any po-tentialresolution of theconflictbetweenthewelfares f differentcitizensfromrepresentingocial preference.14hat is to say,theseconditions preclude societyfrom resolving such conflict.Arrowgetsa contradictionby insisting that societyresolve conflict ny-how. But if it is conceded thatdecision making under unresolvedconflictmay be rational for social agents as it is for personalagents,Arrow's nsistenceon endorsing therequirement hat,forany system f individual preferences r welfare ankings f the so-cial states, rankingrepresenting ocial preferencehould be de-terminedmay be abandoned.To be sure, the Arrovianresultremains troublesome venwhentherequirement hat social preferences e free f conflict s aban-doned. It is one thing to say that society, ike a person,may some-timesbe justified n takingdecisions without having resolvedallconflicts.But it is quite anotherthing to imposeconditionson so-cial valuation whichprevent esolutionof any conflict.I, forone, remain unconvinced that nterpersonal omparisonsare always to be avoided. And, in certainclasses of decision prob-lems,societymay be justified n adopting a dictatorial ule-or, atleast, n restricting esolutions o preference ankingsbelonging to

4 These remarks re a rough characterization f the insight expressed byR. D.Luce and H. Raiffa n Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 343-345,in theirdiscussion of how an argumentdue to Blackwell and Girshick Theory ofGames and StatisticalDecisions (New York:Wiley, 1954),p. 118] pertaining o indi-vidual choice under uncertainty ould be adjusted to yield the Arrow mpossibilitytheorem.Paul Lyon and Teddy Seidenfelddrew this to my attentionndependentlyof each other.


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246 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYmembers f some oligarchy.Nonetheless, ociety ftenmay lack awarrant ormaking nterpersonalomparisons nd forfavoring hevalues of some privilegedgroup of citizens. n such cases, societyshould be prohibited rom dopting any rankingof the ocial statesas a basis formaximizingbehavior.Thus, Buchanan is right at least to this extent.Societyshouldnot always be thought of as a preference-maximizinggent. But,counterto Buchanan, the troublewith Arrow's nsistence hatso-cial choice maximizepreferenceccording to some social preferenceranking is not that social institutionsfail to qualify as agentswhose choices are subject to critical assessmentaccordingto thesame canons of rational valuation and choice applicable to per-sons. Social groupsought oftento be treated s agents ust as per-sons ought oftento be treated s agents,and we should devise ourapproaches to rationalchoicewith this n mind."5But just as per-sonal agentsmay terminate eliberation nd takedecisionswithouthavingresolved themoral, political, economic,and aesthetic on-flicts elevant o theirpredicaments,o too social agentscommittedto promoting hewelfares ftheir lientsor citizensmight ustifia-bly makedecisions without ettling n how to balance the compet-ing interests f theseclients.It is often alleged that the chief difference etween"pure" or"theoretical" cientificnquiryand practical deliberation s that npracticebut not in science the need to makedecisionsdeprives hedeliberatingagent of the luxuryof remaining in suspense evenwhen there s no warrant or ettling utstanding ssuesone wayoranother.Curiously nough, some pragmatistse.g.,CharlesSandersPeirce) seemed quite preparedto accept such a dualism betweentheorynd practice.An alternative ragmatist esponse s to assimi-late theoretical nquiry somehow to practical deliberationin amannerthatdenies topureresearch, s itdoes topracticaldelibera-tion, the opportunity orsuspensionof udgment.My own brandofpragmatism greesthat cientificnquiry s a goal-directedctiv-ity subjectto the canons of criticism egulating ll practicaldelib-eration. But the needto take decisions which, n myview, s as ur-gent in pure researchas it is in practical deliberation)does notmandate or even excuse unjustifiedresolutionof conflict r leap-ing to conclusions. My aim in this paper has been to indicatehow

"SAn important ecent ffort o developdecision theory pplicable to both socialand personal agents has been undertakenby Paul Lyon, PreferenceAggregation,unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,WashingtonUniversity, t. Louis, 1980.


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FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT CAUSATION 247this brand ofpragmatismbears on "rationality" ssumptionsbuiltinto the conditions thatentail Arrow's mpossibility heorem.

ISAAC LEVIColumbia University

COMMENTS AND CRITICISMFREQUENCY-DEPENDENT CAUSATION*S ithhas a certain physicalconstitution; moking can causehim to get lung cancer.Jones, however, s not susceptible.L J When Smith smokes and getsthedisease,we mightwonderwhat it means to say of him that his smokingcaused his cancer.But differentciencesalso have an interestn generalizing ver theindividuals n a population and arriving t a population-level au-sal claim; smoking,we have found,causes lung cancer n thepop-ulation of U.S. adults. If the population includes susceptibleandnonsusceptiblendividualsalike and ifsome individualssmokebut

others do not, what could be involved in a population-levelhy-pothesisabout the causal role of smoking?Ronald Giere' has recently rovideda counterfactualnalysisofsuch claims. One part of his account is designedto cover popula-tions of deterministic ystems; he other s intended o handle pop-ulations of stochastic systems. f Smith is a deterministicystem,then it will be a matterof physical necessity hat, f he smokes,he'll getcancer. f, on the otherhand,Smith s a stochastic ystem,then his smoking won't physicallynecessitatehis getting ancer.Rather,his probability f getting ancerif he smokeswill exceedhis probabilityof gettingcancer if he doesn't. The first lause ofGiere's analysis is that, f smoking causes cancer n a population,then theremust be at least one individualin thepopulation who iseither deterministic r a stochastic ystemwithrespect o the oc-currence f cancer,given smoking.The second conditionof the analysis nstructs s tocomparetwo

*This paper was written nder grantsfrom he John Simon Guggenheim Foun-dation and the University f Wisconsin Madison Graduate School, which I ac-knowledge with thanks. am grateful lso to the Museum of ComparativeZoology,Harvard University, or ts hospitality uring 1980-81.' In Understanding cientificReasoning (New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston,1979) and in "Causal Systems nd Statistical Hypotheses"in L. Jonathan Cohen,ed., Applicationsof nductiveLogic (New York: Oxford,1980).0022-362X/82/7905/0247$00.70 ? 1982 The JournalofPhilosophy, nc.

conflic and social agency

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