configuring the field of play: how hosting the olympic games impacts civic community

Configuring the Field of Play: How Hosting theOlympic Games Impacts Civic Community

Mary Ann GlynnBoston College, Carroll School of Management

abstract I theorize and empirically illustrate how the mega-event of the Olympic Gamesconfigures relational and symbolic systems within the host city. I focus on a field at the levelof the local geographic community and explore how city character and traditions enable bothpersistence and change in institutional elements even when potentially disruptive events occur.I present two exploratory studies. The first shows how the event of the Olympics is rooted inthe local field of the host city but varies by communities; the second explores the dynamics ofconfiguring the field of one Olympic city: Atlanta, host of the 1996 Olympic Games.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last quarter-century, a number of cities have pursued a strategy of hostingmega-events (Burbank et al., 2001) to boost their reputations or economies. The mega-event of choice has been the Olympic Games, one of ‘the most visible rituals dramatizingthe world polity’ (Boli and Thomas, 1997, p. 183). Urban interest in the Olympics wasignited by the unexpected success of the Los Angeles games in 1984: ‘For city leaderslooking to refurbish their city’s image and get the attention of business around the world,hosting the Olympics now appeared to offer a perfect way to do both with little cost tolocal taxpayers’ (Burbank et al., 2001, p. 5). Subsequent cities hosting the games gener-ally realized largely positive returns (e.g. Andranovich et al., 2001; Miyazaki andMorgan, 2001).

The event of hosting the Olympics offers a potent site for examining field-configuringdynamics (Meyer et al., 2005, p. 467) at the level of the local geographic community, aneeded perspective in organizational theorizing (Marquis et al., 2007). Fields produceboth stability and change by moving constituent institutional elements ‘from place toplace and time to time with the help of carriers’ (Scott, 2003, p. 879). I focus on two ofthese carriers (Scott, 2003) – symbolic systems and relational systems – and show howthey are key motors of field configuration (and reconfiguration) for Olympic cities.

Address for reprints: Mary Ann Glynn, Boston College, Carroll School of Management, Chestnut Hill,MA 02467, USA ([email protected]).

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UKand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Journal of Management Studies 45:6 September 20080022-2380

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Relational systems are networks that connect individual and institutional actorswithin a field; for the Olympics, these include athletes, city mayors, corporate sponsors,governments, fans, and Olympic committees at the city, national and internationallevels. Symbolic systems codify core meanings in logos, phrases, images or other rep-resentations, such as the Olympic flame, the five rings, or the mantra ‘Celtius, Altius,Fortius’ (faster, higher, stronger). Olympism supplies an ideology for the event, withnorms and beliefs (e.g. human striving and excellence), action templates (e.g. sportingevents and corporate sponsorship), and institutional ordering (e.g. nation-state system ofathletic representation). Symbolic systems rationalize, organize and motivate the rela-tional systems that connect actors (Ansell, 1997) and, in turn, relational systems rein-force the symbolic meanings that undergird connections. Thus, the Olympic spiritsuffuses the event with meaning and purpose that can function as a sort of symbolicglue across a complex and large network of relationships among diverse urban actorsand institutions. And, while relational and symbolic systems may be conceptually dis-crete, they are nonetheless intertwined, notably through processes of sense-making(Oliver and Montgomery, 2008) and justifying accounts (McInerney, 2008), in field-level configuration.

Mega-events like the Olympics facilitate the observation of field configuration becauseof their potential to create or rearrange symbolic and relational systems in fundamentalways. With its systems of interlocking Olympic committees, the games create ‘transor-ganizational structures’ (Anand and Jones, 2008); the event functions as a jolt to a field(Meyer et al., 1990) that open up interstitial spaces that allow place entrepreneurs withina community to leverage or change existing institutional arrangements. Because of theneed to stage and coordinate action and actors, activities and events can bring previouslyunconnected elements of a field into contact or create new structures of interaction.Hosting the Olympics activates relational and symbolic systems in the urban field.

Cities configure not only institutional, physical and inter-organizational arrangements(e.g. sporting venues, transportation and housing systems, community relations), but alsosymbolic character and traditions to generate the ‘look and feel’ of the games. Staging thegames requires a multitude of diverse community actors and institutions to coordinatenot only with each other within the urban field, but also with the myriad Olympicorganizing committees at national and international levels. For instance, the 2012London Games, still four years distant, have already established the London OrganisingCommittee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG), the National Olympic Committee(NOC), and the standing International Olympic Committee (IOC) in Switzerland. Suchcoordination necessitates host cities to leverage both existing institutional mechanisms,and create new ones, implicating the possibilities for both configuring the field anew andfor reconfiguring the existing field; I investigate both of these dynamics in the researchpresented in this paper.

The city, as an interorganizational field ‘operating in American metropolitan com-munities’ (Warren, 1967, p. 396), is on stage itself in hosting the games. Olympics arenamed for host cities (e.g. Paris 1900, Grenoble 1968; London 2012), symbolicallylending an urban signature to the games, and memorialized in the residual Olympiclegacy planned for the city after the games are over. The legacy concerns the ways inwhich a 14-day sporting event can leave enduring benefits, a ‘lasting legacy for future

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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008

generations’. As LOCOG puts it: ‘Providing a sustainable legacy sits at the very heart ofthe project and is a driving force for all the agencies responsible for building, staging andhosting the Games in 2012’ (http://www.london2012.com).

I examine field-configuring events at the level of the local community. I focus on thedynamics of relational and symbolic systems in the urban field for cities hosting theOlympic Games. I report on two exploratory studies. The first study seeks to establishhow the Olympics functions as a potent field configuring event for cities through theOlympic legacies for 17 host cities over 34 years (1972–2006). The second study exam-ines one field configuring event in detail and over time: the 1996 Atlanta Games. Here,I investigate how the urban field is configured historically, from pre- to post-Olympics.The research question framing both studies is: How – and to what extent – does the eventof the Olympic Games instantiate and change relational and symbolic configurationsin the host city? My intended contribution is to show how a triggering event like theOlympic Games shapes the configuration (and reconfiguration) of a field of actors withina geographic community. I begin by theorizing event-based field configurations, thenturn to understanding the event of the Olympics in the context of urban fields, and finallyconclude with implications for theory, practice, and research.

THEORIZING FIELD CONFIGURING EVENTS

The Host City as an Institutional Field

The oft-cited definition of an institutional field is that articulated by DiMaggio andPowell (1983, p. 148): ‘those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognizedarea of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatoryagencies, and other organizations that produce similar service or products’. As well aspatterns of economic exchange, fields have a ‘common meaning system’ (Scott, 1995,p. 56) that embeds exchange relationships. Hoffman (1999, p. 352) demonstrated how anorganizational field can coalesce around a shared ideology (environmentalism), conclud-ing that ‘a field is the center of common channels of dialogue and discussion . . . notformed around common technologies or common industries, but around issues thatbring together various field constituents with disparate purposes’. Events like the Olym-pics typically become issues to be understood, managed, strategized, resolved and real-ized for host cities; such institutionalized meanings around events can fortify or changethe relationships that structure a field.

I focus on the city as an institutional field. Studying geographic communities (like acity) is a needed perspective in organizational studies, as Marquis et al. (2007) point out:

While early institutional research showed how organizations were heavily influencedby local sources of power (e.g. Selznick, 1949; Zald, 1970), the move from an under-lying logic of cooptation to one of social construction has led neo-institutional theoryto focus on geography-independent organizational sectors, or fields. . . . Thus, asinstitutional theory migrated from a power and political orientation to more of anormative and cognitive one, it also abandoned the study of local influences. (Marquiset al., 2007)

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http://www.london2012.com

There is ample evidence that local geographic fields are important in the dynamics ofconfiguration. Tolbert and Zucker (1983), for instance, demonstrated that isomorphismin civil service reforms is city-specific. Galaskiewicz and colleagues (Galaskiewicz, 1985,1991, 1997; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989), in anextensive set of studies of Minneapolis-St Paul, showed how the patterning of philan-thropy is specific to geographic locale. Marquis (Marquis, 2003; Marquis andLounsbury, 2007) found that institutional norms varied across cities to reflect localfounding conditions and labour pools. Similarly, other scholars have demonstratedpatterns of social action at the level of communities (e.g. Guthrie, 2003; McElroy andSiegfried, 1986), and recently Marquis et al. (2007) have argued for theorizing corporatesocial action at the level of the local community.

Research on urban development is also instructive on how a geographic locale or‘place’ is a dynamic field, incorporating aspects of institutional persistence and change(Marquis, 2003). Molotch et al. (2000) offer a nuanced conceptualization of ‘place’ intheir focus on two key dimensions: city character and city tradition. City character is the‘mode of connection among unlike elements’, and reflects relational aspects of a city anda source of individuation: ‘what is distinctive [about different places] is not a list ofattributes but the way these attributes lash-up and how the structuration process movesthe resulting conjunctures forward through time’ (Molotch et al., 2000). This ‘lashing up’process configures relationships within the city and offers an explanation of how a fieldcan come together and even persist. The connections of character are perpetuated bycity tradition which establishes the relational configuration of a ‘place’ (Marquis, 2003;Molotch et al., 2000). Thus, the relational aspects of city character and the habitualaspects of city tradition can function to shape and perpetuate the configurations of ageographic field.

The institutional character and tradition of a city can change with the significantjolt of a mega-event (Meyer et al., 1990), which opens up interstitial spaces in fields thatallow entrepreneurs of ‘place’ to enact change. For instance, city-building entrepreneursconnect their agenda of urban development to existing interests and networks within acommunity (Heying, 1995, p. 113). These entrepreneurs succeed to the extent that theycan build connections among community actors, cobbling together a ‘growth coalition’to simultaneously advance city interests as well as their own. Heying (1995, p. 5), citingLogan and Molotch (1992, p. 62), clearly describes this ‘growth coalition’ model of urbangovernance as field-configuring: ‘The people who use their time and money to partici-pate in local affairs are the ones who – in vast disproportion to their representation in thepopulation – have the most to gain or lose in land-use decisions’.

Thus, a growth coalition model that coalesces interests and actors around city devel-opment offers one way of ‘lashing up’ and configuring (or reconfiguring) city characterand tradition (Molotch et al., 2000). Configurational patterns can elevate those actorsinvested in the dominant model to the civic elite (Mills, 1956) who, in turn, are likely tostabilize or perpetuate those institutions that favour the agenda they advance (Sampsonet al., 2005). More generally, powerful or disruptive events can ‘shape field evolution byproviding opportunities that induce various participants in a field to come together’(Anand and Watson, 2004, p. 60), offering an occasion to ‘redefine a field’s socialstructure and situation’ (Galvin, 2002, p. 673).

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Institutional elements in fields are transported by four types of carriers, accordingto Scott (2003): symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts. In thisresearch, I focus on the first two of these, the relational and symbolic systems, becausethey are endemic to, and vary by, the urban field in staging the Olympics. Olympicroutines and artefacts, in large part, are less particular to the city because they arevigilantly standardized and regulated by the central organizing body, the IOC. The IOCcontrols the most iconic artefact, the Olympic rings, and ‘owns all rights concerning theOlympic symbol, the Olympic flag, the Olympic motto, the Olympic anthem and theOlympic Games’ and strictly prescribes their application:

A composite logo design can position the Sponsor’s logo/name and official designa-tion above, below, or next to the Olympic rings in any one of several configurations.However, whichever configuration is used, the minimum distance between theSponsor’s logo/name and the Olympic symbol must always be half the radius of anOlympic ring (when comparably sized to Sponsor logo). (Olympic Mark Guidelines,Edition 05.93, Section 2.5)

Similarly, the IOC carefully regularizes the timing, procedures, content and conductof a range of events and performances from the athletic trials, through the performanceand judging of the sporting events, to the closing ceremonies of the games, permittinglittle, if any, local variation by the host city. In contrast, however, the Olympic relationaland symbolic systems are largely interpreted and implemented by the host cities and playkey roles in configuring the field of play.

Relational systems in fields. These are the connections among the key actors in a fieldand range from interpersonal ties among individuals to interlocking boards of direc-tors. Relational systems extend to the collective, as when communities propa-gate new relationships or rules about relationships among its members (Scott,2003). Relational systems not only connect actors within a field but also drawboundaries around the field (Scott, 2003) by identifying members and the criteria formembership.

Events can forge new links among actors in a field, as when corporate sponsors interactwith civic or public bodies that manage the Olympics. Such connections can configurefields by bringing new actors into contact with each other or by strengthening orweakening the existing links among actors. For instance, corporate sponsorship canloosen competitive relationships between firms when those same firms cooperate to stagethe Olympics. Thus, events that reshape actors’ relationships with each other can alsoredraw strategic or competitive boundaries around a field, as well as membershipaffiliations and status rankings within a field. Moreover, as new or different actorsinteract, actors’ understanding of their actions and its purpose can change, as networktheorists have demonstrated (e.g. Ibarra and Andrews, 1993; Mizruchi and Stearns,2001). Relational systems cultivate sense-making dynamics which, in turn, undergird thesymbolic systems that constitute fields.

Symbolic systems in systems. Powerful organizing symbols can coalesce networks of loosely-coupled actors who can come together because of an event. Thus, relational systems can



brace (or weaken) the symbolic systems that add meaning and purpose to thoseconnections.

Ansell (1997) demonstrated the power of a symbolic system in connecting diverseactors around an idea. In his study of the 1890 general strike of French trade unions, hefound that ‘organizing symbols create a shared interpretative framework that facilitatescoordination, exchange, and ultimately commitment’ (p. 360). His research demon-strated how the abstracted notion of a ‘strike’ served as a ‘condensation symbol’ thatcrystallized commitments by the working class. In invoking the idea of a symbolicnetwork, Ansell (1997, p. 360) noted the power of symbols to represent meanings thathelped to integrate groups around a shared sense of ideology. Particularly potent symbolsare ‘dominant symbols’, that ‘stand at the relational center of a web of signification. . . linking many different meanings together . . . Such symbols are powerful preciselybecause of their . . . metaphorical linkage between different levels of meaning’ (Ansell,1997, p. 373).

Symbols are likely to be especially potent in networking a set of loosely connected,independent actors who engage around an issue that affects a field (Hoffman, 1999) oran event that calls on or questions an embedded ideology. The Olympics are ripe withsymbolism and cities can appropriate this to amplify or change city character or tradi-tion, particularly by creating an enduring legacy from the games. For instance, cities cangraft Olympic imagery and symbol to distance themselves from an outdated or unde-sirable past (e.g. Torino 2006) or to aspire to a new one, such as a global player orinternational city (e.g. Atlanta 1996).

To summarize, I theorize that events will configure local, geographic fields in waysthat preserve elements of the existing institutional order but also change the arrange-ments or meaning of those elements. Relational and symbolic systems function asinterdependent motors of reconfiguration; as the connections among field-level actorsloosen or tighten around the significance of the dominant symbol of an event, patterns ofstructure and meaning correspondingly shift. Boundaries are redrawn around these newrelationships; as a result, communities revise their character and traditions. Much like thetransorganizational structures described by Anand and Jones (2008), they not only createawareness of commonalities among disparate community constituencies, but alsoprovide a site of coordination and structuration. Next, I examine these event-based fieldconfigural processes in two exploratory studies.

THE OLYMPIC GAMES AS A FIELD-CONFIGURING EVENT

I examine event-based field configurations in two exploratory studies. The first studyseeks to establish the potential of the Olympic Games as a field configuring event for hostcities in modern times. The core research question is: Can the event of the Olympicsreconfigure civic fields? To answer this, I analyse patterns of city interest in hosting thegames, from 1972 to 2002, as well as the intended and actual legacies from the games for17 cities, 1972–2006. The second study takes a closer look at the dynamics of fieldconfiguration (and reconfiguration) in one city: Atlanta, host of the 1996 OlympicGames. Here, the question is: How are relational and symbolic systems configured (or

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reconfigured) in a civic field in response to the Olympics event? To answer this question,I analyse the relational and symbolic field systems in three periods around the event: pre-,during and post-Olympics.

I focus on the Olympics as a field configuring event for several reasons. The OlympicGames, as one of the most public and visible global rituals (Boli and Thomas, 1997,p. 183), has become ‘the mega-event of choice’ for cities. Olympism offers an appealingand ready-made ideology, i.e. ‘a set of interconnected beliefs and their associated atti-tudes, shared and used by members of a group or population’ (Fine and Sandstrom,1993, p. 24) and a ‘condensation symbol’ (Ansell, 1997) in its iconic representation of thesymbolic five rings. Such a symbol serves as a siren call to various constituencies thatcome together and ‘lash up’ in order to host the games. Olympic symbolism is appliednot only to the games but to the host city as well, which rightly claims a new identity asan Olympic City. The IOC sets the symbolic bar high: ‘Above all, and certainly morethan any other regular global event, the Olympic Games are a potential forum forrekindling the human spirit, lifting morale and bringing people together in the pursuit ofcommon goals’ (Milton-Smith, 2002, p. 140). And yet, the universalism of Olympicideology is enacted through the localism of the host city, through its interpretation ofOlympism and its implementation of the games. In the first study I present, I examinehow cities position themselves relative to the Olympic Games, both as hosts and potentialbeneficiaries of any residual legacies from the games.

STUDY 1: OLYMPIC CITIES, 1972–2006

Research Methods and Data

In this study, I examine the potency of the Olympics as a field-configuring event for thehost city. I draw on data from multiple, published sources on the Olympic Games andthe cities that hosted them; these include books, newspaper and press accounts, websites,and public documents of the International Olympic Committee (e.g. Handbook,Marketing Guides), along with information on its official website, www.olympic.org).The Appendix details these sources.

I developed two measures of configural change. The first measure focuses on cityinterest in hosting the games. I use the number of candidate cities selected by the IOC(from all the cities bidding on a given Olympic game) as acceptable and possible sites.This is a conservative estimate; a better indicator might be the number of cities thatactually bid on the games. However, these data could be obtained only for the mostrecent bidding years (for which the mean average number of cities bidding was 10.5).

The second measure assesses the intended and actual legacy of the games for thosecities that have hosted the games. The Olympic Legacy has become an integral andinstitutionalized part of this event, as the IOC affirms: ‘Legacy is an important topic forthe Olympic Movement’ (www.olympic.org). Although the games are played for only 14days, their impact is not ephemeral. City planning to bid and host often precedes theevent by ten years. Most Olympic Cities try to reap the benefits from their time on theworld stage to build a lasting legacy of social, economic, cultural, educational andreputational benefits to the community such as sustainability, economic development,urban revitalization, tourism, residential quality of life, or urban image.



http://www.olympic.org


The Olympic Legacy can be broken down into two parts: the pre-Olympic aspirationsor goals of the city and the post-Olympic outcomes. As part of their bid typically, and intheir planning certainly, cities articulate their intended Legacy. The IOC reports that‘the concept of legacy can already be seen taking shape in many of the current OlympicGames Organising Committees (OCOGs) – Beijing, Vancouver and London’(www.olympic.org). The London 2012 legacy has been announced as:

We are united in our desire to see spectacular Olympic Games and Paralympic Gamesin 2012. We are also committed to ensuring that the Games leave a lasting legacy ofsocial, environmental, economic and community benefits for London, the UK andfor sport that demonstrate the power of the Olympic Games to change lives.(www.olympic.org)

Data on the intended legacy and the realized (actual) legacy for 17 host cities over theperiod 1972–2006 were gathered using more than 60 press accounts and websites, as wellas books on the subject (e.g. Barney et al., 2002; Burbank et al., 2001; Lenskyj, 2000).The Appendix presents a detailed description, along with key data sources, for each ofthese Olympics, identifying both goals (intended legacy) and outcomes (realized actuallegacy), as well as their success (or failure) in achieving the hoped-for benefits. Mostsources clearly described these Olympic legacies as successful or unsuccessful. Threeraters independently read and analysed these legacies and judged them to be successful,unsuccessful or mixed; there was initial consensus on all but one Olympics, which weeasily reconciled after discussion. As well, we examined the legacies for their referencesto relational or symbolic elements in the fields and categorized these accordingly.

Results

Host city interest. Cities’ interest in hosting the games has been cyclical over the past fourdecades, as Figure 1 depicts. Early on, cities showed considerable interest in hosting thegames, subject to several up-and-down cycles tipped by world events, including twoworld wars. This persisted until the 1976 Montreal Games, which saddled that city withconsiderable debt, and dampened other cities’ interest in risking financial disasters. Thischanged markedly in the wake of the 1984 Los Angeles (LA) Games, which served as aturning point in cities’ interest:

Peter Uberroth took control in Los Angeles and used existing venues, sold lots oftickets, recruited corporate sponsors, and negotiated a great deal with ABC-TV. TheGames showed a $250 million profit. Suddenly 13 cities were bidding for the Olym-pics. (Barney et al., 2002)

Renewed city interest in the Olympics seemed predicated on revenue potential.Figure 2 (taken from Preuss, 2000, p. 105) depicts the upward shift in city revenues sincethe LA Games. Although there are obviously lucrative economic incentives for thegames, there are also ideological ones, best represented in the Olympic legacy themes,which I examine next.

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Figure 1. Trends in number of Olympic bid cities, 1972–2010Data obtained from the official Olympics website (http://www.atlanta.olympic.org/uk/games/index_uk.asp).

Revenues: Munich ’72 to Atlanta ’96(numbers in millions, U.S. 1995 dollars; Preuss 2000: 105)

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Figure 2. Revenues: Munich 1972 to Atlanta 1996Source: Preuss (2000, p. 105).



http://www.atlanta.olympic.org/uk/games/index_uk.asp

http://www.atlanta.olympic.org/uk/games/index_uk.asp

Olympic legacies. Of the 17 cities hosting the games between 1972 and 2006 (see Appen-dix), most (82 per cent) focused their legacy on bettering the host city. The intendedlegacies sought to improve two aspects of civic health: (1) symbolic features, such asboosting a city’s image, cultivating an international reputation, or making the city anappealing tourist destination; and (2) economic returns, such as increasing revenues,developing industries, generating jobs, or strengthening the city infrastructure of trans-portation, and public gathering spaces (parks, buildings, sports venues). This increasinglycommercial aspect seems to parallel the shift in revenues over time (noted in Figure 2) aswell as the aspirations of a city-building growth model that was popular at the time.

Nearly half the cities (8; 47 per cent) were successful in achieving their intended legacy(Torino 2006; Athens 2004; Barcelona 1992; Seoul 1988; Calgary 1988; Los Angeles1984; Lake Placid 1980; Munich 1972) and an additional quarter (4; 24 per cent) hadmixed success (Salt Lake City 2002; Sydney 2000; Atlanta 1996; Lillehammer 1994).Nearly a third (5; 29 per cent) had unsuccessful outcomes (Nagano 1998; Albertville1992; Sarajevo 1984; Montreal 1976; Moscow 1980). On balance, then, the majority ofOlympic cities in this period (12; 71 per cent) realized at least some success in creating anenduring, positive legacy from hosting the event. This provides some preliminary evi-dence that the event of the Olympics has the potential to configure civic fields. A closerlook at the nature of the Olympic Legacies reveals that it implicates both relational andsymbolic system elements in the reconfiguration of cities.

Relational systems connect civic actors, ‘lashing up’ the various elements in a city toconfigure its character (Molotch et al., 2000). Olympic legacies spoke to these relationalaspects in various ways. A desired legacy of tourism prompted cities to lash up differentinstitutions that had not been connected previously. For instance, Torino (2006) suc-ceeded in overhauling its industrial past to become a cultural, tourist and commercialhub, replacing one urban institution (industry) with three different, but newly interde-pendent ones (culture, travel, and business). Athens (2004) succeeded in crafting animage as a mainstream European country, which required reconfiguring the urbaninfrastructure of transportation, cultural, sporting and housing elements. Such recon-figurations of a city’s infrastructure change the relationships not only of those actors whobuild and maintain them, but also among the people who eventually use them. Themodel of city growth and revitalization was the focus of many intended legacies (e.g.Athens 2004; Lillehammer 1994; Barcelona 1992; Calgary 1988; Los Angeles 1984).

Symbolic systems featured prominently in Olympic Legacies. ‘The Olympic City’ wasa dominant symbol that was used to configure (or reconfigure) the meaning of the civicfield. For instance, Torino (2006) aspired to shed its image as a gray, auto-making city;it was successful in recasting itself as an international tourist destination. Athens (2004)left a lasting legacy that reconfigured it as a modern city for the Third Millennium.Hoping to be perceived as more than a ‘good source for raw material’, Sydney’s (2000)success in reconfiguring its image as an eco-city was recognized by a United Nationsaward for Environmental Excellence. Nearly all the cities articulated a legacy of apositive image, typically reconfiguring their identity as a world class city (e.g. Atlanta1996; Seoul 1988; Los Angeles 1984) or as a desirable business (Barcelona 1992) ortourist destination (Lillehammer 1994; Albertville 1992; Calgary 1988). However, legacyefforts at symbolization failed under the weight of alleged bribery scandals that tarnished

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the image of two cities (Salt Lake City 2002; Nagano 1998) or when the politicalsentiment of the times did not favour the ideology the city sought to memorialize(Moscow 1980).

Overall, the evidence from Study 1 points to the potency of the Olympics as afield-configuring event for the cities that host them. Increasing interest by cities in hostingthis event indicates the potential of the event for transforming relational and symbolicsystems, often to positive benefit as Olympic Legacies demonstrates. To understandmore fully the underlying dynamics of field configuration in Olympic cities, I conductedan in-depth study of one, the 1996 Atlanta games.

STUDY 2: THE 1996 ATLANTA OLYMPICS

Research Methods and Data

I used data from Study 1 and supplemented this with newspaper and press accounts thatfocused explicitly on the conduct, organization and management of the 1996 games(rather than accounts of the athletes, sporting events or competitions). This yielded morethan 897 articles, published primarily in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (871), as well as theWall Street Journal (14), Business Week (6), Fortune (2) and Forbes (4). Most of these articles(60 per cent) appeared between 1993 and 1999. Not surprisingly, the Atlanta Journal-

Constitution had the longest period of coverage, i.e. from 1987 (when the idea for theAtlanta Olympics bid emerged) to 2006 (the 10-year anniversary of the games). Inaddition, I conducted field work, interviewing several corporate sponsors and oneOlympic marketing executive for the Atlanta games.

My approach to understanding the Olympics as a field-configuring event in Study 2 iscomparative and historical. I compare how Atlanta’s relational and symbolic systems areconfigured prior to 1996 and then reconfigured post-1996. The pre-Olympic city char-acter is established through archival records, press accounts, interviews, and the use of anavailable data set on the Atlanta network: Heying’s 1995 dissertation. He analysed theinterlocks of nearly 7000 board members, in over 9000 positions on over 1000 boardsfor three distinct periods in Atlanta: 1931, 1961, and 1991. The 1991 data are particu-larly germane; it was the following year (1992) that corporate sponsorship for the 1996games was initialized. Thus, this data establishes the field configuration of the Atlantacommunity immediately prior to the city’s ramp-up to the Olympics.

Heying (1995) focused on two different types of relational networks: networks ofindividual executives who are board members and networks of organizations that are con-nected to each other through shared board members. Over 60 years of his study, hefound that ‘. . . the overall pattern of board interlocking is very regular, hierarchical andconsistent for all years . . . demonstrating a small elite cadre of civic leaders who haveextensive connections on multiple boards’ (p. 57). Heying’s data usefully establishes thebaseline for examining field configuration in the pre-Olympic period.

To examine relational systems at the time of the event, I conducted interviews with 30participants from 7 of the 10 Atlanta-affiliated corporate sponsors as well as one inde-pendent marketing consultant who had worked on the games. Most interviews lastedapproximately 1 hour; not one was less than 30 minutes and some extended to 3 hours.



Interviews were conducted at two points in time: immediately prior to the summer games(Spring 1996) and one year later (Spring 1997). The interviews focused on sponsors’involvement in the Olympic Games and in the Atlanta community, their relationships toother actors involved in hosting the games, as well as the cultural and symbolic associa-tions of the games. The interviews were transcribed and then content analysed usingNVivo2.0 software. Because this study is exploratory, I focused on extracting majorthemes that invoked relational or symbolic systems, rather than specific codes. Twoindependent raters coded the interview transcripts for content that reflected these twosystems; these were sorted by time period and analysed as a narrative, which is reportedbelow.

My analyses are organized into three chronological periods: (1) pre-event, prior to the1987 Olympic bid; (2) the event, from the Olympic bid through the 1996 OlympicGames; and (3) post-event, over the decade following the games (1996–2006). For eachof these periods, I focus on the city character and traditions, as well as how the configu-ration of relational and symbolic systems that structured the field of play shifted withregard to the event of the Olympic Games.

Before the Games Began: Pre-1987 Atlanta

Atlanta is a city whose politics thrive more on informal than formal connections. In hisclassic book, Community Power Structure, Hunter (1953) described Atlanta’s policy-makingand political activity as being housed in the informal discussions of elites rather than theformal deliberations of policy makers. The relational system was dominated by an upperechelon of elites who were primarily corporate executives, business owners, and attor-neys, the ‘bank and utility crowd’, as Hunter (1953) put it. In Atlanta, elite status accruednot from societal standing or membership in the upper class (achieved through birth ormarriage), but rather through occupations, thus reinforcing the importance of businessassociations in shaping relational systems.

The city character, the ‘Atlanta spirit’, was one of image-building and boosterism, andone widely shared in the community; it was a ‘pervasive ethos of the city’s business elites’(Burbank et al., 2001, p. 82). The image-orientation of both city and Olympism blendedeasily; the 1996 Games conjoined them in Atlanta.

Heying (1995), writing more than 40 years after Hunter (1953), found similar patterns.The city traditions of Atlanta tended to perpetuate the web of relationships that shapedits essential character. Heying’s (1995) network analyses affirmed the presence of a civicelite in Atlanta and the centrality of business organizations; he wrote: ‘Atlanta has anentrepreneurial regime . . . (with a) limited role of political actors and their dominationby business interests’ (p. 17). The Atlanta ‘character of place’ was one of growth,opportunism and boosterism, and especially the kind of entrepreneurism which favouredland-owning interests. City-building, fuelled by land-invested business and political inter-ests, created a social structure in which these interests, advanced by individuals andinstitutions, dominated:

The central core of civic leadership in Atlanta is consistently dominated by thehighest ranking executives from: local banks and insurance companies, regional

M. A. Glynn1128


utilities, regional merchandisers, elected officials (especially those with land-basedinterests), locally prominent real estate and land development firms, nationally promi-nent merchandisers, local newspaper and broadcast companies, and establishedAtlanta law firms. . . . The corporate leaders that are essential to this elite networkare affiliated with corporations that are overwhelmingly home grown. (Heying, 1995,pp. 109–10)

The influence that Hunter attributed to the ‘bank and utility crowd’ appeared topersist over this time period, but new elements were also introduced with the jolt ofthe Olympic event. Heying (1995) observed that by 1991 two non-profit, quasi-governmental organizations had penetrated the elite ‘bank and utility’ ranks: ACOG(the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games) and MAOGA (Metro Atlanta OlympicGame Authority). They were among the 70 most central organizations in Atlanta, withACOG ranked no. 19 and MAOGA ranked no. 50. These organizations were critical inAtlanta’s bid for the 1996 Olympic Games and ACOG was central to producing andmanaging the games.

When the Games Began: Atlanta’s Hosting of the Olympics

A pursuit that began in 1987 culminated on 20 September 1990 with the announcementthat ‘The International Olympic Committee has awarded the 1996 Olympic Games tothe City of . . . ATLANTA!’ For the first time in Olympic history, the team that orga-nized the Olympic bid subsequently became the local organizing committee, ACOG.The newcomers (‘place entrepreneurs’) who had precipitated the bid now gained influ-ence over the city. ACOG had a governing board of 31 members, including delegatesfrom the national organizing committee (United States Olympic Committee, USOC)and the international committee (IOC), Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson, and othercivic and business elites (Burbank et al., 2001, p. 87). Billy Payne, a real-estate lawyerwho led the bid committee, became President and CEO of ACOG’s executive com-mittee; in many ways, he was an atypical but energetic ‘place entrepreneur’. AlthoughPayne was not identified as a member of the civic elite in 1991 (Heying, 1995), henonetheless begun to network with others who were, including former Atlanta mayor,UN Ambassador, and civil rights activist Andrew Young, and construction companyexecutive Robert Holder Jr. Thus, the Olympic coordinating organization (ACOG)recreated the network structure already associated with Atlanta, but also reconfigured itbeyond the ‘bank and utility’ crowd. The ‘growth coalition’ model, which had led thedevelopment of Atlanta to this point, was now going to take it into the future with theOlympics. The institutional order of the past was reclaimed but reshaped to manage thismega-event.

Atlanta had three goals in bidding for the Olympics: first, to promote an image as aworld class tourist and conference city; second, to redevelop downtown Atlanta; and third,to provide benefits to city residents (Andranovich et al., 2001, p. 119). However, afterAtlanta was awarded the games in 1990, it became apparent that there were conflictingvisions of the intended legacy: ‘For Young and others on the bid committee, the city’s taskwas to put on a successful athletic event . . . Mayor Maynard Jackson, on the other hand,



described the challenge as scaling the “twin peaks of Mount Olympus”: one peak wasto stage a spectacular Olympics, the other was to use the games to revitalize inner-cityAtlanta’ (Andranovich et al., 2001, p. 120). However, the ideology of Olympism had abetter fit with powerful elite’s growth aspirations of the city; those with land-interestseventually won out over inner city development concerns in spite of vocal grass-rootsefforts to redirect elite interests.

The 1996 corporate sponsors numbered 40 in all, of which one-quarter (10) wereAtlanta-anchored, through their headquarter location (8), a parent organization (1) or aregional presence (1). There were three levels of sponsorship, which required differentlevels of corporate commitment and awarded different rights for using Olympic symbol-ism: 10 worldwide TOP sponsors, a limited association that reportedly started at $40million, giving sponsors international rights to Olympic symbolism; 10 COP (CentennialOlympic Partner) sponsors, giving sponsors national rights to Olympic symbolism; and20 sponsors with limited product niches (e.g. autos, beverages) and use of Olympicsymbolism.

I analysed the extent to which these 10 corporate sponsors replicated the historicalpatterns of civic elites observed earlier (e.g. Hunter, 1953) by using Heying’s (1995)published data on both individual executives and organizations. I sought to determine ifthe 10 sponsors, as organizations or as represented by their senior executives, were in theranks of the civic elite. Table I lists these 10 Olympic sponsors, as organizations and asrepresented by their executives, for each of the three years Heying studied (1931; 1961;1991).

Table I reveals that the corporate sponsors were somewhat bimodal in their networkcentrality or elite status: 40 per cent were central to the existing relational systems at boththe organizational and executive levels (Coca-Cola, NationsBank, Bell South, andGeorgia Power). Thus, there is evidence of persistence in the membership of the insti-tutional elite; the ‘bank and utility crowd’ remained central even for this mega-event.However, change in these relational aspects was also evident. As a newcomer to theseranks, Coca-Cola enjoyed a unique status that was hinged to the event itself. Amongthese elite sponsors, only Coca-Cola had been an Olympic sponsor prior to 1996; thecompany trumpeted this uniqueness by reminders in advertising, press releases and otherannouncements that it was the longest ever continual sponsor of the Olympics. Evenwhile the mega-event reinforced institutionalized relations, it also shifted their bound-aries to embrace newcomers who had special status because of the event. Thus, the eventitself interjected new players and connections into the urban field.

The replication of the institutional order in the set of corporate sponsors was incom-plete: 60 per cent of the Atlanta-anchored sponsors had not been central to the network.Only one of them – Delta Air Lines – had one elite executive in 1991. Within this group,just one (Scientific Atlanta) was relatively local; the others had a national or internationalpresence (Delta, UPS, Holiday Inn, and The Home Depot). Although most of the eliteexecutives were affiliated with Atlanta-headquartered organizations, not all locally-headquartered firms were represented. United Parcel Service (UPS) was conspicuouslyabsent from the civic elite, even though it had relocated its corporate headquarters toAtlanta in 1991. Thus, the jolt of the event did seem to open up institutional space thatpermitted new and influential players to enter.

M. A. Glynn1130


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My 1997 interviews with this group of non-central actors indicated their awarenessof, and affinity for, an elite network to which they had not previously belonged. Oneinterviewee noted that ‘sponsorship got [my organization] into “places” it had not gotteninto before – and would not have gotten into if it had not been a sponsor’. Anotherremarked (in 1996) that sponsorship ‘opened up business relationships as a company, andon an individual basis as well’. Thus, although the event of the Olympics redounded tothe existing institutional order, it only partly reproduced it. It wasn’t only the ‘bank andutility crowd’ on the field of play any more.

Being an Olympic sponsor gave these organizations membership in a fairly exclusivegroup and even more exclusive sub-groups (e.g. TOP or COP). It created a sharedidentity, with sponsors claiming to be members of an ‘Olympic family’. An advertisementthat appeared immediately prior to the games (Summer 1996) depicted the logos of the20 elite sponsors (TOP and COP), overlaid with an athletic image, and the claim: ‘All ofthese companies have joined together to develop a single remarkable product’. Only onebank (Nations Bank) was a member of the pre-Olympic urban field dominated by the‘bank and utility’ crowd; new entrants, with new connections had become part of thefield.

The Olympics symbolized both the shared meaning of sponsorship – the development‘of a single remarkable product’ (i.e. the games) – and the relational systems among thesecompanies. Substantiating this, one interviewee (in Spring 1996) said that corporatesponsorship ‘places you in a new circle, and importantly, in a favourable light’. And therelational connections were not only symbolic but transactional as well: ‘For the Olym-pics, there was dialogue between “our” sponsorship team and “theirs” and reciprocity forgoods and services developed among the sponsors’ (1996 interview).

Sponsors interacted through direct relationships with each other and through ACOG.Each sponsor sent a liaison executive to ACOG and many others ‘loaned’ one with specialexpertise. Heying’s (1995) earlier observation on the centrality of non-profits in Atlanta’scommunity network was re-established with the centrality of ACOG; thus, the citytradition persisted. And, although ACOG was central, it wasn’t necessarily viewed aswell-run or well-intentioned. One 1996 interviewee commented, ‘ACOG has been diffcultto work with. They tend to change their decisions frequently and are not very flexible attimes’. And another (from a different corporate sponsor) described ACOG as follows:

ACOG is cold . . . or at least they appear cold on the surface. I think that they tryhard, but the scale is too large. It’s very impersonal and they have lots of economicconcerns. The games are supposed to be for the athletes. (1996 interview)

There was some contestation between ACOG and sponsors over the meaning orpurpose of the games; this turned on issues of commercialism versus athleticism orhuman achievement. Sponsors critiqued ACOG for both too much and too little busi-ness orientation; it was not ‘run like a company’ and therefore frustrating to deal withaccording to some interviewees. Although ACOG was still the central actor in theOlympics, as Heying (1995) might have predicted, corporations began to encroach onACOG’s jurisdiction and question ACOG’s fitness for the role. Thus, the centrality ofnon-profits in the Atlanta community began to erode just a little (Heying, 1995).

M. A. Glynn1132


The relational system changed the nature of competition and cooperation among thesponsors, consistent with Scott’s (2003) theorization. One interviewee contended thatelite sponsorship was the only way they could get access to another corporation whosebusiness they sought. Another interviewee commented that his company was ‘teamingwith other sponsors’ such as Motorola (on a technology project), Sara Lee (on marketingefforts), and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (to sponsor community meetings).Sponsors spoke of the ‘clubbiness’ of sponsorship which, in turn, ‘makes it easier to workwith potential rivals because it’s for the Olympics’. This network approach to organizingthe games also mapped on to a networking approach to supporting the technology for thegames. Scientific Atlanta partnered with two more prominent and experienced Olympicsponsors – BellSouth and Panasonic – to create a video network (SCARLET) thatprovided real-time viewing of Olympic events.

Symbolically, all the sponsoring organizations exercised their rights to associate theirfirms with the Olympic rings, one of the most recognizable symbols in the world (Barneyet al., 2002). Such ‘identity markers’ – in both linguistic terms (Olympic sponsor) andsymbolic terms (the five-ring logo) – created internal and external perceptions of mem-bership in an exclusive network. Indeed, the sponsorship network was vigilant aboutmaintaining its boundaries, guarding against ambush marketing, in which non-sponsorsimply an association with the Olympics. The prestige of the network was acknowledgedby its participants; one sponsorship manager stated: ‘I’m in the major leagues. I’m oneof the big boys’. And yet, although the broad ideals of Olympism were shared, theirapplication to corporate practices was not:

I’ve been to a lot of meetings both internally (within her company) and with ACOGand other sponsors. They’re always talking about the Olympic Movement. It’s veryidealistic and nice, but it’s not very realistic for companies like [mine]. We’re regulatedand conservative. The ideals may be okay for Coca-Cola because they can promoteanything they want, but [my company] has a different kind of customer. (1996corporate interview)

The symbolic network married the instrumentality of business interests to the emo-tional, advice, and friendship ties often associated with social networks (Ibarra andAndrews, 1993). In an interview with one corporate manager, this was evident:

Olympic sponsorship places you in a new circle, and importantly in a favourablelight . . . It felt like you were a member of a ‘club’ where everybody wanted everyoneto do well. (1996 corporate interview)

And yet, the idealism served as a restraint on some of the commercialism as well. Thiswas a concern for one company:

The [company] is very conscious of the perception that [we] brought these games toAtlanta. To that end, we use the word ‘statesmanlike’ when developing ideas foradvertising, signage and the like . . . We’re not going to paint Atlanta . . . with [our]signs! (1996 corporate interview)



One interviewee summed up corporate involvement in this way:

Sponsorship was something [my company] had to do as a way to give back to thecommunity and because it was based in Atlanta . . . Employees were proud of [thecompany] being a sponsor. (1996 corporate interview)

At one corporate sponsor, employees and managers saw citizenship as one of theprimary motives for sponsorship; they saw its legacy as even more enduring and com-pelling. One employee expressed it succinctly in a 1996 interview: ‘once the last bill ispaid and the last light is switched off, the Olympics will quickly fade out of memory, thelegacy will be that there will be a continued one for Atlanta, as a city’. Although therewere exchanges of tangible goods and services among the sponsors, the networks werealso forged through the exchange of intangible ‘symbolic goods’ (Bourdieu, 1984) codi-fied in Olympic iconography and idealism.

The civic drama that went on, from the multiracial nature of Atlanta’s Games to theemotional reopening of Centennial Olympic Park after the bombing spoke to many here

to the best parts of Atlanta’s character. ‘The Games exceeded my expectations on everylevel’, said Mayor Bill Campbell. ‘The crowds were larger, the athletes performedbetter, our city responded to tragedy in a way that was perhaps the most emotionalpoint of the games. It’s not accidental that our symbol is the Phoenix, a bird risingfrom the ashes’. The thousands of local people who flocked to the park on the Games’final day had much the same feeling. ‘I used to park down here back when this wasparking lot gulch where the winos hung out’, said Hugh Woodall, a local lawyer, afterhe and his 7-year-old son, Zach, doused themselves in the Centennial Olympic Parkfountain. ‘Now look at it. I never thought I’d see the day’. He paused a moment andthen said what most people here, however exhausted, were thinking today. ‘I wish itcould keep going on’. (Applebome, 1996; emphasis added)

After the Games Were Over: Atlanta’s Post-Olympic Legacy

One decade after the 1996 Closing Ceremonies, Atlanta hosted another event:

Thousands attended the 10th Anniversary Celebration of the Centennial OlympicGames on Saturday, July 15. The event began in the early evening as volunteers fromthe Atlanta Games met at designated areas around Centennial Olympic Park toreunite with their fellow volunteers from ten years ago. After an evening full ofreminiscing and live local music, the program began with emcee Bob Costas, the voiceof the Olympic Games for 18 years. He introduced video clips documenting changesin Atlanta over the last ten years, the emotional 1990 announcement that Atlantawould host the games and many triumphant moments from the 1996 Olympiccompetition. (Press release, Georgia World Congress Center, 15 July 2007)

The revellers gathered in one prominent legacy of the games, Centennial OlympicPark, which had served as a sort of ‘town square’ during the games. It was the site not

M. A. Glynn1134


only of some of the fun of the games – musical concerts, interactive Olympic exhibits, pinexchanges, and cooling sprinklers with dancing lights and water showers – but also of asignificant tragedy of the games, the Olympic Park bombing which killed two people andinjured many others. It spoke to the worst of modern fears in staging major events –terrorism – but it also showcased courage and determination: ‘The games will go on’,said Francois Carrard, director general of the International Olympic Committee(http://edition.cnn.com/US/9607/27/blast.games/index.html).

Olympic Park was emblematic of the mixed success of Atlanta’s Olympic Legacy, asreported in Study 1 (see Appendix also). Clearly, there were numerous benefits; theAtlanta Chamber of Commerce highlights three of these, boasting that:

Ten years later, Atlanta is still being transformed by an Olympic legacy that: changedthe face of downtown Atlanta; strengthened the city’s reputation as a hub of globalcommerce; and positioned Atlanta as the sports capital of the world. (www.metroatlantachamber.com)

The boosterism that drove Atlanta to bid on the Olympics still lingered, but wasupdated to claim a new image. The new catch-phrase of the city echoes its Olympic days:In Atlanta, every day is opening day! The city is abundantly symbolizing its success inhosting the Olympics, even claiming that it is still transforming the city. Thus, configuraldynamics seem not to have been ephemeral.

Atlanta memorialized its status as an Olympic City with a new museum, The Centen-nial Olympic Games Museum at the Atlanta History Center. Interesting, it has beensupported by former corporate sponsors, including Delta Air Lines, The Home Depot, theCoca-Cola Company, and UPS. There is a perpetuation of the civic elites that Heying(1995) observed and yet its circle seemingly has been penetrated by two newcomers, TheHome Depot and UPS. Perhaps the Olympics was a catalyst in this reconfiguration, withcorporate sponsorship providing continuing access and ‘clubbiness’. And, not only has thecity shifted, post-Olympics, in its embrace of elite organizations but also of individuals.Billy Payne, the bid organizer and President and CEO of ACOG, which ‘united promot-ers, developers and big business conglomerates’ (Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction:Atlanta’s Olympic Legacy, 2007, www.cohre.org/mega-events/), seems to continue tobenefit from those ties. At a recent celebration, he is quoted as saying, ‘I am proud to bea part of the 10th Anniversary Celebration of the Centennial Olympic Games . . . This isthe perfect occasion to share the Olympic legacy and celebrate the spirit of volunteerismexperienced 10 years ago’. As much as he has been lauded by numerous Atlantainstitutions with awards, been the beneficiary of enduring Olympic ties, and currentlyserves (since May 2006) as President of the Augusta National Golf Club (home of theMasters Tournament), his reach seems to be limited to the city of Atlanta; he wasunsuccessful in his attempts to join the International Olympic Committee (IOC). ShirleyFranklin, who was an inaugural member of the Committee for Olympic Development(CODA) and then MAOG, is serving her second term as Mayor of Atlanta. Reportedly,‘Her training under Andy Young stood her in good stead as she ascended the Olympicladder, used by the powerful to soothe relations with angry, frustrated low-income AfricanAmerican neighborhoods’ (Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction: Atlanta’s Olympic



http://edition.cnn.com/US/9607/27/blast.games/index.html

http://www.metroatlantachamber.com

http://www.metroatlantachamber.com

http://www.cohre.org/mega-events

Legacy, 2007, www.cohre.org/mega-events/). Thus, the connections forged in hostingthe games added new players to the civic elite but simultaneously reinforced the coalitionthat drove the bidding, planning and hosting of the Olympic mega-event.

However, as much as the Olympics drew praise, it also drew heavy criticism. Manywere conflicted, as some old and revered structures, such as the Atlanta-Fulton CountyStadium (home of the Atlanta Braves baseball team), were destroyed in the wake of thegames as new structures – Turner Field, the former Olympic Stadium for track-and-fieldevents – were architecturally reconfigured to new purposes. More generally, the event ofthe Olympics found supporters and critics; which side you were on seemed to mirroryour standing among the civic elite.

An independent, non-governmental, non-profit human rights organization head-quartered in Geneva, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), hasbegun to examine the impact of the Olympic Games (and other mega-events) onhousing in host cities. In June 2007, they issued a report which claims that ‘TheOlympic Games have displaced more than two million people in the last twenty yearsdisproportionately affecting minorities such as the homeless, the poor, Roma andAfrican-Americans’ (COHRE, 2007). As well, they are writing Olympic City Back-ground Papers; one has already been released on the preparedness of the 2012 Londongames. Of the Atlanta games, they cogently summarize the divided perceptions on thesuccess of the games:

The 1996 Olympic Games and the development plans surrounding that mega-eventhad provided the drama, the energy and the interest in long-held dreams of politiciansand investors alike to propel Atlanta into the ranks of international cities. Today, tenyears after the mega-event that attracted developers and planners to try again to gaincontrol of the city, downtown is exploding with expensive, high-rise, inner-city loft andcondominium construction. . . .

Ten years ago this summer, Atlanta welcomed the world to the show. ‘The show’turned out to be a dress rehearsal for what was to come – the complete destructionof inner city public and private housing that very poor city residents could afford.And if housing for poor people is systematically removed and not replaced, thosepeople show up on other people’s sofas, moving around as necessary, and finallyasking for shelter. Then when the shelter is removed to make way for developers,those people show up in other neighborhoods, in housing they cannot afford, andeventually in cars, in abandoned buildings, on the streets and under bridges.(Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction: Atlanta’s Olympic Legacy, 2007,www.cohre.org/mega-events/)

Thus, although the effects of the Atlanta Games were long-lasting, they were notequitable in their allocation of the legacy benefits of the games. Those who occupiedcentral positions in the relational networks that staged the games seemed to gain themost, suggesting shifts in the balance of power under the weight of field-configuringevents (McInerney, 2008). Not surprisingly perhaps, theirs was the agenda of boosterismand growth that was core to the city character of Atlanta.

M. A. Glynn1136




Study 2 highlights the field-configuring dynamics within one Olympic City, over time,and with regard to the relational and symbolic systems that characterized this commu-nity. Like Scott et al. (2000), this study shows how actors in a field both produce andreproduce institutional meanings (symbol systems) and structures (relational systems)as they engage in events. To stage the Olympics, Atlanta engaged a changing cast ofcharacters that shaped and reshaped the field, in ways that resembled field configuralchange noted in other venues (Oliver and Montgomery, 2008). This study complementsother work that maps the emergence of field configurations (Anand and Jones, 2008;Garud, 2008; McInerney, 2008; Oliver and Montgomery, 2008) by revealing change(and reconfiguration) in established configurations of a community field triggered by amega-event.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This study of the Olympics as a field-configuring event illuminates how patterns ofstructuration and symbolization arise in response to an event and shape a communityfield. Events precipitate not only process of field change but also those of persistence. Asmuch as mega-events like the Olympics introduce new actors, new relationships and newideologies, they are also hinged to the history of the place in which they are staged. Fieldinteractions and categories of meaning are not created entirely anew but, much like thePhoenix that symbolizes the Atlanta city character, they arise from the residue of earlierinstitutional processes.

I theorized that field-configuring events will shape relational systems and symbolicsystems of communities in ways that appropriate the character and traditions of placeand also change it. I reported findings from two exploratory studies that investigateddifferent aspects of field-configuring processes. The first study examined the relationshipbetween the Olympics and host cities over time to establish their inter-connectedness. Ifound that most cities that host the games actively seek to enhance their images andreputation by staging this event; they aspire to legitimately claim the world-class statusthat is associated with an Olympic city and generally succeed in doing so. And, the veryact of staging events in local geographic fields tends to imprint particular events with thecharacter and traditions of the host cities. This dynamic was explored in the second studywhich I presented. I found that existing institutional arrangements within cities estab-lished the bases for the relational and symbolic systems for the event they hosted. Thus,city traditions tend to perpetuate the ‘character of place’ even when punctuated bysignificant events but that this city character also changed with it, intentionally andunintentionally, through the legacies of the Olympics.

I offered evidence on how the mega-event of the Olympics instantiates sets of rela-tional and symbolic links among actors in a collective social structure at the level of thecommunity as a field. As a complement to economic or structural exchange mechanisms,I showed how symbolic ties connect community actors through ‘common symbols,common leaders, and perhaps common ideals’ (Putnam, 1995) that reinforce relation-ships. Through their visible subscription to Olympism as sponsors, corporations claimedmembership in the civic elite and central positions in the kind of network described by



Davis and Greve (1997, p. 8): ‘the network is a “community of practice” with its ownmore-or-less shared understandings (ideologies, assumptions, scripts, norms) that form abackground for constructing economic strategies and goals that determine what willcount as appropriate or deviant’.

Corporations figured significantly in the Atlanta community that configured to hostthe games. Corporate sponsorship infused not only economic value (cash contributions,in-kind services, and volunteer labour) but also relational and social capital; as centraland influential network actors in Atlanta, sponsors were key in managing the games.However, this relational system, although pivoting on the traditional ‘bank and utilitycrowd’ discovered by Hunter (1953) more than a century ago and rediscovered byHeying (1995) in the years just prior to the Olympic event, also included more peripheralAtlanta-centred businesses. Thus, even in preserving the past, fields can configure thefuture by giving newcomers access to relational spaces already institutionalized.

And yet, fields are not configured in institutional voids; rather, they are often con-structed by a process of institutional bricolage such that field practices and symbolsalready sanctioned are appropriated into newly configured communities precipitated byevents. Over time, the community field evidences both persistence and change andconfigures a new collective actor – the Olympic city.

Several implications for theory flow from this research. First, this work highlightsthe usefulness of a process oriented or mechanism-based approach to theorizing field-configuring events, supporting work that examines these processes in other settings(Washington and Ventresca, 2004). Examining how fields coalesce around relational andsymbolic exchanges offers insight into both community character and its persistencethrough traditions and relationships. As novel as the event of the Olympic Games are, itsstaging nonetheless is rooted in already institutionalized aspects of fields. Such a brico-lage of institutional beliefs and systems enabled reconfigurations by conjoining newcom-ers to elites, event theorization to established field logics, and marrying symbolization tostructuration. Thus, studying field configuration events can illuminate processes of fieldemergence, change and institutionalization.

Second, the Olympics offer a case where communities actively solicit events, thussuggesting that events may have endogenous as well as exogenous sources. In the caseof Atlanta, the Olympic bid was fuelled by a ‘place entrepreneur’, Billy Payne, whosebackground and interests were aligned with the growth model that characterized thecity. Thus, events may arise not only from external environmental ‘jolts’ (Meyer et al.,1990), but also from the economic, institutional, reputational, and human assets andcapabilities that are internal to an organizational field (e.g. Feldman, 2004). Thus, theremay be a circularity to field-configuring events such that they arise from the endog-enous capabilities of fields but, once in place, function through relational and symbolicsystems to change those systems. Examining the antecedents and outcomes of events interms of their endogeneity and externality would be an interesting area for futureresearch.

These theoretical extensions hint at promising directions for future research. Myfocus is on the local geographic field (i.e. the Olympic city), a relatively neglectedperspective in institutional work, but one that merits future study. This focus on geo-graphic fields resonates with recent research (e.g. Freeman and Audia, 2006; Marquis

M. A. Glynn1138


et al., 2007) as well as classic work that focuses on the significance of the communityin organizational theory (e.g. Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Warren, 1967). Fields areintermediary levels of analysis that connect the more micro-level of the local geo-graphic community to the more macro-level of the nation-state or society (Scott, 2003)that reveal aspects of institutional persistence and change in response to mega-events.This research highlights the importance of geography and joins emerging work thatshows how the local community itself functions as an institutional field (e.g. Marquiset al., 2007) and brings to the foreground the relational and symbolic systems thatdefine and change it.

The rooting of Olympic events in local fields suggests that multi-level inquiries into thenature of field dynamics and field configurations is warranted. How local communityfields are embedded in larger fields (e.g. nation-states or ‘world class’ categories) thatsupply relational forms and legitimated meanings is an area in need of future research.This work, like others in this issue (e.g. Anand and Jones, 2008; McInerney, 2008) pointsto the feasibility of taking a mechanisms-based approach to understanding field-configuring dynamics, particularly with regard to potentially disruptive events, such asconferences (Garud, 2008; Oliver and Montgomery, 2008) and tournament rituals(Anand and Jones, 2008).

Research examining fine-grained variations across cities in their hosting of theOlympics is similarly warranted. Obvious differences in host city themes and legaciesare evident from Study 1. For instance, in 1996, Atlanta configured a field of actorsthat reinforced its growth orientation and entrepreneurial regime; the followingsummer games in 2000 had very different ‘look’ as the ‘green games’, with a sociallyconscious agenda of environmentalism. Thus, although some elements of event-basedfield configurations are likely to hold, particularly in terms of projecting city characterand tradition onto the structures and symbols that support the games, they are likelygoing to be different in the nature of those relationships as well as in the substance oftheir meanings. Studying the commonalities and variations across cities in hosting thesame event could yield insightful explanations of the linkages between fields andevents.

As well as examining variations in host cities, researchers might investigate varia-tions across the kinds of events that cities host. Some cities offer sites that are akin tonaturally occurring field experiments. For example, Atlanta has played host not only tothe Olympics, but also to major sporting events (e.g. Super Bowl; baseball’s All StarGame), and numerous national conferences, including political, religious, professional,cultural, and educational gatherings. Future researchers might examine variationsacross these different types of events for the same city. Is there persistence that tradi-tions foster even when hosting dissimilar events? Or, are contingencies evident suchthat cities are malleable in their hosting of major events? Studies that focus either onthe single city that hosts diverse events or different cities that host the same kinds ofevents could afford a window on the mutuality of field dynamics and event charac-teristics.

Finally, this study offers implications for practice and particularly for hosting majorevents. City planners would do well to map existing networks of actors and interests inorder to anticipate how event management will likely configure to attend to the event;



this study suggests that established patterns of relationships and influence are likely toreplicate, however imperfectly. City managers who seek to use events as a stimulus forradical change are cautioned to realize that they may need to first adjust existingunderstandings of the character and traditions of their local environment, as well asembedded relationships.

Finally, this research can enrich our understanding of fields configured by events byemphasizing the role of ‘place’ in symbolization and structuration. Events, particularlythose that are visible public rituals and ceremonies, can serve up a ready-made set ofbeliefs to which public, non-profit and for-profit organizations subscribe and inter-relate. As much as symbols condense meaning and relational systems structure, bothserve as mechanisms of connection driving the configuration of fields in response to anevent.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper has benefited from the support of Boston College and especially the Winston Center forLeadership and Ethics. I am indebted to Christopher Marquis for his assistance with the data used inFigure 3, and Marc Lavine for archival data collection. I am the beneficiary of the insights and encourage-ment of Christopher Marquis, Gerald F. Davis, Mark Mizruchi, and Mayer Zald, as well as Joe Lampel,Alan Meyer, and Tim Clark as editors. I thank them all.

NOTE

An early version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Academy of Management Meetings, Seattle,WA.

APPENDIX: OLYMPIC LEGACY BY HOST CITIES, 1972–2006

2006 Torino, Italy (Winter) GOALS: Shed its image as a gray, auto-making city to aninternational tourist destination; Attract 4 million touristsannually by 2011, up from 2.5 million in 2005; Overhaulits industrial past and become a cultural, tourist andcommercial hub. OUTCOME: Success: Target revenuefor Games of 64.4 million Euros was exceeded by 5million; New construction of Olympic apartments will helprelieve shortage of public housing; Improved thereputation of Torino internationally.

2004 Athens, Greece (Summer) GOALS: Reinvent itself as a modern city for the ThirdMillennium; Transform Greece into a mainstreamEuropean country; Provide security for the first OlympicGames since the September 11th attacks. OUTCOME:Success: Significant ($12 billion) in infrastructureimprovements included a new airport, expansion ofmass transit system; Opened-up new residentialneighbourhoods; Stadium is being incorporated into a newOlympic park for tourism; Claimed a surplus of nearly$167 million.

M. A. Glynn1140


APPENDIX: Continued

2002 Salt Lake City, Utah,USA(Winter)

GOALS: City improvement; Make Utah winter sportscapital of North America; Generate $900 million inbenefits to entire state; Provide a lasting legacy for Utah.OUTCOME: Mixed Success: Controversy involving IOCbidding process for locating Games in Salt Lake Citypartly overshadowed events; Olympics did generate a lotof revenue, but debate continues as to the amount of theeconomic benefit; Improved the reputation of Salt LakeCity, both nationally and internationally.

2000 Sydney, Australia(Summer)

GOALS: Enhance the tourist image of Australia and notjust Sydney, and develop an international Australianprofile as more than merely a ‘good source for rawmaterial’; Run an environmentally sound Olympic Gamesby using ‘Green Venues’ and committing to publictransportation, etc; Improve city and sports infrastructure;Foster economic growth by attracting investment, boostingtourism and creating jobs. OUTCOME: Mixed Success:Most obvious benefit the creation of two new suburbs nextto the former Olympic site; Regenerated a toxic swampon the city harbour with a large sporting facility andresidential centre; Transport A-system, hailed as a bigOlympic success, is now considered one of the city’sproblems plagued by poor and unreliable infrastructureand badly coordinated routes; Sydney Olympics gets UNaward for Environmental Excellence, the Global 500Award.

1998 Nagano, Japan (Winter) GOALS: Increase both city exposure and revenues;Generate tourism; Provide a long-term boost to theregion’s economy, which was stagnant; Significantinvestment in infrastructure including a new rail link toTokyo. OUTCOME: Failure: Left behind a legacy ofdebt due to the staggering cost of maintaining theirstunning, but now seldom used facilities. Scandal has alsosurrounded the ‘98 Olympics with reports that the citygave the IOC lavish gifts.

1996 Atlanta, Georgia, USA(Summer)

GOALS: Promote image of world class tourist andconference city; Reinvigorate its central business districtand inaugurating a revival of downtown residentialconstruction; Provide benefits to city residents.OUTCOME: Mixed Success: While the Olympics costtaxpayers virtually nothing, providing Atlanta with a new$122 million downtown stadium, new roads, and newhousing for students, the much-promised goal ofrevitalizing urban neighbourhoods fell short.



APPENDIX: Continued

1994 Lillehammer, Norway(Winter)

GOALS: Catalyse the stagnation of a region; Start adynamic development process; Create an internationaltourism destination. OUTCOME: Mixed Success:Lillehammer acquired a new community college campus,a telecommunications grid that was the most sophisticatedin Norway, 14,500 new hotel beds, and several new sportsfacilities. This growth, however, was only temporary. Inaddition, all growth was concentrated within the host cityitself, the goal of improving the region as a whole was notmet. Also, while Lillehammer did not incur any debt fromthe construction of the new athletic facilities, it must nowmaintain them.

1992 Barcelona, Spain(Summer)

GOALS: Modernize Barcelona’s profile and image as abusiness destination; Introduce the leisure component ofits business-oriented image. OUTCOME: Success:Barcelona experiences a major urban regeneration thatleads to a temporary boost to the local economy as well asa short-term boost to the city’s tourism industry. Used theoccasion of the Games for a publicly financed $9 billionfacelift that included a new airport, a new highway ringingthe city and new bathing beaches.

1992 Albertville, France(Winter)

GOALS: Develop new roads, rail links, and skiingfacilities; Turn-around its declining industrial base anddevelop as a tourist destination. OUTCOME: Failure:Games incurred a loss of $56.8 million; Region did notblossom as predicted but tumbled into a recession as therest of France; Unemployment rose by a third in the yearfollowing the Games. Relics of the Games: expensive icerinks, ski-jumps and a bobsleigh and luge course remainlittle used; Several local villages fell so deeply into debtthat residents may be paying increased local taxes until2000.

1988 Seoul, Korea (Summer) GOALS: Put Seoul ‘on the map’ as a player within theinternational system; Develop new trading partners;Implement regeneration projects such as increasedhousing and improved infrastructure and sports facilities;Showcase its modern, high-technology national industriesand replace its image as a developing country.OUTCOME: Success: Promotion of Korean tourist,sports, leisure, electronics, and telecommunicationsindustries was achieved; Significant improvements in cityinfrastructure including sewage, inner-city expressways,telephone facilities and subway lines; The increase inhousing helped ease the housing shortage within the city.The Korean government credits the Olympics in creating336,000 new jobs while also allowing for a 12 per centgrowth in the economy in 1988.

M. A. Glynn1142


APPENDIX: Continued

1988 Calgary, Canada(Winter)

GOALS: Leave a well established legacy of facilities thatwould be used by future generations of athletes; Increasetourism and reverse economic stagnation in the city,caused in part, from decline in oil and grain prices.OUTCOME: Success: Many new facilities were created,as well as a support contract that included the obligationto create a $70 million fund to finance the operations ofthe facilities left from the games; Calgary received $400million dollars worth of athletic facilities and more than $1billion was pumped into the local economy.

1984 Los Angeles, California,USA (Summer)

GOALS: Give LA a global stage; Gain tourism revenues;Enhance LA’s position in history and contemporarysociety. OUTCOME: Success: Revenues and attendancemet or exceeded estimates; Olympics resulted in a $225million surplus, 40 per cent of which stayed in LA tosupport youth sports. Infrastructure improved as well.

1984 Sarajevo, Yugoslavia(Winter)

GOALS: Showcase Sarajevo; Improve city’s sportingfacilities. OUTCOME: Mixed Success/Failure: New skilifts, racing trails, hotels, apartment complexes, skatingand other recreational facilities helped with wintertourism, creating thousands of new permanent jobs forpreviously unemployed Sarajevans. In 1992, communismcollapsed and the Serbs attacked Sarajevo. The OlympicStadium, The Zetra, is destroyed and many of theOlympic facilities are damaged. The IOC rebuilds theZetra in 1994 but all other facilities remain damaged.

1980 Moscow, Soviet Union(Winter)

GOALS: Showcase the communist political system bybeing the first Olympic Games to be held in a communistcountry; Generate revenues; Increase/improve sportsfacilities. OUTCOME: Failure: While sporting facilitieswere improved, only one quarter of the 300,000 expectedforeign visitors attended. This suggests that there was nosignificant impact on the Soviet economy, and that thecommunist political system was not very well showcased.Also, the US-led boycott of Western nations yielded anear-blackout on global television coverage.

1980 Lake Placid, New York,USA (Winter)

GOALS: Update the city’s current sports facilities (whichhad previously hosted the 1932 Winter Olympics) andbring international recognition to Lake Placid.OUTCOME: Success: The city’s sports facilities wereupdated as well as new facilities built. Also, after thegames, the city’s economy developed into more of a ‘yearround’ economy with tourism business extending into thefall and spring months. Tourism doubled between 1980and 1995 and in the last 15 years has hosted 65 WorldCup events, 15 world championships, and 200national-level events involving 20 sports.



APPENDIX: Continued

1976 Montreal, Canada(Summer)

GOALS: Improve city and sports infrastructure; Increaseawareness within the world stage; Put Montreal on themap; Foster economic development by attractinginvestment, creating jobs, and boosting tourism.OUTCOME: Failure: Though the city enjoyedimprovements to infrastructure such as roads and housingas well as improved sports facilities, there were not manylong-term benefits. The financial deficit from the gameswas approx. $1 billion dollars, the final payment for whichwas made in 2006.

1972 Munich, FRG GOALS: Showcase the host city and region, increasehousing, and improve city and sports infrastructure, aswell as attract investment. OUTCOME: Success. Thecity enjoyed massive urban regeneration. The gamesresulted in the development of a previously desolate 3 kmstretch of land. Increases and improvements were made tohousing and roads. A brand new subway system was built.There was also a significant economic impact. Munich isnow one of the most affluent cities in Germany with asignificant tourist industry. The Games accelerated therebuilding process in West Germany and led to manychanges including the pedestrianization of the City Centrewhich has increased consumer spending.

Note: No information on Olympic Legacy was found for the games of 1976 Innsbruck (Austria), 1972 Sapporo ( Japan),nor any Olympic game prior to 1972.Sources: Andrew Gumbel, ‘Winter Olympics: Albertville still in shadow of debt mountain’, Guardian, 11 February 1994, p.21; Christopher Clarey, ‘Albertville learning to turn gold, silver and bronze into green’, New York Times, 13 February 1993,p. 32; Alan Riding, ‘Olympics: Albertville in mountain of debts’, New York Times, 10 July 1992, p. 10; Tracey Quek, ‘China’scoming-out ball: Beijing wants Summer Games of 2008 to be green, high-tech and safe’, Straits Times, 22 April 2006, p. 3;Lachlan Colquhoun, Kerin Hope, Yolanda Ortiz De Arri and Andrew Ward, ‘Will the glory live on? Huge benefits areprojected for London but Olympic legacies have been mixed for the past four summer host cities’, Financial Times, 16 July2005, p. 11; Jon Watts, ‘Olympics 2004: China’s party people’, Observer, 5 September 2004, p. 7; Kerin Hope, ‘Athens playsslow game to avoid wasting a valuable resource. Amid extensive criticism of a failure to exploit the success of the 2004summer Games, the government claims that its halting progress is already yielding results’, Financial Times, 21 June 2005,p. 4; Alan Hubbard, Olympic Games: Athen’s legacy bigger than the l7 billion bill’, Independent on Sunday, 12 June 2005, p.12; John Jeansonne, ‘Numbers crunch: Athens reported profit, which could have affect on NYC bid’, Newsday, 17 May 2005,p. A49; Alan Abrahamson, ‘Games bring in $9.6 million: Athens committee announces surplus from the $2.67 billion madeat the most expensive Olympics yet staged, again putting spotlight on costs’, Los Angeles Times, 13 May 2005, p. 5; StevenKomarow, ‘84 Winter Games site still casualty of war Sarajevo’s mission: get 2010 Olympics’, USA Today, 4 February 1998,p. 1C; Milton Nieuwsma, ‘Sarajevo in the Balkans is an Olympic winneryline’, Los Angeles Times, 16 November 1986, p. 29;‘If the West won’t play’, Economist, 26 January 1980, p. 53; Kevin Klose, ‘Olympics no game to Soviet planners: Soviets pushhard in Olympic effort’, Washington Post, 12 June 1979, p. D1; Bill Pennington, ‘The little village that could, and did’, New

York Times, 3 February 2005, p. 1; Bob Oates, ‘People feel it: Olympics reached out and touched L.A.’, Los Angeles Times, 28July 1985, p. 14; Mike Gorrell, ‘How the Games were won: generosity or bribery?’ Salt Lake Tribune, 26 October 2003, p. A20;Janet Rae Brooks, ‘Turin sees its Olympic moment as investment in future: Turin drawing inspiration from other Oly cities’,Salt Lake Tribune, 10 March 2003, p. A1; Mike Gorrell, ‘In the eye of the behold: impact on state depends on whom you talkto’, Salt Lake Tribune, 8 February 2003, p. O5; Heather May, ‘SLC making plans to capitalize on Olympics: finally; SLCplanning to capitalize in Olympics’, Salt Lake Tribune, 10 February 2003, p. A1; Janet Rae Brooks, ‘Turin sees its Olympicmoment as investment in future; Turin drawing inspiration from other Olympic cities’, Salt Lake Tribune, 10 March 2003,p. A1; Sandro Contenta, ‘Games legacy long on pride, short on cash’, Toronto Star, 27 February 2006, p. D12; John Moretti,‘Day after Turin faces challenges of post-Olympic life’, New York Sun, 27 February 2006, p. 20; Andrew Gumbel, ‘Winter

M. A. Glynn1144


Olympics: Albertville still in shadow of debt mountain’, Guardian, 11 February 1994, p. 21; Christopher Clarey, ‘Olympics:Albertville Learning to turn gold, silver and bronze into green’, New York Times, 13 February 1993, p. 32; Alan Riding,‘Olympics: Albertville in mountain of debts’, New York Times, 10 July 1992, p. 10.

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