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Confidence‐building measuresbetween Pakistan and India: Anargument for changeMutahir Ahmed aa Department of International Relations , University ofKarachi , Karachi, 75270, PakistanPublished online: 11 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Mutahir Ahmed (1998) Confidence‐building measures betweenPakistan and India: An argument for change, Contemporary South Asia, 7:2, 137-145, DOI:10.1080/09584939808719835

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Contemporary South Asia (1998), 7(2), 137-145

Confidence-building measuresbetween Pakistan and India: anargument for change

MUTAHIR AHMED

ABSTRACT India and Pakistan remain locked in traditional Cold War concepts of securityand development. Despite being ranked at 135 and 134, respectively, out of the 173 countrieslisted in the United Nations' 'Human Development Index', India and Pakistan continue todirect their resources towards non-developmental expenditures. In this scenario, the im-plementation of confidence-building measures is extremely necessary for the development ofthese two states and for South Asian as a whole. This paper traces the problems faced by thepeople of India and Pakistan, identifying and examining areas of conflict such as Kashmir,nuclear weapons and religious extremism. An attempt is made to suggest what measuresshould be taken in order to defuse tensions between the two states. In this regard, economicconfidence-building measures have the greatest potential, including the granting of 'most-favoured nation' status to each other. In order to achieve these goals, the removal of the'enemy myth' which continues to perpetuate a highly negative image of each country to theother is necessary, as is the support of the people of India and Pakistan for a range ofconfidence-building measures.

In the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union overshadowedinternational politics. Instead of directing resources towards human develop-ment, they invested in non-developmental expenditure. In the post-Cold War eraof today, ideological warfare has been eliminated from the international horizonand the perception of security has been redefined.

However, India and Pakistan remain locked in the Cold War period andcontinue to direct their resources towards non-developmental expenditures. NewDelhi and Islamabad are spending 3.1 and 6.5%, respectively, of their GDP ondefence. This spending places both countries among the top ten buyers ofweapons among developing states? India tops the list, having imported armstotaling US$12.2 billion during 1988-1992. Pakistan, with its average annualarms imports of US$697 million during the same period, ranks as the ninth

Correspondence: Mutahir Ahmed, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Karachi 75270,Pakistan.

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largest arms importer.1 Moreover, Pakistan's military budget is estimated to be125% of its combined spending on education and health, whereas India'smilitary expenditure is approximately 65% of its combined education and healthspending. The latter also has 350 million of its citizens living in absolutepoverty. India and Pakistan are ranked at 135 and 134, respectively, out of the173 states on the United Nations' 'Human Development Index' (HDI), and withevery passing year both are moving down the list, running the risk of furtherdepriving their people of basic necessities.2

In this scenario, the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs)is extremely necessary for the development of these two states and for SouthAsia as a whole. This paper attempts to trace the problems and hurdles in theway of normalising relations between India and Pakistan through non-militaryCBMs. Areas of conflict such as Kashmir, nuclear arms, religious extremism, therole of their respective ruling establishments and the defeatist mentality of theirrespective leaderships are analysed in detail. This paper also will suggestsolutions and recommend measures to defuse the explosive state of internationalrelations between India and Pakistan. The success of CBMs depends uponending the 'enemy myth' which continues to perpetuate a highly negative imageof each country in the other, as well as the support of the Indian and Pakistanipeople themselves. Indeed, the best way towards realising CBMs is by encour-aging people-to-people interaction.

The concept of security and CBMs

International relations in the post-Cold War era have experienced a change inconcepts and ideas of such things as security, ideology, economy and religion,both at the global and regional level. More importance is being attached tocomponents like political stability and national cohesion, the participation of allsection of the population in civil society economic progress in education, healthand welfare, the building of viable physical infrastructures, and cordial relationswith neighbours.3 Only a combination and balance of all these components willprovide national security in today's world. CBMs have become a watchword,reducing fear and insecurity between states, and paving the way for thesettlement of disputes through negotiation and the reduction of national defenceexpenditure.4

CBMs, both military and non-military, constitute building blocks which canprovide operational substance to the notion of common security.5 However, as aninstitutional process, CBMs may take decades to provide positive results. Theprocess needs political will and meaningful cooperation and patience. Threeexamples may be cited in this regard: (i) the 1975 Conference of Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE) held to ease global tensions was the first majorlandmark in resolving problems through CBMs and has been institutionalised inthe shape of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);(ii) the process of dialogue between the European Union and 10 Asian countriesinitiated by the March 1996 Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) to accelerate the pace

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of development in the regions through CBMs; and (iii) the peace processcurrently underway between Israel and PLO in which CBMs are providingpositive results.

Current tensions between Pakistan and India

The lack of vision on the part of ruling elites to face challenges which threatenthe very existence of political and economic structures are readily evident inIndia and Pakistan. Both countries have been facing problems of economicmismanagement, social chaos and political instability. The continuing arms racebetween India and Pakistan is the most obvious example of the orthodoxmentality of their respective ruling oligarchies. The need of the hour is to adopta new approach to deal with a variety of security issues.

The nuclear debate in South Asia began with the 1962 Sino-Indian War, afterwhich segments of the Indian establishment displayed a strong desire to achievea nuclear weapons capability. In 1974, India exploded a nuclear device andchanged the balance of security in the region. Today, much of its rulingestablishment—the Congress elite, civil bureaucracy, military establishment andHindu extremist religious parties—believes that the possession and/or deploy-ment of nuclear weapons will increase India's respectability in the communityof the nations.

India's 1974 explosion caused Pakistani rulers to develop a sense of insecu-rity. Pakistan's establishment, along with other hawkish elements comprisingreligious extremist forces and the adventurist orthodox segment of society, tooka firm decision to also develop a nuclear weapons capability. They argued thatthe possession and deployment of nuclear weapons was the only way forPakistan to neutralise Indian superiority in conventional forces. A declarednuclear capability would also give the country immense prestige among thecommunity of nations—all five permanent members of the United NationsSecurity Council are nuclear powers—in general, and in the eyes of the Muslimworld in particular. The actual deployment of nuclear weapons may be unneces-sary, argues Professor Gary Mullhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project onNuclear Arms Control: 'Pakistanis may not need to test. They understand theirweapon very well, and they know it will work.'6 The strength of the hawkishelements among Pakistani decision-makers has made it almost impossible for thecountry's democratically elected governments to take any steps towards disarma-ment.7

Yet, while the of building a nuclear weapons capability may have carriedmuch weight in the Cold War era when power politics, ideology and economicswere the watchwords, the situation has totally altered today and the abovearguments have lost their validity.8 The acquisition of nuclear weapons or anuclear capability has nothing to do with the contemporary power of states; forinstance, a non-nuclear Japan exercises greater power in international politicsand offers a higher quality of life and opportunities to its citizen than the nuclearpower China.9 Indeed, one of the reasons for the disintegration of the Soviet

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Union was its heavy investment on defence expenditure rather than the develop-ment of other state-society institutions.

Pakistan, in particular, is facing similar problems. Its armed forces are undersevere pressure. Already under-equipped, their present equipment is aging andhas become more or less obsolete. The need for new weapons technologydemands money and resources which is simply not there as Western prioritieshave changed, leaving Pakistan with little or no foreign military aid.10 Pakistanalso has been pressurised to unilaterally sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT). In order to divert this pressure, its rulers took the position that thecountry would not sign up unless India also did so." The Indian establishmenthas internationalized the nuclear issue, refusing to sign the CTBT because itexempts the five declared nuclear powers—China, France, Russia, UK andUSA—from any obligation to disarm.

Both states must realise that instead of taking a hard line on the CTBT issue,they should utilize their resources for the betterment of the masses. For the timebeing, Pakistan has neutralized the situation, hiding behind India—but this ishardly a permanent solution. Both states should consider their growing problemsin social, economic and social matters. In the post-Cold War era, the developmentof a sound economic infrastructure is the only viable alternative in contemporarypolitics.

Kashmir is another ongoing point of international tension between India andPakistan. While New Delhi declares the region an integral part of India andalleges Pakistani interference in its internal affairs, Islamabad insists that Kashmiris an unresolved international dispute which must be settled by a plebiscite asenvisaged by the Security Council resolution passed a full four decades ago.Presently, the dispute is threefold. Firstly, among the population living in theIndian state of Jammu and Kashmir—that is, the Kashmir Valley—there is a deepsense of alienation from the Indian Union. Secondly, since 1988, Pakistan hasmounted a covert military operation to exploit this alienation, instigating andaiding acts of terrorism. Thirdly, Indian security forces have systematicallyperpetrated violations of human rights in the valley.12 While Indian efforts todefend the status quo have met with some success, the efforts of Pakistan'sforeign policy-makers to highlight their view that Kashmir is an unfinished partof Partition and that the UN-decreed plebiscite must take place issued on theinternational, regional and domestic front have mostly failed. Notably, in March1994, Pakistan was unable to push through a resolution on Kashmir at a Genevasession of the United Nations Human Rights Commission due to lack of support.

Kashmiris themselves have some strong reservations in endorsing Pakistan'sposition as many of them aspire to full independence for the region. A Kashmiriacademic from Srinagar has stated: 'East Pakistan [Bangladesh] has viol-ently separated from the West. The Muslim nation of the Quaid-i-Azam[Mohammed Ali Jinnah] is now divided into three sovereign states. Sowhat unfinished agenda of partition are the Kashmiris required to complete?'13

Yet the Kashmiri liberation movement has also faced severe setbacks. Thereis a notable lack of unity among Kashmiri political parties. When the Chinese,

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Algerian, Cuban and Vietnamese peoples were fighting for the right of self-de-termination and national liberation they were united under one party andleadership. In Kashmir, there are no less than 38 armed parties in the Valley.14

The creation of religious nationalist extremist groups has also stifled thecreation of a truly pan-Kashmiri independence movement. In the beginning, theJammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular nationalist organizationwhich enjoyed international support, controlled the movement to establish anindependent state. When it became increasingly replaced with Islamic groups,often supported by militant Muslim 'fundamentalists' drawn from outside Indiaor Pakistan, the cause of Kashmiri independence slid down the internationalagenda. It has been estimated that approximately 1200 foreigners, of whomnearly half belong to Afghanistan, have infiltrated into the Valley from AzadKashmir.15 These fundamentalists have isolated the moderate, nationalist elementof Kashmir and indirectly strengthened extreme Muslim and Hindu fundamental-ist forces in Pakistan and India, respectively. They also have institutionalizedmilitancy and violence, inviting India to brutally crush them.

Armed struggles are out of date. In the Cold War era, armed movements failedmore than they succeeded, even in an era when the right to self-determination,by violence if necessary, was supported by the money, arms and, often, thepersonnel of the capitalist and socialist blocs. In the post-Cold War era, thestrategy of changing the system through violence is obsolete. It is openlyacknowledged that a deadlock now prevails in Kashmir which neither India,Pakistan nor the Kashmiri people can open. Islamic extremist groups deployingviolent means only worsen the Kashmiri cause.

Historical differences in South Asia have also centered around the use ofreligion in politics. In Pakistan, mixing the two started in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto'sera and was institutionalized further under Zia ul-Haq. Outside powers also haveplayed an increasing role in dividing religion along sectarian lines; for instance,with the introduction of, on the one hand, Anjum-i-Sipah Sahaba (ASS), anextremist Sunni organisation assisted by Saudi Arabia and, on the other hand,Sipah-i-Mahmoodi (ASM), a Shia organisation supported by Iran. Recent yearshave seen Pakistani society divided along Sunni vs. Shia lines, often violently.16

Thus the role of religion in Pakistan is not leading towards unity but division.Though religious parties have never managed to win more than 3% of the nationalvote, they have influenced the political leadership of the country.17

In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and other Hindu extremist partieshave been making steady inroads into Indian society. In 1990, the governmentof V.P. Singh was dissolved largely due to the BJP-led campaign to demolish theBabri Mosque in north India. Most recently, the results of the 1998 generalelections have seen the BJP form the new national government at the head of an18-party coalition. Replacing the secular nationalism presented by the CongressParty with the religious nationalism advocated by the BJP is a very dangerousstep for both India and South Asia. In any multi-cultural and pluralistic society,the growth of religious intolerance is a threat to its very foundation. Will it proveso in India?

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CBMs as instruments for solving disputes in South Asia

The most effective way to solve the problems between India and Pakistan is toopen channels of communication. Relations between the two countries have beenstrained for the last four decades. The only available option is to defuse actualand potential areas conflicts through dialogue. As advised by the former FinanceMinister of Pakistan, Dr Mahbubul Haq, Pakistan and India should begin adialogue as soon as possible and should be flexible on all major issues likeKashmir, the Siachen Glacier dispute and bilateral trade.18 What CBMs areavailable to begin this dialogue?

For a start, as members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), India andPakistan should grant each other most favoured nation (MFN) status. Indeed,according Article I of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),WTO members are obliged to reciprocate the granting of MFN status by othermembers.19 India already has accorded MFN status to Pakistan. In return, thegovernment of the latter has decided in principle to normalise trade with Indiaand constituted five committees to examine the possibility of full-scale trade.

Although moves to normalise trade with India have the full support of theprivate sector in Pakistan, some pressure groups and segments of the rulingestablishment remain strongly opposed.20 They argue that outstanding politicaldifferences should be settled first. For instance, until the problem of Kashmir isresolved, any commitment by Pakistan to granting MFN status to India will bea betrayal of Kashmiri Muslims' aspirations and a setback to the Kashmir cause.They also warn that Pakistani industries cannot compete with their moreadvanced Indian counterparts which, given the establishment of full traderelations, would capture domestic markets. Finally, elements opposed to MFNstatus for India warn that trade leads to cultural exchanges which will endangerthe Islamic identity of Pakistan.

All of these fears are groundless. Trade is not a barrier towards the Kashmircause. There are countless examples of 'enemy' nations trading freely with eachother without surrendering their political position and differences; see, forinstance, the trade between the US and the Soviet Union, China and Japan,China and Taiwan, and even China and India.21 Fears of opening up Pakistaniindustries to Indian competition are also misplaced. In today's world, no statecan do without acquiring technologies from other countries. Today, Pakistanbuys engineering goods and other tools from Japan and Sweden which are veryexpensive. Importing equivalent engineering goods and machinery from India atalmost half the cost from these states would save Pakistan much foreignexchange. Closer integration of their respective economies also would reduce thecost of Pakistan's development spending.22 Finally, the fear of cultural invasionhas no place in today's post-industrialised world of globalisation, virtuallyinstantaneous communications and rapid technological advance which aremaking the world an increasingly smaller place with a truly global society.

Granting MFN status to India simply means that goods will be permitted tobe exported on the basis of which goods of other countries are allowed in and

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taxed. As a member of the WTO, Pakistan already is committed to globalisingits economy and integrating it with the international economic system. GrantingMFN status to India haunts only that class of businessmen afraid of anycompetition. Yet Pakistan has a competitive edge over India in such areas astextiles, carpets and leather goods. Open trade with India means access to amarket of almost one billion people! More trade means more benefit for thepeoples of both sides of the border. Hawkish elements in Pakistan alwayscriticise reconciliatory approaches and favour policies of over-centralisation.Domestically, they oppose democracy, autonomy for the provinces, refuseregional identity, and base their politics on a hatred of India which they regardas the cornerstone of Pakistan's cohesion.

The most important step to institutionalising the process of CBMs betweenIndia and Pakistan is to change the 'enemy' image which both states have of theother. This image may be modified at both the governmental and non-govern-mental level by such measures as:

(1) Maintaining a balance between military and non-military CBMs.(2) Curbing negative propaganda and disinformation.(3) Providing freedom to their people to meet each other and exchange

information.(4) Promoting efforts towards resolving the crucial issue of global nuclear

disarmament.(5) Removing barriers to bilateral trade and commerce.(6) Discouraging trends towards the theocratisation of the state which endanger

peace, democracy, stability and progress.(7) Joint actions by academic, think-tank and other organisations against

religious intolerance.(8) Including a secular (science, philosophy, etc.) component in the curriculum

of religious educational institutions.(9) Providing easy access to information on secular and democratic struggles

and initiatives, thus strengthening such moves.(10) Sharing information on the strategies adopted by fundamentalist ideologies,

thus assisting in negating their effect.(11) Creating institutional linkages for monitoring the process of CBMs.(12) Energising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.23

(13) Establishing a 'University of Peace' in South Asia which, as a teachingand/or research institution, will highlight the importance of peace for theregion.24

Conclusion

The future of CBMs between India and Pakistan will not be easy. The hostilityof the two countries towards one another has resulted in three wars and lastedlonger than even the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry. Powerful elements of both thePakistani and Indian establishments, respectively, remain opposed to any moves

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which seek to normalise relations between the two states. They pressurisedemocratically elected governments to follow the policy of confrontation whichare in their interest only. Religious zealots also are against the institutionalisationof CBMs because their politics are based on mobilising people by stimulatingtheir emotions and fears in the name of religion. They try to sabotage anygenuine effort based on cooperation, development, peace and stability in theregion.

Yet CBMs between India and Pakistan are increasing. South Asia is notisolated from post-Cold War moves towards the globe lessening of ideologicaldifferences, the rise in pluralistic democracies, economic interdependency, rapidcommunications, human rights, development and secularism. If South Asiawants to survive in this increasingly competitive world, its two major powerswill have to follow current trends in international relations. Dr Mahbubul Haqhas pointed out that powerful arms lobbies and other vested interests immedi-ately dub anyone who calls for a dialogue between India and Pakistan 'traitors':

It is in their interest to perpetuate this state of confrontation between the two countries.India and Pakistan have six times more soldiers than doctors. It's up to the youngergeneration especially to stand up to these lobbies and for public opinion to persuade thegovernments of both countries that a meaningful dialogue and reduction in tension is theonly way.25

Changing global politics have been reflected in the thinking of some individualswho believe that India and Pakistan should begin a serious dialogue. Despiteofficial discouragement, concerned citizens from the two states have held three'People-to-People' conventions.26 A concerted effort at CBMs by the govern-ments and peoples of both India and Pakistan will ensure that resources are freedto combat the real dangers to security in South Asia—poverty, overpopulation,ethnic and religious conflicts, and natural disasters.27

Notes and references1. Samina Yasmeen and Aabha Dixit, 'Confidence-building in South Asia', Occasional Paper No 24,

(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Centre), September 1995, p. 1.2. Ibid, pp 2-3.3. Moonis Ahmar, 'National security and the [sic] global politics', National Development and Security Vol 4,

No 3, February 1996, pp 43-44.4. Ibid, p 48.5. John Jorgen Hoist, 'Confidence-building measures: a conceptual framework', Survival Vol 25, No 1,

January/February 1983, p 2.6. From an interview in The Washington Times as quoted in Dawn 9 April 1996. This is not a minor

achievement for a country with a per capita GNP of US$400 per year, 74% illiteracy rate, and aneducational system which is the poorest in quality anywhere in the world. See Hoodbhoy, 'Nuclear issuebetween India and Pakistan: myths and realities', Occasional Paper No 18, The Henry L. Stimson Center,July 1994, p 7.

7. Iftekhar H. Malik, 'World politics and South Asia: beginning of an end?', Journal of South Asia andMiddle Eastern Studies, 19:3, Spring 1996, p 57.

8. Mutahir Ahmed, 'IMF and Pakistan', Third World, p 55.9. Hoodbhoy, op cit, p 5.

10. M.B. Naqvi, 'What option do we have?', Dawn, 2 July 1996.

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11. Ibid.12. A.G. Noorani, 'Confidence-building Measures for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and the Wuller Barage

Disputes: Easing The Indo-Pakistani dialogue on Kashmir', Occasional Paper No 16, The Henry L.Stimson Centre, 1 April 1994, pp 3-4.

13. Eqbal Ahmad, 'Kashmir: elements of impasse', Dawn, 11 August 1996.14. Ibid.15. P.S. Stabdan, 'Kashmir: the key issue', Strategic Analysis Vol 11, No 1, April 1996, p 113.16. Malik, op cit., Ref 7 p 59.17. Mutahir Ahmed, 'The role of CBMs: Indo-Pakistan conflicts', Pakistan Horizon, Vol 48, No 1, January

1995, p 77.18. Dawn, 23 July 1996.19. Umashanker Phandis, 'India to take up MFN status with Pakistan', Dawn, 5 September 1996.20. Sultan Ahmad, 'Trade with India becoming essential', Dawn, 30 August 1996.21. M.B. Naqvi, 'Breaking the barrier', Newsline (Karachi), July 1996.22. Ibid.23. Summary of Proceedings and Resolutions of the People's Convention (New Delhi), 24-25 February 1995,

p 3.24. Professor Syed Sikander Mehdi of the University of Karachi Department of International Relations has

launched this idea, inspired by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a uniqueplatform for researchers recruited for a specific period from different geographical regions and representingvarious academic disciplines.

25. M.H. Askari, 'Ramifications of Indian polls', Dawn, 17 April 1996.26. M.H. Askari, 'Hurdles in the way of Track-2', Dawn, 19 August 1996.27. Dawn, 23 July 1996.

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