conf 2011 jinn-yuh hsu
TRANSCRIPT
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StateTransformationandtheMutationofUrbanRenewalPoliciesinTaiwan
Thispaperexploresthedynamicsbehindthechangingregimesofurbanrenewalin
Taiwan.Atfirstsight,itappearsthattheemergenceofpublic-privatepartnershipin
Taiwansurbanrenewalpolicyrendersneoliberalizationpossible,whichleadstothe
conclusionthatTaiwanjoinstheglobalgentrificationclub.Insteadofactinginthe
spiritofurbanmanagerialismofwelfarestate,theauthoritariandevelopmental
Taiwanesestateshoulderedthejobofevictingsquattersandurbanrenewalwithan
aimtopromoteurbanandeconomicdevelopment.Theevolutionofurbanrenewal
policy,fromapublicinfrastructureprojecttoaprofitablebusinessmodel,reflects
thestatestransformationinurbandevelopment.Thesuccessivewavesofurban
renewalinTaipeiCitydemonstratethechangingstate-societyrelations.Itfindsthat
Taiwansstatepolicies,incomparisonwithpoliciesofAnglo-Americanstates,evolve
throughdivergenttrajectoriesbutconvergeinpromotinglandedcapital,andleadtosocialandspatialinjusticeinTaiwanscities.
Keywords:urbanpolicy,gentrification,neoliberalization,statetransformation,social
andspatialexclusion,Taiwan
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Introduction
Duringthe20thcentury,neighborhoodchangeandtheevictionoflow-income
residentshasoccurredinavarietyofways;fromthedemolitionofentireareasto
morerecentrevitalizationeffortsemphasizingthebuildingofcommunityandnew
governancestructures.Gentrificationinadvancedindustrializedeconomiesis
directlyrelatedtohowcitiesexperienceeconomictransformationandpolicy
interventions.Theurbandisinvestmentresultingfromeconomicchangeandurban
policyalongwiththeindividualpursuitofthesuburbandreamlaidthegroundwork
fortheappearanceofthegentrificationmovement.
Therenewedpositionofcitiesintheglobaleconomyhasfuelledtheexpansion
ofgentrification.Whilegentrificationraisesanumberofissuesinthecorecountries,
suchassocialexclusion,evictionandresistance,ithasspreadtocitiesaroundthe
globesincethe1960s.Sincethe1980sthegentrificationmovementacceleratedand
gainedgeographicalscopeduetothefiercecompetitionofworldcitycup
(AtkinsonandBridge2005).Gentrificationdiffusesinthenationalurbansystemfrom
primarycitiestolower-tieredcities,andintheglobalsystemfromtheGlobalNorth
totheGlobalSouth,andfromcapitalistsocietiestopost-socialistcountries.Atkinson
andBridge(2005)havedocumentedthisprocessextensively,covering,among
others,theUS,theUK,Canada,Australia,Japan,EasternandSouthernEurope,
Turkey,Brazil,Germany,andPoland.Theglobalizationofgentrificationalsoaffects
Taiwan,anEastAsiannewlyindustrializedcountry.Taiwanispartofagroupoflate-
industrializingdevelopmentalstatesintheGlobalSouth.Thesecountriesare
characterizedbyastronginterventionalistgovernmentcenteredoneconomic
growth.Thispaperprovidesamissingpieceintheglobalgentrificationstory,by
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examiningthegentrificationprocessinTaiwan,comparedtothatinWestern
industrializedwelfarestates
Anintriguingpuzzleforstudentsofurbanandregionaldevelopmentiswhy
Taiwansstatechangeditsperspectiveonurbandevelopmentsoradicallyoverthe
past30years.Beforethe1980sthestatewaswillingtosolelyshoulderthejobof
urbanrenewalwithawhollysupportivefinancialbudgetandlandappropriationlaw,
whileinthe1990sitbecamefinanciallyoverburdenedduetoitsgentrificationpolicy.
Ataroundtheturnofthecenturythestateturnedtowardpromotingurban
gentrificationasakeybusinessmodel.Thistransformationofstatepolicywascrucial
forthechangingfateofpublic-privatepartnershipforurbanrenewalthroughoutthe
period.Whatkindsofpoliticalandeconomicforcesdrovethesechanges?Werethe
changesdrivenbytheforceofneoliberalization,andtheactivationofthemarket
mechanism,asinstatetransformationintheWesternworld?Inwhatexactforms
didtheliberalizeddevelopmentalstatebecomeinvolvedinurbandevelopment,and
howdoesthatcomparewithstatetransformationinWesternFordistsocieties?
Finally,howwillthepoliticalprocesses,inwhichtheinheritedinterventionalstate
interactswithneoliberaldiscoursesandpractices,intheEastAsiandevelopmental
statesimpacturbanrenewal?Thesequestionsarecriticalfor(anti-)gentrification,as
thefailuretodistinguishbetween(post-)Fordiststatesand(post-)developmental
statesleadstomisunderstandingthesocialdynamicsinvolved,and,atworst,the
misplacementofresistanceinthesocialtransformation.
Thegeneraltendenciesofgentrificationworkoutdifferentlyinparticular
national,regional,andurbansettings(Lees,SlaterandWyly,2008),whichrequires
anawarenessofthecontingentgeographiesofgentrificationbytheresearcher.Only
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inthiswaycantheresearcheravoidmissingthediversityofgentrificationprocesses
atdifferentspatialscalesandindifferenturbanandnationalcontexts.Gentrification
cascadesintonewlocalitiesdrivenbyglobalforcessuchastheinstitutionalizationof
neo-liberalization(Smith2002),theformationoftransnationalcapitalistclasses
(Sklair2001),andthetravelingofgentrificationdiscursivepractices(Clark2005).
Gentrificationconstitutesanapparentlyuniversalphenomenoninthelandscapes
ofurbanredevelopmentacrosstheworld.Investigatingthegentrificationprocessin
eachparticularlocalityaddressesthediversityofpoliticalcontextsandthewide
rangeofdivergingeffectscausedbythegentrificationprocessintheactually
existingneoliberalstates.Ananalysisofthediffusionofgentrificationthroughthe
historicallydependenttrajectoriesofnon-westernstates,whichpathsdivergefrom
WesternFordistregimes,enrichesourunderstandingoftherestructuringofthe
currentcapitalistsystem.FollowingMassey(2005),wetakethecaseofTaiwanasa
relationalspaceintheshapingoftheglobalmappingofgentrificationby
interconnectionswiththedynamicforcesinWesterncities,whilesimultaneously
remainingsensitivetoTaiwansdivergentgeographicalandhistoricalmanifestations
andeffects.
Inthenextsection,wedrawontheoreticalreviewsofthedevelopmentalstate,
gentrificationandinstitutionalchangetoconstituteananalyticalframework.
Followingthat,thehistoricaldevelopmentofgentrificationisexploredintheprocess
ofstatetransformationinTaiwaninthethirdsection.Inthefourthsection,we
criticallyexaminetheinstitutionalchangeofgentrificationinTaiwan.More
importantly,webringthesocio-spatialrelationsofthegentrificationprocesstothe
foreandexposetheimpactofthelaterwavesofgentrification.Anumberof
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concludingremarkswillwrapupthecaseinthefinalsection.
TheoreticalReview:WavesofGentrification,theDevelopmentalStateand
InstitutionalChange
Giventhecomplexityofgentrificationineachsocialcontextgentrificationhas
evolvedinthreewavesintheadvancedindustrialcountries(HackworthandSmith,
2001).Thefirstwavebeganinthe1950sandlasteduntilthe1973globaleconomic
recession.Gentrificationinthiswavewasoftenfundedbythepublicsectorbecause
gentrificationwasthoughttobetooriskytoleavetotheprivatesector.State
involvementwasjustifiedthroughthediscourseofamelioratingurbandecline.The
secondwaveoccurredinthepost-recession1970sand1980s,andwascharacterized
bytheintegrationofgentrificationintoawiderrangeofeconomicandcultural
processesatglobalandnationalscales(HackworthandSmith,2001;Wylyand
Hammel,2001).Thiswavewitnessedanincreasedconnectionbetween
gentrificationandglobalsystemsofrealestateandbankingfinance.Itwasalso
characterizedbypublic-privatepartnerships,theincreasingroleofdevelopers,and
laissez-fairesubsidies(Gotham,2005).Itwaslargelymarket-led,withlocalstate
efforts,wheretheyexisted,mainlyconfinedtostimulatetheprivatesector.The
1987stockmarketcrashandtheinner-cityresidentiallandmarketcrashtwoyears
laterputanendtothesecondwave.Thethirdwavebeganinthemid-1990sas
Westerneconomiesexperiencedalongperiodofsustainedgrowththatlasted
throughoutthedecade.Thethirdwavewasdistinctivefromthefirsttwowaysin
fourways(HackworthandSmith,2001):itisexpandingwithinpartiallygentrified
neighborhoodsandoutwardsinmuchmorecomprehensiveways;itinvolveslarger-
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scaledevelopers;resistanceisdecliningastheworkingclassiscontinuallydisplaced
fromtheinnercity;andfinally,thestateismoresystematicallyinvolved.
Whatdrivesthedynamicsofthewaves?HackworthandSmith(2001)attribute
thecurrentroleofthestateasfacilitatinggentrificationmainlytotheglobalshift
awayfromKeynesiangovernanceandregulatoryobstaclestoneoliberalpolicies
pursuingeconomicgrowth.Urbangovernancehasshiftedfrommanagerialismto
entrepreneurialism(Harvey,1989),whichleadstothereductionofnational
fundingtolocalgovernmentswhichmakesthelattermorereliantontheattraction
andretentionofthemiddleclassestostrengthenitstaxbase.Thenewurbanpolitics,
asCoxandMair(1988)claim,changestheroleofcitiesfromwelfareprovidersto
economicmotorsthatengageinfiercecompetitionwitheachothertoattract
inwardinvestments.Gentrificationinneoliberalcitiesinadvancedindustrialized
countriesmorethaneverrepresentsurbanentrepreneurialism,andbecomeslinked
tolarge-scalecapital.Theneoliberalstateshiftsfromtheroll-backtypeofthe
minimalistnightwatchmanstateofneoliberalideology,totheroll-outtypeofthe
actuallyexistingneoliberalstatethatusesitsstrongdisciplinarypowertoenforce
marketdisciplineintheeconomy.Suchstatesalwaysmanifestsocialstruggles
amongdifferentclassesatvariousgeographicalscalesinthegentrificationprocess.
Giventhattherolechangeofthestateingentrificationprocessesis
conceptualizedinthecontextofthedynamicsofAnglo-Americanneoliberalregimes,
itstillisunclearhowcitiesintheEastAsiancontextareaffected.TheEast-Asian
developmentalstatesfollowsomehowdifferent,aswellassimilar,trajectoriesof
transformation.Suchastaterestructuringprocessimpliesadifferentdynamicina
differentcontextofstate-societytransformations.
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Incontrasttothewelfaremodelofmarketeconomieswhichoffsetsthe
povertyoftheloserswiththewealthaccumulatedbythewinnersthroughsocial
securitytransfers,theeconomyofdevelopmentalstateembedsthisredistributionof
resourcesinitsownfundamentalinstitutions(UnderhillandZhang2005,Kwon
2005).Tosomeextent,socialwelfareandsocialpolicyaresacrificedforthepriority
ofeconomicdevelopmentwhichisreflectedinthelackofsocialandurban
infrastructureandunemploymentcompensationinEastAsiandevelopmentalstates.
Consequently,whilecitiesandcommunitiesunderWesternwelfarestateregimes
playaroleaswelfareproviders,urbanareasinTaiwanneverhavetheluxuryof
welfareredistributionandsufferfromover-urbanizationduetosuccessivewaves
ofmassrural-urbanmigrationanddilapidatedhousingconditions.Asaresult,city
centersarecongestedwithsquattersinpoorhealthandlivingconditions.Rather
thanengaginginsocialreformtosolvetheurbanquestionofcollectiveconsumption
(Castells1973)astheirWesterncounterpartsdo,thestateinEastAsianNICs(Newly
IndustrializingCountries)seesurbansquattersandrun-downareasasaproblemof
publichealthandphysicaldecay.
Insomesense,theengineeringapproachtosocialandurbanproblemsalso
reflectsthedevelopmentalismofEastAsianstateswhich,unliketheirWestern
counterparts,gainedlegitimacynotfromthedemocraticsupportofthecivilsociety,
butfromaseriesofsuccessfuldevelopmentprojects(Castells1992).Such
development-basedlegitimacyisparticularlycriticalforregimeswhicharenew
rulersandkeepweaktiestolocalsociety,suchastherulingKMT(Kuomintang)
regimewhichmovedfromMainlandChinatoTaiwanin1949afteritsdefeatbythe
CommunistPartyintheChinesecivilwarfollowingWorldWarII.Ahighlycentralized
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authoritarianregimeensurestheEastAsiandevelopmentalstateofcontroland
coordinationovertheprocessofeconomicdevelopment(Winckler1984,Pempel
1999).Insimilarvein,urbanrenewalshowstheomnipotenceofthestate
bureaucracyingoverningtheurbanchaosorpathologiescausedbymassrural-urban
migrationintheprocessofrapidindustrialization.
Undersuchcircumstances,thedevelopmentalstatedoesnotregardurban
renewalasabusinessmodelofurbanredevelopment,buttakeitaspartofpolitical
favoritism(cf.LatinAmericancitiesinPortesandWalton1981).Infact,the
developmentalstateisaproductiviststate.Thedevelopmentalstateisinasensea
childofitstime:historicallyspecifictothesecondindustrialrevolution,mainly
focusedonmanufacturing,inapost-warsystemofinterconnectedbutstilldistinct
nationalcapitalisms(Cumings,1999).Intheeyesoftheproductiviststateland
development,anditsrelatedfinancialsector,arepotentiallyparasitic,andatworst
subversive,tothemissionofindustrialization,andshouldthereforebestrictly
controlledbythestate(Johnson1987).InsomeEast-Asiandevelopmentalstates,
suchasTaiwanandSouthKorea,landreformswereevenenforcedbythestate.The
developmentalstateseesgentrificationaspartofpublicworks,andthegovernment
hastoshoulderthejobtoavoidlandspeculation.
However,inspiteofpositivefeedbackmechanismsenhancingcontinuity,
institutionsareneverfixed.Mostdevelopmentalstates,suchasKorea(Pirie2008)
andTaiwan(Hsu2009),engagedininstitutionalrestructuringsincethelate1980s,in
whichwavesofpoliticaldemocratizationandeconomicliberalizationsweptacross
thepoliticallandscape,replacingauthoritarianregimeswithpopulistones.Inwhat
directiondidinstitutionschange?Asimpleanswerisprovidedbytheglobalpolicy
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diffusionmodelinthecontextofglobalcompetition.Gentrificationpolicy,for
example,migratedcentrifugallyfromthemetropolesofcorecountriestonon-
Westerncitiesthroughpolicylearning(AtkinsonandBridge,2005).Smith(2002)
attributesthediffusionoftheentrepreneurialbusinessmodelforgentrification
policytotheforcesofglobalneoliberalismshapedonaglobalscalebythemedium
ofcapitalflows.
Notwithstandingtheeffectsofglobaldiffusion,localpoliticalprocessesof
institutionalchangearemorecomplicated.Institutionalchangeisaprocessof
reshufflingofinterests,inwhichdivergentactorstrytoachieveadvantageby
interpretingorredirectinginstitutionsinpursuitoftheirgoals,orbysubvertingor
circumventingrulesthatclashwiththeirinterests.Divergentstrategiespursuedby
actorsleadtohybridformsofinstitutionalchange,whichareembodiedinspatial
restructuringprocesses.Takinginstitutionsastheobjectofongoingskirmishing
amongactors,Weiss(2003)arguesthatinthetransformativeprocess,the
developmentalstate,facingglobalizationpressures,isnotsimplyapuppetofthe
allianceofforeignanddomesticcapital.Onthecontrary,basedonthepolitical
constellationofinstitutedforces,thestateisanenablingactorconstructingwaysto
negotiateinterestsatdifferentscalelevels,fromlocaltoregionaltonationalto
globalinterests.
Giventhispoweranalysisofthestate,thetransformationofthe
developmentalstateanditsspatialrestructuringpolicy,suchasurbangentrification,
isacontestedandindeterminateprocess.Thecaseofthetransformationof
Taiwansgentrificationpolicyillustratesthepowerdynamicsandevolutionofurban
governanceinthetransitionoftheauthoritariandevelopmentalstate.Insteadof
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arguingthattheexperiencesofurbangentrificationinWesternneoliberalpolitical
economiesareirrelevanttounderstandingthegentrificationprocessinEastAsian
cities,thispaperaimstoembedthedynamicsofurbangentrificationinthe
divergentprocessesofpath-dependentstatetransformationswithintheirparticular
socialcontexts.Bydoingso,itfleshesoutthediversityandinterplaybetween
modelsofurbangovernanceintheglobalNorthandSouth,whichshapeurban
developmentsintheworldscities(Robinson2011).
TheProcessofStateTransformationandUrbanRenewalinTaiwan
Thispaperconcentratesonurbanrenewalpolicies,ratherthangentrification
ingeneral,todealwiththematerialandsymbolictransformationofworking-class
(orlowerclass)neighborhoodsintozonesdominatedbyupper-middle-class
residentsandconsumersinTaiwan.Lees(2000)demonstrates1 thatgentrificationis
toobroadaconcept,includingvariousrestructuringprocessessuchasnew-built
gentrificationandsuper-gentrification.Moreover,thetermgentrificationisnever
usedinofficialorjournalreportsinTaiwan.Mostly,theprocessofdemolishing
clustersofoldhousesandconstructingnewonesiscalledurbanrenewal(dushi-
gengxin)tosignifythemodernandengineeringmeaningsofthetransformation
process.2 Focusingonurbanrenewalpoliciesillustratesthetransformationofthe
1 Typesofgentrificationhavebecomecomplicatedsincetheearly21 stcentury.Notonlytheclassictypeoftransformationfromlow-statusneighborhoodstoupper-middle-classplaygrounds,butalso
newlybuilttownhouses,high-riseapartments,retailandcommercialdesignershopsandevenart
galleryareincludedinthegentrificationschema(Zukin1995). 2 Theuseofthetermurbanrenewal,ratherthanurbanredevelopmentwashotlydebatedinthe
law-makingprocessintheLegislativeYuan(thecongress)in1998.Somelawmakersarguedthatthe
termrenewalremindspeopleoftheimageofbulldozerincontroversialhousingdemolishing
processesandintendtoreplaceitwithurbanredevelopment.ThechiefoftheBureauofConstruction,whichisinchargeofnationalurbandevelopment,assertsthaturbanrenewalisa
technicaltermwithoutanynecessarynegativeimplication(LegislativeYuan1998)
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stateintheliberalizationprocesswhichisfraughtwithclass-basedandplace-based
politics,andsocialexclusionandresistance(Slater2006).Accordingly,urbanrenewal
processesinvolvevarioustypesofinstitutionalembeddednessindiversesocial
contexts,fromthemarket-led,roll-backtypeneoliberalstatetotheroll-outpublic-
privatepartnerships.Eachinstitutionalsettingisdistinguishedbyitsdistinctformof
interactionbetweenthestate,privatedevelopers,anddisplacedresidents,and
demonstratesthetransformationofthestructuralandstrategicrolesofthestate
(Jessop2002).Threestagesofurbanrenewalpoliciesillustratethechangingstate-
societyrelationshipsinTaiwan.
Stage1State-ledUrbanRenewal:1950s-mid1980s
ThefirstsignificantgentrificationmovementoccurredinTaipeicitywiththe
aimtoevictillegalsquattersinthe1970s.Theissueofsquattersstemmedfromtwo
sources:ontheonehand,morethantwomillionpeoplefollowedtheKMTinits
retreatfromMainlandChinain1949.Themajorityofthesepoliticalrefugeessettled
inurbanareas,particularlyTaipeicity.Thecityplanningsystemcouldnotabsorbthe
abruptlyincreasedin-migrantpopulation,sothatashortageofhousingoccurred
(Huang2002).Ontheotherhand,earlyindustrializationinthe1950sledtoan
exodusfromruralareastourbanlocales.Manyoftheruralmigrantscouldnot
affordadecentunitintheformalhousingmarket.Asaresult,theinformalhousing
marketgrewrapidlyinthecities.Lu(1963)foundthatonapopulationoflessthan
onemillionpeople,morethan15,000squatterslivedinTaipeicityattheendofthe
1950s.Thepresenceofsquattersdeterioratedthequalityoftheurban
infrastructure,whichwasnotprovidedbythestateasitconcentrateditsresources
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onnationalsecurityandeconomicgrowthsincethe1950s(Huang2002).Zhu(1977)
estimatesthatbytheearly1960smorethan50,000illegalhousingunitscouldbe
foundinTaipeicity.Withtherapidindustrializationinthe1960surbangrowth
skyrocketedandurbanquestionssuchasthelackofaproperinfrastructure,traffic
congestion,andpoorpublichealthbecameobstaclesforthecities.Thiswas
especiallysalientforthecapitalTaipeiCityasitstrivedtomaintainitssymbolic
functionastheseatofpoliticalpowerandthemotorofeconomicgrowth.Underthe
adviceofChiangChing-kuo,thepoliticalstrongmanandpremieratthattime,the
TaipeiCitygovernmentlaunchedtheWan-daplanin1972toevictsquatterareas
andrenewtheurbaninfrastructureoftheinnercity.
TheWan-daplanwasquitecomprehensiveandincludednotonlythe
demolitionofrun-downhouses,butalsotheconstructionofpublichouses,or
resettledhouses(zhengjianzhuzhai),toaccommodatetheresidentsofthe
demolishedhousing.Underthepolicyofconstructionfirst,demolitionlater(CFDL)
mostofthelow-incomeresidentswereallocatedtonewresettledhousesinnearby
areas.Morethan4,000oftheseresettledhousingunitswereconstructed.The
majorityofthefundsneededforthisroundofurbanrenewalcamefrom
governmentalbudgets.Residentsweregrantedapreferentialmortgagerateto
amortizethecostofnewhousing.Toexpandtheeffectoftheplan,theTaipeicity
governmentspentmorethan50millionUSdollartomaintaintheinfrastructurein
therenewalareas(Huang1974).
ThecoreoftheWan-daplan,accordingtoitsofficialreport,wastorefurbish
theurbaninfrastructure,andgivethecityacleanimage(Zhu1977).TheWan-da
planalsoshowedthepoliticalwilloftheauthoritarianstateanditsaimtomaintain
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FollowingtheWan-daplan,thecitygovernmentcouldnotaffordtorenewthe
innercityareaduetoitstightfiscalsituation.3 Thecoreofurbandevelopment
shiftedfromthedemolitionofinner-citysquatterareastotheexpansionofurban
areatoneighboringlands.ThiswasclearlyindicatedinPremierChiangscomment
onthedevelopmentofTaipeicity:TaipeiCityhasgrowntobecomeaninternational
metropolissincethelate1960s.Thelandsoftheinnercityarenotsufficientforthe
shapingofthemetropolis,andwehavetoexpandtheurbanizedareastocoverthe
neighboringtownships.(Chiang1972:54)Underthesecircumstances,thesitesof
gentrificationnolongerconcentratedintheinnercity,butshiftedtotheouterrings
ofthecity.Between1970and1976thecitygovernmentspendmorethan500
millionUSdollartoinitiategentrificationinfourareasintheexpandedurbanzone.
Thefourcaseswereseriouslycriticizedasinefficientbythebureaucrat-ledmodel
(Zhang1991).
Inbrief,thefirststageofgentrificationwasfinanciallysupportedand
practicallyinitiatedbythestate.Urbanpolicyrespondedtothedemandsofrapid
urbanizationinTaipeicity.Thisstagewitnessedurbantransitionintheinnercityand
urbansprawltoneighboringareas.Thestateviewedgentrificationasameasureto
solveurbanproblems,andtomaintainthepositionofTaipeiasamotorfor
economicdevelopment.Inshort,thefirststageischaracterizedbyaformofstate-
ledgentrification.
3 TheKMTgovernmentengagedinthetengreatprojectsintheearly1970s.Theseprojects,similartoaTaiwaneseversionoftheNewDeal,aimedtoeconomicallyupgradetheindustrialinfrastructure
toovercometheeconomicdepression,andpoliticallypromotethepopularityofthepremierChiangChing-kuowhowaspreparedtosucceedhisfather,ChiangKai-shek,asthepoliticalstrongman.The
projectsranfrom1974to1979,andthecostsexceededabillionUSdollar.
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Stage2:Failedstate-fosteredUrbanRenewal:mid1980s-mid1990s
In1983,theTaipeicitygovernmentpassedalawonurbanrenewal.It
encouragedtheprivatesectortoparticipateinurbanrenewalprojectsbyoffering
taxcutsandFloorAreaRatioBonus(FARB).Thegovernmentpromisedtomatchthe
initiativesofprivateprojectsbysettingupaspecialfundforurbanrenewal.Whydid
thestatepolicychangefromstate-ledgentrificationtopublic-privatepartnershipin
urbanrenewalprojects?
Firstly,apoliticalcrisisoccurredintheearly1980sthatthreatenedthe
legitimacyoftherulingpartyandservedasanomenoftheendoftheeraofpolitical
strongman.AfterthedeathofChiangChing-Kuoin1988,arealignmentofpower
groupswithintheKMTstateoccurred,whichdramaticallychallengedtherelative
autonomyofthestate.Thepoliticalbureaucracywastraditionallyseparatedfrom
businessgroups(Wang1996),butafterChiangpassedawaytheprivatesector
startedgaininggroundinpolicy-making.Thisalsooccurredinthepolicyarenaof
urbanlanddevelopment.TheTaipeicitycouncilpushedpublic-privateinitiatives,
whichwaswelcomedbyprivatedeveloperswhoneededinvestmentoutletsfortheir
accumulatedcapital(Wang1998).
Secondly,theinefficiencyofthestate-ledinitiativesofthe1970sandofstate-
ownedenterprisesbecameopenlycriticized,astheKMTstatecalledforaspecial
committeeforeconomicrecoveryin1985.Thecommitteereachedaconsensusto
raiseliberalization,internationalizationandinstitutionalizationasthepillarsof
economicdevelopmenttorecoverfromtheeconomicrecessionofthelate1980s.4
4 It was proclaimed by then-premier, Yu Kuo-hua, as the major policy package to lead thecountry away from recession. Milton Friedman, a key advocate of the dominant neoliberal
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Thegentrificationprojectsofthe1970swerecriticizedastime-consumingand
inefficient,andprivatesectorinputwasseenasthecurefortheproblemsofthe
autocraticstate.
Againstthisbackdrop,thestatepassedalawtoencourageprivatesector
participationinurbanrenewalprojects,andthenewmodelofpublic-private-
partnership(PPP)wasappliedtothreeexperimentalcases.Thefirstoneofthese
casesistheDesignatedNo.12parklandrenewalwhichallowedprivatedevelopers
toconvertpartoftheNo.12Parktocommercialusewhenthedevelopersalso
evictedthesquattersfromtheparklandarea.Itwasinitiallydevelopedbya
constructioncompanyin1978,butfailedtoachieveitsgoalin1986.Finally,itwas
takenoverbythecitygovernment,whichevictedthesquattersin1994.Sixteen
yearswerespentforasimpleparklanddevelopment.Similarpatternsoccurredin
theothertwocases,thePalaceMuseumneighborhoodrenewalandJing-hua
redevelopmentproject.Morethan15yearswereneededforeachcase;clearlythe
PPPmodelwasnotasefficientasexpected.
InreviewingtheefficiencyofthePPPmodel,theTaipeiCityGovernment
concludedthatitsfailurewasmainlycausedbythedifficultyofgettingpermissions
fromallthepropertyownersinvolved,whichwasrequiredbylawbeforeland
developmentcouldproceed(Zhang,1991).Moreovertheincentivesfortheprivate
sector,particularlytheFloorAreaRatioBonus,wereconsideredtoolowtoattract
ownersanddeveloperstojoininurbanrenewalprojects.Finally,theroleofthe
state,providingroll-backstatesupport,wasconsideredtoomeagerforpromoting
thePPPmodel.TheTaipeiCitygovernmenturgedthecentralstatetoaggressively
doctrine, was invited to visit Taiwan and advised the Taiwan government to abolish the
Central Bank and the Economic Planning Council (Sun 2003).
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engageinpartnershipbuildup,andtoplayanactive,ratherthanpassiveincentive-
providing,roleinreducingrisksandloweringbarriersforprivatesectorinvolvement.
Accordingly,in1992theTaipeiCityGovernmentproposedtoincreasecompensation
undertheFARBincentivewith50%,andtoupgradetheauthorityoftheurban
developmentdepartmenttoafirst-tierdepartmentinthecitygovernmentin1993.
Besidesencouragingprivateparticipationinurbanrenewalprojects,thestate
continuedtoevictsquattersfromcitycenterresidentiallocales.Infact,themost
controversialstate-ledurbanrenewalprojectsaimedtoevictsquattersfrompublic
landsinthecitycenter.Mostofthesquattersconsistedoflowerclasspeople,and
includedveteranswhofollowedtheKMTretreatfromMainlandChinain1949,rural-
urbanmigrantslookingforjobsinthecity,andaboriginalpeopleforcedtomoveto
thecityforsurvival.Itwasestimatedthatmorethan28%ofthecityresidentslived
inthesquatterareasbytheearly1990s(Huang2002).
ConsecutivecityadministrationsunderbothKMTandDPPruleconductedtwo
majorbulldozer-typesquatterevictions.Thefirstoneoccurredin1992underaKMT
Mayor,andsawthedemolitionofmorethan2,000housesandtheevictionofmore
than16,000peoplefromtheNo.7ParklandintheDa-anDistrict,amostlymiddleto
higherclassresidentialarea.Asaresult,neighborhoodsaroundtheNo.7Park
becamethesiteofexpensivegatedcommunities,comparabletotheneighborhoods
aroundNewYorksCentralPark(UnitedNews,November9,1992).
Theotherstate-ledsquatterevictionprojecttookplacein1997underDPP
MayorChenShui-BianwholaterbecamePresidentin2000.Heusedcitizensfirst
ashis1994electioncampaignslogan,andintheheydayofhisadministrationwas
supportedbymorethan70%ofthepopulation.Inhistermasmayor,community
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regenerationinitiativesmushroomedthroughoutthecity,andwereembracedby
theemergingmiddleclass.TheMayorvowedtosolveTaipeisurbanproblems,
particularlythesquatters,andincreasegreenlandareasforurbandevelopmentin
thecitycenter.Todoso,hestartedamassiveprojecttoclearsquattersfromtheNo.
14&15Parklands.Morethan900housesand3,000peopleweredisplaced.Around
12%belongedtothesociallyweakestgroupsinthecity,includinglowerclass
members,thehandicapped,andthetemporarilyemployed.Sympathizingresidents
andthestudentsresistedfiercelyagainsttheruthlessbureaucrats.But,eventhe
tragedyofanoldveterancommittingsuicide,couldnotstoptheeviction.Aftera
seriesofsquatterevictions,mostofthesociallyweakestgroupswereexcludedfrom
thecitycore.Thesocialmixwhichhascharacterizedthecitycentersincethepost-
Warurbanizationmovementhasbecomeathingofthepast.Deluxeapartment
buildingsboomedaroundthegreenlandspacesafterthedisplacementofthepoor
(Huang1997,Zhang2000).
Stage3:Aggressivestate-engineeredUrbanRenewal:Late1990s-
Therealthrustforurbanrenewalcamefromthecentralstatedevelopment
strategiesinthelate1990s.In1996thegovernmentproposedtheambitiousAsia-
PacificRegionalOperationCenter(APROC)projecttorelievethedomesticand
internationalpressureontheKMTstate.TheAPROCprojectaimedtoturnTaipei
intoahubforregionalmanufacturingindustries,seaandairtransportation,the
financialsector,andtelecommunicationandmediaactivities.Thegovernment
arguedthatAPROCrequiredanopenandcompetitiveeconomywhichincludedthe
privatizationofstate-ownedenterprises,theliberalizationofthedomesticmarket,
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theinstitutionalizationofBOT(Build,OperateandTransfer)servicesandthe
encouragementofprivatecapitalparticipationintheconstructionofpublic
infrastructure.APROCsawurbanrenewalprojectsasthekeyforthedevelopmentof
theconstructionindustrieswhichinturnwerebelievedtobethecrucialforthe
entireeconomy.InthespiritofAPROC,then-PremierLianZhanevenclaimedthat
Urbanrenewalshouldbeoneofthethreekeyareasfornationalcompetitiveness5
andpassedtheUrbanRenewalSchemeintheExecutiveYuanin1997(CEPD1997).
UndertheAPROCinitiative,thecharacterofurbanrenewaltransformedfrom
providingtheinfrastructureofurbandevelopmenttoanimportanttoolfor
economicdevelopment.
Afterafact-findingvisittoJapanbyMr.ChangLong-Sheng,formercabinet
memberandmemberoftheCouncilforEconomicPlanningandDevelopment
(CEPD),thegovernmentproposedtosetupapublic-privatecooperativecompanyto
facilitatethetaskofurbanrenewal.ChangmimickedtheJapanesegovernment,
whichhearguednolongerallocatedbudgetsdirectlyforurbanrenewal,but
delegatedthetasktopublic-privatecooperativecompanies.Hepersuadedthe
governmenttoset-upanurbanrenewalcompany,theJu-zhongcompany.The
companyneededfundstotaling500millionNTdollars,ofwhich75%wouldberaised
bytheprivatesector,whilethegovernmentwouldchipin25%(UnitedNews,
September4,1997).Sixlanddeveloper-cum-constructiongroupsparticipated,and
choseMr.Changasthecompanypresident.TheJu-zhongcompanywould
monopolizethebusinessofpubliclyownedlanddevelopment,andtherenewalof
5 Theothertwokeyareasaretheprivatizationofstate-owned-enterprisesandtheconstructionofnationalinformationinfrastructures.
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urbanareas.
However,theestablishmentofanon-governmentalcompanyforurban
renewalwasfiercelycriticizedbytheoppositionparty(theDPP)andthemediafor
itsanimuslucrandi.ThefiercestcriticastersoftheJu-zhonginitiativewere
lawmakerswhowerereportedtobeendorsedandfinanciallysupportedbyland
capitalgroupswhichwerenotinvitedbythegovernmenttojointheJu-zhong
initiative.Inresponsetothecriticisms,thegovernmentwasforcedtoretreatfrom
theJu-zhonginitiative,andclaimedJu-zhongwouldnotmonopolizethe
developmentofpubliclandsinthecity(UnitedNews,November14,1997).
Consequently,theJu-zhongcompanywasdissolvedintoathirdsectorfoundation,
theUrbanRegenerationResearchDesignFoundation(URRDF),andMr.Chang
resignedfromtheCEPDtobecomethechairmanoftheURRDF.Infact,theURRDF
stillplaysaroleasasemi-officialbody,chosenbythegovernmenttopromotethe
businessofurbanrenewal.TheJu-zhongcompanysignaledthefirsttimethe
governmenttransformeditselffromanexecutingroletoacoordinatingroleinurban
renewaltasks.However,itfailedtorebuffpublicconcernandcriticismofthe
preferentialtreatmentofcertaindevelopersbythestate.Ironically,theDPP,which
criticizedthepublic-privateJu-zhongcompanyinitiative,wouldproposeanother
urbanrenewalcompanyafteritcametopowertenyearslater.Wewillreturnto
thatissuelater.
TheAPROCprojectwasabruptlyabandonedafterthesurprisingvictoryofthe
oppositionparty,theDPP,inthe2000presidentialelection;avictorythatended
morethan50yearsofsingle-party-rulebytheKMT.TheDPPadministrationwas
worriedbyitslackofexperienceineconomicaffairs,anareainwhichtheKMT
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developmentalstateenjoyedagoodtrack-record.Anewpolicypackagewas
proposed,theChallenge2008NationalDevelopmentPlan(ExecutiveYuan2003),
whichfunctionedtodistinguishtheDPPseconomicpolicyfromtheKMTsAPROC
project.However,theDPPmostlycopiedtheKMTinliberalizationandprivatization
policies(Hsu2009).Inurbanrenewalpolicy,theDPPgovernmentpassedthe
ProgramforExpeditingtheImplementationofUrbanRenewalin2005.This
programaimedtoattractinvestmentsexceeding80billionNTdollarsfromthe
privatesector.Tospeedupthebusinessofurbanrenewalthegovernmentsetitself
thetaskofstreamliningproceduresforappropriatingpublicandprivately-owned
lands.Bydoingso,thegovernmenthopedtorendertheeconomyinvulnerableto
economicrecessionsandavoidhousingbubbles(CEPD2006).
Despitethechangeofregimes,thethirdstagewitnessedthestateaggressively
pushingurbanrenewalprojects.Insteadofonlyprovidingincentives,thestatewas
activelyinvolvedinlandappropriation,incentiveamplificationandmoreimportantly,
protestcontainmentbyresorttopoliceforces.Thegovernmentsawthe
requirementforurbanrenewalprojectstoacquirepermissionfromallinvolved
propertyowners,whoweremostlysmallanddecentralized,asthemainbarrierfor
urbanrenewal.Hence,achangeinthejurisdictionrequiringfullpermissionwas
unavoidable.
Thegovernmentinitiatedwavesoflawmodificationfrom2003onwards,
whichmainlytargetedtwoarticles;article25-1andarticle27.Ontheonehand,
Article25-1,announcedin1998,stipulatedthatrenewalprojectshadtocollectallof
thelandownerssignaturesbeforethegovernmentgrantedagreenlight.In2003
thisrequirementwasloweredto80%oftheownersinvolved,undertheinitiativesof
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lawmakersrelatedtotheTaiwanSolidarityUnion(TSU)whichwasaclosepolitical
allyofthethen-rulingDPPregime.Thegovernmentcouldusefinancialappraisal
institutionstoevaluatethevalueofthepropertyoflandownersthatdidnot
acquiescewiththerenewalprojects,andsettleontheamountofcompensationin
courtwithoutpermissionfromthelandownersinvolved.
Ontheotherhand,asstate-ownedlandswitholdbuildingsstillcoveredpartof
theurbanarea,theArticle27stipulatedthatallofthestate-ownedlandsinthe
vicinityoftherenewalprojectmustjointheprivately-initiatedproject.Moreover,
thisarticleloweredthethresholdofrenewalfrom80%ofthelandownersto80%of
theinvolvedlandarea.Asthemajorityoflandownersholdonlysmallplotsofland,
thethresholdchangeallowedthestate-ownedlands,whichwerecontrolledbythe
government,tobecomethecriticalactorinpassingtherenewalproject,and
speededupthejudiciaryprocessinrenewalprojects.Duetotheselawchanges,
renewalprojectsgainedlegislativepower,andtheirnumberexpandedgreatly,as
showninfigure1.
Fig.1.abouthere
Moreover,topromotepublic-privatepartnershipinurbanrenewalthe
governmentactivelystudiedthesepoliciesinothercountries.TheUKwasoneofthe
majorrolemodelsastheNewLaborRegimesturdilyimplementednewpoliciesfor
urbanregeneration(Lees2001).TheTaiwanesegovernmentinvitedexpertsfrom
theUKforlecturesessions,workshops,advisorygroups,andspecialtaskforces,and
dispatcheditscivilservantstotheUKforsiteandprojectobservation,andcourse
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training(WangandHuang2009).Oneofthemainoutcomesofthislearningprocess
wastheestablishmentoftheUrbanDevelopmentCorporations(UDC)modeled
aftertheJointPublic-PrivateCompanyforHousingandLandDevelopmentintheUK.
TheinitiativeoftheUDCaimedtoraisemorethan6billionNTdollar,ofwhich
thegovernmentandstate-ownedbankscontributed49%whileprivatedevelopers
contributedtheremaining51%.SuchaninstitutionaldesignallowedtheUDCto
operateasaprivatecompanywithpublicsupport.However,theoppositionparty
(theKMTthistime)criticizedtheUDCinitiative,andpushedthegovernmenttoallow
itsretreatfromthecompanyincasetheDPPwouldlosethe2008presidential
elections(UnitedNews,March52008).Notsurprisingly,theinitiativewasaborted
withtheendoftheDPPadministration.
UrbanrenewalprojectsflourishedaftertheKMTregainedpowerin2008.
PresidentMaYing-JiouproposedTheI-Taiwan12Project(TIT12P)inhiselection
campaign,andimplementeditafterhisinauguration.TIT12Pseesurbanrenewalas
akeytoolofeconomicgrowth,andcoversabudgetexceedingUS$3.8billionfor
urbanrenewalprojectsfrom2009to2012.Theprivatesectorisexpectedtocover1
billionUSdollaroftheentirebudget(CEPD2009).
Followingthecentralgovernmentsgentrificationpolicy,theTaipeiCity
governmentproposedtoincreasetheFARB(FloorAreaRatioBonus)with200%for
therenewalofhousesconstructedbefore1980.Ratherthantargetingrun-down
areas,thisnewpolicyprovideshugeincentivesforrenewingtheoldhouses
locatedinthecitycenter.TheTaipeiCityMayorHauLung-Pinclaimsthatthisisone
ofthemostinnovativeurbanpolicieseverproposedbythecitygovernment.The
policywillincreasehousingsupplytoprovidehousingtothoseeagertoowntheir
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ownplacebutsufferfromthesky-highhousingprices(TCG2010a).However,figure
2showsthattherenewalprojectsconcentrateintheDa-anandZhong-zheng
districtswheremostmiddle-to-upperclassesliveandaretheleastinneedofurban
renewal.Consequently,insteadofsuppressinghousingprices,thepolicy-ledurban
renewalprojectsbecomespeculativebusinessprojectsforlanddeveloperstoinvest
inthecitycenter.InmayorHaustermtherulingparty,theKMT,andtheopposition
party,theDPP,reachedconsensusabouttheimportanceofpromotinggentrification.
Theonlycontroversyamongthepartiesinvolvedconcernsthespeedof
implementationandthescopeofareacovered.TheDeputyMayorevenclaimsthat
thegentrificationpolicyisawin-winsituationforallpartiesinvolved;thecity
governmentrealizesabettercityview,citizengaincommunitieswithbetterhousing
andinfrastructure,anddevelopershaveprofitablebusinessopportunities(Lin2010).
Issuchamiraclepossible?
Fig.2.abouthere
ACriticalExamination:theIssueofDisplacement
IndefendingTaipeisgentrificationpolicyfromtheaccusationof
marginalizingthesociallyweakestgroups,particularlythemiddle-lowerclasses,
DeputyMayorLinarguesthatmostoftheTaipeicity-centerresidentareasare
inhabitedbythemiddleandhigherclassesandareowner-occupied,aswearean
87%house-ownershipsociety,sogentrificationprojectsdonotdisplacethepoor
peopleasoccurredinWesterncities(Lin2010).Ironically,suchadefenseexposes
theself-contradictionofthegentrificationpolicy.Thepolicyvowstorestructure
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dilapidatedurbanareas.However,30yearoldthehousingunitstargetedbythe
policycanhardlybecountedasrun-down.Neithercanmiddleandhigherclass
residentialareasbedesignatedasdilapidatedareas.Inotherwords,thereisno
justificationforthenecessityofurbanredevelopment.Infact,TaipeiCitysurban
renewalpolicyhasastrongspeculativenature.Thisspeculativepro-landdeveloper
policyattractedtheattentionoftheControlYuan,whichtookcorrectivemeasures
tocorrecttheTaipeicitygovernmentsurbanrenewalpolicyandworriesaboutthe
abuseoftheFARBincentivewhichleadstoaneglectofpublicinfrastructure(Control
Yuan2010).ThreeotherissuesareparticularlyatstakeinTaipeisgentrification
policy.
Firstly,whilethecitygovernmentclaimsthatitsgentrificationpolicywillnot
marginalizethelowerclasses,therealityisthatthesepeoplehavebeenexpelled
fromthecitycenterastheearlytwowavesofgentrificationpoliciescameoverthe
cityasshownabove.Thepeoplewhostayedininformalhousingorsquatterunits
wereevicted,andforcedtomoveoutofthecitycenter.Theyweredispersedtothe
urbanfringe,andwillbepushedfurtheroutofthecityifthegentrificationwaves
keeprollingoverthecity.
Secondly,despitethegovernmentsboastingofhighhousingownershiprates,
thiscouldalsoreflectashortcomingintheinstitutionsonthehousingmarket.6 In
fact,accordingtoHuaChang-I(2010),aseniorandrespectablehousingeconomist,
thisgovernment-claimedownershipratecannotreflecttherealityofhousing
ownershipinTaipeicity.Huaestimatesthatabout30%ofthehouseholdsare
tenants,and60%ownonehouse,7%owntwohouses,and3%own3ormore
6The housing ownership rate is calculated as the total house units divided by the total
number of household.
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houses.Inotherwords,theapproximaterateofhouseownershipliesaround70%.
Moreover,multiple-unithouseownersdonotleasetheirextrahousestotenants,so
thattheyremainvacant.Ownersdonotrentouttheirpropertyduetoaloopholein
Taiwanslandtaxregime.Accordingtothelandtaxlaw,onlywhenthelandproperty
changeshandswilllandvalueincrementtaxesbeleviedagainsttheproperty
owners.Thisleadstoanextremelylowlandtaxrate,sothatcostofholdinglandis
low.Somelandlordspreferkeepingtheirpropertyvacantforspeculativepurpose
withouttheburdenswhichrentingoutthepropertytotenantsbrings..Asaresult,
againsttheofficialrhetoricwhichexaggeratestheownershiprate,tenantssuffer
fromrentincreasesorevictioncausedbyurbanredevelopment.
Thirdly,evenifdirectdisplacementcausedbythegentrificationprojectis
relativelyinsignificant,othertypesofdisplacementareinevitable.Marcuse(1986)
indicatesthatexclusionarydisplacementfromgentrificationoccurswhenany
householdisnotpermittedtomoveintoadwelling,duetoachangeinconditions,
beyondthehouseholdsdirectcontrol,whichaffectsthatdwellingoritsimmediate
surroundings.Asshownintable2,landpricesincreaseonaverageby424.06%after
urbanrenewalwhichcreatesahugepressureforthecurrenttenantstomoveout
andpreventthosewhoareatsimilarsocio-economicstatustomovein.Moreover,
eventhoughtenantswhoareabletoresistthesedirectdisplacementpressuresmay
benefitfromneighborhoodimprovements,theymaystillsufferascritical
communitynetworksandlocalculturesaredisplaced(FreemanandBraconi,2004;
Atkinson,2000).Byfocusingitsdefenseoftheurbanrenewalpolicyontheissueof
directdisplacement,thegovernmentintentionallyignoresthefactthatthe
gentrificationprojectisspeculativeinnature,ratherthananurbanrenewalproject
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incorporateintourbanrenewalprojects.Providingincentivestoencourageprivate
developerstoparticipateingentrificationprojectsprovedfutile,astheinstitutional
system,includingaproperlegislativeframework,wasnotyetinplace.Thisis
reflectedinthefailureoftheestablishmentoftheJu-zhongcompanyasthestate
wasstillexpectedtoleadandexecuteurbanrenewal.Theideaofpublic-private
partnershipwascriticizedforitstendenciestorent-seekingbehaviorandraised
publicconcern.Notwithstanding,thegovernmentliberalizeditspoliciesinresponse
tothepoliticalandeconomiccrisesofthe1980s.Theprivatesectorwasgradually
grantedacriticalroleinurbanmanagementanddevelopment.
Underthelobbyoflanddeveloperinterestgroups,thestateengagedina
seriesoflawmodificationsinthethirdwavetoexpediteurbanrenewalprocedures
andlimitinterferencefromstubbornresistanceofanti-gentrificationresidents.
Ratherthanplayingtheroleofanimpartialinstitutionalmoderator,thestate
obviouslyprivilegedlandownersanddevelopersinsacrificeofthetenantsrightto
stayput.Consequently,thecentraldistrictsareregenerated,whilethedilapidated
areasaresidelined.Theurbanterritorybecomesadiscontinuousspaceconstituted
bythecollusionoftheliberalizedstateandprivatelandownergroups.
Thetransformationoftheroleofthestateisreflectedintheevolutionofits
urbanrenewalpolicyfromapublicinfrastructureprojecttoaprofitablebusiness
model.Inappearance,thestagesofgentrificationandthestatesroleinthemin
Taiwanaresimilartotheirwesterncounterparts(HackworthandSmith,2001).But,
detailedscrutinyrevealssubtledifferences.Insteadofactinginthespiritofurban
managerialisminwesternwelfarestateregimes(Harvey,1989),theKMTstate,an
authoritariandevelopmentalstate,shoulderedthejobofevictingsquattersand
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urbanrenewalwithanaimtopromoteurbanandeconomicdevelopment.Focusing
onurbaninfrastructureconstructionpoliticallylegitimizesthedevelopmentalist
regime.LikemanyotherThirdWorldcountries,theKMTstate,arulingregime
transplantedfromMainlandChinaisendowedwithanoverdevelopedpatriarchic
statemachinery,builttoextract,coerce,andpenetratesociety.Consequently,the
constructionofeconomicandurbaninfrastructurecanbeusedtoconcretely
demonstratethecaringforthepeopleunderthedevelopmentalstate.7
But,whoarethepeople?Thecapitalistdevelopmentalstateeventually
protectsthecapitalist(land)propertyrights.Bydoingso,thestatesecurespolitical
supportfromlandowner-cum-citizens,sothatapoliticalcultureofproperty
developsinwhichlocalcitizenshipispredicatedonownership(Blomley2004).Only
thosewhoownsharesoflandedpropertyinthecityarerecognizedascitizenswho
havetherighttostayputanddecideontheuseofurbanspaces.Suchapro-
propertyownershipviewisalsoreflectedinurbanpoliciestowardssocialhousing
construction.Asneighboringcommunitiesprotestagainstdesignatedsitesoflow-
incomerentedsocialhousing,MayorHauLung-Pinassures,contrarytohisre-
electioncampaignpromises,landowner-cum-citizensthatTaipeiCitywillnotallow
constructionprojectswithoutsupportfromtheneighboringcommunities(United
News,December13,2010).Landedpropertytrumpssocialconcernsandcoherence
inTaipeisliberalizedurbanpolicies!
7
Asato Saito (2002) calls such a developmental state as the public work state, which isbased on huge amount of public work projects constructing industrial infrastructure to winpeoples supports in Japan.
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