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J.L. SHAW

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF ASENTENCE: THE NYĀYA AND THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

INTRODUCTION

Usually the cognition of words, the memory – cognition of objects, the

cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, syntactic

expectancy between the words (āk ̄aṅks. ā), semantic compatibility

( yogyat ̄a), contiguity of words in space and time (āsatti) and the inten-tion of the speaker (t ̄atparyajñāna) are considered as causal conditions

for understanding the meaning of a sentence. As there is a difference

of opinion among Indian philosophers with respect to the referent or

the meaning of a word, so there is a difference of opinion with respect

to the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The

aim of this paper is (i) to explain the Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta

conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, (ii) to claim

that the Vedānta view complements the Nyāya view and vice versa, and

(iii) to discuss the nature of understanding the meaning of a complex

sentence. Both the followers of the Nyāya and the Vedānta have used

the expression ‘āk ̄aṅks.

ā’, ‘ yogyat ̄a’, ‘āsatti’ and ‘t ̄atparya’, but not in

the same sense. The Vedānta philosophers claim that āk ̄aṅks. ā, yogyat ̄a,

and āsatti are conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence,

while the Nyāya philosophers claim that their cognitions are necessary

for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

As regards the interpretation of these terms, there is difference of

opinion between the followers of the Nyāya and the Vedānta. Moreover,

the New Nyāya differs from the Old Nyāya with respect to the interpret-

ation of certain terms. As regards the (primary) meaning or the reference

of a word ( pad ̄artha) and the meaning – relation which relates an expres-

sion (or word) to its referent, there is a striking difference between

these two systems of philosophy. According to the followers of the

Vedānta the meaning of a common noun or a general term such as‘cow’ is the related cowness. In other words, the meaning of a term is

the universal being related to something else. According to the New

Nyāya the meaning of the word ‘cow’ includes both the particular cows

Journal of Indian Philosophy 28: 273–293, 2000.c 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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274 J.L. SHAW

and the universal cowness, although the Old Nyāya has included the

configuration of the particular cows as well in the meaning complex. But

neither the Old nor the New Nyāya has accepted the related designation

(anvit ¯abhidh

¯ana) theory of meaning.

Similarly, the Vedānta differs from the Nyāya with respect to the

relation between an expression and what is referred to by it. According

to the Nyāya the meaning – relation which is called ‘śakti’ in the case

of primary meaning is due to the intention of the name – giver. Hence

it is a conventional relation and it takes the form ‘Let such and such

expression generate the cognition of such and such object or objects.’

But the followers of the Vedānta consider the meaning – relation (śakti)

to be an entity ( pad ̄artha). The śakti of an expression has been explained

in terms of certain effects. As fire has the capacity to burn something,

so a word ( pada) has the capacity which is conducive to the generation

of understanding the meaning of a sentence.

According to our positive thesis a comprehensive discussion of theconditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence would include

the conditions of both the Nyāya and the Vedānta philosophers. Hence

these two systems in this case, far from being incompatible, would

complement each other. At the end of this paper I shall discuss the

atomistic and the holistic nature of understanding the meaning of

a complex sentence. Moreover, since Indian philosophers have put

forward a theory for understanding the meaning of complex sentences,

a consideration of their contributions might add a new dimension to

contemporary Western philosophy.

I

As regards the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, both the

schools claim that it lies in cognising a relation between the referents

of the words which have occurred in a sentence. According to both the

schools the same relation may be cognised in other types of cognition

such as perceptual or inferential. In other words, the same object may

be cognised in perceptual, inferential, or verbal cognition, but not in

the same way. The causal conditions of these cognitions would not

be the same. The set of causal conditions for each of them would be

different. Moreover, the mode under which an object is cognised in a

perceptual cognition cannot be the same as the mode under which it iscognised in an inferential or verbal cognition.

Let us consider the cognition of a mountain having fire. In a perceptual

cognition the sense-organs are related to the mountain, fire and the


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CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE 275

relation between them of conjunction. The mountain which is related

to our senses is presented under the universal mountainhood, and its

particularity (viśes.atva) is also cognised. Similar is the case with fire or

the relation of conjunction. But in an inferential or a verbal cognition,while the same mountain can be cognised under the mode of the universal

mountainhood, its particularity (viśes.atva) will not be cognised. Similar

will be the case with fire and the relation of conjunction. In other words,

in a verbal cognition corresponding to the sentence ‘A mountain has

fire’, we cannot cognise the particularities of the mountain such as its

height. Similarly, we cannot cognise the particular properties of the fire

or the conjunction relation.

Now the question is whether the sentence ‘A mountain has fire’

would generate the cognition of the relation between any mountain and

any fire or between a particular mountain and the fire which is present

there. Suppose a, b, c are mountains, d is the kitchen, and F , G, H are

fires. Further suppose the following sentences are true.

(1) a has F

(2) b has absence of fire

(3) c has G

(4) d has H

Now the question is whether the sentence ‘A mountain has fire’ would

give rise to the cognition of a has G or a has H , in addition to the

cognition of a has F or c has G. Since a is not related to G or H , the

sentence would not generate the cognition of a has G or a has H . Hence

the sentence ‘A mountain has fire’ would generate the cognition of a has

F or c has G only. Now suppose fire is not present in any mountain, butpresent in the kitchen only. The sentence ‘A mountain has fire’ would

generate an erroneous cognition of a mountain being characterised by

the fire which is present in the kitchen only. In other words, the fire

which is related to the kitchen by the relation of conjunction is cognised

in a mountain. Hence the sentence would generate at least one of the

following cognitions:

(i) a being characterised by H

(ii) b being characterised by H

(iii) c being characterised by H

This is how different erroneous cognitions can be generated in different

hearers by a sentence which is false.As regards the nature of a sentence there is agreement among the

followers of both the Nyāya and the Vedānta. A sentence is an order

n-tuple such that n ≥ 2 morphemes or meaningful expressions. A


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276 J.L. SHAW

sequence of morphemes having mutual syntactic expectancy would

constitute a sentence. Hence expressions, such as ‘cooks’, ‘is cooking’,

(‘ pacati’), ‘cooks rice’ (‘tan. d . ulam. pacati’), ‘Rāma cooks rice’ (‘ Rāmas

tan. d . ulam. pacati’), would be considered sentences. Let us explain themeaning of a simple sentence such as ‘John is tall’. The utterance of

this sentence would generate a cognition of the relation between the

objects referred to by the words ‘John’ and ‘tall’. Since each of the

terms is meaningful or non-empty, each of them would generate the

memory – cognition of its referent if the hearer knows its referent. This

is due to the fact that if two entities are related by a relation and if

the hearer knows this relation and cognises one of the terms, then the

memory-cognition of the other will be generated. Now let us consider

the sentence ‘cooks’ (‘ pacati’). Since it consists of the words ‘cook’

(‘ pac’) and ‘s’ (‘ti’), it is treated as a sentence.

It is to be noted that according to the Ny āya verbal and nominal

suffixes are words ( padas). In this example the word ‘cook’ (‘ pac’) ischaracterised by the property of being the immediate predecessor of

the word ‘s’ (‘ti’) and the latter by the property of being the immediate

successor of the word ‘cook’. When it is said that there is āk ̄aṅks. ā

between them, what is meant is that the order between them is conducive

to understanding the relation between the referents of the words ‘cook’

(‘ pac’) and ‘s’ (‘ti’). Since the word ‘cook’ refers to cooking activity

and the suffix ‘s’ refers to mental effort or mental preparedness (kr . titva

or kartr . tva), the expression ‘cooks’ would give rise to the cognition of

conduciveness (anuk ̄ulatva) which will relate cooking activity to mental

effort. Hence the word ‘āk ̄aṅks. ā’ is defined in terms of the properties

of a sequence (an ordered n-tuple, where n ≥ 2) and the ability of this sequence to generate the cognition of a relation which will relate

the referents of the second term ( pratiyogin) to the referent of the

first term (anuyogin). The cognition of āk ̄aṅks. ā, not simply āk ̄aṅks. ā,

is considered as a causal condition for understanding the meaning of

a sentence as distinct from the meanings of the words which have

occurred in a sentence such as ‘cooks’. The cognition of the words and

the memory-cognition of their referents or meanings are also causal

conditions for understanding the relation between the referents.

According to the New Nyāya the cognition of a word ( padajñāna)

is a karan. a (special instrumental cause) and the memory – cognition

of the referent of a word is a vyāpāra (operation) of understanding the

meaning of a sentence. But according to the Old Nyāya the karan. a is the

cognised word or the word’s cognition ( jñāyamānapada). There is an

important difference between ‘the cognised word’ (‘ jñāyamānapada’)


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and ‘the cognition of a word’ (‘ padajñāna’). In the former case the

word is the qualificand (viśes.ya) and the cognition is its qualifier

(viśes. an. a). If the word is not present, there cannot be word cognition

( j˜n¯ayam

¯anapada). Hence the presence of the word is necessary for its

cognition. This theory cannot explain the understanding of the meaning

of a sentence which is due to the memory-cognition of the words which

have been apprehended in the past. Sometimes memory-cognitions of

words are due to inscriptions, or gesture and posture. For this reason

the New Nyāya considers the cognition of a word as a karan. a (special

instrumental cause). In the technical language of the Nyāya karan. a and

vyāpāra may be defined in the following way:

(A) x is a karan. a of the effect E Df x is a causal condition, x is related

to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a

cause due to this relation only.

(B) x is a vy¯

ap¯

ara of the effect E Df (Ey) ( y is a cause or a set of causes of E and x is a cause of E , but x is due to y).

From the above discussion it also follows that the memory-cognition

of the referent of a word depends upon the cognition of the relation

between a word and its referent, and upon the cognition of the word.

Now it may be asked whether the cognition of the word which is a

karan. a presupposes the cognition of the relation between them. In

reply, it may be said that usually the cognition of the relation between

a word and its referent precedes the cognition of the word which is a

causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. But one

may cognise the relation after cognising the word. What is required is

the cognition of both the conditions for the memory-cognition of the

referent. Hence the order between these two conditions is not necessary.

Now it may be asked whether there is āk ̄aṅks. ā in the expression

‘s + cook’ i.e. ‘scook’. Since there is āk ̄aṅks. ā in ‘cook + s’, there

should be āk ̄aṅks. ā in its converse as well. Hence ‘s + cook’ may be

treated as a sentence. On this point the Nyāya claims that āk ̄aṅks. ā

cannot be identified with any sequence. It is a fact that both ‘cook +

s’ and ‘s + cook’ are sequents. But āk ̄aṅks. ā is not defined in terms

of sequence alone. The sequence which is conducive to understanding

the meaning of a sentence has āk ̄aṅks. ā. Since the sequence ‘s + cook’

is not conducive to understanding its meaning, it has no āk ̄aṅks. ā. On

this point one may raise the following objection. If b is related to a by

the relation R and we can cognise the relation of b to a, then a mustbe related to b by the converse of R and we can cognise b ˇ Ra. Since

‘cook + s’ generates the cognition of relation of the referent of ‘cook’

to the referent of ‘s’, ‘s + cook’ should also generate the cognition of


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278 J.L. SHAW

the converse of this relation. On this point the followers of the Nyāya

would claim that since there is no convention for the use of ‘s + cook’ in

our ordinary language, it is not treated as a sentence. From this it does

not follow that the converse relation in question cannot be cognised. Inorder to cognise this relation we have to use a sentence such as ‘The

relation of mental effort (kr . ti) to the activity of cooking ( pāka)’. This

relation is called ‘ prayojyatva’ (‘the converse of conduciveness’).

From the above discussion it follows that the sequences which are

considered as well-formed in our ordinary language have āk ̄aṅks. ā.

Since there is no use of sequences such as s + cook, they do not have

āk ̄aṅks. ā. Hence the concept of āk ̄aṅks. ā coincides with the concept of

well-formedness. In other words, the sequences which are in accordance

with the rules of formation or transformation have āk ̄aṅks. ā. Therefore,

the ordered n-tuples which are in accordance with the rules of language

are considered sentences.

According to the Old Nyāya, the cognition of yogyat ̄a is anothercausal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. In this

context the word ‘ yogyat ̄a’ means the relation of the qualifier (viśes.an. a)

to the qualificand (viśes. ya). Let us consider the sentence ‘a has F ’. The

word ‘a’ would generate the memory-cognition of a under a mode (say

m) and the word ‘F ’ would generate the memory-cognition of F under

a mode (say n). Suppose there are three types of relation, namely, R,

S, T , and the relation which relates F to a comes under the type T . If

we know that neither R nor S relates F to a, then the sentence ‘a is F ’

would generate the cognition of amTF n. But the sentence would not

generate the cognition of the specific relation with its particularity. The

relation T which relates F to a will be cognised under a description.Hence it may be expressed by the definite description ‘The T which

relates F to a’. In other words, the T will not be cognised as a mode

of presentation ( prak ̄ara) of F .

The Old Nyāya also claims that a doubt-free cognition (niścayātmaka

jñāna) of T or a dubious cognition (sam. śayātmaka jñāna) of T is a

causal condition for cognising the meaning of the sentence ‘a is F ’. If

it is a dubious cognition, then it is expressed by the sentence ‘Is a F

or not F ’? If it is doubt-free, then it is expressed by ‘a is F ’. Since a

verbal cognition is always doubt-free, the yogyat ̄a jñāna which could

be dubious cannot be equated with it. Now it may be asked whether the

verbal cognition can be identified with the cognition of yogyat ̄a if the

latter is non-dubious. On this point the Old Nyāya would claim that the

cognition of yogyat ̄a is never cognised as doubt-free even if it is non-

dubious. In other words, it is presented under the mode of cognitionhood


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( jñānatva), not under the mode of certainty (niścayatva). But the verbal

cognition is presented under the mode of certainty. In other words,

the limitor of the property of being the cause (k ̄aran. at ̄avacchedaka) is

cognitionhood ( j˜n¯anatva), but the limitor of the property of being the

effect (k ̄aryat ̄avacchedaka) is certainty (niścayatva), Hence there is no

circularity in accepting the cognition of yogyat ̄a.

Moreover, we can have a true or a false verbal cognition from a

non-dubious cognition of yogyat ̄a. Similarly, we can have a true or

a false verbal cognition from a dubious cognition of yogyat ̄a. If the

verbal cognition is true, then its cause would be the true cognition

of yogyat ̄a (relation). The cause of the latter could be a previous true

perceptual or inferential cognition of it. If its cause is some previous

verbal cognition of yogyat ̄a, then the cause of the latter would be some

previous perceptual or inferential cognition.

If the verbal cognition corresponding to our sentence ‘a has F ’ is false,

then its cause would be the false cognition of yogyat ̄a (relation). Thelatter could be some previous false perceptual or inferential cognition.

If it is also verbal, then its cause would be some other false perceptual

or inferential cognition about the same object.

Now the question is whether the sentence ‘He irrigates the field with

fire’ would generate any verbal cognition. The followers of the Old

Nyāya claim that since there is neither a dubious nor a non-dubious

cognition of the relation, this sentence cannot generate a verbal cognition.

On this point the followers of the New Nyāya claim that it is due to

the fact that there is a preventer cognition. In other words, we have

a cognition that fire has the absence of irrigation. That is to say, we

know that one cannot irrigate the field with fire. Since the presenceof a preventer cognition can explain the non-occurrence of a verbal

cognition from this sentence, there is no need to consider the absence

of a dubious or a non-dubious cognition of it (He irrigates the field with

fire) as a causal condition. Moreover, since the absence of a preventer

cognition is a common causal condition for the occurrence of any other

type of cognition, the acceptance of it would satisfy the principle of

parsimony. Hence the view of the Old Nyāya multiplies the number

of conditions. The followers of the New Nyāya interpret yogyat ̄a as

the absence of bādha. ‘Bādha’ refers to a preventer cognition. If F

is related to a by the relation R, then the doubt-free cognition of F

not being related to a by the relation R is bādha. In other words, it

would be a contrary or a contradictory cognition. The absence of it is

yogyat ̄a. Hence according to the new Nyāya, yogyat ̄a, not the cognition

of yogyat ̄a, is a causal condition for verbal cognition.


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280 J.L. SHAW

Furthermore, the followers of the New Nyāya do not rule out the

possibility of cognising a new relation in a verbal cognition, which has

not been cognised before. In such cases the relation is cognised in its

generic feature. If it is a relation of conjunction, then it is cognised underthe mode of conjunctionhood, not under the mode of its particularity

(viśes. atva), although it has not been cognised before. According to the

New Nyāya, the causal condition for cognising it in a verbal cognition

would be the cognition of āk ̄aṅks. ā (syntactic expectancy between the

words). Hence the view of the Old Nyāya may be rejected on the ground

of inadequacy and the violation of the principle of simplicity.

Now let us discuss whether a contradictory sentence or its denial

can generate a cognition in a hearer or a speaker. According to the

Nyāya philosophers, both old and new, a contradictory or a contrary

sentence does not generate a cognition as it has no yogyat ̄a (semantic

compatibility). Since it is considered as a sentence, it has āk ̄aṅks. ā

(syntactic expectancy). Hence it is a well-formed formula. The relationbetween the cognition generated by p and the cognition generated by

not p is called ‘preventer-prevented’. In other words, the occurrence

of the former prevents the occurrence of the latter and vice versa.

According to the Nyāya there is no contradiction in reality as well

as in thought, although contradictory expressions are sentences. Now

it may be asked, why should we consider contradictory or contrary

expressions as sentences? The Nyāya might claim that since the denial

of a contradiction is an analytic or an identity sentence which is true,

a contradiction may be considered as a sentence. Let us consider the

following sentences:

(a) This brown table is not brown.(b) This brown table is brown.

(c) John is not John.

(d) John is John.

According to the Nyāya (a) is a contradiction. Hence it cannot generate

a unified cognition. The expression ‘this brown table’ would generate

a cognition and the expression ‘not brown’ would generate a cogni-

tion, but the entire sentence would not generate a cognition. In other

words, there is no unified cognition such that this brown table is

the qualificand and the absence of brown colour is the qualifier. As

regards (b), it is claimed by the followers of the Ny āya that it cannot

generate a cognition as the limitor of the property of being the qualifier(viśes. an. at ̄avacchedaka) is part of the limitor of the property of being

the qualificand (viśes. yat ̄avaccedaka). According to the Nyāya if the

former is not contained in the latter or is not identical with the latter,


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then a cognition can be generated. Since in (d) they are identical, it

cannot also generate a cognition. Since (c) is a contradiction, it cannot

generate a cognition. Hence two types of argument may be put forward

against the generation of verbal cognition. One type of argument wouldbe applicable to contrary or contradictory sentences. Another type of

argument would be applicable to identity sentences.

Against the second type it may be said that the limitor of qualifier 1

of an identity or analytic sentence is neither identical with the limitor

of the qualificand nor is it contained in it. Since the relation of the

qualifier to the qualificand is also a limitor of the qualifier, the set of

the limitors of the qualifier is neither identical with nor contained in the

set of the limitors of the qualificand. In reply the Nyāya philosophers

would argue that by the word ‘limitor’ they mean property-limitors

only. Even if the objection can be avoided in this way, the fact remains

that there are two types of rules for two types of sentences. The type

of rule for contradictory sentences can be substantiated in terms of theontological claim that there is no contradiction in reality. Hence there

is no contradiction at the level of thought or in the content of thought.

In other words, we cannot think of a contradiction. On the contrary, in

favour of identity sentences it may be said that the ontological claim is

that everything has its own identity. Hence every sentence of the form

‘a is a’ is true.

On this point it may be proposed that since a contradiction cannot

generate a cognition, its negation which is an analytic sentence also

cannot generate a cognition. If we do not accept this, then we have

to put some restriction on the use of ‘not’ and thereby the law of

parsimony would be violated. Hence the claim is that both the typesof expression are sentences and meaningful, but neither of them would

generate any cognition. Now it may be asked: If they cannot generate

cognitions, then how can we know their truth-values? On this point

the followers of the Nyāya have given an ingenious reply. In order to

know the truth of an identity sentence such as ‘John is John’ it is not

a requirement that it must generate a cognition. In order to know the

truth of ‘John is John’ what we need to know is the truth of a sentence

about John, such as ‘John is tall’ or ‘John exists’. Since there is an

entailment relation, the latter would establish the former. As regards

a contradictory sentence such as ‘John is not John’, we know it to be

false when we come to know the truth of the sentence ‘John is John’.

From the above discussion of yogyat ̄a it follows that there is no

one-to-one relation between the members of the sets corresponding

to ‘āk ̄aṅks. ā’ and ‘ yogyat ̄a’. The set which corresponds to ‘ yogyat ̄a’


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282 J.L. SHAW

is a proper subset of the set which corresponds to ‘āk ̄aṅks. ā’. It also

follows that the Nyāya has avoided two extreme positions present in

contemporary philosophy. According to one of them a contradictory

expression is meaningless.2

Hence it cannot be treated as a sentenceor well-formed expression. Therefore, an analytic sentence which is

a negation of a contradiction has no meaning. According to the other

both the types of expression are meaningful sentences and we can

understand their meanings. Hence the Nyāya philosophers have avoided

the undesirable or counter-intuitive consequences of both the views.

Now let us discuss the Nyāya concept of āsatti, the cognition of which

is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The

word ‘āsatti’ refers to spatio-temporal contiguity between the words of

a sentence. Hence the words ‘cook’ and ‘s’ which have occurred in the

sentence ‘cooks’ are contiguous in space and time. Similar is the case

with other sentences such as ‘John is tall’, or ‘John cooks rice’. Here

‘contiguity’ means absence of a gap or a long gap between the wordsof a sentence or in an utterance. The gaps which are not conducive

to understanding the meaning of a sentence are not permissible. The

cognition of āsatti (contiguity) is a causal condition for understanding

the meaning of a sentence.

Now the question is whether there is any need for āsatti in addition

to the cognition of āk ̄aṅks. ā and yogyat ̄a. In reply, it is said that there are

certain examples where āsatti is necessary for removing the ambiguity

of understanding the relation. Consider the sentence, ‘Here comes the

son-king’s-man should be removed’ (‘ayam eti putro-r ̄ajñah. purus.o’

pasāryat ̄am’).

It is said that this sentence would give rise to the cognition of therelation of the king to his son or the cognition of the relation of the

king to his officer (man). Hence it means either (a) Here comes the son

of the king; the officer (man) should be removed, or (b) Here comes

the son; the king’s officer (man) should be removed.

In such contexts the ambiguity has been removed in terms of āsatti.

In our above example, since the word ‘man’ (‘ purus.a’) is contiguous

with the word ‘’s’ (the suffix ‘ṅs’ in Sanskrit), the relation of the king

to his officer should be cognised, not the relation of the king to his

son as the word ‘son’ (‘ putra’) is not contiguous with the suffix ‘’s’

(the suffix ‘ṅs’ in Sanskrit). Hence āsatti of the Nyāya philosophers

plays the role of scope notations or is a substitute for scope notations.

The cognition of āsatti, not simply āsatti, is a causal condition for

understanding the meaning of a sentence.


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Now let us discuss the need for the cognition of the intention of

the speaker for understanding the meaning of a sentence. If a word

is ambiguous or homonymous, then the sentence in which it is used

would give rise to different cognitions even if all other conditionsfor understanding its meaning are fulfilled. Consider the sentence

‘saindhavamānaya’ (‘Bring saindhava’). Since the ‘saindhava’ in

Sanskrit means both salt and horse, the sentence would generate the

cognition of ‘Bring salt’ or ‘Bring a horse’. In order to remove this

type of ambiguity the cognition of the intention of the speaker is

necessary. From the context of utterance the intention of the speaker

may be cognised. Moreover, there are contexts where the intention of

the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence,

although the sentence does not contain any homonymous expression.

For example, ‘Protect the yoghurt from the crows’ (‘k ̄akebhyo dadhi

raks. yat ̄am’). Here the speaker intends to use the word ‘crow’ to refer to

any animal or bird which will spoil the yoghurt. Hence the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning

of a sentence which contains a metaphorical or suggestive expression.

II

In this section I would like to discuss the Advaita Vedānta theory of

understanding the meaning of a sentence. According to Vedānta also

the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of terms

lies in cognising a specific relation between the referents of its two

terms. The meaning of a general term is a related universal, not a set of

particulars. Hence the word ‘pot’ means related potness. In other words,

potness being related to something else is the meaning of the word

‘pot’. If the sentence ‘The floor has a pot’ (‘ghat .avad bhūtalam’) is

uttered, then the word ‘floor’ would give rise to the memory-cognition

of the related floorness and the word ‘pot’ would give rise to the

memory-cognition of the related potness. Since potness is related to a

particular pot by the relation of specific inherence (or identity), floorness

is related to a floor by a specific inherence and the pot is related to

the floor by the relation of conjunction, the universal potness would

be related to floorness by an indirect relation. When we understand

the meaning of this sentence, we cognise the relation of potness to

floorness. As regards the cognition of a particular from the cognitionof a related universal which is the meaning of a word, there are at

least four views.3 These views may be formulated in the following

ways:


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(1) If there is a cognition of a universal, then there is a cognition of

its instances which are particulars. This is due to the fact that

there cannot be a qualificative cognition of a universal without

cognising its instances. Hence the set of causal conditions forthe cognition of a universal would also be the causal conditions

for the cognition of its instances. Therefore, when we come to

know that the word ‘pot’ has the power to generate the cognition

of the related potness, then we cognise both the related potness

and the particular pots.

(2) According to another view the word ‘pot’ has the power ( śakti)

to generate the cognition of both the related potness and the

particular pots. Hence there are two powers in a word. But the

cognition of both the powers in a word is not necessary for

cognising the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs. What

is needed is the cognition that it can generate the cognition of

a related universal. Hence the cognition that the word ‘pot’ can

generate the cognition of a particular pot is not required for

understanding the meaning of a sentence in which the word ‘pot’

occurs.

(3) According to another alternative the primary meaning of a word

is the related universal, but the secondary meaning is a set of

particulars which are instances of the universal. Hence the relation

between the word ‘pot’ and the related potness is called ‘śakti’

(‘the primary meaning-relation’), and the relation between the

word ‘pot’ and a particular pot is called ‘laks.an. ā’ (‘the secondary

meaning-relation’). Therefore, the cognition of the former relation

would generate the cognition of the related universal, but thecognition of the latter relation would generate the cognition of

a particular.

(4) According to another alternative the meaning of a word is the

related universal, but the effect of its power is the cognition of the

things limited by this universal. Hence the meaning of the word

‘pot’ is the related potness, but its power (śakti) will generate

the cognition of particulars which are limited by potness. Hence

this view draws a distinction between the meaning of a word

and its power to generate a cognition of particulars.4

As regards causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a

sentence, the followers of the Advaita Vedānta claim that the sentence,not the cognition of it, is the special instrumental cause (karan. a) of

understanding its meaning. But according to the Nyāya the special

instrumental cause (karan. a) is the cognition of words, not the cognition


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of sentence in which they have occurred. In this context it is to be

noted that according to the Vedānta a sentence is not just a collection

of words. It is also an ordered n-tuple, where n ≥ 2 words. Hence the

words have mutual syntactic expectancy.The operation (vyāpāra) of understanding the meaning is the memory-

cognition of the entities referred to by the words which have occurred

in a sentence. The memory-cognition is due to the cognition of the

relation between a word and its meaning, primary or secondary. Since

the Vedāntins are followers of anvit ̄abhidhāna (related designation)

theory of meaning, the meaning complex of a word includes a relation

in general, not any specific relation. If there are two words in a sentence,

there would be cognition of two relations in general. For example, the

floor has a pot. This sentence would generate the memory-cognition

of related floorness and related potness. The cognition of these two

relations would eventually yield the cognition of a specific relation

which relates potness to floorness. In the technical language of theAdvaita Vedānta it is called ‘svāśrayasāmānādhikaran. ya’ (‘the relation

of being the locus and having the same locus’). In other words, we

cognise the relation of potness to a pot and the relation of the pot to

the floor which has floorness.

Now let us discuss other causal conditions for understanding the

meaning of a sentence. According to the Vedānta āk ̄aṅks. ā, yogyat ̄a and

āsatti, not their cognitions, are considered causal conditions. But with

respect to t ̄atparya the cognition of it is considered a causal condition

for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

As regards the definition of ‘āk ̄aṅks. ā’ the Vedānta differs from the

Ny¯aya. According to the Ved

¯anta

¯ak

¯a˙

nks. ¯a is a property of the object of a

question which is due to the cognition of the meaning of a word. When

we hear the expression ‘bring’, we may ask, what should we bring? If

the answer is a chair, then it has the property of being the object of this

question ( jijñāsā-vis. ayatva). Similarly, if we hear the words ‘a chair’,

we may ask, what should we do with it? If the answer is bring, then it

(bringing activity) has the property of being the object of this question

( jijñāsā-vis. ayatva). Hence the cognition of one leads to the cognition of

the other via a question. Therefore there is expectancy between them.

But if we utter the sentence ‘Bring a chair’ and there is no further

question, then also the chair or the bringing activity does not cease to

be the object of a question. Each of them has the ability ( yogyatva) to

have the property of being the object of a question ( jijñāsā-vis. ayatva).

In other words, the chair or the bringing activity could have been the

object of a question. Similarly, there would be āk ̄aṅks. ā between the


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286 J.L. SHAW

contents or meanings (vākyārthas) of two sentences if one of them

is the object of a question which is due to the understanding of the

meaning of the other.

It is to be noted that the Ved¯anta use of the word

¯ak

¯a˙

nks. ¯a is related to

a question or the desire of the hearer. Hence it is closer to our ordinary

usage. But the Nyāya conception of āk ̄aṅks. ā as a sequence of words

is present in the Vedānta conception of a sentence which is a causal

condition for understanding its meaning.

In Vedānta the term ‘ yogyat ̄a’ is defined in terms of what is intended

by the speaker when he/she utters a sentence and the absence of the

preventer cognition in the hearer. Suppose the speaker utters the sentence

‘a has F ’ and intends the relation R which relates F to a. If the cognition

of R is not prevented by some other cognition, then there is yogyat ̄a for

understanding its meaning. Since it refers to the absence of a cognition

in the hearer, it becomes a property of the cogniser. In this respect the

Vedānta conception of yogyat ̄a is not different from the New Nyāyaconception of it.

According to the Vedānta also, the sentence ‘He/she irrigates the field

with fire’ would not generate a cognition in the hearer, if he/she knows

that fire is not a cause of irrigation and the speaker intends this causal

relation. But if the hearer does not know that the causal relation between

fire and irrigation does not hold good, then this sentence would generate

a cognition which is erroneous. In this respect also the explanation of

the Vedānta coincides with that of the New Nyāya. But the difference

between the old Nyāya and the Vedānta remains.

Now let us discuss the Vedānta conception of āsatti. It has been

defined in terms of the contiguity or proximity (sannidhi) betweenthe cognitions of the meanings of the words which have occurred

in a sentence. The cognition of the relation between a word and its

meaning ( padavr . ttijñāna) would give rise to the memory-cognition of

the meaning. If the memory-cognitions are contiguous, then there is

āsatti between them. Hence āsatti becomes a property of the memory-

cognitions, not a property of words. But according to the Nyāya it

is a property of the words. For this reason the Nyāya claims that the

cognition of āsatti is a causal condition, while the Vedānta claims that

āsatti itself is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a

sentence.

As regards t ātparyajñāna, the followers of the Vedānta consider it to

be a causal condition for understanding the meaning of any sentence,

ambiguous or non-ambiguous. Even in a sentence such as ‘Bring a

pot’, the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary. The


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fact that the word ‘pot’ has been used to refer to a pot and has not

been used in a metaphorical sense is the intention of the speaker.

Hence the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary for

understanding the meaning of any sentence. But according to the Ny¯aya

the cognition of the intention of the speaker is a casual condition only

in the case of homonymous words such as ‘saindhava’ (‘salt’, ‘horse’),

or metaphorical (lāks.anika) uses such as ‘Protect the yoghurt from the

crows’ (‘k ̄akebhyo dadhi raks. yat ̄am’).

As regards the nature of t ̄atparya, the followers of the Vedānta claim

that it is a property of a sentence, not a property of the speaker. A

sentence has the ability to generate a cognition, the object (content) of

which is its meaning (vākyārtha). The word ‘t ̄atparya’ is used to refer

to this ability of a sentence.

III

In this section I would like to substantiate the view that most of the

causal conditions mentioned in the Vedānta are present in the Nyāya or

would be acceptable to the followers of the Nyāya. Similarly, most of

the causal conditions mentioned in the Nyāya are implicitly or explicitly

present in the causal conditions of the Vedānta.

(a) According to both the Nyāya and the Vedānta the intention of

the speaker (t ̄atparya) will supersede all other causal conditions.

We have to understand the meaning in the light of the intention

of the speaker even if there is no contiguity (āsatti). Consider the

expression ‘A pot is blue a piece of cloth is a substance’ (‘nı̄loghat .o dravyam. patah. ’). In this case there is āsatti between ‘a

pot’ and ‘blue’, and between ‘a piece of cloth’ and ‘substance’.

Hence this sentence would give rise to the cognition of the

relation between a blue colour and the pot, and the cognition of

the relationship between the piece of cloth and a substance. But

if the speaker intends the relationship between the piece of cloth

and a blue colour, and between the pot and a substance, then the

hearer has to cognise these relations when he/she understands

the meaning of this sentence. Hence those who do not know the

intention of the speaker would understand the former meaning, but

those who do know the intention of the speaker would understandthe latter meaning.

Now consider an expression such as ‘The mountain is eating Devadatta

is fire-possessor’ (‘girirbhuktam agnimān Devadattena’).


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But the followers of the Vedānta claim that we cannot convey the thought

that one should not eat at the house of one’s enemy even if we interpret

the word ‘poison’ as ‘something similar to poison’. The concept of

ought or duty cannot be conveyed by using the word ‘poison’ in ametaphorical way. Since the sentence ‘Take poison’ as a whole conveys

this meaning, the metaphorical meaning is to be assigned to it. Hence

understanding the meaning of the sentence, not the words, would give

rise to the metaphorical meaning of it. Secondly, the followers of the

Vedānta claim that the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation which

is due to the related referents of the words which have occurred in the

sentence. In the above example, according to the Vedānta, the primary

meaning of the sentence is related to the metaphorical meaning. Hence

the Nyāya and the Vedānta would differ with respect to the primary

meaning of a word and the explanation of the metaphorical meaning

of a sentence.

(d) As regards āsatti, they would accept each other’s views. In

other words, the Nyāya would accept the contiguity among the

memory-cognitions which are due to the cognition of the words

which are contiguous. Since the followers of the later Vedānta

have accepted the cognition of the sentence, not the sentence, as

the special instrumental cause (karan. a), the contiguity among the

words would be cognised if the sentence is cognised. Hence the

cognition of the contiguity among the words would be acceptable

to the followers of the Vedānta.

(e) As regards āk ̄aṅks. ā, the followers of Vedānta would accept the

relation of successor or predecessor between any two words of

a sentence. Hence the Nyāya concept of āk ̄aṅks. ā as an orderedn-tuple is present in the Vedānta concept of a sentence. Now

the question is whether the Vedānta would accept the cognition

of āk ̄aṅks. ā in addition to āk ̄aṅks. ā. Since some of the Vedānta

philosophers have accepted the cognition of a sentence as the

special instrumental cause (karan. a), this cognition would entail

the cognition of the sequence. Hence the Nyāya cognition of

āk ̄aṅks. ā is present in the Vedānta cognition of a sentence.

As regards the Vedānta concept of āk ̄aṅks. ā, the Nyāya would accept

it so far as contingently true or false sentences are concerned. In other

words, the referents of the words which have occurred in contingently

true or false sentences could be objects of questions. For example,the table is blue. The table would be the object of a question and the

blue colour would be the object of another question. But identity and

contradictory sentences would be excluded, as their referents are not


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290 J.L. SHAW

objects of questions. Consider the sentence ‘The table is the table’

or ‘John is John’. When we cognise the referent of the word ‘the

table’ we do not ask the question whether it is a table. Similar is the

case with the word ‘John’. Again sentences such as ‘The brown tableis brown’ would lack the āk ̄aṅks. ā of Vedānta. The person who has

cognised the meaning of ‘the brown table’ would not ask the question

whether the table is brown. Hence the identity sentences lack the

āk ̄aṅks. ā of Vedānta. Similarly, the contradictory sentences do not have

the āk ̄aṅks. ā of Vedānta. Consider the sentence ‘The table is brown

and not brown’. The question, what is the colour of the table?, cannot

be answered in terms of brown and not brown. Hence it lacks the

āk ̄aṅks. ā of Vedānta. From this observation it follows that the Vedānta

philosophers also would not accept understanding the meaning of

an identity or a contradictory sentence. Hence both the Nyāya and

the Vedānta philosophers would claim that identity and contradictory

sentences do not generate cognitions. As regards necessary truths of mathematics, both of them would claim that sentences such as ‘2 × 2 =

4’ would generate cognitions. From the above discussion it follows that

the Vedānta conception of āk ̄aṅks. ā is not co-extensive with the Nyāya

concept of āk ̄aṅks. ā, although according to both the systems identity

or contradictory sentences do not generate any cognition in the hearer

or the speaker. The Vedānta concept of āk ̄aṅks. ā would be a proper

subset of the Nyāya concept āk ̄aṅks. ā as the latter defines well-formed

sentences.

(f) As regards the cognition of words, it is also present in the

views of the Vedānta philosophers. Since the sentence and the

cognition of the meaning – relation between a word and its referent( padavr . ttijñāna) are considered causal conditions for cognising

the referents, the cognition of the word is already present in the

latter causal condition. But if we follow the view of the later

Vedānta philosophers, then the cognition of the words would

be present in the cognition of the sentence which is a causal

condition.

From our discussion it follows that most of the concepts mentioned

above can be found both in Nyāya and Vedānta, although they have

not used the same expressions for these concepts. Hence, as regards

the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, there is

very little difference between these two systems.


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IV

In this section I would like to discuss the nature of understanding

the meaning of a complex sentence. In other words, the question is

whether understanding the meaning of a molecular sentence is atomistic

or holistic. In the case of atomistic understanding, first we understand

the meaning of embedded sentences or complex expressions which have

occurred in a molecular sentence. Then we understand the meaning

of the entire sentence. But in the case of holistic understanding we

apprehend simultaneously the meanings of the embedded sentence(s)

and the molecular sentence.5

Let us consider the nature of the cognition generated by the sentence

‘The deer has a brown horn’. The question is whether we first apprehend

the relation of a particular brown colour to a horn, and then apprehend

the relation of a brown horn to the deer. For the sake of simplicity

we consider ‘the deer’ as one term. According to some followers of the Nyāya the cognition of the relation of a brown horn to the deer

follows the cognition of the relation of a brown colour to a horn.

But according to some other Nyāya philosophers we cognise both the

relations simultaneously. The followers of the Vedānta would also accept

these two types of the nature of understanding.

Now let us explain the nature of understanding corresponding to

the sentence ‘The deer has a brown horn’. In this case the deer is

the qualificand, a horn is the qualifier, and a brown colour is the

qualifier of a horn. For the sake of simplicity we are not considering

the mode of presentation of these objects of cognition. Hence a horn

is the qualifier in relation to the deer, and it is also a qualificand

in relation to the brown colour. Since the deer is the qualificand in

this cognition, it has the relational property of being the qualificand

(viśes. yat ̄a). Similarly, the brown colour has the property of being the

qualifier (viśes.an. at ̄a). But the horn which is the object of this cognition

has both the property of being the qualificand and the property of

being the qualifier. It is to be noted that these relational properties

specify the way objects are related to this cognition. Now the question

is how these relational properties are related to each other. In this

cognition the property of being the qualificand (viśes. yat ̄a) residing in

the deer is determined by (nir ̄upita) the property of being the qualifier

residing in the horn and vice versa. Similarly, the property of being the

qualificand residing in the horn is determined by (nir ̄upita) the propertyof being the qualifier residing in the brown colour, and vice versa.

Now the question is whether the properties of being the qualificand

and the qualifier residing in the horn are related to each other or not.


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292 J.L. SHAW

If they are independent properties, then we cannot draw the distinction

between

(a) The deer has a brown horn, and

(b) The deer has a horn, and that horn is brown.

In order to draw the distinction between them it is said that in (a) the

property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualificand

residing in the same horn are related to each other by the relation of

limitor-limited (avacchedya-avacchedaka). In other words, the former

is the mode of presentation of the latter and the latter is the mode of

presentation of the former. But this is not the case in (b). Hence in (b)

they are not related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. In

a holistic understanding we cognise the relation of the brown colour

to the horn and the relation of the horn which is brown to the deer

simultaneously. In an atomic understanding first we cognise the former

relation, then we cognise the latter relation.This technique is used to explain the nature of understanding corres-

ponding to a more complex sentence. Suppose a sentence contains four

terms, say a, b, c, and d . As regards the relation between them, c is

qualified by d , b by c, and a by b. At the level of understanding, d has

only the property of being the qualifier, and a has only the property of

being the qualificand. But b and c would have both the properties of

being the qualificand and qualifier. The property of being the qualificand

residing in c will be determined by the property of being the qualifier

residing in d and vice versa. But the property of being the qualifier

residing in c will be determined by the property of being the qualificand

residing in b and vice versa. Moreover, these two properties residingin c are related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. In other

words, each of them is a mode of presentation of the other. Similarly,

the properties of being the qualificand and qualifier residing in b will

be related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited.

The techniques developed by the Nyāya philosopher and adopted

by others has far reaching consequences. This technique may be used

to explain the difference in meaning between the following pairs of

sentences:6

(a) Brutus killed Caesar.

(a) Caesar was killed by Brutus.

(b) John gave a book to Tom.(b) Tom received a book from John.

(c) John sprayed paint on the wall.

(c) John sprayed the wall with paint.


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(d) A pot is on the floor.

(d) The floor has a pot on it.

Since the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation along with its

direction, the meaning of (a) would not be the same as that of (a ).Similar will be the case with other pairs of sentences. Contemporary

philosophers of language such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore and

Jackendoff are also concerned with the question whether the above

pairs have the same meaning. Since the Nyāya has developed a theory

for the explanation of the meaning of a sentence and its understanding,

it might throw some light on the contemporary discussion of meaning

and transformation.7

NOTES

1

For simplicity, expressions like ‘the property of being the qualifier’ are avoided.2 Moore, G.E., ‘Is Existence a Predicate’, Philosophical Papers, p. 118, GeorgeAllen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959.3 In this context I have included some of the discussion from Dharmar̄aja Adhvarindra’sVed ̄anta-Paribhās. ā and Gadādhara’s

Śaktivāda. I have also included the view of PanditVisvabandhu Tarkat̄ırtha.4 For a more comprehensive discussion on this topic see author’s ‘The AdvaitaVedānta on Meaning’, Ved ̄anta: Concepts and Application, edited by J L Shaw andS Walters, The R K Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta (forthcoming).5 In this context I am not talking about Bhartr.hari’s theory, which deals with theholistic approach to meaning.6 Fodor, J., Semantics: Theories of Meaning in Generative Grammar , pp. 89–96,Thomas Y Cromwell Company, New York, 1977.7 I am greatly indebted to Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkat̄ırtha with whom I havediscussed almost all the points mentioned in this paper. Since this research was

partly supported by a grant from Internal Research Committee, Victoria Universityof Wellington, I would like to thank them.

Philosophy Department

Victoria University of Wellington

New Zealand

conditions for understanding-shaw

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