conditions for future military innovation

Conditions for Future M i I i ta r y I n nova t ion

ABSTRACT Innovations have always played a key role for armed forces around the world. In times of reduced spending on defense, it will become more and more important to get usable results from investment in innovation.

It is the responsibility of the leaders of nations and armed services to create the environment where the innovative processes have good possibilities for success. Until now, Sweden has been able to create such a climate within its borders. However, in a changmg security environment, it is necessary to further develop the tools for innovation. This paper discuss Swedish experiences and suggest a framework built on four factors-incentives for innovation, climate for innovation, well defined responsibilities between the actors, and new focuses for innovation-that can be applied to develop the innovative tools for the unknown future.

THE CHALLENGE

oday, defense spending is on a worldwide decline. Yet, at the same time there is much debate about a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the need to improve the capability of forces for tomor- row. However, procurement of defense material is a lengthy pro-

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cess. Normally, it takes more than 10-15 years from the development decision and more than 5-10 years from the procurement decision until equipped and trained units exist in the armed forces.

The very capable systems we see in the armed forces around the world today originally were developed and procured during the final stages of the Cold War. Today we can see a vast variety of these systems. Although many of the original manufacturers are still in business, competition within the defense industry is becoming a struggle for survival. This struggle engages many thinkers, both in the industry as well as within the defense community. New concepts and new ideas occur almost daily, presenting many possible options for responsible leaders.

There is one major problem. The new equipment is very expensive and the budgets are shrinking. In this situation, procurement decisions become extremely difficult and the capability to focus and to direct innovation is becoming. more and more important. One way to deal with this is to structure and en- courage future innovations in different ways. Some approaches are better than others. This paper focuses on suggestions for setting the stage for innovations in nations that are not super powers. However, since many of these suggestions are generic, they are very likely to be valid even for large states like the U. S.A.

THE SWEDISH EXPERIENCE For many years Sweden has worked hard to maintain the credibility of its non- alignment strategy. This strategy aims at neutrality in case of war, and over the years, the strategy has been extremely successful. Sweden has stayed out of war for over 180 years. There is much to learn from this experience in the situation we now face. However, this experience is not enough to guide the future. It must be developed and adapted to the changing international climate.

Sweden is a country with only 9 million inhabitants. Out of the Swedish national budget of 680 billlon Swedish crowns (SEK) (which equals about 85 billlon U.S. dollars (USD), the Ministry of Defense in the Fiscal Year 1997 spent approximately 6.2 percent.

Out of the defense budget 45 percent is spent on acquisition activities. Twenty percent of the money spent on acquisition is spent on Research & Technology & Development (R&T&D). The amount on R&T&D thus equals 3.4 billion SEK. Of this amount engineering development of existing systems takes about 2.5 billion SEK. What is left for military innovative related R&T is 0.9 billion SEK (equals 120 million USD). The Swedish Defense Decision of 1996 has reduced the defense expenditures by about 10 percent. However, it is expected that the amount spent on R&T&D will remain fixed on a level around 0.9 billion SEK.

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Conditions lor Future Military Innovation

Over the years Sweden has developed advanced, state- of-the-art defense systems. The deliberate policy to maintain and to develop a national dedense industry has been one part of the non-alignment strategy. As such, the defense industry has been a vital part of the total defense and has also added to the overall credibility of the strategy itself. The Swedish defense industry has, in cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces, been very innovative. Among the innovative modem systems are: rn JAS 39 GRIPEN aircraft (a 4th generation aircraft) built

by SAAB; Kockums air-independent submarines of the GOT- LAND and the COLLINS classes;

rn Visby Class Stealth Corvettes WS 2000) now under construction and production at Karlskrona shipyard;

m MCM-ships of Landsort and Styrso-class built in Fiber- Reiiorced Plastic (FRP);

rn Sea-to-Sea, Air-to-Sea, Land-to-Sea missiles (SAAB RBS 15).

HISTORY AND FUTURE One may ask how it can be possible for such a small country to produce all these varied types of advanced systems. The answer can be found, in my opinion, in the deliberate balance Sweden has developed between all the actors in the defense procurement arena. In order to ex- amine whether or not it will be possible to maintain this balance in the future, it is helpful to consider four of the factors that makes the balance possible. The factors are: rn Incentives for innovation

Climate for innovation rn Well defined responsibilities between the actors 8 New focuses for innovation

The factors have proven themselves to be vahd (in the Swedish ~ ~ a l community) over a long period of time. A recent confirmation and example of the value and reliability of these factors was the Swedish Navy’s Smyge project. This project was one of the most innovative projects the Swedish Navy has undertaken recently. The project started in the late eighties and was finished three years ago The results from the project are now implemented in the Swedish Navy in many different ways. The Smyge project had three specified aims: rn To test and evaluate stealth technology in a broad sense (within Sweden the delinition of stealth is reduction of all kinds of active and passive signatures such as radar cross section, IR signature, magnetic signature, noise signature, and so on);

rn To test and evaluate total ship system engineering with focus on weapons and sensors within a low-signature ship concept;

rn To test and evaluate the surface effect ship technology. The project was led by the Swedish Defense Materiel

Administration (FMV). It was a joint project with the Swedish Navy, the defense industry, different universities,

the National Defense Research Establishment (FOA), and the Karlskrona Shipyard. Participation was focused on the common incentive-to find cost-effective solutions for the future. The cooperative climate that was created within this project was a necessity for its success. The FMV directed the project with technical knowledge and skill and defined the responsibilities between the actors. This led to an exchange of skills and values among all the actors in the project. The Naval Staff gave input and guidelines on specific tactical areas that needed testing. The Naval Staff in cooperation with the Navy, which conducted the trials, followed and evaluated all trials in order to seek out new tactical and operational concepts used on the new technology, thus identifymg new focuses. The personnel in the Navy and FMV were hand-picked based on their merits. The defense industry and the universities used their knowledge and international partners to create solutions for unforeseen problems during the project. The shipyard had to use commercial technology in many areas in order to keep to the budget. This process also showed that it was possible to use commercial technology in order to reduce cost m many areas instead of using present Navy standards and solutions.

While the Smyge project was platform based and of a relatively small scale, it is my belief that the project fos- tered and created conditions for innovation in many areas. N a t e , the project also benefited from existing structure and the well-developed processes already in place. Therefore, in thdung of innovation, the lessons learned from this project are both accurate and reliable if applied in an adequate way The lessons can form a baseline for a future practical approach in w o r m with innovation. In order to be able to develop this approach for the future, the four factors are therefore discussed in more detail M O W .

INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION General Description Incentives to be considered include the national security and military strategy, since it sets many conditions for the actors within the military-industrial complex. On a more personal level, sufficient chances for personal fulfillment for the people engaged in the innovative community must be provided in order to create drive and spirit.

Strategy Up to the present, a strong incentive for the Swedish defense industry has been Sweden’s strategy of non-align- m t . This comes from the necessity to ensure that the Swedish armed farces would have access to state of the art weapon systems (of our own choice) in case of a crisis. A strong, and nationally independent defense industry, could guarantee this as long as the armed forces were large enough to provide industry with orders.

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Conditions lor Fufure Milllery fnnovstion

Although heady debated, this strategy of non-alignment remains Sweden’s choice for the near future. How- ever, procurement orders from the Swedish armed forces can no longer provide enough orders for industry. New ways of securing independence in a relative sense must therefore be found. The ever-increasing international cooperation among defense industries can provide such a way, if monopoly situations are avoided. Within Europe, a well-developed net of cooperation is probably the only way to be able to counter the large US. defense industry and keep up with weapon system quality and effectiveness.

In order to secure the innovative process, it is therefore necessary to create a web of cooperation and competition within the different defense communities. Monopoly situations benefit no one in the long run and it is the responsibility of governments and defense communities to place orders and spend their R & D money in such ways that this web can be constructed and maintained.

Personal Fulfillment When the military threat diminishes, the defense community does not have the same attraction for people as during times of high threat unless alternative incentives are provided. Stephen Rosen suggests examples of such incentives, such as new paths for promotion possibilities up to flag rank, which must be established within the armed forces. Within the Swedish Navy, the corps of Naval Engineers (Master of Science level) has held its own billets up to the rank of Commodore (approximately Rear Admiral lower half in the current U.S. system). In this way, the Navy has constructed a path where both “mavericks” and “zealots” (mostly Commanders and Captains) have had a chance to act and to be innovative without too many com- plaints from the rest of the naval communities. Although controversial, the system has helped young, skillful, and innovative naval officers obtain positions of authority and responsibility early in their careers. As an example, all of the three most responsible officers in the Smyge project (designer, project manager, and CO of the trials unit) were as young as 31 when the ship was commissioned in 1991. These three officers are now in highly responsible positions within the YS 2000 Visby-class Corvette program and they have all reached the rank of captain.

CLIMATE FOR INNOVATION General Description In order to create the climate for innovation, necessary guidelines from the government and from armed forces headquarters (HQ) needs to be given. Investments have to be made toward increased international cooperation. Advanced technical knowledge has to be kept within the armed forces and personnel exchange systems have to be developed between the armed forces and industry.

Governmental Guidelines The first aspect of a climate for innovation is the need for guidelines to ensure coordinated and synchronized effort. In the future, few countries will have the means to develop and produce all the kinds of products needed in the defense arena. Some kind of speciahzation, within each country, is probably a necessity From an economic viewpoint, if every country tries to do everythmg, there is a high risk that several able companies will go out of business.

A recent approach by governments is to speclfy areas of core technologies as guidelines for the defense industry as well as for other research and development related agen- cies. The Swedish Government has identified five such technologies as vital to keep within the country: w Electronics warfare; w Advanced signature adaptation (stealth in a wider

aspect); Underwater technology; Aviation technology; Maintenance capabilities for today’s systems. In order to ensure that a complete force can be built

with this type of prioritization, the next step should be to develop internationally coordinated guidelines. Such guidelines can provide the defense industry with input to seek joint partners and to further focus their efforts and available capital. Since security related questions and products are always politically sensitive, free market forces alone can not provide the input. Today the Swedish Government places considerable emphasis on broad defense industry cooperation, primarily within Europe. Within Europe the creation of such guidelines are discussed within the West- em European Armaments Group (WEAG) but no specific result yet exists. If provided, such guidelines will help to ensure that knowledge is shared between companies. Re- sponsibilities among the different industries can be divided and result in better competitiveness at lower costs.

Guidelines from the Armed Forces Headquarters In accordance with given guidelines from the government, the Swedish Armed Forces has developed a new strategy for research and technology (R&T). The strategy insti- tutiomhes many of the processes that have been used by the Swedish defense for a long time. The institutional- ization is especially important in times of defense reduc-, tion. The strategy therefore acts like a “guardian” against forces that would like to cut down on the R&T effort and use the available money to fund existing force structure.

The strategy also specifies responsibilities in R&T within the defense community This is likely to reduce internal power-struggles in the future. The strategy also identifies important long-term trends and areas towards which R&T efforts are to be directed. As a result of the strategy, a R&T plan is made (this has been done even


Conditions for Future Military Innovation

before the strategy was formed). This plan has a 10 years’ span of time and is annually updated.

The strategy will be very helpful in the future process of channehg scarce resources to research areas that have future military potential. It therefore plays a vital role in setting the c h t e for further innovation.

International Cooperation When a country’s defense orders are reduced to a degree that they can no longer uphold a speckhed industry, the need for international cooperation expands. In addition to cooperation between different defense industries, cooperation between countries in the procurement process and between separate navies is necessary. In the Nordic countries-Sweden, Denmark and Norway-such cooperation is ongoing. For example, “The Viking Project” aims to create a Nordic submarine concept for the future. All three navies have similar needs for new submarines by the beginning of the next centq . However, the number of submarines each country needs is small, ranging from two to five. There is much to be gained if joint procurement can be arranged. So far, the outline for the project is divided into four phases: study and concept generation (1996-1998), project definition (1998-20011, construction (2000-2006), and production (2001-onwards). While many decisions and much hard work remains before this project can be reahzed, many areas with profitable potential can be identified such as coordinated education, maintenance and future upgrades.

Knowledge-Based Relations One very important consideration is that the climate of relations must be knowledge-based with a well-developed supplier-customer approach. The armed forces (including both the warfighters [users] as well as the procurement organization [buyers]), and the defense industries [sup- pliers]) have different roles to play It is of uttermost im- portance that the complex and detailed knowledge of how systems work be controlled within the armed force, and not left entirely to the defense industry to manage and develop. However, some argue that the armed forces do not and cannot have the detaded knowledge about how complicated systems are constructed and work. This argument is based on the observations that it is too expensive to gain and keep knowledge in the technically complex systems of today The role of the armed forces, accordmg to this argument, is to write aims and specifications. The defense industry then transforms these specification into hardware and delivers the product more or less “ready to use.”

The main counter-argument to this approach comes from difficulties that occur when the development phase is left entirely to the defense industry. Over time, this approach means that the armed forces will lose core com- petencies in several high-tech areas and become more and more dependent on the defense industry. The “end result”

of such an approach leaves only one “innovative” player- the defense industry itself. The central problem is that the armed forces will lose the ability to direct, focus and select future innovative paths. The capability to write stringent specifications wdl diminish and the armed forces will become less competent and professional customers than otherwise would be the case. The defense industry needs strong and capable customers to be able to produce top- quality equipment. If they fail to do this, they will lose credibility and competitiveness and ultimately go out of business.

The key to success lies in s e e h g new approaches for sharing information between the parties involved, while still keeping a necessary customer-supplier approach. One approach for doing this is through education and the exchange of personnel.

Personnel Exchange Raising the combined educational level is an important task. Currently all Swedish men who work in the defense industry have served as conscripts in the Swedish armed forces. Therefore, they share some, although limited, experience of military matters. When the force structure is reduced, there will no longer be a need for everyone to serve. So the number of people with military experience will be reduced within the defense industry. As a result, the advantage of hands-on knowledge of the armed force will decline.

An understanding at a personal level creates trust. When trust has been built, it is easier for ideas and innovations to be implemented. To do this, however, the armed forces as well as industry need to come up with new concepts to resolve this trend in order to keep today’s edge in the future.

One way is simply to create rmlitary jobs within industry itself. For example, an officer could work at a major con- tractor for a limited number of years in a suitable position. By having assignments in industry, the officer corps will gain knowledge of industry conditions, create personal contacts, and in some cases find out about new and prom- ising technologies and approaches. At the same time they will be able to provide valuable input to industry on the military’s views, needs and priorities.

To compensate for the loss of manpower, people from the defense industry could be assigned to different positions within the military system, perhaps as temporanly commissioned or reserve officers. Their function would be to provide specialized expertise from the outside and to help the military to build competence in specific areas.

While countries like Sweden have some of these functions within the conscript system, they still lack a rotation system at higher levels of knowledge. It is one thmg to have a small rotation of 2O-year-olds, but the potential is much greater with 30-35-year-old officers. For countries with other personnel structures, retirement rules and ROTC programs create input to industry. However, the

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Conditions lor Fulure Military Innovalion

rotation of people between industry and the military in the 30-35 year age group is still lackmg.

WELL DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN THE ACTORS One of the major problems in downsizing is to maintain well-defined responsibilities between the key players. In times of sigmficant change, the definition may be non- existent because of the turmoil that follows in the wake of the change. However, sigmficant change within an organization can be revitalizing if handled properly More com- monly, however, a drastic change between players creates long-term confusion and can lead to the loss of valuable and critical information in the process. Without proper thought, brilliant innovations can disappear or be “killed.”

Within the Swedish system, several actors share the task of maintaining the definition of responsibilities. The Armed Forces Headquarters, the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV), the Swedish National Defense Re- search Establishment (FOA, carries out applied research and studies for the total Swedish Defense), the Swedish National Defense College (FHS), the Swedish Aeronauti- cal Research Institute (FFA), and the military services all have their roles to play in times of change.

The key to the process is a fine network of cooperation based on high knowledge and respect. The way new systems and programs are studied is to include members from all the mentioned actors, with each contributing their special SMS. At the same time there is a degree of competitiveness between the actors and their internal communities. As a result, sound arguments are placed on the table and unproductive fighting is kept to a minimum.

In this process, there is an analogy to Clausewitz’s trinity of people, government, and army In the innovative process the HQ represents the government; FMY FOA, FFV, and FHS represents the people; and the armed forces represent the army As Clausewitz said, in order for a war to be successful, all three must be synchronized and work towards a common aim. The existence of a trinity also ensures that several views are put forward and that ideas for innovation are more likely to be reviewed. The new Swedish strategy for R&T WIN ensure that this “trinity” is held in place.

NEW FOCUSES FOR INNOVATION General Description New focuses for innovation must also be considered in order to make the framework functional. Among new focuses are test platforms, adaptation of commercial technology for defense purposes, intelligence, high-technology versus low-technology versus no-technology, operational art and tactics, and continuous development.

Test Platforms As mentioned, it is my belief that test platforms are a very effective way to foster innovation. One of the things the Swedish Navy learned from Smyge was the ability of a highly trained crew to gain knowledge on how to proceed with future projects. The technology envelope was pushed to the h i t in several areas. Within the project this created a mutual feeling “that if everything is successful during the construction phase and trials program-we have not pushed technology far enough to identlfy limiting factors!” The Swedish Navy therefore made mistakes and found problems on the test platform, rather than on a ship “in the line.” Problems that arose were attacked by all parties, and as the trials went on, solved. The ship was commissioned in 1991 and sea trials went on for four years. It is widely accepted within the Swedish defense community that this program was decisive in proving the value of stealth technology in a broader way The ship also acted as an “icebreaker” within the Navy and showed the con- servatives (they seem to gather in navies) that things really could be done in a new way! Many old (and young) “hard-liners” could see with their own eyes that you could run a ship without lookouts standing on an open bridge, that it was possible to handle the ship in port from hatches, and so on. In that way, the project also opened up possibilities for future changes in ship design which otherwise would have been much harder or even impossible to do.

The best gain from the project, however, is still to come. The Swedish Navy, the defense industry, and the research laboratories were able to maintain momentum in their development efforts. This momentum now serves them in many ways during the procurement stages of the YS 2000 Visby-class stealth Corvettes. Four Visby-class Corvettes have been ordered and are under construction and production at the Karlskrona shipyard.

During those four trial years the Swedish Navy also learned that ships with such new capabilities cannot be used in the same old way as ships were used before. New tactics are required to realize the full potential of new systems. Extensive battle simulation and tactical, as well as operational, studies have been conducted. In that way, the evolution of tactics has already begun, and operational concepts will be ready when the first of the new ships are commissioned at the beginning of the next century

It is easy to believe that an approach like this is very expensive. Nevertheless, I would argue that it is a cost-, effective way to keep evolution and innovation up to speed. The contract cost for HMS Smyge was about 15 million USD. The Karlskrona shipyard contributed approximately another 4 million USD of its own money (this amount has not been made official by the shipyard). The Navy, which basically sponsored the crew and the trials during the four year period, put in another 2-3 million dollars a year in- cludmg developing costs. Other groups may have put in a similar amount if the calculus is done “on the high side.” This adds up to a total cost of less than 35 million USD


Condifians lor Fufum Milifary Innovation

for the Smyge program. The next generation of surface ships within the Swedish Navy, the YS 2000 Visby Class corvettes (YS can be translated as “surface combatant”) is estimated to cost about 450 million USD (for 4 ships). The investment of 35 million USD is less than eight percent of the cost for this future class of ships. The confi- dence in the value of stealth gained by the Swedish Navy is worth more than the eight percent. The Navy is also convinced that many mistakes that were made on Smyge will not occur on the new ships.

Adaptation of Commercial Technology for Defense Purposes To foster innovation within the defense industry, the armed forces need to take a new approach toward commercial industry. The idea is simply to get more people into the defense innovation process. The military needs to seek new ways to adapt commercial products over a wide spec- trum. If we are believers in the market economy, it is plausible that the military can use the technologies that are “out there” in the marketplace. Today, the center of technological acceleration in areas such as digitalization, computer processing and global positioning lies generally in the commercial sector. Perhaps these technologies need to be applied differently to have rmlitary sigdicance. The chance that the defense products can have commercial use is not totally out of bounds either. In a recent study, made at the Swedish National Defense College, the idea of dual- usage is mentioned as one of the key future options for the defense industry. This approach leads to another new focus that needs to be reviewed intelligence.

Intelligence About the year 500 B.C. in China, Sun-Tzu said “Know your enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” Still, his argument holds true. When it comes to military innovation, intelligence has always played a sigdicant role. To find out “what the enemy is building” has always been a important concern. In civilian industry, intelligence and counter-intelligence are important factors for survival. There is nothmg new about either of these two approaches.

To be able to find, to adapt, and to develop civilian technology and innovation for military purposes there is a new need for the military to search and to scan the civilian sector for possible new technologies. The need for search and scan is most apparent outside the defense industry, but is equally necessary in the armed forces.

High-Technology versus Low-Technology Few people have argued against the need for high technology since the Gulf War. It has almost become sacro- sanct that high technology is necessary in all areas for a successful military outcome. One modem high-technology dup, for instance, can be more efficient than two ships that lack the same amount of technology on board. The

problem, so far, is that the chosen paths of technology in many areas have dnven the costs sky-high and, therefore, have forced a reduction in future equipment and systems (such as ships). One ship can only be at one place at a time, and if the enemy sinks that ship, the cost can be very high. Therefore, it is necessary to use, to find, and to balance high technology with low technology in a way that actually reduces cost, minimizes risk and maximizes opportunities. High technology needs to be focused on where advantages in combat are needed such as in weapon and sensor systems. In other areas, low technology can be used as a way to reduce cost and also as a way to increase the ability to resist battle-damage. It is important to state that innovations in low-technology are just as important as the innovations in high technology The real challenge is to balance these two aspects of technology in order to maximize battle effectiveness.

Another example is to construct and build platforms in ways that allow crews on the battlefield to maintain them. This would reduce the need for backup from logistic forces in the rear. The Swedish aircraft JAS 39 Gripen, is a good example. This aircraft, one of the world‘s most modem airplanes, can be maintained on the battlefield. This is done by a small number of conscripts led by an officer of lieutenant rank. This is an approach that actually reduces the costs in the long run and also reduces the number of personnel with long and specialized training.

High-Technology and No-Technology Another way to reduce cost is to remove the need for one or several systems on a ship by having such high technology in other aspects that the need for other systems dis- appears. One example of this is stealth technology. Imag- ine a ship with aspects of stealth technology in terms of low radar cross section, low acoustic signature and low magnetic signature. Used properly, one could reduce or even remove some active defense systems on board such a dup and, thus, reduce the procurement and the maintenance costs.

Operational Art and Tactics Today defense industries have become more and more interdependent and specialized in every country. Eventu- ally, this may lead to a situation in which many actors in a potential conflict will have about the same standard of equipment and weapon systems. A similar situation hap- pened in the Falklands War when Argentina launched French Exocet missiles with considerable success against the Royal Navy. In such a conflict-a conflict among peers, so to speak-the operational concepts and the battlefield tactics used by each side will become more and more important compared with the technical level of the forces themselves.

In the light of this situation, the concept of technological innovation needs to be broadened so that it also encom- passes operations and tactics, not just technology. Great

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Conditions for Future Military Innovation

effort needs to be made to ensure that technologically brilliant innovations can be used so that the overall operational and tactical capabilities increase. Technology should act as a force-multiplier, and not merely as a means in itself.

The engineers and operators must work together with wargaming, simulations, and operational analysis to seek out new operational and tactical frontiers. The operational factors involving space, force, and time as well as different operational functions have to be applied in new ways, merging operational art with developing technology. This development has to be carried out in a broad way so that unconventional initiatives are encouraged. To be successful, this must be done in close cooperation with industry, the armed forces, and the universities.

Continuous Development One of the most controversd arguments is that a series of ships or other weapon systems that are not produced over a very long time-period (such as aircraft and vehicles) should be limited within countries that are not superpow- ers. In a small country, it is particularly important to en- courage continuous development. This means having few years between the introduction of classes or variants within the same class of systems. This is necessary for industry and the armed forces in order to remain “in the first line of the technological battle.” If a higher number of systems is needed to keep the price down, and industries occupied, the variety of systems has to be created in some other way The joint Nordic project V i g is such a model for doing this with future submarines. The use of test platforms and test systems is another, although such a model can only work for a very limited number of years.

The need for high quality is also essential in a security situation when increased defense spending might be of interest. In such a situation, time is likely to be inadequate to permit development of new systems that can meet new demands.

CONCLUSION There are no easy ways to ensure that military innovation will meet the armed forces’ future needs. Innovation will occur. However, the trick is to be able to benefit from it and to incorporate it within the military systems so that an effective and capable force is the result. Strategy, operational art, tactical capabilities, technology, and the officers and men of the future are part of such a balanced structure. In the process of malung such a system, innovations play a key role. Innovations will occur if appropri- ate incentives are used, a good climate for innovation exists, well-defined responsibilities between the actors are upheld and new focuses for innovations used and applied. If all this is done, innovations will play a beneficial and

sigmficant role in the shaping of National Security Strat- egies, National Military Strategies, and future forces.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bjorkman, RAdm. Bertil. “Samnordiskt ubatsprojekt VIKING-

myt eller verklighet,” Tidskrift i Sjmendet, 411996, pp. 291- 304.

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FMV HMS S q g e , a test ship, Stockholm: 1990. Krepinevich, Andrew E Restructuring for a new era: Framing the roles & missions debate, Defense Budget Project: April 1995.

Nordbeck, VAdm. Peter. “Marina stridskrafter Ostersjon-Vas- terhavet-Ett vidgat sakerhetspolitiskt perspektiv i norra Eu- ropa,” Tidskrift i S jmazde t , 111997, pp. 7-12.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to give his acknowledgments to Professor John B. Hattendorf, United States Naval War College and to Professor Henry C. Bartlett, United States Naval War College for their insightful advice and help during the work with thls paper. +

Capt. Thomas E. Engevall , Royal Swedish N a y is currently serving as the D@& Program Manager fm the Visby Class Stealth Cmvettes at the Swedish Defense Material Admin- istration (FMV), Stockholm, Sweden. He has a M.Sc. in Naval Architecture fiom Chalmers Universi& of Bchmloa, Gothen- burg, Sweden. He graduated from Naval Command College, U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. , in 199Z His previous assignments i n c l d s duties as Chief Staff Engineer Swedish Fleet Stafi Commander Sea Trials unit Smyge (Sweden’s stealth test ship). Captain Engevall is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy j&r Naval Sciences, and of ASNE and USNI.


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