competition scenario in cambodia* - cuts internationalcapacity that facilitate business, trade and...

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CHAPTER V

COMPETITION SCENARIO IN CAMBODIA*

IntroductionCambodia was disrupted by civil war and isolatedfrom the rest of the world under Pol Pot’s (KhmerRouge) regime and for quite long, even after that. Thecountry’s basic infrastructure was totally destroyed,the intelligentsia devastated – which included themajority of its legal, economic and engineeringexpertise. A democratic administration wasestablished in 1993, trying to shake-up the economyof the country since the late 1980s. However, most ofthe efforts were ineffectual, as the country continuedto be torn apart by civil war.

Being one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)and now on the way to opening up and carrying outmarket-oriented reforms, Cambodia is striving tomobilise all domestic and international resourcesavailable as well as grasp the opportunities for growthand development, by liberalising trade andinvestment. The Cambodian economy is becomingincreasingly complex: urbanisation rates areincreasing; the labour force is shifting from agricultureto light manufacturing and services; the market isexpanding; and the enterprise sector is growing. Inthis context, the task of building a comprehensiveframework of market-oriented laws to create well-functioning private markets has become importantpriority on the development agenda of Cambodia.

Cambodia’s recent memberships to the Associationof South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the WorldTrade Organisation (WTO) also require economicstrategies, which are more adaptable to the changingenvironment. All these changes also demand a policyframework that will provide flexibility for marketplayers and, at the same time, require the leastregulatory intervention, stable institutions to enforcecontracts and property rights, and enhance thepredictability, transparency, and accountability ofstate actions.

Though Cambodia does not yet have a competitionlaw and policy, it has outlined a rather ambitiousprogramme to increase the economy’s internationalcompetitiveness. The cultivation of private markets,economic integration into ASEAN and accession tothe WTO are cornerstones of Cambodia’s economicpolicy. Moreover, to fulfil its accession commitmentsto the WTO, Cambodia would soon have to adopt anational legislation on competition issues.

This chapter looks at the existing state of competition,regulation and consumer protection in Cambodia aspart of the research activity undertaken under theCUTS 7Up2 Project – “Advocacy and CapacityBuilding on Competition Policy and Law in Asia”.More specifically, it analyses the implications ofexisting government policies and interventions on themarkets in the absence of a competition policy andlaw in the country in Section Two. The argument putforward is that Cambodia has much to gain from theimplementation of such a law and policy, and, withoutthe same the country’s long-term growth prospects aswell as social welfare will be undermined. SectionThree discusses the overall structure and the natureof competition in some industries/sectors, where andwhen the scarce information and database in thecountry allows. Section Four explores the existingregulatory regime in some key sectors, such astelecommunications, electricity and financial services,while Section Five looks briefly at such regime vis-à-vis consumer protection. Section Six highlights thevarious anti-competitive practices and unfair tradepractices observed during the process of field researchundertaken under the 7Up2 project. In Section Seven,the results of a perspective survey, also administeredunder this project, regarding the desired competitionregime, which should be built up for Cambodia, arepresented. The chapter is then completed with someconcluding remarks and recommendations for thefuture.

The Existing Economic Policy Regimeand its Implications on Competition

Overview of the EconomyAfter the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979,Cambodia pursued a centrally planned economicsystem. In 1989, Cambodia began its transformationtowards a free market-oriented economic system;however, the country was still distracted by civil warduring the subsequent period, limiting the scope foreconomic development. The support of theinternational community led to the 1991 Paris PeaceAccord that unified all conflict parties and the firstfree and fair national election in 1993 under theauspices of the United Nations Peace Keeping Process,known as United Nations Transitional Authority inCambodia (UNTAC). With the establishment of the

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first coalition government, Cambodia intended inearnest to restore itself to peace.

To back the political aims, many reforms have beenundertaken with assistance from the internationalcommunity. In 1994, a medium-term adjustment andreform programme aimed at restoring the macro-economic stability was launched and a process ofinstitutional strengthening supported by theinternational community was undertaken.

During those first years of liberalisation and reforms,foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cambodia increasedsignificantly, rising from 3.5 percent of gross domesticproduct (GDP) in 1994 to 8.3 percent in 1996.Investment covered almost all sectors of the economy.Economic growth was relatively strong, averaging atabout seven to eight percent per year. However,persistently weakgovernance and thepolitical crisis of 1997,together with the Asianfinancial crisis led to asharp economicslowdown.

Despite a large numberof investment projectsin the garment industrysince 1997 and in thetourism industry since1999, the total volumeof FDI flow intoCambodia hasdeclined progressively,plummeting to lessthan 1.5 percent of theGDP in 2002.1 As aresult, Cambodia’sGDP growth steadily

slowed from seven percent in2000 to 5.5 percent in 2002, andto 5.3 percent in 2003.According to EconomicInstitute of Cambodia's (EIC’s)model projection, Cambodia’sGDP growth would decline (toonly 3.2 percent in 2005 and 3percent for the coming years)(see Figure 5.1) due to theelimination of the quota systemworldwide, resulting in a greatdecline of Cambodian garmentexports to the US.2

Cambodia’s economy is cash-based and highly dollarised.The exchange rate in recentyears was about 4000 riels perUS$. Inflation rate was about

5.6 percent from January to December 2004, whereashad been only 0.5 percent in 2003.

Agriculture, as mentioned earlier, remains thebackbone of the economy. It employs more than 70percent of the total workforce. The contribution of theagriculture sector to GDP has been in declining trend,but its value (in US$ term) has a slight up-downchange. Agriculture contributes about 26 percent toGDP in 2004 down from about 30 percent in 2003,and 40 percent in 1995. On the other hand, thecontribution of the industrial sector has been inincreasing trend, while that of the service sector seemsto be stable. Contribution of the industrial sector wasabout 16 percent in 1995, but this figure almostdoubled (about 27 percent in 2003 and 30 percent in2004), thanks to the growth of the garment industryunder the quota system. The service sector contributed

Source: EIC, compiled from government and international organisation primarydata and EIC model’s projection.

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

1960 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Figure 5.1: GDP Growth of Cambodia

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1960 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Agriculture Industry Service

Figure 5.2: Cambodia-Percentage of GDP by IndustryOrigin at Constant Price in 2000

Source: EIC, compiled from government and international organisation primary data and EICmodel’s projection.

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about 45 percent to GDP since 1995, but its value hasincreased significantly, recently (about 60 percent).

Cambodia’s total exports have noticeably increasedin recent years from US$0.3bn to US$2bn in 2003. TheUS, which used to absorb just 1.4 percent ofCambodia’s exports in 1996, has become a majordestination for Cambodia’s exports, which rose toabout 60 percent in 2003 due to the boom in garmentexports. In the same year, the value of garment exportswas about US$1.6bn, equivalent to about 80 percentof the total exports. The US and the European Union(EU) markets absorbed about 70 percent and 25 percentof the country’s garment exports respectively.

Total imports reached about US$2.8bn in 2003, upfrom about US$1.6bn in 1996. Cambodia’s tradebalance thus has been in deficit during this period.Cambodia’s imports are dominated by other ASEANcountries, accounting for between 40 percent and 70percent of the country’s total import value.

Cambodia’s Economic Policy Regimeand its Implications on CompetitionCambodia does not hitherto have any competitionlegislation. The concept of competition, however, isno longer new to Cambodia. The 1993 Constitution ofCambodia declared the pursuance of an economicmechanism based on market forces in the country,and obliquely provided for the role of the State to takenecessary intervention measures to protect thecompetitive process of the marketplace as well as toprotect consumer welfare.

Article 62 of the Constitution requires the State to payattention to and help solve production matters, protectthe price of products of farmers, crafters, and find themarketplace for them to sell their products. The Stateneeds also to respect market management in order toguarantee a better standard of living for the people(Article 63). As regards consumer protection, the Statehas the mandate to ban and severely punish thosewho import, manufacture or sell illicit drugs, orcounterfeit and expired goods, which affect health andlife of the consumers (Article 64).

The Royal Government of Cambodia has paid fairattention to promoting competition in the market.Development of the private sector has been consideredan important force for gearing up economic growthand generating employment. The governmentacknowledged its critical roles as the architect ofdevelopment by creating an environment conduciveto the development of private enterprises. The role ofgovernment has therefore been, inter alia, to ensurefair competition, transparency, and accountabilitybetween enterprises including public enterprises inthe markets.

Excerpt from the RGC’sRectangular Strategy

Rectangle III: Private Sector Development andEmployment Generation, Slide 1: Strengthening thePrivate Sector and Attracting Investments: […] (i)implementation of policy of Cambodian economicintegration into the regional and world economy; (ii)development of both software and hardware nationalinfrastructure networks; and (iii) strengthening of thelegal framework for enterprise. Within the frameworkof legal framework enhancement, the policy also takesaccount of various laws, regulations and institutionalcapacity that facilitate business, trade and privateinvestment, especially “fair competition,transparency, accountability and fruitful partnershipbetween private and public sectors”.

The enactment of a competition law is a part of thegovernment’s immediate agenda to fulfil thecommitments in the WTO accession deal of Cambodia.Accordingly, a competition law is scheduled forapproval by the National Assembly and the Senate ofCambodia by March 2005 and January 2006,respectively.3 However, the political deadlock afterthe elections of July 2003 has delayed the wholeschedule for enacting laws in compliance with theWTO deal.4

Trade PolicyDuring the 1970s when the country was shattered byregional conflicts and civil wars, there was virtuallyno trading activity, domestic or foreign, in Cambodia.Under the socialist-style economic system adopted inthe early 1980s, both domestic and foreign trade waseffectively controlled by the State through a networkof state-owned trading monopolies. Together with theprocess of market-oriented reforms, which started inthe late 1980s, Cambodia’s trade policy was graduallyliberalised.

The abolishment of the state monopoly for foreigntrade in 1987, and the promulgation of the foreigninvestment law in 1989 allowing private companiesto engage in foreign trade, was the initial stepstowards trade liberalisation. Since then, Cambodiastarted to remove all restrictions placed upon firmsand individuals engaging in international trade. Theadoption of the 1993 Constitution, formalising thepursuance of a clear-cut market economy system inCambodia, was the biggest landmark confirming thefull freedom of Cambodian people to engage in bothdomestic and foreign trade.

Since 1994, Cambodia eliminated most quantitativerestrictions and licensing of imports, except for certaincommodities like pharmaceutical products, gold andsilver, ornaments, ammunition and various culturaland medical materials. Imports of some products suchas pork, motorbike tyres, right-hand four-wheelers,

Cambodia


and second hand footwear, however, are banned.Several classes of products — such as fish, liveanimals and raw hides and skins — are subject toexport taxes.

Tariffs were drastically reduced over time, the latestreduction in 2001. The highest rate of 120 percent wasreduced to only 35 percent. The tariff system wassimplified by reducing the number of tariff bands from12 to 4. But a cascading structure still prevails, with thehighest rates applying to processed goods and lowestrates on raw materials, as an effective shield to protectthe infant processing industries in Cambodia.

The RGC retains its control over exports on the basisof the rule of origin (RoO) as required by other tradingpartners, health, security reasons as well as publicinterests in the form of licences and permits. This typeof control involves: (i) exports of commodities, whichhave bearings on national security, safety and health(such as food, military equipments, pharmaceuticaland medical goods); and (ii) exports of rice due tofood security purposes. Weak institutions andgovernance, nonetheless, render the RGC’s controlover exports inefficient. There are many exports thathave been illegally carried out, particularly at theborders with Thailand and Vietnam.

Cambodia has pro-actively integrated itself intoregional and global markets. The country has becomea member of ASEAN since April 1999, and agreed togradually reduce most tariff rates by 2010 (0-5 percenttarget) under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement(AFTA) schemes. In September 2003, Cambodia wasfully admitted to the WTO with a package ofmembership deals that include concessions andcommitments to reduce tariffs of goods, open theservices sector, and comply with the WTO TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)Agreement.

The liberalisation policies have generated positiveimpacts on the trade flows of Cambodia, especiallywhen quantitative restrictions were removed. Theimport and export value have significantly increased.Due to limited numbers of investments and low levelof domestic productions, Cambodia is heavilydependent on imports of consumer goods, such ascigarettes, televisions, gold, motorcycles, beer,construction materials, cloth, clothing, sugar, cement,steel, and petroleum products, etc, to cater to the needsof the consumers.

Few state trading companies continue to exist withsome privileges; however, trading activities becomemore dynamic with the increased participation fromthe private sector. Competition on both export andimport markets, as well as on the domestic tradingmarkets becomes stiffer, forcing market players toincrease efficiency and adopt new techniques to

compete for customers. An increased number of marketparticipants, coupled with tariff reductions, has ledthe prices of a wide range of imported goods to lowervastly, hence benefiting poor Cambodian consumers.

Investment PolicyAfter the 1993 election, Cambodia started changingits investment policy with a view to attracting moreinvestors into the country. The new 1994 InvestmentLaw was therefore enacted, and subsequently anothertwo sub-decrees: the Sub-decree on theImplementation of the Investment Law No. 88 ANKR-BK issued in 1997 and Sub-decree No. 53 ANKR-BKon Restriction on Some Sectors of Investment issuedin 1999.

Cambodia does not restrict investment, except incertain sectors for national security, social safety andeconomic necessity reasons. Investment in certainhighly ‘sensitive’ sectors is prohibited by bothnational and foreign investors, such as processing ofcultural items, processing of timber and woodproducts using local raw materials, production oftoxic chemicals and weapons production. Certainother sectors require some equity participation by anational or require special approvals from thegovernment for foreign involvement, such as tobacco,alcohol, gemstones, rice mill, wood and stone carving,silk weaving, publishing, printing, radio andtelevision, and land ownership.

A wide range of incentives is to be provided toqualified investors5 without discrimination based onnationality, providing a significant financial benefitto all approved projects. Nearly all approved projectswill enjoy a corporate profit tax rate of nine percent(as compared to the standard rate of 20 percent),except for investment projects on national resourcesexploitation like timber, oil, mines, gold, and preciousstones. A tax holiday of up to eight years may beawarded, depending on the size of the project, sector,location, employees and other criteria. Otherincentives include non-taxation on the distributionof dividends or profits; 100 percent import dutyexemption on construction materials, means ofproduction, equipments, intermediate goods, rawmaterials and spare parts if a minimum of 80 percentof overall goods produced by an investment project isdestined for export or if the project is located in theSpecial Promotion Zone (SPZ); and no restriction onemployment of management personnel and experts,technical personnel, skilled workers, who are subjectto compliance with immigration and labour laws.

Investment in some sectors that are not entitled toincentives such as projects in transportation services,duty free shops, restaurants or other types ofentertainment clubs, business centres,telecommunication services, press related activities,

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professional services, retail and wholesale trading,etc. On the other hand, incentives are available forinvestments into a variety of areas such as cropproduction, livestock, fisheries, industrialmanufacturing, textile and garments, milling,construction of hotels, construction of physicalinfrastructure, etc.

Cambodia’s investment policy has significantlyincreased the total amount of capital invested in thecountry. This investment policy has contributedsubstantially towards increased marketparticipation, and has thus created a favourablyupward drive on market competition in the economy.The equal treatment between domestic and foreigninvestors is rather a unique feature of Cambodia’sinvestment policy as compared to other countries inthe region, which usually have two different policiesfor domestic and foreign investors. Both national andforeign investments are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner in Cambodia, with the onlyexception that foreign investors cannot own any landand only Cambodian nationals are entitled to landownership. Nevertheless, the Investment Lawprovides foreign investors with two alternative, viablepossibilities: they can either acquire long-term leasesof up to 70 years, renewable upon request; or make ajoint-venture with local companies that own share ofmore than 51 percent of the equity capital.

Industrial and Privatisation PolicyThe Cambodian economy is characterised by a verysmall and less developed industrial base and a largeagricultural sector, which has always been thebackbone of the economy. The garment sector is theonly manufacturing industry in Cambodia of any note,benefiting from the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) andGeneralised System of Preferences (GSP) privilegesgranted by the US and EU. Lying at the core ofCambodia’s industrial policy is a policy to focus moreresources on and provide more incentives to attractinvestment first and foremost into those sectors, whereCambodia has comparative advantages as thrust areasfor export promotion, and secondly into thedevelopment of physical infrastructure andproduction of basic necessities and utilities to cater tothe domestic needs instead of relying completely onimports. In more details, as formally pronounced bythe RGC6 , Cambodia’s industrial policy is built uponseven main points:l First, developing labour-intensive industries, such

as garment, toy and footwear;l Second, promoting the development of agri-

business by strengthening the legal framework forlonger-term land management and providingincentives to establish agri-processing factories;

l Third, developing industries which are based onthe utilisation of basic natural resources, mainlyby processing the existing natural resources in the

country such as fish, meat, cement production,brick and tile by using technology and sustainablesources of energy;

l Fourth, promoting small and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs), micro-enterprises andhandicraft by providing micro-finance,streamlining procedures, providing marketingservices, training on production techniques,management and supplying information onsectoral development;

l Fifth, encouraging technology transfer and exportproduct diversification by promoting the assemblyof electrical appliances and electronics productsfor domestic and industrial use and improvingproduct quality;

l Sixth, establishing industrial and exportprocessing zones (EPZ) by developinginfrastructure, improving service quality,streamlining procedures and encouraginginvestments; and

l Seventh, increasing the production of goods forimport substitution to some extent by encouragingthe development of paper, chemical industries,such as the production of fertilisers, acid, as wellas daily consumption goods such as soap, paint,electrical appliance, water pump and agriculturalinputs, etc.

These policies, coupled with a cascading tariffstructure (the highest rates being applied on processedand final products, and the lowest on raw materials),could mean effective protection for domestic industriesagainst competition from imports and promotion ofexports to compete with goods produced andmarketed internationally by other trading partners ofCambodia. There are, however, downside risksinvolved. One such risk may be that differentcommodities will enjoys varied levels of protection,which might lead to costly resource misallocation, byinducing scarce resources away from productiveactivities to less productive ones. The other is that thecosts of such protection might easily be transferred toother down-stream industries or the local consumer.

The one slight difference of the Cambodian economywhen compared with other economies in the sameregion lies in the smaller size of the ‘inefficient’ statesector of the sort found, for instance, in Vietnam, LaoPDR or China. In Cambodia, where corruption is atremendous problem, the State, or ratherrepresentatives of the State seem to be more interestedin collecting rents, snatching away forest and landownership rather than building up their businessempires, shielded away from the competitive threatsof the domestic private sector or other foreign players.This characteristic, together with a rigorous processof opening up the economy and liberalisation, hasled to a full-fledged privatisation policy forCambodia’s State assets.

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Consequently, many State-owned enterprises (SOEs)have been sold and/or leased to the private sector.Some have received foreign investment and have beenturned into joint ventures. As on April 2000, thenumber of privatised SOEs – mainly in themanufacturing, agriculture and commerce sectors –amounted to 177, of which 152 had been leased toprivate investors, five were turned into joint venturesand 20 had been sold off.7 Seven rubber companieswould remain SOEs until 2006, along with around 13enterprises that are considered to have a crucial rolein providing public services to the Cambodia economy(see Table 5.1).

Though some SOEs remain in existence in Cambodia,they seem not to pose a big threat to competition toother private traders, as they are required to competefairly with private companies on the same marketsand are not entitled to special trading rights orprivileges. Evidently, some SOEs have lost incompeting with private traders and have thuscollapsed due to their limited technologies andinabilities to compete with other imported productsin the market.9 The collapses of SOEs may prove thatthe government industrial policy does not actuallyfavour the state enterprises.

Market Structure and CompetitionThe Cambodian economy is made up of a handful ofSOEs and a vast private sector, of which the hugemajority constitutes small and informal enterprises.The agricultural sector mostly comprises of small-scale or household production units, which operateon an informal basis, without any form of registrationor taxation. The non-farm sector operates bothformally and informally, also with a big discrepancyin proportion between the two segments. It wasestimated that, in 2001, there were about 27,000 smallenterprises in Cambodia, which did not register withthe Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and only half of thisnumber operate their business with a MoC’s licence.Only approximately 9,000 companies have officiallyregistered their business. Small enterprises, whileoften licensed to operate by the MoC and other relevantministries at the provincial-municipal level, normallydo not pay profit taxes and are regulated informallyby the local level authorities. Non-licensed enterprisesare often subject to paying small-scale unofficial feesto local authorities. Those commercial enterprises,which are registered with the MoC, are subject to profittaxes based on the filing of financial statements withthe tax authorities. There is a grey area between

Table 5.1: List of State-Owned Enterprises (as on March 2003)8

Ministry in Charge Name of Enterprise

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Chub Rubber Plantation Company

Krek Rubber Plantation Company

Memut Rubber Plantation Company

Chamkar Andaung Rubber Plantation Company

Pem Chang Rubber Plantation Company

Boeung Ket Rubber Plantation Company

Agricultural Inputs Company

Ministry of Public Works and Transport Sihanouk Ville Port

Phnom Penh Port

Kampuchea Shipping Agency and Broker (KAMSAB)

Laboratory of Construction

Royal Railway of Cambodia

Neak Loeung Ferry

Prek Kdam Ferry

Municipality of Phnom Penh Phnom Penh Water Supply

Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy Electricity of Cambodia (EDC- Electricite du Cambodge)

Ministry of Economy and Finance Rural Development Bank

Ministry of Commerce Green Trade Company

Joint-venture enterprises (51%: State shares) Cambodia Pharmaceutical Enterprise

Camintel Company

Source: WTO: Report of the working party on the accession of Cambodia dated August 2003 (WT/ACC/KHM/2)

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informal and formal sectors where enterprises arelocally licensed, but are not formally registered andtaxed. If an enterprise grows to a certain point, it mustregister with the MoC and formalise its operations. Atthis point, the enterprise will pay profit tax based onthe real regime method and will be subject to oversightfrom several ministries relevant to its business.Because of the increased administrative and taxburden resulting from entering the formal sector, thereis an incentive to stay small. Enterprises will onlyregister if their size is big enough to qualify for theincentives given in accordance with the InvestmentLaw, or to apply for import and import licences aswell as to improve their access to the formal financialsector10 . Owing to such a cause, the informal sectoris vast in Cambodia.

The low industrialisation level and high dependenceon imports for most products in Cambodia places thesmall community of local enterprises of the countryunder huge competitive pressure from foreign players.An extensive number of impediments, includingcomplicated licensing procedures, lack of access tofinancial capital, poor access to social infrastructuresuch as health care, limited access to vocationaltrainings, poor road and transportation conditions,high costs of electricity, etc., also render competitionwith imported products difficult for facingCambodian enterprises11 . Besides, smuggling andcounterfeiting are also very rampant in Cambodia,which makes life even more difficult for honestproducers and traders.

In addition to local production and registered imports,informal across-the-border trade undertaken by smallCambodian traders (other than smuggling) withVietnam, Thailand, Lao PDR, China, is alsosubstantially serving the Cambodia market. This isanother informal feature of the Cambodia economy,which somehow helps reduce the scope formonopolisation or cartelisation practices over imports– the bloodline to various economic sectors in the

country. On the otherhand, the scanty andseriously defectivetelecommunications andtransportation networksfacilitate the prevalence ofmonopolistic behavioursand abuses of dominance atthe provincial level, due todifficulty in goods circulationand services provision.

The high level of informalityof the market and loweconomic administrationand management capacity inCambodia makes themaintenance of a database

on the market shares of enterprises an impossible taskat the current stage. Hardly any information orstatistics on market shares is available, either fromgovernment reports or private sources like companies’websites or market research reports. Even whereinformation is available, it is often inaccurate, andimperfect.

The Manufacturing SectorThe manufacturing sector in Cambodia is very lessdeveloped and comprises mostly of small,unregistered enterprises. According to an annualsurvey of industrial enterprises undertaken by theMinistry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), therewere about 27,000 small industrial establishmentswith fewer than 50 employees in Cambodia, most ofwhich are food, beverage and tobacco manufacturers,as compared to around 400 licensed medium (50-200employees) and large (over 200 employees) industrialestablishments, most of which are in the garmentsector (75 percent).

Textiles, Wearing Apparel andLeather IndustriesAccording to the 2004 MIME report on industrialestablishments, the number of textile and garmentfactories in Cambodia amounted to 320 in total. Thesefactories compete fairly with each other. Since the mainmarkets of these enterprises are mainly for exports,there should not be worrisome concern about whetherthese enterprises may apply any anti-competitivepractices in Cambodian markets.

TobaccoIn this sector, competition is stiff among producersand importers. However, the biggest local producer,British-American Tobacco (BAT) acquired marketshare of 43 percent, Paradise Tobacco Co. had its shareof only one percent of the market and other domesticproducers six percent in 2001. Imports accounted for50 percent of the domestic market12 during the sameperiod.

Table 5.2: Medium and Large Industrial Establishment in 2004

ISIC Code Type of Manufacturing No.

31 Manufacture of food, beverage and tobacco 39

32 Textiles, Wearing Apparel and leather industries 320

33 Wood and Wood Products 7

34 Paper and Paper Products 5

35 Chemical, Rubber and Plastic Products 20

36 Non-metallic Mineral Products 11

37 Manufacture of Basic Metals 12

38 Other Manufacturing Industries 1

Total Manufacturing 415

Source: Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy

Cambodia


Services and UtilitiesElectricityElectricity in Cambodia is generated by IndependentPower Producers (IPPs) licensed by the government.Through the Power Purchase Agreement, IPPs sellelectricity to a supplier who has a consolidatedlicence. Sometimes, suppliers may also generateelectricity and supply electricity through its owndistribution system, subject to licenses issued by thegovernment.

The state-owned Electricité du Cambodge – Electricityof Cambodia (EDC) holds a virtual monopoly overmost of the electricity generation, transmission anddistribution activities in the country with its systemof 22 isolated operations. However, there is also someparticipation from the private sector; for example theIPPs, who generate electricity and resell to EDC and/or operate small-scale provision of electricity in somerural areas.

Telecom ServicesFixed-line services: There are three (03) fixed-line serviceproviders in Cambodia: the Ministry of Posts andTelecommunications of Cambodia (MPTC), Camintel(a joint venture of PT Indosat of Indonesia and theRGC) and another Thai-owned company, Camshin.

Cellular telephone services: There are four (04) companiesproviding mobile services in Cambodia: (i) CamGSMCo., Ltd. (commonly known as Mobitel); (ii) CambodiaSamart Communications Company Ltd. (Casacam) –a joint venture of the Samart Group of Thailand,Telekom Malaysia and the RGC; (iii) CambodiaShinawatra (Camshin) – previously a joint venture

with the RGC to provide a WLL network, now, a fullyThai-owned company licensed to provide GSM mobileservices; and (iv) Cambodia Mobile TelephoneCompany (CamTel) – starting in 1992 with ananalogue AMPS system, this Thai-owned companyis no longer popular among mobile phone users sincethe launch of GSM, due to limited functionality and alack of analogue handsets.

Internet services providers (ISPs) Four companies arecurrently sharing the Cambodia market: Camnet ofthe MPTC, Online, CamGSM and Camintel.

TransportationThe Cambodian railway line runs from Phnom Penhto Poipet (Cambodian-Thai border) and from PhnomPenh to Sihanouk Ville, where there is aninternational seaport. Railway transportation is stillunder State monopoly. However, the railway transportservice has not been popular among Cambodians dueto low service standards, lack of security and safety.

There are some other state-owned companies dealingwith the transportation, namely: Sihanouk Ville Port,Phnom Penh Port, Kampuchea Shipping Agency andBroker (KAMSAB), Neak Loeung Ferry, and PrekKdam Ferry. Besides these, most transport companiesare small-scale private companies.

Water and SanitationPhnom Penh is the only place that can supply waterto the majority of its residents. Water supply in PhnomPenh reach about 70 percent of all its residents – thereare about a million of the total population of 13millions resident at the moment. The Phnom PenhWater Supply Authority is the only state-ownedcompany under the direction of the Phnom Penh

government that provides cleanwater within the municipality.Another 16 licences were awardedto private providers to supply waterin some parts of provincial anddistrict towns.

Solid waste management systemsare in existence only in certainurban areas in Cambodia. Someyears ago, the municipality of

Table 5.3: Market Structure of Electricity in Cambodia in 2003

Type of Operation Operator No. of Operators

Distribution only Private companies 7

Generation only Private companies 7

Generation, distribution and transmission Private companies 69

(rural areas and some provincial towns)

Generation, distribution and transmission Electricité du Cambodge (SOE) 1

Source: Electricity Authority of Cambodia (EAC): Report on power sector of Cambodia 2003

Table 5.4: Market Shares of ISP in Cambodia at the End of 2003

Company Status No. of Users Market Shares

Camnet SOE 1,526 21%

Online Private company 3,244 45%

CamGSM Private company 1,747 24%

Camintel SOE 635 9%

Source: Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Cambodia

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Phnom Penh concluded an exclusive contract with aprivate company, Cintri Ltd., for a term of 50 years tocollect garbage in the vicinity of Phnom Penh. Withthe assistance of donors including ADB and JICA,garbage collection services in some parts of themunicipality were provided by the Phnom Penh WasteManagement Authority (PPWM), under theDepartment of Public Works and Transport (Ministryof Public Works and Transport). The liquid wastemanagement in Phnom Penh on the other hand isoverseen by the PPWM. This utility is billed in watersupply bills.

BankingThe banking system in Cambodia consists ofcommercial banks, specialised banks, micro-financeinstitutions and representative offices of banksoperating under the supervision of the National Bankof Cambodia (NBC). According to the Bulletin No. 10of the NBC, there are fourteen (14) commercial banks,of which one bank is owned by the RGC (Foreign TradeBank). Three specialised banks have been alsorecorded; one of them, the Rural Development Bankbelongs to the RGC. Besides, there are another ninelicensed micro-finance institutions. Some other 27micro-finance institutions were registered as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and about other60 NGOs also provide micro-finance services thoughthey do not register at all.

There is no clear information about market shares ofthese banking operators. However, a commercial bank(ACLEDA), formerly a non-profit NGO assisted bythe ILO/UNDP project, has claimed itself as one ofthe largest commercial banks in Cambodia,possessing 13 percent of the market in the overall creditmarket and four percent of the deposit collectionmarket.

Barriers to Entry and CompetitionIn spite of the significant efforts by the government toopen up the economy, liberalise all economic activitiesand develop the private sector in Cambodia, certainexisting laws and regulations still place restrictionon entry into markets, or put extra burden andrestraint on the competitive process therein. Includedamongst these policy-induced barriers to entry andcompetition are, for example, regulations that imposequantitative restrictions on certain commodities likepharmaceutical products, gold and silver, ornaments,ammunition and various cultural and medicalmaterials; regulations that prohibit imports of pork,motorbike tyres, right hand drive vehicles, usedfootwear. Particularly, at the provincial and locallevels, such restrictive regulations are very rampant,due to the enormous authority exercised by localgovernment officials and the high incidence ofcorruptive behaviours. For instance, in Preah Vihearprovince, on the northwest of Cambodia, borderedwith Thailand, the governor issued a regulationauthorising only one person to conduct the sale ofeggs. Any activity of selling eggs by others in the saidprovince is considered unlawful13 .

Certain laws and regulations also reserve specialrights for the State to monopolise various servicesprovided in Cambodia. The Electricity Law, forexample, provides special privilege for the EDC toprovide power transmission to the distributioncompanies and bulk power consumers. More thanoften, the sectoral regulatory frameworks in place seemto be unclear and ambiguous and thus subject todifferent interpretations and uncertainty. Thetelecommunication sector, in particular, does not yethave clear provision to guide the licensing procedures,and incumbent SOEs plays both the roles of regulatorand market player. These practices, however, will be

Table 5.5: Anticompetitive Practices

Practice of Unfair Competition (In percent) All firms Micro SME Large Exporter Non-exporter

Conspire to limit access to

markets/suppliers 34 34 34 36 41 33

Receive subsidies (including

toleration of arrears) 31 31 31 34 37 30

Violate copyrights, patents

or trademarks 31 31 29 37 40 29

Don’t pay duties or observe

trade regulations 25 22 25 34 40 22

Avoid sales tax (VAT and others) 22 16 25 35 40 19

Avoid labour

taxes/regulations 20 14 26 30 40 16

Source: World Bank, 2004

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discussed in more details in the following partfocussing on regulatory policies in selected sectors.

In Cambodia, business registration has often beenmarked as a substantial barrier to entry for manyenterprises. The business registration process ishighly complicated, expensive and time-consuming,acting as major obstacle for a new business operatorto enter the markets, or existing economic entities toformally register themselves – leading to the highincidence of informality amongst enterprises inCambodia and therefore disorder andmismanagement. To register a business, operators arerequired to register with the MoC, need to securepatent tax and/or value added tax identificationnumbers issued by the Ministry of Economy andFinance (MEF) and to get approval for their internalrules and regulations from the Ministry of Labour. Inthe event that the business is related to specific areasthat are tied to other ministries, operators are requiredto get licences from those relevant ministries as well.For example, if the intended business undertakingsmay affect the environment, operators are required toobtain licence from the Ministry of Environment. Theregistration costs approximately US$1,500 and takes94 days to complete14 .

The government has actually pledged to reform thebusiness registration process. A renowned examplehas been the recent reform at the MoC. A newregulation that officially reduces the registration coststo US$177 was released in late 2004. In practice,facilitation services have often been suggested, andthe registration fee generally ranges from US$250 toUS$300 including both official and facilitation fees15 .The biggest constraint on the competitive process inCambodia, however, is an apparent and serious lackof transparent and accountable administration.Corruption threatens fair deals among players in themarkets. The World Bank (WB) survey pointed outthat the corruption level in Cambodia was double thanthat of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China. Corruptionpayments may be up to five percent of annual salesrevenue, exceeding six percent for large firms16 .Undoubtedly, corruption impacts on competition,especially when it comes to government procurementand licensing. The government procurementprocedures are not properly constructed and highlyuncertain. Lately, there had been a controversy overthe procurement of military uniforms. A representativeof a private company, Paragon, allegedly reported thathis company had lost a contract to provide clothingto the military, despite bidding a price lower than thatoffered by the winner17 .

In addition, weak institution and governance alsonegatively affect fair competition in the markets. Thegovernment is still feeble in protecting intellectualproperty rights (IPRs) of holders against counterfeitgoods. While some firms follow government

regulations and pay taxes, some others avoid theirobligations. Because of weak governance, manyproducts have been allowed illegally to pass theborder checkpoints without paying taxes, to thedetriment of suppliers dealing on legally importedproducts. For instance, there has been much concernraised by local pharmaceutical producers,complaining of the difficulties in competing withcheap smuggled medicine18 .

A survey conducted by the WB shows that anti-competitive practices in Cambodia are fairly noticeable(Table 5.5), posing a moderate problem to enterprises.34 percent of the survey respondents informed thatthere were conspiracies with the government toprevent other competitors from entering markets.About 31 percent of firms are of the same opinion –that the government treatment to all firms is not fair,while certain firms receive the government subsidyand their arrears have been tolerated. 31 percent ofrespondents agreed that the violation of intellectualproperty rights has been moderately significant.Besides, between 20 to 25 percent of the interviewedfirms invoked that while they pay taxes and abide byregulations, other firms do not.

Even though these practices may distort competition,strictly speaking they are not anti-competitive practicesby nature, except for the conspiracies to limit accessto markets or suppliers.

Sectoral Regulation & CompetitionLiberalisation and deregulation have become thelatest fashion as countries across regions are movingtowards adopting market-based reforms and reducinggovernment intervention in their economies. Tradebarriers are being lowered, foreign investment is beingencouraged, protection of domestic industries beingwithdrawn and state monopolies being eliminatedand privatised. These changes reflect the heightenedconfidence that free market forces will help increaseproductivity and competitiveness at the firm as wellas economy-wise level, contributing to growth anddevelopment. However, the normal operation ofmarket forces, left to themselves, may not lead toincreased economic efficiency and fair distribution ofwelfare, due to a multitude of reasons. Market failuresmay prevail instead; hence, there is a clear case tointroduce some sort of government intervention , inorder to correct distortions created by market failuresand improve the efficiency in the way the marketoperates. In fact, experience suggests that particularlyduring the early period of any transition from a non-competitive (or minimally competitive) market to acompetitive (or more competitive) one, the governmentwill have to oversee and manage change. It may notneed to direct the change, but at the very least, a processwill be needed that can resolve disputes, respond tomarket failure, and provide new entrants with a senseof stability and fairness. An effective regulatory

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framework is, therefore, more essential than everduring this period of introducing initial competitioninto the market, especially in the absence of acompetition policy and law, which happens to be thecase in most developing economies.

In the absence of a national competition policy andlaw, as in the Cambodia context, government policieshave a very crucial role to play in establishing anddeveloping a competitive environment in the country.It is undeniable that government macro policies mayaffect to some extent competition among variousplayers in markets. The government policies indifferent specific sectors compose closer instrumentsthat impact competition in those sectors. A very simpleexample of this would be a wide range of governmentsectoral policies linked to matters of licensing, pricing,ensuring operational standards, etc. More concretely,in order to achieve the optimal utilisation of resources,government policies may reflect on the policies thatdetermine the number of people to be licensed, theprices of services or products to be fair and reasonable,sectors or types of industries to obtain the governmentsubsidies, and so on.

For that reason, it is of crucial importance to examinethe government policies in different sectors of theeconomy while examining the competition regime inany country. Hereby discussed are three sectors –electricity, telecommunications, and financialservices. These are the sectors in which thegovernment has adopted specific rules andregulations. Besides, there is also the participation ofSOEs therein, in competition with the private sector.

ElectricityAlmost all infrastructures in the electricity industryin Cambodia including generation, transmission anddistribution facilities were destroyed by the civil warin the 1970s. In the wake of the war, electricity facilitieshave been restored and developed under themanagement of the MIME. The task of electricitysupply was assigned to the EDC for Phnom Penh andto other small enterprises for each province throughoutthe country.

Cambodia still has a very low capacity of powergeneration. Electricity supply is very limited,especially in provinces. Many households in the ruralareas do not have access to electricity services; andwhere electricity is available, firm and individualconsumers have to pay one of the highest costs in theworld for their use. The total length and density of theelectrical grid is nearly nine times lower than inThailand and five times lower than in Vietnam.19

Electricity cost in Cambodia is much higher than thatin its neighbouring countries, Thailand (four timescheaper) and Vietnam (three times cheaper).20

To improve the situation, the government has pledgedmany reforms by restoring and developing electricityinfrastructures and thus improving electricity supply.One of the major reforms is the establishment of a lucidelectricity policy as enshrined in the 2001 ElectricityLaw.

The Electricity Law aims to ensure the protection ofconsumer rights to enjoy a reliable, adequate supplyof electric power services at reasonable cost; promoteprivate ownership of the facilities for providing electricpower services; promote competition and createfavourable conditions for attracting investment in thecommercial operation of the electric power industry21 .This Law, therefore, governs all electric powersupplies and services in Cambodia, which includeprovision of services, use of electricity, generation,transmission, distribution of electricity, and otherrelated services.

According to the Law, there are two institutions,which are accountable for electric power supply andservices – the MIME and the EAC. The MIME isresponsible for setting and administering thegovernment policies, strategies and planning in thepower sector, whereas the EAC has duty to ensurethat the electricity services provision and use ofelectricity are efficiently, qualitatively and sustainablyperformed (Article 3). In other words, the MIME isresponsible for overall guidelines, policies andstrategies, which are mainly related to investment,restructuring, private sector participation,privatisation of public utilities, planning andagreements on electricity import/export, subsidies tospecific classes of customers (Article 4). The EACimplements those policies, strategies and guidelinesby issuing regulation, rules, procedures and order, ina transparent manner, to attain the ultimate aims ofefficient, qualitative and sustainable provision ofelectricity services and use.

In this regard, the EAC, which is a legal public entityand autonomous agency to regulate the electricityservices, delivery and consumption, has beenempowered to issue, revise, suspend, revoke or denyany licence for supply of electricity services. TheAuthority also approves tariff rates and charges,terms and conditions of licensees, order the licenseeto implement guidance procedures and standards forinvestment programmes, review the financialactivities and organisation structure of licensee to theextent that these activities and organisation directlyaffect the operation of power sector and electricitysupply, approve and enforce the performancestandards for licensees, prescribe fees applicable tolicensees. In relation to consumer affairs, the EACevaluates and resolves consumer complaints if thecomplaints relate to the violation of the conditions oflicence.22 In order to ensure fair competition for publicinterests in the power markets, the EAC may approve

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or disapprove, or restrict the conduct of a businessmerger or reorganisation, or a major acquisition orsale of assets or security or expanding the licence’sbusiness activities.

The EAC issues licence to enterprises whosecompetence satisfies the requirements of the Authorityto provide electricity in the market and satisfies theservice obligations and conditions. However, indeciding upon whom to get a licence, the Authorityneeds to take into account other government policies,strategies and planning in power sector and publicinterests. The absence of clear provisions on criteriato acquire a licence leaves much discretion to theAuthority, which may be arbitrary.

The Electricity Law mentions different types oflicenses to be issued by the Authority. These licencesinclude generation, transmission, dispatch,distribution, bulk sale, sub-contract and consolidatedlicence (i.e. a licence, which may be the combinationof some or all types of licences). Only person in formof company is eligible to apply for and obtain a licence,except for the case where electricity services provisions(generation, distribution or retailing) are of small size.No licensee may hold more than one licence or ownshares in, or have any other direct financial interestin any other licensees, except for a state-owned licence.

All these licences may be issued to both private andSOEs. Nonetheless, the Law reserves special rightsfor the state-owned utility, EDC, to providetransmission service to distribution companies andbulk power consumers throughout Cambodia underthe national transmission licence. The Law also statesthat consolidated licences can be issued to the EDCand to isolated systems to generate, transmit,dispatch, distribute and sell electricity to consumers.In practice, consolidated licences have been issued toEDC that provides services in Phnom Penh and capitaltowns of various provinces, and to the private sectorin some rural areas.

Though the Cambodian Electricity Law is quite opento the private sector, the monopoly regime is stillapplied. Consumers within a zone or territorydetermined by the licence of the EAC could not chooseother suppliers of their best possible choice. Forinstance, the EDC which obtains consolidated licencefrom the EAC in Phnom Penh and some otherprovincial towns has the sole right to providetransmission service for the whole country and toprovide distribution service in its licensed areas, andto operate generation facilities at different locations.To date, EDC supplied electricity in its licensed areasof Phnom Penh, Sihanouk Ville, and some otherprovincial towns. This practice seems to be incontradiction with the initial aims of the ElectricityLaw that intends to introduce and promotecompetition in the electricity market.

TelecommunicationsCambodia has been identified as one of the countriesin the South-east Asian region that has the lowestlevels of information and communication technologydevelopment. Telecommunication facilities andhuman resources were devastated under the KhmerRouge regime. Not many persons have access to thetelephone line and Internet. At the beginning of 2001,about 0.26 percent of the population (about 30,880)have access to fixed-line telephone. Internet accessand telephone costs are high. Therefore, only a limitednumber of people in Phnom Penh may afford the highcosts.

Notwithstanding these problems, the government hasmade a lot of progress in the telecommunication sector.Cambodia’s mobile phone system is comparativelyclose to world class, competitive and privatelyprovided. There has been a remarkable rise in thenumber of mobile phone subscribers. In 2000, about80 percent of telephone subscribers use mobile phones;this was because fixed-line telephone is not welldeveloped, mobile phone markets have been open toprivate investment and competition, and paymentmethod and installation is not complicated and allowsconsumers to afford the costs23 . Besides, the fixed-linesystem in the country is also relatively modern. Also,there is participation of the private sector in theinvestment of mobiles, wireless, networks, Internetsand gateways24 . Cambodia has been rated by theInternational Telecommunication Union (ITU) as acountry having partial competition in the telecomsector25 . The government has introduced a nationaltelecommunication policy and telecommunicationmaster plan under the auspices of the ITU and theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP) topromote developments in the sector.

In Cambodia, the policy-making and regulatory powerin the area of telecommunication services belongs tothe MPTC. The MPTC plays an important role inissuing licences to various operators that intend tooperate communication business in Cambodia. Yet,there is no any legal provision governing theselicensing procedures.

The draft Law on Telecommunications is beingprepared by the MPTC. In general, the main objectivesof the MPTC are to make available in Cambodia themost cost-effective telecom services and to maketelecom services as widely available as possible inthe country. To bridge these aims, the MPTC adoptedpolicies to promote open, fair and competitive market.These policies include: separation of the function andresponsibility in policy making, regulation, ownershipand share holding and network operations;establishment of a national telecom state enterprise;introduction of regulations to make it mandatory fortelecom service providers to share the use of

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infrastructure; liberalisation of telecom services,development of human resources; and promotion oftelecom services in remote rural areas.

In the absence of the law, the decision of the MPTC onwhether a licence should be issued, on the basis of thenecessity for development of network, infrastructure,the expected coverage, the customer base and so on,seems to be obscure and discretionary26 . In particular,the contracts signed between the MPTC and privateoperators generally form restrictions on market entry.For instance, a contract signed between the MPTC andTelstra27 , an Australian firm, for the establishment ofan international gateway stated that no new gatewayswould be built28 .

In addition to a role as both policy maker andregulator, the MPTC also operates a fixed-line networkthat has been built with the assistance of theinternational donor community. The MPTC also entersinto various joint ventures with other private operatorsin the market. In the joint venture with Indosat ofIndonesia to operate fixed line network, the MPTCowns shares of 51 percent of the company, which isnamed Camintel. MPTC also operates its ownbusiness in proving international telephone gatewayto Cambodia in competition with another privatecompany. Besides, MPTC also engages in theprovision of Internet services.

There is no independent regulator or policy-makingbody in the telecommunication sector, since the MPTCis at the same time regulator and one of the marketoperators. Therefore, there is often some sort of conflictof interests in favour of the state sector. For example,the MPTC issued a regulation banning the Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) facility that offers oversee callsat very low costs. The reason behind the VoIPprohibition is simply that the VoIP facility wouldreduce the state revenue from the telecom industry,which contributes as much to the State budget as theother sectors.

Nonetheless, the state-owned telecom enterpriseappears to be less competitive in the telecom marketscompared to other private operators given its weakmanagement system, institutional structure, andhuman resource constraints. Variousrecommendations have been made by consultants andinternational organisation suggesting that thecommercial functions of the MPTC should beseparated from its regulatory functions, or even thatthe commercial segment of the MPTC should beprivatised29 .

Financial ServicesThe Cambodian economy is cash-based. The scare ofpast political turmoil and civil war has restrictedpeople’s confidence in the banking system. Thisresults in a large amount of cash outside the banking

system, and a low level of savings inside. Instead ofsaving in banks, people prefer to keep cash idle or tofinance their families or friends through personalnetworks. Families’ and friends’ support provideroughly one-fourth of the overall financing; and forsmall rural non-farm and urban informal enterprises,financing through families and friends is close to 50percent30 .

Cambodia is also a highly dollarised economy.Dollarisation started during the period of 1991-95 andcontinued to prevail since then. In the cash-basedeconomy, a large amount of cash dollars circulateoutside the banking system. Even banking transactionreflects high dollarisation; as more than 90 percent ofliability, assets and shareholder’s equity arepredominantly in US dollars31 .

The banking system in Cambodia consisted of theNational Bank of Cambodia (NBC), 14 Commercialbanks (one state-owned commercial bank), threespecialised banks (one state-owned specialised bank),one representative office of Standard Chartered, 2,158registered exchanges bureaux and around 96 micro-finance institutions (including NGOs)32 . The NBCissues licences, de-licences, regulates, and supervisesbanks and financial institutions and other relevantestablishments such as auditors and liquidators, inaccordance with Article 7 of the Law on theOrganisation and Conduct of the National Bank ofCambodia. NBC has 20 provincial branches. Amongmicro-finance institutions, there are nine licensedinstitutions, 27 registered NGOs and around 60 non-registered NGOs, according to NBC’s estimates.

To strengthen the banking system, in early 2000, theNBC conducted a bank re-licensing programmerequiring increase in capital requirement and use ofCAMELS rating system. As a result, the number ofbanks was reduced from 31 in 2000 to 18 in 2004.With these actions, the government expected toupgrade standards and improve the soundness andreliability of the banking system and hence thepublic’s confidence in it. In addition, a blueprint forthe financial sector for 2001-2010 was introduced. Theblueprint sets three phases for the reform programmes.The ultimate goal of the reform programmes is to havea competitive, integrated and efficient banking systemthat effectively mobilises savings and has a reliablepayment system and safety net, as a means to supportthe growth of the private sector through financing.

However, some main constraints for banking sectordevelopment remain, such as the high cost ofinformation and the lack of legal infrastructure tosupport the enforcement of financial contracts. Onlya few firms produce financial statements. Thus, banksare unable to provide loans on the basis of cash-flowanalysis but on collaterals due to lack of clients’financial information. Moreover, collateral

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registration system is cumbersome and requires banksto go through several steps to identify, to confirm andregister secured interests; and there is no propercollateral valuation system yet.

The absence of some important regulations andprocedures has also limited the scope of competitionin banking sector. There is no regulation governingmerger and acquisition (M&A) and businessdiversification that allow banks to expand theiractivities into other businesses33 . For instance, whencompetition in banking sector becomes fierce, somesmall and weak banks may decide to merge and somebanks may adopt strategies to expand into non-bankfinancial business.

Legally, the minimum capital requirement forcommercial bank is 50 billion riels (approximatelyUS$13mn)34 , 10 billion riels for specialised bank and250 million riels for micro-finance institutions (MFI).The reserve requirement is eight percent for banksand five percent for MFIs. However, in practice, thebanks must maintain 10 percent of capital as a formof guarantee35 . This idle reserve increases banks’operational cost and eventually increases consumerinterest rate. The blueprint highlights the reform ofstreamlining reserve requirement and phasing outguarantee deposit, but so far these requirements arestill in practice.36

There are two state-owned banks: the Foreign TradeBank (FTB), a commercial bank, and the RuralDevelopment Bank (RDB), a specialised bank. The FTBwas under the direct management of the NBC andoperates business activities like other privatecommercial banks. In 2000, in an attempt to have equalstatus to other commercial banks, 80 percent of FTBshares were transferred to the Ministry of Economyand Finance (MEF) and the NBC retained only 20percent. Five largest commercial banks including theFTB hold more than 50 percent of total banking assetsand deposits, according the 2001 Financial BlueprintReport. The blueprint also mentioned plans toprivatise in the first phase (2001-2005), but the bankis still owned by the State, cent percent.

The RDB does not compete with other banks. It is awholesaler for the financial sector and a source offinancing for other banks. It processes bankingoperations and loan services to provide micro-financeservices to which most people in rural areas haveaccess. The RDB’s main objective is to refinance creditfunds and services to licensed financial institutions,commercial banks, specialised banks, micro-financeinstitutions, associations, development communitiesand SMEs that take part in the rural development inCambodia37 . The main funds of the RDB come fromthe government and international donors.

Competition and Consumer ProtectionAn effective competition policy and law not onlycontributes to enabling a business environmentconducive to enterprise development, promoting firm-level productivity and competitiveness, but also helpsimprove consumer welfare. Consumers will be able toenjoy the best possible choice of goods, with the bestpossible quality at the lowest possible prices and haveadequate supplies of goods and services; since a faircompetitive process in the market, safeguarded bycompetition policy and law, will impose hugepressures on enterprises to try their best to satisfycustomers’ demands and preferences and protect theirmarket positions by fair means. On the other hand ,many anti-competitive practices and unfaircompetition practices, if not prevented and stoppedin time, may significantly impair the legitimate rightsand interests of the consumers.

It is of vital importance to understand thatconsideration for consumer interests and welfare isnot a novel idea. The concern over consumer abuseshas, in effect, been raised by many countries as wellas international organisations since long time ago.An exemplary practice in this regard is “TheGuidelines for Consumer Protection”, adopted by theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations in 1985 andamended in 1999. The Guidelines provides someimportant international norms served to guide allgovernments in undertaking policies to protectconsumers who often face injustice in economic terms,educational levels, and bargaining power.

The Guidelines focuses on (i) physical safety; (ii)promotion and protection of consumers’ economicinterests; (iii) standards for the safety and quality ofconsumer goods and services; (iv) distributionfacilities for essential consumer goods and services;(v) measures enabling consumers to obtain redress;(vi) education and information programmes; (vii)promotion of suitable consumption; and (viii)measures relating to specific areas such as food,pharmaceuticals and water. The Guidelines alsorecognise several basic consumer rights, such as theright to satisfaction of basic needs, the right to safety,the right to be informed, the right to best choice ofproducts, the right to be heard, the right to redress, theright to consumer education and the right to a healthyenvironment38 .

In Cambodia, consumers are entitled to constitutionalrights to make use of safe and healthy products thatdo not harm their lives and health, and to use productsof decent quality39 . Cambodia has not yet establishedany authority or State agency that is specialised inconsumer issues. Consumer movements are also non-existent in the country and there has been no consumerrepresentative group to act on behalf of consumers onsuch matters as considering and helping to resolve

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complaints from individual consumers, or initiatinglegal actions against private firms or individuals whocommit any act detrimental to consumer interests.

However, to ensure that the constitutional value ofconsumer rights is guaranteed, there have actuallybeen some laws and regulations that seek to safeguardconsumer safety and health in Cambodia.

Legislations Pertaining to ConsumerProtectionThere are two main areas in which Cambodian lawsand regulations seek to protect consumer interests.These areas are: quality and safety of products andservices, and protection of marks and names againstacts of unfair competition.

Quality and Safety of Products and ServicesThe Law on the Management of Quality and Safety ofProducts and Services, hereinafter known as theQuality and Safety Law, followed by three relevantregulations of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry– namely, Prakas40 on product expiry date, Prakasagainst food products devoid of appropriatepackaging labels and Prakas on the registration ofindustrial products, play very important roles inassuring the safety and quality of products andservices that benefit Cambodian consumers.

In order to ensure the safety and health of theconsumers, the Quality and Safety Law requiresmanufacturers or service providers to indicate on theirproducts, goods and services the ingredients,composition, users’ guidelines, manufacturing date,and expiry date and some other requirements in Khmerlanguage prior to commercialisation, which includeall stocking operations, transport, custody for purposeof trade, sale display, and sales of products andgoods, all gratuitous gifts of all products includingimportation and exportation as well as sales,provisions of services or the provisions of gratuitousservices.

Manufactures or service providers are also requiredto provide accurate information of the composition orconfiguration of the products, goods, or services. Incase of the first commercialisation of products orservices that could harm consumers’ health or safety,manufactures or service providers need to obtain priorauthorisation from the relevant institutions followingan inspection and an indication of usage guidelinesin Khmer language. Besides, there are also some otherrequirements relating to the inspections by the relevantState authority. For instance, manufacturers or serviceproviders are obliged to provide proof of inspectionsor records of prior examinations upon request frominspecting agents, to present proper compliancecertificate for exportation and importation if theproducts may be harmful to the health or safety of

consumers, or may negatively affect fair commercialpractices as required by international trade orconventions.

The Quality and Safety Law also prohibits deceitful,misleading or false commercial advertisement or anyadvertisement that is likely to cause confusion on thequality and safety of products, goods, and services.The Law describes the manner of advertisement thatcauses confusion to consumers. It may be related toproduct expectation; identity, type, nature, place oforigin, physical or nutritional quality, contents,quantity, manufacturing methods and date ofproduction; expiry date, usage guidelines and terms;methods of sales, product availability, price; otherwarranties. The person who bears liability for civiland criminal actions is the advertiser placingcommercial advertisements in the capacity as aninitiator.

Any act to falsify or attempt to falsify products, goods,or services is severely prohibited. The Lawcharacterises a variety of means of the falsificationact and even imposes liability to third party, regardlessof being a party to a contract or not for the falsification.These means are identity, type, nature, place of origin,physical or nutritional quality, contents, and quantity;past inspections, usage guidelines, non- conformingusage, risks associated with usage, precautionarymeasures for all products, goods, and services;manufacturing methods and date of production, use,or consumption of products.

The penalties for any violation of the Quality andSafety Law consist of fines and imprisonments. Thesanctions range from the fine of 500,000 riels to10,000,000 riels and/or the imprisonment from daysto one year, depending on the severity of the offences.

In addition to the Law, there are another threesupplementary regulations (Prakas), which also seeksto impose relevant obligations on manufacturers andservices providers. One requires that companies,factories, enterprises and handicrafts register theirproducts with the Ministry of Industry beforecirculating them on the markets.41 The regulationintends to ensure proper industrial products labellingin accordance with national standards and preventproducts counterfeiting.

The MoC Prakas No. 329 on Measures Against FoodProducts Devoid of Appropriate Packaging Labelsbans importation, circulation, sale, and display forsale of food products devoid of appropriatetrademarks or labels or whose trade marks or labelsdo not meet legal requirements, regardless of the healthand safety quality of the substances. Legalrequirements necessitated by this Prakas are: name ofproduct; name and address of person(s) responsiblefor the products (producers, packagers wrappers, or

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traders), source, lot numbers and date ofmanufacturing, date of expiration, ingredients, usageinstructions (where applicable), licence from theconcerned authorities before products circulation (ifrequired and for local products).

Measures to enforce this Prakas includes returning toproprietors for rectification in compliance with therules and regulations governing labels trademarks oncondition that the health and safety quality ofingredients are suitable; seizing or destroying foodproducts; or shipping back to the country of origin.Sanctions are a warning letter for the first time, andimposing penalty in accordance with the laws, incases of repeated offence.

Finally, the MoC Prakas No. 335 on Product ExpiryDate imposes liability to sellers for the quality andexpiry date of food products. This Prakas requires bothimported and locally produced food to have expirydate on their products.

Protection of Marks, Trade NamesAgainst Acts of Unfair CompetitionThe Law Concerning Marks, Trade Names, and Actsof Unfair Competition aims to protect the marks andtrade names registered in Cambodia and prevent actsof unfair competition on the creation, the utilisationof marks and trade names. Apparently, the Law seemsto protect mark or trade name holders rather thanconsumers.

However, this kind of protection does have impactson consumer interests, for the reason that it preventsconsumers from choosing any product or serviceunder confusion or due to false information orallegation. In particular, Chapter 7 of the Law on ‘Actof Unfair Competition’ provides for certain acts to beconsidered as acts of unfair competition. These actsinclude: act that creates confusion by any meanswhatever, with the establishment, the goods, or theindustrial commercial or service activities of acompetitor; false allegations in the course of trade todiscredit the establishment, the goods, or theindustrial, commercial or service activities of acompetitor; indication or allegations that when usedin the course of trade, are liable to the be misleading tothe public regarding the nature, manufacturingprocess, characteristics, quantity, or suitability forpurpose of the goods. The Law does not provide anycriteria that determine the extent of the likelihood ofconfusion, allegation or indication. This absenceleaves the interpretation to the court to fill up the gap.

Trademark and trade name are required to beregistered to be eligible for protection. Nonetheless,the law makes exception to well-known marks. Thisprovision is in compliance with the 1883 ParisConvention for the Protection of Industrial Propertythat seeks to protect well-known marks even though

they have not been registered in the countries, whichare parties to the Convention. Limited human andfinancial resources make it difficult for the relevantState authority to identify which mark is well known.The Law gives hierarchy to relevant internationaltreaties in case of conflicts between the provisions ofthis Law and other international treaties, to whichCambodia is a party.

The law also provides for injunctive measuresimposed by the court to protect trademarks or tradenames’ holders from infringements or to preserveevidence relevant to an alleged infringement. Besides,the law provides for border measures and sanctionsagainst act of unfair competition that range from fineof 1,000,000 riels and one month imprisonment to fineof 20,000,000 riels and five year imprisonment. In caseof repeated offence, the penalty will be doubled.

AdministrationThe MoC, MoI and MEF are main State agenciesresponsible for consumer protection in Cambodia. TheCambodia Import/Export Inspection and FraudSuppression Department (Camcontrol) under the MoCadministers products labelling and/or issuequality-certificates in addition to fraud suppression,quality control and safety, and both field andinstitutional inspections of agricultural products andfoodstuff. Camcontrol has regulatory responsibilityfor ensuring that exported and imported goods meetrelevant international and local requirements.42

The Customs Department under the MEF that takescharge of administering international trade flows intoand out of Cambodia also contributes to consumerprotection. This Department administers clearancesof incoming/outgoing consignments into/fromCambodia, issues permission letters/import permits,customs import/export declarations and collectscustoms duty and consumption taxes.

The Department of Inspection and IndustrialStandards (ISC) under the MoI also help to guaranteesafety and quality of products for consumers. ISC is anational standards body that promotesstandardisation and conformity assessment activitiesas a means to upgrade the quality infrastructure toincrease the competitiveness of Cambodian productsand services in domestic and export markets. Withthe assistance of the United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organisation (UNIDO), ISC carries outstandardisation, product and systems certificationactivities and provides testing, information services,training and consultancy. One of the duties of the ISCis to assist and protect consumers in respect of qualityof goods and services. The Department grants itscertification mark or licence following satisfactorytesting and inspection results. This certification isbeneficial to consumers to understand that productsor services have been guaranteed in terms of quality

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and safety in accordance with a Cambodianstandard43.

The Department of Metrology under the MoI, whichworks in close co-operation with the ISC, also playsan important role in protecting consumer interests.Its main duty is to maintain the conservation ofprimary and secondary standards after the inspectionby the ISC. It is in charge of registration, calibration,verification, and inspection of measuring equipmentand issuing licence to manufacturers, importers,repairers and sellers of weight and measureinstruments44. For instance, it checks measureinstruments of various gas stations to ensure theamount of gas is accurate.

Prevalent Consumer ConcernsThough Cambodia has managed to construct arelatively good legal framework concerning protectionof consumer interests, the enforcement of these lawsand regulations in place is not a simple task. The lawenforcement capacity in Cambodia is relatively weak.The administrations are also not effective and efficientdue to limited financial and human resources.Bureaucracy and corruption are at the root of theproblems. As a result, the status of consumerprotection in Cambodia seems not to be satisfactory.The display of thousands of unsafe and poor qualityproducts in various markets proves this argumentright. Recently, the RGC seems to be committed to avariety of reforms including fights against corruptionand judiciary reform45. The success of the reforms,however, depends to a great extent on thegovernment’s will and commitment.

In general, the guarantee of basic consumer rights inCambodia is at a very infant stage. The main cause isthat there is a lack of resources and a vast majority ofconsumers are not at all aware of safe and qualityproducts. Only a limited number of products havebeen certified for standards. In this regard, there is

urgent need for capacity building of relevantstakeholders — government officials, the civil society,the media and consumers to protect consumerinterests against unsafe products.

Poverty is another problem that limits the promotionof basic consumer rights. Between 40-45 percent ofthe Cambodian population live under poverty line,i.e. below US$1 a day. Cambodia is still one of thepoorest countries in the world, ranking 130 out of 177countries according to the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) 2004 HumanDevelopment Report46. The most urgent and prevalentconsumer concern is their right to basic needs. Manypeople do not have access to basic utilities such aselectricity, clean water and sanitation (see Table 5.6).For this year, as of 2006, the situation is worse. About500,000 people are short of food due to the ongoingdrought, according to the UN World Food Programme(WFP)47 .

Anti-competitive PracticesIn the absence of a competition law, which is currentlybeing prepared by the Ministry of Commerce,restrictive trade practices (RTPs) and unfair tradepractices (UTPs) are quite prevalent in Cambodianmarkets and have eventually damaged consumerinterests and rights.

RTPs have commonly been defined as acts orbehaviour of enterprises which, through an abuse or

Table 5.6: Percentage of People having Access

to Water and Sanitation in 2000

Percentage

Access to improved sanitation 17

Access to an improved water source 30

Source: UNDP: Human Development Report 2004

Box 5.1. Price-Fixing Amongst Boaters to Siem Riep

To leave for Siem Reap, the most popular tourist townin Cambodia, there are three means of transportation:by boat, by road and by air. Boats are the mostpopular, especially for tourists, since the road to SiemReap is not well developed. Boat transportationservices to Siem Reap are provided by 08 privatecompanies. The price for one-way travel from PhnomPenh, the capital of Cambodia to Siem Reap is about40,000 riels (approximately US$10) for Cambodiannationals and around US$25 for foreigners.

Competition between these boat companies, however,has driven the price down beyond the profitable level(sometimes to well below 20,000 riels) and thus turned

many of the boaters to extensive losses. Recently, thecompanies decided to sit down together and resolvethe problems. Even though no written agreement wasrecorded, the companies have entered into anagreement to fix their service prices to 40,000 riels forKhmer nationals and US$20-25 for foreigners, aftermonths of talk. The eight companies further agreedthat they would not compete with each other anymoreand would share their departure schedules. Accordingto their verbal agreement, only one boat may provideboat transportation service in a day by taking turnfrom one company to another. The bigger companiescan have more quotas to provide the services.

Source: Phone interviews with Eng Ang, Chief of Cambodian Dry Port and Thai Bunkheing, Owner of Royal ExpressBoat, on April 26-27, 2005

Cambodia


acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of marketpower, or through formal, informal, written orunwritten agreements or arrangements amongenterprises, limit access to the markets or otherwiseunduly restrain competition, having or being likely tohave adverse effects on trade, and on the economicdevelopment of a country. It is, however, difficult tohave a clear-cut definition or to point out specificfeatures of UTPs. The determination of whether apractice may be fair or not depends upon differentcircumstances and maybe on case-by-case basis. Ingeneral, whether acts or behaviour be abusive hingesupon its purposes and actual effect in actual situation,viz. it may limit access to markets, restrain competitionor have adverse effect on trade or economicdevelopment of a country.48

Horizontal Restrictive TradePractices or Cartel Agreements

Collective Price-fixingInstead of competing with each other, competitors maycollude to fix prices in the markets, which assure themthe highest profits. In general, in this type of RTPs,competitors usually make agreements to set pricesabove that of the least-efficient producer in the market.Price-fixing arrangements may be made under someother forms, such as:l Agreements on a standard formula, according to

which prices will be computed;l Agreements to maintain a fixed ratio between the

prices of competing but non-identical products;l Agreements to eliminate discounts or to establish

uniform discounts;l Agreements on credit term that will be extended

to customers;l Agreements to remove products offered at low

prices from the market so as to limit supply andkeep prices high;

l Agreements not to reduce prices without notifyingother cartel members;

l Agreements to adhere to published prices;l Agreements not to sell unless agreed on price terms

are met; andl Agreements to use a uniform price as starting point

for negotiations.

Market Allocation or Market SharingSome firms may make agreements so as not to competewith each other in a given market or allocate marketsamong them. Firms can decide allocating marketseither geographically or according to customers orclass of customers. When the colluding firms facecompetition from any outside firm, then these firmsmay allow each other to compete freely whilecontinuing to allocate areas where they do not faceoutside competition. The agreement between two firmsto allocate market is a very serious anti-competitivepractice, and may have a greater impact oncompetition due to price-fixing. For instance, two firmsmay conclude an agreement stating: “my firm willsell our products only in Phnom Penh and the rest ofthe markets in Cambodia belong to your firm”.

Output RestrictionAnother case of anti-competitive practices is whenfirms agree to place limit on supplies to a proportionof their previous sales. In order to enforce this, a poolingarrangement is often made, whereby firms selling inexcess of their quota are required to compensate othermembers, who may be selling less than their agreedquota, by making payments to the pool. The ultimateobjective of limiting supplies is to create an artificialdemand-supply gap, or even serious scarcity, andhence raise prices in the markets. For example, firmsmay agree with each other not to produce theirproducts more than a fixed number of products, letsay, 500 products a year. Since there are not manyproducts in the markets, their products may be chargedat high prices at the expense of consumers.

Bid-Rigging or Collusive TenderingIn this case, in the course of offers or quotations duringa tendering/bidding process, firms may agree witheach other not to offer the lowest offer possible. It wouldalso be the case, if they agree with each other not toparticipate in the tender or make fake offers. Bid riggingmay also take the forms of bid suppression (one ormore competitor agrees not to enter into a tenderingprocess or withdraws its application for the tender),complementary bidding (firms arrange amongthemselves as to which firm wins a tender) and bidrotation (competing firms agree to take turn to win atender).

Box 5.2. Refusal to Deal in the Telecom Market

At the end of September 2000, there were complaintsfrom users of Mobitel (the 012 line), a big mobilephone service provider that had a 85 percent share ofthe Cambodia mobile phone service market, that theycould not reply to the Short Message Services (SMS)sent to them by users of Camshin (the 011 line),another mobile phone service provider. It wassubsequently that Mobitel had deliberately blocked

customers of Camshin from reaching the Mobitelphones. Customers of the 011 line could not dial to the012 line, therefore. The problem was solved later onafter the intervention of the MPTC. Theinterconnection rates between different lines are stillhigh, however. This restriction may be considered asrefusal to deal.

Source: Cambodia Daily, October 18, 2000

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These kind of practices exists to a large extent inCambodia, but there is lack of information. In practice,relatively competent public authority may decide asto which firm should get the contract issued by theauthority without any tendering, or private firms maycollude with the authority to favour their bidding.

Vertical Restrictive Trade Practices

Tied-SellingHere the supplier forces the reseller, wholesaler orcustomers to purchase goods or services that thesepeople do not desire to purchase (tied products/services) as a condition for purchase of some othergoods or services that they want to purchase (tyingproducts/services). The tied-sale arrangement is suchthat even if the customer does not want to purchasethe tied product/service, (s) he has to purchase it inorder to get the desired product/service. However,such behaviour is only possible if the firm has marketpower over the tying products/services in the relevantmarket. '

Exclusive DealingIn an exclusive dealing arrangement, the producer/supplier forces their downstream distributors orretailers not to deal with other competing producersor suppliers. This type of anti-competitivearrangement may act as a significant barrier to newentrants into the markets and affect competitionadversely.

Refusal to Deal“Here firms that are at different levels of the sameproduction-supply chain enter into agreement(vertical agreement) whereby, they agree amongthemselves not to sell or buy from certain customers.In other words, they agree to refuse to deal with anythird party, normally a competitor of one of them.Though this may be a fair marketing strategy foroptimum profit, sometimes such practices may reducecompetition in the market and consequently could berestrictive in nature.

From the point of view of competition law and policy,vertical agreements are most likely harmful when at

least one of the transacting parties is dominant ineither upstream or downstream market. However,even restrictive vertical agreements that involvedominant firms can result in efficiency gains. Thuswhether or not such practices are anti-competitivedepends on the specific case”.

Resale Price MaintenanceFor this type of RTP, the producer requires retailer tosell goods at a certain price, so that the price is thesame everywhere. Consumers, therefore, could notchoose to buy the products at any place of their choicesince the prices are maintained and the sameanywhere anyway.

Discriminatory DealingIn this case, a manufacture or a supplier of goodscharges, for the same or similar product, a higher pricefrom one dealer and a lower price from another; thepractice is referred to as price discrimination. Thediscrimination in price can be made either throughfixing or charging different prices from different buyersor classes of buyers or by granting discount,commission, allowance or rebate at different rates todifferent buyers or class of buyers.

Predatory Pricing“Predatory pricing is pricing of the product below thecost of production with the intention to drive outcompetitors from the market. Predatory pricing issomething difficult to prove against any firm”.However, it is believed that these kinds of practicesare not prevalent in Cambodia.

Other Anti-competitive Practices

Mergers and Acquisitions Resulting inDominance in MarketMerger is a combination between two or more firmswhereby the identity of one (or more) is lost and resultsin a single firm. Acquisition (or takeover) of one firmby another usually involves the purchase of all or asufficient amount of shares or assets of another firmto enable it to exercise control.

Box 5.3. Anti-competitive Acquisitions in the Education Sector

The business of educational services in Cambodia hasbeen booming since 1998. Many businessmen haveopened schools that provide educational services suchas kindergarten, English, short computer trainingcourses. One school that expanded its business greatlyin Phnom Penh was the Newton Thilay Institute. TheInstitute started from only one school, but its businessdeveloped quite well. Subsequently, the Institute

opened other branches and at the same time attemptedto buy other schools, which were its competitors. As aresult, seven competing schools were bought. Now, theschool acquires significant market shares in the marketsof kindergarten, English and computer training course(if not including the highly standard and expensiveschools, those which provide very good services andcharge high fees).

Source: Phone interviews with the Vice-president of Newton Thilay Institute

Cambodia


Such mergers and acquisitions (M&As) might behorizontal, vertical or conglomerate. HorizontalM&As involves firms that are competitors at the samelevel of the production-supply chain. Vertical M&Asinvolves firms that are at a different level of theproduction-supply chain (e.g. firm producing colddrinks merges with the other producing bottles tocontain such cold drinks). Conglomerate M&Asinvolves firms in diversified and unrelated business(e.g. firms producing cars merges with a firm that dealsin finance).

When two competitors merge together, it is but obviousthat the market share of the merged entity would bemore than what they used to share, individually.Broadly, there could be three consequences due to anyhorizontal merger: (a) a monopoly, (b) the mergedentity becoming a dominant player in the market, or(c) the merged entity as unable to capture enoughmarket power.

While case (a) and (b) might pose competitionconcerns, case (c) is unlikely to give rise to anycompetition concern, if there remain other competitorsin the market. Hence, the issue of concern to acompetition authority is not the merger itself, butwhether or not such merger results in a monopolysituation or a dominant market player. Consequently,the determination of relevant market becomes thecentral issue. The merging entity would try to definethe relevant market in broader terms so that their

market share becomes lesser. Once the relevant marketis determined, often it becomes very clear whether ornot such mergers are anti-competitive.

Abuse of DominanceDominant firms, which have control over the markets,may restrict new entries into the markets or foreclosethe commercial opportunity of weaker traders orcreate barriers in economic freedom of its probablecompetitors. That is to say, a dominant firm is in aplace to adversely affect existing as well as futurecompetition in the market.

Being dominant is not an abuse. However, a dominantfirm may abuse the competition in the following cases:l Charging excessive prices;l Price discrimination (charging different prices,

according to the profile of customers);l Tie-selling;l Refusal to deal;l Predatory pricing;l Exclusive dealing; andl Resale price maintenance.

Perspectives on Competition PolicyThis part presents the findings of a perception surveyundertaken in Cambodia by the EIC that involved 50respondents. About 20 respondents representing thebusinesses community, 10 representing thepolicymakers (mostly high-ranking government

Box 5.4. Abuse of Dominance in the Mobile Phone Service Market

Mobitel, a leading mobile phone service provider,obtained in 1998 its first patent on the ‘scratch cards’as a prepaid billing system for it customers. The‘scratch card system’ is a system using cards that beara hidden 10-digit code number that customers willscratch to reveal and then dial into the phone. Acomputer then credits the phone with an amount ofmoney on the card.

The exclusive rights granted to Mobitel by the MIMEover this ‘scratch card’ system had hindered othercompetitors’ business and refrained other mobileoperators from doing the same thing. It should benoticed that according to the general principles ofpatent law, three prerequisite elements—novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness—are required to obtain apatent right. Scratch Card for mobile users was notnovel at that time, since the system had been applied along time ago in other countries. However, sinceCambodia did not have a patent law until December2002 (Law on the patents, utility model certificates andindustrial designs), Mobitel had easily abused thehammer granted by the MIME to ask othercompetitors not to adopt similar systems.

The dispute between Mobitel and its competitor, Samarthad reached the Court. Mobitel asked the MunicipalCourt for an injunction against Samart, which had beenplanning to launch its own scratch card system. TheMunicipal Court issued an injunction preventing Samartfrom using the scratch card system. The MunicipalCourt then ruled in favour of Mobitel. The AppellateCourt then upheld the trial court’s decision. The courts’decisions were then viewed by the public as to block thefree-market policy and business opportunity of othercompetitors and ruin customer rights.

The problem was later resolved when a clear statementfrom the MIME was released. The Ministry asserted thatthere was actually confusion misused by Mobitel overthe granted patent. The letter received by Mobitel,which had been signed by the Minister of Industry, wasonly to certify the receipt of the application for patent,not a patent certificate. The controversy was cleared out.The Supreme Court in October 1999 lifted the injunctionof the lower court; meaning Samart was since then freeto use the scratch cards billing system. All mobileoperators now are free to use scratch cards for theircustomers.

Source: Cambodia Daily issue on August 23, 1999; Cambodia Daily, Vol. 16, Issue 66, October 27, 1999; Cambodia Daily,Vol. 16, Issue 28, September 2, 1999

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officials and members of the Parliament), and 20consumers including lecturers, researchers, universitystudents, NGO staffs were interviewed during thecourse of the survey.

Background and MethodologyA tripartite questionnaire containing around thirtyquestions was designed and used for all three groupsof respondents. The questions were structured in a‘multiple choice’ manner for the purpose of simplicity.No subjective questions were asked though additionalinformation provided by the respondents, particularlyin cases of anti-competitive practices prevalent inCambodia was recorded.

The focus of the survey was to probe the extent ofpublic awareness and the major trends of perceptionsregarding competition related issues. However, itshould be noted that given the small size of the sample,and the geographical boundary of the survey (PhnomPenh), the outcome might not be representative;especially because the level of literacy as well as thelegal and economic knowledge in Phnom Penh issignificantly higher than in the rest of the country.Besides, several constraints were recorded during thesurvey process. Firstly, many businessmen andpolicymakers, let alone consumers, did not have asound understanding and knowledge on competitionrelated issues, even though they represented the moreeducated and aware class in Cambodia. A lot ofexplanations had to be made before the intervieweescould respond to the questions. Language was anotherbarrier to the understanding of the respondents. Thequestionnaire was designed in English and manytechnical terms related to competition were used.Many of these technical terms do not exist in the Khmerlanguage, as yet. There was indeed necessity for theinterviewers to providetechnical assistance and in-depth explanation from onequestion to question. In manyinstances, responses to earlierquestions had to be changed asthe respondents understood theissues clearly only as questionsunfolded.

Besides, respondents wereallowed to make multipleresponses to some questions. Insuch cases, an ordinal approachto the ‘multiple choice’ answerswas used, i.e. respondents wereasked to assign ranks to thedifferent choices he/she made.The interviewer then assignedpriority ranking instead of mere‘yes-yes’ or ‘no-no’ typeresponse. As already noted,

subjective information provided by the respondentswere recorded separately.

Field Survey ResultsIn general, a large proportion of the respondents fromall the three groups, namely business community,consumers and policymakers, did not have a clearunderstanding on several concepts related tocompetition issues. Nonetheless, they were aware ofthe ‘unfair’ practices. A majority of respondents wereof the view that anti-competitive practices do prevailin Cambodia. They also pointed out a handful of areaswhere anti-competitive practices are most prevalentand that the concerned governmental agencies havedone very little to put a stop to such practices.

Likewise, most of the respondents believed thateffective implementation of legislation that seek tocheck anti-competitive practices, even if only to someextent, could go a long way in benefiting all sectionsof the society, including the consumers and thebusiness. In addition, an overwhelming majority isalso in favour of a comprehensive competition law.They have, however, pointed out the need forexemptions and exceptions within the legalframework on grounds of economic development,public interest or general welfare. The followingsections present a more detailed breakdown of thefield survey results.

The Extent of Anti-competitivePractices in CambodiaA large number of consumers, businessmen andpolicymakers pointed out that anti-competitivepractices are prevalent in Cambodia. Of the 50respondents, 42 respondents (84 percent) viewed thatanti-competitive practices prevail in Cambodian

Figure 5.3: Types of anti-competitive practices prevalent in Cambodia

Cambodia


markets. However, the perceived extent and degree ofanti-competitiveness varied across the respondents.While 48 percent of the respondents stated that theextent of anti-competitive practices were extreme,around 36 percent of them stated that anti-competitivepractices were significant. 12 percent of therespondents viewed that moderate anti-competitivepractices did prevail. Four percent of the respondentsstated that the extent of anti-competitive practices inthe Cambodian markets is insignificant.

Raising barriers to entry and collective price-fixingwere termed as the most common forms of anti-competitive practices prevalent in the country.However, a majority of respondents could not giveconcrete examples to support their claims, arguingthat their choice was just an ‘informed response’ . Inaddition to the already mentioned two types of anti-competitive practices, respondents also viewed thatprice discrimination, collusive tendering, and tiedselling were also common in Cambodia.

A large number of respondents agreed that sectorswith more market participation such as petroleum,telecommunications, public utility and garment weresubstantially plagued by anti-competitive practices.Other sectors perceived to be also affected by anti-competitive practices were banking, airline,pharmaceutical products, food and beverage, andtourism, etc. All the respondents, including ratherinformed officials, however, could not cite specificexamples to support their responses.

Extent of Awareness RegardingRelevant Legislative FrameworkIn Cambodia, there is no legislation that directlyregulates market competition even though variousexisting policies do have some impacts on thecompetitive process of the market and certainlegislations have extensively provided for theprotection of consumers. Only 24 percent of the totalrespondents were aware of the existence of any lawor regulation relating to various anti-competitivepractices in the market, while 42 percent respondedthat they had no idea.

Though three consumers chose a positive answer, noone was able to mention a law that prevents anti-competitive practices. Only one businessman was ableto name some legislations (the Electricity Law andFishery Law). Policymakers were in the best positionto have the highest level of awareness (80 percent).However, once they were asked to name those relevantlaws and regulations, some could not specificallymention their exact names, and were not able to relatethem to anti-competitive practices. Their valid answerswere the Law on Trademark and Unfair Competition,the Investment Law, laws and regulations allowingmonopoly, and law related to the IPRs.

In addition, in response to the question of whetherthe existing rules, regulations or laws – which werenot specifically enacted to protect consumer interests,to control competitive behaviour of enterprises and toregulate competition related issues – are enough toprotect competition in the market, about 85 percentasserted that the existing rules and regulations werenot sufficient, while 8.5 percent opposed the idea. Itmeans that the vast majority of respondents favoureda competition law that aimed to protect general interestof businesses and consumers.

The Necessity for a ComprehensiveCompetition LegislationAn extensive number of the total respondents (98percent) viewed that a comprehensive law dealingexclusively with anti-competition issues should beenacted in Cambodia. The reason was primarily tocheck and balance such practices in the interest ofconsumers and increase the competitiveness ofbusiness enterprises in the country. There was onlyone interviewee who provided a negative answer forthe solely reason that even a law was enacted; itsenforcement was not going to be effective anyway.

While the vast majority (94 percent) of the threegroups of respondents agreed that “businessefficiency and consumer welfare” should be theobjectives of such competition legislation, if it was tobe adopted, 69 percent of the respondents suggestedalso its focus on other socio-economic objectives. Noneof them had any other specific objectives for thecompetition legislation.

Scope and Coverage of the Competition LawWhen asked if the competition law should cover alltypes of enterprises and entities in all areas ofcommercial activities, 41 percent of all respondentsgave their positive responses, while 57 percentopposed and two percent did not know the answer.Among all categories of respondents, 70 percent ofpolicymakers echoed that there should be exceptionfor certain types of enterprises or activities or any otherexceptional reasons.

Figure 5.4 Awareness about Competition

Related Laws

24%

34%

42% Yes No Don't know

w 23

To the further question on what types of enterprisesor entities should be excluded from the purview of thecompetition law, 55 percent of the respondentspointed to SMEs since they deserved some preferentialtreatment. Another group of 13 percent seemed tofavour Import/Export-oriented Enterprises, whileothers (32 percent) favoured SOEs.

That is not all. 80 percent of respondents alsosupported the view that violations of the competitionlaw would be permissible if some reasons such astechnological advancement, protection of SMEs or anyfavourable condition to some socially disadvantagedgroups, etc. prevailed. Regarding this point, anothergroup comprising 16 percent of the respondentsdisagreed and four percent mentioned that they wereunaware as to the same. Since most of businessmencategory belonged to SMEs, 90 percent of themsupported the idea that the competition law shouldmake exception on the basis of the above grounds.

Only 66 percent of respondents were aware that someanti-competitive practices occurred abroad, but hadimpacts on Cambodia’s market. 88 percent of therespondents were of the common view thatCambodia’s government should have jurisdiction overthose foreign firms committing competition abusesabroad that affected Cambodia’s markets.

The Competition AuthorityThe role of the competition authority has been foundimportant for the enforcement of the competition lawin order to bring the desired benefits to the economyand welfare of consumers. The contribution of allrespondents’ opinions about how the competitionauthority looks like and how much power it shouldbe allocated has been of significant value for this part.Respondents argued for a strong and competentcompetition authority to be set up on a permanentbasis to discharge all the responsibilities, as stipulatedby the competition law. However, respondents wereof different opinions on the status of the competitionauthority. An overwhelming majority of respondents(82 percent) agreed that the authority should beautonomous and independent from any institution

or politics so that the authority could have effectivecontrol over the powerful SOEs or foreign firms, while16 percent of respondents viewed to have the authorityestablished under the authority of a relevant ministry.This relevant Ministry is likely to be the Ministry ofCommerce, since for the time being, the MoC has aDepartment called Domestic Trade Department. Onlya very small number of respondents (two percent)desired the authority to be managed and performedby the ombudsman.

Concerning the regulatory power of the competitionauthority, irrespective of the structure of thecompetition authority, about half (52 percent) of therespondents viewed that the authority should haveboth investigative and adjudicative powers to dealwith any case of anti-competitive practice. Anotherfairly moderate proportion of respondents (36 percent)believed that the authority should be entrusted withinvestigative power only, whereas adjudicative powershould be left to the court. A smaller proportion ofrespondents (12 percent) suggested empowering theauthority to investigate a competition case, but vestingthe power to decide the case to another separateagency. It was impressive that no respondent chose“don’t know” for the answer.

Furthermore, an enormous majority of respondents(92 percent) consented to authorise the competitionagency to deal with both anti-competitive practicesand consumer protection, while only eight percentdisagreed. Nonetheless, respondents shared differentviews when answering the question of whether thereshould be intervention of specialised agencies forspecific sectors such as water, telecom and so on. Ingeneral, they believed that the specialised agencieswould be more efficient in tracking down anti-competitive practices in the sectors they worked inthan the competition authority.

As a result, about one-fourth answered that allcompetition-related issues in some specific sectorsshould be given to only specialised agency and thecompetition authority should not involve. 42 percentagreed that specialised agencies were needed, but theyneeded to share some power with the competitionauthority. More interestingly, the other 28 percent alsoconcurred with the standpoint to leave all powers tothe specialised agency with the leeway of thecompetition authority to only provide advice on thecompetitive impacts of the sectoral policies.

Besides, the duties of the competition authority arenot limited to only either investigation or adjudication,according to the vast majority of respondents. Nearlyall respondents (96 percent) viewed that the authorityshould also take part in the affairs of advocacy andpublicity, etc., by keeping interaction with differentstakeholder groups, such as consumer organisations.Only two respondents said they did not know of and

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Economicef f ic iency and

consumerw elfare

Other socio-economicobjectives

No

Yes

Figure 5.5: What Should be the Objectives of theCompetition Act?

Cambodia


the other two opposed to the vast majority’s ideawithout specifying their reasons for disagreement.Approximately, three-fourths (70 percent) favouredthe way of a consultative committee in order for thecompetition authority to play a role in advocacy orpublicity, while only 36 percent proposed publichearings.

Other Implementation IssuesIn response to the question of whether dominant firmsbreed efficiency and such position in a given marketis in itself an offence or not, an overwhelming majorityof respondents (96 percent) agreed that it was not anoffence, and continued further that the activities ofthese dominant firms needed to be monitored toprevent abuse of market power. Only two percent ofrespondents provided their dissenting opinion. Thesame number to this latter group did not know whatthe answer was.

With regard to M&As, nearly all respondents (98percent) suggested that M&As should be subject toreview to determine whether they had any adverseaffects on competitions, especially when the M&Asresulted in monopoly situation or a dominant marketplayer. However, there were divided viewpointsamong these respondents who suggested the review.Half of them stated that all M&A operations shouldbe reviewed regardless of any circumstance, whileanother half viewed the opposite, saying that only if

the M&As exceeded a determined level of marketshares of the merging firms, should the M&As besubject to review. That is to say not all M&As shouldbe reviewed, but only the M&As that go beyond anembedded benchmark.

It is important to note that even though more thanhalf of respondents disagreed, about half emphasisedthat the dominance of firms and M&As wereacceptable for the sake of national or public interestsincluding their ability to compete internationally andthe increase of the economy competitiveness, whileCambodia had become a member of WTO.

After being explained on the difficulties in searchingfor evidence, particularly in case of collusion, etc.among various market players, a large majority ofrespondents (88 percent) agreed that the competitionlaw should have provisions for leniency clause andwhistle-blower protection in efforts to ensure theeffective implementation of the competition law.

The Way ForwardThe Cambodia government has made its decision toopen the country’s national markets to the region andthe world through its integration into the ASEAN andWTO. From an optimistic viewpoint, the liberalisationhas, to some extent, benefited consumers due to betteravailability of products and services with better price,quality and choice. However, the government’s tasksshould not end up with opening its economy to theoutside world.

To take advantages of the liberalisation as much aspossible, Cambodia needs to work much harder. Oneof the important tasks is to strengthen the comparativeadvantages of the country to be able to compete withother countries. That is not all. As it has undoubtedlybeen perceived that many anti-competitive practicesprevailed in the Cambodian markets, there is anindispensable need for appropriate policies andlegislations to be adopted to guide the markets in orderto render the economy more efficient, to dispense with

concentration of economic powerthat benefits only a small numberof people, and to allocateresources in a better mannerresulting from the best choice ofproducts and services availableat decent prices and quality. Thiswill help alleviate poverty, whilethe fight against poverty in thecountry seems to beunsuccessful.

The RGC has in fact paid a fairdeal of attention to competitionissues. The agenda of thegovernment policies mentions the

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Consumers Businessmen Policymakers

Don't know

No

Yes

Figure 5.6: Should the Competition Act Cover alltypes of Enterprises and Activities?

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Autonomous Competition Authority

Authority under a relevant Ministry

Ombudsman

Don’t know

Consumers Businessmen Policymakers

Figure 5.7: Form of Competition Authority to be Established

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importance of fair competition in the markets. Plus,competition legislation has also been on thegovernment’s priority list to be drafted. Hopefully, acompetition law will be soon enacted. However, it iscritically important to understand that the existenceof the competition legislation would mean nothing ifits enforcement is not effective. Effective enforcementof the competition law requires concerted efforts ofthe government to tackle competition offences throughits different sectoral policies, the actions of acompetent competition authority and an independentjudiciary. In other words, human resources areinevitably needed. A rough perception survey in thispaper indicating that the concept of competition isvery new to many Cambodians may validate theargument. It is, thus, important to provide capacitybuilding to different groups of stakeholders whoseworks may relate to competition issues such as:policymakers, judges, prosecutors, lawyers,businessmen, consumers, civil society, andacademia/media.

In the absence of competition legislation, othergovernment policies and relevant regulations play avery important role in ensuring that firms arecompeting fairly in the markets. Some policies, lawsand regulations of the government in different sectorshave significant impact on competition in the markets.The high costs of electricity and telecommunicationservices, for instance, remain a big problem for

12

12

2

3

3

0

5

5

8

Consumers

Businessmen

PolicymakersInvestigative and adjudicative pow ervested in the court

Investigative and adjudicative pow ervested in separate authority

Investigative and adjudicative

Figure 5.8: Powers of Competition Authority

economic development and all consumers, many ofwhom could not afford and do not have access to thesephysical infrastructures. These sectoral policies needto be remodelled to ensure the economic and socialwelfare of the country. The government seems to beaware that such change is very important by virtue ofthe recent regulation of the MEF that required all StateInstitutions to suspend the sale, exchange, rent andinvestment of the state property that had beenpermitted without clear and transparent procurementprocedures.

Good governance and transparent and accountableinstitutions are other indispensable tools that helpguarantee a fair deal of competition in the markets.Cambodian institutions are still weak. Bureaucracyand rampant corruption in Cambodia make marketcompetition seem uncertain and prohibitive. Inparticular, complicated and obscure licensingprocess, tax evasion, absence of clear procurementpolicies and unaccountable procurement procedureshave set an unfair environment, prohibiting firms fromfairly competing with each other, and raisingsignificant barriers for new firms to enter the markets.So, the collusive firms earn much at the expenses ofthe consumers, the one who bear the cost. Panacea forthese matters strongly depends upon the government’swill. At this stage, we look forward to the arrival andlong-awaited success of a variety of the governmentreform programmes.

Cambodia


Notes:

* This chapter has been researched and written by Nuth Monyrath of the Economic Institute of Cambodia (EIC),Cambodia. The author acknowledges the support received from Nitya Nanda and Alice Pham of CUTS C-CIER indesigning the study and their comments and suggestions on the draft. Comments and suggestions were alsoreceived from Sok Hach of EIC and the members of the Project Advisory Committee.

1 IMF (2004), International Financial Statistics2 EIC (2005), Cambodia Economic Watch, Issue 23 Samnang Chea and Hach Sok (2003), WTO’s accession for Cambodia: Opportunities and challenges, EIC Economic

Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 September-October, 20034 Cambodian government addressed a letter to the WTO Director General requesting the extension of time limit for

acceptance of the protocol for the accession of Cambodia. The letter is available at WT/GC/77 or at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/77.doc

5 It is important to note that only investment projects meeting the minimum capital and sector requirements set outby the RGC will be eligible to obtain incentives and receive an investment license.

6 See www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/government117.htm and www.mef.gov.kh/SpeechDr.Naron/speechnaron1.htm for more details.

7 WTO (2003), Report of the working party on the accession of Cambodia dated August 2003 (WT/ACC/KHM/2),also available at: http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/KHM21.doc

8 This list did not include another SOE, the Foreign Trade Bank, owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance(80%) and the National Bank of Cambodia (20%)

9 Khy Touk (2004), Industrial development in Cambodia: Main issues and opportunities, EIC Economic Review, vol.1, No. 6

10 ADB (2003), Private sector assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia, p. 1011 Ibid. p. 13-1512 Source: Website of the American Cancer Society, http://www.cancer.org/downloads/TOB/Cambodia.pdf13 Interview with H.E. Sun Chhay, Member of the National Assembly14 IFC & MPDF, Business Issues Bulletin, No 2, Cambodia, p.115 AAC & ILO (2004), Study on legal requirements for micro and small businesses, NGOs, and associations and

procedures and practices for exporting Cambodian handicrafts, p. 2516 World Bank (2004), Cambodia Seizing the Global Opportunity: Investment Climate Assessment & Reform Strategy,

p. 14.17 Cambodia Daily, 5 April 2005, Vol. 31, issue 4418 Raksmei Kampuchea Daily, 15 March 2005, Issue No. 362619 The World Bank (2004), Cambodia seizing the global opportunity: Investment climate assessment and reform

strategy, p. 2620 Khy Touk (2004), Industrial development in Cambodia: Main issues and opportunities, EIC Economic Review, vol.

1, No. 621 Article 2 of the Electricity Law22 Article 7 of the Electricity Law23 International telecommunication Union (ITU, 2002), Khmer Internet: Cambodia case study, p. 3424 David Butcher & Associates (2001), Cambodia: Networks, services and regulatory reform25 ITU, List of the level of competition in the Asia Pacific, see the full list at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/profiles/

LevelOfComp.asp26 Samnang Chea, Denora Sarin, Hach Sok (2004), Cambodia’s commitments under the general agreements on trade

in services, EIC Economic Review, vol. 1, No. 427 Testra was the Australia Company that contracted with the MPTC to install the first international gateway for 10

years. Testra owned 51 per cent of the revenue and the MPTC took the remaining shares. Its contract was expiredin 2000 and the gateway now is owned and operated by the MPTC

28 Supra note 23, p. 729 Cambodia Daily, 11 March 2005, Vol. 31, Iissue 2730 Based on report of World Bank (2004), Cambodia- Seizing Global Opportunity: Investment Climate Assessment &

Reform Strategy31 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2004), The Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction in Cambodia,

p. 18132 Based on National Bank of Cambodia Review, No 10, 4th Quarter 2004.

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33 These two laws was in agenda of second phase (2005-2007) of Financial Sector Blueprint for 2001-201034 Riel is Cambodian Currency. Exchange rate was US$1=3,900 riel. However, with current exchange rate of US$1=4,000

riel, the capital requirement is US$ 12.5mn.35 Oum Sothea and Sok Hach (October, 2004), Cambodia Economic Watch, Issue 1.36 Ibid.37 Available at http://www.rdb.com.kh/data/about%20RDB.htm38 General principles of the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection, the full text of the Guidelines is available at: http:/

/www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/consumption/english.pdf#search=’United%20nations%20guidelines%20for%20consumer%20protection

39 Article 64 of the 1993 Constitution of Cambodia40 Prakas (declaration) is a type of regulations issued by any ministry; The hierarchy of the law in Cambodia follows

by: Constitution, Kram (law), Kret (Decree), Anukret (sub-decree), Prakas (declaration or regulation) and Sarachor(circular)

41 Prakas No. 963 on the Registration of Industrial Products by the Ministry of Industry42 Anukret No. 54/ANK/BK of September 22, 1997 on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Commerce.43 Brochures of the Industrial Standards of Cambodia (ISC)44 Brochure of the Department of Metrology (DOM)45 The Prime Minister mentioned he would use his “Iron Fist” to reform the judiciary, Cambodia Daily, 04 March 2005,

Vol. 31, issue 2246 UNDP (2004), Human Development Report 2004, p. 16247 Cambodia Daily, 20 April 2005, Vol. 31, issue 5548 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The United Nations set of principles and rules

on competition (TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2)

Cambodia