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1 Presented in Ist Asian Philosophy Congress, 6-9 March 2010 An Appraisal of Perennialist Approach to Comparative Philosophy Abstract Muhammad Maroof Shah Research Assistant, DIL, Nowshera Srinagar Kashmir Home Address Rajbag Colony, Nagbal, Ganderbal, Kashmir, 190006 [email protected] Cell: 9419078758, 9797187282 Perennialists reread entire philosophical/metaphysical tradition, especially the Western tradition which they accuse of unforgivable sin of oblivion of true metaphysics and thus philosophy proper. Their rereading is challenging, provocative and seems to throw light on certain otherwise irresolvable debates in Western thought. They seek to show transcendent unity of religions (apparently divergent traditions of Buddhism and Islam are ingeniously interpreted to demonstrate this transcendent unity) and of all traditional philosophies. The concept of universal orthodoxy propounded by Schuon integrates and juxtaposes otherwise quite diverse and divergent trends in philosophical traditions of the world. Coomaraswamy has forcefully argued for the essential unity between Platoniosm and Vedanta. Taoism and Sufism are admirably integrated in a common paradigm by Izatsu. Semitic and nonSemitic traditions are reconciled with great conviction by such masters of Sophia perennis as Schuon. Even archaic philosophical thought though couched in mythological terms and that informs their religion and culture is shown to be essentially similar to Unitarian/monistic metaphysics of Vedanta, Sufism and Taoism. An insightful and forceful critique of both exoteric theological and rationalist/empiricist philosophical approaches steers clear of many problems that modernity and postmodernity have raised. It clarifies and adds precision to certain fundamental notions of comparative philosophy. Redefines metaphysics, articulates difference between reason and intellect, clarifies differences between different

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Page 1: Comparative Philosophy

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Presented in Ist Asian Philosophy Congress, 6-9 March 2010

An Appraisal of Perennialist Approach to Comparative Philosophy

Abstract

Muhammad Maroof Shah

Research Assistant, DIL, Nowshera Srinagar

Kashmir

Home Address

Rajbag Colony, Nagbal, Ganderbal, Kashmir, 190006

[email protected]

Cell: 9419078758, 9797187282

Perennialists reread entire philosophical/metaphysical tradition, especially the Western tradition which they accuse of unforgivable sin of oblivion of true metaphysics and thus philosophy proper. Their rereading is challenging, provocative and seems to throw light on certain otherwise irresolvable debates in Western thought. They seek to show transcendent unity of religions (apparently divergent traditions of Buddhism and Islam are ingeniously interpreted to demonstrate this transcendent unity) and of all traditional philosophies. The concept of universal orthodoxy propounded by Schuon integrates and juxtaposes otherwise quite diverse and divergent trends in philosophical traditions of the world. Coomaraswamy has forcefully argued for the essential unity between Platoniosm and Vedanta. Taoism and Sufism are admirably integrated in a common paradigm by Izatsu. Semitic and nonSemitic traditions are reconciled with great conviction by such masters of Sophia perennis as Schuon. Even archaic philosophical thought though couched in mythological terms and that informs their religion and culture is shown to be essentially similar to Unitarian/monistic metaphysics of Vedanta, Sufism and Taoism. An insightful and forceful critique of both exoteric theological and rationalist/empiricist philosophical approaches steers clear of many problems that modernity and postmodernity have raised. It clarifies and adds precision to certain fundamental notions of comparative philosophy. Redefines metaphysics, articulates difference between reason and intellect, clarifies differences between different senses of intuition, sees Maya or Divine Relativity in all important philosophical/esoteric traditions, reconciles creation ex nihilo and emanationist accounts or creation/manifestation ideas, posits Absolute as more primordial conception of Divinity that is to be found in all major traditions and thus reconciles “atheistic” or transtheistic Buddhism and Taoism with Semitic theism. All these points make perennialist approach a better candidate for doing comparative philosophy. Also some seminal problems in post-Aristotelian Western philosophy that continue to generate debate are better resolved by adopting perennialist approach. It provides a more comprehensive and integral view of relation between science and religion and religion and philosophy for which most Asian philosophical traditions have traditionally stood.

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What is the subject matter of comparative philosophy? What is its scope? The traditional view as expressed by Masson-Oursel states that “The scope of comparative philosophy is universal history and cosmos”(1). He goes on to declare that true philosophy is comparative philosophy. But postmodernity is skeptical of such grand claims on behalf of philosophy and comparative philosophy. Many modern philosophers would also contest possibility of developing such a comparative philosophy. The very notion of philosophy stands discredited in the eyes of postmodernists and a wide range of skeptical/relativist thinkers from various quarters. How is it possible to speak now without embarrassment of such a concept of comparative philosophy? What about the notion of traditional philosophy as queen of sciences, as a way of life, pursuit of wisdom, communion with God/enlightenment? The present paper seeks to address these questions from a perspective that has, unfortunately, been largely neglected by the academic world. In an environment where philosophy in the traditional sense cultivated from millennia across civilizations is declared dead or bankrupt or a bunch of lies or contaminated with rhetoric this perspective speaks thunderously for the rights and tall claims of philosophy and even identifies broad counters of what may be called as world philosophy that has been, according to them, the common property of traditional civilizations. This perspective deploys a range of concepts to make possible to demonstrate the unity of philosophies across traditions. Asian philosophies could be studied under one umbrella or in a meaningful dialogue with one another by its means. Not only six systems of Indian philosophy but also so-called heterodox philosophies of Buddhism and Jainism are seen to converge at fundamental level. Confucianism and Taoism are seen as exoteric and esoteric formulations of a wisdom that finds expression in Greek, Christian, Jewish and Muslim philosophies and esotericisms. African and archaic philosophies too are brought in the ambit of Tradition. It is rationalistic modern Western philosophy along with reactions such as Bergsonian intuitionism and existentialism and misosophical cult of postmodernism that are branded as heterodox, as not qualifying for the worthy title of philosophy.

Before embarking on the little appreciated perennialist view of philosophy and comparative philosophy I wish to settle terms with postmodernists who claim that there is no scope for philosophy as traditionally understood. All philosophies claiming possibility of access to truth and wisdom or pursuing moksa/ enlightenment etc. are found fundamentally flawed. Philosophies are comparable in their essential blindness to their own unwarranted claims. According to them our philosophy should be resolute refusal to affirm anything, to speak anything, to know anything, to believe anything and to indulge in meaningless exercises of working for comparative philosophy. Logocentric idealistic metaphysical traditions (as all traditions are including the Western) should be transcended or thrown overboard. That philosophy is not wisdom as the Greeks understood it has been the central point of recent trends in philosophy. Virtue is dispensable. Ethics has hardly any role in approaching or appropriating truth. Philosophers need not be sages and ideally should not be. Philosophy has nothing to do with truth. Certainty and not truth should be its aim though now certainty too has been dispensed with. Philosophy can’t be an aid in enlightenment. Philosophy is just analysis of concepts or a clarification of language. All these are fashionable views on philosophy in recent Western thought. Postmodernism has disallowed all philosophizing except paganism. For it philosophy is rhetoric, mere opinion from which Plato vainly tried to distinguish real knowledge. It is just a power complicit discourse or power game. In view of such a disturbing scenario and extremely constricted estimate of philosophy’s scope any prospect for comparative philosophy and that too as Massonn-Ouslen and perennialists would have it and back home Radhakrishnan and such scholars as P. T. Raju would have it seem to be bleak. The only alternative to resuscitate philosophy and speak meaningfully of comparative philosophy is to search for alternative foundations of philosophy or alternative ways of doing it and criticize the very foundations of modern Western philosophy that has ultimately led to its suicide and distrust of the very activity that traditionally distinguished man from animals and made his life meaningful and gave him access to truth and salvation. I think that it is the perennialist school that best presents such an alternative vision that resists postmodern critique and restores

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to philosophy its hallowed status that all traditions had given it. This allows us to have a genuine basis for comparison of philosophies and even speak about a world philosophy.

Postmodern deconstruction of ontotheological thought, subject, truth, meaning, purpose, language, God, knowledge etc is bypassed by quite different understanding of all these things. The perennialist claim is that all premodern civilizations including the premodern Christianity and Platonic philosophy possess a common metaphysics and that metaphysics is not the metaphysics of presence which Derrida and other postmodernists could problematize. The best and most sophisticated expression of this philosophy is Advaita Vedanta. However it is the Buddhist version of this metaphysics that best appropriates postmodern challenge though we could find integral metaphysics that resists and proceeds beyond postmodernism in Sufism, Taoism and Platonism and even in Christian mysticism.

The idea of a perennial philosophy (philosophia perennis) has received different articulations throughout the history of Western philosophy. It was originally formulated in the East and later was formulated in the West, in particular, by Plato, by Meister Eckhart in the Christian world, and is also to be found in Islam with Sufism. The search for a universal, permanent, and all-encompassing philosophy can be traced to the Neoplatonism of Philo of Alexandria or the Platonic-Christian synthesis of St. Augustine. However, we find the term perennial philosophy has been explicitly used only by the time of the Renaissance. More precisely, it was Agostino Steuco (1497-1546) who coined this term to refer to the prisca theologia or philosophia priscorium of Marsilio Ficino, a unifying philosophical system based on a synthesis of Platonic principles and Christian doctrines. Throughout the history of philosophy, the term perennial philosophy or philosophia perennis was also used as a synonym for Scholasticism and Thomism; as the final goal of philosophy by Leibniz; as the regulative ideal of philosophical practice by Jaspers; and as a world philosophy, synthesis of East and West, by Radhakrishnan. However here it is used to specifically refer to a school of thought spearheaded by the trinity of Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon and Ananda Coomaraswamy that appropriates all these ideals and notions. Perennialists believe in an overlying absolute or universal truth, which can be found in fundamental principles that have been shown to be universal inheritance of mankind, a universal orthodoxy for all people across all times. Common to all these conceptions, however, is the idea that a philosophical/metaphysical current exists that has endured through centuries, and that is able to integrate harmoniously all traditions in terms of a single Truth which underlies the apparent plurality of world views. This unity in human knowledge stems from the existence of a single ultimate reality which can be possibly apprehended by all men through intellect/ intellective intuition.

Philosophia perennis, as Nasr states, pertains to a knowledge “which has always been and will always be and which is of universal character both in the sense of existing among peoples of different climes and epochs and of dealing with universal principles. This knowledge which is available to the intellect is, moreover, contained in the heart of all religions or traditions”(2:54). (Intellect, nuous, in the traditionalist metaphysical perspective is a supra-individual faculty distinct from reason though the latter is its reflection on the mental plane). The philosophia perennis possesses

branches and ramifications pertaining to cosmology, anthropology, art and other disciplines, but at its heart lies pure metaphysics, if this later term is understood as the science of Ultimate Reality, as a scientia sacra not to be confused with the subject bearing the name metaphysics in post-medieval Western philosophy”(2:54).

The perennialist school believes that there is a primordial tradition which constituted original or archetypal man’s primal spiritual and intellectual heritage received through direct revelation when Heaven and Earth were still ‘united.’ This Primordial Tradition is reflected in all later traditions, but the later traditions are

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not simply its historical and horizontal continuation. This concept of tradition is key concept of this perennialist school that has arisen as a response to modernism and humanism. What is tradition? It is the knowledge of First Principles or Universal Principles, the metaphysical core or kernel of all traditional religious and wisdom traditions which are the prerogative of so-called primitive men (and that ancient age is the Age of Gold, in contrast to which modern age being the most degenerate age signalling the end of the world-Kali Yuga-Iron Age) and “barbaric” Africans and Asians – in short the third world, the premodern world or non European or colonized world. Tradition means

truths or principles of a divine origin revealed or unveiled to mankind and, in fact, a whole cosmic centre through various figures envisaged as messengers, prophets, avatars, the Logos or other transmitting agencies, along with all the ramifications and applications of these principles in different realms including law and social structure, art, symbolism, the sciences, and embracing of course Supreme Knowledge along with the means of its attainment (5:68).

In its more universal sense tradition can be considered to include the principles which bind man to Heaven. Lord Northbourne defines it as the chain that joins civilization to Revelation. Rene Guenon thus spells out the essence of tradition:

…those institutions are traditional which find their ultimate juistification in their more or less direct, but always intentional and conscious, dependence upon a doctrine which, as regards its fundamental nature, is in every case of an intellectual order; but this intellectuality may be found either in a pure state, in cases where one is dealing with an entirely metaphysical docrtrine, or else it may be found mingled with other heterogenous elements, as in the case of religious or other sopecial modes which a traditional doctrine is capable of assuming.(3:89-90)

It isn’t to be confused with theosophy, spiritism, occultism, revivalism, fundamentalism, sentimental religion, moralism and the like. It demands intelligence and intuition both of which are absent in the modern world according to perennialists. The scientist neither possesses objective intelligence nor intellective intuition. Modern philosophy and literary theory and also the so-called higher criticism along with proliferation of so many “isms” such as scientism, rationalism, relativism, materialism, positivism, empiricism, secularism, psychologism, individualism, biologism, evolutionism, existentialism, are seen as some of the prime follies of modernist thought. Postmodernism fears no better. Modernism which forms the ideological background of colonialism is characterized as antitraditional and thus such derogatory epithets as progressive, humanist, rationalist, materialist, experimental, individualist, free thinking and intensely sentimental ideology. Modern Western man is cut off from the vertical dimension or the sense of transcendence and lacks knowledge of metaphysical principles. The quantitative dimension of reality which science treats isn’t deepening of knowledge but ‘dispersion in detail.’ Natural sciences are concerned primarily with practical applications and in many cases this is combined with a will to power and thus many modernists confuse science with technology. Westerners in general don’t cultivate science for knowledge, even of an inferior order but for application, manipulation, appropriation, objectivation and desecration of environment. Science thus technologized has fuelled colonialist engine.

The Western world, aver perennialists, has lost its connection to the Primordial Tradition unlike other cultures. “This took place first in the Classical era, was rectified by Christianity, which re-introduced a modified form of the Primordial Tradition, but the severance began again at the time of the Renaissance.” (4:46) Traditional metaphysical conception of God as Infinite and Absolute counters deconstructionist challenge quite effectively. Traditional metaphysics is not what Derrida calls metaphysics of presence. It is not the rational conceptual knowledge of the Absolute. As there is no thought, no subject-object dualism so poststructuralist critique is bypassed. God is impossibility or limit of signification. God's words (kalimaat) can't be exhausted. Total or complete truth is known only to God. All human perspectives are conditioned. This conditioning is transcended completely in metaphysical

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realization as knowing and being become one. It is not the perception of the senses or the eye of the mind or the imagination that sees the Truth. “No speech and thought has ever defiled the absolute.” Noncategorical supraconceptual apropositional knowledge which is not seeing but being really escapes Derridean and related postmodern critiques. God or Truth is mystery (gayyib). Mystery cannot be pinned down or rationally explained away. That is the meaning of the tradition of negative divine. There is no dualism, exclusion or totalization involved. Metaphysical conceptions of Beyond-Being and All-Possibility are inclusivist but not totalist. Here it is not possible to make a detailed study of these points.

No binary thinking, no asymmetrical hierarchy, no linguistic proposition, no truth claim, no exclusive metaphysical or theological claim, no meaning closure, no talk of presence and identity, no dualism of any sort could be implicated in the first principle of metaphysics that perennialists attempt to expound.

In the act of metaphysical realization as distinct from mystical realization (that has become focus of extensive studies in the discipline of philosophy of religion and that has led to never ending debates on cognitivity of religious experience, analysis of fundamental propositions) individual domain is altogether left out. There is no room for feeling and sentimentalism. The mind or everything that contributes to a separative distinctive selfhood or subjecthood has to be transcended completely in order to experience the divine in the fullest sense of the term in the Eastern context. In fact as Guenon has provocatively remarked there is no such thing as mysticism (and religious experience in the modern sense of the term in the East. Here we must point out, from the perennialist (more precisely the Guenonian reading of it) point of view the difference between religion and metaphysics. As Guenon points out the metaphysical point of view is purely intellectual while as in the religious or theological point of view the presence of a sentimental element affects the doctrine itself, which doesn’t allow of it complete objectivity. The emotional element nowhere plays a bigger part than in the “mystical” form of religious thought. Contrary to the prevalent opinion he declares that mysticism, from the very fact that it is inconceivable apart from the religious point of view, is quite unknown in the East (3: 124). The influence of sentimental element obviously impairs the intellectual purity of the doctrine. This falling away from the standpoint of metaphysical thought occurred generally and extensively in the Western world because there feeling was stronger than intelligence and this has reached its climax in modern times. (3:125) Modern theistic appropriations of mystical experience by choosing to remain at the level of theology and not cognizing the metaphysical point of view (that brilliantly and convincingly appropriates such apparently divergent varieties of mystical and metaphysical realization as that of Buddhism and Christianity) cannot claim total truth as theology itself cannot do so. And it is not always possible to fully translate metaphysical doctrines in terms of theological dogmas. Only one example will suffice here. The immediate metaphysical truth “Being exists” gives rise to another proposition when expressed in the religious or theological mode “God exists.” But as Guenon says the two statements would not be strictly equivalent except on the double condition of conceiving God as Universal Being, which is far from always being the case in fact (Tillich comes close to holding this view of God), and of identifying existence with pure Being or what the Sufis call Zat or Essence which is metaphysically inexact. The endless controversies connected with the famous ontological argument are a product of misunderstanding of the implications of the two formulae just cited. It is the inadequate or faulty metaphysical background that contributes a lot to controversies on either side of the debate on religious experience in modern discourses of philosophy of religion. As Guenon says:

Unlike purely metaphysical conceptions theological conceptions are not beyond the reach of individual variations. Those who discuss such matters as the “proofs of God’s existence,” should first of all make sure that in using the same word “God” they really are intending to express an identical conception. However this is hardly the case usually and we see altogether different languages being used. Antimetaphysical anthropomorphism comes to the fore in this realm of individual variations (3:128-129).

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In the perennialist perspective metaphysics constitutes an intuitive, or in other words immediate knowledge, as opposed to the discursive or mediate knowledge which belongs to the rational order. Most protagonists as well as critics of concept of religious experience hardly leave this rational order in their discourse. “Intellectual intuition is even more immediate than sensory intuition, being beyond the distinction between subject and object which the latter allows to subsist.” (3: 168) Subject and object are here identified completely and this complete identification is not an attribute of any inferior or non-metaphysical type of knowledge. A consequence of this is that knowing and being are fundamentally one or two inseparable aspects of a single reality. Knowing and being are indistinguishable in the sphere where all is “without duality” (3:169.) From such a perspective the various “theories of knowledge” with metaphysical pretensions which occupy such an important place in modern Western philosophy (which dominate everything in case of Kant) are purposeless. The debate over cognitivity of religious experience similarly appears purposeless in the metaphysical perspective. As Guenon says such theories arise from an attitude of mind that originated in Cartesian dualism and is shared by almost all modern philosophers. This attitude consists in artificially opposing knowing and being. This is antithesis of true metaphysic. The identity of knowing and being is not merely dogmatically affirmed but realized as well in the integral metaphysic (3:170). The theory and meditational and other practices are a means or aids to such a realization. It need not and could not be certified or verified by other means, other persons or any kind of tests. Of course these considerations appear strange to Western people. Mystical realization is only partial and rather distant approximation or analogy of metaphysical realization (3: 172). Metaphysical realization is common to all Oriental thought and “mysticism.”

Perennialist would agree with Heidegger’s critique of rational metaphysics that it concentrates on the notional surface and “remains in what is.” Truth is not the property of propositions; it is the unhiddenness of being. But Heidegger himself was committed to the realm of finitude. He couldn’t reach the supreme metaphysical principle of Beyond-Being and considered Being finite which reduces metaphysical point of view to bare ontology (4:17). It is only the idea of infinity which establishes the possibility of metaphysics (and thus provides grounding to religion). “Infinity belongs to the combination of Being and Non-being because this combination is identical to universal possibility”(13:59-60) How could Being alone reflect the Unlimited? As Qaisar comments: “How could being alone reflect the unlimited? Heidegger merely unveiled a few layers of the finite but never reached the infinite. By affirming the absence of God, he cut the roots of metaphysics” (4:17). Despite their opposition to rationalism Heidegger along with Nietzsche could not extricate himself from rationalist presumptions and traps.

Explaining the difference between rational and metaphysical knowledge, Shahzad Qaisar writes:

metaphysical knowledge is attained by intellect alone. Intellect has a direct knowledge of the principles for it belongs to the universal order. Strictly speaking, intellect is not an individual faculty otherwise metaphysics would not have been possible. How is it possible for an individual to go beyond himself. The attainment of effective individual consciousness of supraindividual states - the objective of metaphysics is only possible through a non individual faculty. The metaphysical truth is not external to intellect but lies in its very substance. Knowledge is identified with the object itself resulting in the identity of knowing and being. A reciprocity is thus developed between thought and reality. The process of reaching the heart of Reality is by virtue of intellectual intuition for it is not obstructed by the yawning chasm of subject-object duality. Intellectual intuition is supraindividual as compared to intuition of certain contemporary philosophers which is infra-rational. The former is above reason imparting knowledge of the eternal and immutable principles whereas the latter is below reason tied to the world of change and becoming. Intellectual intuition is contemplation whereas the rational capacity is logical. The infallibility of intellect is derived from its own nature with absolute metaphysical certainty.

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Religion is existential formulation of metaphysical thought. From metaphysical point of view it binds man to a superior principle. Religion comprises a dogma, a moral law, and a form of worship. Dogma belongs to the intellectual order and it does not divest itself from its essential metaphysical character. Feeling has a cognitive content and deepens intelligence and establishes a unique form of certitude. Moral law is dependent on the religious doctrine and has both metaphysical and social character. The form of worship is symbolic expression of the doctrine(4:33-34).

If by rationalism is meant an attempt to build a closed system embracing the whole of reality and based upon human reason alone, then this begins, as Nasr points out, not with Aristotle (in whose philosophy there are metaphysical intuitions which can not be reduced to simple products of the human reason) but with Descartes, since for him the ultimate criterion of reality itself is the human ego and not the Divine Intellect or Pure Being. This is rightly critiqued by both perennialists and postmodernists. If philosophy is defined as rational inquiry, staying within the limits of reason and not accepting any other faculty beyond reason (called intellect up to the 17th century) then certain developments in modern philosophy and postmodern turn has indeed discredited it. Metaphysics as Kant correctly perceived is riddled with antimonies as long as we approach it by means of reason. Traditional metaphysics is not the rational metaphysics. It is not concerned with the phenomenal world or even Being but invisibles or Unmanifest.

The most important task for philosophy, according to Ananda Coomaraswamy, is understanding comparative religion. A metaphysical reading of religion as applied by perennialists dissolves the major criticisms against religious thought or against religious basis of philosophy in the East. From a metaphysico-mystical viewpoint religion is not a narrative, a story, an explanation of things, belief in a set of propositions, so postmodern inspired critique of it is unwarranted though of course it may have certain relevance in critiquing exotic literalist theology. Fundamentalism that reduces religion to an ideology and presents it as if it is a metanarrative could be critiqued on postmodern grounds but mysticism and even metaphysics if properly understood in perennialist terms, escapes postmodern critique because there is no privileging and marginilization of any term whatsoever, no binaries, no categorical conceptual linguistic vocabulary at all, no propositions with which the logician or rationalist dabbles.

Perennialists reread entire philosophical/metaphysical tradition, especially the Western tradition which they accuse of unforgivable sin of oblivion of true metaphysics and thus philosophy proper. Their rereading is challenging, provocative and seems to throw light on certain otherwise irresolvable debates in Western thought. They claim transcendent unity of religions (apparently divergent traditions of Buddhism and Islam are ingeniously interpreted to demonstrate this transcendent unity) and thus unity of all orthodox traditional philosophies. The concept of universal orthodoxy propounded by Schuon integrates and juxtaposes otherwise quite diverse and divergent trends in philosophical traditions of the world. Coomaraswamy has forcefully argued for the essential unity between Platoniosm and Vedanta. Taoism and Sufism are admirably integrated in a common paradigm by Izatsu. Semitic and nonSemitic traditions in religion are reconciled with great conviction by such masters of Sophia perennis as Schuon. Even archaic philosophical thought though couched in mythological terms and that informs their religion and culture is essentially similar to Unitarian/monistic metaphysics of Vedanta, Sufism and Taoism.

The metaphysical/traditional understanding of some key concepts such as the Real, Absolute, Infinitude, All- Possibility, Good, Self differs from theological and philosophical understanding of them. Theological notions are translated in terms of metaphysical ideas. Scriptures are subject to metaphysical reading. Literalist exoteric account is substituted or complemented by esoteric symbolist one. It is the absence of such notions as Infinite, Pure Being and ignorance of intellect that have complicated problems for Western philosophy. Philosophical and theological dualism have been the bane of Western and exoteric approaches. The inadequate conception of self is at the root of many errors of theological and

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philosophical thought. Modern thought began as a rebellion against traditional thought of the world and gave rise to hitherto unknown problems. Woeful limitations of rationalism and empiricism and attempt to construct a rational metaphysics and failure of such attempts and more recent cynicism with respect to the whole philosophical enterprise show how problematic has been the modern Western project. Sentimentalism, moralism, irrationalism, subjectivism and a host of other one sided ideologies that have flourished during the modern period are a sad comment on modern man’s attempt to philosophize in the absence of intellection and intelligence capable of objectivity and certitude. It is difficult to see genuine basis for unity among philosophies in the framework of modern presuppositions and prejudices. In such a context perennialist discomfort with modern project and search for alternative foundations for philosophy is better appreciated. Within the limits of reason or experience (limited to conscious mode and ignoring altered states of consciousness of which sages and mystics speak) alone – taking no consideration of transcendence – attempts to build worldview or do philosophy have proved quite problematic. In the absence of moral purification there can be no pursuit of wisdom, no true knowledge according to traditional philosophers from different civilizations. The tragic divorce of fact and value, of phenomena and noumena, of samsara and nirvana, of knowing and being we find in modern philosophies necessitate search for such alternative perspectives such as the one provided by perennialists. Some salient points in perennialist perspective that have a bearing on the enterprise of comparative philosophy are listed below. A systematic discussion of this approach to comparative philosophy is not possible in this short space. I shall be content with presenting broad outline of it.

In a tone reminding of certain postmodernists perennialists lash on modern Western philosophy. The great citadel of Western philosophical thought (especially post-Aristotelian modern philosophy excluding mystical and scholastic medieval trend) is based on colossal ignorance of pure metaphysics and thus fundamentally flawed. Certain acclaimed names in modern philosophy such as Kant and Kierkegaard are dismissed as not deserving the name of philosopher according to perennialists. Kierkegaard is rejected as debaser of intelligence. Kant’s epistemology is laughed away. Descartes is projected as a villain who brought the end of genuine philosophy.

By employing the notion of intellect as against reason and foreground metaphysical/mystical instead of philosophical/theological reading of basic concepts of philosophy and religion perennialists challenge dualistic exoteric theology and excesses of scholasticism, dualistic rationalistic philosophies, exclusivist claims of theology or certain particular philosophical tradition, all totalistic philosophical systems and ideologies, Eastern or Western, uniformitarianism and syncretism in comparative religion and philosophy, all philosophies of Being that ignore the more fundamental notion of Non-Being or Beyond-Being and reduction of philosophy to language game, to social praxis, to handmaiden of modern science, to epistemology /ontology, to merely rational enterprise is challenged. Agnosticism of all sorts and sophistic relativism are rejected in thunderous and unambiguous terms.

The greatest and most uncompromising critic of Western philosophical and religious thought, the arch enemy of rational metaphysics, Nietzsche is accommodated without much difficulty by the perennialists. “Antiessentialist,” “agnostic” or “atheistic” religious figures such as Buddha are promulgated as prophets. Christ and Buddha, Sankara and Nagarjuna, Eckhart and Ibn Arabi, Nietzsche and Paul are all reconciled and juxtaposed. It is intriguing to see how the perennialists put in context and reconcile the apparently polar opposite thinkers. Polemics of Sankara and Nagarjuna against each other are explained away without sacrificing the uniqueness and particularity of each thinker and each tradition.

Certain assertions that are found in almost all works on philosophy by Westerners and which make prospects of comparative philosophy bleaker are contested by perennialists. There is hardly any such thing as materialism and naturalism in the modern sense of the terms in the ancients. For instance in ancient Greece. General understanding of Greek Philosophy,

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especially Platonic and pre-Socratic philosophy is based on great ignorance of traditional language, terms and symbolism. Confounding of reason and intellect and different senses of notion of intuition ( subrational and suprarational ) and certain other confusions are standard in modern textbooks and reference works. The elements of which Greeks and other traditional thinkers talk are crudely understood in literal physical terms. The Water of which Thales talked and the Fire of which other great philosopher talked are gloriously misunderstood by most modern historians of philosophy. Pythagoras is also the victim of gross misunderstanding at the hands of those who fail to understand traditional mathematics and its connection with traditional metaphysics and cosmology. Heidegger had accused Western philosophical thinkers of fundamental errors in understanding Greek Philosophy. Perennialists extend this critique and argue that they commit more fundamental errors in not only understanding certain fundamental notions of Greek philosophy but all traditional philosophies by having very partial understanding of pure metaphysics, symbolism and traditional sciences. Modern science’s influence looms large on modern philosophy and that makes it colossally ignorant of the real idea and understanding of philosophy. There are great aberrations rather perversions in modern understanding. According to perennialists modern science is neither true nor a way to clarify philosophical problems. It can have no bearing on traditional metaphysics. Modern science is an abuse of intelligence.

All philosophy except the modern (which therefore doesn’t qualify to be called a philosophy) are connected to moksa ideal. As R. Balasubraminian notes: “The conception of philosophy as critique of science or as a critique of language, or even an analysis in the most comprehensive sense, is a far cry from the ancient conception of philosophy as knowledge in general about man and the universe.”

It clarifies and adds precision to certain fundamental notions of comparative philosophy. Redefines metaphysics as the science of supraphenomenal, articulates difference between reason and intellect, clarifies differences between different senses of intuition, sees Maya or Divine Relativity in all important philosophical/esoteric traditions, reconciles creation ex nihilo and emanationist accounts or creation/manifestation ideas, posits Absolute as more primordial conception of Divinity that is to be found in all major traditions and thus reconciles “atheistic” or transtheistic Buddhism and Taoism with Semitic theism. No religion absolutizes personal God. Deploying a series of distinctions such as metaphysics and theology, esoterism and exotericism, form and substance, God and Godhead, it unifies apparently conflicting traditions and schools. For instance, Taoism is understood as an esoteric dimension of Confucianism. Dualistic and monistic currents in different schools or within the same tradition are easily reconciled. Taking theological/religious standpoint is justified at its own plane though it is associated with dualistic viewpoint. But it must be borne in mind that it is nondualism (even the term monism is found inexact by perennialists in describing Vedanta and other nondualistic traditions) that best describes the heart of all wisdom. It finds polytheism and pantheism absent or quite marginal in traditional civilizations. Vedanta or Sufism has nothing to do with pantheism. Describing them as pantheistic is typical orientalist fallacy. It finds no mysticism in East. Not to speak of positivism, atheistic existentialism, Marxism and other major schools of modern philosophy which have explicitly secular or antireligiuous/antitraditrional outlook, it has no kind words for even such things as theistic existentialism (it finds its subjectivism and irrationalism quite offensive), intuitionism of Bergson (seeing it as subrational and thus dangerous, perverted idea) and process philosophy. Ramanuja and Shankara and even Nagarjuna and Shankara are brilliantly reconciled and subsumed in the perspective of universal orthodoxy.

Metaphysical perspective distinguishes itself from religious position that is formulated keeping in view the salvation of men rather than logical coherence. Elliptical and even

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seemingly contradictory and scandalous use of language in scriptures is not quite respectful of logic and rationality. However a metaphysical exegesis of scriptures is enough to distil a metaphysical core of scriptural statements that makes perfect sense. Religions are interested in saving people rather than satisfying their philosophical queries. In the interests of salvation certain aspects of truth may go into the background and others overemphasized. Goethe has well expressed the vacation of man in the world: “Man is not born to solve the problems of the universe, but to find out what he has to do and to restrain himself within the limits of his comprehension.” Promethean-Faustian attitudes are ultimately suicidal. Modern man vaily attempts to read the mind of God, to dissolve the Mystery at the heart of everything by ratiocinative means rather than open himself up to the Mystery and get dissolved as a separate autonomous subjectivity (ego) and get redeemed. It is vain to attempt to scan God. ·

A metaphysical/symbolist reading of key theological notions disarms the critics who employ purely logical and philosophical tools in dismissing theodicy.· It employs metaphysical notions which are not reducible to traditional theological counterparts but subsume the latter; it appropriates and transcends theological perspective. Modern criticism of theology and religion are not applicable to metaphysics. Modern rejection of metaphysics applies to an impoverished conception of the latter rather than to the sacred science of supraphenomenal accessible to intellect. The real is knowable as Hegel would say against Kant or there is no such thing as knowledge. Millennial intuitions and experiences of sages and prophets can’t be written off by any Kant or positivist. Man is made for the Absolute and he is equipped fully for the task. Modern philosophy is ignorant and that is why it wallows in the mud of relativism and unprotected against skepticism which implies impossibility or vanity of all philosophizing. Modern philosophers, generally speaking, have little use for the treasured writings of traditional civilization and that accounts for its exclusivism. Perennialists can speak for most of humans or human collectivity as such as they rrespectfully appropriated. All the canonical sacred scriptures are kept in the background and not criticized as is fashionable in many modern circles but approached and interpreted metaphysically. If dominant approach of modern philosophy is taken as the yardstick the galaxy of traditional philosophers, mystical thinkers, sages, prophets and masses following them are all thrown out of the court as gullible or widely mistaken ignorant creatures. Religions having produced great civilizations with all the armory of art, philosophy, sciences are rejected as products of mistaken epistemology and metaphysics by predominantly secular modern philosophies. How is it possible to evolve a global philosophy or meaningful dialogue of different philosophies in the modernist or postmodernist framework that outlaws all traditional philosophies that take transcendence or the sacred to be of principial significance. The perennialists ask for no crucifixion of reason, no recourse to mystery mongering and rely on no ad hoc or arbitrary theses that have to be swallowed. They feel hardly any warrant for keeping mum in the face of inexplicable; they rely on no silencing strategy. They concede much of the modern philosophical critiques of theology and theodicy as practized in exoteric theological circles.

It considers demonstrating transcendent or metaphysical unity of all traditional religions as the most important task of philosophy. In its reevaluation of modern trends in study of religion

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and religious movements it irrationalist interpretations of mysticism which debunk logic and reason are rejected. Krishnanmurti and Osho like figures are rejected for distorting tradition and misunderstanding the significance of forms and traditional symbolism. For theosophy are reserved the harshest words as great distortion of traditional outlook. Popular conception of reincarnation is rejected as incompatible with traditional thought. God is the only transmigrant as for Sankara. Profound correspondences are found in apparently divergent religious conceptions. NeoVedanta of Vivekananda is found to be seriously limited and even accused of certain falsification of tradition. Though Ramakrishna is extolled as exemplary sage Vivekananda is not seen as his correct interpreter on certain accounts. The huge army of gurus and guru cults that have spread is most often criticized. Perennialists find pseudomysticism and pseudospirituality in them. Ramana Maharishi is extolled highly and he is among the few great mystics that they recognize. Aurobindo and Tielhard de Chardrin are criticized for their evolutionism. Most of modern gurus are counterfeit gurus.

In its major reevaluation of philosophers from the perennialists viewpoint it extols Plato and Pythagoras, the whole of Orphic tradition, medieval philosophy- Jewish, Christian and Islamic – on the whole despite the limitations of scholasticism. Sankara, Nagarjuna and in fact all thinkers in the framework of universal orthodoxy which comprise a galaxy of sages, traditional philosophers and traditional scholars and commentators in various traditions are accepted. Nagarjuna, Plato, Sankara, Ibn Arabi and Eckhart are the representative thinkers of different traditions that are mentioned in the same breath as expounding the same metaphysical truth in different languages and expressions. Fusion of Eastern and Western thought is best possible on the firm foundations of perennial philosophy which transmits the Light of God that belongs equally to East and West. There is no such thing as a dark age in philosophy or human thought as the Middle Ages are generally believed to be. However Christianity and history of Christianity is censured for its compromising or even destruction of primordial tradition. Rama Coomaraswamy has described this point in one of his important books. For modern philosophy they have, on the whole contempt though such thinkers as Leibnitz are accepted in certain measure. Renaissance is, as for Eliot, devil inspired movement. Enlightenment thought is quite dark and accused of abysmal ignorance of traditional heritage of mankind in general and the West in particular. Rationalism on the whole has debased intellect and therefore reason as well. Postmodern critique of Enlightenment Project is anticipated though from a different perspective.

Wholesale rejection of philosophy in the name of mysticism is censured. In fact perennialists differentiate between mystical and metaphysical thought. It finds no mysticism in the East in the strict sense of the term. Debunking some traditional philosophies as mystical while lauding rationalist thought and making the (modern) Western philosophy the standard of judging other philosophies is turned on its head.

For perennialists philosophy in the primordial sense of the term prepares one for death and assimilation to God as Plato said and is not a rational logical abstract discipline only and is allied to gnosis, a way of life or realization of the good. It is not a prerogative of ratio or mental faculty of reason but of nous, the supraindividual universal faculty of intellect. Metaphysics, the science of supraphenomenal universal principles, the Infinite, that transcends all binaries and dualisms that have plagued the Western philosophical and theological tradition, and resolves all contradictions in the One, the Absolute, coincidentia oppositorum, is intellectual (non-discursive intelligence) rather than rational discipline and postmodern critiques are hardly relevant to it as it is not dualistic, “structuralist,” or to be identified with metaphysics of presence. It is not a mere theoretical rational inquiry but a realization, intellection or noetic vision that transcends subject-object duality and demands something like ethical discipline that Plato argued for. Logos of which Plato, Neoplatonism and the perennialists speak is not renderable exclusively as reason or discursive reasoning (dianoia).

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“It could mean divine speech as well as noetic apprehension of the first indemonstrable and sacred principles, archetypes.” So Derridean and Oshoean critique of logocentric philosophy and rational metaphysics doesn’t apply to the traditional understanding of philosophy understood in this sense – Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic sense – and to nondualistic metaphysics cultivated in India and elsewhere. Philosophy in the traditional Orphic-Pythagorean sense is wisdom and love combined in a moral and intellectual purification in order to reach the “likeness to god.” It is contemplation of Beauty and Good. This is attainable by gnosis. The Greek word nous covers both spirit and intellect (intellectus, ‘aql) of Medieval Christian and Islamic lexicon. Platonic philosophy, understood as a spiritual and contemplative way of life leading to illumination or enlightenment; an intellectual discipline based on intellection culminating in union (henosis) with ideal Forms; his “Orphic”-Indian conception of philosopher as one who seeks release from the wheel of cyclical term concurs with the vision of perennialists and escapes postmodern critiques. So we conclude that philosophy, understood in the above sense of the term, has ever been alive and is not dead pace Derrida and Rorty. It is traditional metaphysics that can come to the rescue of philosophy in the postmetaphysical postmodern age and reclaim for it its lost dignity and sanctity attacked by science inspired positivism and linguistic turn in philosophy. Perennialist criticism of purely discursive rational thought, theology and philosophy and pleading for a non-discursive awareness or vision has great significance. Cultivation of this awareness is the common point of most New Age spiritual thinkers. Creative appropriation of Islamic-Sufistic, Taoist and Buddhist thought is ideally suited to an audience that is willy nilly postmodern – postmetaphysical, posttheological and postsecular and postrationalist.

There can be no progress in philosophy, the assertions of progressivists not withstanding. Guenon has provocatively remarked that there are no new truths to be discovered. Our task is only to understand the ancients who have discovered the fundamental metaphysical and saving truths. Human effort isn’t relevant at all in discovering the key to existence and its meaning. There can be progress in certain peripheral areas but none in discovering or updating our knowledge of Reality, of hierarchy of existence. There can be no denial that man has made great strides in understanding the outward reality with the help of modern science which was a product of certain tendencies in modern philosophies. But what perennialists point out however is that metaphysics concerns the knowledge of supraphenomenal realities and nothing is understandable here except with reference to the ontologically superior realities. Modern science has rejected symbolist spirit of traditional sciences and that is why it fails to make sense of the very big and very small where other unknown dimensions of reality are being reflected or impinge more clearly. Perennialists point out that there has been on the whole retrogression and degeneration in philosophical thought from ancient times onwards. Progress in the absolute sense of the term is categorically denied rather than in every sense.

There can be nothing new in truth, in revelation and intellection. It is also to be remarked that it is not modern intellectuals who have advocated it. Iamblichus had long before seen Plato and Pythagoras (and indeed all pagan Greek philosophers, with the exception of materialists) as part of continuing source of true knowledge. His unified theory included not only Greek philosophers and poets, but also Egyptians, Chaldeans, and other non-Greek pagans. The later pagan Neoplatonists embraced Iamblichus’ vision. Platonism is the part of the Golden Chain of knowledge, ultimately secured from the highest realms of the universe, from the gods and the One itself. The unity of revelation that the Quran claims is demonstrable in history only if we assume the perennialists notion of Golden Chain.

The key to comparative philosophy is the notion of philosopher and philosophy in different traditions. We will here explain it with reference to four traditions – Greek, Indian, Islamic and Chinese. As Schuon has noted:

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For Heraclites, the philosopher is one who applies himself to the knowledge of free nature of things; for Plato, philosophy is the knowledge of the Changeless and of the Ideas; and for Aristotle it is the knowledge of first causes and principles, together with the sciences that are derived from them. In addition, philosophy implies for all of the Ancients a moral conformity to wisdom: only he is wise, sophos, who lives wisely (7:136).

Tolumin has also observed in his Philosophers: East and West that only sage can be a philosopher in oriental civilizations and in modern Western philosophy this is not a required qualification and even ideally it is a hindrance. Schuon suggests to reserve the name of philosophers for sages and to describe rationalists for profane thinkers. (8:136) Philosophy, according to the best of the Greeks, is to express by means of reason certainties “seen” or “lived” by the immanent Intellect (8:138). Plato has maintained that the philosophers should think independently of received opinion. But, as Schuon notes, he refers to Intellection and not to logic alone. This is in sharp contrast to Descartes who reached such a conclusion from the starting point of systematic doubt and thus for him philosophy is synonymous only with rationalism and scepticism. This is, according to Schuon a first suicide of intelligence inaugurated by Pyrrho and others. What has been hailed as Greek miracle is “the substitution of the reason, of the fact for the Principle, of the phenomenon for the Idea, of the accident for the Substance, of the form for the Essence, of man for God” (7:144). To refer to the standard Chinese view of philosophy and philosopher I quote Fung Yu Lan “ The purpose of philosophy is to enable a man, as a man, to be a man, not some particular kind of man.” Chinese ethics is meant to fashion this man and this ideal man is one “ with sageliness within and kingliness without.” (8:11). This is what Plato called the philosopher-king.” Islam envisages the Prophet as teacher of philosophy (hikmah) in accordance with the Quran (65:2). Certain Sufis believe Pythagoras and Plato to be prophets. Their sagehood is not doubted at all. Certain Muslim philosophers are traditionally referred to as sages and all Muslim philosophers were pious believers at least. Ghazali’s inveighing against the philosophers not withstanding who unwarrantedly wishes to reserve for the Sufis the monopoly of spiritual knowledge as if, as Schuon observes, “faith and piety, in combination with intellectual gifts and with grace- didn’t provide a sufficient basis for pure intellection (7: 137 ). “It is to the credit of Muslim philosophers that the great Greeks Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus could be integrated. Indian view of the philosopher hardly needs to be reiterated. It is axiomatic that only sages are philosophers. Significance of perennialists approach for Indian philosophers lies in its elevation of nondualism as formulated in Vedanta as the most perfect expression of metaphysics, as the standard by which all other philosophies may be judged in a way. There is absolutely no reason for being apologetic or trying to present native philosophies in terms of alien and constrictive framework and jargon of Western philosophy. Radhakrishhnan and others have fell victim to this trap. There is an open advocacy of superiority of Western philosophy or modern philosophy and its methodology by certain Indian philosophers and many are consciously or unconsciously under the impression that the West has indeed progressed in philosophical thought and we need to very respectful towards it. Great labour is diverted to proving antecedents of Derrida, Wittgenstein, Kant and other in classical Indian thought and even connect Buddha with modern rejection of religion and theism. Great names in Western philosophy are drastically cut to size and dwarfed in comparison with the great names – philosopher-sages in Eastern traditions. Schuon finds it easy to condemn Descartes and Kant as philosophers. In the last century Indian philosophy has grown under the shadow of Western philosophy.

Perennialists, bringing in the witness of countless traditional sages throughout the world regard ancient philosophy as

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essentially a way of life: not only inseparable from “spiritual exercises,” but also in accord with cosmological myths and sacred rites. In the broader traditional sense, philosophy consists not simply of a conceptual edifice (be it of the order of reason or myth); but of a lived concrete existence conducted by initiates, or by the whole theocenrtric community, treated as a properly organized and well guided political and “theurgical body” attended to the principle of maat -- “truth” and “justice” in the ancient Egyptian sense of the word (8:xi).

This explains why, considering ancient philosophy as the norm, perennialists condemn modern Western philosophy a “rather monstrous and corrupted creature, systematically reduced to a philosophical discourse of a single dogmatic kind, through the fatal one-sidedness of its professed secular humanistic mentality, and a crucial misunderstanding of traditional wisdom” (8:xiv). Ancient philosophers tried to awaken the divine light through the noetic vision (noesis) and to touch the divine Intellect. Perennialists reject the belief of modernists that philosophy is an abstract philosophical discourse based on rationalistic scientific method and its methodically obtained “truths.” Perennialists reject the account of modern textbooks on philosophy that believe that Thales first used rational method. For the Safavid Persian Hakims identified the water of Thales with the Breath of the Compassionate of the Sufis, and considered the pre-Socratic philosophers to have used a symbolic language to reveal the unity of Being. As Uzdavinys points out: “To conventionally assume that Thales simply opposed myth to “rational account” (logos) is to misunderstand the Greek word logos and follow the modern reductionist tendency to render it exclusively as reason or “discursive reasoning”(diaonia)” (8:xiv). But Plato made no clear distinction between attitude to myth and philosophical reasoning. The Greek word logos can mean divine speech, what Egyptians meant by the demiurgic word Ra rendered into operative wisdom by Troth as well as noetic apprehension of the first indemonstable and sacred principles, archetypes, or gods in addition to meaning proportion and analogy. By philosophizing ancients meant “both noetic activity and spiritual practice; and this was attributed not only to various Hellenic philosophers who belonged to haireseis (schools or theoretically founded ways of life), but also to the Egyptian priests, Chaldeans and Indian Gymnosophists (8:xvi). Contrary to the prevalent view of modern historians of science and philosophy, the ancient Hellenes (whom modern considers their forefathers, considered themselves to be students of much older Oriental civilizations. “Plato paraphrased Orpheus everywhere” as Olympiodorus asserted. Platonists believed in the revelation given to the ancient sages and theologians, i.e., to divinely inspired poets and hierophants. The primordial revelation was viewed as unchangeable; there could be nothing “new” regarding metaphysics and divine truths. According to Celsus, Plato never claimed to have discovered anything new. Plotinus also didn’t claim (8:xviii). Uzdavinys further points out that can be reduced top Pythagoreans and subordinated to the revealed wisdom of the ancient East. What distinguishes the theology of Plato from that of the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian initiates as well as the Homeric, Orphic, and Phythagorean sages, is its scientific and demonstrative character (8:Xxiv). Socrates described philosophy as divinely inspired madness. Socrates was referred to as saviour by Hermias of Alexandria. According to him, , Socrates was sent to the world of becoming as a benefit to mankind and to turn souls- each in different way- to philosophy. Not only Pythagoras, Archytas, Socrates and Plato, but also later philosophers such as Ammonius, Saccas, Plotinus, Porphry, Iamblicus and Syrians … belonged to the revelatory and soteriological tradition of philosophy”(8:xxvi). According to perennialists there is no ground whatever upon which all men can be in absolute agreement, excepting that of metaphysics. And this metaphysics is the basis and the norm of all religious formulations according to them. However even though the perennialists emphasize ultimate identity of religion and metaphysics they are acutely aware of the respective differences both at doctrinal and practical level. As Coomaraswamy has explicated:

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Broadly speaking, the distinction is that of Christianity from Gnosticism, Sunni from Shia doctrine, Ramanuja from Samkara, of the will from the intellect, participation (bhjakti) from gnosis (jnana), or knowledge of (avidya) from knowledge-as (vidya). As regards the Way, the distinction is one of consecration from initiation, and of passive from active integration; and as regards the End, of assimilation (tadakarata) from identification (tadbhabva). Religion requires of its adherents to be perfected, metaphysics that they realize their own perfection that has never been infringed (even Satan is still virtually Lucifer, being fallen in grace and not in nature). Sin, from the standpoint of religion, is moral; from that of metaphysics, intellectual (mortal sin in metaphysics being a conviction or assertion of independent self-subsistence, as in Satan’s case, or envy of the spiritual attainments of others, as in Indra’s)(9:17-18).

Religion, in general, proceeds from the being in act (karyavastha) of the First Principle, without regard to its being in potentiality (karanavastha) while metaphysics treats of the Supreme Identity as an indisserverable unity of potentiality and act (9:156). To the postmodernists’ reasons against reason Schuon replies:

Naturally the most “advanced “ of the modernists seek to demolish the very principle of reasoning, but this is simply fantasy pro domo, for man is condemned to reason as soon as he uses language; unless he wishes to convey nothing at all. In any case one can’t assert the impossibility of asserting anything, if words are still to have any meaning (7:145).

There is nothing new in perennial philosophy; there can’t be by definition. Perennialists present the most well articulated challenge to Eurocentricism and its colonialist ideology. There are important Western philosophers and thinkers who have asserted that genuine philosophy doesn’t exist outside the West. To this perennialists would reply that genuine philosophy or wisdom (as philosophy is understood in the primordial sense) philosophy exists only outside the West, especially the modern West. Great philosophers such as Phyhagoras and Plato and their notion of philosophy as a pathway of communion with God has not been accepted by the posterity in the West. If the criterion is pure metaphysics as the perennialists contend it to be post-Aristotelian Western philosophy falls short of attaining it. Notorious problems in Western philosophy, which are a legacy of form matter dualism of Aristotle, are not encountered in traditional nondualistic metaphysical worldviews. Insoluble problems in post-Descartean epistemology and metaphysics are bypassed by perennialists. The utter poverty of modern philosophy is demonstrated and the value of alternative traditional philosophy asserted with great force and conviction. Big names in modern philosophy are laughed away or cut to size and their blinded pointed out.

Perennialist project is the most ambitious, most comprehensive, most wide ranging and inclusive perspective on comparative philosophy. It not only penetrates the diversity of religions, mythologies, theologies, philosophies, artistic expressions, cosmological doctrines of all traditional cultures but gives us an alternative approach that dissolves certain pernicious and difficult problems in modern thought. It opposes much of what has been cherished in the past few centuries but it does so in the name of that which has been cherished by all traditional cultures, by all revelations, by sages and great traditional philosophers of all ages. It exposes shallowness of most modern approaches to metaphysical questions and religions. It shows how hollow are the standard text books of philosophy such as Russell’s, how great a mass of unintelligence permeates modern thought in general and modern philosophy in particular, how precarious and problematic is that which constitutes the distinguishing character of modernity and postmodernity, how artificial

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and self imposed various challenges to philosophy and rationality from certain modern and postmodern quarters, how incoherent and groundless modern criticisms of metaphysics are, how unscientific and unintelligent and unempirical foundations of modern scientific thought and culture. Defining figures of modern philosophy such as Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Heidegger all are cut to the size in comparison with the giants of traditional thought. Perennialists forcefully argue how little positive achievement in comparison with enormous retrogression in philosophical thought the last few centuries have recorded. Western colonialism and epistemic chauvinism which have been the painful realities of the modern world are subject to a most devastating critique by the perennialists. Modern academy (epitomized by university) is discredited as having failed to deliver coherent or unified knowledge for guidance, for ethics and thus fashioning souls. Schuon refused to accept an invitation for delivering lectures in any modern university. Perennialism is not nostalgia for the past but for the truths that past people embodied/ understood better than their modern inheritors. Perennialism applauds objectivity (and that is why extremely subjectivist existentialists are ruthlessly condemned, rationality (that is why all; criticisms of rationality and rationalism from irrationalist existentialists and postmodernists are rebutted), coherence consistency, logic, and are quite respectful of all empirical facts or rather take it as a point of departure from those who limit it to sensorial realm (their criticism of Kant is because he refused to concede concrete evidence for religious experience that has been seriously taken by countless people from all the ages.

For perennialists different systems of Indian philosophy are not incompatible philosophical systems but different complementary viewpoints. This approach is finding increasing support from various scholars in recent years. Studies of diverse philosophical traditions are unearthing common points that perennialists seek to highlight. Pluralism is provided sound philosophical grounding by perennialism. As against mere tolerance or indifference towards other religions perennialism provides a warrant for all traditional religions and religion linked traditional philosophies.

Moksha (though understood somewhat differently)is the ultimate though not the immediate goal of Indian philosophy, Muslim philosophy, Platonic-Phythogorean philosophy, Chinese Philosophy and many other traditional philosophies. Moksha has served to “giver a purpose and direction to philosophy and proved to be a bulwark against battling in the clouds, which Sri Aurobindo calls the ‘besetting sin of metaphysics,’ and which is the bane of unbridled, directionless thinking for thinking’s sake. Praxiological commitment makes all the differences. Modern Western philosophy lacks such a serious purpose, direction and orientation. Nobody knows what it is out to do. Ancient philosophy aimed at enlightenment and felicity with or without salvation at the great denouement, whereas current philosophy aims at dry clarity and mechanical precision on their own account” (10:94). Perennialist perspective on philosophy foregrounds mokshacentrism of different philosophies including premodern Western philosophy. Values are not written off in any traditional philosophy. That explains close association of religion and philosophy in traditional cultures. There is a global philosophy and we need not deny uniqueness of different traditions in philosophy.

It is not possible to have a dogmatic or final formulation of perennial philosophy. Guenon changed his views on some issues such as Buddhism. There are slightly different readings in different writers on perennial philosophy. Some are more open for serious dialogue with modern and postmodern philosophies. The details of the conception of modernity and postmodernity in perennialist writings may be disputed. Too dismissive and rejectionist a view of modern science and modernity may not be warranted. Great figures in modern philosophy from Hegel to Whitehead have been mystically oriented. A deeper and more sympathetic reading of modernity

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reveals convergence with mystical thought currents. Postmodernists are not quite off the mark in their critiques of rationalist philosophies and linguistic constructions. Some New Age thinkers can’t be summarily dismissed as many perennialists do. Modernity can’t be bypassed as if it is all perversion. If scandals must come as perennialists often remind us and modernity is a scandal we need to be very conscious of the importance of these scandals at their own plane. The notion of heterodoxy employed to reject modern philosophy seems to be too constricting. The need is to have a more constructive dialogue with modern Western philosophy rather than a straightway rejection of it. There are few detailed in depth studies of modern philosophy published by perennialists. Perennialists have yet to apply their insights on many concrete issues such as class conflict and some key social issues in a satisfactory manner. Perennialists do provide the outlines of global philosophy but a lot of work still needs to be done in the application part – there are many issues raised by modern thought, some too disturbing and complex to be complacently written off. It is a huge challenge to demonstrate that there are no significant differences between different traditions in philosophy, between Nagarjuna and Shankara or Lao Tzu and Confucius. Perennialists are vitally relevant in approaching some long standing issues in comparative philosophy and difficult problems in Western philosophy and the challenge from antiphilosophical thought currents and scientism. We need to give more attention to them. Philosophizing after postmodernism is not an easy task and perennialists could provide vital clues. Perhaps a synthesis of perennialism and postmodernism as seen in Ken Wilber will be of interest. Philosophy departments should introduce a paper on perennialist thinkers such as Coomaraswamy who has been lately revived in certain European universities. This may go a long way in defining and developing contours of Asian philosophy as an integrated entity and make possible a dialogue between “orthodox” and “heterodox” philosophical systems, between the East and the West, between theology (or autology as Coomaraswamy would say) and philosophy, between tradition and modernity and possibly between seemingly antagonistic social philosophies. The contradictions in Capitalist societies and problems in Marxist analysis of them could be profitably approached by taking recourse to perennialist view of man and society which takes transcendence into consideration missing which the former antagonistic worldviews are handicapped in evolving a comprehensive view of man, the metaphysical animal, the meaning seeking animal, the Homo religious. A range of ethical, social, economic, philosophical problems encountered by us demand fresh appropriations and adaptations of wisdom traditions of the world. Comparative philosophy is direly needed. And amongst different approaches to it perennialist approach seems to be a better candidate.

If philosophy is a way of life and its end communion with Ultimate Reality and ethics or cultivation of virtues integrally connected with it and not science of ratiocinative arguments or mere linguistic analysis or clarification of concepts then perennialist contention that there is unity amongst different – in fact all – traditions, Semitic and nonSemitic, archaic and “advanced” ones can be granted without much difficulty. All traditions teach the doctrine of two selves, one lower and the other higher divine one. All traditions are for self transcendence. All traditions advocate a vision of hierarchy of existence consisting of a series of gradations from matter to Spirit. All traditions believe in the other or deeper world that encompasses or complements this world. The primacy of the moral but transcendence of good-evil binary by sages is discernible in all major traditions. From the Unitarian metaphysical viewpoint doesn’t compare traditions or philosophies in terms of presence or absence of personal God in them or such binaries as prophetic vs. mystical, thisworldly vs. otherworldly, rational vs. irrational, pantheistic vs. theistic or transcendentalist, idealist vs. realist, theological vs. philosophical. Dualistic binary thinking is transcended in the metaphysical standpoint as knowing and being become one. The inclusive potential of perennialist approach is evidenced from the fact that it is able to bring into its ambit so much from religions and philosophies across the world. It finds little to reject in the traditional worlds. It dubs as

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perverse or heterodoxical dominant mode of last few centuries of Western thought. It sees modern Western civilization as an anomaly in human history, as something built on sand. By excluding modern episteme on principle grounds – dubbing it ignorant of the twin sources of knowledge intellection and revelation and ignorant of the self and committed to false views of scientism, evolutionism and progress and the cult of the ugly – it is able to make senmse of traditional universes. I don’t think it is too great a cost for a project that seeks to recover the lost light of tradition that unifies so comprehensively. Philosophies are not static or monolithic but do evolve in some sense though not in the manner conceived by most modern historians of philosophy. That there can be no new discovery of truth concerning our ultimate destiny and most fundamental issues is a claim that runs counter to modernist evolutionary thinking. Humanism and individualism are the prime follies of modern age against which perennialists wage war. The very notion of progress is counter to traditionalist thinking. Speaking so clearly and unambiguously for the sacred science – scientia sacra – of metaphysics that comprehensively provides a foundation for all sciences and arts and thus for unity of knowledge which modern world misses so terribly.

Religions may no longer be credible to man especially when symbolic nature of its language is forgotten and because of the influence of non-objective elements in them and because they fall short of the certitude reserved for pure truth to which metaphysics alone can claim access. Talking about universal history and cosmos in the postreligious or postheological age is a difficult task but for that the road to it is not through modern and postmodern thought. We need to explore the traditional road afresh albeit with full awareness of centuries of skepticism through which we are still currently passing. There is a widespread skepticism that there is no salvation outside the phenomenal as transcendence is felt to be something too remote and abstract. Only a renewed faith in the sacred can answer the perennial quest for all-comprehensive philosophy which is the aim of comparative philosophy. But how can the postmodern man open up to the sacred? I think the best answer is through the scientia sacra the evidences of which are dazzlingly shown in the writings of perennialists.

To conclude it may be asserted that the notion of Tradition as understood by perennialists is one of the most significant ideas for constructing a comprehensive view of comparative philosophy. There have been few detailed critical studies of perennialist notion of comparative philosophy. There is not much space to consider charges against perennialist approach but the reader is referred to the brilliant defence against detractors of perennialist view of comparative philosophy by Henry Oldmeadow.11 The readers are referred to this article. Perennialist view needs consideration and critical discussion. It has mostly been ignored so far.

References

1 Raju, P. T., Introduction to Comparative Philosophy ,Motilal Banarsidas Pvt. LTd., Delhi, 1992. Quoted by Raju.

2 Nasr, S.H, Knowledge and the Sacred, Gifford Lectures, Suhail Academy Lahore,1988.3 Guenon, Rene, An Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines, Munshiram Manoharlal

Publishers, New Delhi, 2000 (1945) 4 Qaisar, Shahzad, Of Intellect and Reason, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1990.5 Nasr, S.H, The Need for A Sacred Science, SUNY, New York, 19936 Coomaraswamy, A. K., Hinduism and Buddhism, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Delhi,

1996.7 Schuon, Frithjof, The Essential Writings of Frithjof Schuon, ed. S. H. Nasr,Element, 1991.

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8 Uzdavinys, Algis, (Ed.), The Golden Chain: An Anthology of Phythagorean and Plationic Philosophy, Pentagon Press,2005

9 Coomaraswamy. A. K., “On the Pertinence of Philosophy” in What is Civilization, Oxford University Press, 1989.

10 Narain, Harsh, Daya Krishna on Indian Philosophy,” in The Philosophy of Daya Krishna,, Eds. Bhuvan Chandel, K.L. Sharma, ICPR, New Delhi, 1996.

11 Oldmeadow, H., “The Comparative Study of Eastern and Western Metaphysics: A Perennialist Perspective,” in Sophia, 46:1, 2007.