community cohesion without parallel lives in bradford
TRANSCRIPT
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Community cohesion without parallellives in BradfordYunas SamadPublished online 20 Jun 2013
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Community cohesion without parallel lives inBradford
YUNAS SAMAD
ABSTRACT The concept of community cohesion is the centrepiece of the policy that
was formulated by the British government in response to the urban disturbances in
northern English towns during 2001 A number of official reports identified lack of
community cohesion as the critical factor The central argument for community
cohesion the self-segregation thesis was based on evidence from Bradford The core
idea parallel lives was first articulated in the Ouseley Report and incorporated into
the Cantle Report and subsequent government reports into the 2001 disturbances
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion widened the concept of community
cohesion which encompassed faith and ethnic groups to include income and
generation suggesting that the concept was more complex than earlier definitions
allowed However the increasing concern with terrorism has meant that Muslims
remain the focus of debates on cohesion and a conflation of the community cohesion
programme with the governmentrsquos anti-terrorism strategy is evident in the policy
literature Samadrsquos article is based on research carried out in Bradford to unearth and
explore the factors that enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areas
where there are established Muslim communities and additionally those in which
Muslim migrants have recently arrived It scrutinizes the debate on a number of
issues the difficulties in defining and implementing community cohesion policy
and the issues of segregation social capital transnationalism and belonging This
data-driven analysis takes the main areas of debate and tests them with evidence
from Bradford The research findings challenge some of the fundamental assump-
tions that have informed government policy by providing new evidence that throws
light on central aspects of the debate The need to reflect on these assumptions
became more relevant after the English riots of 2011 centred in London and the
subsequent necessity to develop an effective strategy that engages with their root
causes
KEYWORDS Bradford community cohesion parallel lives riots segregation socialcapital social cohesion
As the disturbances in 2011 spread through London and to other urbancentresand the country faced the prospect of copycat riots inflaming
sectarian conflictspoliticians commentators and the chattering classes
searched for causes Criminality gangs poor educational attainment the
collapse of family and the moral fabric have all been suggested as
Patterns of Prejudice 2013Vol 47 No 3 269 287 httpdxdoiorg1010800031322X2013812343
2013 Taylor amp Francis
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explanations for the disturbances It is curious that in seeking this
explanation reference has been made to the Brixton riots of 1981 but the
disturbances of 2001 in northern English towns it is unanimously agreed
were different and do not offer insights into the London riotsThe apparent willingness to compare events in 2011 to those of thirty years
earlier but not to the more recent northern riots is primarily the result of the
latter being understood by policymakers and commentators as having
cultural causes The 2011 riots according to the Riots Communities and
Victims Panel had no single cause They were not race riots and material
deprivation combined with social injustice and inequality particularly for
young people were important causal factors along with poor parenting and
suspicion of the police The panel focused on how government policy might
build a socially cohesive society in which everyone one had a sense of
belonging1 To make comparisons with the 2001 riots in northern towns
would challenge both the assumption that the latter had cultural causes and
the subsequent policy responses In order to maintain the present policy
strategy pertaining to ethnic minorities the two disturbances needed to be
seen as distinct events requiring different explanations and policy initiativesIn sharp contrast to the London-based riots the northern disturbances
were officially ascribed to a single factor namely culture and specifically
Muslim culture This approach was underpinned by the formulation and
implementation of community cohesion strategies as the centrepiece of
government policy and the subsequent demise of multiculturalism
The central argument for community cohesionthat the disorder was the
product of self-segregating Muslim communitieswas based on the
experience of Bradford The ultimate consequence in terms of social policy
was a shift in emphasis from integration to assimilation and the turn from
socio-economic factors to cultural causes to explain the failure of multi-
cultural policy This policy shift generated considerable debate in the
literature in discussions of segregation the role of social capital and the
significance of transnationalism identity and belongingThis paper is based on a larger study funded by the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation and conducted in 2006 with fieldwork in Birmingham Newham
and Bradford2 It investigates factors contributing to community cohesion as
they have affected recently arrived Muslim and non-Muslim migrants as
well as established communities in two Bradford wards Bowling and
Barkerend and Little Horton The aim of the study is to explore factors that
1 Riots Communities and Victims Panel After the Riots The Final Report of the RiotsCommunities and Victim Panel (London Riots Communities and Victims Panel 2012)25 8 115
2 Hiranthi Jayaweera and Tufyal Choudhury Immigration Faith and Cohesion Evidencefrom Local Areas with Significant Muslim Populations (York Joseph Rowntree Foundation2008) available on the Joseph Rowntree Foundation website at wwwjrforgukpublica-tionsimmigration-faith-and-cohesion (viewed 10 April 2013)
270 Patterns of Prejudice
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have contributed to or undermined community cohesion as it affectsMuslims and non-Muslims recent migrants and established communitiesliving alongside each other in the chosen localities In each ward recentlyarrived Muslims of fewer than five yearsrsquo residence recently arrivedresidents of other faiths or no faith and established Muslims and non-Muslims born in the United Kingdom or with more than ten yearsrsquoresidence have been included in the sample The primary focus of theresearch has been the experience of those defined as lsquorecently arrivedMuslimsrsquo and their perceptions of belonging within a given localitySignificantly recently arrived Muslims are greater in number than thoseparticipants belonging to the other categories Recent non-Muslim migrantsprovide a comparison with their Muslim counterparts with regard to theexperience of integration and perceptions of belonging It has also beenuseful to relate the perspectives of recent migrants to those of establishedcommunities given differences in the length of time spent in the UnitedKingdom
A purposive quota-based sampling strategy was used to select eligibleinterviewees in order to match the desired characteristics of the sample asdiscussed above Sampling was based on the mix of ethnicity and country oforigin and the demographic characteristicsparticularly gender and age3of the local areas A questionnaire using open and closed questions was usedwith a sample consisting of 117 participants This broke down into 52recently arrived Muslims 15 recently arrived non-Muslims 35 establishedMuslim residents and 15 UK-born non-Muslim residents This kind of non-random sampling meant that the interviewees were not necessarilyrepresentative of the population groups from which they were selectedeither in the areas in which the research was conducted in other areas or inEngland as a whole Additional interviews were conducted with ten localpolicymakers and service providers While it is not possible to generalize theresults of this research the experiences and views of the migrants andestablished residents and the Muslims and non-Muslims studied make avaluable contribution to understanding factors that affect communitycohesion at the neighbourhood and local level This contribution isparticularly important given that the processes consequences and implica-tions of new migration to the United Kingdom are still very much under-researched at the local level
The article begins by elaborating the concept of community cohesion andexploring its evolution and implementation by policymakers The focus thenshifts to the central aim of the project namely to unearth and explore thefactors that either enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areaswhere there are established Muslim communities and in which recently
3 Quotas for gender and age-groups (18 24 25 44 and 45 and over) were set accordingto 2001 Census data for the wards selected
YUNAS SAMAD 271
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arrived Muslim migrants have settled It investigates the concept of parallel
lives by examining the connections between residents and their modes of co-
operation in the same neighbourhood locality and other localities in Britain
It also examines the forms of cultural capital used by residents and their
expression in political and civic engagement by examining crosscutting
interaction and modes of co-operation in specific settings in terms of their
nature quality and strength Furthermore the research looks at the impact of
local national and international interventions on individualsrsquo feelings about
a lsquocommon sense of belongingrsquo and at evidence for social cohesion
including the factors that affect cohesion Finally it examines the impact of
transnationalism on social cohesion testing the hypothesis that transnation-
alism v integration is not a zero-sum game This paper takes the main areas
of debate on community cohesion and tests them with evidence from
Bradford
Community cohesion
Social policy in the United Kingdom over the last fifty years has swung
between integration and assimilation The first steps away from assimilation
took place under Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in the 1960s when he
simultaneously introduced immigration control and policies to facilitate
integration He proclaimed that lsquointegration was not a flattening process of
uniformity but cultural diversity coupled with equality of opportunityrsquo and
his declarations led to the implementation of the Race Relations Acts of 1965
and 19684 An important feature of these acts was that responsibility was
devolved to local government In the late 1970s local authorities began
experimenting with multiculturalism but it was only after the inner-city
riots of 1981 that convulsed Brixton Toxteth and Handsworth that local
authorities engaged seriously with the issues of multiculturalism equal
opportunity and anti-racism The Scarman Report that followed a public
inquiry into the Brixton riots identified discrimination as a key factor and
suggested that local government implement multicultural policies In spite
of criticism from right-leaning commentators such as Ray Honeyford
multiculturalism became de rigueur for government5 Ultimately under
Tony Blairrsquos leadership multiculturalism had been repackaged as Cool
Britannia and the celebration of difference had become the mantra of official
policy In the early Blair years this celebration of difference was
4 Adrian Favell Philosophies of Integration Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in Franceand Britain (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan 1998) 104
5 Yunas Samad lsquoThe plural guises of multiculturalism conceptualising a fragmentedparadigmrsquo in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds) The Politics of Multiculturalism inthe New Europe Racism Identity and Community (London Zed Books 1997) 240 60
272 Patterns of Prejudice
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multicultural multivocal celebratory and elitist it was represented by agamut of artists and writers such as Salman Rushdie Monica Ali HanifKureishi musical forms such as bhangra and fusion music in general andtheatre productions such as Beshti6 But it also included the erasure ofdiasporic habitats that reflected specific origins or locations and of thepolitical urge for social justice once embodied by the anti-racist movement
However in reaction to the civil disturbances in northern England in2001 social policy swung away from multiculturalism and towardscommunity cohesion This shift was influenced by Herman Ouseleyrsquosreport on the riots in Bradford which introduced the concept of parallellives according to which contact between ethnic communities wasminimal7 A number of government reports into the 2001 disturbancesthe Cantle Report and others subsequently adopted the concept8 Theparallel lives framework for understanding the riots set up a binaryopposition between social cohesion and segregation and a belief that self-segregation was the product of a dysfunctional community9 It should bestressed that all the official investigations into the 2001 disturbancesuncritically accepted the Ouseley Reportrsquos characterization of BradfordrsquosMuslim community as self-segregating10
Arun Kundnani described the policy of community cohesion as thedemise of multiculturalism marking a return to assimilation11 Theconcept nestled easily within government policy which was attemptingto build socially mixed and sustainable communities Social cohesionadapted the 1990s concept of the underclass which referred to self-segregating enclaves of white tenants on white estates and applied it to
6 Claire Alexander lsquoDiaspora and hybridityrsquo in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies (London and Los Angeles Sage2010) 487 507
7 Bradford Race Review (chaired by Herman Ouseley) Community Pride Not PrejudiceMaking Diversity Work in Bradford (Bradford Bradford Vision 2001) passim
8 Community Cohesion Independent Review Team Community Cohesion A Report of theIndependent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London Home Office 2001) BurnleyTask Force (chaired by Tony Clarke) Burnley Speaks Who Listens (Burnley BurnleyTask Force 2001) Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion(chaired by John Denham) Building Cohesive Communities A Report of the MinisterialGroup on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London HMSO 2002) OldhamIndependent Review (chaired by David Ritchie) Oldham Independent Review OneOldham One Future (Manchester Government Office for the North West 2001)
9 Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain lsquoConflict and cohesion official constructions oflsquolsquocommunityrsquorsquo around the 2001 lsquolsquoriotsrsquorsquo in Britainrsquo Critical Studies vol 28 2006 347 65
10 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion Burnley Task Force BurnleySpeaks Who Listens Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community CohesionBuilding Cohesive Communities Oldham Independent Review Oldham IndependentReview
11 Arun Kundnani lsquoThe death of multiculturalismrsquo Race amp Class vol 43 no 4 200267 72
YUNAS SAMAD 273
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Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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ctob
er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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ded
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] at
23
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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014
Community cohesion without parallel lives inBradford
YUNAS SAMAD
ABSTRACT The concept of community cohesion is the centrepiece of the policy that
was formulated by the British government in response to the urban disturbances in
northern English towns during 2001 A number of official reports identified lack of
community cohesion as the critical factor The central argument for community
cohesion the self-segregation thesis was based on evidence from Bradford The core
idea parallel lives was first articulated in the Ouseley Report and incorporated into
the Cantle Report and subsequent government reports into the 2001 disturbances
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion widened the concept of community
cohesion which encompassed faith and ethnic groups to include income and
generation suggesting that the concept was more complex than earlier definitions
allowed However the increasing concern with terrorism has meant that Muslims
remain the focus of debates on cohesion and a conflation of the community cohesion
programme with the governmentrsquos anti-terrorism strategy is evident in the policy
literature Samadrsquos article is based on research carried out in Bradford to unearth and
explore the factors that enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areas
where there are established Muslim communities and additionally those in which
Muslim migrants have recently arrived It scrutinizes the debate on a number of
issues the difficulties in defining and implementing community cohesion policy
and the issues of segregation social capital transnationalism and belonging This
data-driven analysis takes the main areas of debate and tests them with evidence
from Bradford The research findings challenge some of the fundamental assump-
tions that have informed government policy by providing new evidence that throws
light on central aspects of the debate The need to reflect on these assumptions
became more relevant after the English riots of 2011 centred in London and the
subsequent necessity to develop an effective strategy that engages with their root
causes
KEYWORDS Bradford community cohesion parallel lives riots segregation socialcapital social cohesion
As the disturbances in 2011 spread through London and to other urbancentresand the country faced the prospect of copycat riots inflaming
sectarian conflictspoliticians commentators and the chattering classes
searched for causes Criminality gangs poor educational attainment the
collapse of family and the moral fabric have all been suggested as
Patterns of Prejudice 2013Vol 47 No 3 269 287 httpdxdoiorg1010800031322X2013812343
2013 Taylor amp Francis
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explanations for the disturbances It is curious that in seeking this
explanation reference has been made to the Brixton riots of 1981 but the
disturbances of 2001 in northern English towns it is unanimously agreed
were different and do not offer insights into the London riotsThe apparent willingness to compare events in 2011 to those of thirty years
earlier but not to the more recent northern riots is primarily the result of the
latter being understood by policymakers and commentators as having
cultural causes The 2011 riots according to the Riots Communities and
Victims Panel had no single cause They were not race riots and material
deprivation combined with social injustice and inequality particularly for
young people were important causal factors along with poor parenting and
suspicion of the police The panel focused on how government policy might
build a socially cohesive society in which everyone one had a sense of
belonging1 To make comparisons with the 2001 riots in northern towns
would challenge both the assumption that the latter had cultural causes and
the subsequent policy responses In order to maintain the present policy
strategy pertaining to ethnic minorities the two disturbances needed to be
seen as distinct events requiring different explanations and policy initiativesIn sharp contrast to the London-based riots the northern disturbances
were officially ascribed to a single factor namely culture and specifically
Muslim culture This approach was underpinned by the formulation and
implementation of community cohesion strategies as the centrepiece of
government policy and the subsequent demise of multiculturalism
The central argument for community cohesionthat the disorder was the
product of self-segregating Muslim communitieswas based on the
experience of Bradford The ultimate consequence in terms of social policy
was a shift in emphasis from integration to assimilation and the turn from
socio-economic factors to cultural causes to explain the failure of multi-
cultural policy This policy shift generated considerable debate in the
literature in discussions of segregation the role of social capital and the
significance of transnationalism identity and belongingThis paper is based on a larger study funded by the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation and conducted in 2006 with fieldwork in Birmingham Newham
and Bradford2 It investigates factors contributing to community cohesion as
they have affected recently arrived Muslim and non-Muslim migrants as
well as established communities in two Bradford wards Bowling and
Barkerend and Little Horton The aim of the study is to explore factors that
1 Riots Communities and Victims Panel After the Riots The Final Report of the RiotsCommunities and Victim Panel (London Riots Communities and Victims Panel 2012)25 8 115
2 Hiranthi Jayaweera and Tufyal Choudhury Immigration Faith and Cohesion Evidencefrom Local Areas with Significant Muslim Populations (York Joseph Rowntree Foundation2008) available on the Joseph Rowntree Foundation website at wwwjrforgukpublica-tionsimmigration-faith-and-cohesion (viewed 10 April 2013)
270 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
have contributed to or undermined community cohesion as it affectsMuslims and non-Muslims recent migrants and established communitiesliving alongside each other in the chosen localities In each ward recentlyarrived Muslims of fewer than five yearsrsquo residence recently arrivedresidents of other faiths or no faith and established Muslims and non-Muslims born in the United Kingdom or with more than ten yearsrsquoresidence have been included in the sample The primary focus of theresearch has been the experience of those defined as lsquorecently arrivedMuslimsrsquo and their perceptions of belonging within a given localitySignificantly recently arrived Muslims are greater in number than thoseparticipants belonging to the other categories Recent non-Muslim migrantsprovide a comparison with their Muslim counterparts with regard to theexperience of integration and perceptions of belonging It has also beenuseful to relate the perspectives of recent migrants to those of establishedcommunities given differences in the length of time spent in the UnitedKingdom
A purposive quota-based sampling strategy was used to select eligibleinterviewees in order to match the desired characteristics of the sample asdiscussed above Sampling was based on the mix of ethnicity and country oforigin and the demographic characteristicsparticularly gender and age3of the local areas A questionnaire using open and closed questions was usedwith a sample consisting of 117 participants This broke down into 52recently arrived Muslims 15 recently arrived non-Muslims 35 establishedMuslim residents and 15 UK-born non-Muslim residents This kind of non-random sampling meant that the interviewees were not necessarilyrepresentative of the population groups from which they were selectedeither in the areas in which the research was conducted in other areas or inEngland as a whole Additional interviews were conducted with ten localpolicymakers and service providers While it is not possible to generalize theresults of this research the experiences and views of the migrants andestablished residents and the Muslims and non-Muslims studied make avaluable contribution to understanding factors that affect communitycohesion at the neighbourhood and local level This contribution isparticularly important given that the processes consequences and implica-tions of new migration to the United Kingdom are still very much under-researched at the local level
The article begins by elaborating the concept of community cohesion andexploring its evolution and implementation by policymakers The focus thenshifts to the central aim of the project namely to unearth and explore thefactors that either enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areaswhere there are established Muslim communities and in which recently
3 Quotas for gender and age-groups (18 24 25 44 and 45 and over) were set accordingto 2001 Census data for the wards selected
YUNAS SAMAD 271
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arrived Muslim migrants have settled It investigates the concept of parallel
lives by examining the connections between residents and their modes of co-
operation in the same neighbourhood locality and other localities in Britain
It also examines the forms of cultural capital used by residents and their
expression in political and civic engagement by examining crosscutting
interaction and modes of co-operation in specific settings in terms of their
nature quality and strength Furthermore the research looks at the impact of
local national and international interventions on individualsrsquo feelings about
a lsquocommon sense of belongingrsquo and at evidence for social cohesion
including the factors that affect cohesion Finally it examines the impact of
transnationalism on social cohesion testing the hypothesis that transnation-
alism v integration is not a zero-sum game This paper takes the main areas
of debate on community cohesion and tests them with evidence from
Bradford
Community cohesion
Social policy in the United Kingdom over the last fifty years has swung
between integration and assimilation The first steps away from assimilation
took place under Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in the 1960s when he
simultaneously introduced immigration control and policies to facilitate
integration He proclaimed that lsquointegration was not a flattening process of
uniformity but cultural diversity coupled with equality of opportunityrsquo and
his declarations led to the implementation of the Race Relations Acts of 1965
and 19684 An important feature of these acts was that responsibility was
devolved to local government In the late 1970s local authorities began
experimenting with multiculturalism but it was only after the inner-city
riots of 1981 that convulsed Brixton Toxteth and Handsworth that local
authorities engaged seriously with the issues of multiculturalism equal
opportunity and anti-racism The Scarman Report that followed a public
inquiry into the Brixton riots identified discrimination as a key factor and
suggested that local government implement multicultural policies In spite
of criticism from right-leaning commentators such as Ray Honeyford
multiculturalism became de rigueur for government5 Ultimately under
Tony Blairrsquos leadership multiculturalism had been repackaged as Cool
Britannia and the celebration of difference had become the mantra of official
policy In the early Blair years this celebration of difference was
4 Adrian Favell Philosophies of Integration Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in Franceand Britain (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan 1998) 104
5 Yunas Samad lsquoThe plural guises of multiculturalism conceptualising a fragmentedparadigmrsquo in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds) The Politics of Multiculturalism inthe New Europe Racism Identity and Community (London Zed Books 1997) 240 60
272 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
multicultural multivocal celebratory and elitist it was represented by agamut of artists and writers such as Salman Rushdie Monica Ali HanifKureishi musical forms such as bhangra and fusion music in general andtheatre productions such as Beshti6 But it also included the erasure ofdiasporic habitats that reflected specific origins or locations and of thepolitical urge for social justice once embodied by the anti-racist movement
However in reaction to the civil disturbances in northern England in2001 social policy swung away from multiculturalism and towardscommunity cohesion This shift was influenced by Herman Ouseleyrsquosreport on the riots in Bradford which introduced the concept of parallellives according to which contact between ethnic communities wasminimal7 A number of government reports into the 2001 disturbancesthe Cantle Report and others subsequently adopted the concept8 Theparallel lives framework for understanding the riots set up a binaryopposition between social cohesion and segregation and a belief that self-segregation was the product of a dysfunctional community9 It should bestressed that all the official investigations into the 2001 disturbancesuncritically accepted the Ouseley Reportrsquos characterization of BradfordrsquosMuslim community as self-segregating10
Arun Kundnani described the policy of community cohesion as thedemise of multiculturalism marking a return to assimilation11 Theconcept nestled easily within government policy which was attemptingto build socially mixed and sustainable communities Social cohesionadapted the 1990s concept of the underclass which referred to self-segregating enclaves of white tenants on white estates and applied it to
6 Claire Alexander lsquoDiaspora and hybridityrsquo in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies (London and Los Angeles Sage2010) 487 507
7 Bradford Race Review (chaired by Herman Ouseley) Community Pride Not PrejudiceMaking Diversity Work in Bradford (Bradford Bradford Vision 2001) passim
8 Community Cohesion Independent Review Team Community Cohesion A Report of theIndependent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London Home Office 2001) BurnleyTask Force (chaired by Tony Clarke) Burnley Speaks Who Listens (Burnley BurnleyTask Force 2001) Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion(chaired by John Denham) Building Cohesive Communities A Report of the MinisterialGroup on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London HMSO 2002) OldhamIndependent Review (chaired by David Ritchie) Oldham Independent Review OneOldham One Future (Manchester Government Office for the North West 2001)
9 Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain lsquoConflict and cohesion official constructions oflsquolsquocommunityrsquorsquo around the 2001 lsquolsquoriotsrsquorsquo in Britainrsquo Critical Studies vol 28 2006 347 65
10 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion Burnley Task Force BurnleySpeaks Who Listens Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community CohesionBuilding Cohesive Communities Oldham Independent Review Oldham IndependentReview
11 Arun Kundnani lsquoThe death of multiculturalismrsquo Race amp Class vol 43 no 4 200267 72
YUNAS SAMAD 273
Dow
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ded
by [
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ity o
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23
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er 2
014
Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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ctob
er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
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ded
by [
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ity o
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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014
explanations for the disturbances It is curious that in seeking this
explanation reference has been made to the Brixton riots of 1981 but the
disturbances of 2001 in northern English towns it is unanimously agreed
were different and do not offer insights into the London riotsThe apparent willingness to compare events in 2011 to those of thirty years
earlier but not to the more recent northern riots is primarily the result of the
latter being understood by policymakers and commentators as having
cultural causes The 2011 riots according to the Riots Communities and
Victims Panel had no single cause They were not race riots and material
deprivation combined with social injustice and inequality particularly for
young people were important causal factors along with poor parenting and
suspicion of the police The panel focused on how government policy might
build a socially cohesive society in which everyone one had a sense of
belonging1 To make comparisons with the 2001 riots in northern towns
would challenge both the assumption that the latter had cultural causes and
the subsequent policy responses In order to maintain the present policy
strategy pertaining to ethnic minorities the two disturbances needed to be
seen as distinct events requiring different explanations and policy initiativesIn sharp contrast to the London-based riots the northern disturbances
were officially ascribed to a single factor namely culture and specifically
Muslim culture This approach was underpinned by the formulation and
implementation of community cohesion strategies as the centrepiece of
government policy and the subsequent demise of multiculturalism
The central argument for community cohesionthat the disorder was the
product of self-segregating Muslim communitieswas based on the
experience of Bradford The ultimate consequence in terms of social policy
was a shift in emphasis from integration to assimilation and the turn from
socio-economic factors to cultural causes to explain the failure of multi-
cultural policy This policy shift generated considerable debate in the
literature in discussions of segregation the role of social capital and the
significance of transnationalism identity and belongingThis paper is based on a larger study funded by the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation and conducted in 2006 with fieldwork in Birmingham Newham
and Bradford2 It investigates factors contributing to community cohesion as
they have affected recently arrived Muslim and non-Muslim migrants as
well as established communities in two Bradford wards Bowling and
Barkerend and Little Horton The aim of the study is to explore factors that
1 Riots Communities and Victims Panel After the Riots The Final Report of the RiotsCommunities and Victim Panel (London Riots Communities and Victims Panel 2012)25 8 115
2 Hiranthi Jayaweera and Tufyal Choudhury Immigration Faith and Cohesion Evidencefrom Local Areas with Significant Muslim Populations (York Joseph Rowntree Foundation2008) available on the Joseph Rowntree Foundation website at wwwjrforgukpublica-tionsimmigration-faith-and-cohesion (viewed 10 April 2013)
270 Patterns of Prejudice
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have contributed to or undermined community cohesion as it affectsMuslims and non-Muslims recent migrants and established communitiesliving alongside each other in the chosen localities In each ward recentlyarrived Muslims of fewer than five yearsrsquo residence recently arrivedresidents of other faiths or no faith and established Muslims and non-Muslims born in the United Kingdom or with more than ten yearsrsquoresidence have been included in the sample The primary focus of theresearch has been the experience of those defined as lsquorecently arrivedMuslimsrsquo and their perceptions of belonging within a given localitySignificantly recently arrived Muslims are greater in number than thoseparticipants belonging to the other categories Recent non-Muslim migrantsprovide a comparison with their Muslim counterparts with regard to theexperience of integration and perceptions of belonging It has also beenuseful to relate the perspectives of recent migrants to those of establishedcommunities given differences in the length of time spent in the UnitedKingdom
A purposive quota-based sampling strategy was used to select eligibleinterviewees in order to match the desired characteristics of the sample asdiscussed above Sampling was based on the mix of ethnicity and country oforigin and the demographic characteristicsparticularly gender and age3of the local areas A questionnaire using open and closed questions was usedwith a sample consisting of 117 participants This broke down into 52recently arrived Muslims 15 recently arrived non-Muslims 35 establishedMuslim residents and 15 UK-born non-Muslim residents This kind of non-random sampling meant that the interviewees were not necessarilyrepresentative of the population groups from which they were selectedeither in the areas in which the research was conducted in other areas or inEngland as a whole Additional interviews were conducted with ten localpolicymakers and service providers While it is not possible to generalize theresults of this research the experiences and views of the migrants andestablished residents and the Muslims and non-Muslims studied make avaluable contribution to understanding factors that affect communitycohesion at the neighbourhood and local level This contribution isparticularly important given that the processes consequences and implica-tions of new migration to the United Kingdom are still very much under-researched at the local level
The article begins by elaborating the concept of community cohesion andexploring its evolution and implementation by policymakers The focus thenshifts to the central aim of the project namely to unearth and explore thefactors that either enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areaswhere there are established Muslim communities and in which recently
3 Quotas for gender and age-groups (18 24 25 44 and 45 and over) were set accordingto 2001 Census data for the wards selected
YUNAS SAMAD 271
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arrived Muslim migrants have settled It investigates the concept of parallel
lives by examining the connections between residents and their modes of co-
operation in the same neighbourhood locality and other localities in Britain
It also examines the forms of cultural capital used by residents and their
expression in political and civic engagement by examining crosscutting
interaction and modes of co-operation in specific settings in terms of their
nature quality and strength Furthermore the research looks at the impact of
local national and international interventions on individualsrsquo feelings about
a lsquocommon sense of belongingrsquo and at evidence for social cohesion
including the factors that affect cohesion Finally it examines the impact of
transnationalism on social cohesion testing the hypothesis that transnation-
alism v integration is not a zero-sum game This paper takes the main areas
of debate on community cohesion and tests them with evidence from
Bradford
Community cohesion
Social policy in the United Kingdom over the last fifty years has swung
between integration and assimilation The first steps away from assimilation
took place under Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in the 1960s when he
simultaneously introduced immigration control and policies to facilitate
integration He proclaimed that lsquointegration was not a flattening process of
uniformity but cultural diversity coupled with equality of opportunityrsquo and
his declarations led to the implementation of the Race Relations Acts of 1965
and 19684 An important feature of these acts was that responsibility was
devolved to local government In the late 1970s local authorities began
experimenting with multiculturalism but it was only after the inner-city
riots of 1981 that convulsed Brixton Toxteth and Handsworth that local
authorities engaged seriously with the issues of multiculturalism equal
opportunity and anti-racism The Scarman Report that followed a public
inquiry into the Brixton riots identified discrimination as a key factor and
suggested that local government implement multicultural policies In spite
of criticism from right-leaning commentators such as Ray Honeyford
multiculturalism became de rigueur for government5 Ultimately under
Tony Blairrsquos leadership multiculturalism had been repackaged as Cool
Britannia and the celebration of difference had become the mantra of official
policy In the early Blair years this celebration of difference was
4 Adrian Favell Philosophies of Integration Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in Franceand Britain (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan 1998) 104
5 Yunas Samad lsquoThe plural guises of multiculturalism conceptualising a fragmentedparadigmrsquo in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds) The Politics of Multiculturalism inthe New Europe Racism Identity and Community (London Zed Books 1997) 240 60
272 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
multicultural multivocal celebratory and elitist it was represented by agamut of artists and writers such as Salman Rushdie Monica Ali HanifKureishi musical forms such as bhangra and fusion music in general andtheatre productions such as Beshti6 But it also included the erasure ofdiasporic habitats that reflected specific origins or locations and of thepolitical urge for social justice once embodied by the anti-racist movement
However in reaction to the civil disturbances in northern England in2001 social policy swung away from multiculturalism and towardscommunity cohesion This shift was influenced by Herman Ouseleyrsquosreport on the riots in Bradford which introduced the concept of parallellives according to which contact between ethnic communities wasminimal7 A number of government reports into the 2001 disturbancesthe Cantle Report and others subsequently adopted the concept8 Theparallel lives framework for understanding the riots set up a binaryopposition between social cohesion and segregation and a belief that self-segregation was the product of a dysfunctional community9 It should bestressed that all the official investigations into the 2001 disturbancesuncritically accepted the Ouseley Reportrsquos characterization of BradfordrsquosMuslim community as self-segregating10
Arun Kundnani described the policy of community cohesion as thedemise of multiculturalism marking a return to assimilation11 Theconcept nestled easily within government policy which was attemptingto build socially mixed and sustainable communities Social cohesionadapted the 1990s concept of the underclass which referred to self-segregating enclaves of white tenants on white estates and applied it to
6 Claire Alexander lsquoDiaspora and hybridityrsquo in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies (London and Los Angeles Sage2010) 487 507
7 Bradford Race Review (chaired by Herman Ouseley) Community Pride Not PrejudiceMaking Diversity Work in Bradford (Bradford Bradford Vision 2001) passim
8 Community Cohesion Independent Review Team Community Cohesion A Report of theIndependent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London Home Office 2001) BurnleyTask Force (chaired by Tony Clarke) Burnley Speaks Who Listens (Burnley BurnleyTask Force 2001) Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion(chaired by John Denham) Building Cohesive Communities A Report of the MinisterialGroup on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London HMSO 2002) OldhamIndependent Review (chaired by David Ritchie) Oldham Independent Review OneOldham One Future (Manchester Government Office for the North West 2001)
9 Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain lsquoConflict and cohesion official constructions oflsquolsquocommunityrsquorsquo around the 2001 lsquolsquoriotsrsquorsquo in Britainrsquo Critical Studies vol 28 2006 347 65
10 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion Burnley Task Force BurnleySpeaks Who Listens Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community CohesionBuilding Cohesive Communities Oldham Independent Review Oldham IndependentReview
11 Arun Kundnani lsquoThe death of multiculturalismrsquo Race amp Class vol 43 no 4 200267 72
YUNAS SAMAD 273
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Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
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23
21 1
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er 2
014
Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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ded
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
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ska
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coln
] at
23
21 1
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er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
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er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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21 1
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ctob
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014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
have contributed to or undermined community cohesion as it affectsMuslims and non-Muslims recent migrants and established communitiesliving alongside each other in the chosen localities In each ward recentlyarrived Muslims of fewer than five yearsrsquo residence recently arrivedresidents of other faiths or no faith and established Muslims and non-Muslims born in the United Kingdom or with more than ten yearsrsquoresidence have been included in the sample The primary focus of theresearch has been the experience of those defined as lsquorecently arrivedMuslimsrsquo and their perceptions of belonging within a given localitySignificantly recently arrived Muslims are greater in number than thoseparticipants belonging to the other categories Recent non-Muslim migrantsprovide a comparison with their Muslim counterparts with regard to theexperience of integration and perceptions of belonging It has also beenuseful to relate the perspectives of recent migrants to those of establishedcommunities given differences in the length of time spent in the UnitedKingdom
A purposive quota-based sampling strategy was used to select eligibleinterviewees in order to match the desired characteristics of the sample asdiscussed above Sampling was based on the mix of ethnicity and country oforigin and the demographic characteristicsparticularly gender and age3of the local areas A questionnaire using open and closed questions was usedwith a sample consisting of 117 participants This broke down into 52recently arrived Muslims 15 recently arrived non-Muslims 35 establishedMuslim residents and 15 UK-born non-Muslim residents This kind of non-random sampling meant that the interviewees were not necessarilyrepresentative of the population groups from which they were selectedeither in the areas in which the research was conducted in other areas or inEngland as a whole Additional interviews were conducted with ten localpolicymakers and service providers While it is not possible to generalize theresults of this research the experiences and views of the migrants andestablished residents and the Muslims and non-Muslims studied make avaluable contribution to understanding factors that affect communitycohesion at the neighbourhood and local level This contribution isparticularly important given that the processes consequences and implica-tions of new migration to the United Kingdom are still very much under-researched at the local level
The article begins by elaborating the concept of community cohesion andexploring its evolution and implementation by policymakers The focus thenshifts to the central aim of the project namely to unearth and explore thefactors that either enhance or undermine community cohesion in those areaswhere there are established Muslim communities and in which recently
3 Quotas for gender and age-groups (18 24 25 44 and 45 and over) were set accordingto 2001 Census data for the wards selected
YUNAS SAMAD 271
Dow
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] at
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21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
arrived Muslim migrants have settled It investigates the concept of parallel
lives by examining the connections between residents and their modes of co-
operation in the same neighbourhood locality and other localities in Britain
It also examines the forms of cultural capital used by residents and their
expression in political and civic engagement by examining crosscutting
interaction and modes of co-operation in specific settings in terms of their
nature quality and strength Furthermore the research looks at the impact of
local national and international interventions on individualsrsquo feelings about
a lsquocommon sense of belongingrsquo and at evidence for social cohesion
including the factors that affect cohesion Finally it examines the impact of
transnationalism on social cohesion testing the hypothesis that transnation-
alism v integration is not a zero-sum game This paper takes the main areas
of debate on community cohesion and tests them with evidence from
Bradford
Community cohesion
Social policy in the United Kingdom over the last fifty years has swung
between integration and assimilation The first steps away from assimilation
took place under Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in the 1960s when he
simultaneously introduced immigration control and policies to facilitate
integration He proclaimed that lsquointegration was not a flattening process of
uniformity but cultural diversity coupled with equality of opportunityrsquo and
his declarations led to the implementation of the Race Relations Acts of 1965
and 19684 An important feature of these acts was that responsibility was
devolved to local government In the late 1970s local authorities began
experimenting with multiculturalism but it was only after the inner-city
riots of 1981 that convulsed Brixton Toxteth and Handsworth that local
authorities engaged seriously with the issues of multiculturalism equal
opportunity and anti-racism The Scarman Report that followed a public
inquiry into the Brixton riots identified discrimination as a key factor and
suggested that local government implement multicultural policies In spite
of criticism from right-leaning commentators such as Ray Honeyford
multiculturalism became de rigueur for government5 Ultimately under
Tony Blairrsquos leadership multiculturalism had been repackaged as Cool
Britannia and the celebration of difference had become the mantra of official
policy In the early Blair years this celebration of difference was
4 Adrian Favell Philosophies of Integration Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in Franceand Britain (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan 1998) 104
5 Yunas Samad lsquoThe plural guises of multiculturalism conceptualising a fragmentedparadigmrsquo in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds) The Politics of Multiculturalism inthe New Europe Racism Identity and Community (London Zed Books 1997) 240 60
272 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
by [
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ity o
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23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
multicultural multivocal celebratory and elitist it was represented by agamut of artists and writers such as Salman Rushdie Monica Ali HanifKureishi musical forms such as bhangra and fusion music in general andtheatre productions such as Beshti6 But it also included the erasure ofdiasporic habitats that reflected specific origins or locations and of thepolitical urge for social justice once embodied by the anti-racist movement
However in reaction to the civil disturbances in northern England in2001 social policy swung away from multiculturalism and towardscommunity cohesion This shift was influenced by Herman Ouseleyrsquosreport on the riots in Bradford which introduced the concept of parallellives according to which contact between ethnic communities wasminimal7 A number of government reports into the 2001 disturbancesthe Cantle Report and others subsequently adopted the concept8 Theparallel lives framework for understanding the riots set up a binaryopposition between social cohesion and segregation and a belief that self-segregation was the product of a dysfunctional community9 It should bestressed that all the official investigations into the 2001 disturbancesuncritically accepted the Ouseley Reportrsquos characterization of BradfordrsquosMuslim community as self-segregating10
Arun Kundnani described the policy of community cohesion as thedemise of multiculturalism marking a return to assimilation11 Theconcept nestled easily within government policy which was attemptingto build socially mixed and sustainable communities Social cohesionadapted the 1990s concept of the underclass which referred to self-segregating enclaves of white tenants on white estates and applied it to
6 Claire Alexander lsquoDiaspora and hybridityrsquo in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies (London and Los Angeles Sage2010) 487 507
7 Bradford Race Review (chaired by Herman Ouseley) Community Pride Not PrejudiceMaking Diversity Work in Bradford (Bradford Bradford Vision 2001) passim
8 Community Cohesion Independent Review Team Community Cohesion A Report of theIndependent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London Home Office 2001) BurnleyTask Force (chaired by Tony Clarke) Burnley Speaks Who Listens (Burnley BurnleyTask Force 2001) Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion(chaired by John Denham) Building Cohesive Communities A Report of the MinisterialGroup on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London HMSO 2002) OldhamIndependent Review (chaired by David Ritchie) Oldham Independent Review OneOldham One Future (Manchester Government Office for the North West 2001)
9 Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain lsquoConflict and cohesion official constructions oflsquolsquocommunityrsquorsquo around the 2001 lsquolsquoriotsrsquorsquo in Britainrsquo Critical Studies vol 28 2006 347 65
10 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion Burnley Task Force BurnleySpeaks Who Listens Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community CohesionBuilding Cohesive Communities Oldham Independent Review Oldham IndependentReview
11 Arun Kundnani lsquoThe death of multiculturalismrsquo Race amp Class vol 43 no 4 200267 72
YUNAS SAMAD 273
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
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ity o
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23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
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014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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ded
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ity o
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coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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] at
23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
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ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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by [
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] at
23
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er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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23
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arrived Muslim migrants have settled It investigates the concept of parallel
lives by examining the connections between residents and their modes of co-
operation in the same neighbourhood locality and other localities in Britain
It also examines the forms of cultural capital used by residents and their
expression in political and civic engagement by examining crosscutting
interaction and modes of co-operation in specific settings in terms of their
nature quality and strength Furthermore the research looks at the impact of
local national and international interventions on individualsrsquo feelings about
a lsquocommon sense of belongingrsquo and at evidence for social cohesion
including the factors that affect cohesion Finally it examines the impact of
transnationalism on social cohesion testing the hypothesis that transnation-
alism v integration is not a zero-sum game This paper takes the main areas
of debate on community cohesion and tests them with evidence from
Bradford
Community cohesion
Social policy in the United Kingdom over the last fifty years has swung
between integration and assimilation The first steps away from assimilation
took place under Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in the 1960s when he
simultaneously introduced immigration control and policies to facilitate
integration He proclaimed that lsquointegration was not a flattening process of
uniformity but cultural diversity coupled with equality of opportunityrsquo and
his declarations led to the implementation of the Race Relations Acts of 1965
and 19684 An important feature of these acts was that responsibility was
devolved to local government In the late 1970s local authorities began
experimenting with multiculturalism but it was only after the inner-city
riots of 1981 that convulsed Brixton Toxteth and Handsworth that local
authorities engaged seriously with the issues of multiculturalism equal
opportunity and anti-racism The Scarman Report that followed a public
inquiry into the Brixton riots identified discrimination as a key factor and
suggested that local government implement multicultural policies In spite
of criticism from right-leaning commentators such as Ray Honeyford
multiculturalism became de rigueur for government5 Ultimately under
Tony Blairrsquos leadership multiculturalism had been repackaged as Cool
Britannia and the celebration of difference had become the mantra of official
policy In the early Blair years this celebration of difference was
4 Adrian Favell Philosophies of Integration Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in Franceand Britain (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan 1998) 104
5 Yunas Samad lsquoThe plural guises of multiculturalism conceptualising a fragmentedparadigmrsquo in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds) The Politics of Multiculturalism inthe New Europe Racism Identity and Community (London Zed Books 1997) 240 60
272 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
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014
multicultural multivocal celebratory and elitist it was represented by agamut of artists and writers such as Salman Rushdie Monica Ali HanifKureishi musical forms such as bhangra and fusion music in general andtheatre productions such as Beshti6 But it also included the erasure ofdiasporic habitats that reflected specific origins or locations and of thepolitical urge for social justice once embodied by the anti-racist movement
However in reaction to the civil disturbances in northern England in2001 social policy swung away from multiculturalism and towardscommunity cohesion This shift was influenced by Herman Ouseleyrsquosreport on the riots in Bradford which introduced the concept of parallellives according to which contact between ethnic communities wasminimal7 A number of government reports into the 2001 disturbancesthe Cantle Report and others subsequently adopted the concept8 Theparallel lives framework for understanding the riots set up a binaryopposition between social cohesion and segregation and a belief that self-segregation was the product of a dysfunctional community9 It should bestressed that all the official investigations into the 2001 disturbancesuncritically accepted the Ouseley Reportrsquos characterization of BradfordrsquosMuslim community as self-segregating10
Arun Kundnani described the policy of community cohesion as thedemise of multiculturalism marking a return to assimilation11 Theconcept nestled easily within government policy which was attemptingto build socially mixed and sustainable communities Social cohesionadapted the 1990s concept of the underclass which referred to self-segregating enclaves of white tenants on white estates and applied it to
6 Claire Alexander lsquoDiaspora and hybridityrsquo in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies (London and Los Angeles Sage2010) 487 507
7 Bradford Race Review (chaired by Herman Ouseley) Community Pride Not PrejudiceMaking Diversity Work in Bradford (Bradford Bradford Vision 2001) passim
8 Community Cohesion Independent Review Team Community Cohesion A Report of theIndependent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London Home Office 2001) BurnleyTask Force (chaired by Tony Clarke) Burnley Speaks Who Listens (Burnley BurnleyTask Force 2001) Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion(chaired by John Denham) Building Cohesive Communities A Report of the MinisterialGroup on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London HMSO 2002) OldhamIndependent Review (chaired by David Ritchie) Oldham Independent Review OneOldham One Future (Manchester Government Office for the North West 2001)
9 Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain lsquoConflict and cohesion official constructions oflsquolsquocommunityrsquorsquo around the 2001 lsquolsquoriotsrsquorsquo in Britainrsquo Critical Studies vol 28 2006 347 65
10 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion Burnley Task Force BurnleySpeaks Who Listens Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community CohesionBuilding Cohesive Communities Oldham Independent Review Oldham IndependentReview
11 Arun Kundnani lsquoThe death of multiculturalismrsquo Race amp Class vol 43 no 4 200267 72
YUNAS SAMAD 273
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Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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23
21 1
7 O
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er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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7 O
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er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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23
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
Dow
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21 1
7 O
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er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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ded
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23
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er 2
014
multicultural multivocal celebratory and elitist it was represented by agamut of artists and writers such as Salman Rushdie Monica Ali HanifKureishi musical forms such as bhangra and fusion music in general andtheatre productions such as Beshti6 But it also included the erasure ofdiasporic habitats that reflected specific origins or locations and of thepolitical urge for social justice once embodied by the anti-racist movement
However in reaction to the civil disturbances in northern England in2001 social policy swung away from multiculturalism and towardscommunity cohesion This shift was influenced by Herman Ouseleyrsquosreport on the riots in Bradford which introduced the concept of parallellives according to which contact between ethnic communities wasminimal7 A number of government reports into the 2001 disturbancesthe Cantle Report and others subsequently adopted the concept8 Theparallel lives framework for understanding the riots set up a binaryopposition between social cohesion and segregation and a belief that self-segregation was the product of a dysfunctional community9 It should bestressed that all the official investigations into the 2001 disturbancesuncritically accepted the Ouseley Reportrsquos characterization of BradfordrsquosMuslim community as self-segregating10
Arun Kundnani described the policy of community cohesion as thedemise of multiculturalism marking a return to assimilation11 Theconcept nestled easily within government policy which was attemptingto build socially mixed and sustainable communities Social cohesionadapted the 1990s concept of the underclass which referred to self-segregating enclaves of white tenants on white estates and applied it to
6 Claire Alexander lsquoDiaspora and hybridityrsquo in Patricia Hill Collins and John Solomos(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies (London and Los Angeles Sage2010) 487 507
7 Bradford Race Review (chaired by Herman Ouseley) Community Pride Not PrejudiceMaking Diversity Work in Bradford (Bradford Bradford Vision 2001) passim
8 Community Cohesion Independent Review Team Community Cohesion A Report of theIndependent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle (London Home Office 2001) BurnleyTask Force (chaired by Tony Clarke) Burnley Speaks Who Listens (Burnley BurnleyTask Force 2001) Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion(chaired by John Denham) Building Cohesive Communities A Report of the MinisterialGroup on Public Order and Community Cohesion (London HMSO 2002) OldhamIndependent Review (chaired by David Ritchie) Oldham Independent Review OneOldham One Future (Manchester Government Office for the North West 2001)
9 Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain lsquoConflict and cohesion official constructions oflsquolsquocommunityrsquorsquo around the 2001 lsquolsquoriotsrsquorsquo in Britainrsquo Critical Studies vol 28 2006 347 65
10 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion Burnley Task Force BurnleySpeaks Who Listens Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community CohesionBuilding Cohesive Communities Oldham Independent Review Oldham IndependentReview
11 Arun Kundnani lsquoThe death of multiculturalismrsquo Race amp Class vol 43 no 4 200267 72
YUNAS SAMAD 273
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ded
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Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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ded
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23
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ctob
er 2
014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
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er 2
014
Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
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coln
] at
23
21 1
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er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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] at
23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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ded
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23
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ctob
er 2
014
Muslim communities12 It depoliticized race and social inequality and
marginalized social context and economic inequality13 Community cohesion
readily juxtaposed stable white identities with a destabilizing Muslim Other
and saw the need to reduce the gap between Whites and others14 The
community cohesion agenda was sustained by anti-immigrant rhetoric far-
right electoral success concern over Islam and British identity and an
overarching anxiety about transnational Islamic terrorism15 Statements on
the subject made by then Home Secretary David Blunkett were indicative of a
return to Jenkinsrsquos dual approach an apparent commitment to diversity
combined with control of migrants asylum-seekers and refugees Blunkett
demanded that migrants and ethnic minorities learn English introduced the
citizenship test and railed against forced marriages female circumcision and
transnational marriage16
Multiculturalism became the whipping boy Too much diversity was
considered to be a dangerous threat to national solidarity the social fabric
and the prosperity of the country There was a perceived need to hold on to
core British values norms and common perceptions As a result community
cohesion was introduced adopted as a panacea to these perceived problems
and exported to Australia Canada and Singapore17 Critics argued this was
a moral panic against Muslims Islam had become the new folk devil and the
demand was that British Muslims should fall in line and offer unconditional
support for community cohesion and government polices like anti-terrorism
legislation and Britainrsquos foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan18 David
Cameron confirmed this shift in 2011 by announcing that state multi-
culturalism had been a failure and that Islamic radicalism was a product of
separatism and parallel lives19
12 Pauline Hope Cheong Rosalind Edwards Harry Goulbourne and John SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capital a critical reviewrsquo Critical Social Policyvol 27 no 1 2007 24 49 John Flint lsquoFaith and housing in England promotingcommunity cohesion or contributing to urban segregationrsquo Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies vol 36 no 2 2010 257 74
13 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo14 Virinder S Kalra and Nisha Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the
community cohesion agendarsquo Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 20091397 415
15 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo16 Les Back Michael Keith Azra Khan Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos
white heart politics multiculturalism and the return of assimilationrsquo PoliticalQuarterly vol 73 no 4 2002 445 54 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and SolomoslsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo
17 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
18 Back Keith Khan Shukra and Solomos lsquoNew Labourrsquos white heartrsquo19 David Cameron lsquoPM calls for lsquolsquoshared national identityrsquorsquorsquo 5 February 2011 available
on the Number 10 website at wwwnumber10govuknewspm-calls-for-shared-national-identity (viewed 12 April 2013)
274 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
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23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
Dow
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ded
by [
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ity o
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Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
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ity o
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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ded
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] at
23
21 1
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er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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] at
23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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ded
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23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
Despite the repudiation of multiculturalism in favour of community
cohesion the latter proved to be a slippery policy to implement Defining the
concept was difficult as it was both contested and politicized The problems
in formulating a clear and unambiguous definition resulted in the concept
being redefined a number of times This lack of conceptual clarity led to the
adoption of a range of indicators that were clearly related neither to the
concept nor to each other For example the Local Government Associationrsquos
definition elaborated a number of indicators for community cohesion These
included lsquoa sense of belonging for all communitiesrsquo a positive appreciation
of diversity similar life opportunities for those from different back-
grounds and vigorous and positive relationships between people from
different backgrounds and circumstances in the workplace schools and
neighbourhoods20
Nonetheless in 2003 the government established the Community Cohe-
sion Unit in the Home Office and policy direction came through the
Community Cohesion Pathfinders Programme with practical guidance from
the Home Office Community Cohesion programme and the Local Govern-
ment Association The Public Service Agreement rooted community cohe-
sion in its regulatory framework and performance targets for public
agencies were negotiated between the Treasury and other government
bodies in the Comprehensive Spending Review The Commission on
Integration and Cohesion then refined the notion of community cohesion
to take into account new migrants different generations and income levels
and raised concerns about resistance from the white working class21 While
this made the concept more complex and nuanced it retained its overall
focus on ethnic minorities as the problemThe Communities Secretary at the time Hazel Blears accepted the
recommendations of Our Shared Future the Commissionrsquos final report The
Chancellor in October 2007 announced a new Public Service Agreement
that included PSA 21 (lsquoBuild more cohesive empowered and active
communitiesrsquo) Blears also emphasized a shift away from a one-size-
fits-all approach This involved the mainstreaming of cohesion a national
framework for local support and guidance the integration of newly arrived
migrants into existing communities the building of positive relationships
between different groups and a focus on what works The government also
increased funding for the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo and information
packs for newly arrived migrants Despite these efforts to reshape
community cohesion into a workable social policy the authorities adopted
20 Local Government Association Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
21 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future (Wetherby WestYorkshire Communities and Local Government Publications 2007)
YUNAS SAMAD 275
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
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vers
ity o
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23
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Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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ded
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] at
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21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
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21 1
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er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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ctob
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014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
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ded
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coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
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vers
ity o
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coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the Commission on Integration and Cohesionrsquos lsquoshared futuresrsquo ap-
proach22
In Bradford policymakers had been struggling to apply the concept of
community cohesion as there was little consensus on its meaning They saw
deprivation and marginalization as the main issues and at best community
cohesion was seen as the repackaging of multiculturalism or interfaith
activity At worst it was seen as coercion They recognized that new arrivals
asylum-seekers and refugees had needs that were different from those of the
established black and minority ethnic (BME) population Local policymakers
also raised concerns that community cohesion did not deal with white
working-class resistance to the development of mixed housing and educa-
tion23 Eventually they adopted the new agenda of Our Shared Future in order
to confront these problemsWhat has complicated the application of the community cohesion agenda
has been the governmentrsquos counter-terrorism strategy PREVENT PREVENT was
to be a distinct arm of government policy separate from community
cohesion dealing with radicalization and extremist violence However the
target communities of both strategies and the professionals involved in the
implementation of both programmes were often the same which led to a
blurring between the two Thus the line between community cohesion and
counter-terrorism was never clear and work done to further the community
cohesion agenda was perceived as simultaneously advancing that of
PREVENT This resulted in the sending of contradictory messages The first
premised on the PREVENT strategy focused on Muslims as potential al-Qarsquoida
supporters and a community vulnerable to radicalization The second based
on the community cohesion agenda demanded that the same Muslim
community should integrate and become fully paid-up members of British
society This confusing conflation of messages became apparent during a
review of PREVENT which remained in theory distinct from community
cohesion while its remit broadened and in practice demanded that all
service providers and front-line workers be understood as a new layer of
surveillance24
22 Department for Communities and Local Government The Governmentrsquos Response to theCommission on Integration and Cohesion (London Department for Communities andLocal Government 2008) 5 16 Hazel Blears lsquoBlearspound50 million investment incommunity cohesionrsquo Department for Communities and Local Government pressrelease 2007 available on the National Archives website at webarchivenationalarch-ivesgovuk httpwwwcommunitiesgovuknewscorporate500395 (viewed12 April 2013) HM Treasury PSA Delivery Agreement 21 Build More CohesiveEmpowered and Active Communities (Norwich The Stationery Office 2007)
23 Yunas Samad Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2010) 6 45 9
24 M Y Alam lsquoSocial cohesion and counter terrorism the duck test on Preventrsquo 15 June2011 available on the Soundings website at httpsoundingsmcborgukp40(viewed 12 April 2013)
276 Patterns of Prejudice
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Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
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ded
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] at
23
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ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
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ity o
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21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
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ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
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23
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ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
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014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
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ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
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] at
23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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ctob
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014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
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ded
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vers
ity o
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23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
Parallel lives
The concept of parallel lives is central to the community cohesion initiativeThe Cantle Reportrsquos exposition of parallel lives stressed that it was not justabout physical segregation but also about ethnic communities that did notsocially interact with each other25 Trevor Phillips then chair of theCommission for Racial Equality claimed that interaction between ethnicminorities and Whites was worsening there were few friendship patternsbetween these groups Furthermore Muslimsrsquo self-segregation was believedto endanger security order and stability as well as to be a threat to nationalidentity He claimed that levels of ghettoization in cities like Bradford andLeicester were comparable to those in Chicago26 However Phillipsrsquoscomparison with segregation in the United States is misleading The levelsof concentration in that countrywhere 67 per cent of Chicagorsquos Blacks and29 per cent of Miamirsquos Blacks live in wards in which they constitute 80 percent of the populationsimply do not exist in the United Kingdom In factethnic concentration in the United Kingdom is declining making suchcomparisons disingenuous27 Furthermore the term lsquoghettorsquo has beenmisused and confused with housing concentrations28 While there is adesire to live in enclaves this is not rigid segregation29
It is curious to note that segregation was not an issue prior to 200130 Thesegregation debate focuses almost exclusively on working-class Muslimsand Whites and ignores middle-class segregation in housing and educa-tion31 white concentrations in middle-class gated communities for examplego unmentioned Furthermore Asian cultural norms have been transformedinto Muslim separatism and ethnic minority segregation is only of concernwhen it is linked to Islam Indian concentration in Leicester the highestdensity of any ethnic minority community in the country appears not to be aproblem but Pakistani concentration in Bradford and Bangladeshi enclavesin Tower Hamlets which is lower in density is32 Community cohesion sees
25 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 9 28 30 59 7026 Trevor Phillips lsquoAfter 77 sleepwalking to segregationrsquo speech given at the
Manchester Council for Community Relations 22 September 2005 available on theUniversity of Manchester website at wwwhumanitiesmanchesteracuksocialchangeresearchsocial-changesummer-workshopsdocumentssleepwalkingpdf (viewed31 May 2013)
27 Ceri Peach lsquoSlippery segregation discovering or manufacturing ghettosrsquo Journal ofEthnic and Migration Studies vol 35 no 9 2009 1381 95
28 Ibid29 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo30 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the community
cohesion agendarsquo31 Flint lsquoFaith and housing in Englandrsquo Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos
lsquoImmigration social cohesion and social capitalrsquo32 Peach lsquoSlippery segregationrsquo
YUNAS SAMAD 277
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
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Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
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Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
Dow
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ded
by [
Uni
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ity o
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] at
23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
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nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
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ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
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ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
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Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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by [
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] at
23
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ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
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ded
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Uni
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ity o
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coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
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Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
the white working class and Muslims as the vulnerable groups subject to
British National Party and jihadi extremism33
Paralleling the national trend ethnic concentration in Bradford is declin-
ing The local population increase is due to natural fertility and some in-
migration while overall there is a gradual dispersal However the dispersal
rates are lower than in other minority communities34 There is no doubt that
housing clustering along ethnic and religious lines exists in Bradford Yet
residential patterns in the city are the product of racism in the housing
market reinforced by white migration and flight35 However the issues of
limited housing mobility among Muslims or their propensity to self-
segregate become more nuanced when the findings from neighbourhoods
are examined The sample suggests that at the micro level there are
variations with new arrivals mainly clustered in neighbourhoods in which
there are the same ethnic and religious groups Established Muslims are
more evenly spread with a significant number living in neighbourhoods in
which there are different religious and ethnic groups Thus at the sub-ward
level there are mixed housing patterns that are not apparent at ward or city
level36 This suggests that higher concentrations of particular Muslim
groups such as Pakistani children in particular schools37 are due to
catchment area rather than choiceParallel lives is not simply about housing concentrations but also about
the supposed unwillingness of Muslim minorities to mix with other faith
groups Evidence from the research contradicts suggestions that Muslims are
inward-looking isolationist and preferring to mix only with their own faith
group Muslim respondents follow the samplersquos general pattern of meeting
the same ethnic and religious groups at home and meeting different
ethnicities and religious groups in external locations However established
Muslims meet more people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
than from the same ethnic and faith backgrounds unlike new Muslim
arrivals who meet approximately the same number from the two different
categories (see Figures 1 and 2)
33 Kalra and Kapoor lsquoInterrogating segregation integration and the communitycohesion agendarsquo
34 Ludi Simpson and Vasislis Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and OldhamPopulation Household and Social Change (Manchester Cathie Marsh Centre for Censusand Survey Research University of Manchester 2005) 5 12 Deborah PhillipsMovement to Opportunity South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities ESRC Full ResearchReport R000238038 (Swindon ESRC 2002) 10
35 Peter Ratcliffe lsquoRacersquo and Housing in Bradford Addressing the Needs of the South AsianAfrican and Caribbean Communities (Bradford Bradford Housing Forum 1996) 4Simpson and Gavalas Population Dynamics within Rochdale and Oldham 6 11
36 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 1937 Simon Burgess Deborah Wilson and Ruth Lupton lsquoParallel lives Ethnic segregation
in schools and neighbourhoodsrsquo Urban Studies vol 42 no 7 2005 1027 56
278 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
Dow
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Uni
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ity o
f N
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] at
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7 O
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er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
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ded
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ity o
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] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
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ded
by [
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ity o
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] at
23
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7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
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Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
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nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
All the groups in the sample felt a deep attachment to their localities a
result of living among familiar people as well as having easy access to
amenities and services Among established participants many stated that
they were born raised and educated in their neighbourhoods and that
they still had many friends there In the majority of cases participants
were positive about the locales and the communities in which they
thrived Respondents demonstrated a high degree of interaction across
ethnic and religious boundaries in their daily lives and in a wide range of
Figure 1 Established Muslims () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligion bymeeting place
714
171
457
371
343
457
429
259
257
657
257
800
657
771
771
667
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
Figure 2 Recent Muslim arrivals () meeting people of samedifferent ethnicityreligionby meeting place
423
558
577
635
152
173
423
18
500
481
269
635
152
385
904
596
Home
Workcollegeevening classes
Religious places
Shopping places
Places of entertainment
Familychildren oriented spaces
Use of public servicesfacilities
Associationssocial activities
Same ethnicity andor religion Other ethnicity andor religion
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Source Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 22
YUNAS SAMAD 279
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
public spaces this was more the case among established populations of
all faiths Overall then the participants reflected mixed communities
in which most people got on with each other and felt that they were
accepted
Social capital
The social capital argument has been critiqued as lsquoold wine in new bottlesrsquo
Earlier debates saw Asian culture in a positive light enabling Asian
immigrants and ethnic minoritiesas opposed to Blacksthe opportunity
to overcome structural barriers such as unemployment and discrimination38
Today the debate is heavily influenced by Robert Putnamrsquos argument on
social capital39 in which he differentiates between bridging capital (associa-
tional) bonding capital (ethnic) and linking capital (connecting individuals
to institutions) Ted Cantle acknowledged the importance of bridging
capital and suggested a negative influence of bonding capital40 However
the Commission for Integration and Cohesion described the social capital
argument as lsquosleepwalking into simplicityrsquo41 as it ignored the fact that
community is complex and in a continuous state of flux and evolution It
also downplayed the conflicted nature of civil society including anti-
immigration sentiment and resistance to outsiders Social capital and
community cohesion are located in the contested terrain of political power42
which cannot be switched on and off and are variables in a context of
inequality and injusticeThus Pierre Bourdieu argued that social capital is the outcome of
inequality it depends on access to resources and works in tandem with
other forms of capital reproducing inequalities in specific forms43 Different
mixes of capital lead to different trajectories and inequality is an important
variable that cannot be excluded from the contemporary debate on social
38 Sue Benson lsquoAsians have culture West Indians have problems discourses of race andethnicity in and out of anthropologyrsquo in Terence Ranger Yunas Samad and OssieStuart Culture Identity and Politics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Aldershot HantsAvebury 1996) 47 56
39 Robert Putnam Bowling Alone The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NewYork and London Simon and Schuster 2000) 22 3
40 Community Cohesion Review Team Community Cohesion 13 72 341 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 342 Roger Zetter David Griffiths Nando Sigona Don Flynn Tauhid Pasha and Rhian
Beynon Immigration Social Cohesion and Social Capital What Are the Links (YorkJoseph Rowntree Foundation 2006) 10
43 Pierre Bourdieu lsquoThe forms of capitalrsquo in John G Richardson (ed) Handbook of Theoryand Research for the Sociology of Education (New York Westport CT and LondonGreenwood Press 1986) 241 58
280 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital44 Recent research challenges a central assumption of Putnamrsquos
argument that cultural capital is declining While this may be true for the
working class it is not reflected in studies conducted on the middle class
undermining claims for the generalizability of the social capital thesis More
broadly the social capital debate is part of the neoliberal agenda shifting
away from socio-economic equality to culture and making individuals
responsible for their relative level of success or failure The preoccupation
with social capital is also mirrored in the growing interest in communitar-
ianism and active citizenship both of which have been used to justify the
downsizing of the welfare state45
The Commission for Integration and Cohesion suggested that a simple
dichotomy of good and bad social capital was unhelpful and that the
presence of bonding capital facilitated the formation of bridging social
capital46 In order to understand better the role of social capital in relation to
community cohesion I investigated the support networks to which people
turn The results indicate that the social contacts of respondents expanded
over time While initially such contacts were between members of the same
ethnic and religious group they were then extended to include networks of
work colleagues housemates and peers In terms of social capital among
Muslim respondents the trend appears to be one that balances bonding
capital and bridging capital The prevalence of bonding capital persists for a
variety of complex reasons ranging from structural factors such as
residential concentrations of the same ethnic and religious group to
social-psychological factors like the desire to sustain and maintain kith
and kin relationsRecently arrived Muslim participants have been supported by bonding
capital as more than half of them have come for marriage and several others
for family reunification The family and clan remain important in terms of
both social contact and support However established Muslim respondents
appear increasingly to use friendship networks that include members of
different ethnic and religious groups and mainstream agencies such as the
Citizen Advice Bureau for support This suggests a gradual and incremental
shift towards bridging capital and away from dependency on bonding
capital While there are complex reasons for using particular forms of social
capital an important though partial explanation is the ability to speak
English47
Associational forms of engagement are dependent on bridging social
capital Political and civic engagement is indicative of such forms of social
44 Cheong Edwards Goulbourne and Solomos lsquoImmigration social cohesion and socialcapitalrsquo
45 Ibid Zetter Griffiths Sigona Flynn Pasha and Beynon Immigration Social Cohesionand Social Capital
46 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 11147 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 26 30
YUNAS SAMAD 281
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
capital High levels of bridging capital lead to the better functioning ofdemocratic processes and play an important role in giving associationalcohesion to social life48 Bringing people together on issues of commonconcern or interest is important for community cohesion Political and civicengagement is greater when there is a sense of trust in local and nationalinstitutions and both are perceived to be acting in the interests of all groupsAll established groups from the sample demonstrated higher rates ofparticipation in the electoral process than new arrivals irrespective of faithThis was due to being better informed having a higher level of Englishproficiency and becoming more familiar with life in Bradford and EnglandEstablished Muslim respondents had the highest rate of participation in theelectoral process The local election turn-out among the sample was higherthan the national turn-out with more men voting than women In otherrespects the pattern was similar to national voting trends In both nationaland local elections the participants most involved in politics were from theestablished Muslim population49
Overall involvement in organizations was found to be infrequent50
although female respondents were twice as likely as male respondents toparticipate in organizations and those who were involved were generallybetter educated and fluent in English Established Muslim respondents hadthe highest rates of involvement and recently arrived Muslim respondentshad the lowest The main reason individuals gave for non-involvement wasthat they were too busy with work or family The sample revealed a varietyof public activities that brought diverse communities together supportingthe Commission for Integration and Cohesionrsquos view that rather than seeingbridging and bonding capital polarized as good and bad social capital thepresence of the latter facilitates the formation of the former51
Identity belonging and transnationalism
One of the aims of the community cohesion agenda is the advancement ofthe healthy and positive relationships between people from differentbackgrounds that are conducive to a harmonious society52 The LocalGovernment Associationrsquos definition of community cohesion included the
48 Putnam Bowling Alone 22 349 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 31 250 The range of organizations include school-related groups (PTA play groups school
governors) youth clubs adult education classes mosque committees political partiessocial welfare and voluntary groups community organizations trade unions housingand neighbourhood groups human rights organizations and so on
51 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3052 Jane Jensen Mapping Social Cohesion The State of Canadian Research (Ottawa Canadian
Policy Research Network 1998) v 5
282 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
element of a lsquocommon vision and belongingrsquo53 supporting Ted Cantlersquos
argument that traditional multiculturalism led to competing claims of
belonging and recognition Community cohesion fed into the government
emphasis on a common sense of belonging that combined local loyalty and
affiliation with national identity and it assumed that transnationalism
produced divided loyalties and undermined notions of Britishness Hence
the importance the government placed on the citizenship test learning
English and the promotion of lsquocitizen daysrsquo The Home Office strategy
document stressed that community cohesion relied on groups having the
ability to influence political decisions that affected their lives54 Added to
this was the observation by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion
that there must be confidence that local institutions will act fairly and
equitably in the discharge of their responsibilities55 To assess these
conditions the research investigated the impact of local national and
international interventions on peoplersquos feelings about a lsquocommon sense of
belongingrsquo and looked for evidence of social cohesion and the factors
affecting its formationOn local national and international issues there was broad agreement and
a commonality of concerns among the samplersquos different groups Issues that
concerned them were the anti-social behaviour of young men drugs and
crime and they unanimously considered these the major local problems
Most respondents also agreed that they could not influence the local
decision-making process Although a sizeable proportion of established
Muslim respondents disagreed arguing that they could make a differenceIn relation to national issues there was a greater degree of satisfaction
among new arrivals while all established groups were highly critical of the
political system Respondents across all categories complained that the
government was not responsive to public opinion and was in the pockets of
the rich and powerful and that political leadership was susceptible to
corruption Common concerns were anti-social behaviour deprivation the
rise of the far right as well as social issues like poverty homelessness and
unemployment Established Muslim participants placed greater emphasis on
discrimination and anti-terrorismWhen international issues were discussed all groups were deeply
unhappy with British foreign policy They raised concerns about war in
general and Iraq and Afghanistan in particular Established respondents felt
that voting had no effect on foreign policy politicians were not straightfor-
53 Local Government Association (LGA) Guidance on Community Cohesion (London LGAPublications 2002) 6
54 Department of Communities and Local Government Improving Opportunity Strength-ening Society Two Years On A Progress Report on the Governmentrsquos Strategy to IncreaseRace Equality and Community Cohesion (Wetherby West Yorkshire Communities andLocal Government Publications 2007) 7
55 Commission on Integration and Cohesion Our Shared Future 120
YUNAS SAMAD 283
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
ward and British foreign policy was dominated by the United States On
national issues as well respondents in all groups disagreed strongly with
government policy and felt they had no way of influencing the process
There was a degree of cynicism among established participants of all faiths
about the transparency of the democratic process56
The investigation then considered the ways in which recent arrivals of all
faiths maintained transnational contacts Strong transnational involvement
does not rule out integration in the country of settlement Although the
relationship between transnationalism and integration is dependent on the
degree of socio-economic incorporation recent studies of transnational
engagement show that transnationalism coexists with a sense of belonging
in the society in which former migrants have settled A key variable in
relation to migrants and former migrants is poor economic integration
which reinforces transnational identification with the country of origin
while satisfactory employment correlates with weak identification with the
country of origin57 Furthermore the literature indicates that there are
considerable variations in transnational ties ranging from the firmly non-
transnational to the fully transnationalIn her study conducted in Switzerland Janine Dahinden identified four
categories of transnationalism weak medium pronounced and strongly
networked Local indigenous populations and established migrants have
localized networks are legally integrated and economically involved and
are historically anchored They show weak transnational networks and this
includes former migrants On the other hand guestworkers with low skills
and education but with resident permits not acquired through asylum have
both local and transnational networks the latter to a greater degree They are
classified as having medium transnational networks The third category
consists of asylum-seekers and refugees with low education and skills or
women who had emigrated for family reunification they are poorly socio-
economically integrated and disadvantaged and they are often character-
ized by high unemployment They have pronounced transnational networks
identifying with relatives in their countries of origin and with family in their
countries of settlement Finally the last category consists of those who were
born abroad those who have lived in different countries and those who are
highly educated They have high levels of cultural capital exhibit strong
transnational connectedness and are not anchored in local society58
56 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 3657 Godfried Engbersen lsquoTransnationalism and identitiesrsquo in Yunas Samad and Kasturi
Sen (eds) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War on Terror(Oxford and Karachi Oxford University Press 2007) 123 42
58 Janine Dahinden lsquoAre we all transnationals now Network transnationalism andtransnational subjectivity the differing impacts of globalization on the inhabitants of asmall Swiss cityrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 32 no 8 2009 1365 86
284 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
The sample included people with weak medium and pronouncedtransnationalism but no instances of individuals with strong transnationalnetworks In line with the literature the findings show that establishedMuslims have weak transnational ties while recent arrivals of all faiths havemedium or pronounced connections The evidence demonstrates thattransnational financial contact is not significant and a large percentage ofthe sample states that it isnrsquot relevant Among Muslims remittances to theircountries of origin do not represent a significant transfer of assets and havelittle effect on home ownership which is very high among the Muslimcommunitiy in Bradford As expected recent arrivals both Muslim and non-Muslim are more in contact with their country of origin than establishedMuslims and they use a range of media to keep in contact print media andtelephoning being among the most popular Many recently arrived Muslimsand non-Muslims seldom visit countries of origin mainly for financialreasons while established Muslims make trips infrequently perhaps once ayear or even less When participants were asked whether they were involvedin homeland politics very few Muslims and non-Muslims said they were
The findings on transnational engagement were then related to positiveand negative perceptions of belonging to local communities and to BritainThe important variable was not faith but length of stay in the UnitedKingdom Established Muslims had a strong sense of belonging to Britainwhile recent arrivals Muslims and non-Muslims had a greater sense of dualloyalty When asked where the people most important to their lives livedthere was a clear difference between recent arrivals and established Muslimresidents For recent arrivals of all faiths their important social connectionswere in their country of origin while many established Muslim residentssaid that their significant social connections were in Britain The majority ofrecently arrived non-Muslims felt they did not belong here as their familieswere back home They wanted to return and felt they belonged only to theircountry of origin However when recently arrived Muslims were asked thisquestion they responded ambivalently as they had family in both countrieslsquoKids here and parents therersquo might be a life circumstance that helps developa dual sense of belonging Established Muslims reiterated a discourse ofroots and family ties but many stated their main sense of belonging was toBritain Some went further and indicated they did not like Pakistan becauseof its politics they felt alien there and only belonged in Britain For theserespondents Pakistan was for holidays only59
Muslims in general felt that there were hardly any religious constraints onintegrating with the local community Established Muslims felt that theirneighbours accepted them and there were few obstacles preventing themfrom socializing outside of their ethnic and religious groups No substantivedifferences emerged among the different groupsrsquo views on education RecentMuslims raised the issues of segregated schools for girls and teaching in the
59 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 39
YUNAS SAMAD 285
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
YUNAS SAMAD 287
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
mother tongue of Punjabi All the groups agreed that their main concernsabout schools were substance abuse poor discipline and peer grouppressure and that they wanted their kids to speak good English Muslimsand non-Muslims however had different views on marriage Muslimstalked of family religious and cultural compatibility while non-Muslimstalked of love as the only criterion Established Muslims included issues oflove and consent they were happy for children to select their own marriagepartners as long as they got family approval and strongly disapproved offorced marriage When the issue of free speech was raised the maindifference occurred between the British-born non-Muslim population andthe rest All the other groups agreed that there should be limits to sexuallyexplicit and religiously offensive material but overall there was no strongsentiment expressed The research findings reinforced the point made byM Y Alam and Charles Husband that established Muslim populations areintegrating in ways that reflect their experience of being Bradfordian andBritish60
Ethnicization of social divisions
While there is a consensus in British policy circles that repudiates multi-culturalism its replacement by community cohesion has proven to bedifficult to implement Besides the definitional problem there has also beenthe issue of how to recognize successful examples of community cohesionHence the policy shifts at both the national and local level to lsquosharedfuturesrsquo At the same time the community cohesion agenda has been taintedby the PREVENT programme which has targeted the same communities andquite often the same people with two different messages and moreimportantly has failed to engage with the white working class This hascontaminated community cohesion in the eyes of the Muslim communitywhich sees it as an excuse for snooping on its members and simultaneouslymaking demands that it become more British Furthermore the classificationof lsquoAsianrsquo which was credited with using cultural resources in order toovercome barriers to integration such as unemployment discrimination andpoverty has been disaggregated into religious categories One result is thatthe classification of Muslim is now tainted with the threat of terrorism andculture has become an obstacle to integration
The investigation critically examined the central assumptions of thecommunity cohesion agendaself-segregation parallel lives transnational-ism identity and belongingand identified critical challenges to themWhile there are housing enclaves there is no evidence of self-segregation
60 Samad Muslim Community Cohesion 42 3 M Y Alam and Charles Husband British-Pakistani Men from Bradford Linking Narratives to Policy (York Joseph RowntreeFoundation 2006) 15
286 Patterns of Prejudice
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ebra
ska
Lin
coln
] at
23
21 1
7 O
ctob
er 2
014
and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
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and at the sub-ward level there is indication of mixed housing patternsparticularly among established Muslims who also mixed socially in variouslocations with different ethnic and faith groups Participants spoke ofdiverse communities and of knowing many people with whom they goton If schools along with youth clubs reflect segregated populations this isprimarily a result of catchment areas
In terms of social capital the trend among established Muslim respon-dents was towards employing bridging capital rather than bonding capitalThis trend was reinforced by the high degree of political and organizationalengagement found in this group Muslim respondentsrsquo views of localnational and international issues were similar to those of non-Muslimrespondents on a range of subjects When asked about transnationalismidentity and belonging it was found that established Muslims were rootedin Britain There was a difference regarding belonging with new arrivals ofall faiths stating they had dual identities while many established Muslimsstrongly identified with the United Kingdom Muslims felt that there werefew religious constraints on their mixing with others and there were nosubstantive differences in views on education although there were somebetween Muslimsrsquo and non-Muslimsrsquo views on marriage and censorshipThe findings indicate that as Muslims establish themselves they areintegrating rapidly and developing strong commitments to Britain and tobecoming British on their terms
The 2001 northern riots reflected the failure of the political elite to tacklemajor issues of deprivation marginalization and discrimination Instead ofdealing with the substantive material issues a moral panic against Muslimswas initiated turning the debate into a victim-blaming exercise Thoseunderlying issues are still not being addressed and the clock appears simplyto have been turned back to assimilation as a solution to this predicamentreverberating in the responses to the 2011 London riots Sound bites andknee-jerk reactions seem to be steering that response as David Camerontalks of lsquobroken Britainrsquo leading to a moral panic against young peoplerather than an addressing of the socio-economic issues of deprivation andmarginalization
Yunas Samad is Professor of South Asian Studies and Director of Post-Graduate Research at Bradford University His publications include Pakistan-US Conundrum Jihadis Military and the People The Struggle for Control (Hurst2011) Muslim Community Cohesion Bradford Report (Joseph Rowntree Founda-tion 2010) Islam in the European Union Transnationalism Youth and the War onTerror (with Kasturi Sen Oxford University Press 2007) Faultlines of Nationhood(with Gayen Pandey Roli Press 2007) Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage(with John Eade Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2003) Culture Identity andPolitics Ethnic Minorities in Britain (ed with Terence Ranger and Ossie StuartAvebury 1996) and A Nation in Turmoil Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan193758 (Sage 1995) Email aysamadbradfordacuk
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