communication networks a second course rahul jain (guest lecture) department of eecs university of...
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Communication NetworksA Second Course
Rahul Jain (Guest Lecture)Department of EECSUniversity of California at Berkeley
Network Bandwidth Exchange
Jain and Varaiya, “The Combinatorial Seller’s Bid Double Auction: An Asymptotically Efficient Market Mechanism”, JET submission, 2006
The Framework
A Mechanism for Indivisible Goods
An Example
Basics of Mechanism Design
Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Back to Example
ak=min {ck+1,vk }
Every Nash Equilibrium is efficient
The Network Case
Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium
Step 1
Step 2
Step 2, contd.
Putting it together