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    Law & Society Association, Annual Meeting, Minneapolis 1 June 2014

    Commitment, Resistance, Disengagement and Game-playing:

    Understanding (non-) compliance with the smoking ban in Dutch bars.

    (Draft articleplease do not cite)

    Willem Bantema

    University of Groningen

    [email protected]

    ABSTRACT

    In recent years, all countries in Europe have introduced a smoking ban in bars and restaurants. While

    most countries show a high level of compliance, the picture in the Netherlands is quite different.

    Especially the level of compliance in Dutch bars is lower than in most other countries. In this paper I

    will argue that these differences in regulatory compliance may be explained by the motivational

    postures of bar owners, focusing on their level of commitment, capitulation, resistance,

    disengagement and game-playing (Braithwaite, 2003, 2009).

    To this end, a mixed methods approach was used, including a survey among Dutch bars and in depth

    interviews with bar owners (N=23). This paper demonstrates that four motivational postures are

    relevant for bars owners in the Netherlands. Finally, this paper shows that motivational postures

    have a high explanatory value in the analysis on self-reported compliance, even when controlled for

    instrumental explanations.

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Commitment, Resistance, Disengagement and Game-playing:

    Understanding (non-) compliance with the smoking ban in Dutch bars.

    (Draft articleplease do not cite)

    Willem Bantema

    University of Groningen

    [email protected]

    INTRODUCTION

    In recent years, all EU countries have introduced a smoking ban in bars. In the Netherlands,

    it was introduced at July 2008. Only bar owners can be legally sanctioned by for violating the

    smoking ban. The Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (NVWA) enforces this

    legislation.1However, how effective is this new legislation in terms of compliance? While

    most countries show a high level of compliance with the new regulation, the picture in the

    Netherlands is quite different. For instance, two years after introducing the smoking ban,

    around 90 percent of the bars in Ireland (Howell, 2005), Norway (Lund, 2006) and Italy

    (Gorini et al. 2007) complied with the smoking ban. In the Netherlands, 76 percent of the bar

    owners complied with the smoking ban, one year after introducing the smoking ban

    (Intraval, 2009). However, this compliance appeared to be short-lived. Almost two years

    after the smoking ban was introduced, only 59 percent of the bars complied with the

    smoking ban (Intraval 2010).2This variation in (non-) compliance makes the Dutch smoking

    ban an interesting case to explain compliance motivations.

    The aim of this paper is to understand and to explain different levels of compliance with the

    smoking ban of Dutch bars. In order to understand these differences in compliance, one has

    to focus on motivations of the regulatees. With respect to the smoking bans we may

    differentiate between customers, bar staff and bar owners. This paper focuses on the bar

    1See Weyers (2010) for background and more detail about the Dutch smoking ban in bars.

    2At present, 75 percent of the bars complied with the smoking ban.

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    owners, because they can be legally sanctioned for violation of the smoking ban. Thus, bar

    owners are expected to play a central role in (non-) compliance with the smoking ban by

    differences in smoking policy. I will argue that the central explanation for differences in

    compliance are, what Valerie Braithwaite (1995, 2009) refers to as "motivational postures".Braithwaite distinguishes between five postures: commitment, capitulation, resistance,

    disengagement and game playing.

    Motivational postures have demonstrated to be a fruitful explanation for compliance

    (Braithwaite, 1995; 2003; 2009). However, thus far, they have never been used to explain

    the compliance with smoking bans. Braithwaite claims that motivational postures are

    measures that are not context sensitive (Braithwaite, 2003: 17). However, postures are

    seldom applied outside Australia. There is another strength of the posture model. As said

    postures are indicative of (non-) compliance. Postures are not only aimed to describe and

    explain (non-) compliance, they are also useful to describe the character of the (non-)

    compliance. This underlines the scientific and social relevance of this motivational postures

    approach.

    In this paper I will argue that postures are useful in the context of smoking bans and that

    they are indicative of (non-) compliance of bars. Moreover, this paper will nuance

    Braithwaites claim that motivational postures are not context sensitive.

    THEORY

    Postures can be used to capture the ways in which regulatees position themselves in relation

    to a regulatory authority. Postures can be defined as conglomerates of beliefs, attitudes,

    preferences, interests, and feelings that together communicate the degree in which an

    individual accepts the agenda of the regulator, in principle, and endorses the way in which

    the regulator functions and carries out duties on a daily basis (Braithwaiteet al. 2007: 138).

    Central to this posturing is the concept of social distance (Bogardus, 1928). Based on their

    relationship with the regulator (authority) and by the support with the regulation, people

    can place social distance between themselves and concerned authorities. When people wish

    to create a greater distance between themselves and authorities, they intend to be more out

    of reach and out of contact with authorities. In case of greater social distance, it becomesmore difficult for regulators to respond to the dissatisfaction of the concerned regulatees.

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    Braithwaite distinguishes between five postures: commitment, capitulation, resistance,

    disengagement and game playing. These postures differ in social distance (low to high) and

    in the way dissatisfaction is expressed. These postures also differ in which element of social

    distance (authorities versus regulation) is predominant.

    Motivational postures have demonstrated to be a fruitful explanation for compliance and

    non-compliance of regulatees in different contexts: for example taxing (Braithwaite, 2002;

    2009 and Kircher & Wahl, 2010), environmental law (Bartel & Barclay, 2011), safety

    (Braithwaite, 2011), nursing homes (Braithwaite, 1994; 1995) and child-care. Furthermore,

    commitment and capitulation are indicative for compliance, whereas resistance,

    disengagement and game playing are indicative for non-compliance of regulatees

    (Braithwaith et al. 1994; Braithwaite, 2003; Braithwaite, 2011; Murphy et al. 2009, Murphy

    & Cherney, 2012).

    Commitment is associated with embracing the mission of the respective authority or the

    agenda of the authority(Braithwaite et al. 2007: 139). That is to say, commitment is

    characterized by supporting the regulation. This is the main reason for the low social

    distance between the regulator and the regulatee. As a consequence the relationship with

    the regulator will be harmonious.

    Capitulationis more focused on a good relationship with the regulator. This relationship is

    mainly based on avoiding problems with the regulator and simply doing what is asked,

    instead of supporting the regulation as the right thing to do. As Braithwaite states:

    regulatees agreed to do what is being asked , driven by willingness to please and desire to

    avoid trouble, without stopping to think too much about the ultimate goals (Braithwaite,

    2009: 78).

    Resistanceis a oppositional posture. This posture reflects relational stress between

    regulators and regulatees. This stress can be based on the way regulators are doing business,

    for example in the way they perform their inspections. The message from the regulatee is

    one of dissatisfaction with the regulation or with the relevant procedures. By responding to

    these grievances, regulators can reduce resistance, and bars owners may shift to the

    posture of commitment or capitulation.

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    Disengagementalso reflects dissatisfaction with the regulation and the regulators. However,

    this dissatisfaction goes beyond resistance. It is characterized by a cool detachment from

    regulatory efforts(Braithwaite et al. 2007: 139) and by a complete dismissal of the

    regulator and the regulatory system (Braithwaite, 2009: 78). This is accompanied by feelingsof indifference and is expressed by saying the regulation is of no use. Those who feel

    disengaged place themselves out of the reach (psychologically) of the regulators. This

    withdrawal, instead of the more vocal opposition of resistance, is more difficult to handle for

    regulators. As Braithwaite states: It involves dropping out, with no communication that

    betrays the source of the injury, and therefore no basis for responsiveness that can repair

    the situation (Braitwaite, 2009:80).

    Game playingis also a posture which is based on a high social distance to regulators and the

    regulation, including the emotional detachment of disengagement (Braithwaite et al. 2009:

    139). The social distance is principally based on low support for the regulation. Game playing

    consists of a specific attitude to law, what is seen as something that can be used for ones

    own purposes, rather than something that shall be respected (Braithwaite, 2002: 19). Game

    players live to the letter of the law but not to its spirit. In this respect it parallels capitulation.

    An important difference between capitulation and game playing is that the former is

    captured by the regulator, whereas the latter is challenging the regulator. Also, the

    relationship with authority is actually different compared to resistance and disengagement.

    Where disengagement is based on feelings of alienation and withdrawal, game playing is

    based on the feeling that regulators could be beated on their own game (Braithwaite, 2009:

    109). Therefore, game playing is essentially a posture of competition.

    Character of the (non-) compliance

    Resistance is about reflecting stress about regulators and the regulation. Regulators may

    respond to these signals to diminish this stress or dissatisfaction. When dissatisfaction is

    accompanied by feelings of disengagement it is more problematic for regulators, because

    people want to stay out of reach from the regulators and therefore they are irresponsive for

    additional efforts from the regulator. Empirical studies in the context of nursing homes and

    taxing supports this claim. In existing research about postures and taxing, people were

    surveyed twice. In the meantime, regulatory action was carried out to increase compliance.

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    The resisters showed a higher level of compliance, while the disengaged were characterized

    by a decreasing compliance, despite the additional efforts of regulators (Braithwaite, 2009:

    80). This paper focuses on two questions:

    1.

    Are motivational postures applicable in the context of a smoking ban in Dutch bars?

    2. Can differences in (non-) compliance be explained by motivational postures of bar

    owners?

    Structure of the paper

    In the first section I will discuss the research design and the methodology of this study. The

    second section discusses the applicability of the motivational posture model in the context

    of the smoking ban in bars. The third section gives a profile of bar owners, based on postures

    and background variables. In the fourth section the central argument of this paper will be

    discussed, that is the relationship between motivational postures and the self-reported

    compliance of bar owners. In the final section I will summarize the main conclusions of this

    study.

    PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE

    The present study utilized survey data collected from a random sample of 398 bar (venue)

    owners from the Netherlands. An introduction letter had been sent to a random sample of

    bar owners, in which the purpose of the study was explained and in which they were invited

    to participate in the web survey (using an password). The 16 page survey examined a range

    of issues, including views about the smoking ban, personal experience with the inspection

    agency (NVWA), smoking policy in their bar, motivational postures and questions about the

    owner of the bar and his or her establishment.

    A total of 1801 bars received a letter in October 2012)3. A reminder was sent three weeks

    later. Meanwhile, a database of email-addresses was created to obtain a higher response.

    Two weeks after the first reminder (post) an email was sent to bars whose email was

    available (1 out of 3), followed by a reminder two weeks later. After a period of

    approximately three months a total of 429 completed surveys were returned (response rate:

    24%).3This is corrected for not existing or fault addresses (N=54).

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    In addition, 23 in-depth interviews were conducted with bar owners, in June 2013. The

    survey ended with the question, do you want to participate in an interview? About 50

    percent wished to participate. Based on their motivational postures and variation on other

    variables (purposive sampling) a total of 23 bar owners were interviewed. Thematicsaturation was achieved around this point, that is to say that additional interviews would not

    lead to new thematic information about the smoking ban in bars.

    Measures

    Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and Cronbachsalpha reliability.

    Table 1 Variables (means)

    Measure N Mean (SD)

    Self-reported compliance 363 3.8 (1.3) .93

    Commitment 429 3.2 (1.4) .82

    Capitulation 406 2.6 (0.9) .72

    Resistance 394 3.3 (0.8) .63

    Disengagement 398 2.6 (0.9) .73

    Game playing 422 2.8 (1.2) .74

    Economic impact of the smoking ban 341 4.3 (0.9) .82

    Deterrence 394 3.1 (1.5) -

    Comfort in pointing customers at the smoking ban 344 3.2 (1.4) -

    Age 395 3.8 (1.0) -

    Education (highest) 390 3.9 (0.8) -

    Experience with inspection agency 402 2.8 (1.0) -

    Size of establishment 391 4.9 (2.0) -

    Table 2 variables (frequencies)

    Measure N Percentage

    Abolish smoking ban

    No 110 33

    Yes 219 67

    Total 329 100

    Smoking room

    No 234 57

    Yes 175 43

    Total 409 100

    Smoking

    No 260 65

    Yes 137 35

    Total 397 100

    Sex

    Man 286 73

    Woman 107 27

    Total 393 100

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    Dependent variable

    Self-reported compliance

    Self-reported compliance behavior was measured with seven items, based on a combination

    of three general questions (This establishment complies with the smoking ban) and four

    specific questions about conditions for (non-) compliance in bars (If the weather is bad, I

    permit smoking in my establishment or smoking inside this establishment is permitted after

    midnight. The answers were given on a five-point scale (1=completely disagree to

    5=completely agree). The scores of the general questions were combined into one overall

    score for self-reported compliance behavior. A higher score indicates a higher level of

    compliance (M= 3.82, SD= 1.34, Cronbachs = .93).

    Independent variable

    Motivational postures

    The measures of motivational postures were based on Braithwaite (2009) and measured

    with 20 items. Commitmentwas measured with four items: complying with the smoking ban

    is the right thing to do, Its my responsibility toensure that people dont smoke in my bar,

    I feel a moral obligation to comply with the smoking banand complying with the smoking

    ban is a responsibility that should be willingly accepted by all bars. The answers were given

    on a five-point scale (1=completely disagree to 5=completely agree). A higher score indicates

    more commitment(M= 3.17, SD= 1.36, Cronbachs = .82).

    Capitulation was measured with four items: if you cooperate with the NVWA, they are likely

    to be cooperative to you, The NVWA is encouraging to those who have difficulty meeting

    their obligations through no fault of their own, even if the NVWA finds that I am doing

    something wrong, they will respect me in the long run as long as I admit my mistakes and

    no matter how cooperative or uncooperative the NVWA is, the best policy is to always be

    cooperative with them.The answers were given on a five-point scale (1=completely

    disagree to 5=completely agree). A higher score indicates a more capitulation (M=2.59, SD=

    0.92, Cronbachs = .72).

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    Resistance was measured with 5 items: once the NVWAhas branded you as non-compliant,

    they will never change their mind,the NVWA is more interested in catching you for doing

    the wrong thing, than helping you do the right thing, its important not to let the NVWA

    push you around, bars have to take a stand against the NVWA and Im dissatisfied with the

    practice of the NVWA.The answers were given on a five-point scale (1=completely disagree

    to 5=completely agree). A higher score indicates more resistance(M= 3.28, SD= 0.78,

    Cronbachs = .63).

    Disengagement was measured with four items: I dont care ifthe NVWA thinks that I am not

    doing the right thing, I personally dont think that there is much the NVWA can do to make

    me comply with the smoking ban, if I dont want to, I dont really know what the NVWA

    expects of me and Im not about to askand I dont care what the NVWA thinks of me. The

    answers were given on a five-point scale (1=completely disagree to 5=completely agree). A

    higher score indicates more disengagement (M= 2.62, SD= 0.94, Cronbachs = .73).

    Game-playing was measured with three items: I enjoy talking to fellow bar owners about

    loopholes in the smoking ban regulations,I enjoy spending time to work out how changes in

    the smoking ban (regulation) will affect me and I enjoy the game of finding ways to evade

    the smoking ban.The answers were given on a five-point scale (1=completely disagree to

    5=completely agree). A higher score indicates more game-playing (M= 2.80, SD= 1.23,

    Cronbachs = .74).

    Background variables

    Economic impact of the smoking ban

    There are indications that bar owners who experience higher costs (for example a loss inturnover) were more inclined to violate the smoking ban (TNS, 2009). The economic impact

    of the smoking ban is measured with four items: The smoking ban results in an increasing

    turnover and the smoking ban results in welcoming new customers, the smoking ban

    results in a lower sale of alcohol in my establishment and the smoking ban results in a

    runaway of major customers to establishments were smoking is allowed. The answers were

    given on a five-point scale (1=completely disagree to 5=completely agree). A higher score

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    indicates a higher economic impact of the smoking ban (M=4.27, SD=0.94, Cronbachs =

    .82).

    Deterrence

    Deterrence was measured with the following statement: If you violate the smoking ban,

    how likely do you think that you would be fined by the NVWA (see Tyler, 1990, 188). The

    answers were given on a five-point scale (1= not at all likely to 5=very likely). A higher score

    indicates a higher perceived probability of getting fined (M=3.05, SD=1.45).

    Social distance

    To check if postures represent social distance two items were included, based on support for

    the regulation (smoking ban) and based on the perception of (dis) respectful treatment by

    the inspection agency. Support for the regulation is measured by asking if one wishes to

    abolish the smoking ban or one wishes to have a more comprehensive and more strict

    smoking ban, without exemptions for small bars.

    Furthermore an item about respectful treatment by the NVWA was added: The NVWA

    treats bar owners with respect. The answers were given on a five-point scale (1=completely

    disagree to 5=completely agree). A higher score indicates a more respectful treatment by

    the NVWA.

    Characteristics of bar owner

    Besides, education, sex, age, personal smoking behavior and the comfort in pointing

    customers at the smoking are also included. A previous study about the smoking ban in the

    Netherlands (also bars), showed that many bar owners find it difficult to point customers at

    the smoking ban. Furthermore, bar owners who smoke, showed less support for the smoking

    (TNS, 2009).

    Differences in bar lay-out and design

    Finally, bar owners were asked if they have a smoking room and if this room is enclosed

    when it is attended by customers. Bars having a smoking room are more inclined to comply

    with the smoking ban (TNS, 2009). Also size had been included in two ways: based on the

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    The results of this analysis revealed that the postures can be regarded as relatively

    independent. We can conclude that bar owners recognize themselves in terms of

    motivational postures and that these scales were relatively independent from each other.

    The same applies here, the factors of commitment and game playing were related on twoout of three items of game playing. Furthermore resistance and game-playing are related on

    one of the items of game playing. To sum up, motivational postures were relatively

    independent of each other, but game-playing and commitment are not cleanly separated

    from each other.

    Table 4Factor analysis differentiating motivational postures (all bars)

    Item Factor

    1 2 3 4 5

    Commitment

    Obeying the smoking ban is a responsibility that should be .79

    Obeying the smoking ban is the right thing to do .77

    I feel a moral obligation to obey to the smoking ban .75

    I accept responsibility for banning smoking in my .64

    I enjoy the game of finding ways to circumvent the smoking -.68 .41 #

    Disengagement

    I dont really know what the NVWA expects of me and Im .74

    I dont care if I am not doing the right thing by the NVWA .74

    I dont care what the NVWA thinks ofme .66

    I personally dont think that there is much the NVWA can do .63Capitulation

    If you cooperate with the NVWA they are likely to be .74

    Even if the NVWA finds that I am doing something wrong .73

    The NVWA is encouraging to those who have difficulties .62

    No matter how cooperative or uncooperative the NVWA is -.41 .55 #

    Resistance

    Once the NVWA branded you as a non-compliant, they will .68

    The NVWA is more interested in catching you for doing the .62

    Im dissatisfied with the practices of the NVWA .49

    Its important not to let the NVWA push you around .44 # .54

    Bars had to take a stand against the NVWA

    Game-playing

    I enjoy talking to friends about loopholes in the smoking ban -.46 .67 #I enjoy spending time to working out how changes in the .66

    Eigenvalues 3.51 2.54 2.08 1.87 1.79

    Explained variance (%) 17.52 12.69 10.39 9.37 8.93

    Principal components factoring with varimax rotation. Only loading >.40 are displayed. Due to space constraints in

    table 1, full wording of items can be found in the participants section of this paper. # denotes cross loadings on

    two factors.

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    Bars with or without food and game-playing

    Braithwaite claims that postures can be used in all regulating contexts in which an authority

    and a regulation are present. Game playing seems strongly related to commitment (more

    game playing indicates less commitment). Game-playing is derived from what Mc Barnett

    calls creative compliance. Creative compliance is about seeing law as material to be

    worked on, to be tailored, regardless of the policy behind it, to ones own or ones clients

    interests (Mc Barnett, 2002: 230). This involves (for example) seeking out the ex-files of law,

    expressing exceptions, with practices to fit them.

    In the case of the Dutch smoking ban, there are exceptions in the law, and one of these

    exceptions is only applicable to specific bars, namely bars without food. Bars where drinking

    is the main source of income, smaller than 70 meters and without employers may apply to

    this exception. This exception can be seen as a grey area in the law that can create confusion

    or space for game playing. The law is more clear for the bars serving food than, than for bars

    without food. Here we ask the question has game playing a better fit when there is a

    greater confusing about the law and subsequent more space for game playing? To answer

    this question a factor analysis is performed (only to answer this specific question), based on

    a subsample of 213 bars without food.4

    The factor analysis showed again a five factor-solution based on commitment, capitulation,

    resistance, disengagement en game-playing. Interestingly, the overlap between game-

    playing and commitment has declined to one item. Contrary to the previous analysis the

    positive loading of this item is stronger than the negative loading on commitment.

    Furthermore, the overlap between resistance and game-playing has disappeared. These

    results indicate that when there is a greater confusion and space for game playing in law

    (based on exceptions), game playing can be cleaner differentiated or separated from other

    motivational postures.

    4(including a 38 bars that can apply to this exception)

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    Table 5Factor analysis differentiating motivational postures (only bars without food)

    Item Factor

    1 2 3 4 5

    Commitment

    Obeying the smoking ban is a responsibility that should be .79

    Obeying the smoking ban is the right thing to do .78

    I feel a moral obligation to obey to the smoking ban .76

    I accept responsibility for banning smoking in my .63

    Disengagement

    I dont care if I am not doing the right thingby the NVWA .76

    I dont really know what the NVWA expects of me and Im .71

    I dont care what the NVWA thinks of me .68

    I personally dont think that there is much theNVWA can do .65

    Capitulation

    The NVWA is encouraging to those who have difficulties .75

    If you cooperate with the NVWA they are likely to be .73

    Even if the NVWA finds that Im doing something wrong .71

    No matter how cooperative or uncooperative the NVWA is .44

    Game playing

    I enjoy talking to friends about loopholes in the smoking ban .78

    I enjoy spending time to working out how changes in the .77

    I enjoy the game of finding ways to circumvent the smoking -.54 .56

    Resistance

    Once the NVWA branded you as a non-compliant, they will .64

    The NVWA is more interested in catching you for doing the .62

    Im dissatisfiedwith the practices of the NVWA .60Its important not to let the NVWA push you around .51

    Bars had to take a stand against the NVWA

    Eigenvalues 3.14 2.47 2.15 1.97 1.88

    Explained variance (%) 15.71 12.35 10.75 9.88 9.41

    Principal components factoring with varimax rotation. Only loading >.40 are displayed. Due to space constraints in

    table 1, full wording of items can be found in the participants section of this paper. # denotes cross loadings on

    two factors.

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    Distributions of postures

    Postures are applicable in the context of the Dutch smoking ban, applicable to bar owners.

    But, how are these postures shared through bar owners? To address this question I followed

    the approach of Braithwaite (2009). When bar owners have a higher score than the midpoint

    of the rating scale (higher than 3) they endorse a posture. The results were presented in

    figure 1.

    The postures of commitment (53%) and resistance (55%) are common among bar owners.

    Game playing is also an common posture of bar owners (41%). The postures capitulation and

    disengagement are less common among bar owners. As you can see these percentages add

    up to more than 198 percent. This is because people can hold multiple postures at one time.

    Figure 1- Postures of bar owners (percentage)

    To make the use of distributions of postures more practically useful I developed an

    additional approach to calculate and present the distribution of motivational postures

    among bar owners. In my approach, that I call dominant postures, each bar owner is

    allocated to one posture. This allocation is based on the highest score on a motivational

    posture. When a bar owner has a score of 4 on commitment and 3 on capitulation, then he is

    classified as a commitment.5This approach makes it possible to show the relative

    5Difference between two postures is 0,10 or more. In case of similar score no dominant posture is assigned.

    41

    25

    55

    25

    53

    0 10 20 30 40 50 60

    Game-playing

    Disengagement

    Resistance

    Capitulation

    Committment

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    importance of specific motivational postures and adds to the practical relevance and

    usability of the posture model. The results of this analysis were presented in figure 2.

    Figure 2

    Dominant postures of bar owners (percentage)

    In accordance with the previous analysis the postures capitulation (5 %) and disengagement

    (5 %) are the least common postures of bar owners. But more interesting, this percentage is

    much lower than one would expect, based on the previous analysis. Based on a total

    percentage of almost 200 percent one would expect that the distribution for each posture

    should be divided by two. This would be the case if the dominance of the postures is equally

    distributed. For capitulation and disengagement one would expect both postures to be

    endorsed by 12 percent of the bar owners. The reason for the much lower percentage is that

    the dominance of the postures is actually not equally distributed. In this case, this means

    that bar owners with scores higher than 3 on capitulation or disengagement (previous

    analysis) often have a second posture with a higher score, the so-called dominant posture.

    Almost one out of two bar owners has commitment as dominant posture. Conversely the

    posture of commitment is more frequent endorsed by bar owners (47 percent) in

    comparison with the expected percentage of 26 percent (53 divided by 2). When a bar

    owner has a score higher than 3 on commitment, than most of the time its also the

    20

    5

    23

    5

    47

    0 10 20 30 40 50

    Game-playing

    Disengagement

    Resistance

    Capitulation

    Committment

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    In accordance with the results of Braithwaite we see that commitment and capitulation

    accompany perceptions that the inspection agency treated the bar owners respectfully

    (r=.34 and r=.53) and that the smoking ban should not be abolished (r=-.69 en r=-.33). The

    interviews were also illustrative and complementary at this point. A typical expression ofcommitment is the following reaction of a bar owner to a more comprehensive smoking ban:

    Thats great!I hope the new legislation (1 July 2014) will bring more clarity and that

    exceptions of the smoking ban are no longer allowed. Furthermore, I hope that everyone will

    simply comply with the smoking ban.

    Capitulation is more about avoiding problems with the regulator than supporting the

    regulation. One of the bar owners said: I once kicked out the NVWA. I will never do that

    again because after that, they came every week and that was a quite bad experience. Its

    best policy to always cooperate with them!

    The results for resistance, disengagement and game-playing are in the opposite direction.

    Bar owners endorsing these postures wish to abolish the smoking ban. This definitely

    concerns bar owners who can be classified as game players (r=.67). Resistance appears to be

    directed at two elements of the regulation: the exception of the smoking ban and the

    question who should be fined for violating the smoking ban. The first element of discontent

    is for instance expressed as: The 70 square meters rule (legal exception of the smoking ban)

    doesnt solve the problems. For example my neighboursbar is smaller than 70 square meters

    and they are allowed to smoke, while we are not. There is totally no logic in this. I know there

    is 70 centilitre in a bottle of wine, but why 70 square meters instead of 100, 120 or 200? The

    second element of discontent can be formulated as: I think its awful that bar owners are

    fined for violating the smoking ban! That would be the same as fining the railway company

    when I smoke on a train. Its an inequality I experience as truly unpleasant.Furthermore

    resistance is also expressed by a critical stance toward the way the regulator conducts its

    inspections: When the NVWA treats you with respect, it makes no sense to fight them. But

    when they dont introduce themselves as inspectors, I find it much more difficult to

    cooperate. I think its quite rude.Disengagement is more about keeping out of contact with

    the regulator instead of voicing discontent (resistance): I dont see any point in discussing

    the smoking ban with the NVWA! In my view, as soon as this legislation is formally

    introduced, it becomes the law.

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    The interviews indicated that game-playing sometimes is with the letter of the law (see

    Ewick & Silby, 1998). For example one bar owner sacked his employees to fit the exception

    of the smoking ban, based on the requirement of not having employees. Another example is

    about bar owners who have decreased their floor space below the 70 square meters rule, forinstance by dividing a bar in two separate bars with two bar owners. However, most of the

    time game playing is outside the law, game playing goes beyond the law. One striking

    example is about bar owners allowing smoking after midnight: Most of the bar owners are

    not particularly clever, but what they do know is when civil servants go home. Then they

    think, the civil servant is sleeping; now I can put the ashtray back on the table. This happens

    especially after midnight. Other methods to evade the inspections by the NVWA are using

    flower vases as ashtrays and warning other bars when inspectors are on patrol.

    Instrumental explanations

    Economic impact is often been viewed as an important variable in the context of smoking

    bans. Commitment and capitulation are related with a lower economic impact (r=-.34 and

    r=-.27), while resistance (r=.28), disengagement (r=.15) and game playing (r=.40) are related

    to a higher (or experienced) economic impact. For deterrence the same pattern follows.

    Commitment and capitulation are characterized by a lower perceived chance getting caught

    (r=-.43 and r=-.25) while resistance (r=.33), disengagement (r.=.16) en game playing (.40) are

    related to a higher perceived chance of getting caught. In general, instrumental explanations

    are the most important for game-playing (+) and commitment (-). The weakest relationship

    between instrumental explanations and postures is found for disengagement. This is an

    indication that disengagement may reflect a more principal dissatisfaction not only based on

    costs and benefits or deterrence.

    Table 7 - Characteristics of bar owners (instrumental variables)

    Characteristic Commitment Capitulation Resistance Disengagement Game playing

    Economic impact

    (higher)

    -.34 ** -.27 ** .28 ** .15 ** .40 **

    Deterence

    (higher)

    -.43 ** -.25 ** .33 ** .16 ** .40 **

    * p

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    Characteristics of bar owners

    Commitment and capitulation are related to non-smoking of bar owners, while resistance,

    disengagement and game-playing are significantly related to smoking of bar owners. The

    education level of bar owners looks higher for commitment, while resistance and game

    playing represent a lower education of bar owners.

    Table 8 - Characteristics of bar owners (social demographic)

    Characteristic Commitment Capitulation Resistance Disengagement Game playing

    Smoking (no) .20 ** .14 ** -.18 ** -.19 ** -.31 **

    Education (higher) .13 ** .07 -.15 ** -.05 -.16 **

    Sex (female) .02 .04 -.05 -.05 -.10 *

    age -.03 .05 .06 .05 .04

    Pointing customers at smoking ban .47 ** .30 ** -.40 ** -.29 ** -.47 **

    * p

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    The posture of disengagement is related to absence of a smoking room (r=.13). For the other

    postures there is no significant relationship with the presence of absence of a smoking room

    in the establishment. Two items about the smoking room are added to this analysis, based

    on the legislation on this point. Smoking in a smoking room is permitted, but the door of thesmoking room has to be closed. Besides, it is not allowed for employers to serve drinks in the

    smoking room, because of the protection of bar staff to the harmfulness of second-hand

    smoke. Committed bar owners are more inclined to close (if they have a smoking room) their

    smoking room (r=.21), while game players are more inclined to leave the door of the

    smoking room open (r=-.27). The same picture is revealed for serving drinks in the smoking

    room. Committed bar owners are more often inclined to disallow serving drinks in the

    smoking room (r=.23), while game players are more inclined to serve drinks in the smoking

    room (r=-.27).Size is also associated with postures.

    Commitment and capitulation (r=.26 and r=.13) are related with a higher floor space (size),

    while disengagement (r=-.18) and game playing (r=-.18) are associated with a lower floor

    space and smaller establishments. The same pattern is even stronger when the number of

    employees is used as indicator for size. Especially commitment (r=.35) is related to

    establishments with more employers while game playing is related to smaller establishments

    with less employers (r=.-.31).

    POSTURES AND SELF-REPORTED COMPLIANCE

    Based on the analysis thus far, it may be argued that postures are applicable both outside

    Australia and in relation to the smoking ban. To test if the postures are actually related to

    (non-) compliance two analyses are performed: correlation and a regression analysis. The

    correlation analysis correspondents with the way postures have been analyzed in general.

    This technique is quite weak in terms of causality. Therefore a more strict and elaborate

    technique, regression analysis, also had been performed.6The advantage of this approach is

    that it controls for rival explanations. This result supports the findings of other scholars.

    6Structural equation models are even more elaborated to study causal relations, but for aims of this research

    this had not been applied.

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    capitulation, is still related to the self-reported compliance of bar owners, indicating that bar

    owners with a higher score on commitment show a higher self-reported compliance.

    Resistance (=-.09; p

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    bar owners in this study is almost identical to the official levels of observed compliance7

    (Intraval, 2012).8

    CONCLUSION

    The aim of this paper was to understand and to explain differences in (non-) compliance with

    the smoking ban in Dutch bars. The results show that five relatively independent postures

    can be distinguished for bar owners. Moreover, this study supports the claim that postures

    reflect social distance, based on differing attitudes to abolishing the smoking ban and

    perceived treatment by the NVWA.

    This study supports the claim that postures are applicable to every context were a regulation

    and regulator (or respective authority) are present. Furthermore, postures are related to

    compliance, even when controlled for instrumental explanations and other important

    background variables. Four out of five postures are related to (non-) compliance.

    Commitment is related to a higher self-reported compliance and resistance, disengagement

    and game playing are related to a lower self-reported compliance.

    7

    Observed compliance means in this case the presence of smoking in bars (yes or no).8In this study 64 % of the bar owners reported compliance,. Intraval (2012) observed 61% compliance with the

    smoking ban in the Netherlands.

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