command and control canadian armed forces of tomorrow ... · drdc-rddc-2016-r144 i abstract the...

Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T) Scoping study synthesis

Micheline Bélanger DRDC – Valcartier Research Centre

Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Report DRDC-RDDC-2016-R144 August 2016

IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS This work was conducted as part of the project 05cb – Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T).

Template in use: (2010) SR Advanced Template_EN (051115).dotm

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2016

© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2016

DRDC-RDDC-2016-R144 i

Abstract

The Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T) project is a scoping activity to identify the research and development areas to improve the command and control (C2) of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), principally at the operational level of operations. This report presents an overview of the C2CAF-T scoping study findings, starting with a refinement of the C2 gaps and needs at the operational level of command. Following a review of decision-making and decision support concepts that would allow CAF to be more efficient, flexible and adaptable, it proposes to develop a new research and development (R&D) project related to the management of the battlespace. Intended to support the development of a Joint Battlespace Management Capability (JBMC), it focusses on the challenges associated with the development of Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) situational awareness and courses of actions as well as the planning and the management of battlespace at the operational level in such context.

Significance to defence and security

The results of this work will contribute to inform the Chief Force Development (CFD) as well as CAF about the areas of R&D required to fulfill existing and anticipated C2 gaps in the conduct of future operations. By conducting those R&D activities, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) will develop evidences to provide advices to CAF on the value to include or not the most advanced concepts, approaches and tools for the battlespace awareness and management. CFD and the Joint Information and Intelligence Fusion Capability (JIIFC) Project would benefit from these advices in the planning and implementation of new decision support functionalities in the future versions of the CAF JBMC.

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Résumé

Le projet de Commandement et contrôle pour les Forces armées canadiennes de demain est une activité de délimitation de la portée visant à déterminer les domaines de recherche et développement (R-D) permettant d’améliorer le commandement et contrôle (C2) des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC), principalement au niveau opérationnel. Ce rapport présente une vue d’ensemble des conclusions de l’étude de délimitation et débute par une clarification des lacunes et besoins en C2 au niveau opérationnel. Après un examen des concepts de prise de décision et d’aide à la décision qui permettraient aux FAC d’être plus efficaces, flexibles et adaptables, on propose d’élaborer un nouveau projet de gestion de l’espace de bataille. Afin de soutenir le développement d’une capacité interarmées de gestion de l’espace de bataille, ce projet est centré sur les défis associés au développement d’un éveil situationnel et de plans d’action, ainsi que sur la planification et la gestion d’un espace de bataille de niveau opérationnel dans un contexte interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public.

Importance pour la défense et la sécurité

Les résultats de ce travail contribueront à informer le Chef du Développement des forces et les FAC dans les domaines de R-D nécessaires pour combler les lacunes actuelles et éventuelles en C2 des opérations futures. Ces activités de R-D permettront à Recherche et développement pour la défense - Canada (RDDC) de compiler des données probantes dans le but de fournir des avis aux FAC sur le besoin d’intégrer ou non les concepts, approches et outils les plus avancés pour l’éveil situationnel et la gestion de l’espace de bataille. Le Chef du Développement des forces et le projet de capacité de fusion de l’information et du renseignement interarmées (CFIRI) pourraient tirer profit de ces avis dans la planification et la mise en application de nouvelles fonctionnalités d’aide à la décision pour le développement futur de la capacité de gestion de l’espace de bataille interarmées des FAC.

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Table of contents

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Significance to defence and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Résumé . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Importance pour la défense et la sécurité . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Table of contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii List of figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

List of tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 C2 Gaps and needs / requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1 Findings from the lessons learned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2 Exercise observed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.3 Senior leadership inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.4 Leveraging on previous DRDC activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.5 In summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3 Identification of decision-making and decision support concepts . . . . . . . . . 12

3.1 Information and decision advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.2 C2 Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3.3 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3.4 Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3.5 Battlespace management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.6 Social Media (SM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.7 Visualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.8 Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.9 Collaboration and reach back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.10 Mission assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3.11 Risk / Opportunity management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.12 Red teaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.13 War-gaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3.14 Fusion of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3.15 C2 assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.16 Areas of interest not covered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3.16.1 Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3.16.2 Comprehensive approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3.17 Drivers for change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.18 In summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4 CAF baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

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5 Support to information management dimension in CAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

6 New project proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

6.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

6.2 New project goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

6.3 Project workplan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

6.4 Exploitation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

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List of figures

Figure 1: Joint Mission / Operational C2 framework [3]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Figure 2: Capstone construct [8]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Figure 3: Battlespace management relationships [26]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Figure 4: JDL model [38]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Figure 5: Integration strategy [56]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Figure 6: CPOF installation at DRDC – Valcartier Research Centre [57]. . . . . . . 34

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List of tables

Table 1: Leadership attributes identified in the literature [31]. . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Table 2: Constraints mapped to different C2 event types [42]. . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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Acknowledgements

The author wants to thank the Chief Force Development team, RAdm Hawco, Col Cook, LCdr Henry, Maj Kvas, as well as the Joint Information and Intelligence Fusion Capability (JIIFC) project team for their time and support in the conduct of the project Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T). The author also want to acknowledge the contribution of the different C2CAF-T team members, who have contributed to the identification of the C2 requirements as well as the different areas of interest for the conduct of a new research and development project to improve the C2 at the operational level.

The C2CAF-T members from DRDC – Valcartier Research Centre includes:

– Abder Sahi;

– Bruce Forrester;

– Denis Poussart;

– Marie-Josée Marcoux;

– Marielle Mokhtari;

– Mark Eldridge;

– Mohamad Allouche;

– Nicolas Léchevin;

– Normand Pageau; and

– Valérie Lavigne.

The C2CAF-T members from DRDC – Toronto Research Centre includes:

– Angela Febbraro;

– Keith Stewart;

– Marie-Eve Jobidon;

– Megan Thompson; and

– Tara Holton.

The C2CAF-T members from DRDC – CORA Research Centre includes:

– Patricia Moorhead; and

– Sandy Babcock.

The C2CAF-T members from Director General (Science and Technology) Joint Force Development team includes:

– Richard Wagner; and

– Stéphane Paradis.

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DRDC-RDDC-2016-R144 1

1 Introduction

The intent of the Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T) project is to scope and define a new Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) project to improve the command and control (C2) of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), principally at the operational level of operations. While the direct clients of C2CAF-T are Chief Force Development (CFD) and Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management) (ADM(IM)), the project was primarily looking at improving C2 at Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and Joint Task Force (JTF). Organizations such as 1st Canadian Division (1CAD), Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) could also benefit from it.

The Director General Cyber (DG Cyber) Force Development intermediate outcome identified for the project was: “The CAF employs improved C2 through an adaptable and interoperable defence information sharing and collaboration environment that achieves exercise of authority and direction over assigned, allocated and attached forces; and management of force and orchestration of effects and outcomes in response to government direction” [1]. Following discussions with members of CFD at the beginning of the project, it has been decided to focus the effort on the challenges associated with the different functions of the command team [2]. As presented in the Figure 1, the command team’s functions include:

– Lead – the ability of the commander to achieve common intent, inspire, motivate, build relationships and trust at all levels, engage when and where needed, balance risks and opportunities, and make rapid, effective decisions with a comprehensive understanding of mission assurance;

– Coordinate – the ability of commander and staff to manage and integrate information within a complex Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) battlespace, across the full spectrum of missions;

– Plan and Organize – the ability of the commander and staff to use information advantage to develop, evaluate and select Courses of Actions (COAs), and to identify key decision points and possible contingencies;

– Direct – the ability of the commander to issue orders and instructions to those with a role in mission accomplishment; and

– Control – the ability to continuously monitor, assess the situation and progress, and orchestrate and deconflict the battlespace to achieve desired effects.

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Figure 1: Joint Mission / Operational C2 framework [3].

The C2CAF-T project charter [4] identifies a set of project deliverables, which constitute a list of potential areas for C2 improvement at the operational level. Some of these deliverables are already being addressed by other projects conducted under different portfolios. For those, it was decided to leverage from:

– Land Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Computers Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance / Electronic Warfare (Land Tactical C4ISR/EW) project (expected end date in March 2019) for:

– Scoping of mobility issues with recommendations for future implementation activities; and

– Identifying emerging C2 technologies to facilitate widely distributed headquarters formations in the future;

– Joint Intelligence Collection and Analysis Capability (JICAC) project (expected end date in March 2019) for:

– Scoping on C2I information exchange requirements;

– Prototype system architectures to support data and information management and exchange;

– Developing comprehensive and integrated direction collection processing and dissemination strategies to respond to Requests for Information, including cueing and tasking across all defence intelligence disciplines; and

– Tools to promote shared Situational Awareness (SA) amongst collaborators and to facilitate the circulation of discoveries and information amongst collaborators; and


– Assured Communications in Challenging and Contested Environments project. However, since this project was ended before its completion, the following deliverable will not be completed:

– Validated concepts and techniques to support robust and resilient communications in Arctic and remote regions; and

– Validated concepts, techniques and policy recommendations for the integration of advanced spectrum access technologies into operations.

The High-Level Deliverables (HLDs) extracted from the project charter that C2CAF-T has focussed on are:

– Scoping on the future production of concept papers on information and decision advantage for potential application for increasing the speed and effectiveness of decision-making;

– Leveraging existing Science and Technology (S&T) on human factors and leadership for potential application to enhance trust and collaboration in decision-making;

– Surveying senior leadership on C2 gaps and needs in order to establish vectors for future S&T;

– Scoping of future investigation of existing (industry solutions) and emerging new solutions related to information fusion and predictive analysis tools, with potential experimentation;

– Scoping of concepts and solutions for network enabled expertise search, reach back and collaboration capabilities for command support;

– Scoping of future collaborative planning tools, COA evaluations and development tools and techniques, war gaming, red teaming (including leveraging of existing S&T);

– Scoping a Technology Demonstration activity on how to holistically integrate battlespace management, for maximum effectiveness (Integrated Activity), with Commander and staff orchestrating different force elements, to provide synergies, balancing risks with opportunities;

– Providing direct S&T support to the implementation of the Joint Battlespace Management Capability (JBMC) capability, including Canadian Forces Warfare Centre (CFWC), and DRDC Joint Fires and Battlespace Deconfliction activities; and

– Support ADM(IM) in their activities of Defence IM/Information Technology (IT) Governance, Strategic Plans, Life Cycle Cost Analysis.

This report presents an overview of the work conducted during the execution of this project: Chapter 2 describes the C2 Gaps and needs / requirements; Chapter 3, the decision-making and decision support concepts investigated; Chapter 4, the approach proposed to leverage the CAF baseline for the implementation of a C2 Research and Development (R&D) project; Chapter 5, the support that has been provided to ADM(IM); and Chapter 6, a new project proposal.


2 C2 Gaps and needs / requirements

C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned, allocated and attached forces [5]. It is the establishment of a common intent to achieve coordinated actions [6]. The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) recognizes that a credible C2 capability is essential to underpin operational success [7].

At the enterprise level, C2 shapes the force, determining the purpose of the organization, its priorities, and ultimately its capabilities. At the mission level, C2 is about employing the organization assets for the identification and pursuit of mission specific objectives. C2 has a key role of integration:

– It involves the orientation and integration of Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance activities of the functional domain of Sense to enhance decision-making; and

– It links up the strategic functional domains of Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain, and Generate to efficiently identify and integrate the effects produced by the different environmental domains (Traditional environmental domains of Maritime, Army, Air, as well as the new environmental domains of Space, Cyber and Human) (as presented in the Figure 2) [8].

Figure 2: Capstone construct [8].

The Force Capability Plan 2014 identified the following C2 high-level capabilities for investment:

– Fuse and exploit information;

– Create situational awareness;

– Conduct collaborative planning;

– Assess effects and outcomes;

– Decide and execute;

– Cross domain information sharing; and

– Mobile computing.


In 2015, CFD identified the following list of S&T requirements in order of priorities [9]:

– The analysis of the information and the presentation of the analyzed information to improve understanding of complex situations in support of timely decision-making in a joint context;

– More intelligent decision support;

– Decision support for the conduct of prioritized targeting of an adversary;

– Tools to support the execution of operations for the monitoring of operations, the management of risk and opportunities in real-time as well as the evaluation of effects and the prediction of the outcomes;

– C2 concepts, processes and tools that support agility in operations, as well as the use of asymmetric force against an adversary;

– Understanding the JIMP context as well as how to operate when dealing with a diversity of actors, considering the impact of different organizational objectives as well as cultural, social and organizational behaviours on operations, and the need to develop and maintain trust with partners of different chains of command or not;

– Intelligence informed C2 processes;

– The efficiency of collaborative approaches and tools;

– The identification of potential contributions from different partners/environmental domains (AF, Maritime, Army, Cyber, Space, Information, Other Government Departments (OGD), asymmetric), the understanding of the interaction/relation between these entities and the operationalization of their integration in a complex environment; and

– The identification of the right level of autonomy of information systems that is acceptable/ desirable in operation.

To satisfy some of these requirements, the Joint Information & Intelligence Fusion Capability (JIIFC) project will deliver a C2 support capability which focusses on the provision of SA to the operational commander for the dynamic synchronization, prioritization and deconfliction of activities. In support of the roll-out of the JBMC planned for 2017, DG Cyber identifies three (3) areas where initiatives will be conducted to resolve some of the missing elements of the JIIFC Project [10]. Accordingly, in January 2016, the intention of the CAF director C4ISR was to invest in:

– Mission Planning, Targeting & Strategic Management Capability;

– C2 Operational Support Information; and

– Unclassified JIMP Collaborative Support Capability.

2.1 Findings from the lessons learned

Unclassified lessons learned documents pertaining to six (6) CAF operations were reviewed to identified issues that happened in the past and the solutions found at that time [11]. Three (3) of these six (6) operations were domestic, and three (3) (including an exercise) were expeditionary in nature. The operations reviewed covered different types of missions, including major events, disaster relief, and combat operations.


For each operation reviewed, relevant lessons learned were retrieved from the CAF database and collated. The research team scanned them by looking for lessons learned pertaining to agility. The

extracted lessons learned were then associated with the different command team functions [12] as potential conditions for C2 agility improvements. The following paragraphs present the main

findings of this effort.

The lead function can enable operational agility by the implementation of:

– Relationship built prior to the mission; – Appropriate exposure to partners’ organizational context and culture; – Personnel stability (limited rotation and replacement of personnel); – Liaison function; – Mission command philosophy; – Command presence; and – Facilitation of OGDs’ integration in the military team.

The coordinate function can enable operational agility by the implementation of:

– Good and regular interactions amongst all contributors of an operation (which include the different levels of command (strategic, operational and tactical), the varying command elements as well as OGD and public domain);

– More coordination amongst and with OGD; – Appropriate exploitation of social media; and – Continuous shared situation awareness for all partners.

The planning function can enable operational agility by the implementation of:

– Harmonization of priorities between the different levels of command (e.g., between the operational level and the tactical level);

– Integration of mission partners early in the planning cycle; – Operational planning process synchronization amongst all mission partners; – Contingency planning; and – Matching the availability of resources with the operational (level) plans.

The organize function can enable operational agility by the implementation of:

– Collectively clear delineated and understanding of command structures of the various partners;

– Collectively clear definitions of concepts of operations, standard operating procedures, and roles and responsibilities of the various partners;

– Collectively clear understanding of lines of authority; – Assignment of the right person in the right job; and

– Integration of military Liaison Officers within Whole of Government (WoG) operation centre.


The direct function can enable operational agility by the implementation of:

– An adequate balance of top-down and bottom-up communication;

– Production of clear and unequivocal taskings;

– Timely dissemination of orders and fragmentary orders; and

– Dissemination of mission-type orders and warnings.

The control function can enable operational agility by the implementation of:

– Good synchronization of battle rhythm and operational tempo; and

– Continuous assessment of the levels of effort/resources required for the conduct the operation as well as for the conduct of the organization.

2.2 Exercise observed

To gain better insight into the operational level of C2, exercise “Determined Dragon” (from 28 October and 1 November 2013) was observed at the CJOC. Focussing on the J3 Continental team, the following observations related to efficiency and agility were made [13]:

– Verbal transfer of information can benefit from being supported by artefacts, reducing the risk of information loss;

– Cascading meetings should be carefully managed to avoid duplication of effort and alteration or distortion of the message;

– Reduction of intermediate in the transmission of information by using support tools such as Command View can reduce potential sources of error in the messages, however, require additional effort to reduce different interpretations;

– To be fully effective technology support tools should be available to everyone in order to give real-time access to information to everyone that needs it;

– A formal delegation of authority may help decisions to be made at appropriate lower levels and increase decision-making efficiency and speed;

– Trust and quality of personal relationships appeared to be critical to team functioning. Standard operating procedures can compensate for lower quality in interpersonal relationships amongst team members and support efficient teamwork;

– An efficient global information management process should be cross-organization and cross-level (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical), and should be known by everyone involved;

– Behaviours, such as verifying members’ understanding, are helpful in maintaining situation awareness and supporting efficient team functioning;

– Team meeting encouraging approaches such as critical thinking can be helpful in mitigating human decision-making biases;

– Leaders approach highlighting good points, offering constructive comments, and generally providing guidance to the team contribute to overall positive leadership; and


– Technology/tools can facilitate teamwork and support discussion, situation analysis, scheduling and share situation awareness.

Over the course of the exercise, the following agility enablers were identified:

– Self-monitoring and self-assessment (as an example, the J3 Continental team was performing daily informal self-monitoring of overall team performance);

– Trust and good interpersonal relationships between team members; and

– Constructive leadership (as an example, J3 leaders highlighted good points, offered constructive comments, and generally provided guidance to the team).

The observations also revealed two (2) main agility barriers:

– Lack of access to a common system (in this case Command View), which could potentially impact distribution of information and situation awareness; and

– The delegation of authority was not always brought at the lowest possible level for greater potential agility.

2.3 Senior leadership inputs

CAF members at different levels of the organization have their own understanding of the existing gaps related to C2. Leveraging informal and opportunistic discussions with members of CAF as well as civilian organizations, general areas subject to potential R&D effort have been identified as [14]:

– Describing the future C2 environment;

– Shaping operational art to allow an operational command to anticipate, prepare, shape, conduct, and command multiple, simultaneous, distinct, and dispersed operations in a variety of theatres and embedded within multiple campaign plans;

– WoG/JIMP/ Defence, Diplomacy, Development;

– Headquarter (HQ) effectiveness, agility and mobility; and

– Tools and enablers.

Based on the diversity of opinions concerning C2 gaps and requirements, it was deemed appropriate to better understand what the General/Flag Officers (GOFO) identified as the most important C2 challenges, needs and gaps in the current and future security environment. To get that input, a person with a technology background and a person with a human dimension background met sixteen (16) GOFO individually for a one (1) to two (2) hours semi-formal discussion (face-to-face or via teleconference). The analysis of the discussions led to the identification of nine (9) themes of interest [15]:

– Battlespace management;

– Battlespace preparation and planning;

– C2 systems;

– Exchange of information;


– New and emerging environmental domains and capabilities;

– Operating concept of C2;

– Operating in a WoG, multinational and public context;

– SA and situational understanding; and

– Targeting.

The interdependence between these themes, as revealed in these discussions, is an evidence of the complexity and interconnectedness that is associated with C2. Furthermore, human, technological, and process components with their implications for doctrine and training were found to be interrelated in most of the discussions. Finally, it is important to mention that the results of this study must be interpreted with caution since these findings do not constitute an exhaustive list of C2 challenges, gaps or needs, nor a prioritized list.

2.4 Leveraging on previous DRDC activities

DRDC has been conducting R&D in the area of C2 for the last 25 years. Accordingly, based on discussions with CFD staff, it was thought that some of the previous work was of interest to the different CAF C2 initiative conducted at the operational level. A list of previous R&D activities was presented to CFD’s staff, who identified the most interesting ones based on their current initiatives. A workshop was organized in NDHQ on the 09–10 March 2015 to foster discussions about R&D needs. CAF participants in attendance included:

Cmdre Hawco, D. CFD – DGCyber; Cdr MacDonald, D. CFD – DGCyber/DC4ISR/SSO CapDev; LCol Bernard , S. SJS – Current Operations; Maj Kvas, P. CFD – DGCyber/DC4ISR/C2; Maj Masnyk , D. CJOC – J5 Continental; Maj Bedard, G. CJOC – J5 Middle-East; Maj Funk, S. CA – DLFD 5-4; LCol McKinnon, D. CJOC – J5; and Maj Noel, S. SJS.

The agenda of the workshop included the following topics:

– A prototype to support tactical planning and execution management using an Army based scenario. A set of decision support capabilities for in-theatre logistics planning and sustain missions was also introduced;

– A prototype to support commanders and senior staff officers on the move or with limited connectivity. Designed to work on a smart phone or handheld device, that prototype allows access to SA and planning information, receive real-time notification, collaborate with their staff, provide online guidance and directives, receive briefings, make decisions and approve documents;

– Tools to support the operational design of an operation:

– Centre of Gravity Analysis Tool – To support planners in their brainstorming to identify the relationship between critical elements (Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements


(CR), Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)) influencing friendly as well as adversary centres of gravity (COGs). It leads to the sketching of a first iteration of Decisive Points (DP); and

– DP Analysis Tool – To support the planners in their brainstorming to sequence DP into lines of operations and to identify operational phases with their associated objectives and tasks. It provides the grounds to initiate the thinking required to identify possible branch plans and/or sequel plans where transition conditions are desired;

– An integrated flexible suite of planning, decision-aid and workflow management tools aimed at supporting distributed military planning processes such as the Canadian Operational Planning Process (OPP);

– DRDC initiatives supporting non-kinetic targeting and information operations:

– Socio-cultural intelligence support to Joint Tactical Targeting (JTT) – To enhance the ability of the CAFs to gain an asymmetric advantage in the Information Environment through integrated and synchronized JTT;

– Attack the network – To enhance the ability of the CAF to better appreciate the human environment / socio-cognitive aspects of the “left-of-boom” space and enable robust pre-event interdiction;

– Micro target (psychological) profiling – Validate a tool that will allow Influence Activities (IA) personnel to effectively conduct psychological profiling in support of the planning and execution of the broad range of IA;

– Macro target (sociocultural) profiling – Develop an analytical method that will allow intelligence analyst personnel to gain an enhanced understanding of the socio-cultural context in order to better plan and conduct IA;

– Non-kinetic targeting effects and risk estimate – To provide CAF with a structured and replicable methodology to support the identification and management of effects and risks associated with non-kinetic engagement, in particular but not limited to casualties and damage to infrastructure that may result in harm, injury or undue hardship and suffering to civilian / non-combatant populations (i.e., non-kinetic Collateral Damage Estimation);

– Threat network disruption – Develop and validate models, approaches and techniques to effectively disrupt the human element of threat networks using non-kinetic interventions; and

– Adversarial intent / asymmetric threat analysis using social media exploitation;

– A set of tools to support the collaborative understanding of complex situations:

– OPP handbook for interagency planners;

– Team building and handover procedure;

– Common interactive glossary;

– Integrated mission analysis briefing template;

– Collaborative knowledge representation;

– Operational design tool;


– Integrated mission analysis briefing template; and – Cross impact method;

– A set of tools to support collaboration and interactive visualization: – Visual analytics for maritime domain awareness; and – Social network analysis for counterinsurgency operations;

– Products from the Comprehensive Approach Training Toolkit (CATT) to support CAF in the comprehensive approach to operations: – Tools for the preparation of operations, which familiarize the user with their

comprehensive approach counterparts (“who’s who”) as well as facilitate understanding of the relationship they may have with one another in theatre;

– Tools for the development of specific communication and relationship skills required when working with other players in the comprehensive approach field;

– An acronym and terminology database; – A quick reference guide comparing the Results Based Management planning process

and the OPP; – Lists and links to relevant documents, models; – Links to relevant courses and software programs; – Comprehensive approach lessons learned database; and – Links to in-theatre resources.

Workshop discussions led to the identification of specific areas of interest from different CAF organizations. CJOC and CA representatives were interested in the tools providing support to the Operational Planning Process, COG Analysis and the Operational Design. CFD/DC4ISR was interested in the OPP Handbook and on the work comparing this handbook with the Results Based Management Handbook, which is used by OGDs. CJOC representative was interested in the acronym and terminology database that incorporates data from across OGDs, the CAF, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)’s and other organizations. These discussions led to exchange of additional information/prototypes on these different items.

2.5 In summary

While acknowledging the existence of C2 specificities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, as well as at different environmental domains, the previous activities allowed the identification of five (5) high-level decision support requirements. They are:

– All domain situational awareness; – Collaborative planning; – Battlespace management; – Targeting; and – Comprehensive approach to operations.


3 Identification of decision-making and decision support concepts

Based on the requirements identified in the previous section, different areas of investigation can be conducted. This section presents the findings of the efforts conducted to identify some of the R&D areas of interest for C2 at the operational level of command.

3.1 Information and decision advantage

In order to be effective in the future operating environment, the CAF aimed at implementing the mission command philosophy towards the Forces [2]. Such a philosophy promotes decentralized decision-making, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. The implementation of mission command philosophy by a chain of command will depend on the “appropriation” of the following tenets by the overall organization:

– The importance of understanding a superior commander’s intent;

– A clear responsibility to fulfill that intent; and

– Timely decision-making.

DRDC has conducted some work [16] to investigate how the concepts of Information Advantage and Decision Advantage can contribute to the efficiency of CAF by supporting the philosophy of mission command. It is believed that, by achieving Information Advantage, commanders will more effectively manage operations. Information Advantage is about improving Battlespace Management (BM) by satisfying the knowledge requirement of commanders quickly and effectively. It requires that the right information get to the commander within an operationally relevant time and within expected quality. Information Advantage will provide improved synchronization between and within the strategic, operational and tactical levels. IT and IM will enable access, correlation, synthesis and contextualization of a wider range of information more quickly. Such a capability will be used to develop better and a broader range of plans, organize and direct forces more effectively, and coordinate the application of a wider range of national power effects. Through Information Advantage, commanders will expand the time and space available during operations by getting inside the decision loop of an adversary. Then, Decision Advantage will exploit Information Advantage to achieve mission success by enhancing the speed and effectiveness of decision-making. Accordingly, Decision Advantage is designed to support commanders exercising leadership and will involve the capabilities of collaborative planning, situational understanding, decision-making and plan execution.

The future operating environment will require an integrated and comprehensive solution for Joint C4ISR allowing the achievement of Information and Decision Advantage. The implementation of such solution will require further investigation in the following areas [16]:

– Interoperability should be achieved through a Services-Oriented Architecture;

– C4ISR capabilities should be affordable and proactive;

– Sensors and platforms should be connected and will enable SA;


– Interoperable architecture should support data processing, exploitation, fusion and analysis;

– Weapon and data systems should be integrated;

– Human-technology interfaces should be effective;

– Data, information and knowledge should be available to those that need them when they need them;

– Comprehensive approach should lead the conduct of operations; and

– Vulnerabilities and cyber risks associated with operations should be rigorously tracked, assessed and mitigated.

3.2 C2 Agility

All military operations have to deal with unexpected events. In fact, one of the constants that military officers have to face is the impossibility to predict how the situation will evolve. While the time goes by, the objectives, affiliation and capabilities of the different actors (friendly, adversary or neutral) change leading to fuzzy boundaries of the battlefield from different panes (moral, geographical or cyber). Furthermore, the tempo of the evolution of the situation is such that time and information to fully understand the situation can never be obtained.

In such situations where there are never enough resources and/or capacities, military organizations don’t have the choice than to find out and execute, in real-time, different ways and means to achieve the desired end state. Accordingly, CAF have identified that more agile organizations will be required to be responsive to defence and Government of Canada priorities in future security environments [17].

Research and analysis have highlighted that different C2 approaches may be needed to succeed in complex context. In fact, prior work [18] found that in addition to an improvement of performance, entities able to adapt their C2 approach to the current state of the situation are better able to effect, cope with and/or exploit changes in circumstances. It was also highlighted that the ability to adopt multiple C2 approaches has the potential to enhance an entity’s agility. Accordingly, the capability to recognize the characteristics of situations as well as to determine and timely adopt an appropriate approach to C2 must be considered a critical enabler of future mission success.

In its work, the NATO Research Task Group on C2 Agility (SAS-085) [18] has defined the concept of agility as the capability to successfully effect, cope with and/or exploit changes in circumstances. C2 agility has been defined as the capability to identify and execute the C2 approach (e.g., edge C2, collaborative C2, coordinated C2, de-conflicted C2, conflicted C2) that will successfully effect, cope with and/or exploit changes in circumstances.

SAS-104 is currently working to improve NATO, member nation and coalition partners’ C2 agility by conducting four (4) main activities:

– C2 agility evidence gathering by conducting different case studies;

– C2 agility assessment by developing C2 agility assessment tools as well as identifying how to measure enemy agility;


– C2 agility design by investigating how to develop C2 design principles; and

– C2 agility dissemination and explanation by developing related material.

Canada, as one of the members will contribute to the development of SAS-104 outputs, and accordingly, will have access to them.

3.3 Planning

A few years ago, a literature survey [19] was conducted to determine R&D trends in military operational planning and to assess potential tools or models in support of operational art. The bibliometric assessment of R&D trends in tool development was based on a short review of selected doctrinal documents and discussion papers in the field as well as 325 publications on operational planning tools. The major research topics in the domain have been identified using a subject-based analysis of the keywords found in these bibliographic records. It includes:

– Effects-based concepts;

– Visualization, graphical interfaces, displays and conceptual graphs;

– Simulation and modelling, which are linked to games/war-gaming as well as scenarios; and

– Operational art concepts such as CV-CR, COG and performance/effectiveness (including performance measures, metrics and measures of effectiveness).

Generally, the operational planning aspect most supported from a tool development perspective is the COA analysis. The topics identified included:

– Behavioural analysis; – Causal analysis (cause and effect); – Case-based reasoning; – COG analysis; – COA diagrams; – Coloured Petri Nets; – Conceptual graphs; – Critical factor analysis and critical path analysis; – Link analysis; – Prediction and forecasting; – Risk analysis; – Scenario generation and scenario analysis; – Systems of systems analysis; – State space analysis; – Uncertainty analysis; and

– What-if analysis.


The review identified a list of R&D trends for military operational planning, including:

– Tools that facilitates creativity and non-linear planning approaches, allowing more space for humans-in-the-loop;

– Planning processes with more emphasis on framing the problem, causal analysis and on iterations in problem development;

– Adaptive tools that provide modelling and simulation for multiple scenarios or COA;

– Tools should employ multiple models and agents that introduce elements of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (social science models), as well as including non-military instruments (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics) in the COA; and

– The identification of COG and DP remain important in all doctrines, but there should be an emphasis on critical factors analysis through the critical vulnerabilities-critical requirements construct.

More recently, work has been conducted in understanding the challenges associated with planning while having to work with other partners. For example, one of the problems related to planning while being in a coalition is the fact that each nation has its own planning tool. Those tools used their own representation of a plan which can make the exchange of planning information amongst allies time and effort consuming. Usual approaches to improve planning interoperability require that each planning tool develop a specific interface to interact with any other planning tools, which might be costly or not timely achievable in situations of crisis.

The collaborative planning activity under Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) C3I Technical Panel (TP) 1 has investigated how a dynamic plan representation would contribute to the improvement of a shared understanding of the plan and facilitate collaboration amongst the coalition, leading to more timely as well as better coordination of national plans [20]. It was identified that an ontology would be a good approach to represent the contextual aspects that are key to the human understanding of a plan (e.g., analysis elements, issues and assumptions). Furthermore, the ontology reasoning facilities would allow an improvement of the knowledge base in real-time.

However, since it is not likely that all the nations that you may have to work with in the future will build their planning tool using a single ontology, it was decided to conduct a limited experiment using the ontology as an intermediate model between different planning tools. So a planning ontology could be considered for the future of the Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) [21] which intends to achieve international interoperability of Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) from formation to the lowest appropriate level. Accordingly, the collaborative planning activity of TTCP C3I TP1 (Information Exploitation, C2 and Decision Support) decided to demonstrate sharing of plans between a Canadian decision support prototype for the planning of operations, and the NATO operational planning tool using an ontology, the Collaborative Planning Model framework developed within the USA-UK International Technology Alliance programme. Different experiments/demonstrations were conducted in the UK as well as in Canada. While the experiments demonstrated interoperability between planning tools, it also highlighted the following weaknesses:

– Problem of lack of concepts;


– Problem of concept characterization;

– Problem of concept alignment;

– Lack of format specification; and

– Lack of integrity validation.

In addition to the lack of documentation available for some of the tools, these problems were related to the fact that all the functionalities provided by the ontology were not tested. The interest in using an intermediate model is to integrate data from multiple systems thus producing a more comprehensive picture of the reality. However, this method creates other problems such as coherence management induced by conflicting information from different systems, which can be handled by an advanced ontology. The results of this work emphasized the need to conduct additional R&D to support continuous planning amongst different levels of command as well as between allies and partners.

3.4 Prediction

The field of prediction has been investigated from the perspective of benefiting a C2 organization that plans and executes missions at the operational and tactical levels in a JIMP environment [22]. This review of the literature highlights the use of prediction and related topics in various defence and civilian projects and S&T activities. In particular, this review suggested that, while most of the projects related to prediction involve a subset of the following components, namely (i) data collection, processing, and analysis, (ii) modelling, and (iii) human judgment, only a few integrate all of them. Since prediction is involved in anticipating adversarial intent and action, as well as in any option selection based on consequence analysis, it is important to be aware that, no matter the approach used, prediction accuracy tends to deteriorate as the level of structural uncertainty increases with time.

The analysis of the context of C2 at the operational level suggested that efforts should be allocated to the “development of an assistant tool that enhances the cognition of planners in decision-making by means of a cognitive interface, prediction-based courses of action exploration engine starting from planner best guesses, parametric and structural uncertainty exploration to detect plan vulnerabilities, and predictive analysis of coalition’s decisions and actions.” [22]

To operationalize such a vision, additional R&D efforts will be required in the following areas [22]:

– Aggregation of predictive models;

– Simulation for exploration and not for prediction;

– Prediction discourse;

– Prediction-enabled visual tools;

– Blue predictive analytics; and

– Enhanced experimental COAs generation and war-gaming.


3.5 Battlespace management

The new operational context demands an ability to operate at high tempo and with a great deal of agility. The conduct of military operations requires a good understanding of the situation as well as the potential effect(s) that existing capabilities (belonging to us or available to us) can have to modify as well as influence the evolution of the situation according to a desired end state. Functionalities of battlespace awareness and BM are then key to military operations. To understand the multitude of implications that such capabilities involve, it is important to define some of the key concepts, such as:

– Battlespace [22] – “The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power, protect a force or complete a mission successfully. It includes: the land, maritime, air and space environments; the enemy and friendly forces present therein; facilities; terrestrial and space weather; health hazards; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment in the joint operations area and other areas of interest”;

– Battlespace Awareness [24] – “Knowledge and understanding that enable timely, relevant, comprehensive and accurate assessments in order to successfully apply combat power, protect the force and/or complete the mission”; and

– BM [25] – “The means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronization, prioritization and de-confliction of activity across all dimensions of an assigned area of operations within the battlespace. It comprises dimensions of land, sea, air and space, electromagnetic spectrum, information and time”.

To enable the management of the battlespace, technology can provide visibility over a wide operational area. This involves challenges related to elements below [26]:

– SA – SA needs to be achieved at all levels for all the contributors. Accordingly, development of individual or shared SA is a real challenge considering a JIMP context considering a potential of divergence in strategic and operational goals which will directly affect effective and timely decision-making through lack of unity of actions, trust as well as mutual understanding;

– The coordination of the different partners – It involves establishing the organizational structure, planning the different activities, communicating as well as aligning the activities of the different actors;

– Synchronization of efforts in function of the required operational tempo – Based on the schedules and synchronization matrices developed during the planning phase, the detection and the development of a response to a synchronization failure need to be done in real-time while considering a set of situational constraints that are contributor dependent and evolve over time, space and purpose; and

– Prioritization of the efforts to take into account the finite number of resources and their current capabilities.

As it is presented in the Figure 3, the BM activity can never be considered in isolation. Accordingly, the level of complexity associated with the management of the overall battlespace raises many challenges which lead to the identification of the following research areas [26]:


– The most effective and efficient approach to be applied to the appropriate situation;

– The coalition to operate in a strategic security environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change and persistent conflict; and

– The provision of guidance on the design of enablers including technology.

3.6 Social Media (SM)

Social Media (SM) can be considered as a new capability to support C2. Despite the multitude of methodological issues surrounding the exploitation of SM data, it is believed that SM constitute a source of information required for sound decision-making as well as an opportunity for international collaboration and the sharing of services between friendly allies [27]. A first attempt to identify how C2 concepts or principles can be supported by SM led to the following elements [27]:

– For coordination:

– SM can contribute to the coordination of vision development by large groups of followers through peer production using Wikis and the “wisdom of crowds” concepts;

– Coordination is a common function facilitated by SM tools such as microblogs and location tools as well as event tools;

– For communication:

– SM tools excel at allowing communications to flow in real time or asynchronously. Social networking, blogs, microblogs, questions and answers (Q&A), discussion and forums all can contribute to this communication function which is an important aspect of leadership;

– For SA:

– Shared SA is achieved by first creating and maintaining a single authoritative source of data which reflects the needs of commanders and staff. The picture that is developed is sometimes referred to as a common operating picture. The idea of a wiki is a perfect location for the Common Operating Picture (COP). Combined with Q&A and discussion forums, personnel could easily discuss and work out misunderstandings that would then be readily available for others to read;

– For military planning:

– SM tools such as discussion forums, wikis, Q&A, social gaming, and location apps would be useful to support military planning and organizing which usually involves many inputs from dispersed units;

– For direction:

– The inherent nature of SM is that they are social – based on human activity. The fact that they can be used with mobile devices and can update in real-time means that agility and adaptability are enabled through their use; It also means that commanders can quickly and easily provide direction and receive feedback and updates to allow for freedom of action;


– For a JIMP context:

– Having a COP is particularly important when exercising the comprehensive approach to operations where unity of effort will be a key success factor. Only when all decision makers have a common mental model can they achieve their common objectives. Again, SM tools have been created to share information and understanding between people using text, pictures, videos etc.;

– SM tools are commercial and hence are easily acquired by NGOs as well as allies; certainly plugging into the internet would not be a problem; security issues would need to be addressed in this case.

There are thousands of working and suitable SM tools that could be used today to enhance C2. Challenges to a potential implementation of this capability enhancer are mainly related to: 1) the potential cultural impacts of such approaches, and 2) the issue of interoperability and security. Furthermore, current engineering and empirical challenges surrounding SM are associated with the computing power required to monitor and analyze large amounts of data produced by SM, the acquisition of the rights and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) required to access the existing “data fire hose” as well as the challenges associated with the natural language processing and machine learning that are required for analysis and understanding.

3.7 Visualization

Work has been conducted to investigate how visualization can support C2. Some of the challenges associated with the visualization related to C2 include the elements below [28]:

– All domains SA – The ability to visualize the battlespace and develop a clear understanding of the current state of friendly forces and other partners in relation to the enemy and environment is key to a commander [2]. The integration of all the different perspectives that are often environment specific (land, navy, air, information, cyber, human) is key to the conduct of the operations;

– Temporal evolution – The highest level of SA will involve the understanding of the battle dynamics over time and space; and

– Visualization of plans – To support the orientation and course of action development phases of the OPP, the visualization of a plan cannot be limited to the representation of a list of tasks in time. It requires the ability to represent the different elements that affect the situation in relation to the plan as well as the different types of achievements (e.g., objectives, decisive points, outcomes) that the plan needs to implement, and the evolution of the status of these achievements in time. Furthermore, considering the interrelation amongst the different plans involved in an operation (national or in a coalition), it is important to support the visualization of different plans at different levels of abstraction as well as the relationship amongst them.

The concept of user defined operating picture was proposed to overcome some of the limitations that COPs present [29]. However to fulfill these requirements, further R&D should be conducted on:


– Spatial visualization of temporal situation evolution (using either comparative visualization, a three-dimensional (3D) representation with time as the Z axis or small miniatures);

– New environments (space, cyber and human terrain) COPs representation and integration;

– Multi-level plan interconnection visualization and execution monitoring;

– Hypothesis management capability; and

– Adaptive intelligent interfaces.

Furthermore, to face the challenges associated with big data problems, the NATO group on Visualization for Analysis (NATO IST-110) suggest to the integration of agile and effective visual analytic capabilities [30].

3.8 Leadership

In the literature reviewed [31], leadership was indicated as a key behaviour impacting most of the other areas of interest such as collaboration, mission assurance, risk and vulnerability analysis. The diversity of operations that the military officers may have to be involved in as well as the uncertainty regarding the context in which these operations may have to evolve in make it very difficult to determine the type of knowledge and skills that would be required by the military leaders. Two (2) different levels of military context influence leadership processes: 1) the institutional and 2) the environmental. While the first one relates to factors associated with the profession of arms, the second refers to the operating environments that the military forces have to operate. Much of the literature reviewed referred to the second one.

Work [31] published on leadership in dangerous or extreme contexts identified that leaders’ ability to adaptively respond to the situation can be impacted by the five following dimensions: location in time; magnitude of consequences; probability of consequences; physical or psychosocial proximity; form of threat. Some work [31] on leadership and team dynamics for dangerous military contexts identified that the leadership approach (pragmatic leadership, individualized leadership, shared leadership) to be used depends on the context and leaders need to balance and integrate the three (3) leadership approaches. Other works [31] identified that one of the key roles of the leader is to organize ambiguity. To do so, they need to engage in three (3) interactive processes: 1) identify what is important and what is not (framing), 2) develop assumptions about the level of risk (heedful interrelating), and 3) be prepared for a change in action if assumptions prove to be wrong (adjusting). Leadership processes associated with framing are direction setting and knowledge; Leadership processes and tasks associated with heedful interrelating are talk, role acting, role modelling and trust; Leadership processes and tasks associated with adjusting are SA and agility. Finally, leaders’ sense-giving is important to help the team understanding unfolding circumstances and leaders’ cognitive/affective multifaceted self-concept will facilitate adaptation to the situation varying role demands.

Work published [31] on distributed team leadership (collective/shared leadership) suggests that teams with more than one (1) leader seem to report higher levels of collective efficacy and transactive memory systems. Though distributed leadership can be associated with positive team outcomes, we still don’t know the best environments for implementing distributed leadership.


Some work [31] published on leadership styles argues that most effective leaders will use the leadership style that is the most appropriate to the situation.

Table 1 presents the leadership attributes that impact mission success according to the literature reviewed.

Table 1: Leadership attributes identified in the literature [31].

Work published on factors impacting leadership [31] suggests that feedback and relationships with members are factors that have a positive impact on the performance of the team. The leader’s capacity to develop and communicate multi-team mental models will enhance between-team coordination and overall performance of the teams in a system. Leaders of virtual teams will be key to the effectiveness of this new working modus operandi. They will have to implement practices such as: communication technology trust establishment and maintenance, understanding and appreciation of the distributed diversity, virtual work-life cycle management, virtual team process monitoring, visibility enhancement of virtual teams’ members.

Nowadays, leadership is often considered a collaborative activity. This is even more obvious while working in a distributed environment. In such a context, leadership may take different forms, e.g., mutual influence.

The literature opens the door for multiple areas of R&D related to leadership, such as [31]: – What is the effectiveness of the traditional leadership styles in military C2? – What is the most appropriate leader-member relationship in military operations? – What is the most appropriate leadership style according to different types of situations? in

WoG/JIMP environments? – How can we implement the different leadership styles? – How the devolution of authority to lower organizational level impact leadership approaches?


– What are the team dynamics, processes, and reach back technologies that can support leadership of virtual teams? and

– What is the impact of distributed leadership on C2 effectiveness?

3.9 Collaboration and reach back

Thirty-two (32) articles relevant to collaboration and reach back have been reviewed [31]. Collaboration can be considered as a super construct of coordination and co-operation and teamwork. Shared team values can have a positive effect on team cohesion and effective group performance in intense contexts where military personnel is in difficult collaboration conditions. Furthermore, recent meta-analysis concluded that task cohesion was even more important than social cohesion in difficult collaboration conditions [32].

Intense collaboration is being defined by four (4) different dimensions [31]: 1) the temporal nature of the work, 2) the ease with which the work is shared, 3) the level of interdependence required and 4) the uncertainty of the work. Different models related to collaborations and factors influencing the process of collaboration are presented in the literature. While the type of interaction (face-to-face or distributed) and the diversity of the team members’ knowledge (homogeneous or heterogenous) did not seem to have an impact on the accuracy of the team decision-making, asynchronous, distributed teams took more time for problem-solving. Furthermore, problem solving and consensus in distributed teams seem to show non-linear trend requiring feedback loops while face-to-face have a tendency to linear paths for knowledge construction. It was demonstrated that different teams will take different approaches of collaboration.

While the integration of collaboration technologies resulted in improved performance, however, when task demands are very high, their use seems to result in decreased performance. Different tools are more appropriate to different types of context. However, face-to-face communications are considered the preferred means of communication and direct collaboration was also the preference. Collaboration tools help promote effective C2 collaboration, but will not replace relationships amongst collaborating team members.

Reach back is used when the resources and expertise to solve a problem are dispersed and distributed, the stakes are high and the problem is sufficiently complex to require interdependency amongst various players. It is a human process that is likely to be affected by levels of credibility and trust between deployed and home personnel. As such, some of the findings related to distributed collaboration could be applied to reach back.

The literature [31] also presents different command post models that rely on reach back, where linkage has to be done between personnel within the area of operations and outside the area of operations. Previous studies on reach back have focussed on technology as well as leadership, teamwork, organizational factors, and information support. Results related to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance reach back demonstrated that information was successfully passed on, but that overall timeliness was disappointing, shared awareness and understanding of other teams were low, and systems were not appreciated by users.


Based on the literature findings [31], additional R&D could be conducted in:

– Development of a clear and unambiguous understanding of collaboration;

– Understanding of the multi-level nature of collaboration (e.g., at team levels vs organizational levels);

– Contextual factors influencing collaboration;

– Measuring collaboration;

– Facilitating collaboration;

– Role of macro cognition in collaboration;

– Tools enabling information sharing in multiple forms;

– Tools to support critical thinking and contingency analysis in real-time interaction;

– Tools for current and historical perspectives to support awareness of activities and tasks within planning teams;

– Tools to support global and shared SA and help to gauge the impact of specific actions on the overall plan; and

– Modelisation of reach back process.

3.10 Mission assurance

Twenty (20) articles relevant to mission assurance have been reviewed [31]. Mission assurance has multiple meaning to multiple audiences, partly because the term “mission” has different meanings for different communities (e.g., Military vs aerospace). While some work relates mission assurance to a degree of confidence in overall success, other relates it to how the execution will be conformed to the plan. Different methods/protocols leading to mission assurance exist. One of the mission assurance processes described in the literature involves prioritization, mission mapping, vulnerability assessment, mitigation and red teaming [31]. Others look at what can be done to reduce the operational risk prior to problem occurrence as well as how to resolve problems that occurred. However, in all cases reviewed, Commanders (leaders) have to play a central role in mission assurance by providing direction on prioritization of threats.

Based on the literature reviewed [31], there are a lot of R&D opportunities to improve mission assurance, including:

– Formalization of mission assurance;

– What are the methods should be utilized for mission assurance?

– How simulation and modelling could be effectively leveraged to support mission assurance?

– How AI can be used to represent dispersed operations as well as insurgent, network and cyber threats?

– How red teaming exercises could be improved to support mission assurance?

– How leaders can better support mission assurance culture?


– How risk management processes can better support mission assurance?

– What are the different level of risk acceptance tolerance between different people and how it affects mission assurance? and

– How do we manage human factors as project risk?

It is interesting to note that UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) is currently investigating how requirements traceability provides a means to enable military mission assurance and configurability [33]. The challenge is about determining how mission objectives can be related to the available assets (technical and people):

– Mission assurance – Given a configuration of assets, how do changes to asset performance and behaviours impact on the mission objectives? and

– Mission configurability – As mission objectives change, how can the available people, processes and technology be reconfigured to deliver the objectives?

They have demonstrated visual methods for presenting the traceability of system of system engineering requirements.

3.11 Risk / Opportunity management

Sixteen (16) articles relevant to risk/opportunity management have been reviewed [31]. The literature identifies that management and operators have different sensitivities towards risk. The development of residual risk assessment criteria must take into consideration individual differences and unforeseen events of the mission. Experienced operators (experts) are more proficient than novices in understanding the situation, detecting meaningful patterns and being intuitive in decision-making. However, even expert opinions, which are used to identify risk, are subject to cognitive bias. It has been suggested that a template for risk identification may support inexperienced staff officers in risk assessments. Furthermore, it is noted that traditional risk management process is time consuming and typically accomplished by a few isolated technicians.

Gartner [34] has identified that, too often, there is a misconception that risk management is limited to subject matter experts instead of taking in consideration all the stakeholders. This leads to a lack of accountability across a range of risk management processes, from decisions related to residual risk to the implementation of intervention plans. Critical capability features to support operational risk management include the following elements [35]:

– Risk documentation/assessment:

– Risk related content, including a risk taxonomy/library, key risk indicator catalogue; and

– Risk assessment methodology and calculation;

– Incident management:

– External risk event repository;

– Incident management workflow and reporting; and

– Root cause analysis;


– Risk mitigation action planning:

– Risk-related initiatives/tasks progress tracking; and

– Risk control testing such as continuous control monitoring;

– Key risk indicators monitoring and reporting:

– Risk scorecard/dashboard; and

– Performance metrics related to key risk indicators; and

– Risk quantification and analysis:

– What-if scenario analysis;

– Statistical modelling; and

– Predictive analytics.

3.12 Red teaming

DRDC has invested some effort in the investigation of red teaming [36]. A recent study suggested that while red team production capability is a key enabler to missions, it cannot be built at the last minute [37]. To identify the latest development related to read teaming, eleven (11) articles relevant to red teaming were reviewed [31]. Some make the distinction between a red team (a military capability which should provide critique to the overall own force process) and a red cell (which should focus on the possible activities of adversaries and associated threats). The literature also suggested that there is no singular method for red teaming, but rather a broad assortment of techniques [31]. A number of R&D activities that could be undertaken in the area include [31]:

– What are the mental and cognitive models most used by red teams and how effective are they?

– What are the appropriate metrics/methodologies for assessing red team performance and effectiveness?

– How lessons learned by red teaming can enhance training and/or future red teaming activities?

– What are the appropriate methodologies for selecting individuals who have the appropriate cognitive capabilities suited for red training?

– What are the different models of red teaming? And how can we apply them in a C2 environment?

– What are the appropriate techniques for training the unique analytical skills required of red team members? and

– What are the challenges of the dynamic between red team and red cell? What model could conceptualize the working dynamics between them?


3.13 War-gaming

Thirteen (13) articles relevant to war gaming have been reviewed [31]. War gaming can serve as a means of socializing groups to a common purpose a well a critical means of developing and testing plans. Different war gaming methods are presented in the literature [31] as well as different approaches to evaluate war gaming performance.

The papers reviewed allowed the identification of potential areas to conduct future R&D [31]:

– Considering war gaming as a socio-technical system;

– Comprehensive, generic measurement model that incorporates all of the elements of a war-gaming system where outcome, process and personnel are evaluated at all organizational levels;

– War gaming across different agencies with diverse cultural backgrounds; and

– Assessment of existing war gaming theories.

3.14 Fusion of information

The fusion of information is a subject of research that has been going on for many years. The basic concept is to find out how information from diverse sources can be combined to improve situational understanding and better support decision making. One of the main drivers of the research in that area has been the Joint Director Laboratory (JDL) fusion model as shown in the Figure 4.

Figure 4: JDL model [38].

A lot of effort has been oriented towards the fusion of data provided by a wide diversity of sensors (often called hard data) for target recognition & identification, and how uncertainty can be represented and processed using different approaches [38]:


– Classical sets; – Probabilities; – Belief functions; – Fuzzy sets; and – Possibilities.

Information and data reliability always need to be taken into account. It can be incorporated into fusion processes using one (1) of these three (3) different approaches [39]:

– Measuring the reliability of data input to fusion processes and eliminating data of poor reliability;

– Modifying the data and information by considering their reliability before fusion; and

– Modifying the fusion process to account for the reliability of the input.

More recently, the increasing use of SM in the world has opened new opportunities in terms of sources of information. The internet, with its huge quantity of unstructured human-produced data, is an important data source that analysts cannot ignore anymore, which has led to a recent military interest into the research area of hard and soft fusion. Such sources of unstructured information produced by human contain new dimensions of analysis, such as emotional context, social relationships, and analyst insights, that have never been explored previously. Different strategies can be used to fuse soft data sources that have large volumes, high velocity and wide variety [40].

Nowadays, soft data are considered complementary sources of information that need to be integrated with the existing hard data to improve the overall understanding of the situation. Based on a rapid literature scan, the main research topics identified to hard and soft fusion are listed below [41]:

– Challenges:

– Uncertainty;

– Complexity; and

– Heterogeneity;

– Data types:

– Human-generated data;

– Radar / Laser Detection and Ranging; and

– Textual data;

– Processing methods:

– Belief functions; and

– Bayesian/Gaussian methods;

– Tasks and functions:

– Modelling and simulation;

– Tracking;


– Prediction; and

– Estimation.

Informed decisions require the fusion of relevant information from structured and unstructured sources. This fusion must be automated to handle the volume, velocity and variety of information and facilitate comprehension and projections of the situation. TTCP C3I TP1 has a current research activity looking at how hard and soft fusion can enable proactive decision-making.

3.15 C2 assessment

The development of accurate, sensitive, and practical measures is required to evaluate C2. Considering the complexity of current and future situations, the evaluation approach used to evaluate C2 needs to be able to consider both the vertical (strategic, operational, tactical) and lateral (between environments, with partners and with OGDs) dimensions of C2 while identifying the degree to which computer tool support impact the overall processes involved in C2.

While trying to be opportunistic in the selection of potential measurement events, it is important to be aware of the constraints that the different types of C2 measurement events may have. The Table 2 presents an overview of these constraints mapped to different C2 event types. Two (2) main types of measurements were identified in the open literature [42]: Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). A MOE is assessing a system’s ability to achieve its goal; its impact on the operational environment. A MOP focusses on the absolute measurement of unidimensional qualities. Thus MOPs may also be used as MOEs.

Table 2: Constraints mapped to different C2 event types [42].

To facilitate the assessment of C2, a framework for evaluating tool support was developed in a previous work [42]. Different measurement considerations, MOPs and MOEs for operational and human performance measurement have been identified and integrated into the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act framework. The approach allows to rapidly switch between measures to achieve the same objectives if a planned measurement approach becomes unachievable. Furthermore, a set of flow charts is proposed to assist in the planning/replanning of measurement events.

The NATO Research Task Group on Measuring and Analyzing Command and Control Performance Effectiveness (RTG-HFM-156) conducted a study on the existing assessment tools for C2. They found that there are gaps in the assessment of the following areas [43]:

– C2 Approach;

– Quality of Actions;


– Decision-Making;

– Quality of Decisions;

– Entity Characteristics and Behaviours;

– Sense-Making;

– Information;

– Quality of Information; and

– High-Level Measures of Merit.

Accordingly, we can consider that these areas would require additional R&D efforts.

3.16 Areas of interest not covered

Considering the limitation of human resources assigned to project, no effort was put to further investigate the areas of interoperability and comprehensive approach. However, as mentioned in the following sub-sections, it is known that these two areas will require additional R&D activities to fulfill the needs of CAF.

3.16.1 Interoperability

While ontology has been looked at as an interoperability mechanism for the planning (Section 3.3), additional work should be conducted to identify the R&D questions related to interoperability for the C2 at the operational level. One of the particular areas to investigate would be the interoperability issues related to existing data/information exchange models such as Coalition Battle Management Language (C-BML) [44], National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) [45] and MIP model [46].

3.16.2 Comprehensive approach

The complexity of today’s operations requires a WoG approach where all government entities contribute to an overarching strategic objective. Furthermore, today’s theatre of operations involve non-governmental as well as coalition contributors, local government and population. It is, therefore, required that all participants be engaged in activities that promote a common understanding of each of their roles, mandates and responsibilities. The operationalization of a comprehensive approach will require R&D in the human dimension as well as the processes and technological aspects of C2. DRDC has invested and continue to invest effort to better understand the challenges of implementing a comprehensive approach to military operations involving the Canadian Army [47], [48]. Their findings will have to be reviewed, assessed and actualized to the reality of joint operations at the operational level.


3.17 Drivers for change

Technology trends will influence future C2 processes as much as future user expectations. Looking at CFD [49] and Gartner’s [50], [51], [52], [53], [54] analyses, three (3) main areas of change can be expected to modify CAF ways of doing C2 business:

– Real world and virtual world will be merged – Computing will be everywhere (e.g., wearable devices) and the internet of things will change our way of doing business; converging towards the user needs, the interconnections between all these devices (digital mesh) will be dynamic and flexible, changing throughout the day and the human-machine interfaces will become predominantly mobile rather than desk-based;

– Intelligence will be everywhere – Advanced, pervasive invisible analytics will focus the effort on big questions and big answers instead of managing big data; systems will have embedded intelligence allowing them to be alert and responsive to the surroundings (context-rich systems); different kinds of logic such as business rule processing, predictive analytics, prescriptive analytics, process orchestration, context brokerage, business activity monitoring and complex-event processing will be used to improve operational decisions; smart machines enabled through the exploitation of the analytics combined with an understanding of context will have a more active role; and

– New IT reality will emerge – Cloud/client architecture will support simultaneous use of multiple devices and coordination of applications to enhance customer outcomes; agile programming will lead to the flexibility required by the new digital work context; IT will be scaled to the Web and combined with active context-aware and adaptive access controls; applications will be security self-aware and self-protected.

3.18 In summary

As described in the previous sections, many S&T areas require additional R&D effort if DRDC wants to support CAF in the evolution of C2 capabilities from an evidence-based perspective. The following list of trends, in alphabetical order, has been extracted from those S&T areas:

– All domain and multidimensional (e.g., time and space) visualization in support of battlespace awareness, planning and management;

– Approaches and tools emphasizing agility in command and operations;

– Automated intelligent interfaces that adapt themselves to the environment, the context of the situation and the user;

– Comprehensive approach in the planning and conduct of operations;

– Coordination and synchronization of efforts across all boundaries (military, governmental and civilian as well as levels of command);

– Enhanced COAs generation and war-gaming tools involving advanced techniques such as predictive analytics, red teaming and socio-technical system;

– Environments facilitating and maximizing the benefits of collaboration and reach back of distributed/dispersed teams;

– Holistic approach to risk/opportunity management in support of mission assurance;


– Integrated assessment tool sets for C2 output, approaches, processes and tools;

– Intelligent decision support tools for complex problem exploration, framing and design;

– Interoperability amongst C2 artefacts/outputs, processes and systems;

– Leadership approaches efficient for different types of situations (e.g., complex), different types of contributors (e.g., JIMP) and different types of teams (e.g., virtual, distributed);

– Linking communications, sensors, weapons and data systems to support decisions at all levels of command; and

– Tools fostering human creativity for complex problem solving.


Based on discussions with members of JIIFC project, the most interesting configuration to have access to CPOF within DRDC Valcartier Research Centre is depicted in the Figure 6 and allowed direct and remote access to CPOF. DRDC would have an advantage by accessing to the JIIFC sandbox version located at the CFAWC in order to better understand the use of the tool (considering the different data sets available) as well as the evolution of the functionalities. In addition to this access, DRDC could have one (1) unclassified instance of CPOF locally, which would allow experimentation with new decision support functionalities, without disturbing JIIFC project. Then, to demonstrate new concepts to CFWC, a diode could push up relevant data/modules to the CFPOF version located to the CFWC in Ottawa. Such approach facilitates dynamic interactions between DRDC and CFWC.

Figure 6: CPOF installation at DRDC – Valcartier Research Centre [57].


5 Support to information management dimension in CAF

During the investigation of the different R&D areas to support the C2 at the operational level, DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) conducted two (2) research activities that provided advice to ADM(IM).

The first study [58] was related to the prioritization framework developed within the Defence Resource Management Information System (DRMIS) team to rank initiatives by priority for inclusion in the DRMIS Roadmap. The DRMIS prioritization framework was reviewed and led to identification of several areas for improvement, such as [58]: including additional criteria to better capture the relevant data; realigning the scoring scale to create a stable baseline as well as reduce the current bias towards low-risk initiatives; and adding more information to some criteria definitions to reduce the potential for misinterpretation. Implementation of any or all of the recommendations would strengthen the proposed DRMIS prioritization framework, leading to an improved placement of initiatives in the DRMIS Roadmap.

A second study [59] was conducted to support an options analysis for the replacement of the existing CAF Recruiting Information Management System with a new system that would deliver enhanced recruiting functionalities. A sensibility analysis [59] was conducted which indicated that the evaluation criteria and scoring results were relatively robust to changes in the weighting scheme used.


6 New project proposal

6.1 Background

Based on discussions with members of the CFD team in January–February 2015, it was confirmed that there was no additional value in revisiting the program outcomes. Accordingly, the intermediate outcome of Director General Cyber Force Development still remains [1]:

“The CAF employs improved C2 through an adaptable and interoperable defence information sharing and collaboration environment that achieves exercise of authority and direction over assigned, allocated and attached forces; and management of force and orchestration of effects and outcomes in response to government direction”

and the immediate outcomes remain:

– C2 enables Commander and staff to lead, coordinate, plan & organize, direct and control; and

– Commander and staff have the ability to distribute & share, control & manage information.

The JIIFC Project, which the project director is from the CFD team, will deliver a JBMC that collates, correlates and integrates information sources and command support services to meet the operational SA of the commanders. The capability deliverables will include the process of collating, correlating, and integrating diverse elements of information into a holistic, sharable, scalable and context driven presentation of the commander’s battlespace [60].

6.2 New project goal

The original goal of C2CAF-T was to identify areas of operational effectiveness enhancements throughout the spectrum of missions by gaining, maintaining and exploiting operational information to achieve decision advantage of the modern battlespace. Accordingly, having JIIFC project delivery in mind, it is believed that the new R&D project should contribute to the improvement of CAF C2 capability by identifying/developing and operationalizing decision support concepts and tools used in the planning and the management of the battlespace, for use by commanders and staff at the operational level, in the conduct of JIMP missions. The goal of the new project could then be:

– The identification of decision support requirements and system specifications enabling the dynamic synchronization, prioritization and de-confliction of activities across all dimensions of an assigned area of operations within the overall battlespace.

Such an objective would complement the functionalities provided by JIIFC project in the JBMC. Depending on CAF priorities, R&D could be conducted in the S&T areas identified in Section 3. These areas include:

– All domain and multidimensional (e.g., time and space) visualization in support of battlespace awareness, planning and management;


– Approaches and tools emphasing agility in command and operations;

– Automated intelligent interfaces that adapt themselves to the environment, the context of the situation and the user;

– Comprehensive approach in the planning and conduct of operations;

– Coordination and synchronization of efforts across all boundaries (military, governmental and civilian as well as levels of command);

– Enhanced COAs generation and war-gaming tools involving advanced techniques such as predictive analytics, red teaming and socio-technical system;

– Environments facilitating and maximizing the benefits of collaboration and reach back of distributed/dispersed teams;

– Holistic approach to risk/opportunity management in support of mission assurance;

– Integrated assessment tool sets for C2 output, approaches, processes and tools;

– Intelligent decision support tools for complex problem exploration, framing and design;

– Interoperability amongst C2 artefacts/outputs, processes and systems;

– Leadership approaches efficient for different types of situations (e.g., complex), different types of contributors (e.g., JIMP) and different types of teams (e.g., virtual);

– Linking communications, sensors, weapons and data systems to support decisions at all levels of command; and

– Tools fostering human creativity for complex problem solving.

Focussing on the operational level of command, the new project would require DRDC interactions with CFD, CJOC and 1st Canadian Division. In addition, working with CFWC and Staff College in Toronto will allow the leverage from existing experimentation campaign plan for potential experimentations/demonstrations.

Accordingly, this work could be focussed on the number one priority of CFD/D C4ISR namely putting in place and expanding a JBMC. CFD is currently delivering the JIIFC capital project (Horizon 1) focussed upon the SA of BM [60]. This S&T project will demonstrate concepts to complement the SA with planning and decision support tools with a Horizon 2/3 objective.

The project would thus address three (3) out of the eight (8) HLDs of the DRDC C2/CIS Program [4]:

– Lead: 1.1 – Validated concepts, techniques and applications to: achieve decision advantage; manage the human dimension in order to achieve common intent, inspire, motivate, build relationships and trust at all levels; assess mission assurance; and permit commander’s mobility to maintain C2 while engaging when and where needed;

– Plan and Organize: 3.1 – Validated concepts, techniques, applications and procedures to: conduct mission planning; and experiment for the future; and

– Control: 5.1 – Validated concepts, techniques and applications to: orchestrate joint fires; and deconflict the battlespace, including kinetic and non-kinetic effects, manoeuvre, and spectrum management.


6.3 Project workplan

To achieve its goal, the proposed project regroups the S&T areas identified in Section 3 into the following three (3) main activities:

– Decision advantage enablers:

– Demonstration of an integrated set of decision support concepts for the planning and the management of the battlespace;

– Planning enablers:

– Synchronization of situation understanding between different partners;

– Planning between partners (JIMP);

– Integration of CAF/Allied/Coalition targets into the planning of operations; and

– Integration of opportunity/risk management in the planning of operations;

– Operational BM enablers:

– Synchronization of situation understanding between different partners;

– Integration of the step five (5) of the targeting cycle (i.e., Mission Planning and Force Execution) into the battlespace management;

– Opportunity/risk management in the conduct of operations;

– Synchronization of effects amongst partners; and

– Assessment of the battlespace management.

Executed during a period of five (5) years, this project will develop the knowledge required to write evidence-based specification for decision support tools for the planning and management of the battlespace to feed JIIFC. The production of these specifications will directly leverage from the following project outputs:

– Reports on existing approaches for mission planning and operation management;

– White paper on approaches/tools enabling decision advantages;

– Report on the experimentation campaign plan;

– Reports on interim assessment of existing approaches/tools;

– Reports on approaches/tools for the planning of operations involving JIMP context;

– Decision support tools for the conduct of the operational planning of operations considering the agility required to work in a JIMP context;

– Reports on approaches/tools for the operational management of the battlespace;

– Decision support tools for the operational management of the battlespace, considering a better integration of the relevant elements of the targeting process; and

– Experimentation reports.


The sourcing strategy proposed for the delivery of this project is mainly based on a collaboration approach with knowledgeable partners. It involves:

– DRDC and CAF capabilities in C2: While the development of prototypes to assess new C2 concepts will be conducted with the help of the industry, their assessment will be conducted in DRDC C2 laboratories in Toronto and Valcartier. This will be followed by experiments at the CFWC in coordination with CFWC CORA effort in support of the DRDC force employment portfolio. Every effort will be made to utilize APIs that will permit integration within the JBMC environment or architecture thus making future client exploitation potentially easier by the JBMC systems integrator;

– A task authorization contract in the C2 S&T capability area: As mentioned in the previous item, industry with expertise in prototype development will be leveraged for the development of proof of concepts. In October 2015, a statement of work for a C2 Decision Support task authorization contract was ready to be posted on the Canadian public tender website;

– Contributing to and leveraging from our allies: The intent is to share the effort with our allies using different international mechanisms such as:

– TTCP C3I TP1 – Information Exploitation, C2 and Decision Support: to jointly investigate challenges related to coalition BM;

– NATO SAS-104 – C2 Agility The Next Step: to investigate the different approaches to institutionalize and assess agility in the C2 of operations; and

– TTCP JSA-TP2 – Modelling and Simulation (including Serious Games as a focal area): to identify the most beneficial modelling and simulation approaches to support decision making in the context of BM;

– Linking with other DRDC projects will make sure that the concepts developed for the joint capability leverage from as well as link to environmental capabilities. The DRDC projects identified of interest to our project are:

– 01da – Maritime Information Warfare;

– 02ca – Land Tactical C4ISR / EW;

– 05da – Joint Intelligence Collection and Analysis Capability; and

– 06aa – Warfare Centre Sciences – Non-munitions targeting.

6.4 Exploitation strategy

It is proposed that the exploitation path of this project would be towards:

– CFD, by the identification and demonstration of novel C2 concepts at the operational level of command can influence doctrines and tactics; and

– JIIFC project, by the identification of evidence-based specifications for the JBMC; and CFWC, by contributing to the experimentation campaign envisioned in the Non-Munitions Targeting Science project proposal from the DRDC force employment portfolio to support CAF Joint Targeting initiatives.


7 Conclusion

The increasing complexity of future security environments requires that C2 in the CAF evolve into a comprehensive approach to operations. Accordingly, the C2 operating concept emphasis the need to have an organization that will be efficient, flexible and adaptable. To do so, people, process and technology will require to have a greater horizontal integration, while being able to coordinate up and down in the different chains of command. C4ISR will then be required to support joint operations considering that the CAF is one of the contributors to the overall government strategy.

As a scoping project, C2CAF-T conducted a set of activities to refine client’s requirements regarding the C2 at the operational level of command as well as to identify some of the questions that R&D needs to address. That work led to the identification of R&D requirements for the development of a JBMC focussing on situational awareness, development of COAs and the planning /management of battlespace at the operational level in a JIMP context. Accordingly, it is recommended that, to contribute to the improvement of CAF C2 capability, the new project should look at identifying/developing decision support concepts and tools for the planning and management of the battlespace considering the operational level of operations under a JIMP context.

While the definition process of the new project was quite mature having developed an updated charter and beginning the staffing process to transition to implementation, the recent CDS Planning Guidance on Joint Targeting has raised the priority of Joint Targeting. To align with this priority, ADM S&T was tasked with developing and executing a program to assist in the development of a Canadian joint targeting capability. It is then recommended that the project proposed in this report be revisited to also consider the different steps of the targeting process. It is expected that, in addition to the HLDs of “Lead”, “Plan and Organize”, and “Control” identified for the project proposed in this report, “Direct” and “Coordinate” HLDs may also have to be addressed.


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List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

1CAD 1st Canadian Division

2D Two-dimensional

3D Three-dimensional

ADM(IM) Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management)

ADO Adaptive Dispersed Operations

AI Artificial Intelligence

API Application Programming Interface

BM Battlespace Management

C2 Command and Control

C2CAF-T Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow

C2IS Command and Control Information Systems

C3I Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems

C4 Command, Control, Communications and Computers

C4ISR C4 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CAF Canadian Armed Forces

CATT Comprehensive Approach Training Toolkit

CDS Chief Defence Staff

CFD Chief Force Development

CFDS Canada First Defence Strategy

CFWC Canadian Forces Warfare Centre

CFXNet Canadian Forces eXperimentation Network

CIS Computer Information System

CJOC Canadian Joint Operations Command

COA Course of Actions

COG Centers of Gravity

COP Common Operating Picture

CORA Centre for Operational Research and Analysis

CPOF Command Post of the Future

CR Critical Requirements

CV Critical Vulnerabilities


DG Director General

DLFD Directorate Land Force Development

DP Decisive Points

DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada

DRMIS Defence Resource Management Information System

DSTL Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

EW Electronic Warfare

GOFO General/Flag Officers

HLD High Level Deliverable

HQ Headquarter

IA Influence Activities

IM Information Management

IT Information Technology

JBMC Joint Battlespace Management Capability

JDL Joint Director Laboratory

JICAC Joint Intelligence Collection and Analysis Capability

JIIFC Joint Information and Intelligence Fusion Capability

JIMP Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public

JSA Joint Systems and Analysis

JTF Joint Task Force

JTT Joint Tactical Targeting

MIP Multilateral Interoperability Programme

MOE Measure of Effectiveness

MOP Measure of Performance

MSOC Marine Security Operations Centres

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

OGD Other Government Department

OPP Operational Planning Process

Q&A Questions & Answers

R&D Research and Development


S&T Science and Technology

SA Situational Awareness

SAS Systems Analysis and Studies

SJS Strategic Joint Staff

SM Social Media

SSO Senior Staff Officer

TP Technical Panel

TTCP Technical Cooperation Program

USA United States of America

UK United Kingdom

WoG Whole of Government


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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security markings for the title, abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the document is Classified or Designated)

1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g., Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in Section 8.) DRDC – Valcartier Research Centre Defence Research and Development Canada 2459 route de la Bravoure Quebec (Quebec) G3J 1X5 Canada

2a. SECURITY MARKING (Overall security marking of the document including special supplemental markings if applicable.)

UNCLASSIFIED

2b. CONTROLLED GOODS

(NON-CONTROLLED GOODS) DMC A REVIEW: GCEC DECEMBER 2013

3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in

parentheses after the title.) Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T) : Scoping study synthesis

4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used) Bélanger, M.

5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.) August 2016

6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.)

60

6b. NO. OF REFS (Total cited in document.)

60 7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g., technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report,

e.g., interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Scientific Report

8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) DRDC – Valcartier Research Centre Defence Research and Development Canada 2459 route de la Bravoure Quebec (Quebec) G3J 1X5 Canada

9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)

9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)

10a. ORIGINATOR’S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) DRDC-RDDC-2016-R144

10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.) 05cb

11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)

Unlimited

12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)) Unlimited

13. ABSTRACT (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

The Command and Control Canadian Armed Forces of Tomorrow (C2CAF-T) project is a scoping activity to identify the research and development areas to improve the command and control (C2) of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), principally at the operational level of operations. This report presents an overview of the C2CAF-T scoping study findings, starting with a refinement of the C2 gaps and needs at the operational level of command. Following a review of decision-making and decision support concepts that would allow CAF to be more efficient, flexible and adaptable, it proposes to develop a new research and development (R&D) project related to the management of the battlespace. Intended to support the development of a Joint Battlespace Management Capability (JBMC), it focusses on the challenges associated with the development of Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) situational awareness and courses of actions as well as the planning and the management of battlespace at the operational level in such context.

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Le projet de Commandement et contrôle pour les Forces armées canadiennes de demain est une activité de délimitation de la portée visant à déterminer les domaines de recherche et développement (R-D) permettant d’améliorer le commandement et contrôle (C2) des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC), principalement au niveau opérationnel. Ce rapport présente une vue d’ensemble des conclusions de l’étude de délimitation et débute par une clarification des lacunes et besoins en C2 au niveau opérationnel. Après un examen des concepts de prise de décision et d’aide à la décision qui permettraient aux FAC d’être plus efficaces, flexibles et adaptables, on propose d’élaborer un nouveau projet de gestion de l’espace de bataille. Afin de soutenir le développement d’une capacité interarmées de gestion de l’espace de bataille, ce projet est centré sur les défis associés au développement d’un éveil situationnel et de plans d’action, ainsi que sur la planification et la gestion d’un espace de bataille de niveau opérationnel dans un contexte interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g., Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.) C2; command and control; operational level of operations; decision support

command and control canadian armed forces of tomorrow ... · drdc-rddc-2016-r144 i abstract the...

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