combat vienna in '45

8/6/2019 Combat Vienna in '45

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English Copy

COMBAT IN VIENNA(29 Mar-16 Apr 1945)

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COMSBAT IN VIENNA(29 Maroh-16 April 1945)

I. ACZGROUND1~ LJl an.JS* During th e defense of Vienna the defend-

era were tehnically under the command of the Commander ofDefense Area, Vienna.

In theory, th e following units were subordinate: Allunits and commands of the Replacement Army stationed in thedefense area which had not yet been shifted or were in processof being shifted west; all units of the field forces withdraw-ing to the defense area; all a ir force units detailed forground fighting; the police, the military units of the "Party"(organized in the Volkseturm), and the civilian administrativeagenciee of the city.

n practice and probably because of the rapid course ofevents, no clear regulations about the extent f command wereissued by higher uthorities, so that only the following unitswere subordinate the remaining commands and units of thePReserve ,my; air force units detailed for ground fighting;


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r /_ J-160some elements of the police force; the Volksatur, and .fora short time the civilian administrative agencies of the town.During the entire battle of Vienna, troops of the field forceswere subordinated for one day only, 13 April 1945. At allother times they remained under the command of the IX SSPanzer Corps.

GO 7 April 1945, I, as combat eommander, with my staff,was likewise placed under the comand of that corps and thereupon my combat command function practioally ceased. Moreover,my authority was limited by the necessity of obtaining theagreement of Reich Defense Commissioner von Schirach for everyimportant measure* I had nothing to do with ARLZ measures(general regulations concerning demolitions); I could spareneither materiel nor forces for such measures.

2. The ~8eent.xcept for the telephone order fromthe Wehrmacht High Command, Army Personnel Department, whichappointed me Commander of Defense Area, Vienna, neither GeneralHeadquarters nor any other superior headquarters issued averbal or written order concerning the defense of Vienna.reasures undertaken by me s co t commander, therefore, wereframed for the situation as I found it md for its probablecourse, within the scope of my at ined defense duties, Theywere also guided by general orders issued to combat comnderoby the Wehrmrcht or Army Bigh Comnd


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3, stAimate of1thet n_ A. 'd1 45. On 31 MarchRussian troops had penetrted the frontier fortificationssouth of Lake euiatedler and had therefore been able oni April to open the Sorpon (Oedenburg) defile from the southand west. On 3 April they took iener Neustadt, blocked theSemmering Pass railroad line near Gloggnitz and took FortPresaburg (Bratislava). During the night of 3 April, enemyspearheads were fighting against German reserve and alert units(4th and 33d Training Sattalions) south of Moedling and in thevicinity of axenburg. Ona 4 April the enemy penetrated thefrontier fortifications between Lake eusiedler and the DanubeRiver, attacked Bruck on the Leitha River and, advancingsimultaneously from south and north, occupied it on 5 April.

The enemy now had three choices:The first, most probable, and politically advisable, was

to gain speedy possession of Vienna as the capital of a countrywhich was to be restored to "freedom,"

The second was to advance on one or both sides of theDanube (passing south nd north of Vienna and avoiding thecity) and push on in the gereral direction Krems (bridges)Lins.

1inally, he could combine both courses of action, sincehe probably was strong enough to do so. He had at his dis-posal, as we found out later, one arwored, one motorized,


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# -B-60 .4.one mechanized, and one infantry army. In addition he wasassisted by an air force which had absolute command of theair and probably by forces of the Austrian resistance movement,which we also learned about later. At the time we did nothave a clear picture of the strength of the enemy and of thenumber and type of his units but we.had the general impressionthat the enemy was far superior both in personnel and materiel.

German forces (Sixth S8 Panzer Army), which had withdrawnfrom un ary to the frontier fortifications on both s.ides ofLake Neusiedler, had not been able to establish themselves inthe prepared positions south of the lake, since these positionshad already been overrun by tl enemy. Hence they had to re-treat to the Vienna Woods and to the Leith River. North ofLake Neusiedler several experienced, though exhausted, Easternfront divisions were occupying positions which they succeededin holding for a few days.

Because of their poor combat efficiency, the alert re-placement units which had been moved to the front by order ofth e commander of the eplacement Army to reiRlforce th e line,were not able to offer much resistance. Some did not evenreach the position, but were surprised by the enemy, south ofLake Neusedler, while detraining or moving up.

The combat efficiency of thea replacement units Fad theVolksturm still in Vienna was in general poor, because they

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D.-16O -5were numerically weak and for the most part insufficientlyarmed and equipped.

The Luftwaffe antiaircraft units detailed for groundfighting in and around Vienna (24th Antiaircraft Division)could be expected to provide some defense. On the other hand,assistance from a ir force units was unlikely. (As it turnedout, not a single German plane was in the air during the entirebattle for 'ienna.) Supply troops had not been provided. Inshort, no preparations whatever had been made for the defenseof the city.

Nevertheless an attack against Vienna by strong Russianforces was to be expected within a few days. Our only hopewas that some German divisions from the field would become.available for the battle, Since the numerical strength ofsuch divisions, if any, had probably been greatly reduced in

ungary, the idea of a asuccessful or even prolonged defenseof Vienna had to be rejected from the beginning, and measurestaken accordingly. . ich Defense Commissioner von ; hirach,the Co mander in Chief of the Sixth aS Panser Army, SS Oberet-gruppenfuehrer Dietrich, and I agreed about this at our firstmeeting 4 April, 1945. And again at a later date, when itwas proposed to make a corresponding report to the High Com-mand in the hope that the intention of defending the city mightbe abandoned and the battle avoide d As late as 2 April, after

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the loss of the frontier fortifications which up to that timehad generally and correctly been considered the only possibleline of defense for Vienna, the order was given to defend thecity and, in the end, I indorsed it, in spite of the clearlyunfavorable situation. the decision had been made because ofthe following considerations

1. The early occupation of Austria's capital by theRussians, with its incalculable poli t ical consequences, mustbe prevented or, at least, delayed.

2. The defense of the city would engage strong enemyforces if the Russians decided to first attack Vienna. Inthis case, it was hoped, wea ld gain time for consolidatingthe front.

The decision for or against fighting was not mine to make.All I had to do was to concentrate on gaining as much time aspossible and building up our defense.

II. CO~ AT AQTIONIa r nd Orders

a ~Measurea to Strengtbhen the Defense. Formation ofalert battalions an alrtndlert artillery units, consisting of re-placement training and recruit uvits of the Vienna garrison,soldiers on leave and stragglers from the field forces.

b, Collection of Arms, Ammunition, and Equipmentfrom Depots in Vienna and Vicinity. Because of thee tactical

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situation and general confusion, this measure met with manydifficulties, which sonetimes were not worth the effort. Insome cases these difficulties may have been intentionallyaggravated by embers of the Austrian resistance movement.

C. Bringing in of Beinforements (alert units ofMilitary District XVII). Two l ight and two heavy batteriesfrom Wels and one antitank company from Freist .twere expect-ed, but only the antitank company arrnd one ight battery arrivedThese units were placed under the co=mand of the 6th PanzerDivision for technical reasons.

4. Formation of Transport Columns. This was donethrough the rounding up of all motor vehicles still in Vienna.This project did not get underway smoothly.

e. Requisitionin of Officers and GC0s for the AlertUnits. On 7 April two battalion commanders arrived from theOfficer Replacement pool in the Doellersheim training area,and 100 cadets were detached from the reserve officers train-ing courses at Znojmo (Znaim). The majority of the latterwere detailed to the 6th Panzer Division, some to the 2d SSPanzer Division, and others to my staff as administrative of-ficers.

f. Organization of a Working Staff for my HeadquarterThis met with considerable difficulty. Beside a few commandand administrative officers and myself only the staff of


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Military Headquarters Vienna was available. This staff con-sisted chiefly of officers with little battle experience andcombat initiative. Some were too old and, as it turned outlater, some were inclined to cooperate with the resistanemovement.

g. Organization of a Quasi-military Government Overthe City's Public Services and Agencies. Because of the rapidand unfavorable development of the tactical situ tion, thisproject did not reach fulfillment. I could only instruct thecivil authorities to keep working as long as possible andcharge them to do their beet to help the populace during thefighting and keep vitally important industries going at allcost.

2. eaeures Related to Co bat Commana. I requested that the field divisions in the Vienna

area be placed under my com nd, for centralization of authoritThis request was rejected but contact with these units wasestablished and continuously maintsiTed.

b. Comitment of alert units, after reconnaissanceby bicycle and mototized scout squads, for blocking anddefensive missions on the main enemy approach roads.

o. Commitment of bicycle mounted antitank detach-ments to attack tanks which had broken through.


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d. Protection of the Danube Canal and River bridgesagainst sudden enemy seizure.

e. 'Employment of engineer alert units for blockingarterial roads leading to the city. Some of th e engineeralert units were placed under the army group engineers, (127thG&Q Engineer Brigade), whose task it was to prepare for thedemolition of the bridges over the Danube Canal and River.Railroad engineer alert unite were placed under the commandof the army group railroad engineer regiment and directed toprepare for the demolition of railroads.

f. Command was exercised almost exclusively throughspecial-missions staff officers and messengers, since only asmall and technically inadequate alert signal company was atmy disposal. 1or most of the time, liaison with higher commands and adjacent units had to be established in person orthrough local telephone or radio service.

a. Vienna Declared a Defense Area (29 March-2 April).On 29 arch 1945 Russian troops captured oeszeg (Guena).Therefore German atitank units from the Cadet Academy atwiener Neustadt, in approximately battalion strength, blockedth e roads leading over the Rosalien ountains and through thePitten Valley northwest to Gloggnitz, eunkirohen, nd Wiener~e t dt. On 30 >arch the enemny, advancin from Koeszeg,

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penetrated the Rosalien Moutains and overran, with tanks,the alert units attoahed to Military Distriot TXII as theywere about to occupy th e frontier fortifications. Russiantanks and infantry then attacked German bloking unite at theroad defile south of 3attersburg. The engagement continuedthrough 31 March. On I April the enemy succeeded in pene-trating this defile and captured Matterburg. Severe fightingon the hills northwest and north of Mattersburg followed. On31 arlc, a fight for the defile southeast of Sopron (0eden-burg) near Nageenk and Kophaza had taken place. Since afrontal attack brought no sucoess, the enemy turned west viaDeutahkreuz and beeaenmarkt, nd captured Sopron on 1 April .

In the course of a further enemy penetration on 31 Marchand I April, through the Rosalien Mountains northwest towards

iener Neustadt, two other battalions of the ienmer NeustadtCadet Academy, though equipped only with small arms and afew machine guns and Panzerfaeuste, initially frustrated enemyattempts to debauch from th mountains between Erlaeh andFrohadorf. In these egagements the eadets destroyed about30 tanks.

On 2 April, while fighting continued in this area, thecourse of events in th e 'attersburg--Sopron area led to anenemy penetration in the direotion of btenfurth. German forceswere now compelled to withdraw to iener Neustdt and the


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Leitha River and during the night of 2 April to give upiener Xeustadt. On the same day the enemy advanced viadlitz towards Gloggnitzs. Also on 2 April the i gh Command

declared Vienna to be a defense area.b. Vitdrawal to Iariabrurin--Mauer-Liesing--

:nzersdorfe--oedling--W endorf--Himberg (35-4 April)* On 3 Aprilthe enemy advaned northward from the line Wiener Neuata t--Eb nfurth. This advance led to the first engagements withforward reconaissanoe detachments to the south and with partsof the alert units of the 4th and 33d Panzer Replacement andTrainirig Battalions stationed approximately on a line fromGuntrasdorf to Laxaburg Farther east the enemy capturedEisenatadt, and north of the Danube he captured Bratielava(Preasburg).

On the evening of 3 April, having been appointed combatcommander of Defense Area, Vienna by order of the ehrmaehtHigh Co mand, I arrived in Vienna and took over the com andfrom the former commander of the ity, LtGen. saerker, whowas still present, and from MaJGen, Ioellts, who had beenprovisional combat ooma der. Hs command post was the Viennamilitary headquarters on Universitaetastrasse.

Because of the danger impending in te south, th e 2d sPanzer Division (t*Das eich") wa committed in the positionbetween Gutrarsdorf nd Laxenburg, which up t that time ad


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W1 -160been occupied by parts of the 4th and 3d Pan er Replacementand Training attalions. The divieion now absorbed thesebattalions Seoaurty forces were advanced to Cuntramsdor.and uenoehendorf, owever, the continuous pressure of great-ly superior enemy fores moving up from the south, penetrationsof frontier fortifications between Lake leusiedler and theDanube River, the loss of Bruck on the Leitha River on 4 April,made th e withdrawal of the 2d Sr Panzer Division to th e lineMoedling--Neudorf--imberg inevitable and led to severe fightinon that line as well as in the vicinity of Rauchenwarth. Aenvelopment attemteed by Russian troops west of Moeling onthe afternoon of 4 April was evaded. On this day I had mfirst conference with Reich Defense Commissioner yon Sohiraohand on the same or the followig day a onference with themilitary and oivilian authorities who had reaied in Vienna.At this time the easures listed ie setions II, 1, a and II,1, b were inaugurated. According to instructions, FilitaryDistrict headquartera XVII moved to Duernstein near Krems(later Preistadt, Upper Austria),

During the night of 4 April stronger enemy forces advancedfrom the south through the Vienna Woods i the direction ofPressbaum on the western railroad line. A police battalion,with one police tank, in position on both sides of the Press-baum road to protect this important line of comuication was

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out in half. The batt lioM, nevertheless, was able to mina-tain a rear gu;,rd resistance. tDring the night it was with-drawn to Huettendorf. There it joined an eaer, fighting,hitler Youth battalion, which had been committed meantimeat full strength and soe alert units of lesser combat ef-ficiency. However, the Cerman cormunications and supply lineto and from the west was now cut south of the Danube Aiver.

Because of these developments and the enemy's attemptat envelopment near Moedliag, during th e night of 4 April theposit ion of th e 2d alanier Division was extended from Moedlinnorthwest and north to the vicinity of the western railroadline. This extension was man ed by cavalry units of the 11thiReconaissance Replacement Training Battalion and one companyof th e 80th Engineer KEplacement and Training Battalion. Inmatters affecting oisimand theseemets were pleced under the2d Th Panser Division and were employed by that division forreconnaissance and blocking. The extension of the positionwas fo r security purposes, fo r by 5 April the enemy was feel-ing his way Iforxard on both sides of the western railroad l inetowards Vienna. ewere able at first to hold the posit ionnorth of this line, but south of it a threatened enemy envelop-ment of the 2 3 Paaer Division led to another withdrawal

Battalions of "Hitler Youth" werr.rtganied within theframework of the Volkcsstur.

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and to the abandonment of Moedling. Fighting developed inthe vicinity of nzersdorf

The enemy now pushed farther north between oedling andSchwehat toward the Schwechat and Liesing Rivers. To meetthis threat, alert and police units were committed on thenorthern bank of the Liesing, especially on Laser Mountain.Antiaircraft batteries took part in this action, for the firsttime, to delay the enemy's advance.

Ever growing enemy pressure against the Vienna front fromseveral sides necessitated further withdrawal of the 2d 8$Panser Division and adjoining units to the auer--Liesing--EnZersdorf line during the night of 5 April. Probably in-fluenced by this withdrawal, the alert and police units com-mitted on the Laser ountain evacuated their positions untnecessarily and on their own authority. On the left or easternflank the 3d SS Panzer Division and the 6th Panzer Divisionwere still withdrawing toward and across the Schweohat River,taking along with them the remnants of the security detach-ments from Military Headquarters Vienna which had beern stationein the Schweohat area. Russian armored spearheads invaded the"Favoriten ' borough f Vienna. Cotncentration of stronger enemyforces in the vicinity of othbneueiedl and Kledering indicatedthe imminence of a drive in that area.

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e. ithdrawal To Edge of City. On 6 April the east-ward advance of tank-supported enemy troops of unknown strengthnorth of the western railroad line, was halted temporarily bya vigorous coxterattack of th e Hitler Youth battalion from thevicinity of Huettendorf toward -4ariabrunn. The counterattackrecovered ground even beyond- ariabrunn and threw a Russis nbattalion back. In th e afternoon, however, this sector had tobe abandoned and the Hitler Youth battalion, facing southwest,was given the task of protecting the ithdrs~ from hill posi-tions north of Huettendorf until noon of 7 April. In thesouth the 2d 8 Panzer Division stopped fo r a short time strong

enemy forces that had been advancing with tanks on the tWientalroad and south thereof toward Hietzing.

At nightfall and during the night of 6 A.pril , however,th e division had to withdraw to th e outskirts of Vienna. Itsright flank was in the vicinity of Hietzinger Hauptplatz andits left in contact with the 3d SS Panzer Division near theRossmarkt. Or 6 April, this divaion had to resist strongenemy forces, in the southeastern part of the city, attaokingrom Rothnewsiedl and in an eastern direction over th e Laser

Mountain. These Russians were finally stopped or both sidesof uedatirolerplat . severe fighting took place for the south-east railroad station and fo r the arsenal grounds. The advanceoT enemy forcts from the vicinity of Kiedr ing northwest and

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north through the Zentralfriedhof (cemetery) toward the Sim-mering-Danube Canal made it necessary to commit the advance.elements of the Puehrer Grenadier Division on the terrain eastof the arsenal just as they were arriving in Vienna. The 6thPanzer Division also was committed at once on the island be-tween the Danube Canal and ?iver. The leading artillery bat-teries of the Fuehrer Grenadier Division took up positions inthe Priatr. But during the evening the arsenal grounds had tobe surrendered. At the same time, the southernmost railroadbridges over the Danube Canal and River were blown up.

d. The Aighting Inside the City, 1-8 April. Duringthe niht of 6 April Russian armored spearheads cautiously moveforward toward the west railroad station although Hitler Youthantitank detachments were employed against them with consider-able success. The fighting near Rietzinger Hauptplatz, Sued-tiroler Plats, and the southeast railroad station lasted allnight.

On 7 April the enemy reached the Danube River northwestof Vienna. Fighting ensued near Kloterneuburg, where the 80th

,ngineer eplacement and Training Battalion was committed.During the night of 6 April two 75-mm antitank guns of the antitank alert company, which had arrived from Yreistadt, were setat the exit from the city toward Klosterneuburg, and two otherson the opposite bank of the Danube.

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Three heavy (75-mm) antlaircraft guns were placed inposition on the Guertel (belt line), near the west railroadstation, to reinforce antitank defense. However, the advanceof superior enemy forces toward that statation forced th e 2d2SPanzer Division to withdraw, fighting, to the Guertel andabandon the station. During this action contact with ther ight (north) flank, where the situation was doubtful, wasinterrupted for some time, but contact with the 3d SS PanzerDivision on the left was maintained. After severe fightingand in spite of determined resistance, this division finallyhad to abandon the southeast railroad station to the enemy.

The enemy likewise gained ground, although slowly, againstthe 6th Panzer 'ivision on the Prater. The fighting there wasespecially severe.

On the same day strong Russian forces crossed the Danubein & northwesterly direction above hainburg and the MarchRiver in a westerly direction north of Hainburg.

On the afternoon of 7 April, by order of the Sixth SSPanzer Army, I was placed under the II SS Panzer Corps. Thusafter three days wy duties as combat cornmander hd in practicecome to an end. My subsequent assign ent was as regional com-mander of the northern half of the town My position wassimilar to that of a division com, ander, although I retainedthe title of combat commander.


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$ I-160 lDuring the night of 7 April stronger elements of the

auehrer Grenadier Division came into the city and were de-ployed for the purpose of regaining the west railroad station.But the enemy was also observed to be assembling strongerforces near that station. Further north, the Hitler Youthbattalion, ably led and bravely fighting, completed its cover-ing assignment in the vicinity of Huettendorf, disengageditself from the enemy according to instructions, and took upnew posit ions in the Hohe Warte area. It was reinforced bythree 75-rm antiaircraft guns withdrawn from th e vicinity ofthe west station and placed under its command.

.On April the battle of Vienna gained momentum on thewhole front, from th e northern part of the city through theKahlenberg, the uertel, the arsenal grounds to the Prater .Russian t nk attacks on the road from Xlosterneuburg along thebanks of th e Danube were halted. (Two tanks were put out ofaction by the two 75-mm antitank guns.) However, the Kahlen-berg, occupied by a air force alert battalion of poor combatefficiency, was lost.

Strong enemy forces attempting to advance east and north-east along the Alserstrass wreere attacked on their southernflank by a pa zer infantry regiment from th e Fuehrer GrenadierDivision. The regiment was advancing to retake th e west rail-road station but, seeing the Russian forces, turned north and

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cS p 8-160 . 19- .stopped them. Major General Weasely, killed later in thevicinity of Mannhardabrunr, gathered the alert units stillavailable into the Rossau barracks and set up a makeshiftdefensive line running in th e general direction Friedee-brueoke--University--Rathaus, and thus preserved a certaincontinuity on this front. However, the attempt to close thegap in the left wing of the Hitler Youth battalion north ofthe Friedensbruecke was unsuccessful.

The rest of th e front he dReconnaissance operations were carried out against enemy

forces which liad crossed th e March and Danube Rivers on bothsides of hoinburg, My command post was moved from the ViennaM ili tary Headquarters Building t tthe Deputy Corps Headquartersof the XVI. Corps at Stubenring 1.

e. Withdrawal Aoross Danube Canal, Abadonment ofCity (9-10 April). During the following night and the nextday, 9 April, the fighting continued with increasing violencealong the entire front. The Hitler Youth battalion had firmlyestablished its all-around defensive position from NusadorferSpitz on th e Danube Canal, through Grinzinger Allee and Silber-gasse, to the Danube Canal north of the Priedenabruecke andaround the Rohe Warte. In the morning enemy armored reconaie-sance patrols probing this position were turned back. Likewisea later enemy attack launched against the sme position from


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1-160north and northwest was repulsed with high casualties. Mean-while, on the east bank of the Danube Canal, between Nus-edorter Spitz atd th e Sriedensbrueoke, an alert battalion wasstitioned to give tactical support and possibly assist thewithdrawal of the Hitler Youth battal ion. This ws the onlycase in which reserves were employed according to plan.

Almost simultaneously with the attack on the Hitler Youthbattalion other enemy forces farther south, advanced southwardand in the early after oon took possession of th e Franz .JosephRailroad Station and Joined up there with units advancing fromthe west.

In the late afternoon the front line of the Bitler Youthbattalion was vigorously attacked from the north, west, andsouth. After initial resistance, th e battalion had to be with-drawn across th e Danube during th e night, to avoid annihilationat the hnds of greatly superior forces.

The withdrawal was carried out i good order ad, as be-.fore, without major casualt ies. The enemy, however, followingon the battalion's northeast f lank, gained a foothold on thecanal lock near iussdorfer Spitz. Valiant attempts to dis-lodge th e enary from th e lock fai led Can the other hand, theotinued attempts of the enemy, or 9 nnd 10 April , to cross

over to the islan between the Danube Canal rad !iver--probablyin order to push on t the Florisdorfer Bridge--were beaten


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back and many casualt ies were inflicted. tha 9 Apri l the north-west railroad bridge was blown up because of the imminent dangerthat it might fall intact into the enemy's hands. On th e sameday the northern railroad bridge was l ikewise demolished. Itwa no loiger useful to us and would have had to be destroyedsooner or later anyway. :Moreover, the engineer units com-iitted there without possibility of reinforcement were urgent-1y needed elsewhere.

The unfavorable development of the tactical situation allalong th e Vienna front, th e continuous dwindling of th e Germantroops in the face of growing enemy forces, and above all theappearance of enemy troops on th e north bank of the Danube,called for new decis ions and measures, notwithstanding thervliant efforts of the three field divis ions still fightingwest of th e Danube Canal and th e 6th Pnzer Division at therater. On the evening of 9 April, therefore, II SS Panzer

Corps Headquarters ordered the abandonment of th e center ofthe city and a withdrawal acrosa the Danube Canal during thenight.

I also directed th e demolition of the Danube C nal bridgesin order that forces could be diengaged to fight against enemyt roops advancig westard along th e orth ban of the river.These %forcesad . already olashed with the el eents of theFuehrer Grenadier Division that had been advanced southeast on


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en~ B-160Q 2%9 April to the ihrhood &:oiss Thzro c14'. .vrhernorth, ." these n M other erman units st il committed ont ~.tside of .teube lve wee withrawn aross P e anali 00n od i and wirthot much. Ia.trf-rencc by Mthe enemiy,

,d t sntact ith the 6th Nanzr Ivi :o o a 'est i ed, J.pn

csbi ir#; cortn ot wit-. th e 1: S Pc. z tof I'e relievedof my duties and ordered to the Corps coonmnd post at 3isam-

~4.. f r r x .h? kt~~r n~t~: ; CLL~~~Wr~ddB-cvsrtat d our QQLrat 't, y .toorsb-

roitr A otr nes G rv line, .. L7ov : .wed uT t it. 12 ; a'-wumed figting ye: ore At nul V ig nagat the fisti rs

of the I V-1dk 3di P:- ,cp5. : . : +er t4.i swve es 1bii&.J OJ Li A .4 .sr .f. ?; o..cnu r4 pi .y n thewerea ea4;abli-shs B on the as t. banak of the Da J Ca~inal a:-idl,heP . it Ar..w . Li V .ubc zct'a. (1s -lUii

h ighting rth o the 'Paxub- l ie' iw C (r i.er emas'hglyvr. "he ewm i nned slowly 4t..r zS..+itead l:: no rth-

westerly ireoticn


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D r. . t -v rit " f 10 Aprfl thz iti ,r 'Youth b t:1iom+tlry t V rt W"; o- t. Danube ndthen t

I~~~i rt of .t.. -b( tob t th c ) '1 tzeI.l 4ifl Panze r C or mi

.urri tce tw o ioi* .; a srior e'emy suaceededV3 cr iy1A th 3V~U,.{~~;qe 'Ce4 n 'AR>u jpoir tc g Ke,#'P( npd inthe Ptater diztriot dSb9 ~i.t. the ec m.ttud, 6th Panwz r D i s ion3,and reduced tAe :front 1ine, of the 3d D1 1z~jvir to abj.11Ow b jr 'e ro d thl F'J1JV 4ttVJ. r 1X;t~ andJAHti

'I, 12 Apri. at 31 ;


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ft 13-160

night of 12 April. The beich Bridge was intact but under firefrom enemy infantry heavy weapon or the r ight bank of theDanube. On the left flank it was securely guarded by Germanforces

It was clear that th e situation had changed basicallysince th e issuance of th e order from Bisamberg. Therefore,changing the plan oBn my own authori ty, and reporting the changeto the IX 8S Panzer Corp, I decided to withdraw my troopsaoross th e river, but to hold th e reduced bridgehead untilnightfall Crosig the Danube by day would have entailed highcasual t ies because th e Florisdorfer Bridge waa under enemy fire.

iighting became incredibly severe. German troops, prac-tically out of amunition, suffered almost continuous enemy firerom all typea of weapons* $-34 tanks were employed against

them on all streets leading to Pater Abel Plats, and even onthe railroad tracks alon the Danube. The small number ofsoldiers occupying the bridgehead resisted unflinchingly fo rmar hourA but suffered high casualties.

A strong Pussian attack launched in the morning from theeich Bridge toward the loriaFdorer Bridge and against the ex-

posed left wing of the 2d %B Panzer Division nearly crushed androlled up.the entire bridgehead. The situation wac saved bywithdrawing th e front line some 100 meters and by archoring theleft flank on the Danube River, but by evening the bridgehead


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was narrowed to a semicircle of about 200 meters radius aroundthe Pater Abel Platz.

At nightfall the withdrawal to the north bank of theDanube began in accordance with instructions First all thewounded were taken to the rear; ther the whole bridgehead wasvacated,* At 2400 th e Florisdorfer Bridge wa demolished. Theenemy did not interfere. Why the :ussiars did not react withmore energy is incioprehensible, for they could easily haveannihilated the forces holding the bridgehead and captured thebridge probably undamaged.

The ooLander of the 2d SS Panzer livision, S4 ColonelLehmann, ws wounded during these engements on the afternoonof 13 April. y command post was at first in the same areaas that of this division. Later, headquarters were againestablished together at 'resdener trasse near th e southweaternramp oW the lorisdorfer Bridge. During all of this period,I observed the fighting, often at close range, and in the firstline during the final battle for the loridorfer bridgehead.

The eich Bridge was not demolished, but the enemy madeno attempt to pursue us there.

, Withdrawal to Leobendorf--Treadorf--Ma nhardsbrunn(14-15 April). Covering parties had been posted on the leftbank of the ainube, to insure the eventual withdrawal of unitsfighting on the right bana:. O 14 April these covering parties

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were reinforced, particularly opposite the Reich Bridge whichunder heavy fire, could not now be destroyed. I first assumedcolmasnd of the covering parties, but during the day, I wasisatructed to relinquish this authority and place myself againat the disposal of the II S8 PaMzer Corps.

Meanwhile strong Russian forces had pushed forward alongthe northern bank of the Danube and were approaching the suburbsof Vienna o. that side. This approach led to severe fighting,specially in the Lobau sector held by the Fuehrer Grenadier

Division, and to the north. On 14 April the enem unexpected-ly crossed the Danube north of Klosterneuburg and succeeded ineffecting a deep penetration toward Koenigsbrunn. Some enemyforces turned from eiring toward Gerasdorf. It no was im-possible to hold the ?ermar front north of the Danube bank, whiran approximately along the line Stadlau--Kagran-Leopoldau--Ltammersdorf-Hagelbrunn, ead to the north thereof. During theright of 14 April therefore this frot line was withdrawn toa new position, Leobendort--Treadorf--iannhardMbrunn, north ofkarneburg. arge quanti t ies of materiel, especially artillery,were lost during this action. fevertheless, the ew front wasestablished.

h. Dissolution of Staff (16 April). The oo and postof the .I SB P anzer Corps was at first located at Ober-Rohrbch;l ter it was moved to UBter-Sierndorf. y attachment to the


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Ms #; B-160II S Panzer Corps was terminated on the evening of 14 April.On 15 April my staff at Roselfeld was dissolved. (. 16 AprilI went to my ne command post at Schloss Schallaburg, neare l, with a reduced staff, and assumed new duties o command-

ing general of the St. Poelten sector, where I remained untilthe capitulation to American forces.

1. Generala. Durin the whole battle of Vienna the enemy con-

tinuously employed a large number of figter planea which at-taoked division artillery batteries in posit ion on the leftbak of the Danube, strafed our forces, especially the 6thPanzer Divisio, ir the Prater are, ad disrupted th e trafficacross the bridges during th e day. Althgth these attacks didnot effect severe losses in personnel, they did seriously impede our freedom of movement They also caused great havoc ithe city, whi suffered much more from enemy air raids thanfrom th e actual fighting in the streets--except possibly atsuch focal pointa ts th e rai lroad statioss, the Prater, thedistrict between th e Danube Canal and .iver, and th e Peter Abellats. toreover, these areas suffered more from enemy fYre

than from ours, curtailed s it was by sortge of a,,unition.The enemy air force had complete command of the ar over thebattle area, with no opposition fro us.


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b. The iussians carried out their land attackssystematically: first, armored reconnaissance with mountedinfantry, ther an assaul t by tanks and infantry with heavyweapons, especially trench mortars, in support. When theyencountered resistance they usually stopped or withheld theirattack temporarily and tried to reach their goal from anotherdirection. Typical of this method were their tactics designedfor accomplishing large or small-scal e envelopments (the advancthrough the Vienna Woods, bypassing Vienna to the west, and theattempted envelopment near Foedling). Also typical was theircustomary infiltration through woods or built-up areas. Thearea west of Vienna, and especially the city itself, offeredexcellent opportunities for these tactics. The Russians re-peatedly demonstrated their skill in this procedure. It couldhave been coped with by strong, experienced infantry unite,but such units were not at our disposal .

. The performance of the hostile' artillery did notin general exceed th e normal expectation fo r such supportingfire. Stronger Russian fire concentrations were evident atthe foal points and especially during the fighting fo r theisland between the anube Canal and river. In this area evenmultiple rocket guns of large caliber were used. Occasionallythere were sudden concentrations of fire on the center of thecity, in th e area round th e Parliament Building, th e Hofburg,


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and th e M ilitary District Headquarters. Reinforcing artillery(corps, army, or GHQ artillery) apparently was not employed.The general impression was that of a methodical and relativelyslow, sometimes even hesitant, attack. This was surprising inview of the great superiority of the enemy, in numbers andmaterial. This deliberate, cautious offensive was all the moreinexplicable in view of the enemy's undoubted knowledge of ourweakness.

S The extent to which the Russian tactics of sparing theirforces may have been due to expected aid from the Austrianresistance movewent is not known. The loss of Vienna was in-evitable. tven the length of the battle, providing that noconsiderable reinforcements of fresh troops could be brought upcould be predicted and calculated through a comparison of thestrength of the opposing forces in the light of the tacticalsituation, without special allowance for the Austrian resistancemovement. However, itt is not only possible, but probable, thatthe enemy ws directed occasionally by inhabitants of the cityand perhaps even by guides who were adherents of the resistancemovement.

d. The cosfiguration of th e terrain and the presenceof wooded areas made observation difficult except toward theeast and southeast. It was even more difficult inside the cityThis difficulty faced by us ve the nemy covered routes ofapproach, ese cially through infiltration.


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owever, t the sme time it helped corceal the Mnuericalweak!ess of our forces and favored reonnaissance and minorcombat actions. he terrain did not facilitate either sidesa.observation fo r heavy infantry weapons and artillery. On theothar hand the terrain sout and southeast of the city wasrather ope and level. Outside the city we had the best op-portunity for observation.

2. gri tjgaloe . s. These were th e most critical momentsduring the fighting:

a.o Thebdvance of the Russians through the ViennaWods toward the orth, in th e direction of Pressbaum, duringthe niht of 4 April and their turning moveent eastward to-ward Vienna. Northward and along the western railroad line,a main route of approach from th e west, was one of th e weakestsectorsit our entire front line. Except for the Hitler Youthbattalion, only units of poor combt efficiency were availablefor that sector. th e point of junction with the 2d 88 PazerDivision ov the left (south) flank was situated there. Therefore th e danger tha te udden enemy advance toward the eastinto t he city would penetrate to th Ee Can l and Danubebridges was very great. It was averted by coXmitment of theHitler Youth battalion and some alert units.

b, The ussirn advance on 8 April northeast andeastward along the Alser trasse. t first no d efense forees

*R0-


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s t -460were vai lable . The enemy could theorfore have occupied theDanube Canal bridges near the Rossauer Barracks easily. Thisdanger was averted by a northward shift of the panzer grenadierregiment of the ?uehrer Grenadier Division, which had beenadvancing south of the sertrase towaroward the west in orderto take the west railroad station. This regiment stopped theenemy advance. We were also able to establish a makeshiftblocking and security line between the rieden Bridge and theRathaus, but not to extend it to the left flank of the HitlerYouth battalion stationed north of the bridge.

c. The Russian advance from the vicinity of theReich Bridge toward the lioridorfer Bridge on the morning of13 April. his advance might easily have crushed the leftflank of th e 2d SS Panzer Division near the northwest railroadstation and probably have caused withdrawal of the division'sentire front line, the annihilation of the division itself,and th e apture ofapture of th e Floridrfer Bridge intact The situ-ation was restored temporarily by withdrawing the front lineto a reduced bridgehead of about 700 meters radius around the

loriadorfer Bridge, though it remained endangered until theretreat across the Danube that night.

d. The unexpected crossing of the Danube by theenemy near Klosterneuburg on 14 April 1945 and the loss ofKorneuburg, together with the deep penetration from the east


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toward Koenigabruan. These events might have led to theaihiilation of Vtie. front held by th e II 85 Panzer Corpa, ex-tendig in the general direction Stadlau--Kagran--Leopoldau--Staimeradorf-- agelbruna, if it had not been possible to die-engage the corps fro the enemy during the night of 14 April.The disengagement was acomplished with great lose of materiel,and the front was reestablished on a line running approximate-ly north of Korneuburg--Manrhardsbrunn.

53 Final Coment. The course of events during th e battleof Vienna proved th e correctness of the original estimate ofthe situation-. did not have the authority to decide whetherthe battle of Viena hould or should not take place-. hen thebattle was ordered, the only poasiblity, fo r command and troopwas wholehearted f ight ing. Commendation is due to the fielddivision and th e Hitler Youth battalion; in the case of otherunits commendation must be qualified or even denied altogether.

Seen as a whole, the battle of Vienna was regret table froma humain point of view, however, it tied down very strong Bus-ian forces, and made the establishment of a new front line

south of the Danube possible. It also made possible, underenormous difficulties, the evacuation o.a ome 9000 wounded fromthe battle rea n their removal westward.


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APPENDIX A

List of units

Designation Neme of commanders Time

A. SuFperior authorities Commander in Chief Afternoon of1) 6th SS Armored Army Oberstgruppefuehrer 3 April toet qarre d ASy Dietrich afternoon of2) HeadQuariers 2d 28') Headquarters 24&a- Commanding General 7 AprilArored orp eaOberstgruppenfuerer afternoon ofquerters Bittrich 7 April toevening of

14 AprilsvWSn9^ tS tPE

r.'. YU; ilU.1 -- Yi- IW-Y4Y.-~l '--~Q l )-1~i - -LI--I*~ 111*Y~~YA'nT l l X'lqIIYlB. Subordinate authori-I) gCombat trooeAlert tintsof ihe re -placement and trainingunits of garrisonGreater Vienna and Mili-tary District XVIIAlert units consistingof soldiers on leave,convalescents,andstragglers from fieldforcesNavy alert unitsAir Force alert units,including antiaircraftunits

iames have beenforgotten

4 April toafternoon of7 April, somto morning o10 April


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3 1 -160-List of units (Cont'd)

Deaignatio Name of commanders Time- - .- :....... -- . ..... m :- ' - . ...... . : --- - :- --- --- w,,e .._, U 1-- l Y Y-. . ._ -Y .; ._ --- ' - '- -- - -'- -Antiairoraft units ofthe 24th AntiaircraftDivision, detailed fo rground fightingPolice alert uaitsUnits of the localVolkesturm consistingpartly of organizationsof the Party (politicalleaders, .tional Social-ist 1otor Corps, HitlerYouth)2)

3) geurit , |oloeIehrmaeht PatrolService ViennaConstabulsry4) 2ul troostemaiintg hospitalsand other sanitaryestablishments not yetevacuated or in thecourse of beingevacuated

Commander: Maj. Gen,Griea ha~me r

Names forgotten

Comander: MaJBiedermannNames have beenforgotten

a u0 arl..alllM torte1) 6th Armored Division Corm nder:(Army) Maj GeQ. Baeron.von laideafels2) Fuehrer Grenadier Co aderDivision (Army) aj. Gen. Meder

6-14 Aprilevening4-14 AprileveningSadvanced elements from6 April

aa.rwo~.~~' - r-- jl-*iW~~ -~-illl -IUYW I___II~L-.IIY-* -~-- IYY ~LLLIPI YII--_- ) YI-blUI~YI~-Y-t-LI-CC

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IMS -160 -35-

List of units (Cont'd)

Designation Name of commanders Time3) 2d S Panzer Commandert SS Stan- (4-14 April

Division, "Das Reich" dartenfuehrer evening;)Lehmann, from 14 April (re ining el8S Standartenfuehrer ments subordKreutz .ated on

13 April)4) 3A SS Passer. Commander: . Ober- 4-14 AprilDivision, "Totenkopf" fuehrer Becker evening


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..K62 9 -1

APPENDIX B

Evaluation of TroopsOrder of Battle

Strength CDesignation Personnel Materiel Combat Efficienc

Alert units of 11thRecomnaissance Re-placement and Train-ing BnAlert unite of 4thand 33d Armored Re-placement and Train-ing B.Alert units of 17thAntitank Replace-ment and Training

2 cavalrytroops,fullstrengthNo record

I company

Alert battery of 96th 1 batteryArti l lery Replace-ment ad TrainingAlert units of 80thand 86th gineereplacement andtraiing Bn

3 companies

small armsmachinegunm

light in-fantryweaponsno tanks4 mstz75-mm anti-taik guns3 75-mmheavy anti-aircraftguns4 105-i AAhowitzers

small armscomplete

well led, averag

well led; goodcombat efficiencemployed asiifantrywell led; goodcombat efficienc

subordinated to6th Armored Division, details umknownwell led, goodcombat efficienc


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StrengthDesignation Personnel Materiel Combat Efficiency

Alert units of 17th 1 company small ar s inexperienced;Administrative poorly led, poorReplacement and combat efficiencyTrainiag BM

Alert units con- No detailed mostly poorly led, andstating of soldiers record. At small the most parton leave, convaP th e time, arms moderate to poorleseents and about 8 bat- ombat efficiencstragglers from talionsfield forces endavy

A ir Force alert About 3 bat- small badly led; poorunits talions arms combat efficienc

AA units of 24th 2 AA regi- oomplete command average;AA Division detail- meats, Combat eff ic ienced for ground about 75 average, in partfighting good

Police alert I police small commad poor;units regiment arms inexperienced;3 police 1 police poor combat ef-battalions tank ficieny, noenthusiasm

Units of the No record small uninstructed oomlocal Volkmturm arms mand; no 'combatexperietce, verypoor combat ef-ficiency, with sexceptions

13-160pak~


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*trengthSDeligatio Personnel Materiel Combat ftficieney

Hitler Youth 3 companies some pan- well led; highBattalion some anti- zerfausts, combat morale;

tank detach- some arms willing .nd eagermeats to fight; highcombat efficiency

Alert units of 17th 1 under- small arEms just sufficientRignaleplacement strength insuffi- personnel andand Training la company iently materiel to keep

equipped up and maintainwith sig- local installa-nal equip- tions; poor radioment equipment (fight-

ing troops weremostly connectedby loal tele-phone network);willing to work

Armed toroes Not con- emall lot dependable, aspatrol service stant arms command belongedto Austrian re-

sistance movement;improved laterConstabulary No record small At first fair,

arms but deterioratedgradually

Supply troops -------- --.-- -I Except forsanitary estab-lihmenits, nosupply troops wereavailable; thusthe bulk of alertunits d pended onthe supply in-atallations of thefield divisionsand experit cedgreat diffiulty

'"---a~~~~~~Q, -W%~~ai- V,,4 A,4. A.VSW4" vjllj~ Yy


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StrengthDesignation Personnel Materiel Combat Efficiency

6th Amored About 2 adequate Very well led;Division (Army) excellent combatefficiency

luehrer Grenadier 100% 100% Well led; highDivision (Army) combat efficienoy2d SS Panzer About 50% adequate Well led; combatDivision efficiency better

than average3d S Pa.Ser About 25% adequate well led; goodDivision combat efficiency

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combat vienna in '45

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