comaroff, john l. rules and rulers. political processes in a tswana chiefdown

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Rules and Rulers: Political Processes in a Tswana Chiefdom Author(s): John L. Comaroff Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 1-20Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801061Accessed: 18-08-2015 10:52 UTC

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RULES AND RULERS: POLITICAL PROCESSES IN A TSWANA CHIEFDOM

JOHN L. COMAROFF

University of Manchester

Most Southern African political ethnographies have relied heavily upon the analytical assumption that careers of indigenous politicians are largely determined by ascriptive factors. It is shown here that, among the Barolong boo R2tshidi (Tswana), ascriptive rules rarely determine the devolution of authority; rather, they represent a code through which the complexities of political competition are ordered and comprehended. Indeed, ascription and achievement, far from being opposed principles of political determination, constitute co- existent levels of a single reality. Competition for the chiefship, moreover, is not limited to interregna; it is a continuous process, of which succession to office is one potential outcome. Under these conditions, the meaning of political rules, and their systematic relationship to the political process, require re-assessment. In providing such a re-assessment, an attempt is made to explore its implications for a comprehension of genealogical manipulation and political history among the Barolong.

Introduction Most Southern African political ethnographies have focused almost

exclusively upon institutional and constitutional arrangements as their fundamental unit of analysis. This tendency is, perhaps, the corollary of a form of jural determinism which assumes the classical dichotomy between ascription and achievement; indeed, it takes as given that stated rules should actually determine the careers of actors in the public arena, at least in an aggregative sense.1 Of course, Gluckman (e.g. 1965: 138sq., I64), among many others, has demonstrated that the existence of clearly defined rules rarely precludes competition for power. And, in fact, several ethnographers have alluded to the manifest contradictions in this respect between stated prescriptions and everyday processes among the Southern Bantu.2 But, once noted, the problem is seldom taken further. Accounts proceed as f stated rules did determine the course of the political process; and transfers of office which do not follow upon a straightforward application of the rules are regarded as anomalous (cf. Goody I966).3 In some Southern African chiefdoms, such 'anomalies' have occurred with remarkable frequency. Yet this, it seems, has not been viewed as sufficiently important to warrant a re-assessment of underlying assumptions.

Man (N.S.) 13, 1-20.



2 JOHN L. COMAROFF

In Order and rebellion, Gluckman re-stated his position on the nature of rebellion in the following terms (I963: 36):

I stress that I do not think that the 'rebellious structure' of African polities is significant only when a rebellion occurs. The possibility of rebellion is something that King, subordinate rulers and subjects have to take into account all the time. Thus we have to see 'rebellion' as an ever present, persistent, repetitive process influencing day-to-day political relations.

Perhaps the term 'rebellion' has been broadened here to the extent of becoming a virtual synonym for 'political process', and 'rebellious structure' remains an elusive concept. But the statement does suggest two critical ideas, especially in the Southern Bantu context. First, it stresses that competition for power is a ubiquitous feature of everyday politics and is neither precluded by rule nor limited to interregna. And, second, it implies that succession to office-in the form of successful rebellion-is not primarily concerned with the replacement of personnel when this is necessitated by such contingencies as death; rather, it represents one possible outcome in a constant competitive process. In addition, Gluckman (I963: 36-7) suggests that there is likely to be ... an oscillation of power between the king and the "barons" during the course of a reign. . . .' Now, if we divorce these insights from the crude functionalist assumptions often associated with, but ultimately relinquished by, their author (I963: 20), they may serve as a basis for re-assessing the nature of Tswana political processes and, especially, the meaning of stated rules in organising everyday political action.

The Barolong boo Ratshidi, or Tshidi, comprise two chiefdoms, one in South Africa and the other in Botswana.4 It is upon the South African Tshidi, and specifically upon competition for their chiefship, that my analysis will concentrate. Like all other Tswana,5 the Tshidi share a well-defined repertoire of rules and ideologies associated with their apical office. These may be divided into two sets: those regulating access to the position and those governing its incumbency. The rules, however, cannot be assumed to determine the outcome of indigenous political processes. If they are read literally, and examined in the context of the history of the office, 8o per cent. of all cases of accession to the chiefship represent 'anomalies'. Under such circumstances, the jural determinist assumption simply cannot be entertained: stated prescriptions do not, in general, decide who is to succeed. Hence it becomes necessary to make a rather different assumption about the nature of Tshidi rules and processes. I shall argue, then, that the transmission of office in this system is determined by factors extrinsic to the stated prescriptions; and that the meaning of these rules is an empirical problem sui generis, to be resolved after, and not before, the fact.

After discussing the indigenous rule-sets, I shall outline a case of competition for the chiefship. This case is a historical one (I9I I-I9I9), and is selected because it describes a series of events in which most of the essential elements of strategic political manipulation among the Tshidi are readily evident. Finally, by examining the stated rules in relation to this material, I shall attempt to account systematically for their meaning.



JOHN L. COMAROFF 3

II Rules ...

While they conceive of the chiefship as the epicentre of their political universe, the Tshidi combine an esteem for the office with a highly critical attitude towards its holder. The chief, although entitled to formal respect and ceremonial precedence, is regarded as a fallible human being who may or may not be powerful, and who may rule efficiently or ineptly. Theoretically, he is responsible for the management of every aspect of public life; in practice, however, the extent of chiefly control varies widely. Moreover, Tshidi ideology suggests that, while access to authority is determined by birth, political power depends upon individual ability. At the same time, the recruitment of talented office-holders is held to be a basic requirement for the achievement of the indigenous ideal of good government. The means by which this apparent dualism is resolved lie in the properties of the rules themselves.

(a) Rules associated tvith accession to office The prescriptive rules which ostensibly determine access to office are

derived from agnatic ranking principles which apply to kinship groupings throughout the society. Hence they are known to all and are in no sense esoteric. The chief, in formal rhetoric, is born, never elected. Once installed, he rules until his death.

The primary rule6 is a straightforward formulation of the principle of primogeniture:

i. The eldest son of the principal wife of a chief (kgosi) is his rightful heir.7

The remaining rules appear to define this status, and to provide for situations in which an heir is lacking:

2. The principal wife of the son of a chief is selected for, and betrothed to him by his father or guardian and the chiefly advisers when he is a young boy. She is the first woman to be betrothed to him.

There is no defined period in the young boy's life during which this should be done, but the arrangement should be made public. It is also significant that the heir's principal wife is not necessarily (indeed, is very rarely) the first woman he marries.8

3. When a chief dies without an heir, a close surviving agnate must cohabit with his widow (go tsena mo tlung; lit., 'to enter the house') and raise sons on his behalf. Also, when a chief dies without having married, or having had sons by, a principal wife, this house must be entered (or created)-even if he had sons by other wives.9

Although it is a younger brother who should 'enter the house', the rules do not specify that this must be a full brother. In fact, the identity of the genitor is secondary-a matter of preference only-and a wide range of agnates may actually undertake the task. Another point to note, since it is crucial in strategies of rule manipulation, is that there is no time limit upon the fulfilment of this prescription.



4 JOHN L. COMAROFF

4. If any of the chief's wives either die childless or prove to be barren, a substitute (seantlo) must be supplied without further transfer of bridewealth. Children of the seantlo are credited to the house of the barren woman.10

5. If an heir predeceases his father, right of accession passes through the dead man to his senior son. (If the deceased has no heir, rule 3 must be put into effect.)

6. When a chief dies without having had sons and none have been raised in his name, right of accession passes to his younger full brother; if he has no full brother, it passes to his eldest brother of the second house, and so on. Order of proximity to office is defined by age within (and descent from)1I ranked houses.

While rules 4 and 5 are straightforward, rule 6 appears to be residual, for it should only operate if the previous ones have not been applied. Subsequent prescriptions, however, demand that the next-in-line who is old enough may be required to act as regent when the heir is still a minor. This necessitates the constant ordering of proximity to office, and rule 6 apparently serves this end.

7. A chief cannot be deposed.

The Tshidi often stress this: the office-holder may be scolded publicly or even punished. But, if he is a chief, he holds office until his death.

There are four additional prescriptions which I refer to collectively as regency rules'. The Tshidi themselves confirm that these belong to the accession set.. In indigenous terms, they are simply an extension of the norms associated with the guardianship of a dead man's property, position and dependants (see Roberts 1972):

8. When there is not an heir old enough to assume office, a regent (motshivareledi) must be designated. He muist be the next-in-line in order of seniority who is also old enough to rule.

9. The regent enjoys all the rights and duties of office and may retain assets accruing to him while acting as incumbent.12

IO. A regent must hand over to the heir when the tribe decides he is ready to rule. i I. If a regent exceeds his authority, neglects his duties or refuses to hand over when the tribe

decides, he may be removed from office.

I have referred to these rules throughout as prescriptions. This reflects an important dimension of their underlying logic: the Tshidi suggest that they must be enforced and tend to treat reality as if they either have been or will soon be (cf. Ardener 1971: 454 sq.), It will become clear that this prescriptive logic gives internal coherence to the rule-set and imparts form to strategic political activity.

Although rules i and 7 give it an inflexible appearance, this set comprises a repertoire of potential manipulations. For it allows a wide range of competing claims to be made without contravening its prescriptive nature. Moreover, despite formal statements to the contrary, it permits the replacement of office- holders. Indeed, the accession rules provide a systematic basis for ongoing political competition and a means for imposing order upon it. Before this can be explored further, however, it is necessary to consider indigenous ideas regarding incumbency.

(b) Rules associated with incumbency These rules are not addressed to the content of the ruler's functions. Rather,

they concern the means by which the affairs of the chiefdom are conducted. 13



JOHN L. COMAROFF S -Tshidi Thutlw Tau Montshiwa Kebalepile Lotlamoreng (Io)

(4) -Wessels (Besele) Tlale (5) Boyes

4+ Lwanika -Tawana Seetsela

_-Makgetla -Badirile Tshipiyareng

(6) Ditselatsela Mokoto

-Bakolopang (g) Mosarwa Sehularo

_Sekgoro -Marumolwa Lekoko(7) Richard

Ditau ) Paul Lekoko

+Borale -Seleri Selebatso

TiTego LSekano LDithako

-Seru -Tshaoka ^ Seleri _Seru

-Toko Mathe Tokonyane Kolante

Banka -Montshiwana Nchc -Mashi

Malotswana -Segomotso -Tawana -Seetsela Tshipinare

(3) -Tlale -Molwakapelo -Motshegare Bathobatho

-Tatinyane -Mokholokholo -Setilo

-Digwamaje --Motshegare --Molema

-Phetlhu -Makgatla -Kepadisa Sebotho

-Ditselatsela Ratlatsana -Magogobi

-Motshegare -Phetogane

-Molale -Mokhaka L-Mokhakanyane

Tshipiethata -Majuro -Molema

Ramoketekwa -Molema -Israel -Maatlametlo

E-Oposiri -Palo Kabo -Tawana -Joshua -Segakolobi

(8) S-ebopiwa __Mokgabo -Bafiti -Telo

-Silas Modiri Morara Sefetogi

Teleshwane -Phetogane -Saane Stephen

-Andrew Setlogelo "'BathoBatho

-Mochoche Bogale Saane Kebalepile

-Gabebi I Tshosa -Lwanika

-Tshupaneng Taolelo Telesho

LGaseitsiwe -Rabodietsho Ramakoloi Ketlhopilwe

-Tau LGareipope LKalsara

-Tawanyane -Kampa Bereng -Seru

Moshwelaa- Lekgetho -

_Masetlha -Legae> -Lekone -Matshekaa-

--Mokgothu > _U-Leshorno -- ---

--Makgetla (2)

(I)

| unlisted descendants

E division between houses

FIGURE I. (I), (2) denotes incumbents and their order



6 JOHN L. COMAROFF

Tshidi place a high value upon consultation and participatory politics. Hence most formal statements regarding incumbency stress that the chief must seek, and heed, the advice of his subjects, whether it be proffered informally or in public. Deliberations concerning legislation and administration take place in three spheres-a close circle of advisers, a council (lekgotla) composed mainly of headmen, and the public assembly (pitso)-and he is responsible for encouraging free speech and the formulation of wise policy within each of them. In theory, any chiefly decision handed down in these contexts is binding. But, in practice, the ability to execute new policy depends largely upon the incumbent's legitimacy. Essentially, his success is assessed in terms of his material and governmental achievements, which the Tshidi subject to constant evaluation.

As this suggests, the Tshidi hold that legitimacy is a negotiable value. Indeed, this underpins their theory of incumbency and is systematically expressed in a model which describes the relationship between the performance of a ruler and his legitimate power. According to it, the rights of an incumbent are not immutably predetermined; rather, he and his subjects are constantly engaged in a transactional process in which the former discharges his duties and, in return, is delegated the authority to influence policy and people. The degree to which his performance is considered to be satisfactory is thought to determine the extent of the office-holder's legitimacy, expressed in the willingness of the public to execute his decisions. This, of course, is a simplification: power is not allocated by popular consent alone and chiefs do not watch impassively as their regimes are evaluated. Nevertheless, the incumbency model represents a medium through which debate over chiefly performance and legitimacy may proceed.

These rules, then, constitute the formal elements of the conceptual repertoire which underlies Tshidi political processes. In order to examine how this repertoire is expressed in competition surrounding the chiefship, I now describe the events which occurred in respect of this office between I9I I and I9I9. Figure i, which represents the Tshidi royal genealogy as it is accepted today, provides a background in terms of which the dramatis personae may be located.

III . . . and rulers

(a) Background When Chief Montshiwa died in I896, two rival factions had emerged

around the chiefship. The core of the larger one, led by Lekoko, comprised many of the jural descendants of Tau. The other included several descendants of Tawana, headed by Joshua Molema. A third grouping, the boo Makgetla, also represented a major political force. The descendants of a junior brother of Tshidi, they had frequently supplied the ruling line with wives. During this period they were aligned with the Tau faction, which contributed significantly to the hegemony it exercised over the chiefship.14

Between I896 and I9II, the Tshidi had two chiefs, Besele and Badirile. Badirile, in fact, had been backed by the Tawana faction which, for a brief



JOHN L. COMAROFF 7

spell, enjoyed a superordinate position of power. Early in his reign, however, ,it became clear that his incumbency was going to be a failure: he dispensed with his advisers, alienated tribal land and ran the Tshidi into debt. For reasons discussed elsewhere (Comaroff I973: ch. 6), the Tawana faction was nevertheless reluctant to see him deposed. The Tau grouping conspired in this, as they obtained public agreement for an arrangement whereby Lekoko, then the most influential man in the chiefdom, would act for the chief. The latter died shortly after.

The successive accessions of Besele and Badirile, who were sons of different wives of Montshiwa, had implied a transformation of the royal genealogy. When Besele was installed, he was generally viewed as the rightful heir of his father. His elder brother, Kebalepile, had died without having had sons and none had been raised in his name as yet. Rule 6 therefore applied, and Besele acceded as the new chief of the Tshidi-a status which was stressed at the installation. His mother, Tsadinyana, was popularly regarded as having been Montshiwa's principal wife. Thus the genealogy read as in fig. 215:

TAU TA WANA

MONTSHIWA = Tsadinyana = Majang = Gaeshele

KEBALEPILE BESELE o BADIRILE BAKOLOPANG

-->unlisted siblings J, unlisted descendants

FIGURE 2.

When Badirile acceded, however, it was also as chief; the Tawana faction argued successfully that Besele had merely been acting as a regent for him. Hence, in retrospect, the former chief was relegated to a relatively junior rank among Montshiwa's sons, and the genealogy came to read as in fig. 3:

TAU TAWANA

MONTSHIWA = Majang [Gaeshele]* = Tsadinyana

BADIRILE BAKOLOPANG KEBALEPILE BESELE

* seantlo

FIGURE 3.



8 JOHN L. COMAROFF

By this transformation, Majang was recognised as having been the principal wife of Chief Montshiwa, a view which her brothers (the sons of Tawana) and their descendants had long asserted.16 She, however, had no sons of her own, so they had claimed that her BD, Gaeshele, was her seantlo and had born the heir on her behalf. Badirile's accession had affirmed this status. The implication of his installation as chief, in terms of Tshidi prescriptive logic, was that he had to be his father's senior son (rule i). And this meant that his (ural) mother must have ranked first among Montshiwa's wives. The house of Tsadinyana and her sons, by extension of the same logic, was now relegated to a more junior rank.

(b) The accession of Lekoko (1911) Badirile died in i9ii. By then, the Tawana faction was grooming his

younger brother, Bakolopang, as a new candidate. But he was still too young to succeed, which explains why his followers had consented earlier to Lekoko's assumption of control on behalf of Badirile. This leftJoshua and his supporters without a candidate at the time. Joshua and his younger brother, Silas, remained the outstanding figures within the faction. But the former was not himself a serious contender for the chiefship. Although rich and powerful,17 he had a reputation for autocratic behaviour which made him an unpopular choice for the Tshidi at large. It seems that the long reigns of Montshiwa and Tawana before him had cut across the generations and had left the ruling group with few strong candidates of suitable age.

The leaders of the Tau faction, believing that the Tshidi would not accept another inexperienced or inept incumbent, suggested that Lekoko himself take office. Before, he had had good reason to avoid this, although it would not have been difficult for him to find a genealogical rationalisation. (Indeed, his daughter suggested two possible ones to me in I969.) Lekoko's own strategy also had longer-term ends. He was apparently aware that, when he died, leadership of the faction would pass to his less forceful brother, Paul. For them to have any chance of preventing the designation of Bakolopang under the control of Joshua, it was necessary to start preparing their own future candidate. Lekoko chose a little-known member of Montshiwa's segment, Lotlamoreng. This man, who was not yet twenty, was a migrant labourer and is said to have had little interest in public affairs. The Tau faction leader, however, persuaded him of the scheme and brought him back to the capital.

At the meeting called to discuss Lekoko's accession, the latter declared his intentions: he would accept the nomination provided it was recognised that he was not the heir to the chiefship. Rather, the rightful person was Lotlamoreng, on whose behalf he would act as regent. The logic behind Lekoko's action had several aspects. First, his assertion of Lotlamoreng's seniority implied his ownjuniority; and, in terms of the rules, this meant that he had to be a regent. Second, he was conscious of the dissatisfaction among members of the Tawana faction over his accession. The declaration of regency, however, did something to alleviate this. For Lekoko's sponsoring of Lotlamoreng, who was younger than Bakolopang, gave the rival faction an



JOHN L. COMAROFF 9

implicit assurance that they would later have the opportunity to campaign for their own candidate. Had Lekoko been installed as chief, they might have feared the transfer of the office to Marumolwa segment, within which they had few friends. Of course, his designation as regent did not preclude this; but, while Lekoko was arguing Lotlamoreng's claim, the issue remained open. Thus the strategy transmuted potentially intransigent opposition into tacit, if grudging, support on the part of his opponents. Third, according to the regency prescriptions, Lekoko was entitled to all the resources of office (rule 9) and suffered nb deprivation by not being a chief. He already enjoyed considerable power and his dejure status did not affect this; in this respect, the strategy had no political costs. Indeed, it demonstrates how politicians may also invoke the rules to prepare future campaigns and to limit opposition in the short-term.

Lekoko reigned successfully until his death four years later. As one indigenous source18 states: 'In patriotism and wisdom, he was a second edition of Montshiwa. His reign was brief but brilliant.' In order to avert factional conflict, Lekoko stressed the centrality ofJoshua and Silas as advisers. He did not, however, fail to argue Lotlamoreng's claims, stating continually that the future chief was being trained and reiterating the genealogical justification for his designation. Joshua, on the other hand, kept Bakolopang's claim alive.

(c) Joshuia's regency (191.5-1917) Lekoko's death, in I9I5, greatly weakened the Tau faction. Its leadership

passed to Paul, who was left to confront Joshua over the competing claims of Lotlamoreng and Bakolopang. The genealogical arguments in terms of which debate proceeded were as follows:

The Tau faction claimed that Lotlamoreng was the senior son of the late Kebalepile who, they argued, had been Montshiwa's heir. Moreover, they said that Montshlwa had publicly affirmed Kebalepile's status, and had called the (former) Resident Magistrate to a meeting to witness this. In contrast, the Tawana faction pointed out that Lotlamoreng had not been fathered by Kebalepile, who died two years before the former's birth. Paul and his supporters acknowledged this, but held that Lotlamoreng was nevertheless the legitimate son of Kebalepile, whose principal house had been entered (rule 3). Their argument was complicated by the fact that Kebalepile's widows had no children. But they circumvented this by asserting that Lotlamoreng's mother had been a seantlo for Kebalepile's senior wife; i.e., both Lotlamoreng's biological parents were held to have been substitutes for his jural ones. Bakolopang's followers denied all this, arguing that nobody had entered Kebalepile's houses, and that the seantlo claim was dubious. In any case, the house of Kebalepile's mother was only second in seniority to that of Majang among Montshlwa's wives. Gaeshele, Majang's seantlo, had borne sons who were thus senior to Kebalepile. (This view, of course, had been generally accepted when Badirile was installed; see fig. 3.) Contrary witnesses, produced by the Tau faction, countered that the seantlo for Kebalepile's widow (i.e. Lotlamoreng's mother) had lived with Montshiwa himself, and that he had raised this heir in his son's name-an arrangement which transformed biological fatherhood into jural grandfatherhood. But Joshua himself replied that a father cannot enter a house for his son. Lotlamoreng's protagonists asserted, however, that the rule was that every man must have an heir; it was not so important who the actual father was. Furthermore, if Montshlwa had said that Kebalepile was to be his heir, Majang could never have been his principal wife and Gaeshele's status was irrelevant. In turn, the Tawana faction spokesmen answered that they knew nothing of Montshiwa's putative statement. Like other leading men of the



I o JOHN L. COMAROFF

present, they had only been boys at the time. But they did know that Gaeshele had been a seantlo for Majang: their fathers had certainly sent her without receiving any bridewealth (rule 4). As her eldest son, and thus the eldest son of Montshiwa's first house, Bakolopang should be chief.19

The absence of a strong Tau faction leader seems to have contributed to the growth of support for their opponents. In addition, Joshua and Silas exploited their considerable control over economic resources to recruit followers at this time. Paul, apparently realising this, appealed to the Resident Magistrate to reject Bakolopang's designation if it did occur. The Resident Magistrate, who had observed the events surrounding the Chiefship, wrote to the Department of Native Affairs (I8/8/15), summarising the dispute:

Intrigue has been well afoot since the Chief s [Lekoko's] death .. .; on the one side the Molemas are striving to gain power, and on the other side are the followers of the house of Kebalepile. Now the Molemas are urging John's [Bakolopang] so-called rights and it is alleged that a marriage between one of the Molema girls and John will be arranged-the obvious object is to get power into the Molema hands.... Though long since of age he [Bakolopang] has never taken any interest in the councils of the tribe but has consorted with the riff-raff of the town mainly with the object of securing liquor ... I cannot possibly recommend him.... Moreover, I feel that the domination of the Molemas would not be in the interests of the people. The leader of the house of Kebalepile ... is Paul, a younger brother of Lekoko, who has much to recommend him but unfortunately is too weak.... I could not recommendJoshua Molema for reasons already given.

The Resident Magistrate thus recorded objections against all candidates, except Lotlamoreng whom he did not even mention.

After a series of meetings, the Tawana faction secured agreement, by a small majority, for Bakolopang's designation. Even some members of the Tau faction were worried about Lotlamoreng's inexperience, and found it difficult to support him wholeheartedly againstJoshua's concerted efforts on behalf of his rival. But many had misgivings about Bakolopang too. Apart from being young and possibly irresponsible, he was widely viewed as the puppet of his sponsor. The marriage alluded to in the letter, between Bakolopang and Silas's daughter, had indeed been arranged and few did not realise that they were consenting to the transfer of power to Joshua. Many of those who backed Bakolopang later said they were unhappy about it, but had had no alternative: Lotlamoreng was only I9 and Paul was not a suitable regent.

The Resident Magistrate wrote immediately to Pretoria urging the rejection of Bakolopang. The Native Secretary read the evidence and decided to installJoshua as Acting Chief for two years (N.A.D. Letter no. 675/F.7i 8 of 25/9/I 5). This provoked unanimous outrage. Joshua himself was discomfited by it, realising that many who had followed him in backing Bakolopang did not want him in office.20 In fact, the Tshidi ignoredJoshua's appointment entirely: the inner circle of the Tau faction continued to administer the chiefdom and the lekgotla was called regularly by Paul. With the exception of Joshua and Silas, most accepted this arrangement and supported Paul's presiding over the chief's court. Joshua, having been placed in a difficult position, did not assert himself. The government, however, took no further



JOHN L. COMAROFF II

action: the temporary arrangemnents persisted until 19I7, when Joshua's official period of regency ended.

Unlike Joshua, Bakolopang did continue to assert himself. A series of incidents, in which he was found guilty of unruly behaviour, ended in his being fined by the lekgotla. Joshua, realising that these events were endangering Bakolopang's career, persuaded him to leave the capital temporarily.

(d) The accession of Bakolopang (1917) Since the designation of Bakolopang (1915), the Secretary of Native Affairs

had not heard anything further from the Tshidi concerning the chiefship. Taking the Magistrate's advice that the indigenous decision be ratified, he therefore recognised Bakolopang officially. By now, however, support alignments had changed: the Tawana faction no longer existed as before. It had, in fact, become the Molema faction, as many of the other descendants of Tawana had transferred allegiance to Paul and his protege. Although he might have persuaded the Tshidi to designate Lotlamoreng immediately, Paul counselled his allies to wait. Arguing that another demand upon the Administration could again elicit an undesired reaction, he suggested that they allow Bakolopang to discredit himself. Apparently Paul was convinced that this would happen soon.

The installation of the new chief meant that the genealogy remained as it had been after the accession of Badirile, his elder brother (fig. 3). Bakolopang's career proved to be much as expected. Joshua persuaded him to appoint his son, Sebopiwa Molema, as tribal secretary. The latter managed to attend to some of the administrative affairs of the chiefdom; but Bakolopang quickly ceased to consult advisers or the lekgotla, and eschewed his governmental duties. By the time Joshua died, in i9i8, he retained little power. Few would execute his orders or legal sentences and many headmen refused to attend the occasional meetings which he summoned. When he commanded that they be fined for this, he could persuade nobody to attach their cattle. Soon most ceased to send tribute or plough for him. Paul and his followers withdrew from the public arena, having no intention of supporting Bakolopang's regime. The Molema faction was acutely embarrassed by this turn of events, for which it was being widely criticised.

After the death of Joshua, Bakolopang further discredited himself by harassing Lotlamoreng. The latter, who had been advised by Paul to keep away from Bakolopang, then wrote to the Magistrate in protest:

With the exception of one or two, the majority of the leading councillors and the Barolong nation criticize the regime ofJohn Bakolopang owing to his bad manners and behaviour, and having no character which could command respect. He also has an unnecessary opinion of himself as chief ... John Montshiwa assumes that he is the paramount chief and acting for nobody.... I deem myself to be the paramount chief of the Ratshidi Barolong by virtue of birth.... I am a married man, I see no reason why the time should be prolonged, for I am quite capable to watch my interests, andJohn to act for me is absurd since he is my equal with the difference of one year....



I2 JOHN L. COMAROFF

The Magistrate also wished to see Bakolopang deposed, as he had consistently refused to cooperate with the Administration. But official policy, in respect of the Tshidi, was not to interfere in the designation or deposition of office- holders.

(e) The accession of Lotlamoreng (1919) After further meetings it was agreed publicly that Bakolopang had been

acting for Lotlamoreng, who should now assume his 'rightful' position. The Molema faction did not resist and the government was duly petitioned by the lekgotla. This petition asserted both Lotlamoreng's ascriptive right and his ability, and detailed Bakolopang's poor performance as regent. Significantly, those signatories who had changed allegiance now opposed a genealogical claim they had accepted before-and advocated one which they had previously rejected.

The petition was accepted and Lotlamoreng installed in I9g9. Having been transformed in accordance with his ascriptive justification, the genealogy came to read substantially as represented in fig. i. One implication of this outcome was that all incumbents since Montshiwa had been acting for Lotlamoreng. For it follows from Tshidi prescriptive logic that only those in the direct line of descent could have been chiefs. This is appreciated by Tshidi themselves. Witness the following statement, written by a Morolong in a pamphlet:

Lotlamoreng ... was confirmed by the Union Government on I7th November, I9I9.

Theoretically, all the chiefs after Montshiwa had only been regents-acting for this son of Montshiwa's eldest son, Kebalepile.

In retrospect, Tsadinyana once more became the principal wife of Montshiwa, and the succession order restored Kebalepile to the position of Montshiwa's heir. Lotlamoreng reigned until his death in I954.

IV Conclusion

Although it has only been described in bare outline, this case material demonstrates that the Tshidi chiefship is not reducible to an ascriptive status or a simple institutional arrangement. Rather, it embodies the ideational and organisational framework within which the process of competition for power occurs. In this sense, it is the fulcrum of a dynamic political system. The rules associated with accession may be clear-cut at the formal level. But the fact is that, up to and including Lotlamoreng, only two of the ten Tshidi incumbents are now recognised as having been chiefs, though all except Lekoko and Joshua were installed as such. Moreover, returning to the analytical insights of Gluckman with which I began, it is clear that the transmission of office here is not primarily a matter of the replacement of personnel (cf. Firth I960; repr. I969: I45 sq.). For the competitive process is constant, and the succession of a new incumbent is just one of its possible outcomes. Indeed, succession is the ultimate reward for success in the public arena.



JOHN L. COMAROFF I 3

If the prescriptions associated with office do not necessarily determine its transmission, they certainly do impart form to the competitive process. This suggests the existence of a cogent indigenous political logic which underpins the Tshidi system. As I have already implied, the essential elements of this logic inhere in the rules themselves, and these may usefully be comprehended at three analytical levels.

(a) Rules and processes The case history indicates that the flexibilities of the rule-set are utilised

repeatedly by politicians in the course of competition for power. Lotlamoreng, especially, invoked both parental substitution prescriptions (3 and 4) when justifying his status as heir. He then argued for the application of rule io (that regents must hand over when the tribe decides) in his effort to accede to the chiefship. The effect of his success was to affirm his own seniority and to relegate a rival who had, only two years before, been publicly recognised as the senior jural descendant of Montshiwa. The fact that the automatic application of the rules does not decide accession is again demonstrated by the fact that the same men who had supported Bakolopang's ascriptive right (and rejected Lotlamoreng's) in I915 and I9I7 argued for the opposite case-on the same 'evidence' in I9g9. Clearly, what had changed in the interim was the distribution of relative support. This, in turn, was due to several factors, among which were Bakolopang's disastrous career in office, Lotlamorang's growth in stature and a concomitant change in factional alignments. These events confirm that ascriptive status may be a correlate of political success-and not vice versa.

In short, the potential for manipulation which is built into the rule-set provides a means whereby ambitious royal actors mayjustify claims for office. Rules 3 and 4 open the way for a wide variety of such claims. Given the mutability of 'evidence' in political debate, any member of the ruling descent group who does not have a surviving elder full brother may conceivably legitimise his right to the chiefship. Hence, far from specifying a successor, the accession prescriptions create a field of competitors from which candidates may arise, either by their own efforts or by those of a powerful faction (cf. Gluckman I963: I5). And, of course, while genealogical reckoning constitutes the idiom of political argument, it can never determine the outcome of itself. In fact, many informants state explicitly that this arrangement facilitates the emergence of efficient regimes. For the best candidate-or, if not, the one backed by the most able men-will tend to succeed.

It is, however, one thing for the rules to encourage rivalry for the chiefship and quite another for them to permit ongoing competition. While rule 7 (a chief cannot be deposed) suggests that such rivalry must be confined to interregna, the case material demonstrates that competition does not cease when there is an incumbent in office. This implies the existence of a mechanism which allows for the removal of a chief without contravening the prescription. As the culmination of Bakolopang's career indicates, the answer to this problem is to be found in the regency rules.



14 JOHN L. COMAROFF

Rule i i states that a regent may be deposed. This mean-s that anyone may suffer this fate if he is first relegated to the status of regent. By now it is clear that, in claiming the chiefship, a pretender must assert his jural seniority within the ruling descent group (rule i). One corollary of a successful campaign is that his version of the royal genealogy becomes publicly accepted. If that campaign was aimed against an incumbent (rather than at the vacant office), it follows that this man is now recognised as having been junior to his rival. In terms of the prescriptive logic, this means that he must have been a regent and should hand over the office.

In other words, the regency rules provide a means whereby those who rule ineptly or lose support (the two being correlated in indigenous theory) may be replaced without contravening rule 7. As such, it permits ongoing competition for office without challenging the emic theory of ascription. Regency, then, does not simply have the function of ensuring the continuity of office- holding: it has the more complex one of mediating and maintaining the continuity of the political process itself. Of course, it is crucial that, under rule 9, the Tshidi do not distinguish, linguistically or substantively, between chiefs and regents while they are in office. For, if a rigid distinction were made, it would severely limit the potentiality for the re-ordering of rank, either prospectively or retrospectively.

The regency rules have a related logical function: they allow for systematic genealogical re-ordering in such a way that the past may be made to correspond with, and legitimise, the present. Each transformation of the genealogy in the case history demonstrates how the status of earlier incumbents was altered to accommodate the reality of the period. Hence, for example, although Besele died as a chief, the accession of Badirile-and the genealogical manipulation which this necessitated-made him into a regent; at Lotlamoreng's installation it was pointed out that all the incumbents since Montshiwa had been acting for him, for this was the corollary of his ascriptive justification. Thus the successive alterations of the genealogy represent a map in terms of which the logical properties of the rules transform the past in the light of contemporary political contingencies.

In summary, while rules i and 7 encode the ascriptive basis of the system, rules 2-6 admit manipulation of rank and the rationalisation of competing claims. The regency rules, however, mediate these two tendencies. On the one hand, they allow for the deposition of incumbents and ensure in perpetuity that the chiefship is an achievable goal. On the other, they permit the legitimisation of processual outcomes in ascriptive terms. As a total set, then, the accession rules provide the systematic basis for ongoing political competition.

From the standpoint of the politician, these arrangements may be exploited in the course of his career either to campaign for office or to act as a king- maker-a role whichJoshua assumed as a means of obtaining defacto control of the chiefship and which Lekoko played effectively until I91I. From the position of the Tshidi public, they constitute a set of principles through which the ideal of good government may be realised. For, in indigenous theory, accession and incumbency are closely related. The Tshidi explain the



JOHN L. COMAROFF I 5

subjection of their office-holders to perpetual assessment as an expression of their desire to ensure efficient and benevolent regimes. Whilst he rules as a 'real chief', and can demonstrate the quality of his regime, the ruler cannot be removed: no amount of campaigning by his opponents will convince the public that he should be, for a chief cannot be deposed. But, if his performance falls below a critical threshold, he will come to be viewed as 'no longer a real chief'. In such a situation, the emergence of a popular rival may result in his relegation to the status of a regent who must hand over to the rightful heir. Some Tshidi informants suggest that the genius of their system lies in the integration of the accession and incumbency rules. For, by constraining opposition against efficient chiefs, it ensures a measure of stability. On the other hand, the allowance for the replacement of inept ones serves both to give expression to the aspirations of politicians and to expedite the achievement of good government. Moreover, it guarantees, at least in emic perspectives, the participation of the public in the process.21

This level of analysis demonstrates that the 'anomalous' cases of succession are not anomalous at all. The fact that 8o per cent. of past office-holders are not recognised as having been chiefs is simply the logical extension of Lotlamoreng's ascriptive legitimisation translated into genealogical terms. Indeed, 8o per cent. of these past holders were installed as chiefs. A future claim, phrased in different terms, could alter the genealogy in such a way as to relegate Montshiwa and Lotlamoreng to regents and elevate other past regents to chiefs. The anomaly, it seems, is a function of etic methodological perspective, not of Tshidi political history as they understand it.

(b) Rules as resources In the most general sense, the manipulability of the rules itself equips

politicians with a means both for asserting their own legitimacy and for validating their actions. But there is another, more specific, aspect to the properties of rules as resources. Because of the nature of the set, there are always a number of alternative ways in which a candidate may justify his claim to office. The latter, or his sponsors, are compelled to select between them. Now it can be shown that the justification selected is seldom the simplest one available. For there are more complex strategic problems at issue, and the decision may directly affect the success of an individual's career. This is best illustrated with reference to Lotlamoreng's case:

It was widely accepted that Lotlamoreng had been fathered by Chief Montshiwa. The simplest legitimisation for him would have been that his mother had actually been his father's (rather than Kebalepile's) principal wife-or the seantlo for her childless elder sister, who had been married to Montshiwa. For reasons which need not detain us here, this straightforward argument would certainly have been tenable. But Lotlamoreng's more complicated one, asserting descent from Kebalepile rather than Montshiwa, had two important advantages. First, had he claimed to be descended directly from Montshiwa by a separate house, he would have excluded himself from the one which had raised Besele and Tawana (see fig. I), each of whom had adolescent children. While this house promised no effective short-term support, it could become a powerful unit. Had it been relegated to a position of juniority (the



I 6 JOHN L. COMAROFF

implication of a justification by Lotlamoreng through Montshiwa), its members might later respond by claiming the chiefship in terms of their relationship to Besele. On the other hand, by declaring himself its senior member, Lotlamoreng might not have guaranteed the elimination of subsequent opposition from this quarter, but it did converge the interests of this grouping with his own. For any future external campaign against him would threaten the status of the segment, and thus encourage it to support Lotlamoreng. In contrast, direct descent from Montshiwa would have made him vulnerable as the only member of his house. Also, affiliation to Kebalepile's house allowed him to influence the marriages of the late Besele's children; as their senior FB he could also claim guardianship over their property. The second advantage lay in Lotlamoreng's relationship to the boo Makgetla. Although his mother came from this grouping, Besele had also married a woman from it, who had borne his eldest son, Tlale. If Lotlamoreng had claimed affiliation to a different segment from Besele, he risked losing Makgetla support later :22 he and Tlale shared matrilateral kinsmen, and there was nothing to stop them backing the latter against himself. For the outcome of such rivalry would not affect the senior Makgetla men; their relationship to the incumbent would be the same. However, by arguing that he was Kebalepile's son, and hence descended from the same house as Tlale, Lotlamoreng ensured that Makgetla interests coincided with his own. For, if it were ever suggested that Kebalepile had not been the heir of Montshiwa (and Lotlamoreng not the chief), it would follow that Besele, his younger full brother, could not have been either. Thus it would have been difficult for them to support Tlale against Lotlamoreng, at least in the short-term. In fact, this strategy did yield the advantages it had promised: later, both the descendants of Besele and the boo Makgetla proved faithful and powerful allies when Lotlamoreng faced campaigns against his incumbency.

Like Lekoko's invocation of the regency rules in order to perpetuate the hegemony of his faction, this example demonstrates the potentiality of the rule-set for subtle manipulation in the cause of recruiting support and eroding rivalry. It also illuminates the Tshidi view that wisdom is the political resource par excellence.23

(c) Rules as a code Finally, it will be apparent that the prescriptive rules also constitute a

cultural repertoire in terms of which political processes may be explained and the complexities of everyday competitive action rendered comprehensible. In this sense, achievement and ascription may be seen as two levels of one reality, rather than as opposed principles. The case material makes it clear that winning the chiefship is a matter of achievement, an achievement gained largely by controlling resources and capabilities which are extrinsic to formal institutional arrangements. Yet such outcomes are rationalised in entirely ascriptive terms: the successful competitor becomes the rightful heir, and his mother's status as his father's principal wife is affirmed after the event (cf. Gluckman I963: 14-15 for the Zulu case). By invoking the rules in this way, the Tshidi maintain a performance-oriented system within the context of an agnatically ordered small-scale society. Moreover, in so doing, they resolve the fundamental dualism in their political ideology-i.e. the emphasis upon good government and the delegation of legitimacy to able men on the one hand, and the theory of ascription on the other.

In exploring further the implications of some of Gluckman's later



JOHN L. COMAROFF I7

suggestions concerning the nature of rebellion and power relations, I have sought to examine the meaning of rules in the context of competitive processes among the Tshidi. There has been no attempt to isolate and specify the factors which underlie political success. But it is clear that such factors are extrinsic to the rule-sets themselves. Some have emerged in the course of the description: for example, the manipulation of support alignments; the exploitation of economic resources; the dependence upon intellectual acumen to create effective strategies. The systematic analysis of political achievement, however, is a separate question which is not considered here. Nor does this account of the meaning of rules pretend to exhaust the problem. But it does raise a number of fundamental issues. For it indicates that, among the Tshidi, political rules are far more complex than has been made out for the Southern Bantu-as are indigenous theories concerning the dynamics of power relations.

In so far as it seeks to comprehend the relationship between rules and political processes among the Tshidi, this analysis is addressed primarily to the particular logic of their system. Nevertheless, its wider implications may be explored at two levels. First, we could look to other ethnographic cases to establish, in purely empirical terms, whether comparable patterns exist elsewhere. This, however, is not my immediate concern. It is no doubt possible to select any number of centralised African societies at random and to show that succession to, and incumbency of, given offices (or sets of statuses) may be the object of competitive rivalry; or that indigenous rules are employed to rationalise outcomes. For this is to note nothing more profound than the fact that these societies 'have politics'. Indeed, it would simply return us to Gluckman's views, the starting point of the present account. But the essence of this exercise does not lie in the mere affirmation that the Tshidi have politics. Rather, I have sought to examine the encompassing logic of a system in which the transmission of power, its ongoing negotiation and its coding are articulated elements in a constant process; a process which is mediated by the properties of a specific set of rules.

The second implication, which is of more general methodological consequence, refers back to the classical dichotomy between ascription and achievement as competing principles of political determination. As I implied at the outset, and as the Tshidi case confirms, this dichotomy is fundamentally misconceived. In logical terms, neither ascription nor achievement can meaningfully be said to comprehend a system in itself, even as an ideal-type. Apart from simplifying and reducing the phenomenal world to a level of absurdity, the very concept of an ascriptive political system would appear to be self-contradictory. For, if the devolution and incumbency of authority, or access to power, were entirely a function of non-negotiable ascription, the system would not admit political action as this term is generally understood today. Similarly, in order to have any enduring currency or social meaning, political action and achievement must be organised by means of established cultural categories. In other words, the logic of a political system necessarily resides in the dialectical process whereby the ongoing negotiation of power relations is mediated in terms of the cultural order. 'Ascription' and 'achievement' are not linked as cause to effect, or as independent variable to



I8 JOHN L. COMAROFF

epiphenomenon; indeed, it is in their dialectical relationship that political culture inheres.

One corollary would appear to result directly from this. It is quite clear that, in many African societies, there are offices whose content is primarily formal or constitutional. It is hardly necessary to point out that systems vary widely in both the nature of their offices and the loci of generic political action; or that the two are not necessarily correlated. Moreover, where any particular office is circumscribed in purely ritual or constitutional terms-and the possibility itself must be ideal-typical-its devolution may in fact follow ascriptive principles. However, ascriptive determination would appear to be inversely related to the power dimension of status: the greater the degree to which any such status entails access to the management of power relations, the less likely it is that its transmission and incumbency will actually be ascriptively constrained. Of course, the ideology of ascription may provide a cultural repertoire in cases where office does have a political dimension. But once this dimension is primary, ascriptive rules are transformed from principles of determination into elements of the political dialectic.

These considerations, in summary, have implications for the analysis of succession. The transmission of office has generally been treated as a bounded institutional arrangement whose function resides in the continuity of the political and social order. In these terms, the rules which govern it are seen, a fortiori, to represent the normative means of effecting an ideal state of affairs (cf. Goody I966). Even those writers who have stressed the ubiquity and teleological value of rivalry and rebellion have not departed far from this view, except to attribute functional value to the competition which may arise in terms of the rules. It is not apposite here to enter debate on the general issue of functional explanations of political institutions. But, despite their internal differences, these approaches share two specific assumptions which may be questioned in the light of the Tshidi ethnography. The first is that succession is an independent and discrete process, which may be isolated for analytical purposes.24 The present account, however, demonstrates that the transmission of office need not be a bounded sequence of events. It may equally be one moment in the constant flow of everyday action, a moment at which success is encoded in a particular fashion. It is not necessitated by contingency, but is one possible outcome of the ongoing political process. The second assumption lies in the opposition between the 'ideal' and the 'real': the ascriptive rules are held to embody the former; while practical action, which deviates from it, constitutes the latter. As I have sought repeatedly to demonstrate for the Tshidi, this assumption obscures the very essence of the political process. For ideology and its management are intrinsic elements of this process, and not adjuncts to it. After all, the creation and dissemination of meaning is a critical feature of political transactions. In this respect, the relationship between rule and process, like that between ascription and achievement, must be treated as problematic, and not as given. The failure to do so, I would argue, results either in the elimination of politics from political anthropology, or the reduction of the logic of political systems to a mere epiphenomenon of the so- called 'manipulating man'.



JOHN L. COMAROFF

NOTES

I should like to record my gratitude to Drs A. P. Cohen, R. P. Werbner, J. S. La Fontaine, and Jean Comaroff, with whom the ideas expressed here have been repeatedly and valuably discussed. It should be noted that parts of Section II of this article have been considered, albeit more briefly and with different purpose, in two recent essays (I974; I975).

1 For a review of the literature in support of this characterisation, see Comaroff (I973). A recent 'synthesis' of the Southern African ethnography (Hammond-Tooke I974) also serves to confirm it, as does Schapera's earlier (I956) summary account of government and politics in Southern Africa. One notable exception to the generalisation, however, is Kuper (I970).

2 See, for example, Schapera (e.g. I938: 53 sq.; I963: I59 sq.) and Jones (I966: 6I sq.). 3 It was this tendency among Sotho-Tswana ethnographers which led Gluckman (I963: 22)

to suggest that his view of the political process might not apply to the Tswana in the same way as it did to the Zulu and the Swazi. The evidence, as he read it, implied that 'Tswana rules of succession do not produce that same doubt over who is the main heir' (I963: 22). It will be central to my argument that this is not the case; but Gluckman's interpretation of the ethnography adds weight to my characterisation of the analytical assumptions underlying it.

4 Fieldwork was conducted among the South African Tshidi for I9 months in i969-70, and among the Botswana Tshidi for I2 months in I974-5.

5 For a full account, and a description of Tswana political structures, see Schapera (1938; I 940).

6 Although Tshidi can list the rules when questioned, they treat them as self-evident and rarely recite them spontaneously. I have numbered them here for the sake of convenient reference.

7 The Tshidi, most of whom are at least nominal Christians, rarely practise polygamy any more. The rules are still stated as if they did, however, and many modern claims to office are made in terms of past events and arrangements. Hence I list them in the present tense.

8 While the ranking of commoner wives tends to be correlated with marriage order, that of royal wives corresponds, in theory, to order of betrothal. However, the relative status of wives is often a matter of negotiation (see Section III below).

9 Schapera's account (1938) does not make this rule completely clear for the Tswana in general, as he does not mention the second part of it. Tshidi informants, however, were emphatic that this is integral to the rule-set.

10 According to Schapera (1950: I54), 'the sororate in general was never obligatory'. The Tshidi, when I told them of this statement, tended to answer that a childless woman must have a substitute. But it does not follow that the latter must live permanently with the husband of the woman for whom she bears children, even if the latter is dead. The voluntary aspect of the sororate, then, may pertain to the incorporation of the substitute into the domestic group, while the stated prescription refers to the bearing of children. The fact that it is a prescription, moreover, does not in itself ensure that the rule is always applied; but the reality is usually treated as if it had been, or will be in the future (see below).

11 A prior corollary of rule 5, of course, is that the>sons of a man are always senior to his younger (orjunior) brothers and their respective descendants. Lineal descent takes precedence over fraternal links, and age and genealogical seniority are not coterminous.

12 Tshidi stress, in both word and action, that there is no observable difference between a chief and a regent while they are in office. All incumbents are referred to as kgosi ('chief'). The word for regent (motshwareledi) is only used (i) during an open debate over the relative status of two rivals for office; and (ii) when discussing the status of aformer incumbent.

13 For a more detailed description of Tshidi incumbency rules, see Comaroff (I973; I975). 14 The politics surrounding the Tshidi chiefship during this period are fully described in

Comaroff (1973: ch. VI). The sources for this account are also evaluated there. They include, among others, the extremely detailed unpublished notes and records of two Barolong observers, authors Sol T. Plaatje and S. M. Molema; the extensive documents in the 'Barolong Chiefship' file of the Mafeking District Bantu Commissioner's Office; the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana) archive papers; and statements of several elderly informants who had key information on these processes.

15 Figures 2 and 3 only include those children of Montshiwa mentioned in this account. For the greater genealogical context, see fig. i. It should also be noted that Kebalepile had predeceased Montshiwa and, at this time, had no recognised descendants.

16 The fact that Majang had herself been a daughter of Tawana was one of the stated reasons why the Tawana faction had chosen her (jural) son as their candidate.



20 JOHN L. COMAROFF

17 It would not have been difficult for Joshua to formulate a genealogical legitimisation. Later, the descendants of Molema did try to argue several such claims in a series of bids to remove Lotlamoreng. Matthews (I945: 24) offers a similar view.

18 Historical pamphlet prepared for the 25th anniversary of Lotlamoreng's reign. This was drafted by S. M. Molema and approved by the lekgotla.

19 One aspect of the logic of the Tawana faction leaders' argument should be noted: if Bakolopang's claim was accepted in the terms stated, he could not be a chief, but only a regent for Badirile's infant son. Yet nobody in the Tau faction pointed this out and debate proceeded on the basis of who should be chief

20 This is the only time that the Administration has ever intervened directly in a Tshidi succession dispute. Warned off by the indigenous reaction, local officials subsequently assumed an attitude of non-involvement.

21 For an analysis of political debate, in which the evaluation of regimes and the negotiation of legitimacy proceeds, see Comaroff (i975).

22 The Tshidi constantly assert that men competing for, and holding, positions of power depend primarily upon their matrilateral kinsmen for support-especially against their close agnates, who may be their most bitter rivals (see Cohen & Comaroff I976).

23 This capacity also extends to the manipulation of incumbency rules in the context of political debate, again a problem beyond the scope of this essay (see note 2i above).

24 Gluckman, in his later writings (see above), and Werbner (i969) provide exceptions to this generalisation.

REFEREN CES

Ardener, E. W. 197I. The new anthropology and its critics. Man (N.S.) 6, 449-67. Comaroff, J. L. I973. Competition for office and political processes among the Barolong boo

Ratshidi. Thesis, University of London. 1974. Chiefship in a South African homeland: the Tshidi case.J. S. Afr. Stud. I, 36-5 I. I975. Talking politics: oratory and authorship in a Tswana chiefdom. In Political

language and oratory in traditional society (ed.) M. Bloch. London: Academic Press. Cohen, A. P. &J. L. Comaroff I976. The management of meaning: on the phenomenology of

political transactions. In Transaction and meaning (ed.) B. Kapferer. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

Firth, R. i969. Succession to chieftainship in Tikopia. Oceania, 30, I6o-8o. (Repr. in Essays on social organisation and values (L.S.E. Monogr. 28). London: Athlone Press.)

Gluckman, M. i963. Order and rebellion in tribal Africa. London: Cohen & West. i965. Politics, latw) and ritual in tribal Society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Goody, J. R. (ed.) i966. Stuccession to high office. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Hammond-Tooke, W. D. I974. The Bantu-speaking peoples of southern Africa. London, Boston:

Routledge & Kegan Paul. Jones, G. I. i966. Chiefly succession in Basutoland. In Succession to high office (ed.) J. Goody.

Cambridge: Univ. Press. Kuper, A. I970. Kalahari village politics: an African democracy. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Matthews, Z. K. I945. A Short History of the Tshidi Barolong. Fort Hare Pap. I, 9-28. Roberts, S. A. I972. Tstvanafamily lawv. London: Sweet & Maxwell. Schapera, I. I938. A handbook of Tstvana latv and custom. London: Oxford Univ. Press.

I940. The political organisation of the Ngwato of Bechuanaland Protectorate. In African political systems (eds) M. Fortes & E. E. Evans-Pritchard. London: Oxford Univ. Press.

I95o. Kinship and marriage among the Tswana. In African systems of kinship and iarriage (eds) A. R. Radcliffe-Brown & D. Forde. London: Oxford Univ. Press.

I956. Gov)ernment and politics in tribal societies. London: Watts. i963. Kinship and politics in Tswana history. J.R. anthrop. Inst. 93, I59-73.

Werbner, R. P. i969. Constitutional ambiguities and the British administration of royal careers among the Bemba of Zambia. In Lawi) in culture and society (ed.) L. Nader. Chicago: Aldine.



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