colonial agricultural policy: the non-development of the northern territories of the gold coast

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Colonial Agricultural Policy: The Non-Development of the Northern Territories of the GoldCoastAuthor(s): Inez SuttonSource: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1989), pp. 637-669Published by: Boston University African Studies CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/219058 .

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The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 22, 4 (1989)

COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY: THE NON-DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES OF THE GOLD COAST

By Inez Sutton

The area of the Northern Territories was acquired belatedly, and added almost as an afterthought to the Gold Coast Colony. As with all colonies, it stood in a relationship of dependence to the metropole, the function of the colony being to supply raw materials, especially those exotic to Europe. This relationship has been described in many ways, one of the most useful being Andre Gunder- Frank's metropole-satellite model, which is not so very different from the eighteenth-century mercantilist idea.1 The intention here is not to detail the relationship between metropole and colony,2 but to look at the relationship among parts of the Gold Coast Colony. Here also, Gunder-Frank has provided a useful framework, showing that as well as a center-periphery relationship between metropole and colony, there developed in many colonies a similar relationship between more and less developed parts of the colony. This model, while not as stark as in, for instance, Latin America, is useful in describing the economic pattern in Ghana of a growing export-oriented money economy in the south, and stagnation, or much slower change in the north.3

Growth or development can be defined in terms of per capita income, investment, provision of basic needs, infrastructure, or other indicators. The growth of one sector of the colony cannot be seen in isolation from the slower growth or lack of growth in other parts. The development of the southern part of the Gold Coast depended on there not being similar development in the north. This can be seen in the way colonial funds were allocated, and in the fact that southern industries - commercial agriculture, mining, and other enterprises - depended on labor from the north. Here, various studies of labor migration complement the center-periphery analysis. It seems clear from the work of Samir Amin and others that the large-scale supply of migrant labor has precluded

1A. Gunder-Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (London, 1969).

2The application of dependency theory to this subject may be seen in Rhoda Howard's Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana (London, 1978).

3M. Staniland, in The Lions of Dagbon (Cambridge, 1975), Ch. 3, refers to the north as an economic satellite of the south, but stresses that the relationship was one more of indifference rather than of aggressive exploitation. Another approach to the differentiation between north and south - consistent with the above - can be seen in Ladouceur's "regionalism," which he sees as a process having to do with disparities in economic development (and in other areas, such as social services), leading to a "sense of relative deprivation" and a feeling of regional identity, partly in a negative sense. P. Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana (London, 1979), 13, and Ch. 1, passim. On social services, R. Thomas, "Education in Northern Ghana, 1906-1940," International Journal of African Historical Studies, VII, 3 (1974), suggests that the absence of strong economic pressures contributed to the slowness of change through education. In education as well as the economy, the government's desire to maintain the traditional was emphasized.

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638 INEZ SUTTON

development in the areas supplying it,4 and in many cases this has been deliberate policy. Shepherd's more recent work emphasizes this very strongly for northern Ghana in particular, suggesting that labor migration drained the economic resources of the north (expropriating the surplus in terms of labor) and that this was deliberate.5 This discrepancy was reinforced by the separate administration of the north. (Shenton, arguing from the Nigerian evidence, makes a similar point, that the amalgamation of the administration - which happened at a later stage and to a lesser extent in Ghana - facilitated the incorporation of the north into a national money economy, something which barely occurred in Ghana in the colonial period.6)

I would argue that, although many officials emphasized the role of the north as a labor reserve, the drain of labor was itself not a significant a factor in the northern economy as is sometimes implied. Rather, the vision of the north as a supplier of labor conditioned colonial investment, or the lack of it, in northern agriculture and especially infrastructure, so that little was done to create alternatives to labor migration when cash was demanded. The north did emerge to an extent as a food supplier to the south, providing already existing foodstuffs with existing technology, and this was somewhat at variance with demands for northern labor. Much labor continued to come from French colonies to the north, where the agricultural base was more disrupted than in the Northern Territories. Again, the Gold Coast does not present as harsh a picture of the effects of labor migration on the supplier, but Amin's framework is useful.7

The Northern Territories were annexed to the Gold Coast Colony in 1900. The annexation was preceded by explorations of the political situation and economic possibilities of the north. Chief among these explorations was a trip made by George Ekem Ferguson, a Fante geologist employed by the Gold Coast government to visit and makes treaties in the north. In addition to the political maneuvering, Ferguson took note of the possible resources of the north. Some gold and ivory figured in his list, but the major possibilities appeared to be agricultural. The shea-butter tree was widespread, rice and millets grew well in the plains, and the development of cotton, tobacco, and indigo was projected. Considerable caravan trade existed, in livestock and slaves from the north (including what became French territory) and kola from the south. Most of this trade, however, was in the hands of outsiders (people from further north, Hausa, Fulani and Moshi, and from further south), while the trade goods themselves mostly derived from outside. The role of the proposed Northern Territories was in selling food surpluses to the caravans, and extracting tolls and market taxes.

This pattern was to persist well into the twentieth century. Very little local produce was being traded outside the north - some yams and shea-butter going south in the Volta salt canoes - but Ferguson and the early Northern Territories administration believed in the possibility of expanding the production

4S. Amin, ed., Modern Migrations in West Africa (London, 1974), especially introduction.

5A. W. Shepherd, "The Development of Capitalist Rice Farming in Northern Ghana" (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1979), Ch. 1.

6R. Shenton, The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (London, 1986), passim.

S. Stichter, Migrant Labourers (Cambridge, 1985).



COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY 639

and trade of northern staples. Ferguson's writings reflect a great interest in promoting trade, without a clear idea of how extensive this might be. And much of the trade was dependent on routes through French and German territory remaining open. The effects of this political question can be seen in the twentieth century, in the fluctuations of the cattle trade, and of the salt trade from the south, some of which went north through Togo.8

As noted, Ferguson saw the economic possibilities of the north largely in terms of trade. And indeed, in the early years of British administration, revenue in the north derived almost entirely from caravan tolls and market dues. Revenue in the early days was about £7000 a year, and later f12,000, virtually all taxes on livestock and kola (the slave trade having been gradually abolished). It must be emphasized that virtually all the taxable goods only passed through such markets as Salaga, rather than originating in the vicinity. Livestock came from the French colonies to the north, kola from Asante, salt from Ada at the mouth of the Volta, and some few manufactured goods from Togo and the Colony. Such trade, therefore, contributed little to the development of production in the north, except for the sale of foodstuffs to the caravans. This level of production was of long standing, but could not begin to provide capital for new demands, such as investment in transport, health, or education. Government expenditure invariably financed such change as there was, partly out of the northern revenues. There was a small local trade in shea-butter, dawa dawa (the product of another northern tree), and locally made cotton cloth, but this brought in little revenue to the government.9 When caravan tolls were abolished in 1908 in the hopes of attracting more trade, revenues plummeted, and remained negligible until the 1930s, when transport improved somewhat.10

An economic consideration of the north came slowly. By the time the Northern Territories were annexed, the southern part of the colony already had a long tradition of export-oriented cash crop agriculture. Palm oil had given way to cocoa as the major agricultural export, and much government attention was focused on improvement of cocoa and the development of other coastal and forest crops. And although the years from 1874 to 1914 can be seen as a period of transition, with change from "an economy deriving its main impetus from activities carried on at trading stations along the coast to one based on the exploitation of the resources of a continental interior,"11 the notion of "interior" did not in practical terms extend beyond Asante. It is clear from documents in the Ghana National Archives (Accra) that there were only vague ideas at this stage about trade with the north, and the role of the Volta River in facilitating

8G. E. Ferguson, "Mission to the Gonja Districts," cyclostyled, Department of History, University of Ghana (from the Ghana National Archives); K. Arhin, ed., Papers of George Ekem Ferguson (Leiden, 1974); Gold Coast Annual Report, 1910 (Cd 5467 of 1911), 1; I. Sutton, "The Volta River Salt Trade," Journal

of African History, 22, 1 (1981), 43-61.

9Gold Coast and Northern Territories Annual Reports, 1900, 1901 (Cd 788 of 1902); Cd 2238 of 1905, Cd 3285 of 1907.

10Gold Coast Annual Report 1908 (Cd 4448 of 1909); N. T. Annual Report 1916 (Cd 8973 of 1918); Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, 44.

11H. J. Bevin, "Economic History of the Gold Coast, 1874-1914," (mimeographed, Legon, 1960), introduction.



640 INEZ SUTTON

trade. Ivory was noted, and its decline, as Germany annexed the area east and north of Salaga. Shea butter was briefly mentioned, but generally the consideration of the expansion of trade was taken to mean better access to palm oil producing areas, such as Krobo.12

Administrative control of the north took the best part of a decade to achieve; in 1908 the British were still "pacifying the wild tribes" and the Protectorate was not considered an integral part of the British domain. This, perhaps, also helps to explain why less effort was put into the north at this stage.13

The growth of a money economy was also slow. Throughout the early 1900s, and in some places into the 1940s, cowries were the major currency, with some silver coins, and copper and brass rods also circulating. The dominance of cowries as currency indicates buying and selling in only small amounts. Cowries in Lawra district were valued in 1940 at 1,000 to the ld, and for most transactions, even ld was too large a denomination. So, in many cases, large denominations would have been little used. Trade or purchase of European goods was slow to develop, and the demand for money only gradually made itself felt. Generally, demands for money were met by labor migration to the south. Production of cash crops as an alternative was very sporadic through the colonial period.14

Attempts to generate a cash economy in the north were thus erratic. The sporadic nature of these efforts is reflected in the fact that experimental agricultural and livestock schemes were initiated, dropped, and revived several times in the course of the colonial period (and even after). Experiments with cotton as a cash crop, for instance, recur from the 1910s onward, with little, apparently, noted from previous schemes. The same is true of shea butter, livestock, and other products; each new venture seems to have been treated as a complete innovation, with scant reference to earlier efforts (partly, perhaps, because the initiatives often came from different sources). The major effects of this were expenditure of time, effort, and money, with little benefit from past mistakes and successes. The data, therefore, are also repetitious.

Such efforts as were made to upgrade the economy of the north concentrated on agriculture and livestock. Sensibly, there was little attempt to introduce new industries or even new crops; the focus was rather to try to expand the production of existing crops. Thus efforts were made in the direction

1Ghana National Archives, Accra (hereafter GNA), ADM 1/469, no. 46; ADM 1/473, n. 377, ADM 1/489 no. 309; Gold Coast Annual Report 1903 (cd. 2238 of 1905). Even by the 1920s the economic possibilities of the north were considered more potential than actual. See, e.g., A. W. Cardinall, The Natives of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (London, 1921), xi, and In Ashanti and Beyond (London, 1927), 277.

3N. T. Annual Reports, 1904, 1910, 1911.

14Rhodes House, Mss Afr s1207, H. W. Amherst, Informal Diaries, January 1940. The "monetization" of the north and the penetration of commodities proceeded extremely slowly. Van Hear's contention, that the above factors were from an early time crucial in draining labor from the north, to the detriment of northern

development is, I think, overstated, and difficult to quantify. Few figures for labor migration exist, any virtually none for the penetration of currency and commodities in the north. N. van Hear, "Northern Labour and the Development of Capitalist Agriculture in Ghana" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1982), 8-9. See Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 1, for evidence of only a limited market for imports in the north.




of cotton, cattle, grains, and shea butter, already traditional parts of the northern

economy, the surplus of which was sometimes already sold. The question of

expanding production was at times directed toward cash crops for sale either to an overseas market (for instance, cotton) or to the southern parts of the colony (livestock, for example), and at other times simply towards improving the standards of living in the north. Problems of food shortfalls or bare self-

sufficiency were frequent, and consequently the production of cash crops often

unlikely. Although "every endeavor" was being made to develop cash crops, it was said in 1910, at the same time "one must be possessed of great optimism to be able to throw out hopes of much export trade from the Northern Territories."15 Soil was poor in places, and availability of water variable. Overgrazing and erosion also contributed to the precarious nature of agriculture in many places. At times, therefore, the efforts of agricultural advisors were directed toward soil and water

conservation, "mixed farming" (a better integration of agriculture and animal

husbandry, with more use of manure), and more selective stockbreeding. By the 1930s subsistence farming was, in many cases,, supplemented by migrant wage labor and by the purchase of foodstuffs.16 The government was resigned to

showing a deficit in the Northern Territories in the early days, and to the

subsidizing of the north by the south. The nature of the administration's work in the north, Governor Clifford wrote in 1912, was that of increasing confidence and

security among the people, and the richer area of the colony "can be content to share in the furtherance of work of this character, and has no reason to grudge the expenditure."17

Such a situation, however, was unlikely to be acceptable indefinitely, and thus the question of commercial agriculture was continually raised. Taking subsidies into account, the north invariably lagged behind the south by all economic criteria applied to the country as a whole. There were both historical and geographical reasons for this, including the factors of soil, water, feasible

crops, and distance from ports. The natural or introduced crops of the forest

(tropical crops) were more in demand and more easily exploited, with proximity to the coast, and capital and labor accumulated around them from the early nineteenth century. Development of infrastructure and services therefore concentrated in these areas, and further economic activities were attracted there. The mid-nineteenth century palm oil producing areas of Akwapim, for instance, diversified into cocoa at the end of the century, with later investments in additional cocoa land and in other activities such as transport. Hired labor for these ventures was forthcoming from some distance, and increasingly from the north. The regional levels of production in Ghana in 1966, concluded Birmingham

5Annual Reports, N. T., 1909 (Cd 4964 of 1910) and Gold Coast, 1910 (Cd 5467 of 1911).

16N. T. Annual Report Cd 3729 of 1908; A. F. Kerr, "The Frafra Constitution," cyclostyled, Dept. of

History, University of Ghana, from GNA, undated, probably late 1940s; C. W. Lynn, in Gold Coast Dept. of

Agriculture Bulletin no. 34; F. Stockdale, "Report on a Visit to Nigeria, Gold Coast and Sierra Leone"

(Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health, 1936).

17N. T. Annual Report 1912 (Cd 7050 of 1913). Expenditure in the north usually vastly outweighed revenue, and the Northern Territories continued to be seen as a liability. Expenditure was in areas related to

maintaining administrative control, and to encouraging trade and labor for the benefit of the south.

Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, 45.



642 INEZ SUTTON

and others, "can be satisfactorily explained by the availability of capital and labor." The north had always been deficient in capital, partly through lack of government and other investment, and partly through its own lack of income- generating activities (also related to the question of investment), while labor was absent in some cases in significant numbers and for extended periods. The impact of the absence of labor may be debatable, especially in the absence of detailed figures, but the lack of investment is unquestionable. In the north, specifically, "the economic condition of the people is... unlikely to be improved unless they can produce stock or crops for export from the Northern Territories to other parts of the Gold Coast or overseas."18 For the British, however, taking an overview of the Gold Coast and of West Africa as a whole, there was little of economic interest in the north, and discussion of agriculture tended to emphasize the forest products of cocoa, palm oil, and timber.19

Nevertheless, schemes to promote cash crops and commercial animal husbandry were introduced in the north from time to time. One detects in the working of these schemes a pervasive ambivalence on the part of the Gold Coast government, and a begrudging of expenditure. The question of the north as a labor reserve also came into this thinking, and throughout, wage labor in Asante and further south was a more reliable source of cash than agriculture in the north (though cash does not seem to have been required in great amounts, in the absence of a direct tax, and of many trade goods, until the late 1930s).

There was, however, a distinction between the attitudes of Gold Coast government and officials in the south, and those of local officials in the north. An impression gained from the Northern Territories files in the National Archives is that district officers, local agricultural and veterinary officers, and other officials in the north (usually including the chief commissioner) were enthusiastic and encouraging about agricultural programs. Such local officials seem to have initiated many of the experimental schemes, badgering the central government for money and personnel. There was continual conflict over the allocation of resources between officials in the north, who felt that the north must develop a local capital-generating economy (and many improvements recommended by agricultural officers were impossible without an input of capital), and Colony officials, who saw the Gold Coast as a whole, with the north forming only a minor part in economic terms, except for the supply of labor. One effect of these conflicts, it seems, was that many of the schemes initiated in

1W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt, E. Amaboe, A Study of Contemporary Ghana, I (London, 1966), 144 ff; Sutton, "Labour in Commercial Agriculture"; Stockdale, "Report," 81.

19Cd 1600 of 1922, Committee of Trade and Taxation for British West Africa; Cd 5897 of 1890, Report on the Economic Agriculture of the Gold Coast (though, admittedly, this is too early for any detailed

knowledge of the north); Gold Coast Annual Report, 1935-6 ("there is little of economic value in the savannah zone.")



COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY

the north reflected the predilections of the local officials and were piecemeal and very localized, with much duplication and little coordination.20

The insufficiency of transport and infrastructure was another problem hampering the development of money-producing activities in the north. Indeed, virtually all schemes for selling northern products were limited by the cost of

getting the product to the railhead at Kumasi or to the coast. Precolonial trade to and through the north had been in caravans and by canoe on the Volta. These methods sufficed for non-perishable goods consumed in relatively small amounts

(such as kola or salt) or for livestock, but were unsuitable for the large-scale transport of such food crops as administrators were hoping to develop in the north. Small quantities of foodstuffs did go south in the Volta salt canoes, and it was proposed that a cash crop such as cotton could also do so. But this form of

transport was not feasible for the quantities envisaged to make such a crop economically viable. Transport improved gradually, with the extension of the railhead to Kumasi, and with the advent of relatively cheap lorry transport in the north by the 1930s. The availability of regular transport was uncertain even then, however; communication was often hampered by rain, which closed roads and washed out bridges. There is also a 1935 reference to there being no lorries left in the north.21 Obviously, the lorry owners also concentrated their efforts in areas where there were goods to move and these tended, again, to be fewer in the north. This cycle - no exports, therefore no transport, and therefore no incentive to produce for export - can also be seen in relation to investment in transport in the north. As early as 1912, Governor Clifford noted that major changes would have to occur in the north before large-scale agriculture would be profitable and would justify investment in transport. It was argued that the north did not have

any specific economic advantage, especially compared to the still-undeveloped but more accessible parts of the Colony and Asante, where investment in

transport would pay for itself. The idea of a railroad to the north was mooted several times, most notably during Guggisberg's governorship, but the imperial government never agreed to the expenditure. Here the population pattern of the

north, with a dense and possibly profitable population at the most distant points, must have been crucial in decisions against a railway - the contrast with Nigeria is obvious. With the final abandoning of the proposed railway in the 1950s, there

20This is very much an impression gained from using the numerous Northern Territories files in the GNA in Accra. Benedict Der, of Cape Coast University, having used the Tamale archives extensively, confirms this impression. His findings are summarized in "Agricultural Policy in Northern Ghana During the Colonial Era," Universitas, 8 (1987), 3-18. Further comments come from the Duncan-Johnstone papers in Rhodes House (from his time as provincial commissioner of the southern province of the Northern

Territories), demanding an agricultural policy and investment for the north, and indicating that the director of agriculture and other authorities in the south knew or cared little about conditions in the north. Vol. 1/8, March 1930; vol. 2/3, p. 37. Also 2/3, pp. 34-35, on other ideas for "development, trade and money."

21Cd 3729 of 1908; Gold Coast Annual Reports 1903, 1910, 1934-5; Amherst diaries, 1935 and passim; Duncan-Johnstone papers, vol. 2/4.

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was supposed to be more work on northern roads. This work, as before, was very slow, and offered "little in exchange for the loss of the railway."22

A breakdown of expenditure on public works confirms this pattern of greater investment in the south. Many agricultural experiments - such as cotton, shea butter, and tobacco - were considered even by their proponents unlikely to flourish until transport improved.23 By the mid-1930s this was still the case; most of the cash in the north came from migrant labor and export to the south of small quantities of poultry and yams. Cash crops had proved uneconomic because of the high cost of transport, and this seemed unlikely to change in the near future. No crop capable of being grown in the north (except very high quality tobacco, with which there had been very little experimentation) could stand the cost. The Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture, therefore, concluded that the development of export crops in the north was not practicable.24

When faced with the slowness of the north to develop commercial agriculture, one question considered by agriculturalists was whether traditional patterns of land use and land tenure were a barrier to change in agriculture. Certainly, the impression one gains from various surveys in the colonial period - those of Kay, Blair, Read, Gordon and others - is that land tenure did not show changes associated with the commercialization of land.25 In other parts of Ghana (and other parts of Africa) as cash crops were introduced, land tenure became more individual and more freehold, with land being bought and sold, often among people of different ethnic groups, without reference to the traditional authorities.26 Land in the Northern Territories does not appear to have been a commercial asset in this sense in the colonial period. There are frequent references to land disputes in the north, but this occurred far more extensively in the south.27 Land disputes, however, do not seem to have been a function of the commercialization of land; neither did they impair the development of cash crop farming.

22Northern Territories 1912 (Cd 7050 of 1913). F. Agbodeka, "Sir Gordon Guggisberg's Contribution to the Development of the Gold Coast, 1919-27," Transactions of the Historical Association of Ghana, XIII, 1 (1972), 51-64. See Nigeria for contrast where an early railroad to the north was linked to the growth of commercial agriculture - in area, however, of very dense population. Shenton, Development of Capitalism, passim.

23N. T. Annual Report 1908 (Cd 4448 of 1909); Cd 8248, evidence of J. H. Batty, #1246-1254, N. T. Annual Report 1916 (Cd 8973 of 1918).

24Stockdale, "Report"; Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 1. The cost of transport of shea, for

instance, was £10-p14 per ton from Tamale to Kumasi. By rail from Kumasi to the coast was £3 a ton.

25M. Read, "Wa or Wala," cyclostyled, Department of History, University of Ghana, from GNA; J.

Gordon, "Notes on Gold Coast Crops and Agriculture," Rhodes House, Mss Afr. s977-8; G. F. Kay, "Essay on the History and Customs of the Mamprusi Tribe," Department of History, University of Ghana, from GNA; H. A. Blair, "Dagomba Papers," Department of History, University of Ghana, from GNA.

26p. Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana (Cambridge, 1963); C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1979).

27Kerr, "The Frafra Constitution"; C. Lynn, in Gold Coast Dept. of Agriculture Bulletin, no. 31. The ADM series, GNA, is replete with land dispute cases, especially the "Native Affairs" files ("native affairs" was used almost synonymously with land and chieftaincy disputes.)




Traditional land tenure varied in the north, even within societies, but there seems to have been sufficient scope for cash crop farming to develop within the land tenure system, if this was desired. In theory, over large parts of the north, anyone who wanted to expand his farming on a commercial basis could do so if the chief were correctly approached. Availability of capital to do this was likely to be a more serious barrier; even in the 1970s, the advent of rice farming, with bank loans, allowed few people access to large-scale farming. The availability of land also varied, of course, with some parts of the north having dense populations. Where land was abundant (in Dagomba, for instance), members of the community could easily acquire land, and pass it on to their descendants. This practice was tending, by the late 1960s, to produce a category of "inheritance" farmers, as distinct from those who had communal rather than individual rights. Commercial or specialist crops tended to be grown by the "inheritance" farmers with permanent rights to the land; and also by people with more dependents and therefore more labor. One sees, then, in some areas of the north, a recent tendency toward freehold tenure associated with cash crop farming. This was not nearly so pronounced or prevalent as in the south, however. A broad-ranging study of land use by Acquaye and Murphy seems to suggest that a change in land tenure from communal to individual was easy to achieve, land being available, but the desire to do so, at least for purposes of commercial farming, depended also on the availability of capital and labor.28 Variation in land use, therefore, as well as output and aspiration, was related to the two types of land tenure. Though "inheritance" farmers were associated with cash crops, the output and "entrepreneurial spirit" was greater among the communal farmers. This, it was argued, was because the "inheritance" farmers felt more secure in their land holding; this also probably illustrates the process by which communal farmers, with greater productivity, acquired some capital and moved into the other form of land tenure.29

The relative importance of the north in the overall economy of the Gold Coast can be quantified by a consideration of the figures for income and expenditure. The figures for the Northern Territories are not always given separately, but when they are, it is clear that far less was invested there than in other parts of the colony, and far less revenue was generated there. These facts are, of course, not unrelated. There was no direct taxation in the north until the advent of indirect rule in the late 1930s, and in the early days most of the revenue was derived from caravan taxes (mostly kola going north and livestock going south). This accounted for around 17,000 - M8,000 annually in the early 1900s, rising to f15,852 in 1907, out of a total northern revenue of around k18,000. Revenue dropped sharply thereafter, to under 12,000, following the abolition of the caravan tolls in August 1908. A slight rise was recorded again in 1912, due to the introduction of gun licenses. Expenditure in this decade generally far

28M. C. Murphy and E. Acquaye, Land Tenure, Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Ghana (Kumasi, 1972).

29Staniland, Lions, 15-16. Later, when commercial rice farming did develop, traditional land tenure was no barrier to the acquisition of large freehold farms, often by outsiders. (Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 5 and 159 ff). Also, however, the 1927 Land and Native Rights Ordinance, vesting land in the crown (later in the Ghana government) made the alienation of land to outsiders relatively easy. The provisions of the ordinance had little impact earlier, because land lacked commercial value.

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exceeded revenue, except in 1907, when around 110,000 was spent. Figures for expenditure (generally, at this time, imperial grants in aid), include 1100,000 in 1899, 150,000 in 1900, t25,000 in 1901, 148,000 in 1905 and 175,000 in 1910. Much of this expenditure had to do with setting up the machinery of a newly acquired colony - transport and the telegraph are mentioned specifically - with recurrent expenses, especially salaries of administrators and constabulary (the latter 110,000 in 1908). Very little was allocated at this stage for what might be termed development. "Miscellaneous," possibly including such areas as health and agriculture, accounted for 1200 in 1905; agriculture specifically was allocated £13/15 in 1908, with a slight increase for agriculture and medicine in 1910. The lack of government interest in investing in such fields at this stage reflects, perhaps, the newness of British administration in the north, the as-yet-incomplete control, and the lack of detailed knowledge of the economic possibilities of the territory. More important, however, is the fact that the Colony and Asante were already generating a much larger revenue, and thus justifying greater investment. In 1910 when the income from the Northern Territories was under 12,000, Asante accounted for 137,621 with the Gold Coast as a whole generating about a million pounds. Earlier, when the revenue from the north was much higher (113,500 in 1905) the colony as a whole recorded 1600,000, the north still being a relatively negligible factor.30

This pattern continued into the 1920s. In most parts of the Gold Coast, income balanced or exceeded expenditure, and this was true of the colony as a whole. In the north, however, revenue consistently fell far short of expenditure. (In 1925-26, for instance, expenditure was over 1100,000, income 19,000.) With a much lower expenditure in the later 1920s, revenue at times exceeded expenditure, but in the 1930s with both income and expenditure increasing, the former (now including taxes) was less than half of the latter.31 Both revenue and expenditure for the colony as a whole, and its southern provinces in particular, far outstrip the north, and illustrate how peripheral a part the north played in the economy of the Gold Coast, at least in terms of attracting and generating capital.32 The question of northern labor in the development of the south is, however, another aspect of the role of the north in the Gold Coast economy, which will be considered below. A breakdown of expenditure, and of areas of increased expenditure, also reflects the discrepancies between north and south. In 1923-24, for instance, increases in public works are mostly in the south. These included the growth of railroads - for instance to Prestea and Kumasi - and harbor works in Sekondi, Takoradi, and Accra. The attention given in expenditure to

3Gold Coast Annual Reports 1900, 1901, 1903, 1905, 1907, 1909, 1910; N. T. Annual Reports 1908, 1911.

31For example: 1928-9, income 112,695, expenditure 18,894; 1929-30, income h11,822, expenditure 110,074; 1934-5, income 134,500, expenditure, 170,000; 1935-6 is approximately the same; 1936-7, income

134,500, expenditure f122,531. Annual Reports N. T. 1925-6, 1928-9, 1929-30, 1934-5, 1935-6, 1936-7.

32For instance, in 1929, expenditure for the Northern Territories was £10,074; for the Gold Coast as a

whole, nearly l4 million. The gap narrowed in the 1930s e.g., 1122,531 for the north and again nearly £4 million for the whole colony. Expenditure in the Northern Territories fluctuated greatly in the 1920s and

1930s, from well under 110,000 to over 1120,000. The expenditure for the whole colony was generally between £3 and ;4 million. During this time the revenue from the north never exceeded 136,000, while revenue from, for instance, Western Province was habitually over 1500,000. Gold Coast Annual Reports, passim.




agriculture emphasized cocoa, palm oil, and rubber, all southern crops and all proven export crops. Work on hospitals, schools, and other social services was also largely confined to the areas south of Kumasi.33

The expansion of the rearing and trade of livestock (especially cattle) seemed one of the more obvious solutions to the problem of generating revenue in the north. The movement of cattle from north to south was already well- established, with a ready market in the south. Most of the livestock came from beyond the Northern Territories, from Upper Volta and Niger, but cattle were raised in the Northern Territories (though not usually for sale). The local cattle were small but, it was argued, of better quality than the Moshi breed, more disease resistant and, of course, closer to the markets of Kumasi and the south, and to the kola for which cattle were traditionally traded. Also, the international cattle trade was difficult to assess (and therefore difficult to tax when the caravan tolls were in force) and difficult to regulate. Many of the routes did not pass through government stations (despite attempts to set up regular caravan stops), or passed at night. The trade was also subject to fluctuations dependent on French policy; a decrease in the cattle trade in 1914, for instance, was attributed to "unsettled conditions" and "general unrest" in Upper Volta and Niger, and restrictions placed by the French on the export of cattle. The vulnerability of these supplies to the Gold Coast was demonstrated again and again, as diversion of cattle to the Ivory Coast, epidemic control, and taxation policies all affected the volume of trade in livestock. Also, finally, this trade, while it supplied meat to the southern parts of the Gold Coast, necessitated external payments and did little to increase the income of the north. For all these reasons, the development of the northern cattle industry seemed to be indicated. The development of a livestock industry and attendant veterinary work was seen to be an effective program in other African colonies, and was reckoned "one of the most successful developmental activities during the colonial period in African territories."34

The work of increasing and upgrading local cattle was generally handled by the veterinary department, established in 1909 and based at Kumasi. The resources of the department, however, were always limited (1.02 percent of the budget in 1936-37, for instance) and the staff small. A base in Kumasi meant that the main areas of cattle rearing were rarely visited. The preoccupations of the veterinary department were varied, and received different emphasis at different times. One of the aims, of course, was to improve the quality and quantity of cattle in the north, and so reduce dependence on imports. In the early days, upgrading was attempted by importing European bulls, all of which died en route or shortly thereafter. In the late 1920s some half- or quarter-bred European crosses were being placed in chiefs' herds.35 Later, experiments with crossbreeding local varieties were attempted, along with the encouragement of more selective breeding within local herds. Crossbreeding of Dagomba cattle

33Gold Coast Annual Report, 1922-3.

34GNA, N. T. files, passim; Annual Reports, N. T., 1905, 1906, 1914, 1915; K. David Patterson, "he

Veterinary Department and the Animal Industry in the Gold Coast, 1909-1955," International Journal of African Historical Studies, 13, 3 (1980); Duncan Johnstone papers, vol. 2/2, p. 17, 2/3, p. 13.

35Many attempts to introduce new methods in both animal husbandry and agriculture took the form of

offering innovations to the chiefs in the hopes that they would serve as an example.

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with Zebu, Moshi, and Ndama cattle from the Futa Jallon was more successful than the attempts to introduce European breeds, but never got beyond the experimental stage on demonstration farms. The attitude of producing cattle for sale also needed to be encouraged - holding cattle fairs was one idea - and although there are indictions of Dagomba cattle being sold at Kumasi, animal husbandry remained "marginal," with a chronic shortfall of local meat in the twentieth century (exacerbated by urbanization and cash crop rather than food farming), a shortfall which was met by imports.36

Another part of the veterinary department's work was epidemic control, partly with the furtherance of local livestock breeding in mind, and partly so that the French would continue to allow the passage of cattle from their territories. There was a major rinderpest epidemic in 1916-1918 and another in 1920. Policies of vaccination and isolation (creating quarantine stations along caravan routes) were only partly successful at this time, because of insufficient funds, staff, and vaccine. Inoculation usually took place when outbreaks occurred, rather than as part of a preventive program. The effectiveness of quarantine measures was hampered by the fact that continued meat supplies to the south were seen as necessary. More effective inoculation occurred from the 1930s, when serum began to be produced locally, with an improved vaccine in the 1950s. Other diseases - anthrax, foot and mouth, and trypanosomiasis (not endemic in the north, but contracted on the way south through the forest zone) also occurred.37

Another aspect of veterinary work was linked to that of the Department of Agriculture, and was concerned simply with increasing the food supply for consumption in the north. Much veterinary extension work, therefore, was directed to the goal of "mixed farming" - the integration of animal husbandry, and the use of manure, especially with the production of food crops. Only incidentally, and in the very long run, was this seen as raising the cash income of the north. So that while some attention was given to upgrading and increasing livestock, with the implication that this would earn revenue for the north, equal or greater emphasis was placed on measures to ensure the continuity of the Upper Volta and Niger trade. The former aim always suffered from the lack of input from the veterinary department, and while the animal population of the north did increase (from around 70,000 cattle in 1921 to around 324,000 in 1957, comprising over three-fourths of the cattle in Ghana), the imports of cattle rose in the same proportion. Meat in the south was always, apparently, in short supply.38

The first detailed look at animal husbandry in the north was Beal's report of 1920. In it, the enormous gap between the animal population of the north (68,500 animals) and the annual demand in the south (40,000 head) was quantified and the shortcomings of northern livestock-rearing practices (for purposes of sale, at any rate) were enumerated. These "numerous faults" included: a high loss

6Gold Coast Annual Report 1909; Patterson, "Veterinary Department"; Duncan-Johnstone argued repeatedly that people might be more willing to sell cattle if a direct tax were introduced, thus combining monetizing the north with his advocacy of indirect rule.

37Cd 4448 of 1909; N. T. Annual Reports 1911, 1915, 1918; Cd 3279 of 1908; Gold Coast Annual Report 1927-8.

38Patterson, "Veterinary Department."




from disease, since few precautionary measures were taken (or were available); too much interbreeding within herds, with no criteria of selection for bulls; no supplementary feeding; and breeding of immature stock, the emphasis being on increasing quantity. Suggestions for improvement included increased extension work by a hopefully increased staff, and the introduction of new stock. The local animals, though small, were considered to be of good quality and apparently were more disease-resistant than Moshi cattle. It was thought the crossbreeding, with Zebu cattle and possibly some English stock (not fully taking into account the past failures with imported bulls) could build on this foundation. Dagomba was considered the best area in which to test these proposals, as a place with the most, and best, cattle, and where people were more willing to sell livestock. (Indeed, most references to the sale of local cattle indicate Dagomba stock.) The question of developing local meat supplies was pressing; at this time virtually all the cattle sold in Kumasi were from French colonies, to the value of £650,000, with only around 2,000 head from the Northern Territories. And as the French were trying to develop the export of chilled meat to Europe (as well as for other reasons given above) these supplies were by no means assured.39

Change proceeded slowly along the lines suggested. One landmark was the establishment near Tamale, in the 1930s, of a laboratory to manufacture rinderpest serum, thus reducing the cost, the possibility of contamination, and the fluctuation in supply. It was hoped that the recurrent costs, estimated at £5,000, would be met by the tax on imported cattle, which replaced the old caravan tolls. Northern officials proposed raising these taxes, and thus hoped to avoid charging local cattle owners for inoculation.40 This seems to have been successful; by 1933 it was reported that rinderpest had been eliminated and all cattle immunized.41 Imported cattle, it was believed, were already better protected because of increased government control of the trade. Quarantine stations, and rest stations, were being built along the major routes, to monitor the health of the livestock, to encourage trade by the provision of such facilities, and to facilitate taxation. (For this reason, however, traders tried to avoid the government kraals.)42 The other matters - upgrading stock by crossbreeding and by educating farmers to selective breeding - seem to have made little progress between 1919 and the late 1930s. One is struck by the repetition, through several decades, of the same analysis of the problems of northern animal husbandry, and the same advice. The suggestion of crossbreeding with other West African cattle, for instance, was made in 1920, 1931, 1936, 1938 and in the early 1940s, as well as often in very local contexts.43 Supplementary feeding, linked to mixed farming and the production

39Patterson, "Veterinary Department"; N. T. Annual Report 1918. "One day [wrote Duncan-Johnstone] the French may close the frontier to cattle and what shall we do then." Vol. 1/1, p. 20.

40W. P. Beal, Report on the Livestock Industries of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast

(Accra, 1920).

Gold Coast Sessional Papers, X of 1929-30; Gold Coast Annual Reports, 1929-30, 1933-34.

4Gold Coast Annual Report, 1931-2; Amherst, Informal diaries, July 1931.

43Beal, Report; Gold Coast Annual Report, 1931-2; Stockdale, "Report"; Gold Coast Annual Report, 1934-5,1937-8; Third West African Agricultural Conference, 1938, J. Steele, "Improvement of Livestock in the Gold Coast."

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650 INEZ SUTTON

of silage, was also advocated repeatedly from the 1920s to the 1950s.44 Partly, this must be a question of the level of government input and the fact that change was slow. But there also seems to have been a lack of awareness of previous efforts, with frequent backtracking (the question of European bulls, for instance, which were imported on several occasions). Perhaps with another decade's knowledge available, it was thought that earlier failures could be reversed. Success would depend, however, on there being adequate travelling staff, demonstrators, and model herds, and the budget rarely supported this.

Gradually, the number of cattle increased in the north, and with it the rearing of livestock for sale.45 Upgrading by interbreeding with Zebu and Ndama bulls (larger than local cattle but less disease-resistant) proceeded first on government stations and schemes run for chiefs, and eventually spread in part to the ordinary farmer. The eventual interest of the northern cattle raiser in a commercial approach was contrasted with the "indifference" of the cattle owners on the Accra plains. The beginnings of commercial cattle-rearing in the north can be dated from the 1930s, with a major expansion in the 1950s. "Exports" of cattle from northern Ghana tripled in the decade following 1954, with many first- generation cattle owners entering the market. Throughout, however, cattle continued to be imported from the territories to the north of Ghana. The proportions of this trade to the meat trade as a whole varied, and were often difficult to assess, but always remained preponderant. As the population and sale of northern livestock rose, so did the numbers of imported cattle. The hopes that the Gold Coast would be able to end its dependence on imported cattle never materialized. By the 1960s some 75 to 90 percent of the cattle sold at Kumasi market were imported. By this time Ghanaian cattle owners were also importing cattle for resale, to fill the gaps in what they were able to supply. The raising and sale of cattle in northern Ghana did increase, but so did the demand, with the growth of towns and increasing agricultural affluence in the south. Meat, by the 1950s, was the only product of significance in the north.46

The trade in livestock was for a long time largely in the hands of dealers from outside the Gold Coast Colony - Hausa, Fulani, and Moshi from Upper Volta.47 The moving of cattle was mostly on foot, as far as the forest edge, in any

44Beal, Report; Stockdale, "Report"; Steele, "Improvement of Livestock; Gold Coast Annual Report, 1951.

45Representative figures indicate a gradual increase; 70,000 head in 1921, 190,000 in 1935, 250,000 in

1946, 390,000 in 1951. Cattle were also raised on the Accra Plains, but the numbers were always far smaller, e.g. 50,000 in 1946. These were closer to the major markets, but the bulk of livestock supplying the southern markets still came from the north (a much larger area of cattle raising, of course). Within the Gold Coast, the Northern Territories always accounted for at least three-fourths of the livestock population. Gold Coast Annual Reports 1934-5; 1946; 1951; Patterson, "Veterinary Deparment."

46Gold Coast Annual Reports, 1931-2, 1932-3, 1934-5, 1936-7, 1946, 1951; Stockdale, "Report," 75 ff; Steele, 'Improvement of Livestock"; P. Hill, "The Northern Ghanaian Cattle Trade," in Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge, 1970); H. A. Blair, Dagomba Papers, Rhodes House Mss Afr s626; Patterson, "Veterinary Department," passim. Meat was the major item of imported food, in cost and quantity, throughout the colonial period; for example, in 1939, 13,000 tons at a cost of £253,931. Gordon, Mss Afr s977.

4A reference to trade being mostly in the hands of "Gold Coast Africans" is, I think, incorrect. (Gold Coast Annual Report 1931-2). Some of the dry season trade seems to have been in local hands; it may have been difficult in some cases to identify traders as local or foreign.




case, with major markets at Prang, Atebubu, and Wenchi. Small stock - goats and sheep - were being conveyed by lorry by the late 1930s, and in some areas earlier. There seems to have been, despite the demand, only modest profit to be made by cattle rearers, traders, and butchers (at least in the 1930s and 1940s, when figures became available), simply because people could not afford and would not buy meat above a certain price. Cattle raisers in the north often got low prices from traders, and were advised not to wait for buyers, but to take their stock directly to Tamale for sale. (This, presumably, would only be viable if one were a full-time cattle raiser.) Cattle traders often found it difficult to collect from the butchers of Kumasi and other towns, and the butchers themselves were often in debt or bankrupt. Part of the problem with pricing was said to be the taxes levied on stock from French territory (by both the French and the British). This ought not to have affected the prices of the Northern Territories cattle; they commanded lower prices, however, as they weighed less. As against taxation and other administrative controls surrounding the import of livestock, profits in the Gold Coast were evidently greater than in the Ivory Coast, so there was always incentive to continue the trade.48

The cattle trade - especially the trade in imported cattle - was largely a wet season trade, especially when it was done on foot. Once the water holes dried up, the imports decreased. This gap was filled to a limited extent, from the 1930s, with cattle from Grunshi, Frafra, and Navrongo, mostly in the hands of Lobi traders. (This is very local evidence and must not represent a very large proportion of the overall volume.) By the 1960s, when trade was more dependent on lorry transport, the reverse was true; stock coming from far away could not easily be brought in the rainy season, and the gap there was beginning to be filled by Ghanaian cattle owners. Though aspects of the cattle trade were still seasonal, by this time sales to butchers were fairly constant, indicating that gaps in supply were being successfully met by local producers.49

The trade proceeded as follows: the primary trader bought the cattle at source (as noted, the Ghanaian cattle raiser generally did not take cattle to market, and even in the 1960s there were no regular cattle markets in the north). These traders had some capital, paying in cash for stock, but not usually enough to buy many head at once. The traders brought the cattle to forest-edge markets where larger traders, using local brokers to raise cash, paid cash to the primary traders and conveyed the stock to butchers in Asante or beyond. The average consignment of cattle handled by the "small bringer" was only ten to twenty head at a time, with "larger bringers" dealing in herds of over thirty. This pattern seems to have remained constant from the 1930s to the 1960s. So one must picture the trade in terms of many small-scale traders, perhaps making more than one trip a season. By the 1960s, the proportion of trade handled by the "large bringers" had increased.50

In the 1930s, as always, most of the cattle coming to the forest edge were imported (an annual average of about 38,000). The price at source ranged from

48Rhodes House, Mss Afr S365, A. Fulton, "A Survey of Meat Supplies and Distribution in the Gold Coast," 1940; Amherst, informal diaries, Salaga, 1933, Bole 1935; Gold Coast Annual Report 1924-5.

49Amherst, Dec. 1935, July 1937; Hill, Studies.

50Hill, Studies; Fulton, "Survey."

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652 INEZ SUTTON

one to five pounds per head (the lower prices for the Northern Territories cattle, which weighed on average 200 pounds dressed as against 350 for imported stock). Travelling expenses to the forest edge (a month's journey) averaged 15/- per head, and the price at those markets ranged from three and a half to seven pounds, with always some loss along the way due to illness or lameness. The price paid by the secondary trader included his fee of 2/- per head to the broker and often, if

money was borrowed from market moneylenders, interest of 10 percent. Cost of

transport to Kumasi was around 4/- per head, with the price in Kumasi being around 10/- higher than at the forest edge. The largest profits, therefore, seem to have been at the forest edge, when the primary trader sold his generally small

consignment. From Wenchi, Prang, and other market towns, some cattle went by rail to their destinations; some were walked from town to town until sold, reducing the profit to the secondary trader.51

Government attention to agriculture in the north oscillated between attempts to develop cash crops and attempts to improve subsistence farming, with the hopes that the latter would eventually lead to the former. Programs to develop cash crops - especially cotton - were initiated early in the colonial period, before anyone had studied northern agriculture in detail. The first serious studies of the region's agricultural and land tenure systems began to appear in the 1930s, and from these studies arose the emphasis on upgrading existing production and the integration of agriculture and animal husbandry. These programs were not generally linked with hopes for commercial farming, or if so, only at a far remove. Farming, it was argued, was "a custom, not a business," and it was considered that farming, even for subsistence, would not improve until it came to be regarded more as a business, or, to put it another way, until an interest in a money economy developed in the north. There were signs of this in the 1930s, fostered by the building of new roads and the availability of some imported goods, but the main emphasis of the agriculture department was on increasing the local food supply.52

From the agriculture and land use surveys done in the 1930s the Northern Territories was reckoned to be generally a poor area, with low rainfall and poor soil producing a marginal subsistence in most areas. Some parts of the north had a more favorable environment, and these were densely populated, leading to overuse of land, with the same results. The staple crops of the north - accounting for 90 percent of cultivated land in Mamprusi, for instance - were, and are, grains (millets and Guinea corn) with yams at the forest edge. These two grains were often intercropped, so accurate estimates of yields were difficult to ascertain, but yields were said to be low in the 1930s and 1940s. Grain shortages were common, and grain was often moved around the north, as farmers bought it to supplement what was grown. Grain was sometimes a cash crop, sold south to Kumasi, but this was more in the nature of selling off surplus, rather than deliberate cultivation for sale. (It was this tendency to sell surplus which perhaps led officials to hope that more commercial agriculture might be developed.) Because of the periodic grain shortfalls in the north, these "exports" needed a

51Fulton, "Survey."

52C. W. Lynn, "Agriculture in North Mamprusi," Accra, 1937.




permit from local officials.53 Along with the main crops (including rice and maize by the 1940s), yams were cultivated in places, and various vegetables. Crops such as tomatoes were occasionally grown as cash crops - in some parts of Frafra in the 1950s - but this was sporadic and hampered by lack of transport. Yams were by far the most productive crops - on average three tons per acre, as against 500-700 pounds for the grains - but were also the most labor-intensive, requiring three times as many days per acre. Yams were also exported south - they formed part of the canoe-carried salt trade in the early twentieth century, and later went by lorry. This also generally represented a sale of surplus, and, as with the grains, must have fluctuated considerably, though the growing of yams for sale did become more deliberate, and expanded.54 Exports of surplus from the north to the south by the late 1940s included Guinea corn, millet, maize, yams, shea butter, groundnut oil and of course livestock (including increasing quantities of poultry). Much of the effort to develop cash crops in the north concentrated on these already existing crops. But the profit was not high, and attempts to expand production never passed much beyond the experimental stage. One author argues that by the 1930s any hope of the Northern Territories producing for a world market had faltered, but the area continued to be seen as a possible producer of food to relieve constraints in the south, especially in urban areas. There was some growth in food production for sale, especially in areas where there was the least out-migration, but generally, the demands for food supplies to the south were not followed by investment. The government attempted to increase food production without altering the basic socio-economic structure of the north - the mixed farming policy was one reflection of this. Continuing post- war concern with food production led to investment in large projects, such as the Gonja scheme, rather than in peasant agriculture; post-colonial schemes included large-scale capitalist farming.55

The aim of increasing the local food supply was centered around encouraging mixed farming, with an emphasis on the use of manure on the arable land. This was done traditionally to a limited extent, in many areas, but

53Kerr, "Frafra Constitution"; Rhodes House Mss Afr 1122, Beattie papers, Boxes 1/3, 1/4 end. W. B. Mason, "Agricultural Extension"; Rhodes House Mss Afr S943, J. C. Anderson (Asst. DC Tamale) papers, Informal diaries; Gordon, "Notes"; Staniland, Lions, 2; another reference to food shortages in the north linked to sales of food to the south is Cardinall, In Ashanti, 279. Also Duncan-Johnstone papers, vol. 2/5. Though local food shortages were noted from time to time in the north, famine on the scale associated with, for instance, northern Nigerian groundnut monoculture did not appear until the advent of the large-scale rice

production of the 1970s. R. Shenton and M. Watts, "Capitalism and Hunger in Northern Nigeria," Review of African Political Economy, 15-16 (1979), 53-63. See N. Plange, "Underdevelopment in Northern Ghana; Natural Causes or Colonial Capitalism?" in the same issue of ROAPE (pp. 4-14) for the argument that the environment had less to do with lack of development than government policy. Many of the points - about lack of investment, especially in infrastructure, and about what resources the colonial government chose to

develop - are well taken, but the remoteness of the north and the thinness of much of its population (surely related to environmental factors) contributed to decisions about investment there.

54Beattie papers, Mason end.; Gordon, "Notes," Ch. 7; Sutton, "Volta River"; MacKay, "Essay , Ch. 8; Read, "Wa."

5Gordon, "Notes"; Beattie, Boxes 1/3, 1/4; Rhodes House Mss Afr 979, Jones papers, Vol. 2A, end. R.

Smith, "Agriculture in South Mamprusi," 475 ff; Kerr, "Frafra"; Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," 14, and Ch. 1, passim.



654 INEZ SUTTON

was confined to the field near the living compound, with outlying fields unimproved. Considerable reorganization was thought to be necessary, including cattle feeding in confined areas to collect manure, storing of manure, and improvement of pasture. The principles behind this were obviously sound, but the full program required a large capital outlay, requiring a stable holding of ten to twelve acres arable, thirty to forty acres grazing (which was usually communal), and, of course, cattle. Transport of manure from place to place was also a problem (carts were the recommended method, but were slow to catch on). Amassing the capital necessary for such a venture was hampered by the lack of credit facilities in the north. Mixed farming was first, as with other innovations, introduced on government experimental farms and spread only gradually. By the mid-1950s there were said to be around 2,000 mixed farmers in the north, who "had put mixed farming on the map as one great contribution to an improved standard of living."56 This is obviously a very limited impact in terms of population, but some of the techniques of mixed farming, if not the entire scheme, were perhaps more widespread. Other more scattered efforts to upgrade local farming included the introduction of a tractor-hiring scheme, the building of small dams, soil conservation schemes, and the fencing of grazing land.57

Still with upgrading in mind, the Department of Agriculture proposed a ten-year development plan for the Northern Territories in 1949. Agricultural stations, at which the basic experimentation and demonstration took place, were to be further developed and new ones created, with a corresponding increase in staff. The emphasis was obviously on extension work, but the increases in staff seem inadequate for the territory covered; from 12 to 35 senior staff over the ten years, and from 72 to 114 junior staff, including up to 75 agricultural assistants. Most of the staff would presumably be manning the nine proposed stations, with limited opportunities for field work and roving instruction. Total expenditure over the ten years was estimated at £969,000, about half of this recurrent expenditure (wages, maintenance, and so on). Spread over ten years, this seems unrealistically low, given the size and relative lack of development of the north. Some of the estimates within the plan - such as the cost of labor and of clearing land, relative to what agricultural wages were in the south, where people went when they wanted wage labor - also seem low.58

As already noted, systems of land tenure did not seem to be a barrier to increased cultivation. In some areas, however, dense populations produced already intensive cultivation, and precluded expansion. It was in such areas that food shortages occurred, and government officers often urged people to move to less populated areas. This redistribution of people was one of the rationales behind the development schemes of the 1950s. In these densely settled areas, the congestion produced the practice of continuous cropping, especially around the

56Gold Coast, Dept. of Agriculture Bulletin #23 (1930); Gordon, "Notes" (s977); Lynn, "Agriculture"; Beattie papers, Box 1/4, "Agricultural Extension" (Mason).

57Mason, "Agricultural Extension." This also began to create more obvious rural economic

stratification, a process extended later with the advent of capitalist farming. Der, Universitas, 8.

58Jones papers, Vol. 2, 346 ff. Agricultural extension work generally seems to have been erratic and limited. Cf. Duncan-Johnstone's reference to Salaga district, where the DC had not seen an agricultural officer "the whole of his tour." Vol. 1/7, August 1929.




dwellings, where manure was traditionally used. More generally, shifting cultivation was practiced, with the majority of land in the north lying fallow or uncleared at any one time. It was estimated in the 1940s that about 1,300,000 acres were cultivated, or 9 percent of the land. The capital outlay of the farmer, on tools and so on, was slight - about 30/- a year; this presents a very different picture from the southern cocoa farmer, who was employing labor, buying new land, paying for transport, and perhaps buying pesticides.59

There was scope for the extension of farming everywhere, it was argued, except in the most densely populated areas. One aspect of this, upgrading subsistence farming, has already been discussed. From time to time, attempts were also made to find a suitable cash crop for the north. In the early colonial period interest was devoted primarily to cotton, reflecting the expansion of cloth manufacturing in England and its increasing sale in the new colonies. Later, attention moved to the search for edible oils, and both shea butter and groundnuts were investigated as possibilities for northern cash crops. Other products, such as rice, dawadawa, and tobacco were also considered, but more fleetingly.

The British were interested in establishing cotton growing in many of the new colonies, and all over West Africa. Cotton was considered a strong candidate for a profitable export crop almost from the onset of British administration in the Northern Territories. It was already widely grown in the north - for local use, locally spun and woven - and samples of local cotton sent to Britain were favorably received. The demand for cotton cloth in the north already exceeded what was produced locally - Moshi cloth was imported - and it was felt that people would readily produce more, given more seeds and a larger market. It was proposed to issue seed (mostly American varieties, following trials at the agricultural station at Aburi and on the Volta), and to encourage chiefs and "other important natives" in the first instance. This paralleled the methods of introducing change in livestock management; the government was "strongly of the opinion that the cultivation of cotton should be left in the hands of native kings and chiefs who it is considered will take up its cultivation readily as soon as they see an early prospect of a good profit.'6 By this method it was hoped to compensate for the lack of more general agricultural extension work, and also, specifically, to avoid the setting up of European plantations. The British Cotton Growing Association (private British growers) was brought into the scheme, with the government paying for Association experts, and the Association contributing seed, machinery, and labor costs, and, hopefully, buying and marketing the cotton. In the Gold Coast cotton was tried first in Krobo and on the Volta, with the Association testing several varieties and experimenting with hybridization. In the north, experimental stations were set up at Salaga, Yeji, and Tamale, and ginning facilities were made available (it was not considered worthwhile to grow cotton unless the preliminary processing could be done nearby). Hopes were high initially; "recent reports favour the impression that at no distant date this product

59Gordon, "Notes," s977; Smith, in Jones papers; Department of Agriculture Bulletin #23; Beattie

papers, "Agriculture and Land Use, Interior Savannah, Central Portion"; Jones papers, "Agriculture in Kumasi."

6GNA, ADM 56/1/24, memo, Secretary for Native Affairs.

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will form an important export from the Protectorate," and conditions were favorably compared to those of northern Nigeria, where cotton was also being encouraged.61

This investment was not expected to produce commercially viable results immediately, but was to encourage the local industry "in advance of immediate needs." However, cotton production was slow to respond to this stimulus, and there were suggestions of increasing the price paid by the Association. But the growing of cotton, except for local use, remained largely experimental. The yield per acre and the quality remained low, except on government research stations; the government lost interest, and the Association closed down its operations by the mid-1910s, it having been "conclusively demonstrated that cotton growing in the Northern Territories can never be a remunerative industry for export purposes.'62 Even at the height of enthusiasm for cotton there were doubts, particularly in regard to transport, a recurring problem which plagued all schemes for the north. Cotton production along the Volta was considered feasible, as it could be transported by water (in the salt canoes, at one ton per canoe), but most of the north was considered too remote. (In Nigeria, in contrast, the railroad was quickly extended to the north, to facilitate the marketing of cotton and groundnuts. The larger and more concentrated population there made this a more pressing issue.) The expense of transport obviously affected the price the BCGA was prepared to pay, or could afford, and this of course discouraged large-scale production. Further, the government had little money to invest in northern cotton schemes; most of its attention was directed toward the more accessible Krobo and Volta experiments. A further factor (as with other agricultural schemes) was the question of labor. "Owing to the absorption of native labor for mining operations [said a report of 1904], it is doubtful whether any great development of cotton growing is possible in this colony.'63 While 1904 is too early for massive labor migration from the north to have been a factor -

only about 400 workers from the north went to work in the mines in 1908 - this did become more significant later on (primarily from the southern point of view) and was considered whenever northern agricultural schemes were proposed. Moreover, this is an indication of government priorities, later more pronounced, where northern labor for southern economic expansion took precedence over development in the north.

By 1920 the Gold Coast did not appear at all in a survey of imperial cotton-growing areas. Post-war schemes for developing a cotton export industry were drawn up, but cotton production remained either experimental or solely for local use until the end of the colonial period. At the same time, cotton goods and yarn were always items imported to the colony. Extensive cotton trials were carried out in the early 1930s, especially at Tamale. Some of the varieties which

61N. T. Annual Reports, 1904,1905; Gold Coast Annual Report, 1903; Governor to CCNT, 1903; Cd 3997 of 1908; Cd 3729 of 1908; Cd 5215 of 1910; N. T. C2238.

62Cd 5215 of 1910; Cd 6007 of 1912; Cd 8973 of 1918; Cd 7622 of 1915; Cd 8434 of 1917; N. T C2238; Cd 1684 of 1906.

6GNA ADM 56/1/24; Cd 3285 of 1907; N. T. C2238; N. T. Annual Report 1904; Blair, "Dagomba Papers"; Cd 2020 of 1904, "Report on Cotton Cultivation in the British Empire." The diversion of labor from subsistence crops to cotton (or other export crops) would also have been a factor.




did well at Tamale, however, were less successful at other stations. And while manuring doubled yields, the problems of having manure in the right place, with the prevalent wide-ranging grazing, would be similar to those encountered in the attempts to foster mixed farming. Fertilizers delivered to Tamale were "quite uneconomic." By the late 1940s, cotton was still being discussed as a possibility, still at the experimental stage.64

The other major direction in many of the twentieth-century colonial economies was the development of edible oil crops, as witness the growth of palm oil in Malaya, and the various groundnut schemes in Africa. The Northern Territories had its groundnut scheme, in the late 1950s, which will be discussed below. But earlier, attempts were made to increase production of a traditional product, shea butter.

Shea butter is an edible fat extracted from the nuts of the tree Butyrospermum parkii. It formed (and forms) a part of the traditional diet of the savannah regions of Ghana and was, from at least the mid-nineteenth century, a major item of trade to the south (often comprising the return cargo in the Volta salt canoes).65 The tree is widespread in the north, growing over 63 percent of the region, and though the yield varies, there are no serious pests or diseases. All of these factors suggested shea butter as a possible commercial crop, first as an item of trade to the south, and later (from the mid-1920s) as an export. Traditional methods of extracting the fat were very prolonged and labor-intensive, involving boiling, drying, pounding, roasting, grinding, mixing with hot and cold water, and skimming off the fat. This method extracted only a quarter of the nut's fat, and was clearly not a large-scale economic proposition, but it was argued that other methods could be more profitable. Crushing machinery was suggested in the early twentieth century - itself probably also uneconomic in the short term at least - and the use of solvents in the later 1920s, which doubled the fat extraction.66

The possibilities of shea butter were first discussed in the decade following the establishment of British administration in the north, with the greatest enthusiasm on the part of the Swanzey's representative, this major Gold Coast trading firm being eager to exploit new commodities. The commission on Oil Producing Nuts and Seeds of 1916 was more diffident, pointing out the difficulties of storing, refining, and transporting the fat. Looking at the entire West African picture, shea was of little importance compared to palm nuts or groundnuts, yielding much less oil. The palm oil industry, especially, was already well-developed in the Gold Coast and elsewhere, and in more accessible areas. In

64Cd 523 of 1920, "Report of the Empire Cotton Growing Committee"; Gold Coast Annual Reports, 1925-6, 1927-8, 1934-5; Gold Coast Department of Agriculture, Bulletin, #22 (1930), p. 264-302, #23 (1930), p. 169-173, #24; Blair, "Dagomba"; Colonial Office "Colonial Primary Products Committee, Second Report" (London, 1949); Gold Coast Annual Report, 1946.

65N. T. Annual Report, Cd 3729 of 1908; Gold Coast Annual Report 1934-5; Sutton, "Volta River." Later, shea butter was sent south in quantity by lorry (nearly 700,000 lbs. over the Yeji ferry in 1928) at a cost of around £10 a ton. Gold Coast Department of Agriculture, Bulletin, #22 (1930)

66Gold Coast Sessional Papers, VII, 1925-6, "The Shea Butter Industry of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast Colony," by G. C. Coull; Beattie papers, Box 1/3; GCDA Bulletin #22, Ibid., 226-232; Cd 8248 of 1916, "Oil Producing Nuts and Seeds," evidence of J. H. Batty of Swanzeys', #1246-1254.

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1913 its exports from the Gold Coast were valued at six million pounds, as against shea butter and nuts at f70,000. There was some interest in shea in Belgium and Germany, but little interest or expertise in Britain. Overall, the Commission concluded, "The condition of the trade does not appear to be such as to warrant prolonged treatment in this report," though shea could become important if the many difficulties could be overcome.67

Presumably with this in mind, research into expanding production of shea nuts began in the mid-1920s, mostly at the main northern agricultural research station at Tamale, and at Yendi. The research became somewhat more intense at the end of the decade, with a government grant of 1600 devoted to it. It seemed to be an industry with a potential for growth, given the number of trees, the fact that they were not all exploited, and the wide area over which they would grow (and also given the methods of extraction, which left more of the oil behind.)68 One problem was labor; women traditionally harvested the crop - presumably not in commercial quantities - but it was thought that if the crop became more economic, men would get involved. (Possible social complications do not appear to have been much considered here.) Also, the collecting season coincided with the main farming season. Another problem was that the trees were scattered, and often in areas of sparse population. To exploit the trees fully, labor migration would be necessary, and for this to occur, the crop would have to be demonstrably more viable. Other problems appeared as the trials progressed. As noted, the trees were scattered, and as a plantation crop shea would be slow to develop. Further trials indicated that it did not grow well under plantation conditions. Another range of problems concerned processing. Factory methods for extracting the oil did not exist in the Gold Coast, and to install such machinery was considered too expensive (about 41,000 for one pressing machine, allowing for the use of the engine from the defunct Tamale cotton gin.) Furthermore, the fat was considered deficient relative to palm or coconut oil ("unsaponifiable," that is, not usable for soap) and not pure enough by current methods for edible purposes. (The latter is odd, considering the large amounts consumed in the Gold Coast, but perhaps it could not easily be used for margarine, which the other oils were.) Some machinery for pressing was ordered, and some oil exported to Europe in 1929, but the limited demand for oil was outweighed by the cost of transporting it. The question of transport remained a major problem, as with other attempts to market a northern product. With the railway extended only as far as Kumasi, and an indifferent road system in the north, the cost of transporting the crop even to the coast was prohibitive. There was, in the early 1930s, an experiment where the government purchased nuts in one area, to extract 100 tons of oil locally, and to ship it to the London market. The project was to cost t500 (not expected to be compensated for by the sale of the oil) but "the information obtained would certainly be worth five hundred

67Cd 8247 and 8248 of 1916, Batty, evidence; J. E. Trigge, #1569, 1347-8 in 8248; J. W. Pearson, letter; T. A. Henry, #5851-3 and 1156-60, all in 8248.

68Some estimates suggested that up to 53,000 tons of shea nuts and 26,000 tons of shea butter a year could be exported (in addition to that, presumably, consumed in the colony.) Gold Coast Sessional Papers XI of 1929-30. This seems to have been based partly on an agricultural report of 1925-6 in the Gold Coast Sessional Papers VII of that year. Other estimates were much lower, for demographic reasons.




pounds, even if it had not other result than to put a stop to unsound propaganda."69 The results of this experiment showed conclusively that, at least for the time being, shea butter was uneconomic. The nuts were purchased for an average of 125/10 a ton (reflecting the cost of production) and when transport was added, the cost of delivery to London was £46/10 per ton; the price on the London market was £19/19. Interest in shea then declined; it was thought that perhaps it could be profitable, eventually, as an ancillary to mechanized groundnut production, but when the latter was attempted in the 1950s, shea was not seriously considered.70

The first systematic economic survey of the north seems to have been that of J. R. Raeburn, commissioned by the Colonial Office at the end of the 1940s. From the report, it is obvious that the changes during the colonial period were relatively small. In areas such as education, health, clothing, housing and so on, the north still compared unfavorably with the south, and the economy was still primarily a subsistence one. The total value of production was reckoned at sixteen to twenty million pounds in 1948, with only two million of this generated by an "external economy" - that is, the export of crops and the earnings of migrant labor, each accounting for half. (Cash income was only £2 per capita annually.) The minor improvements noted - increase in the raising and sale of livestock, the very recent increase in the sale of food crops to the south, aided by high post-war prices, and increased earnings from labor migration - were due primarily to developments in the south, increased lorry transport, and only "in lesser degree" to increased government expenditure in the north. The changes were slight, limited again by lack of transport, an unevenly distributed population, lack of farming implements, and very variable yields as well as prices. Between 1936 and 1939, for instance, the price of millet at Tamale ranged from 46 percent below to 24 percent above "normal," and there were variations of up to 200 percent in groundnut prices at Bawku in the 1940s. Raeburn listed as some basic needs for the future: a rise in food production and, generally, in the standard of living to the level of the south, so the migration would decline; redistribution of population within the north; and regulation of the cattle industry with a view to ensuring meat supplies. Problems in achieving this included the variable quality of the land, the lack of local and outside capital in the north, the lack of labor (and, according to Raeburn, the lack of "native initiative") and, of course, distance and transport. Recommendations included, as a priority, the provision of cheaper transport (to boost the "external economy") and various means to improve farming. Many of the recommendations reiterate those of earlier and more local reports - manuring, soil conservation, mixed farming and so on - and the whole tenor of the report summarizes the problems of the north seen in earlier decades. Some recommendations, however, were innovative, and on a much grander scale, needing a large government input or group efforts. These suggestions included the use of tractors (mostly for dams and other infrastructure, rather than ploughing), ox ploughs, the creation of secondary industries such as milling and tanning, and the development of new arable land

69Beattie papers, Box 1/4, "Agricultural Extension"; Gold Coast Sessional Papers VII of 1925-6; Department of Agriculture Bulletin #22; Gold Coast Sessional Papers XVI of 1929-30.

70Beattie papers Box 1/3.

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to allow for the resettlement of population. It was emphasized, however, that any such change should fit into a "workable system of farming which is acceptable," that is, within traditional agricultural and land tenure systems.71

This blueprint, advocating change within traditional systems, would of

necessity have been extremely gradual. In practice, little seems to have been

attempted on a comprehensive scale, but rather, more piecemeal encouragement of mixed farming continued at local levels. In the absence of vastly improved transport, the incentive to produce for market was unlikely to increase; the "lack of initiative" noted by Raeburn (if such it was) was based on a long history of little return for the various experimental market crops. In fact, Raeburn's report, while noting what might be eventual "sale products," emphasized the increased

production of subsistence crops. Other contemporary development schemes also

emphasized the upgrading rather than the commercial aspect; a report on the

development of the Volta basin, for instance, suggested the possibility of commercial rice growing with irrigation in some parts of the north, but this was

only a very small and marginal part of the scheme as a whole. Grants to northern farmers from the Chief Commissioner's Reserve Fund seem to have

gone to upgrading rather than to innovation. A related development was the

upgrading of agricultural education in the north, with the establishment of a center near Tamale, the rising qualifications of agricultural instructors, and increased extension work. By the first years of independence, half the national

budget for agricultural stations was being spent in the north.72 The major exception to this policy of slow change was the well-known

Gonja Development Company scheme, which incorporated some of the more tentative of Raeburn's suggestions, such as the mechanization of agriculture, transfer of population, and the search for a cash crop. The intended crop was

groundnuts, already a traditional crop, and one in which there was some trade to the south.73 Interest in this crop reflects the long-standing preoccupation with edible oils, and efforts were made elsewhere to develop groundnuts as a cash crop (for instance, earlier in northern Nigeria, and in the contemporary Tanganyika groundnut scheme of similar design). The Gonja Company grew out of

experiments with large-scale, mechanized agriculture at Damongo, and was set up in 1950 as a subsidiary of the Colonial Agricultural Development Corporation. The ideas behind the scheme were linked both to upgrading and to production of food for the colony and an export crop. Linked to the former concern were

71J. R. Raeburn, "Report on a Preliminary Economic Survey of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast" (Colonial Office, undated, but probably early 1950s); Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, 78. The data on earnings, generally, and on cash income does not support the notion of a significant monetization of the north, nor that as a major factor in creating labor migration.

2Government of the Gold Coast, "Report on Development of the River Volta Basin" (London, 1951); Colonial Office, Colonial Primary Products Committee, Second Report, London, 1949; Gold Coast, Record of Seventh Session of Territorial Council of the Northern Territories, Tamale, 1950; Government of Ghana, Consolidation Development Plan, 1957-8; Beattie papers, Box 1/5, "The Agricultural Training Center, Nyankpala, Northern Ghana" and "Extension Campaigns."

73Amherst, Informal diaries, July 1942; Department of Agriculture Bulletin #23 of 1930. A general overview of the Gonja scheme can be found in S. T. Quansah, "The Gonja Settlement and Development Scheme, Ghana," Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 2, 1 (1972), 14-24, and a discussion of this in comparison with similar projects in E. R. Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa (London, 1969).




proposals to create 'balanced general farming ... suitable for the settlement of African farmers" and thus to attract people from the densely settled parts of the north; and to produce enough surplus food for sale in the colony, especially in the south. Also entailed, however, were plans to clear large areas of land and introduce the mechanized farming of groundnuts as an export crop. It was thought that this was not feasible in areas already under cultivation, because of the nature of land holding practice, and so the scheme was proposed for the thinly-settled area of western Gonja, around Damongo. The advocates of the scheme believed that agriculture would not expand solely by adapting traditional methods, and that the sale of farm products which were simply a "spillover" from subsistence farming was insufficient either for local or export purposes.74

It was initially planned to settle four or five hundred families at Damongo, giving each a large, thirty-acre farm for the cash crop (mostly groundnuts, but also food crops for local sale) and a small plot for subsistence farming. This was a much large acreage than had been traditionally cultivated, but much of the labor was to be done by machinery. The Company was to clear the land, plant and harvest the crop, and the settled families to weed, sharing the profits, with the farmers getting a third. One million pounds was allocated for the scheme, and fifty square miles. It was projected that eventually 25,000 acres would be cultivated. This was later reduced to 14,500 acres and, in fact, no more than 4,000 acres was ever under cultivation. Production of the proposed export crops, groundnuts and tobacco, was always secondary to the production of local food crops (Guinea corn, especially, and rice and maize). In fact, as an agricultural scheme, the settlement never progressed beyond the experimental stage. This is seen in the limited amount of land brought into arable, and in the trials and testing of the use of fertilizers, tractors, other machinery, crop rotation and so on. In terms of agricultural research, the program was considered useful by later agronomists; much data was collected about varieties of local crops, and about the applicability of mechanization to these crops. The Company, however, did not succeed in applying this data to large-scale food production, and indeed, some of the planned crops were found to be unsuitable for mechanization. Later projects, such as the State Farm Corporation, apparently benefited from some of the research, while ignoring other aspects of it.75

One of the problems of the scheme concerned the attraction of settlers and their relationship to the company; this was evidently never clear to the settlers, especially with regard to land rights. The settlers seem to have been agricultural laborers in the first instance, very dependent on the Company and little involved in the planning. This relationship was supposed to evolve into that of a cooperative, but clearly there was always far more initiative and authority vested with the Company. In the time of the scheme, many farmers came and

74Rhodes House, Mss Afr s652, G. Burden, "Labour Migration"; Gonja Development Company, Managing Director's Report, Dec. 1950-June 1952; Colonial Office, no. 224 of 1948, "Report of West African Oil Seeds Mission"; J. A. Dadson, "Farm Size and the Modernization of Agriculture in Ghana," in I. M. Ofori, ed., Factors of Agricultural Growth in West Africa, (Legon, 1973); Rhodes House, Mss Afr s1539, J. P. Mullins, Gold Coast Notes, 1951.

75Dadson, "Farm Size"; Gold Coast Development Plan, 1951; Gold Coast, "Report of the Second Advisory Committee on the Gonja Development Company," Accra, 1955; Quansah, "The Gonja Settlement"; British African Land Utilization Conference, Jos 1949, HMSO, 1951.

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left, with only fifteen permanent settlers. After the collapse of the Company, more migration to the area took place, attracted by the services initiated by the project. Eventually, people who moved into the area became interested in methods involving mechanization, and tractors were hired to plough for planting of rice and tobacco as cash crops. In the early 1970s most of the rice grown in Ghana was produced in the old Gonja Development company area.76

The other major set of problems was technical and mechanical. As noted, the crops were not as suitable for mechanization as had been supposed; the equipment was unsuited to the soil, breakdowns were frequent and spare parts in short supply, and operators and technicians inadequate. Also, much of the Company's effort was spent on basic infrastructure, rather than on farming itself. The initiation of the Gonja scheme meant massive construction of roads, and creation of water and power supplies, buildings, and so on, and this aspect tended to overshadow the agricultural side. Transport of what were intended to be export crops remained a problem, as Damongo was 300 miles from the nearest railhead, at Kumasi.77

As with other agricultural schemes in the north, the Gonja development seems to have fallen between upgrading local agriculture and commercial agriculture. It was argued later that the scheme, and others like it, contained sound ideas about agricultural development and technique and, as noted, much was learned from the project. Most of these schemes, however, were later considered overambitious, especially in their advocacy of mechanization. Mechanized cultivation, in agricultural areas not already mechanized, suffered from the difficulties of what were called "new labor peaks" - that is, lack of synchronization with traditional work patterns in farming. In the late 1950s smaller, more piecemeal schemes were attempted, and the money allocated to Gonja was widely regarded as a resource which could have been better spent.78 The situation did not change appreciably in the post-colonial period. Report after report complained about bad animal husbandry, lack of transport, reliance on traditional methods of subsistence agriculture and, most telling, the continued discrepancy between north and south in terms of services (such as banking, transport, and education), investment, and gross value, per capital and per square mile. The south had been generating increased economic activity for some time, but for this to happen in the north, a "flow of transfer payments" would have to be undertaken. Though at various times the governments of the Gold Coast and of Ghana considered it desirable to reduce the concentration of development in the south, measures to achieve this had not been successful. In the 1960s and 1970s the same sort of still valid recommendations were being made, such as increased irrigation, mixed farming, more seed trials, agricultural education, and so on. Large-scale state schemes in the 1960s and 1970s - irrigated and mechanized agriculture on state farms - were costly and took insufficient account of traditional farming practices and the limitations of the environment; in short, the

76Dadson, "Farm Size"; Second Advisory Committee, "Report"; Quansah, "The Gonja Settlement."

77Dadson, "Farm Size"; Quansah, 'The Gonja Settlement"; Colonial Office, "Report of the Sorghum Mission to Certain British African Territories," 1951; Burden papers; Second Advisory Committee.

78Burden papers; Chambers, Settlement Schemes, Ch. 13, 241; Beattie papers, Box 1/4, "Agricultural Extension"; Raeburn, "Report."




mistakes of the Gonja scheme were repeated. The idea of increased production based on the small farmer seems to have been neglected and banks and other credit agencies were reluctant to offer loans to such people because of the difficulty and high cost of supervision and servicing. So by the late 1970s many aspects of agricultural development in the north were still at the pilot or experimental stage.79

Clearly, development in the north was hampered by settlement patterns and environment, as well as by the erratic government interest and the variable effectiveness of attempted schemes, large and small. One overriding factor, however, must be the question of manpower, and the fact that much of the labor for the profitable industrial and agricultural enterprises of the south came from the north. From the early days of British rule in the north, labor was recruited with government aid for mining, and later came voluntarily (partly in order to escape local public works labor) to work on the southern cocoa farms. Throughout the colonial period, there was far greater opportunity to earn money in the south, and higher wages, and the south grew to depend on this labor, with the result that programs to enable northerners to earn money at home were ambivalent, to say the least. Sometimes this was expressed directly; "with care and trouble there is without a doubt a large supply of labour to draw on," and, more starkly, "the great service which the Northern Territory renders to the Gold Coast lies in the supply of manpower which it affords," which was "an appreciable percentage of the total labor available for the Colony and Ashanti alike."80

While one school of opinion was that "everyone realises that an export product is necessary if the Northern Territories are to progress,"81 clearly the balance of opinion as reflected in government policy - the lack of investment and sustained projects in the north - was that the north's role was primarily as a labor reserve. Perhaps the emphasis on improving subsistence agriculture, valuable in itself, also reflects the non-commercial role northern farming was expected to play.

There have been many studies of labor migration in West Africa, and there is no need to repeat in detail the information contained therein. Several general points, however, emerge from these studies. First, a variety of factors contribute to migration from certain areas, and specific areas tend to become labor reserves because of these factors. They include such "push factors" as

79Birmingham et al., Study, 89ff, 104-105, 221-222, 298ff; FAO, "Land and Water Survey in the Upper and Northern Regions, Ghana, Final Report," I (Rome, 1968); A. Bennett and W. Schork, "Studies Toward a Sustainable Agriculture in Northern Ghana," Research Center for International Agrarian Development (Heidelberg, 1979), 26, 37-45, 56-64, 71ff; G. Benneh, "Water Requirements and Limitations Imposed on Agricultural Development in Northern Ghana," in Ofori, ed., Factors, Chambers, Settlement Schemes, Ch. 12; Times of Ghana, Supplement, March 25, 1974. Also see Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," for post- colonial agricultural developments.

80N. T. Annual Reports, 1908, 1918, 1913, 1912; Gold Coast Annual Reports, 1907, 1910; Sutton, "Labour"; Kerr, "Frafra Constitution"; R. Thomas, "Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1906-1927," Journal of African History, XIV, 1 (1973), 79-103. Recruitment of labor for both private (mostly the mines) and public works was done at times through the political officers and chiefs.

81Gold Coast sessional papers XI of 1929-30.

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taxation, so that people have to enter a money economy (a factor relatively late in the Northern Territories); land alienation (not a dominant feature in West Africa, though overpopulation in some parts of the north might have been a significant factor); escaping from various forms of forced labor; and the less direct policy of encouraging a commercial sector in some parts and not in others by selective investment. The main pull factor, is, of course, the chance to earn money for whatever reason, in the areas where a commercial economy has been encouraged, and the related possibility of access to the services and facilities growing up in that economy. Even this, for the north, seems to have been of limited interest; the monetization of the north, and the availability of consumer goods to buy, proceeded very slowly. The idea that this contributed to a great labor drain, as argued by Van Hear, is exaggerated.82 Only after various forms of taxation were introduced did the number of migrants rise above a few thousand. Related to this question of push and pull, then, is the issue of policies of selective investment and development, which ensured that the southern third of the Gold Coast would be the producer of export products and that the north (and to a lesser extent, parts of the east) would supply labor for these enterprises.

This pattern was not entirely a deliberate colonial creation, as it reflected nineteenth-century production and trade, with palm oil and later cocoa being commercially grown and labor in the form of slaves being brought from the north. The existing commercial agriculture produced capital for expansion, and this was enhanced to a small extent by government and private investment in the colonial period. The colonial government, finding a thriving export economy in the Gold Coast, reinforced it. Thus a viable income-producing sector grew up and expanded without massive investment in pilot projects, infrastructure, and so on. It is probably true that for northern Ghana, as well as for other areas studied, extension of the local economy, even to commercial proportions, could have been achieved given a much higher level of investment.

Northern Nigeria, with a very large population, is one place where attempts to integrate the north into the national economy were made on a large scale early in the colonial period, with the swift arrival of the railroad at Kano (by 1911) and cotton and groundnut schemes funded, Shenton argues, largely by merchant capital.83 As noted, northern Ghana was considered potentially superior to northern Nigeria in terms of cash crop production (for environmental reasons) but clearly northern Nigeria was a more economic proposition. Generally, northern Ghana was thinly populated, with the areas of dense population at the northern extreme; building a railroad to these areas would mean putting it through an area of dubious profitability for most of its length. In contrast, much of northern Nigeria was densely populated.

A further consideration, no doubt, was the fact that a high level of pre- capitalist surplus accumulation existed in pre-colonial northern Nigeria, managed and distributed by the ruling elite; this presented possibilities for the diversion of the surplus to international markets. A local merchant class exited and British capital (the Royal Niger Company and others) was beginning to make advances into northern Nigeria in the pre-colonial period, in a way that barely occurred in

82Van Hear, "Northern Labour," 8-9.

83Shenton, Development, Ch. 2.




northern Ghana throughout the colonial period. In northern Ghana, little surplus accumulated; all observers commented that there was virtually no economic differentiation between chiefs and others, and little economic distinction among most of the population, which remained primarily subsistence oriented until well after independence.84

The early political amalgamation of north and south, Shenton argues, is another reason for the early integration of the northern economy, and the early implementation of indirect rule, which appropriated much of the surplus to the colonial state through direct taxation. (This occurred in northern Ghana only in the late 1930s, where it was also seen potentially in terms of greater economic integration.) Colonial land policy in northern Nigeria - the vesting of land in the state - was similar to that in northern Ghana (the 1927 Lands and Native Rights Ordinance), but while Shenton sees this as an advantage to capitalism in that it precluded the growth of a landlord class, in northern Ghana it does not seem to have had much actual effect on access to land and production. Within the economy of the Gold Coast, therefore, attention to the north was clearly seen to be a misplaced use of funds. Increasing in the colonial period, advocates of northern development stressed simply improvement of the standard of living (or attention to basic needs), and the idea that the north could be made to contribute significantly to the export economy was unconvincing. Generally, then, less money was spent by colonial administrators (and also post-colonial ones, for the same reasons) in the areas from which migrant labor came. There grew up a vested interest in keeping such areas as labor reserves, with little beyond a subsistence economy, with the argument that cash and new ideas picked up as wage laborers would eventually contribute to the modernization of the areas from which the laborers came.85

In the case of the Gold Coast, labor migration became in many cases a permanent transfer of people from north to south. The population of the southern third of the colony was a third of the whole in the 1920s, and half by the 1970s; the growth of the rural population was also proportionally higher in the south. The 1960 census showed a million northerners living in the south, and there had also been much northern settlement in the newer cocoa-growing areas of Brong-Ahafo. As well as rural settlement, zongos - concentrations of northerners in the major towns of Asante and the south - testify to this pattern. The permanence or semi-permanence of agricultural labor (the most common form of migrant labor) was caused partly by patterns of employment, where year- long (annual) and longer-term caretaker (abusa) contracts were widespread. Even

84Shepherd documents the beginning of rural class distinctions associated with capitalist rice farming in the 1970s. Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 2 passim, Ch. 7.

85Amin, Modern Migration, introduction; H. Kuper, ed., Urbanization and Migration in West

Africa (Berkeley, 1965); Sutton, "Labour." The Treasury objected to Colonial Office investment, and

generally the governors preferred balanced budgets, so most development was in fact financed by Ghanaian

capital (earnings and taxation). Howard, Colonialism, 158-160; Shenton, Development of Capitalism, introduction, 129 ff, xiv, 6-7, Ch. 2; Duncan-Johnstone papers, passim; Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," passim and Ch. 1; Van Hear, "Northern Labour," introduction. The contention that development policy in the north concerned promotion of trade and cash crop farming, and only last and least recruitment of migrant labor (Staniland, Lions, 52) cannot be accurate. This may have been true of local northern officials, but

certainly not of Gold Coast policy.

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contracts considered temporary or short-term meant that the migrant was absent during at least part of the agricultural cycle, with detrimental effects on production, at least in some cases.86

Virtually all studies on West African labor migration conclude that migration from an area which specializes in it is incompatible with the development of that area.87 The effects on the area supplying labor include the loss of manpower and the lowering of productivity; most studies conclude that peak times for wage labor agriculture and agriculture in the home area are likely to overlap. Other economic activities, including those carried out in the low agricultural season, are also affected (such as building, repair, and clearing new land). As against this, migration may relieve population pressure in some areas (and substantial number of northern migrants did come from intensively settled areas), and temporary migration may result in some transfer of money to the areas from which the migrants come. New values, new ideas, and new skills may also come in, perhaps not always ones relevant to the migrant's home environment.88

Generally, however, the amount of money transferred was not significant, and was seldom used in such a way as to improve the local economy. This is obvious from the discrepancies in income and per capita value, and in how small a part the "external economy" played in the north.89 The discrepancies between northern and southern Ghana were not as great as between southern Ghana and other areas of migration; labor in southern agriculture, especially cocoa, was well- paid by the standards of the time, and often entailed semi-permanent contracts of great responsibility. And while the French made a conscious decision to use the Moshi as a "reservoir of manpower," nothing quite so deliberate occurred in the

86Amin, Modern Migrations, Sutton, "Labour"; E. Schildkrout, People of the Zongo (Cambridge, 1978); Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers. There were fears of migration becoming permanent as early as 1916. Gold Coast Annual Report, 1916.

87Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, 20ff; Amin, Modern Migrations. A major exception is E. Berg, "The Economics of the Migrant Labour System" in Kuper, ed., Urbanization, which assumes that most

migrant labor is short-term and seasonal (coinciding with the low period of the agricultural cycle at home). G. Burden, a colonial labor officer, also argued this point, but the evidence indicating a basic conflict between

migrant labor and maintaining one's own farm is overwhelming. The effect of labor migration on the supplier can, however, vary greatly, depending on the length of stay, the season of stay, the pattern of traditional

agriculture, and many other factors. See Stichter, Migrant Labourers for a survey.

88Gordon papers; E. Skinner, "Labour Migration Among the Mossi of Upper Volta," in Kuper, ed., Urbanization. Skinner studies the effects of a French cotton-growing scheme in Upper Volta in the 1920s and 1930s. The Moshi did not want to grow the crop, as it interfered with both patterns of labor migration to southern Ghana (which was more remunerative) and with local food production. For another example of the effects of migration see J. Bugnicourt, "La Migration, Contribue-t-elle au D6veloppment des Zones

Retard6es?," in Amin, Modern Migrations; N. T. Annual Report, 1915.

89Birmingham, et al., Study, 104-111; Raeburn, "Report"; Amin, Modern Migrations, 98-99; Skinner, "Labour Migration," 81. By the 1950s, 20 percent of the cash income of the north was from migrants' wages. Most of this, however, was spent in the south, on lorry transport and consumer goods. Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 3. Plange, "Underdevelopment," emphasizes migrant labor as the only way the male

population had of "earning their keep." This is, I think, an overemphasis. It was certainly a common way of

earning cash, for goods or taxes, and the sale of surplus or crops planted deliberately for sale was another, but "keep" remained subsistence farming. Until the late 1930s there was no direct taxation in the north.




Gold Coast, though, the situation having arisen, little was done to alleviate it. Depopulation and the deterioration of farming did not occur to the same extent as elsewhere; nor, however, did farming improve much, and investment, as demonstrated, was limited. The patterns of migration and concentration of production in the south comprised an overall "transfer of value" to the south, mostly in terms of labor, though not to such an extent as to "underdevelop" the north. All studies of this imbalance recommended a massive transfer of capital to the north as the only way to reduce the economic concentration in the south.0

In conclusion, one can say that the south's dependence on northern labor was greater than the north's dependence on the wages of that labor. The north was not, as in the classic center-periphery model, drained of its surplus (here, in terms of labor), though there was certainly a transfer of value. Northern agriculture changed little in the colonial period, and did not on the whole deteriorate; food shortages existed, but these do not seem to have been related to the absence of labor. Not until the 1970s, with the development of capitalist agriculture and the loss of communally owned land, were there famines associated with the emphasis on cash crops rather than food production (the pattern one saw in northern Nigeria much earlier).

There are few figures for labor migration (and these give little indication of how long migrants were away, and in what seasons), but the numbers would not suggest a massive drain of labor, even when the numbers rose after the introduction of a cattle tax in the late 1920s and, later, after direct taxation in the north. Figures for the 1960s show over 91 percent of northern men (and up to 96 percent) engaged in subsistence agriculture. So the north was not systematically underdeveloped, in the sense of most of its surplus being expropriated. But because the south depended on the north for labor, little was done to discourage the north from providing labor - in fact, the opposite occurred, but in a desultory manner, and the resulting scale was not great enough to damage seriously the existing northern economy. The lack of investment in the north, generally, ensured that most cash earnings had to occur in the southern economy. The lack of investment and the absence of an export oriented agriculture in the north, therefore, can be seen to have produced cleavages between northern and southern Ghana in the colonial period, but perhaps to have avoided the greater dislocations described for northern Nigeria. Ghana's main area of incorporation into the national economy was through labor migration and, as noted, with relatively slight effects on economy and society. Northern Ghana's lack of development can perhaps best be seen, as Shenton puts it, as that of insufficient capitalist exploitation. If underdevelopment is a process of deterioration, the north was not underdeveloped, but simply not developed. The main reason for this, I would argue, was the labor demand of the south (allied, probably, to the

90Amin, Modern Migrations, 103-104; Raeburn, "Report"; Birmingham, et. al., Study, 104-105.

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668 INEZ SUTTON

demographic patterns of the north). The north functioned as a necessary, but poorer, and not very thoroughly incorporated appendage of the south.91

Indirect rule, Shenton argues, functioned in Nigeria to integrate the north into the national economy and into the world capitalist system. In northern Ghana (where indirect rule occurred much later) its economic function was not so all-embracing (despite the hopes of some officials) in that the north remained very much peripheral and the "external economy" small. Indirect rule, combined with taxation, however, did reinforce the migration of labor to the south and, to a certain extent, the sale of food crops (though not as much as hoped for). Indirect rule also, it is argued, divided the north so as to make any concerted opposition to government policy (economic or other) difficult, and further isolated the north in political terms. Certainly the dividing and devolution of responsibility for all social services (health, agriculture, education, and so forth) onto the various district commissioners created another barrier to an integrated agricultural policy for the north. (One indication of this is the plethora of purely local proposals and projects). The idea of indirect rule as emphasizing the traditional ("a deliberate attempt to isolate the Northern Territories from the twentieth century") seems to me only a marginal consideration in the area of economic policy, which was more pragmatic in the reasons given; the idea of the maintaining the traditional, however, may have given ideological backing to the lack of development in the north, though after the fact. The traditionalist arguments, striking in areas of education and politics, are not often raised in discussions of the northern economy.92

The Gold Coast, like other colonies of the "new imperialism," was approached primarily in terms of the production of raw materials unavailable in the temperate zone. As noted, the most successful production of these products was in the southern third of the colony, leading to the more rapid development of this area in terms of services, income, and so on. Moreover, the development of the south can be shown to have taken place at the expense of other areas. The surplus extracted - labor - was not at such a level as to prevent the generation of capital in the north. There was never anything approaching a population drain in the north in the colonial period, but the lack of capital input, especially in infrastructure (related to the extraction of labor), and questions of environment, settlement patterns, suitable crops and their demand (to an extent, pre-existing conditions) ensured that the north was neglected. A pre-colonial distinction between the economic activities of north and south was enhanced by colonial policy. Certainly, there must have been few areas of the north totally untouched by the existence of an export economy in the south, with labor migration, the sale of food crops, and the trickling in of money and manufactured goods.

91Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 2; G. B. Kay, The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana (Cambridge, 1972), introduction; R. Thomas, "Education"; Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, 48; T. E. Hilton, "Depopulation and Population Movement in the Upper Region of Ghana," Bulletin of the Ghana

Geographical Association, 11, 1 (1966), 27-47; Shenton, Development of Capitalism, Ch. 7; Shenton and Watts, "Capitalism and Hunger." Migration increased from around 8,700 in 1926-27 to around 69,500 in 1928- 29 (probably related to the new cattle tax), dropping to 47,059 in 1938-39, and up to 130,745 in 1948-49. There were nearly always more migrants from the French colonies.

92Duncan-Johnstone papers, vol. 1/7, p. 70, 1/10, p. 5, 2/4, p. 27-28; Shepherd, "Capitalist Rice Farming," Ch. 1; Staniland, Lions, Ch. 3, 42-43; Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, 48; Thomas, "Education."




Gunder-Frank's model assumes that if the center proceeds forward, the periphery regresses, but in this case the periphery simply changed less and more slowly; the aim of colonial policy was to develop the south, ignoring rather than underdeveloping the north. The idea of a center and periphery is still useful in this context, though the contrast is not as stark as elsewhere. The center and periphery developed less close ties than elsewhere, and less integration "of the farthest outpost and peasant into the system as a whole."93 Also, the Latin American model of the development of industrial centers at the expense of rural areas is not really applicable, but rather the development of towns associated with prosperous agricultural areas, and the lower level of development and less urbanization of other agricultural areas, more marginal to a world economy. In colonial Ghana, labor migration from the north, and a certain limited amount of colonial spending there, seem to have balanced each other to maintain a fairly static situation of non-development which, nevertheless, made the north marginal in terms of economic change, of raising the standard of living, and of participation in national political and social processes.94

93Gunder-Frank, Capitalism, 147.

94Ibid.

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colonial agricultural policy: the non-development of the northern territories of the gold coast

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