1. 1. Collective Action Zbigniew ukasiak (CC BY 4.0)
2. 2. Who is bringing wood?
3. 3. Who is bringing wood? In small groups there is no problem with that. But imagine a fire for a few dozens of people. This will not happen so spontaneously
4. 4. Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action Group definition all who cannot be excluded from consumption of a good. For example the warmth of the fire. This shows the relativity physically it would be possible to exclude someone, but that would break some silent rules. Other similar examples: roads, TV program, national defence, environment. Another example workers of a company.
5. 5. Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action In small groups it is often rational to do something for the group only because we would benefit from it as well. For example bring wood for the fire. In big groups the situation is different our benefit is lower than the effort needed to produce the good. For example bring wood for the fire for a 1000 people.
6. 6. Mancur Olson Logic of Collective Action Big groups need other means to incentivise their members. This can be: rules of law, various social pressure etc. But it is a big threshold because it changes the expectation of the members about the actions of their peers. Sometimes those who act ostensibly for the benefit of the group are shunned for being gullible (i.e. maybe their actions are not really good).
7. 7. Examples Unions Cooperatives and housing associations Free Software 'scratch your itch'
8. 8. The tragedy of the commons Copyright Chris Yeates and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence.
9. 9. The tragedy of the commons Overgrazing One more cow benefit for the owner, costs shared It is actually the same as the above just with negative numbers Hardin's conclusion is that there are only two solutions either privatisation or state control.
10. 10. Common Pool Resources
11. 11. Common Pool Resources Underground water in some location Irrigation systems Common pastures Forests Fisheries
12. 12. Common Pool Resources - definition It is hard (but not impossible) to exclude someone. Using the resource deplets it
13. 13. Classification of goods Excludable Non-excludable Rivalrous Private goods: food, clothes, etc. Environment, parking space Non-rival Club goods: private schools, theaters, cinemas, clubs Public goods: national defence, police, fire fighting, information
14. 14. Governing the Commons Watching others is also work. The second-order problem The state originally was mostly concerned about defense i.e. public good, but it now also governs common pool and other types of resources
15. 15. Governing the Commons Pastures and forests (Toerbel w Szwajcarii, Hirano, Nagaike i Yamanoka - wsie w Japonii) Irigation systems (Huerta in Spain and Zanjera - Philipines) Underground water case study in California Fisheries in Turkey, Sri Lanca and Nova Scotia
16. 16. Governing the commons Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties) Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to local conditions
17. 17. Governing the Commons Collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators
18. 18. Governing the commons A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and of easy access
19. 19. Governing the Commons Self-determination of the community recognized by higher-level authorities In the case of larger common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level.
20. 20. Governing the Commons Self-determination of the community recognized by higher-level authorities In the case of larger common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level.
21. 21. Literature Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521405997. Ostrom, Elinor (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691122380. Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (PDF). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1965. ISBN 0-674- 53751-3. Hardin, G (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons". Science 162 (3859): 12431248.
22. 22. Questions?