collaborative vs. adversarial relationship between the...

asia pacific jouRnal of social woRk and developmentvolume 18 • number 2 • december 2008

Collaborativevs.AdversarialRelationshipBetweentheState

andCivilSocietyinFacingPublicDisaster

TheCaseofHongKongintheSARSCrisis

HUnGWOnGAnDTERRYT.F.LEUnG

• Hung Wong is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Work at the ChineseUniversityofHongKong.E-mail:[email protected] isAssistantProfessor intheDepartmentofAppliedSocialStudiesat theCityUniversityofHongKong.E-mail:ssterry@cityu.edu.hk.ThecontributorsacknowledgethefinancialsupportoftheDirectGrantfromtheChineseUniversityofHongKongforthisstudy.

A study on activities launched by the civil society in dealing with the SARS crisis in Hong Kong identifies that civil society in Hong Kong simultaneously performs the collaborative and adversarial functions, embracing a sensitive balance between trust and risk when entrusting the state to serve the public good. Drawing on the survey analysis, the article argues that the complexity of state and civil society relation has to be understood as dialectics in the “collaboration/adversary” duality. Several hypotheses are generated from the study for further research.

Key words: civil society, public disasters, state-civil society collaboration, SARS

IntroductionHongKongwasseriouslyhitwhentheSARS(SevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome)epidemic struck the territory in the misty spring of 2003. The then unknownvirus infected1,755 individualsandclaimedthe livesofnearly300. Inrespondingto this unprecedented community-wide health hazard, many non-governmentalorganizations(nGOs)inHongKong,includingwelfareagencies,schools,religiousorganizations, as well as community and grassroots organizations, initiated andorganizednumerousactionsandresponsestotheSARScrisis.Someoftheseactionssupplementedgovernmentalefforts.Forexample,whilethegovernmentfocusedoninformationgivingandpublichealtheducationattheoutbreakofSARS,thewelfare

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agenciessetupdifferenthotlineservicesandprovidedneedyemotionalsupporttothegeneralpublic(Leung&Wong,2005).TherewasalsomuchcooperationbetweenthestateandnGOs, like“OperationUnITE,”whichwasaterritory-widecleaningand education campaign initiated by the civil society but fully supported by theGovernment of the Special Administrative Region (henceforth referred to as theHong Kong Government or the Government). Such concerted endeavors supporttheclaimofcomplementarinessandinterdependencebetweencivilsocietyandthestate,despitethatcivilsocietyplaysasimultaneousadvocacyroletochallengetheinefficiency and ineffectiveness of governmental actions. As the pandemic crisissubsidedinthesummerof2003,somecivilsocietyactionsalsoreceded. ThisarticleisbasedonastudyconductedfromtheSARSoutbreaktoanextendedperiodinitsaftermathontheactionsandreactionsofcivilsocietytothecommunityhealthhazard.Thestudysetouttounderstandthedialecticsbetweencollaborationand adversary in the desired “state-society synergy” (Evans, 1995; Jalali, 2002), asthedutiesofthegovernmentandthecivilsocietywerenegotiatedandplayedoutindealingwiththecommunalcrisis.

Collaborative versus adversarial Relation between Civil society and the state in Disaster Mitigation

Therelationshipbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyhasbeenapopularthemeinthestudyof communitycrisisordisastermitigation (Evans,1995; Jalali, 2002;Powell,2000;Rose,Mishler,&Haerpfer,1997;Shaw&Goda,2004).Inanalyzingthestate-civilsocietyrelationaftertheearthquakeinTurkey,Jalali(2002)arguesthatanidealdisasterresponsesystemcanonlybebasedonstate-civilsocietyrelationsthatareboth collaborative and adversarial. Whilst acting as advocates for survivors andforcingchangesatthestatelevel,civilsocietyalsoprovidessocialcapitaltosupportgovernmentactions(Jalali,2002).A“state-societysynergy”(Evans,1995;Jalali,2002),“wherecivilsocietysupplementstheworkofthegovernmentandvoicestheconcernof the voiceless—are essential for alleviating the suffering of victims and creatinganeffectivedisasterresponsesystem”(Jalali,2002,p.124).Thedialecticsbetweencollaborativeandtheadversarialrelationinthe“state-societysynergy,”however,hastobeunderstoodinthelightof“trust”(Seligman,1997). Civil society, as characterized by a network of voluntary associations andcitizen organizations, has always been taken as a platform for the generation oftrustanddevelopmentofsocialcapital(Morris&Rodriguez;2005;newton,2001;Saegert, Thompson, & Warren, 2001). A high level of social trust is seen as thebasis of cooperation because it mutually reinforces expectations about reciprocity(Misztal,2001;Scott,1999).Inthereciprocity-basedmodeloftrust,trustassumespredictability and rationality enhanced by the threat of retribution and retaliation(Morris&Rodriguez,2005).Trustistheconfidencethatnopartywillexploitanother’svulnerabilityinanexchange(Sabel,1993).Yet,suchtrustisbuiltonasocialcontract

•��Collaborativevs.AdversarialRelationshipBetweentheStateandCivilSocietyinFacingPublicDisaster:TheCaseofHongKongintheSARSCrisis

inwhich isassumedacapacityofexacting fairamountsof retributionwhen trustfails(Morris&Rodriguez,2005).Morris&Rodriguez(2005)furtherexplicatethattrustinthisreciprocity-basedmodelnecessitatesageneralsuspicionanddistrustasasafeguardagainstanypotentialassaultorploy.Inthisway,trustisasourceofriskthathastobemanagedproperly(Webb,2006),astrustisaboutmediatingandnegotiatingdistrust (Morris&Rodriguez,2005).AsMisztal (2001)proclaims,healthydistrustis essential for democraticprogress.This dialectic analysisbetween trust and riskis precisely the premise on which Jahali (2002) builds her thesis that “civil societyneedstobecollaborative(actingaspartner)butalsoadversarial,givingvoicetotheconcerns of the voiceless” (Jalali, 2002, p. 135), in the necessary safeguard againsttheriskoftrusting.Inthisarticle,weexploretherelationbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyinthelightofthe“collaborative-adversarial”and“trust-risk”dialectics,whenHongKongwasconfrontedwiththeSARScrisis.Tocapturethesituationalcontextofthestudy,developmentofthe2003SARScrisisinHongKongisfirstdeliberated.

The saRs Crisis in Hong Kong: Context of the studyThe SARS crisis started with an outburst of the epidemic in the Prince of WalesHospitalinearlyMarch2003,whenmanydoctors,nurses,andmedicalstudentswereinfectedbyathenvirtuallyunknownvirus.WorriesandanxietiesbuiltupintheHongKongcommunityasthenumberofinfectedcasesgrew.Theabsenceofknowledgeaboutthevirus,coupledwithitsspeedyspread,createdacrisisatmospherethatwasunprecedentedinHongKong.Knowledgeaboutthenewepidemicwassoimperfectthatthenatureofthevirus,thesymptomsofinfection,therouteoftransmission,andthe appropriate treatment were all subject to recurrent controversy and continualdiscovery.Whetherfacemasksshouldbeworninpublicplaceswasalsoasubjectofdebatewhenthethreatwas initiallydetected.Butthecontroversywasshort-lived.The threat was clearly recognized and this was reflected in the citizens’ hunt forfacemasksshortlyaftertheonsetoftheepidemic. Following the detection of the threat and a series of public warnings, thecommunity of Hong Kong reluctantly acknowledged that the customary ways ofcopingwithpublichealthproblemsdidnotworkanymore.ForthefirsttimesinceWorldWarII,emergencymedicalservicesweretemporarilysuspendedinthePrinceofWalesHospitalonMarch19,2003,andsubsequentlyinotherinfectedhospitalsaswell.ThecommunalhazardalsothreatenednormaldailyroutinesinHongKong.Witnessingthesteepriseininfectedcases,theHongKongGovernmentannouncedon March 27, 2003, the suspension of classes in all schools below tertiary level.Universityauthorities followedsuit,andactivity inalleducational institutionswasvirtuallyputtoahalt. TheGovernment’sdecisiontosuspendclassesinallschoolswasrelatedtotheoutbreakofalarge-scalecommunityinfectionintheresidentialareaofAmoyGardens,in which coincidental environmental factors caused the infection of hundreds of


residentsinasmallresidentialcommunity.ResidentsinthemostinfectedblockofAmoy Gardens were quarantined in their own flats on March 31, 2003, and werelaterquarantinedinholidaycampsinanefforttocontroltheinfection.TheAmoyGardensinfection,whicheventuallyaccountedformorethan40deaths,promptedtheintroductionofquarantinemeasuresforthefamilymembersofinfectedpatients.Atthesametime,thenumberofcontractedcaseswentintoasteeprise.Thehighestnumberofnewinfectionsinasingledayduringtheperiodwas81.Withsuchahighnumberofnewcases,asenseofriskbuiltupquicklyinHongKong.Thissenseofriskwasmanifestedamongconsumersinarushtosupermarketstostockupwhen,onApril1,AprilFools’Day,a14-years-oldladspreadarumorovertheInternettotheeffectthattheborderwouldbeclosed(TaKungPao,2003). In the face of an invisible and unknown virus hiding in the community,the customary values of trust and courtesy came under challenge. Governmentpromotional clips on television urged the citizens of Hong Kong not to use theirhandstotouchtheireyes,nose,andmouth,andtowashtheirhandsalwaysbeforetouchinganypartoftheirface.Ascarriersofthevirusmightnotpresentsymptoms,peoplewereadvisedtokeepothersatadistance.Shakinghands,anormalexpressionofcourtesyinsociallife,wasdiscouraged.IntheshadowofSARS,sociallifeinHongKongwasvirtuallybrought toa temporaryhalt,whenpeoplewereasked toavoidpublicplacesandcloseencounterswithotherpeople.Ostensibly,SARShademergedasmorethanapublichealthhazard.Itwasachallengetothecustomarylifeofthepeople in Hong Kong. The public health hazard arising from the SARS epidemicwasbeyondtheexperienceof theHongKongGovernment,andwasnot includedinanypre-conceivedcontingencyplan.Amidsttheuncertaintiesaccompanyingthenewvirusandintheabsenceofanyprecedent,complaintsandargumentswerenotwantingduringtheperiod.Onemainargumentatthattimewaswhethersufficientprotectivefacilitieswereprovidedtohospitalstaffandwhethertheyweredistributedinanefficientmanner. ItwasnotuntilApril12,2003,thatinfectionfiguresbegantodisplayasteadydownwardtrend.AstheHongKongcommunitybegantocometotermswiththerealityoftheepidemic,varioussectorsbegantotakemeasurestoresumeoperationsin the shadow of the threat from SARS. Educational institutions issued a policyon wearing facemasks when classes resumed. The facilities management sectorupgradedtheircleaningstandardsandenhancedtheircleaningprocedurestoregaintheconfidenceofusers.Theoperatorsofpublic transportprovided freemasks topassengersandadvisedthemtowearthemduringtheir journey.Civilsocietyalsostarted to contribute its own resources when the Government, on its own, wasseenasinadequateinrespondingtothedisaster.Themediainitiatedafund-raisingcampaigntoprovideprotectiveclothingandmasksformedicalworkers.SomeyoungprofessionalsestablishedawebsitetoannouncetheresidentialandworkaddressesofinfectedSARScaseswhentheGovernmentrefusedtodoso.Welfareagenciesalsoinitiatedanumberofcontingentservices forvulnerablegroupstosupplementthe


Government’sefforts.ThepandemicbegantorecedeonJune23,2003,whenanullinfectionwasregistered.ThepandemiccrisiscametoacloseinAugust2003,whenallSARSpatientsweredischargedfromhospitals.ContingentandadhocmeasuresbytheGovernmentandcivilsocietyweregraduallyended,replacedbylonger-termhealtheducationandcommunitysupportinitiatives. During the SARS crisis, 1,377 reported events were launched by nGOs. TheHong Kong Council of Social Service (HKCSS), a coordinating body for welfareagencies,claimedthattheSARScrisisunitednGOs,thebusinesssector,professionalbodies,andtheGovernmentinastrategicpartnership(HKCSS,2003).Criticsweremeanwhile cynical about this “state-civil society partnership.” Shiu (2003) arguedthatmostactivitieslaunchedbycivilsocietyduringtheSARSperiodwere“repeatedpoliticalnarratives”and“publicrelationstactics,”representingacollusionbetweenthe state and the civil society for rebuilding legitimacy and authority of the state.Law(2003)explainedtheready“collusion”betweentheHongKongGovernmentandnGOsbythelegacyofcolonialgovernanceculturewascharacterizedbythenGOs’heavyfinancialdependenceontheGovernment.noempiricalevidenceis,however,availabletosupporttheabovedivergentclaimsabouttherelationbetweenthestateandcivilsocietyduringtheSARScrisis.Theresearchonwhichthisarticleisbasedis an endeavor to fill this empirical gap for further exploration of the relationshipbetweenthestateandcivilsociety. Themainobjectiveof this article is toexplore thepurposeandnatureof thepost-disasteractionsandactivitiesofnGOs,andtheperceivedroleandperceivedrelationshipofthenon-governmentalorganizerswithotherstakeholdersinhandlingsimilarcommunitycrisis.

Research MethodThecurrentstudywasconductedinJune2004,intheaftermathoftheSARScrisis,byemployingasurveymethod.ByInternetsearchwithYahoo,Google,andWisenews(aChinesenewsdatabasecoveringallmajorChinesenewspapersinHongKongandChina),itwasfoundthat128nGOsinHongKonghaveorganizedactivitiesinresponsetoSARSduringtheperiodfromMarch2003toMarch2004.Aquestionnairewaspostedtothese128nGOs.Themajoritemscoveredinthequestionnaireinclude:(a)adescriptionofSARS-relatedactivitiesorganized;(b)difficultiesencounteredduringtheorganizingprocess;(c)theperceivedarenaofriskengenderedbytheSARScrisis;(d)theperceivedleveloftrustinotherstakeholdersincombatingsimilarcrisis;(e)theperceptionoftheorganization’sroleinthefaceofasimilarcrisis;and(f )theperceivedextentofcontactandlinkagewithdifferentstakeholders.Altogether,55organizationssuccessfullycompletedandreturnedthequestionnaire,yieldingaresponserateof43percent.Themajorityof therespondingorganizations (75percent)weresocialserviceagencies,whilstaboutone-tenth (11percent)werereligiousorganizations,andanotherone-tenth(9percent)wereself-helpandmutualhelpgroups.


findingssaRs-related activities by the nGosIn the survey, 211 SARS-related activities were reported by the respondingorganizations. Among these 211 activities, the majority of them comprisedprovisionoffinancial/materialsupport(55percent),whilst29percentcomprisedfundraising or collection of in-kind materials, 9 percent comprised healtheducation activities and 5 percent comprised provision of emotional support.ThemajortargetsoftheseactivitieswerefamiliesofpatientswhohadcontractedSARS(44percent)andhigh-riskgroups(15percent)suchaselderlypersonsandyoungchildren.Amongothers,11percentoftheactivitiestargetedthemedicalworkerswhosecontributiontomitigatingtheSARScrisiswashighlycommendedbytheHongKongsociety. The responding organizations were asked to indicate the goals they assignedto the211SARS-relatedactivities.Assomeactivitieshadmultiplegoals,298goalitemswere reported.Thesegoal itemswereclassified into “collaborative”goalsor“adversarial”goals,intermsoftheiragreementwiththeGovernment’sstatedmissioninrelationtocombatingcommunityhealthhazard.Amongthe298statedgoalitems,93percentwere“collaborative”goals,whilst7percentwere“adversarial”goals.ThedetailscanbefoundinTable1.

TABLE 1

distribution of activities by Goals

Goal category Goal items frequency (%) % in 211 activitiesCollaborative goals

Preventing the re-occurrence of SARS 76 (26%) 36.0%Imparting knowledge and information about SARS to citizens

50 (17%) 23.7%

Providing counseling, support or direct service to the needy

49 (16%) 23.2%

Enhancing community cohesion & solidarity

49 (16%) 23.2%

Providing finance and in-kind assistance to the needy

27 (9%) 12.8%

Helping Government implement anti-SARS activities

26 (9%) 12.3%

Adversarial goals

Monitoring Government departments

5 (2%) 2.4%

Filling up service gap arising from Government inadequacy

16 (5%) 7.6%

298 (100%)

•�1Collaborativevs.AdversarialRelationshipBetweentheStateandCivilSocietyinFacingPublicDisaster:TheCaseofHongKongintheSARSCrisis

perceived Role of the nGos in similar crisisTherespondentswereaskedinthesurveytoindicatetheirperceivedroleinconfrontingasimilarcrisisonafive-pointsLikertscale.Theroleas“providerofdirectservicetotheneedy”receivedthehighestmeanscoreof4.00,whilsttheroleas“facilitatortoenhancecommunitycohesionandsolidarity”hadameanscoreof3.65,and“auxiliarytofillupGovernmentservicegap”and“auxiliarytohelpGovernmenthandlecrisis”hadameanscoreof3.62and3.45respectively.Therespondingorganizationsdidnotcommonlytakeupthe“watchdog”role,whichreceivedthelowestmeanscoreof2.35.

CHART 1Roles perceived by nGos in combating similar crisis

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

4.003.65 3.62 3.45

2.35

Direct service to the needy

Community cohesion

Fill government service gap

Help government

handle crisis

Watchdog on

government work

trust among different actors in combating similar crisisWe further explored trust among the responding organizations as manifested intheir perception of relationship with other stakeholders. “Trust” was measuredin the study by a five-points Likert scale on the perceived reliability of differentstakeholdersincombatingsimilarcrisis,andtheorganization’sperceivedreciprocalrelianceondifferentstakeholders.Itwasfoundthatperceivedreliabilitywashighestfor“community-basedorganizations”(meanscore=3.19)and“communitymembers/residents”(meanscore=3.17).“nGOs”hadaslightlylowerscoreof3.15,whilstallthegovernmentdepartmentsreceivedascorelessthantheneutralmarkof3.Amongthegovernmentdepartments,theHospitalAuthorityhadthehighestscoreat2.53.TheChiefExecutiveoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegionreceivedthelowesttrustscoreat2.06.


CHART 2perceived reliability of different actors in responding to the saRs crisis

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

3.19 3.17 3.15

2.70 2.66

Coop

erat

ion

com

mun

ity o

rgan

izatio

ns

2.53 2.50 2.40

2.06

Mut

ual-h

elp

com

mun

ity re

side

nts

Coop

erat

ion

serv

ice

agen

cies

Hosp

ital a

utho

rity

Heal

th d

epar

tmen

t

Heal

th a

nd w

elfa

re b

urea

u

Soci

al w

elfa

re d

epar

tmen

t

Indi

vidu

al

Chie

f exe

cutiv

e

Roles perceived by the nGos in combating similar crisisReciprocalreliance“amongstaff,”“betweenclientandstaff,”and“betweenmanagementandstaff”werecategorizedas“intra-organizationaltrust,”whilstreciprocalreliance“betweentheorganizationandothernGOs”and“betweentheorganizationandothercommunity-basedorganizations”werecategorizedas“inter-organizationaltrust.”Allperceivedreciprocalrelianceinvolvingagovernmentalpartywascategorizedas“trustonGovernment.”Itwasfoundthat“intra-organizationaltrust”wasthehighestamongtherespondingorganizations,withanaggregatemeanscoreof4.19(meanscoreforperceived reciprocal reliance “among their own staff” = 4.27, “between client andstaff”=4.22,and“betweenmanagementandstaff”=4.09).“Inter-organizationaltrust”hadanaggregatemeanscoreof3.67(meanscoreforperceivedreciprocalrelianceinrelationtoothernGOs=3.70, inrelationtocommunity-basedorganizations=3.63),stillstandingonthepositiveside).TrustleviedontheGovernment,however,received the lowest aggregate mean score at 2.82. Trust between the GovernmentandnGOs(meanscore=2.94),betweenthegovernmentdepartments(meanscore=2.82),andbetweentheGovernmentandcivilians(meanscore=2.65)allstoodbelowtheneutralmarkof3.

•�3Collaborativevs.AdversarialRelationshipBetweentheStateandCivilSocietyinFacingPublicDisaster:TheCaseofHongKongintheSARSCrisis

CHART 3perceived Reciprocal Reliance on different actors

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

4.27 4.224.09

3.70 3.63

TrustStaff-staff

TrustClient-staff

TrustManagement-

styaff

TrustNGOs-NGOs

TrustCBO-CBO

2.942.82 2.65

TrustGovernment

-NGOs

TrustGovernment department-government department

TrustGovernment-

citizen

contact and linkage between different actorsThe responding nGOs were asked in the survey to indicate their linkage withother actors. Perceived close contact and linkage was highest among staff in theorganizations (mean score = 4.16), whereas the mean score between client andstaffwas3.76,andbetweenmanagementandstaffwas3.7.ThecontactandlinkagebetweenthenGOshadalowermeanscoreof3.35,andthatofbetweencommunity-basedorganizationswas3.19.ThemeanscoreforcontactandlinkagebetweentheGovernmentandotherpartiesstoodatthelowest(meanscoreforlinkagebetweentheGovernmentandnGOs=2.94,betweengovernmentdepartments=2.93,andbetweentheGovernmentandcivilians=2.57).Therankorderwasconsonantwiththatofperceivedtrustbetweendifferentactors.

correlation between activity Goal and perceived Reliability of different actorsCorrelations between the number of collaborative and adversarial activities, andbetweenactivitygoalandperceivedreliabilityofdifferentactorsareshowninTable2.Itisfoundthatthenumberofcollaborativeandadversarialactivitiesispositivelycorrelated (R = .437, p < 0.01), and the correlation is highly significant. It meansthat organizations taking part in more collaborative activities tend to have moreadversarialactivitiestoo.Itrejectstheassumptionofadichotomousdivisionbetweencollaborativeandadversarialorganizationsintermsoftheirrelationwiththestate.

��•HUnGWOnGAnDTERRYT.F.LEUnG

Meanwhile, the number of adversarial activities is found to be correlated toperceivedreliabilityoftheGovernment(R=.283,p<0.05).OrganizationsperceivingtheGovernmentasreliabletendtoorganizemoreadversarialactivities.ItindicatesthattheadversarialfunctionofnGOsisnotcontradictorytotheirtrustinthestate.Adversarial endeavors can sit comfortably with a trust of the state’s capacity andreliability. Statisticalanalysisalsofoundthatthetargetsofperceivedreliabilityarehighlycorrelatedtoeachother.PerceivedreliabilityoftheGovernmentishighlycorrelatedtoperceivedreliabilityofcommunity(R=.420,p<0.01)andindividual(R=.388,p<0.01),whereasperceivedreliabilityofcommunityisalsohighlycorrelatedtoperceivedreliabilityofindividual(R=.519,p<0.01).Itsuggeststhattrustisageneralattitudecharacterizinganorganization’sdisposition,andtrustinonearenamayinducetrustinanother.

correlation between activity Goal and perceived Role of nGosThecorrelationsbetweenactivitygoalandtheperceivedrolesreportedbynGOsareshowninTable3.Thenumberofcollaborativeactivitiesissignificantlycorrelatedtotheroleoforganizationsas“facilitatortoenhancecommunitycohesionandsolidarity”(R=.282,p<0.05)and“auxiliarytohelptheGovernmenthandlecrisis”(R=.330,p<0.05).Both,acommunityfocusandastatesupportorientationintheorganizationalmission,purporttocollaborativeactivitiesattimesofcommunitycrisis.

CHART 4contact and linkage between different actors

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

4.16

3.76 3.703.35

3.19

ContactStaff-staff

ContactClient-staff

ContactManagement-

styaff

ContactNGOs-NGOs

ContactCBO-CBO

2.94 2.93

2.57

ContactNGOs-

government

ContactGovernment department-government department

ContactGovernment-

citizen


1 ** *

55 55 52 52 53

** 1 *

.425 .108 .010

55 55 52 52 53

.283* .113 1 .420** .388**

.042 .425 .002 .004

52 52 52 52 52

.140 .225 .420** 1 .519**

.324 .108 .002 .000

52 52 52 52 52

.160 .350* .388** .519** 1

.252 .010 .004 .000

53 53 52 52 53

Pear

Sig.

N

Pear

Sig.

N

Pear

Sig.

N

Pear

Sig.

N

Pear

Sig.

N

No. o

No.

Activiti

Faith

Faith t

Faith

Faith-

TABLE 2correlation between activity Goal and trust in different actors

**Correlationissignificantatthe0.01level(2-tailed).*Correlationissignificantatthe0.05level(2-tailed).

TABLE 3correlations between activity Goal and different Roles of the nGos

no. of adversarial activities

no. of collaborative

activitiesRole fill government service gap Pearson correlation .262 .219 Sig. (2-tailed) .053 .108 N 55 55Role help government handle crisis Pearson correlation .170 .330(*) Sig. (2-tailed) .214 .014 N 55 55Role watchdog Pearson correlation .254 .184 Sig. (2-tailed) .064 .184 N 54 54Role community cohesion Pearson correlation .200 .282(*) Sig. (2-tailed) .143 .037 N 55 55Role direct service to needy Pearson correlation -.015 .203 Sig. (2-tailed) .913 .137 N 55 55

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DiscussionDuringtheSARSpandemichazardinHongKong,criticismofgovernmentresponsewasnotwantingfromnGOsandthemassmedia.Therewerenumerouscivil-societyinitiatives to supplement or rebuke the Government’s actions, which were seen asinadequateincombatingthepublicdisaster.Promulgationoftheresidentialandworkaddressesof infectedSARScaseson the InternetbyagroupofyoungprofessionalsagainsttheGovernment’spolicywasoneoftheexamplesofadversarialactionsduringthecrisis.Whilstadversarialactionsweremorevisiblebythemediaattentiontheyusedtoattract,itsvolumewas,however,smallcomparedwiththatofcollaborativeactions,particularlyintheaftermathofthecrisis.Lessthan10percentofthenon-governmentalinitiatives identifiedby the study includedanadversarial goal.Meanwhile, thenon-governmental sector was comfortable with a collaborative role in working with thestate,asindicatedinthestudybyapositiveattitudetowardtheirroleas“auxiliarytofilluptheGovernmentservicegap”and“auxiliarytohelptheGovernmenthandlecrisis.” Despiteapropensityforcollaboration,thecivilsocietyinHongKongdoesnotpredisposetoahightrustonthestate.ThestudyidentifiedthattheGovernmentwasatthetailoftheleaguetablewhenitcametotrusttheyearnedfromtherespondingnGOs.Asuspicioussentimentprevailsamongthenon-governmentalsector,amidstits readiness to collaborate with the state. The study findings do not support thealleged positive and harmonious relation between nGOs and the Government asportrayed by the HKCSS (2003). This suspicious sentiment can be related to thegreaterdistanceinrelationshipbetweenthecivilsocietyandthestate,whencontactandlinkagewiththegovernmentalsectorisfarfrombeingclose. It is worth noting that a suspicious sentiment on the state does not necessarilyencourageadversarialactionsinthefaceofpubliccrisis.Thestudyidentifiedthatthenumber of adversarial activities is positively correlated to perceived reliability of theGovernment.Contrary to the ruleof simple logic,organizationswithgreater trust intheGovernmenttendtoorganizemoreadversarialactivities.ThedatasuggeststhattheadversarialfunctionofnGOscanbeconsonantwiththeirtrustinthestate.Adversarialendeavors may represent an expectation and quest for the enhancement of statefunctions,whichcanonlybebuiltontrustinthestate’scapacityforimprovement.Toacertainextent, thishypothesisof latent trust in thestateechoesLaw’s (2003) thesisaboutthedependencynatureofcivilsocietyinHongKong,inthelegacyofthe“colonialgovernanceculture.”notwithstanding,thefindingalsoindicatesthatnGOs’adversarialfunctionandwatchdogrolecanbeactivatedbytheriskanduncertaintythatcommunalcrisisengenders,promisingacriticalreviewoftheircustomarydependencyonthestate. Thepositivecorrelationbetweencollaborativeandadversarialactivitiesasidentifiedinthestudyisanotherfindingthatiscontrarytopopularassumption.Theorganizationstakingpart inmorecollaborativeactivities tend tohavemoreadversarial activities. ItrejectsthepopularassumptioninHongKongofadichotomousdivisionoforganizationsintheirrelationshipwiththestate.nevertheless,thevariableoforganizationalsizeandresources was not included in this study. Further investigation in future research isnecessarytoascertaintheimpactoforganizationalcapacityandpowerinthepropensity


forcollaborativeandadversarialactivitiesattimesofcommunalhazard. Jalali(2002,p.123)arguesthatcivilsocietyperformsmultiplerolesindisaster.It“createssocialcapital(cooperationandtrust)foreffectivedisasterrelief,intermediatesbetween state institutions and the concerns of disaster victims and supports thepublicspherebyraisingissuesinthepublicarenaanddemandingpublicaction.”Herdepictionofthemultipleroleofthecivilsociety iswitnessedinHongKongwhenit encountered the public disaster of SARS. Ostensibly, the nGOs in Hong Kongarereadytorealizetheirdualroleinthe“state-societysynergy”(Evans,1995;Jalali,2002), whereby both collaborative and adversarial functions are incorporated intotheirrelationshipwiththeGovernmentwhenitcomestocombatingpublicdisaster.SuspicionasindicatedinthelowleveloftrustintheGovernmentrendersanecessarysafeguard against any potential assault or ploy in the building of trust (Morris &Rodriguez,2005),amidstthecivilsociety’sreadinessforcollaboration.Attheheartofthe“state-societysynergy”(Jalali,2002)isasensitivebalancebetweentrustandriskwhenthestateisentrustedtoservethepublicgood.Meanwhile,whilstpublicdisastercanengenderastrongcivilsocietybybondingcommunitiestogetherinthefaceofadversity,italsostimulatesadversarialactivitiesandactivatesthewatchdogroleofnGOsinHongKong,amidsttheircustomarydependencyonthestate.

ConclusionThestudyhasrejectedseveralsimplisticassumptionsinunderstandingtherelationshipbetween the state and civil society. Instead of a presumed division of nGOs intocollaborativeandadversarialorganizationsintermsoftheirrelationshipwiththestate,bothcollaborativeandadversarialfunctionstendtoco-existinsomenGOs.Insteadofataken-for-grantedalignmentbetweentrustinthestateandtheextentofcollaboration,organizationswithgreatertrust intheGovernmenttendtoorganizemoreadversarialactivities;andthepropensityforcollaborationdoesnotpredisposetoahightrustinthestate.Thefindingsareindicativeofthecomplexityofstate-civilsocietyrelation,whichhastobeunderstoodasdialecticsinthe“collaboration/adversary”duality.Asanexploratoryendeavor,severalhypothesesaregeneratedfromthisstudy:(a)closercontactandlinkagebetweenthestateandcivilsocietyenhancescivilsociety’strustinthestate;(b)nGOsengageinadversarialactivitieswithatrustinthestate’scapacityforimprovement;(c)riskanduncertaintycanactivatetheadversarialfunctionandwatchdogroleofthenGOs.Thesehypothesesaresubjecttoverificationinfutureresearch. Therearesomemethodologicalandtheoreticallimitationsinthisstudy.First,thelistoforganizationsconstitutingthesamplingframeofthesurveyismainlygatheredfromnewspapersandInternetreportsattheheightoftheSARScrisis.Unpublicizedsmallscaleorad-hocactivitiesaswellasactivitiesheldoutsidetheInternetsearchperiodwereexcludedfromthestudy.Accordingly,thisstudytendstoreportactivitiesorganizedbyformalandmoreestablishedorganizations,whicharemoresusceptibletofinancialdependencyontheGovernmentinthespecificsituationofHongKong.Second,only7percentofthereportedactivitieshave“adversarial”goals.Thedatais


notsufficientformeaningfulin-depthcomparisonandanalysisinthestudy.Finally,asthereisnovalidatedscaleinHongKongon“trust”betweencivilsocietyandthestate,asimplescalewasderived formeasurement in thestudy.Thescalerequiresfurtherdevelopmentandvalidation.Lastbutnotleast,thestudyremainsexploratory,generatinghypothesesforfurtherinvestigationratherthanofferinganytheoreticalproposition.BytakingadvantageoftheSARScrisisasasituationalcontext,wehopethatthisexploratorystudycanadvanceourunderstandingofthedialecticrelationshipbetweencivilsocietyandthestateforfurthertheoreticaldevelopment.

ReferencesEvans, P. (1995). Government action, social capital and development: Creating synergy

across the public-private divide. Paper presented at the Conference of the EconomicDevelopmentWorkingGroupofSocialCapitalandPublicAffairsProjectoftheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,Washington.

HongKongCouncilofSocialService.(2003).UnityincombatingSARS.HongKong:HongKongCouncilofSocialService.

Jalali,R.(2002).Civilsocietyandthestate:Turkeyaftertheearthquake.Disasters,26(2),120–139.Law,W.S.(2003).ReflectiononproblemsofcivilsocietyfromSARSepidemic.Reflection,86

(Sept2003),9–11.HongKong:HongKongChristianInstitute.Leung,T.T.F.&Wong,H.(2005).CommunityReactionstotheSARSCrisisinHongKong:

AnalysisofaTime-LimitedCounselingHotline.JournalofHumanBehaviorintheSocialEnvironment,12(1),1–22.

Misztal, B. A. (2001). Trust and cooperation: The democratic public sphere. Journal ofSociology,37(4),371–386.

Morris,C.E.&Rodriguez,A.(2005).Towardanexistentialmodeloftrust.JournalofSocialJustice,17,95–102.

newton,K.(2001).Trust,socialcapital,civilsociety,anddemocracy.InternationalPoliticalScienceReview,22(2),201–214.

Powell,F.(2000).State,WelfareandCivilSociety.InT.Fran&A.Passey(Eds.)TrustandCivilSociety.Basingstoke:MacMillanPress.

Rose,R.Mishler,W.&Haerpfer,C.(1997).Socialcapitalincivicandstressfulsocieties.StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment,32(3),85–111.

Sabel,C.F.(1993).Studiedtrust:Buildingnewformsofcooperationinavolatileeconomy.HumanRelations,46,1133–1170.

Saegert,S.,Thompson,P.&Warren,M.R.(Eds.)(2001).Socialcapitalandpoorcommunities.newYork:RussellSageFoundation.

Scott, J.C. (1999).Geographiesof trust,geographiesofhierarchies. InM.E.Warren(Ed.)Democracyandtrust.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Seligman,A.(1997).TheProblemofTrust.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Shaw,R&Goda,K.(2004).Fromdisastertosustainablecivilsociety:TheKobeexperience.

Disasters,28(1),16–40.Shiu,K.C.(2003).Empowermentofcivilsociety:typicaloratypical?InD.C.Hui(Ed.)SARSrevelation:

atypicalgazeatHongKongsociety.HongKong:StepForwardMultimedia.(inChinese).TaKungPao,2April2003,A02.Webb,S.A.(2006).Socialworkinarisksociety.newYork:Palgrave.

asia pacific jouRnal of social woRk and developmentvolume 18 • number 2 • december 2008

LessonsUnlearned–PlanningDisasterandCommunityAnomie

ERnESTCHUI

• ErnestChuiisAssociateProfessorattheUniversityofHongKong.E-mail:[email protected]

This article critically reviews the Hong Kong Government’s ‘new town’ policy. It argues that the case of Tin Shui Wai illustrates the ‘planning disasters’ where casualties are resulted from poor government planning; a lesson that should have been learned from its predecessor, Tuen Mun, in the early 1980s. The analysis shows how rigid bureaucratic administration led to inadequate community facilities and services; the physical remoteness and the homogeneity of the populations stalled economic development; and large numbers of new immigrants, ethnic minorities, and people of low socioeconomic status concentrated in a virtually deserted community that was characterized by various social problems. The article concludes with the recommendation to make community development efforts to nurture social capital in anomic communities.

Key words: planning disaster, community development, anomie, social capital

IntroductionThisarticleaimstoexaminethecaseofanewtownthatwasdeveloped inrecentyearsanddiscusstheproblemswithHongKong’stownplanninganddevelopment.Originally, before it was ceded to Great Britain in 1842, Hong Kong, later knownas “The Pearl of the Orient,” was merely a small fishing village in southeasternChina. However, with the advent of urbanization and economic modernization inthe1970s,HongKonghasbecomeoneof themostprosperousandcosmopolitancitiesinAsia.TheBritishcolonialadministrationlaidasoundfoundationforefficientgovernmentadministrationthatpavedthewayfortheSpecialAdministrativeRegionGovernmenttosustaineffectivegovernanceuponthereturnofHongKongtoChinain1997.nevertheless,despitethecommendabletrackrecordofeffectiveandefficientadministration, thereareoccasionalproblems,attributable tobureaucratic rigidityandthefailuretocorrectearliermistakesthathaveresultedingreatsocialcoststothepeopleofHongKong. The poor planning and implementation of the development has broughtserious socialproblems to the residents living in thisnew town to theextent thatthecommunityhasbeen“eclipsed”andhauntedbyanomie(Chui,2003).Thisaptly

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illustratesthesocialcostsbornebythepublicasaresultofagovernment“planningdisaster”(Hall,1980;ThePlanningDisasterCoalition,n.d.),theadverseconsequencesofwhichmightperhapsbecomparabletothosecausedbyanaturaldisaster.Suchdisasters result from a lopsided emphasis on physical planning and the lack of agenuine human concern that characterizes the social-work profession. Efforts torevitalizethecommunitybydevelopingandmobilizingsocialcapitalarecalledfor.ThepresentarticlefocusesspecificallyontheTinShuiWai(TSW)northarea,anewtownthatbegantobedevelopedinthelate1980sandwhichisaconstituentpartoftheTSWareawithintheYuenLongDistrictinthenorthwestregionofHongKong.

“new Town” Development – a Hong Kong version of a british legacy

TheproblemofTinShuiWainorthactuallyresultedfromtheHongKonggovernment’s“new town” policy, which reached its high point in the 1970s. The policy and itsintellectualheritageofnewtowndevelopmentcanbetracedtoHongKong’sBritishcoloniallegacyandtheUnitedKingdomduringthepost-SecondWorldWaryears.Immediatelyafterthewar,in1945,theU.K.governmentestablishedanewTownsCommittee,vestedwiththeresponsibilityforreconstructingpostwarLondon.Thecommitteetookatwo-prongedapproach: itsoughttoimprovehousingconditionsinovercrowdedareasandtoreducetheconcentrationofindustrythathadresultedin the over-expansion of the metropolis to an unmanageable size. Alongside thisdecentralizationpolicy,thecommitteeestablishedtwoguidingprinciplesinplanningthenewtowns,namelyself-containmentandbalanceddevelopmentforbothworkingandliving(Aldridge,1979,citedinLai,2003). GiventhatHongKonghadbeengovernedbytheU.K.,asacolony,intheperiod1942–1997,itisnosurprisethatnew-towndevelopmentinthe1970sinheritedthephilosophyandpracticalimperativesoftheU.K.strategy.Specifically,theHongKongcolonial administration also adopted the abovementioned two guiding principlesin its new-town policy. Although Hong Kong was supposed to follow the Britishexampleindevelopingthenewtowns,HongKong’snew-townprojectdifferedfromtheU.K.modelinthatitmainlycateredtotheworkingclass,whereastheU.K.modelcateredprimarilytothemiddleclass(Sit,1979).ThiswasbecausetheHongKonggovernmenthadmergeditsnew-townpolicywiththepublicrentalhousingpolicyintheearly1970s.Also,therewasstillnomiddleclassassuchinthe1970s,whentheHongKongeconomywasonlyjustbeginningtoprosper.Giventhatpublichousingwasprimarilyakindofwelfareprovision,astringentmeanstestservedasaneffectivescreeningmechanismtoensurethatonlythosegenuinelyinneedwouldbeallocatedapublicrentalhousingunit.Asaresult,therewasahighconcentrationoflow-incomepeopleonthesepublicrentalhousingestates.Thus,oneofthetwoprinciplesofnewtowndevelopment—balanceddevelopmentintermsofapopulationmix—wasnotupheld.

LessonsUnlearned–PlanningDisasterandCommunityAnomie•61

Buttheotherprinciple—self-containment—didnotmaterializeeither.Sit(1979)arguedthatnewtownsareusuallyfoundatremotelocationsandareonlylinkedbyhighwaysormasstransitsystemstotheurbancenter.Thenewtownsbythemselvescannot provide any incentive to attract sufficient business investment in order tocreate job opportunities for the residents. As a result, residents have to commutebetweentheirhomes(inthenewtown)andtheirworkplace(inthecitycenter).Thus,thenewtownscannotbeconsidered“self-contained.”Thisisalsoapparentinthecasethatfollows,theTinShuiWainorthnewtown.

Community anomie in Tin shui Wai north resulted from Planning Disaster

ThedevelopmentofTinShuiWai(TSW),HongKong’seighthnewtown,beganin1987.Thegovernmentstartedtoconstructthefirstpublichousingestatein1992andaphasedpopulationintakebeganin2001.Accordingtothegovernment,theoverallpopulationoftheTSWnewtownisexpectedtoincreasefrom258,600in2003toabout291,400in2011(ReviewPanelonFamilyServicesinTinShuiWai,2004).However,asdescribedbelow,thereareahostoffactorsthathaveledtotheproblematicdevelopmentofthenorthernpartofTSWandthathavemanifestedthemselvesascommunityanomie.

lopsided population composition leading to unemployment, poverty, and family problemsWith TSW, the government has repeated its 1970s “public-housing-led” strategy.Thishasinvolvedmovingapopulationintoadesignatednewtownfirstinthehopethatitwouldsubsequentlyattractretailandpersonalserviceindustries.Thepublic-housing residents, in a sense, would serve as “pioneers,” laying the foundation forsubsequentdevelopment.Forinstance,theywereregardedasformingthenucleusofapopulationthatwouldgrowtothe“criticalmass”ofconsumersnecessarytoattractproviders of goods and services. The government’s strategy was primarily basedontheassumptionthatthelocalcitizenshadagreatdemandforsubsidizedrentalhousing.Thisistobeunderstoodagainstthebackgroundthat,aslandandprivatehousingpricesandrentsinHongKongbecamehighcomparedwiththoseofothercountries,citizensonlowerincomeswouldhaveastrongdesiretobeallocatedpublicrentalhousingunits.Thus,althoughthelocationofTSWisveryremote,therewerestillsomepublichousingapplicantswhowerekeentomovethere.However,therewasstillanimportantdifferencebetweenapplicantsfromindigenoushouseholdsandthosefromhouseholdsthatwerelargelymadeupofnewimmigrantsfromMainlandChina.Becauseofitsremotelocation,localapplicantswhocouldfindoraffordothersolutionstotheirhousingproblemsusuallyrejectedbeingallocatedaccommodationinTSW.Incontrast,newmigrantfamiliesmorereadilyacceptedtheoffersincetheydesperatelyneededtoreducetheircongestedlivingconditionsasmorenewmigrantscamefromthemainlandtojointheirspousesorparents.Asaresult,since2002,a

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considerableamountofnewarrivalshavemovedintotheestatesinTSW(HKSARGovernment Housing Department, 2006). This disproportionate concentrationof new migrants constitutes one of the facets of the repeated failure to develop a“balancedcommunity.”These“newcomers”totheHongKongcommunitymayhavetroubleadjustingtothehecticatmosphereofurbanHongKongingeneralandtheanomicconditionofTSWinparticular. TheTinShuiWainorthcaseagainrevealsthefailureofthe“self-containment”approach in terms of its inability to provide sufficient business and employmentopportunities. It also reinforces the failure to achieve a balanced population mix.Whencomparedwithpreviouscasesofmassivepublichousingdevelopmentintheurbanareasinthe1960s,theTinShuiWainorthdistricthasfewnearbyindustrialestablishments.ThisbasicallyresultedfromthefactthatHongKonghasundergonean economic restructuring with the opening up of China’s economy in the late1970s,andthat industrial factorieshave“migrated”northwardtoChinaunderthepervasivetrendofglobalization.Consequently, few industrialistswereestablishingfactoriesinHongKongwhenTSWwasdevelopedinthelate1990s.Also,duetoitsremote location, businesses refrained from investing in the area to avoid the highcostoftransportation.Asaresult,businessactivitiesarecurrentlyminimalandsoemploymentopportunitiesarescarce. The high cost of traveling between Tin Shui Wai north and the urban centereffectivelydeterstheinhabitantsofTSWfromfindingjobsoutsidethearea.Thisexplainsthehighunemploymentratewithinthearea.InJanuary2004,7,544peoplewerereceivingunemployment welfare from the government (the Comprehensive Social SecurityAssistance,or“CSSA”)inYuenLongdistrict,whichincorporatesTinShuiWainorth.Thiswasthethirdhighestfigureamongall18districtsinHongKong.Ofthese7,544unemploymentwelfarerecipients,61percentwereinTSW.Infact,onthesixpublicrentalhousingestatesinTinShuiWainorth,therewere27,148unitshousing87,620persons.About 35 percent of the families on these estates were receiving government welfareassistance(ReviewPanelonFamilyServicesinTinShuiWai,2004).Manyhouseholdsalsocannotaffordthealreadylowpublichousingrentduetopoverty;447ofthesehouseholdsreceived “rent allowance” from the Housing Department (HKSAR GovernmentCommissiononPoverty,2006).Thereisalsothedangerofa“cycleofpoverty”forming,asahighproportionofchildrenandyoungadultsliveinwelfarerecipientfamilies:amongtheCSSArecipients,36percentand29percentrespectivelywereagedbelow10andinthe10–19group(HKSARGovernmentCommissiononPoverty,2005). To further exacerbate the problem of a high concentration of low socio-economicgroups,a“historicalaccident”occurredthatworsenedtheimbalanceofthepopulation“class-mix”inthedistrict.FollowingtheAsianfinancialcrisisof1997–1998, the Hong Kong economy suffered a severe setback. The newly inauguratedSpecialAdministrativeRegiongovernmenthadtoreviseitshousingpolicyinordertosalvagetheplummetingpropertymarket,sincethepropertysectorconstitutedasignificantorevenpivotalroleinHongKong’seconomy.Inordertopreventafurther

LessonsUnlearned–PlanningDisasterandCommunityAnomie•63

dropinprivatehousingprices,thegovernmentstoppedsellingthegovernment-builtfor-saleflatstoavoidcompetingwiththeprivatesector.Thus,thegovernmentflatsinTinShuiWainorthwereconvertedintopublicrentalhousingestates.Consequently,thisresultedinanearvacuumofmiddle-classresidentsintheareaandaggravatedthe disproportionate volume of low-income public housing residents. As a result,thepopulationprofileinTinShuiWainorthisverylopsided:while59percentand22percentofthepopulationofthewholeofTSW(bothSouthandnorth)livedinpublicrentalandfor-salehousingrespectivelyinMay2004,ashighas86percentofthepopulationofTinShuiWainorthlivedinpublicrentalhousing.Eventually,TinShuiWainorthbecameanareacharacterizedbylowincomeorevenpoverty. Familyproblemsarealsoprevalentinthedistrict.TinShuiWaihashadhighestratesof childabuseandspousebattering in the territory since2004.LocalnGOshave found that poor parenting skills, family finance difficulties, poor spousalcommunication,andunemploymentare the fourmost frequentproblems inTSW(HongKongStudentAidSociety&CityUniversityofHongKong,2004;InternationalSocial Services (Hong Kong) & Samaritans (Hong Kong), 2003). There is also aconsiderablenumberof“age-disparate”couplesthatwereformedwhenlocalHongKongmenmarryyoungerwomeninMainlandChina.TheseyoungbrideseventuallymovedtoHongKongtobewiththeirhusbands(BoysandGirlsClubsAssociation,2006).Thedissimilaritybetweenthesocialbackgroundsofthespousescanleadtoconflictsthatmayeventuallycausedomesticviolence.TwotragiccaseshaveoccurredonthepublichousingestatesinTSWinrecentyears.In2005,ahusbandkilledhiswifeandtwochildrenandthenjumpedtohisdeath.In2007,awomankilledhertwodaughtersbeforejumpingtoherdeath(Motheranddaughters,2004). Anotherproblemispoorrelationshipsbetweenneighbors.Thiscanbeattributedto the fact that the residents who move into the “virgin” land of a new town findthemselvesdeprivedof anypreexistingpersonalororganizationalnetworks.Theyarethereforepronetofeelingalienated,estranged,andinsecure,andhavedifficultydeveloping generalized trust toward the community or specific trust toward theirneighbors. Furthermore, in order to house many residents in a limited space, thepublichousingestatesweredesignedwith40-storeyskyscrapers.Thishasresultedinahighpopulationdensity.Thephysicallayoutandarchitecturaldesignofthehousingblocksareintendedtomeettheresidents’increasedneedforprivacy,andthereforehavetheeffectofcreatingphysicalandsocialdistance.Thearchitecturaldesignofincludingmultipleopenaccessestoestateshasalsomadetheestatesmorevulnerableto crime. This has increased the residents’ caution toward their neighbors, thusvividlyillustratingtheproblemofa“defendedneighborhood”wherepeoplebecomedefensiveagainstoneanother,thusaccentuatingcommunityanomie(Suttles,1972).

lack of community facilities and social services because of Bureaucratic delaysWithahighconcentrationofpopulationinTinShuiWaithereisanenormousdemandforpublicfacilitiesandsocialservicestomeettheneedsoftheresidents.However,

6�•ERnESTCHUI

due to the rigidity of government bureaucracy, which adheres strictly to planningguidelines,therehasbeenaseriouslackofsuchcommunityfacilitiesandservices.Ithasbeenthegovernment’sestablishedpracticeofputtingpeopleonsitefirstandprovidingtherelatedserviceslater,theprovisionofsuchfacilitiesandserviceshassufferedfroma“timelag”(Chow,1988).Thegovernmenthasjustifiedthedelayinitsprovisionoffacilitiesandservicesbyclaiminganeedtoavoid“under-utilization”by the residentsand to reduce thegovernment’s financialburden.Asa result, theTinShuiWainorthdistricthasbeendeprivedofsorelyneededfacilities.Thisisinsharpcontrasttothedistrict’ssoutherncounterpart,TSW(South),whichhassomegovernmentfor-saleestatesandprivateestateshousingmiddle-classresidents,andis provided with a park, a sports ground, areas of commercial activity, public andsocialamenitiessuchasa library,an indoorrecreationcenter,andsomeshoppingcenters.Deprivedof themuch-neededcommunity facilities, and facinghighcostsof transportation if they wish to travel beyond the community, youngsters haveno alternative but to wander about or gather at street corners within the district,a situation that potentially gives rise to delinquency. Residents in general are alsofrustrated at the lack of facilities and recreational opportunities. As a result, anundesirablephysicalinfrastructurehasledtohighsocialcosts. Apartfromcommunityfacilities,thereisalsoalackofsocialservices.Bureaucraticrigidityleadingtodelaysinapprovingtheestablishmentofnewsocialservicecentershasprovedtobeasignificantobstacletoprovidingtimelyservicestotheresidents.Specifically, the government administration has laid down stringent requirementsforfindingsuitableandavailablepremisesforwelfareorganizations.Thesituationisfurthercomplicatedbythepluralityofgovernmentdepartmentsinvolvedinregulatingvariousaspectsofproblems,suchasthestructuralsafetyandthefiresafetyaspectsofbuildingcontrolandthelike.“Buckpassing”amongvariousdepartmentsmayhavemadecoordinationamongthemdifficultandtimeconsuming. Deprived of community facilities and social services, the TSW residents had noalternativetogoingoutsidetheirresidentialareatoseeksubstitutemeansofsatisfyingtheirneeds.Butinthemain,preciselybecauseofthedistantlocationandthehighcostoftravel,theresidentsofTinShuiWainorthrefrainedfromgoingoutsidetheirarea.Theywerethereforevirtually trappedwithinthearea,deprivedof jobs,consumption,entertainmentopportunities,andcommunityservices.Asvarioussurveyshaverevealed(HarmonyHouse,2004;HongKongChineseYMCA,2005),TSWnorthresidentshaddevelopedtheimpressionthattheircommunitywasamonotonousandisolatedenclavedesertedbythegreaterpartofHongKongsociety.Itisthereforenotsurprisingtoseethatthereisnosenseofcommunityidentification.Onthecontrary,theanomic,eclipsedcommunitydepictedbyChicagourbansociologistspalpablysprangintoexistence.

a lesson unlearned – the precedent of tuen mun in the 1��0sIn fact, theTinShuiWainorthcase resemblesoreven replicates itspredecessor,TuenMun,whichwasdevelopedinthe1970sasthefirst“experiment”ofnewtown

LessonsUnlearned–PlanningDisasterandCommunityAnomie•6�

intheruralarea.LocalacademicslaterconductedcriticalstudiesonTuenMuntoreveal the failure of the “self-containment” and “balanced development” approachofthethencolonialadministration(Chan,1977;Chan,1998;Chow,1988).TinShuiWai,developedinthe1990s,andTuenMun,developedinthe1970s,sharedthesameproblem.They,too,hadhadinadequatecommunityfacilitiesandsocialservices,anexcessiveproportionofthepopulationlivedonpublichousingestates,therewasaremotenessfromplacesofwork;andresidentswerecutofffromsocialnetworksintheurbanareas.InTuenMun,whenitwasdeveloped,therewasalsoanimbalanceofpopulation,withtheratiobetweenpublicrentalhousingandprivatehousingbeing6.5to1(Chan,1998).Therehadactuallybeenasustainedshortageofemploymentprovidedinthedistrict:22percentin1981and48percentin1991(Chan,1998,p.93).Surveyfindingsin1988revealedthat56percentoftherespondentsfoundinadequateemploymentopportunitiesinTuenMun(Chow,1988).Evenaftersome30yearsofdevelopment,only29percentoftheworkingpopulationinTuenMunfoundworkwithinthedistrictandmorethan70percentoftheworkingpopulationhadtoworkinotherdistricts(Chan,1998,p.64). Residentsweregenerallyquitedissatisfiedwiththeinadequacyofvariousservices:74percentand55percentrespectivelyfoundmedicalandwelfareservicesinadequate.Some59percenthadadjustmentproblemswhenmovingintothearea(Chow,1988).Asaconsequence,familyproblemssuchasmaritaldiscord,domesticviolence,youthdelinquency,and illegalgangswere frequentlyreported. In2007,TuenMunhadapopulationof500,000;butitrecorded12percentofHongKong’stotalcasesofchildabuse,6percentofbatter-spousecases,9percentsingle-parentfamilies,8percentdrugabusers,18percent juvenileoffenders,15percentyoungoffenders,8percentofsocialsecurityrecipients,and9percentofunemployedsocial-securityrecipients(HKSARSocialWelfareDepartment,2008).Thus, itcanbepostulated that,giventhegovernment’spoorplanningand implementation,communitysentimentcouldhardlybenurturedinthenewlyestablishedcommunitiesofthenewtowns.Instead,alienation, a high crime rate, family problems, and community anomie prevailed.All these problems were attributable, in the final analysis, to the government’s“planningdisaster”ininadequatelyattendingtotheneedsofthephysicalandsocialinfrastructureofthecommunity.

Hong kong people’s materialistic and exclusionary normative order drains away community sentimentCommunityanomieinTSWcanalsobeattributabletothementalityofthepeopleofHongKong.Originally,theHongKongChinesepeopleconstituted95percentofthepopulationoftheregion,andwerecharacterizedashavingacollectivistculturaldispositionandapredispositioninfavorofthecommunitarianidealsofmutualhelpandsupport.However,giventheuniquehistoricalbackgroundofHongKong,subtlechanges inpeople’s culturalorientationsdeveloped.Aconsiderableportionof thepost-Second World War population of Hong Kong is composed of refugees from

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MainlandChina.A“refugeesentiment”prevailedamongtheseimmigrants(Hoadley,1970),whoweremerelylookingforameansofearningalivingwithoutgivingmuchthoughttoasenseofbelongingtoHongKong.Thesepeoplewereregardedashavinga“utilitarianfamilism”(Lau,1977)astheirnormativeorder.Thisfamilismwasparochialinthesensethatitmeantattendingonlytoone’sownimmediatefamilialinterests.People became apathetic toward community affairs, not to mention communitymutualhelp(Tam&Yeung,1994).Theeconomicprosperitythatdevelopedfromthe1970sdroveHongKongpeopletobecomeevenmorepredisposedtothespeculativeand opportunistic pursuit of immediate economic and pragmatic concerns. HongKong people have become virtually the prototype of the Homo economicus whoembraces a “capitalistic consciousness” (Harvey, 1989). All these factors have laidthefoundationsforthedevelopmentofegoisticandmaterialisticaspirationsamongthe Hong Kong population. Worse still, faced with an economic downturn in the1990s,theindigenouspopulationhaddevelopedaparochialismthatwas,however,accompaniedbyaresentmentofmigrants,whomtheythoughtconstitutedbothasourceofcompetitioninthejobmarketandaburdenonpublicwelfarefunds(Chui,2004).ThesetensionsareparticularlycriticalintheTinShuiWainorthcommunitywithitshighconcentrationofnewmigrantsfromMainlandChina,aconcentrationthathasaccentuatedthefeelingsofalienationfromthecommunitythere. The gloomy picture depicted above vividly portrays the anomic situation ofa community as theorized by classical sociologists, who analyzed the attendantproblemsoferodinghumanrelationshipsinthetransitionfromaruraltoanurbansocial context. Tin Shui Wai north also mirrored the conditions of “communityeclipse”(Stein,1960)or“lossofcommunity”(Lyon,1989:97).

Revitalizing Community through better Urban Planning and social Capital Development

Inorder torescuetheseeclipsedcommunities, thesignificanceof “socialcapital” inrevitalizing community spirit and sentiment should be recognized when tacklingcommunity problems. Although there are various interpretations and usages of theterm,“socialcapital”cangenerallybeunderstoodasbeingembodiedintheconnectionbetween people, social networks, norms of generalized reciprocity, trustworthiness,and civility (Putnam, 2000). It also contributes to developing a civic culture thatembracestoleranceandtheacceptanceofdiversity,which,inturn,eventuallyleadstothatsocialinclusionthatisindispensableinanincreasinglycomplexandheterogeneoussociety.Endowedwithsocialcapital,communitiescanprovidepeoplewiththesocialpsychologicalsupporttheyneedtofacethetroublesofurbanliving.Ifageneralizedtrustprevailsinthecommunity,peoplecanalsohaveasenseofsecurity(Clarke,1981). Inpractice,socialcapitalcanbedeveloped innumerousways,byworkingonthe“hardware”oftheurbanformandonthe“software”ofpeople’ssocialfabricandculturaldispositions.Thehardwareofthephysicallayoutofthecityorcommunity


servesasthe“materialbase”(Harvey,1989)thatprovidestheplatformorvenueforsustainingtheprocessesofhumaninteractionandnormativedevelopment.Inthisconnection,theconceptof“publicspace”isrelevant.Publicspacesarevenuesthatenablepeopleto“meetandgreet”(Beatley&Manning,1997)andengagein“place-making” or “city-making” efforts (Frug, 1999). Such spaces can be libraries, postoffices, pedestrian sidewalks, atriums, indoor marketplaces, downtown shoppingmalls,communitycenters,andahostofsimilarplaces(Carr,Francis,Rivlin,&Stone,1992).IfonefocusesspecificallyonpublichousingestatesinnewtownslikeTinShuiWainorth,publicspacessuchas“sittingoutareas”mightbelocatedinthemidstofthebuildings.Here,referencecanbemadetotheSingaporeanpublichousingexperiencewhere“voiddecks”aresetasidewithinblocksofbuildingstoprovideresidentswithcommunalmeetingplaces(Tan,1996).Insuchpublicspaces,onecomesintocontactwithavarietyofpeople,andthisengendersanacceptanceortoleranceofdiversity.Itevendevelopscommoninterestsandsentimentsbaseduponthesharingandusageofthesamephysicallocale.Inconsequence,peoplemaydevelopasenseofcollectiveidentificationtotheircommunity.Suchstrategiescanrectifytheman-made‘disaster’ofimproperplanningandimplementationinitiatedbygovernmentintheearlystagesofdevelopmentofthecommunity. Providing the physical infrastructure to bring about people interaction shouldbeaccompaniedbyeffortsonthesoftwarefronttonurturechangesinthenormativeorderofpeopleatthesocietallevel.Afteritsinaugurationin1997,thegovernmentmadeeffortstorecultivatepeople’snationalisticsentiments,andthismaycontributeto the nurture of a collective identity. The people of Hong Kong should shift theirfocusfromanegocentric“me”toacommunitarian“we”(Etzioni,1993).Areemphasisoncollectivityandmutualconcernshouldleadinthepositivedirectionofreducingcommunityalienation. In this respect, civiceducationcanbepromoted tonourishpeople’ssenseofcollectiveresponsibilitytocounteract individualisticparochialism.Specifically,volunteerismshouldbefostered,asthishelpstobreedaltruism,genuineconcern, and mutual help among individuals. non-materialistic pursuits of thiskind are particularly pertinent to confronting people’s materialistic aspirations andegocentricconcerns.Inparticular,asrevealedintheTinShuiWainorthcase,thenewmigrantsfromMainlandChinashouldbebetterintegratedintothehostcommunity,whichisalsomadeupmainlyofethnicChineseanyway.Effortsshouldbemadetopromoteinclusionarysentimentstofacilitatethebetterintegrationofnewimmigrantsintosociety(Chui,2004),inordertoreducethestressandalienationtheysuffer.Infact,therearesomepre-existentrudimentarysocialnetworksfoundintheTinShuiWaicommunity.Thereareresidents’committeesinthepublicrentalhousingestates,which may provide the infrastructure for promoting neighborliness among theresidents.ThenGOssituatedwithinornearthecommunitycouldalsobelinkedupwithbettercoordinatingmechanismsinthepromotionofnetworksamongresidents. Withtheconcernforcombatingthewidespreadpovertyinmind,a“communityeconomy” can be developed in the new towns like TSW north, in which small

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businesses operate within the framework of “social enterprises.” Such socialenterprisescanhelptocreatejobs,training,andtheprovisionofservicesforpeoplewithinaspecificcommunity.Theyarecharacterizedbyethicalvalues thatcarryacommitmenttobuildingpeople’sskillsinlocalcommunities.Theprofitsgeneratedfromthesesmallbusinessesareprincipallyreinvestedtoachievetheirsocialobjectives(SocialEnterpriseCoalition,2008).Mutualhelpnetworksandprogramsfocusingontheexchangeofgoodsandservicesamongtheparticipantscanalsobeorganized.Forinstance,whilearetiredbarbercutsthehairofthechildrenofawelfarerecipientfamily,themotherofthatfamilyhelpstocookfoodforthiselderlyretireewhomaylive alone. This kind of activity, apart from meeting the tangible and immediateneedsofpeople,canalsonurturethekindofmutuality, trust,andreciprocitythatare the manifestations of social capital within a community. In collaboration withan nGO, I helped to start up a mushroom farm in which welfare recipients andnewmigrantwomenintheTinShuiWainorthcommunitywererecruitedtogrowmushroomsforsale.Thefarmwouldeventuallybecomeasocialenterpriseoperatedonacooperativemodel for thesedeprivedgroups. Inadifferentscenario,wealsorecruited some unemployed women to form a cooking team to prepare lunch fora school in the community, and another “school support team” to help in schoolcleaning.Theparticipantsinthesetaskgroupsallgainedasenseofthebenefitsofmutual help and overcame their learned helplessness acquired over a prolongedperiod of unemployment and welfare dependency. Through accomplishing somespecifictasks,theyalsoobtainedthefeelingofbeingrespectedandtrusted,insteadofbeingdespisedbyothersasbeingdependentonwelfare. LocalnGOsmayalsohelpbyservingas“carriers”or“changeagents”tofacilitatethedevelopmentofneighborlinessandcommunitysentiment,andtheorganizationofsocialnetworks.Infact,asearlyasinthe1960s,localnGOshavepioneeredtheprovision of community services and the development of community cohesion indeprivedcommunities like squattergroups, fishermen’svillages,orgroupsofboatpeopleattyphoonshelters.ThesenGOscancontributebyidentifyingcommunityneeds, promoting residents’ interaction, cultivating a “we-feeling,” developinggrassroots leadership, involving residents in community activities, and promotingwelfareservices.Communitysocialworkersmaymobilizevolunteerstoserveneedyclients in the community, like single parents, low-income families, elderly peoplelivingalone,andthelike.AlthoughtheHongKonggovernmenthasalreadyhalteditsfinancialsupportforthesettingupofcommunitycenters,thereshouldbeaseriousreconsiderationoftheproposalforsettingupsmall“communityworkteams”(HongKongCouncilofSocialService,1997)attheneighborhoodlevel.Thesecommunityorganizing “agents” can help local residents’ groups or community organizationsto develop and enrich their community life and their collective problem-solvingcapacity. I reviewed the existing projects to find the following possible strategies,which illustrate the point. Community workers in a neighborhood developmentprojectorganizedsomeeldersintoamutualhelpgroupthatmaderegularvisitsor


phonecallstoitsmemberssothatthememberscouldprovidetangibleandintangiblesupport foroneanother.Womeninruralvillagesandolderpublichousingestateswere organized into mutual support groups to assist one another in looking afterchildrenandsharinghouseholdchores.MypersonalinterviewwithsomeMainlandChineseimmigrantsservedbythesecommunitydevelopmentprojectsrevealedthattheyhadbecomeenthusiastictoserveothersandwantedtoreciprocatetheassistancetheyhadreceivedfromthecommunityworkers(Chui,2002).Alltheseshowthatsuchcommunitydevelopmenteffortscantrulybringaboutpositiveattitudechangesandmanifestationsofbehaviorthatvividlydemonstratethevirtuesofthesocialcapitalthusdeveloped.

ConclusionThis article reviews the case of Tin Shui Wai north as one of Hong Kong’s newtownsdevelopedfromthelate1990suptorecentyears.However,theHongKonggovernmenthasnotbeenabletorealizethetwocoreprinciplesoftheBritishlegacyindevelopingnewtowns—thatof“balanceddevelopment”and“self-containment.”What was worse, it apparently had not learned the lessons of the development ofTuenMuninthe1970sinitsplanningandimplementationofthedevelopmentofTinShuiWainorthsome20yearslater.Thesameproblemsofinappropriateplanning,rigidityinimplementingplanningstandards,anddelayedprovisionoffacilitiesandserviceshavebasicallybeenrepeated.Worsestill,uponthetransferofsovereigntyfromBritaintoChina,thenewlyinstatedSpecialAdministrativeRegiongovernmentwasfurtherhardhitbya“historicalaccident”ofturninghousingformiddle-incomeresidents to public rental housing during the Asian financial crisis, which furtherdisrupted the original intent of the administration, resulting in another “planningdisaster” that led to enormous social costs. Community eclipse and anomie haveresulted, to thedetrimentof theresidentsofTinShuiWainorthandeven to thedetrimentoftheentiresocietyofHongKongatlarge. Itisarguedherethat,inadditiontorectifyingthemistakesinurbanplanningbyreinstatingthenecessaryphysicalinfrastructureandsocialservicesinthecommunity,effortstorevitalizethecommunityshouldalsobemade.Thesocialworkprofessionmaycontributeinthisendeavorbyworkingoncommunitydevelopmentprogramstonurturesocialcapitalthatmayhelptotacklecommunityeclipseandanomie.SuchexperiencesinHongKongwillprobablyberelevanttoothercitiesandcommunitiesconfrontedwithsimilarproblemsofrapidandimproperlyplannedorimplementedurbanization.Thegovernmentandthecommunityshouldengageinjointeffortstorevitalizecommunities.Althoughtherehavebeensuggestionsthattheconceptof“community”almostbelongstotherealmsofnostalgia,itispostulatedherethatcommunitydevelopmentisactuallyfuturistic in that it can prevent the further worsening of community alienation andeclipse. Social capital helps to nurture positive social norms, engender generalizedtrust,anddevelopsocialnetworksincommunities.

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