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authority, they
can use
their
power
to enter
legislative
venues,
such
as
state
and federal
arenas,
where related
pol
icy
decisions
can
render local collaborative efforts
largely
meaningless
(Weir,
Rongerude,
and
Ansell
2009).
Success
ful local collaboration
requires
building
multilevel
politi
cal
power
to
defend
and
expand
the
scope
of
authority
for
collaboration.
Without
access
to
levers
of
power,
collabo
ration is
simply
a
diversion.
Finally,
issues of
power
emerge
when
we
consider
the
durability
of
collaborative
enterprises.
Sirianni shows that
widespread
support
for the
planning
efforts
helped
to
elect
a
sympathetic
mayor
in
Seattle
in
1998,
and
perhaps
more
impressively,
to
pass
bond
measures
needed
to
implement
the
planning
process
(pp.
99-100).
In
2007,
however,
Seattle
elected
a
new
mayor
who
had little
interest
n
pro
moting
the
model
of
decentralized
collaboration that
Sir
ianni
documents
and,
accordingly,
downgraded
the effort
(pp.
106-16).
Chicago
community
policing,
a
case
that
the author cites
as a
model
of
collaborative
governance,
lost
much of its
capacity
for
autonomous
civic
engage
ment
when
the
police
department
withdrew
support
for
the
independent
organizing
that
had
begun
to
rattle local
politicians.1
These setbacks
suggest
that
collaborative
pro
cesses
are
quite
vulnerable
to
political
rollback. Unless
those
engaged
in
collaboration have the
political
power
to
defend
the
structures
and
resources
thatmake
collabora
tion
possible, they
can
be scaled back
or
eliminated
in
the
face
of
tightening budgets, unfavorable elections,
or
shift
ing
fashions
in
public
administration.
These
concerns
underscore
the
ways
that
politics
can
intrude
on
collaboration.
Collaborative
processes
do
not
suspend
the
battle
among
contending
interests
and the
struggle
for
advantage
in
policymaking;
at
their
best,
they
constrain
and direct these
forces
while
engaging
themwith
a
broader
set
of
ordinary
citizens.
But
collaborative
pro
cesses
are
always
vulnerable
to
defectors
who
venue-shop
to
get
a
better
deal
and
to
politicians
who
see
no
advan
tage
in
supporting
collaboration.
This
vulnerability
sug
gests
that
durable collaboration
requires
the
backing
of
governmental power in the formof regulation, participa
tory
requirements,
and
ongoing political
action
to
defend
and
expand
its
domain. Political
vulnerability
also
high
lights
he limits
f collaboration:
Where
collaborative efforts
have
insufficient
authority
and
no
plan
for
expanding
their
reach,
they
are
a
diversion
from
the
hardwork of
political
engagement.
If
politics
intrudes
on
collaboration,
how
might
collab
orative
processes
intrude
on
political
processes?
Does
col
laboration
filter
out
into
the
larger
political
system,
providing
new
pathways
to
engagement,
improved
polit
ical
discourse,
or
deeper
trust
n
the
political
system?
hese
are critical questions for assessing the payoff from this
type
of
investment
in
democracy.
One
area
of
paramount
importance
that
Sirianni
touches
on
is
political
socializa
tion.
After
a
decade of
building
the
system
f
youth
involve
merit
in
civic
affairs,
he
reports
that the
youth
vote
in
Hampton
Virginia,
was
18.5%
higher
than the
national
average
in
2000
and
28.7%
higher
in
2004
(p.
154).
Fur
ther
research should
investigate
the
impact
of collabora
tive
governance
on
youth
political
engagement
and on the
political
involvement of
immigrants
who
participate
in
collaborative
governance,
such
as
those
in
Seattle.
If
col
laborative
processes
can
promote
political
socialization and
stimulate
broader
political
participation,
especially
among
those who
are
poised
to
acquire
a
lifelong
pattern
of
par
ticipation, they
may
exert a
significant
nd
positive
impact
on
the
ills of American
democracy.
Additional research
into
the
relationship
between
collaborative
governance
and
participation
more
broadly?as
well
as
the
size
and
dura
bility
of
any
political
socialization effect?will
help
illu
minate
this
potentially important
channel for
revitalizing
American
democracy.
The
exploration
of
the
pathways through
which collab
orative
governance
influences
politics
raises
a
fundamen
tal
question
about
collaborative
endeavors:
Do
they aspire
to
serve
as a
substitute
for
regular
political
channels
or
do
they
aim
to
reform
the
political system?
n
California,
the
dysfunctional
state
government
has
sparked
broad
interest
in
collaborative
processes.
But
at
the
end of the
day,
deci
sions
about
resource
allocation
are
political
decisions. Unless
supporters
of
collaborative
governance
recognize
this
real
ity,
their
effortswill
remain
small,
vulnerable islands of
engaged civility ithin
a
sea
of apathetic, polarized, unequal
politics
dominated
by
big
money
interests.
Even
worse,
enthusiasm for
collaborative
processes
may
encourage
a
focus
on
the
issues
most
amenable
to
collaboration,
rather
than
on
conflict-provoking legislative
measures
that
are
essential for
addressing
many
problems.
Financial
literacy,
a
collaborative initiative
that Sirianni
points
to,
provides
a
case
in
point.
While it
is
certainly important
for low
income
people
to
learn
how
to
manage
their
money,
build
assets,
and limit their
chances of
getting
caught
in
the
web
of
the
credit card
companies,
is
it
not
more
important
to
regulate
those firms
hose
business model
requires
them
to prey on ordinaryAmericans?
Sirianni's
argument
that
government
needs
to struc
ture,
promote,
and
provide
ongoing
resources
for collab
orative
governance
is
a
refreshing
nd
invaluable
departure
from the
purely
voluntarist
approaches
to
civic
engage
ment.
But
we must
not
lose
sight
of the
fact
that
politics
will
always
impinge
on
collaborative
ventures
and
that
government
is
never a
neutral
problem
solver. Govern
ments are
controlled
by
parties
and
politicians
who
sup
port
distinctive
goals
and
purposes;
moreover,
theAmerican
political
system
provides
many
opportunities
for
losers
in
the
collaborative
process
to
seek
advantage
elsewhere. Col
laboration promises a path to overcome dysfunctional,
litigious,
unresponsive
governments.
Yet it
is
important
to
identify
he
conditions
under
which
collaborations
are
likely
to
achieve
these
goals
and
to
remain
attentive
to
the
danger
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As
an
example,
Sirianni
offers
community
policing.
Widely
used
throughout
theUnited
States,
this
strategy
f
crime
control
aims
to
engage
community
residents
in
work
ing
with
police
and other law
enforcement
officers.
Through
a
variety
ofmethods,
ranging
fromblock watches
to
restorative
justice
programs
(where
civic
groups
adju
dicate
minor
offenses),
local
citizens
are
allowed
to
utilize
their
familiarity
with their
surroundings
(and
their
neigh
bors)
to
help
promote
public
safety.
At the
same
time,
professional
law
enforcement officials
can
still do
what
they
are
uniquely qualified
to
do,
such
as
collect
data
about
the incidence
of
lawlessness,
or,
of
course,
appre
hend and
punish
criminals.
As Sirianni views
it,
this kind
of
partnership
leads
to not
only
better
results
(particularly
in
areas
where
community
pressure
can
affect
individual
or
collective
behavior),
but
also better
citizens,
more
knowl
edgeable
about the
problems
they
face
and the often dif
ficult choices
required
to
resolve
them.
At
a
time
when
surveys
show considerable
unhappi
ness over
polarization
and
gridlock
in
government,
col
laborations like
these
understandably
have
broad
appeal
in
that
they
transcend
ideological
divisions.
Portions
of
the
Left
have
always
had
a
fondness for
Jeffersonian
deas
of
democracy,
which look
upon
community
groups
as
schools
for civic
virtue
and vehicles
for
self-government,
worthy
of
encouragement.
And
notwithstanding
Sarah
Palin's
jibes
about
community
organizers
during
the 2008
presidential campaign, segments on theRight have also
viewed
empowering
people
as
an
alternative
to
an
expan
sive
and
intrusive welfare
state,
even to
the
point
of
allowing
for
the
possibility
of
government
help
for medi
ating
institutions. 3
In
fact,
until overtaken
by
the war
on
terrorism,
supporting
faith-based and
community
organizations
looked
likely
to
be
one
of
the
signature
initiatives
of
George
W.
Bush's
presidency.
Moreover,
as
the
case
studies
in
Investing
in
Government
show,
collaborative
governance
is
not
an
untried
concept.
Sirianni
describes
in
elaborate detail
neighborhood
plan
ning
efforts
in
Seattle,
Washington,
youth engagement
programs inHampton, Virginia, and a varietyof environ
mental
projects
undertaken
by
the
United States
Environ
mental
Protection
Agency
(EPA).
These
examples
suggest
to
him
that
government
can
successfully
promote
mean
ingful
civic
activity
in
different
locations
and
on
a
variety
of
issues.
Hence,
the
book's
chief
recommendations: that
federal
agencies
should do
more
to
incorporate
a
civic
mission
into
their
activities
and
a
White House
office
should be
created
to
give
high-level
impetus
to
the idea.
Sirianni
acknowledges
that
previous
effort
o
foster cit
izen
participation,
such
as
the
ill-fated
(and
in
his
view,
ill-designed)
Community
Action
Program
of the
war
on
poverty, tarnished the idea's reputation. Indeed, a copi
ous
literature
now
exists
that
seeks
to
explain
what
went
wrong.4
However,
according
to
Sirianni,
research
on
delib
erative
democracy
and other
efforts
to
engage
the
public
in
decision-making
has
now
illuminated
a
series
of
prin
ciples
that
can
guide
more
successful
collaborations.
These
include
focusing
on
community
assets
(rather
than
defi
cits),
sharing professional
expertise, transforming
institu
tional cultures
(especially
in
government
bureaucracies),
and
several others
(p.
42).
Since
each
of
the
examples
he
offers
manages
to
incorporate
these
principles
in its
efforts,
Sirianni
sees
them
as
models
for
implementing
the
civic
mission
he
wants
federal
agencies
to
adopt.
Still,
the evidence that these
experiments
in
democracy
are
successfully
addressing
important policy
issues is thin.
Although
he makes
a
few claims about
results
(such
as
reduced
juvenile
crime
rates
in
a
Hampton
neighbor
hood),
most
of the
Sirianni
book describes
a
seemingly
endless
procession
of
studies,
meetings,
conferences,
train
ings,
and
occasionally,
even
elections
or
referenda.5
That
is
not
surprising,
since
in
an
important
way,
the real
goal
of these
initiatives
s civic
engagement.
The
time-consuming
process
of
mobilizing
citizens
and
building
relationships
is
assumed
to
be
not
just
a
first,
but
also
an
essential
step
toward
getting public
work done.
Research
provides
some
support
for that
view. For
exam
ple,
communities
rich
in
social
capital ?networks
among
citizens
and between
civic
groups
and the
police?have
lower
crime-rates than
those
with
weaker social
ties6
and
schools that involve
parents
in
their
efforts
are
likely
to
out-perform
those
more
bureaucratically
controlled.7
But
civic activism can produce a varietyof less salutary results
as
well8
and
Sirianni
does little
to
demonstrate
that
Seat
tle's
neighborhoods,
Hampton's
young
people,
or
the
large
number
of
watersheds and other
sites
involved
in
theEPA's
programs
are
better off for
having
networks of
engaged
citizens.
The
challenges
governments
face
in
embracing
a
civic
mission
ought
not
to
be overlooked
either.Much
of
the
interest
in
collaborative
government
stems
from
a
belief
that
public
(and
to
a
lesser
xtent,
non-governmental)
agen
cies
have
become
too
professionalized
and
hence,
too
dis
tant
from
and
unresponsive
to
citizens.9
Accordingly,
giving
people greater opportunities to participate, and furnish
ing
them,
where
necessary,
with
enough
training
to
do
so
effectively,
seems
called
for
to restore
public
trust
in
government.
However,
apart
from
the
question
of
the
willingness
of
ordinary
citizens
to
spend
their
spare
evenings
contem
plating
the
finer
points
of,
say,
oning,
education,
or
envi
ronmental
rules,
the
kinds
of initiatives
Sirianni
advocates
are
apt
to
demand
a
great
deal
from
government
too.
As
earlier
efforts
to create
partnerships
have
shown,
more
sophisticated
management?including
better
monitoring
and
measurement
of
results?will be
required.
Predic
tions that governingbynetwork will save taxpayersmoney
or
trim
the ranks of
public
employees
are
apt
to
be illuso
ry.10
If
anything,
it
requires
more
professionalism,
not
less.
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Siriannis
own
accounts
bear this
out.
All
the
more
remarkable,
then,
is
that
one
of
his
main
recommenda
tions
is
to
expand
AmeriCorps?the
federal
government
program
that
recruits
and
pays
mostly
young
people
for
up
to two
years
of work with
community
groups?and
assign
its
members
to
help
public
agencies
fulfill their
civic
mission
(pp.
235-239).
Whatever
the overall
mer
its of the
program
(and
that
is
still
debatable),
largely
untrained,
short-termvolunteers
are
not
likely
to
bring
to
government
the skillsneeded
to
implement
complex,
long
term
efforts
at
collaboration.
Indeed,
if
the
public
is
to
become
more
engaged
in
doing
public
work,
the
con
tention
that
too
much
professionalization
is
at
the
root
of
disaffection
with
government
perhaps
itself
ought
to
be
reconsidered.
So
too
should another
claim
of collaborative
gover
nance
advocates:
that
excessive conflicts
currently
existing
in
government
prevent
it
from
acting
on
important
issues
The
efforts
irianni
describes
are
meant
to
foster
greater
consensus.
By
engaging
a
wide
range
of citizens
working
together
on
common
tasks,
under
carefully
designed
rela
tionships,
the
prospects
for
reaching
agreements
are
expected
to
be
enhanced.
The
examples
Sirianni offers
are,
in
fact,
notably
free from
the kinds of
divisions
that
so
often
characterize local
and
national debates
today.
Even
so,
does this
mean
that collaborative
governance
is
a
useful
approach
to
reducing
conflicts?
Or
that
it
works
best where disagreements are small and readily bridge
able?
Siriannis
book does
not
provide enough
informa
tion
to
tell.
However,
the
ability
to
arrive
at
agreements
is
only
one
sign
of
health
in
a
democracy,
and
sometimes
a
dubious
one.
At least
as
significant,
democratic
theorists
have
long
argued,
is
the
ability
of all sides of
contentious
issues
to
be
heard.
Robust debate
may
be
more
important
than manufactured
consensus
and
finding
common
ground
less valuable
than
clarifying
the
scope
and
nature
of dis
senting
positions.
Yet,
oddly
for
an
approach
that
pur
ports
to
be
aimed
at
revitalizing
democracy,
collaborative
governance
places
more
emphasis
on
the
virtues
of
coop
eration and exercising authority than itdoes on encour
aging
the
expression
of differences
and
challenges
to
power.
This
is
especially
problematic
when
government
is
called
upon
to
play
a more
active role
in
structuring
civic
life.
The
arrangements
Sirianni describes
are
heavily
influ
enced
by
administrative
actions,
legal
mandates,
financial
aid,
and other
instruments
employed
by
the
public
sector.
In
fact,
one
of the
main
points
of
Siriannis
book
is
to
illustrate
the
many
ways
government
has
to
cooperate
with
civic
groups.
But the
power
to
collaborate
is
also
the
power
to
co-opt.
And
what
Sirianni does
not
explain
is
how
much
auton
omy the civic groups involved in his case studiesmain
tained,
or
which
groups
were
not
included
because
they
may
have been
too
uncooperative
to
begin
with.
Through
tax
laws,
corporate
statutes,
grants
and
contracts,
and
a
variety
of
regulations,
both the
federal
and
state
govern
ments
already
exercise considerable. influence
over
the
so-called
independent
sector,
prompting
criticisms
that
non-governmental
groups
have
grown
too
close
to
public
officials.11Collaborative
governance
will
only
exacerbate
this
problem.
To
be
sure,
civic
groups
in
the
United
States have
never
been
wholly independent
from
government.
And
many
want
even more
connections
than
they
currently
have.
More
participation
by
Americans,
either
through
their
sso
ciations
or
individually,
could
conceivably
benefit
govern
ment
as
well.
Exactly
how
might
surprise
those,
like
Sirianni,
who
notes
he served
as an
advisor
on
civic
engage
ment
to
President
Obamas
campaign.
Tea
partiers,
it is
worth
noting,
are
citizen-activists
too.
Striking
the
right
balance
between
a
citizenry
that
actively participates
in
public
affairs nd
political
institu
tions that
can
govern
effectively
has
always
been
a
chal
lenge
for
merican
democracy.
But
despite
Sirianni's
efforts,
the
case
that
collaborative
governance
offers
fruitful
ew
approach?a
third
way
between the
public
and
private
sectors?remains
unpersuasive.
Notes
1
Skocpol
2003.
2
Salamon
1995.
3
Berger
and
Neuhaus
1977.
4
E.g., Lipsky
and
Smith
1993;
Couto
1999;
Warren
2001.
5
If,
as
Oscar
Wilde
supposedly
quipped,
the
prob
lemwith
socialism
is
that
it
takes
up
too
many spare
evenings,
collaborative
governance
undoubtedly
will
do
so
too.
6
Sampson,
Raudenbush,
and
Earls
1997.
7
Chubb
and
Moe
1990.
8 Olson
1984.
9
McKnight
1996.
10
Goldsmith
and
Eggers
2004.
11
Brody
and
Tyler
2009.
References
Berger,
Peter and
Richard
Neuhaus. 1977.
To
Empower
People:
From State
to
Civil
Society.
Washington,
D.C:
American
Enterprise
Institute.
Brody, Evelyn
and
John
Tyler.
2009.
How Public
is
Private
Philanthropy:
Separating
Reality rom
Myth.
Washington,
DC:
The
Philanthropy
Roundtable.
Chubb,
John
E.
and
Terry
M.
Moe.
1990.
Politics,
Mar
kets and
Americas
Schools.
Washington,
D.C:
Brook
ings
Institution.
Couto, Richard A. with Catherine S. Guthrie. 1999.
Making
Democracy
Work
Better:
Mediating
Structures,
Social
Capital
and
the
emocratic
Prospect.
Chapel
Hill and
London:
University
of
North
Carolina
Press.
6CMI
Perspectives
on
Politics
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8/10/2019 Collaborative Governance and Civic Empowerment
8/14
Goldsmith,
Stephen
and
William
D.
Eggers.
2004.
Governing by
etwork:
The New
Shape of
the ublic
Sector.
Washington,
D.C.:
Brookings
Institution.
Lipsky,
Michael
and Steven
Rathgeb
Smith.
1993.
Non
profits
or
Hire: The
Welfare
State in the
Age
of
Con
tracting.
ambridge:
Harvard
University
Press.
McKnight,
John.
1996.
The Careless
Society: Community
and
its
Counterfeits.
New
York:
Basic
Books.
Olson,
Mancur.
1984.
The Rise
and Decline
of
ations:
Economic
Growth,
Stagflation
and Social
Rigidities.
New Haven:
Yale
University
Press.
Salamon,
Lester M.
1995.
Partners in
Public
Service:
Government-Nonprofit
Relations
in
the
odern
Welfare
State.
Baltimore:
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press.
Sampson,
Robert
J.,
Stephen
W.
Raudenbush,
and
Fenton
Earls.
1997.
Neighborhoods
and Violent
Crime: A Multilevel
Study
ofCollective
Efficacy.
Science
277:
5328. 918-24.
Skocpol,
Theda.
2003.
Diminished
Democracy:
From
Membership
to
Management
in
American
Civic
Life.
Norman:
Oklahoma
University
Press.
Warren,
Mark
R.
2001.
Dry
Bones
Rattling:
Community
Building
to
Revitalize American
Democracy.
Princeton
and
Oxford:
Princeton
University
Press.
Romand Coles
doi:10.1017/S1537592700000435
Carmen Sirianni's
pathbreaking
book
boldly
explores
the
role of
government
in
facilitating
citizen
engagement
in
collaborative
networks.This
is
a
terrain
toward
which
many
express
skepticism,
fear, resistance,
indifference,
nd
some
times
ignorance.
We
are
indebted
to
Sirianni
for advanc
ing
the
debate
and
compelling
us
to
think
more
carefully.
Many
engaged
democrats
view
government
as
a
bureau
cratic
system
hopelessly
colonized
by
corporate
capitalism
in
ways
that render
it
blivious?and often hostile?to
spe
cific
conditions,
knowledge,,
needs,
and
aspirations
of
the
demos.
From
this
perspective,
civil
society
becomes the
sin
gular
terrain
fordemocratic initiatives
that seek?in often
Sisyphean
ways?to
pressure,
resist,
and
make
more
account
able
highly
undemocratic
institutions.
Seeking
to
rewire
gov
ernment
to
enable citizen
agency
is like
putting
one's
democratic
eggs
in
n
antidemocratic
basketwhere
they
ill
surely
be
broken. Sirianni
acknowledges
a
long,
sobering
history
f
government purposes
and
processes
betraying
em
ocratic
aspirations,
yet
he
sees
and
carefully
rticulates
trans
formative
possibilities
where others
do
not.
One
of his
great
achievements
is
to
render this
hopelessness
questionable.
Many
have
long argued
for
government
policies
to
democ
ratize
the
economy,
regulate
the
commons,
provide public
services,
support
the
vulnerable,
and
so on.
Yet
Sirianni's
distinctive
and
deepest spirit
is
expressed by
a
city
manager
and a leader of an exemplary youth civic-engagement ini
tiative
in
Hampton,
Virginia:
[D]on't
bring
me
more
pro
grams;
change
systems
(p.
118).
Sirianni
doesn't
suggest
simply
changing particular
systems,
but rather
transform
ing
the
fundamental
character
of
systems.
In
the
contem
porary
theoretical
discourse
that
culminates
in
thework of
theorists such
as
Niklas Luhmann
and
Jurgen
Habermas,
social
systems
re
characterized
as
modes
of
organizing
activ
ity
y
means
of
media
(e.g.,
money
and
bureaucratic
power)
that
transform he
world
into
a resource
environment
toward
which
systems
are
essentially
exploitative.
Although
others
have
offered
profound
challenges
to
systems-theoretic
laims,
veryew have suggested ot onlythatgovernmental systems?
especially
at
the
federal
level?are
profoundly transformable
in
directions
ofresponsive
ommunication
and
reciprocal
col
laboration
with
citizens,
but
moreover
that
they
an
become
the
key
agents
in
a
process
that
facilitates
and
organizes
cul
tural
change
so
that
citizens
becomeproactively ngaged
in
ways
thatwill
powerfully
limit,
shape, coproduce,
and
implement
governmental
behavior.
This is
a
radical
idea.
Sirianni
does
not
develop
this
critique
of
systems
theory
in
a
direct and
expressly
theoretical
way.
But
his
theses
Romand
Coles
is
the
cAllister
Chair
and
Director
of
the
Program
for
Community,
Culture,
and
Environment
at
Northern
Arizona
University.
June
2010
|
Vol.
8/No.
2
601
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Review
Symposium
s
-
'
v iv
?
.
>
'/./?vvement
on
collaborative
governance
and
his
analyses
of
case
studies
offermuch
to
support
it.
is
discussions
of
how
municipal
governments
have facilitated
neighborhood
empowerment
in
Seattle
and
youth
civic
engagement
in
Hampton,
Vir
ginia,
and
his
analysis
of
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency's
efforts
o
build
civic
capacity
around
environmen
tal
problems,
are
replete
with
impressive examples
of
gov
ernments
advancing
his
core
principals
of
collaborative
governance:
engaging
citizens
in
coproducing
public
goods,
enhancing
their
capacities
to
do
so
effectively,
obilizing
community
assets,
enabling
more
inclusive
and
equitable
public
deliberations,
fostering
sustainable
partnerships
among
diverse
constituencies,
transforming
nstitutional
ul
tures
to
view
people
as
participants
ratherthan
consumers
of
services,
and
so on.
He
provides
many
examples
of
grass
roots
activistsmoving
into
governmentalpositions
andmak
ing
important
advances
to
change
systems.
Yet while all of the
cases
Sirianni
analyzes
owe
pro
found debts
to
more
conflictive
social
movements
and
organizing
traditions
that have
fought
for
seats at
more
level
tables,
his citizen
engagement
paradigm
heavily
accents
collaborative
relationship building
over
conflict.
Indeed,
the focus
on
receptive relationship
building
across
myriad
differences
is
a
central
community-organizing
motif that
is
relentlessly
ultivated
by
leaders
of the collaborative
gov
ernance
experiments
that
he
investigates.
The democratic
effects
f
nurturing
relational
cultures
are profound. In contrast to bureaucracies and markets,
relational
cultures
that
are
dialogical,
receptive,
and
col
laborative
have
proven
that
we can
creatively
respond
to
theworld's
dynamic complexities
and
diversities
in
ways
that avoid
the blunders
of both
monological
governance
and
gridlocked
multiplicity.
Sirianni
writes that Seattle's
neighborhood
empowerment
planning
effectively egoti
ates
among
scores
of
neighborhoods,
agencies,
nonprofits,
and
other
constituencies
in
ways
that lead
to
exemplary
public
work:
What
kept
the
neighborhood
planning
pro
cess
from
becoming
just
another
complex
bureaucratic
maze
of technical
details,
participatory
process
require
ments, andmultilevel accountabilitymechanisms were the
relational
civic skills
and
philosophy
underlying
the
project
manager's
role
(p.
98).
Sheldon
Wolin's
provocative
work
on
Montesquieu
embraces
the
latter's
ffirmative
ision of
the
polity
as a
labyrinth,
in
contrast
to
tyrannous
sovereignties.1
Labyrinths
can
both
impede
such
powers
and
give
responsive
articulation
to
social,
political,
and
ecological
complexities.
What
makes such
a
complex
con
stitution
of
political
processes
possible
and
desirable?
and
what
can
in
turn
be
nurtured
by
such
constitution?is
an
infrastructure
f
relationality
that
articulates
principals
of
receptivity,
inclusiveness,
equality,
reciprocal
account
ability, and collaborative public work.
Engaged
radical
democratic
scholarship
has
made
many
important
advances
in
the
past
dozen
years
or so.
Along
with Sirianni's work
on
collaborative
governance,
one
might
note
the
rich
literature
that
is
developing
around
community-based
organizing,
and
the
fascinating
work
on
widely emergent
modes
of
democratic
economic
prac
tice
in
municipalities
and
states.2
Yet
most
often,
those
who would democratize and
pluralize
the antidemocratic
powers
of
our
polity
focus
on
particular
sectors
(e.g.,
civil
society,
governmental
bureaucracies,
corporate
mar
kets)
of
radical
reform
in
ways
that do
not
sufficiently
investigate
the
elemental
relationships
between these
trans
formations
and
transformations
in
other
sectors
that
are
conditions
of
each
other's
(im)possibility.
Gar
Alperovitz,
for
example,
in
America
Beyond Capitalism,
brilliantly
analyzes
important
initiatives for
democratizing
econom
ics
in
ways
that have
important implications
for Sirian
ni's
discussion
of
democratizing governance (and
vice
versa).
Yet
Alperovitz
does
not
sufficiently
address
the
importance
of
collaborative
governance
and
ongoing
trans
formative
social
movements
for
sustaining
the
demo
cratic
directions
of the
economic initiatives
he
analyzes.
Similarly,
though
many
scholars and
practitioners
of
community-based
organizing
have made
indispensable
contributions
to
our
ethical
and
political
tool kit for
cultivating
relational
power
that
maintains
a
vital
tension
between idealist
and
pragmatic
sensibilities,
most
ignore
the
possibilities
for
transforming
both
governance
and
corporate
markets. Such
sector-focused
scholarship
is
use
ful in order to open and probe possibilities in particular
domains;
yet
if
we
are
to
change
systems,
it is crucial
that
democratic
scholarship
push
these
limits
and
focus
more
on
larger
configurations?the
interrelationships
between
multiple
sectors
that
must
be
engaged
and
trans
formed
in
tandem because
unresponsive
systems
are
co-engendered
in
multiple
locations.3
Underemphasizing
the
relationships
among
different
sectors
can
diminish
the critical
vision
and
voice
necessary
for radical
demo
cratic transformation.
Unfortunately,
Sirianni focuses
on
governance
in
ways
that
significantly
iminish
our
attention
to
the
manner
in
which profound transformations ncorporate capitalism and
intensifications
of
independent
democratic
organizing
are
indispensable
conditions
for
developing
the
very
direc
tions
in
governance
he affirms. adical democratic
theory
and
practice
that
focus
on
changing
the broad
interrela
tionships
of
power
necessary
for
more
expansive
and
dura
ble
democratization
can now
be
more
than
an
empty gesture,
precisely
because
of
the
many
experimental
initiatives
nder
taken
in
recent
decades.
Sirriani's
avoidance
of such
a
rad
ical
democratic
focus
is
problematic.
Consider
three
examples
related
to
global
capitalist political
economy
that
are
deeply
important
for
collaborative
governance:
As
David
Bacon compellingly suggests,contemporary global capital
ism
engenders
the
migration
of
millions
of
people
and
yet
simultaneously
criminalizes
immigrants.4
While
Sirianni
points
to
vital
ways
in
which
immigrants
are
drawn
into
602
Perspectives
on
Politics
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collaborative
public
work
around
neighborhood
gardens,
community
centers,
nd
so
on,
such
engagement
largely
ails
to
respond
to
this
greater
systemic
problem
of
global
migra
tion
and
immigrantrights?unless
it
s
linked
to
organizing
that
begins
to
address
it.
Similarly,
while
Sirianni
points
to
many
inspiring
collaborations around
environmental
prob
lems,
such collaboration takes
place
in
a
context
in
which
nearly
all
evidence
suggests
that
we are
racing
ever
more
quickly
toward
catastrophe
from
global
warming
(and
myr
iad other
problems)
that
is
engendered
by
the
degradation
of the
planetary
commons
by
global
capitalism.
Finally,
in
spite
of
all
the excellent collaborative
engagement
in
Seat
tle,
the level
of
income
inequality
has increased
signifi
cantly
there
during
the
period
he
discusses,
in
ways
that
are
corrosive
of
democracy.5
These
problems put pressure
on
Siriannis framework
in
some
key
ways.
First,
his sectoral focus diminishes
our
critical
attention
to
intersectoral
relationships
of
power
in
ways
that
marginalize
important
broader
concerns
from
our
understanding
of
engaged
citizenship.
Evidence
of
this
is
discernable
in
the absence of
an
indispensable
critical
vocabulary,
voice,
and
vision
regarding
these
monumental
problems
that
greatly
undermine and
limitwhat he
affirms.
Sirianni mentions
at
the end of
every
case
study
that the
initiatives
described
have
suffered
significantly
from
bud
get
cuts
and the
persistence
of
technocratic frames
(to
which
we
might
also add
narrowing
consumerism,
hyper
mobility, and antidemocraticworkplaces). Yet he offers
no
discussion
of,
for
example,
the
ways
in
which
the
global
economy
shapes
and constrains the
processes,
priorities,
and fiscal
crises
of
governments.
Second,
this
lack
in
turn
de-emphasizes
(and
de
energizes)
the
crucial work
of
imagining
and
experiment
ing
toward
political
economic
transformations that
might
extend
a
web
of initiatives
more
capable
of
furthering
nd
supporting deep
democratization. While Sirianni
is
not
inattentive
to
the
concerns
of
organizers
and
scholars
about
ways
in
which
independent
initiatives
can
be
assimilated
and domesticated
by
governmental
and
corporate
powers,
his own framework risks inadvertently nurturing such
assimilation
in
the
absence
of
links
to more
transforma
tional initiatives.
Third,
these
two
issues raise
questions
concerning
the
extent
of
Siriannis
accent
on
collaborative
citizenship
and
suggest
that initiatives
of
robust
conflictive olitics
are
also
a
more
necessary
part
of
the
mix
than he
acknowledges.
Megapowers deeply
invested
in
patterns
of
damage
do
not
like
to
be
named and
never
change
without
movements
that
directly
contest
them.
My
point
is
not
simply
to
suggest
that
Sirianni
leaves
to
the
side
one
kind of
politics
as
he
studies
collaborative
modes.
Conflictive
politics,
as
he
acknowledges, have been central forenabling the zones of
collaboration
he
brilliantly
explores.
Moreover,
many
cen
tral
problems
of
our
day
call
for
dimensions
of intense
con
flict
now
and
in
the
foreseeable future.
Thus,
we
must
cultivate the
possibility
or
mutually
enabling relationships
between the collaborative ethos and
practices
at
the
center
of
Sirianni's
normative
and
empirical
vision,
on
the
ne
hand,
and
an
ethos that
summons
up courage
for?as
well
as
affir
mation
of?arts
that
enable,
and
knowledge
that
informs,
intense levels of contestation
as
part
of
a
vibrant demo
cratic
political
ecology
in
the face
of
catastrophe.
Collabo
rative
citizenship
engaged
in
public
work
is
an
absolutely
indispensable
element of the
needed
ecology.
(I
spend
doz
ens
of hours
a
week thus
engaged
as a
scholar
and
organizer.)
Yet if
the
centrality
of thismode
is
overplayed,
it
can
deplete
democratic
awareness
of
the
importance
of
more
agonistic
modalities. The Industrial
Areas
Foundation
(LAF)
has
a
motto,
no
permanent
enemies,
no
permanent
friends,
which
they
take
to
mean
that conflict and
coop
eration, polarization
and
depolarization,
are
both
necessary
for democratic
empowerment.
To
reifyolitics
and theoret
ical
frames
in
one
direction
or
the other
is
to
misunderstand
thatdemocratic
politics
flourishes
in
the
tension
between
these
modes.
Sirianni
notes,
for
example,
that
cultivating
a
com
mon
language
was
essential
for
enabling
the
youth
engage
ment
initiatives
in
Hampton,
Virginia.
My
worry
is
that
the
most
salient and
repeated
concepts
in
his
political
lex
icon
tend
to
underplay key
terms
(like conflict )
needed
to
envision,
inform,
and
empower
modes
of
democratic
engagement
without
which
we
are
going
nowhere fast.
I
suggest
that democratic
scholarship
ought
to
take
a
lesson from the IAFmotto and offera frame for under
standing
the
political
that
ceases
to
slant
toward conflict
or
collaboration,
and
instead focuses
on
the
the
ways
in
which
conflict and
collaboration
are
entwined,
at
once
enabling,
and
in
tension
with,
each other.
We
need
to
enliven both modes
in
order
to
empower
democracy.
This
capacity
in
turn
requires
carefully
cultivating
robust
asso
ciations
that
are
jealous
of
their
independence
and
highly
attentive
to
the
possible
negative
(as
well
as
positive) impli
cations
of
deep
collaborative
relationswith
governments.
If
we
ignore
this,
we
risk
instituting
a
democratic
vision
that
disciplines
citizens
into
collaborative
activity
at
the
expenseofmore contestational politics that engagemonu
mental and
deeply
entrenched
patterns
of
subjugative
power.
When
this
happens,
the
problem
under
discussion
can
enter
a
vicious
circle
with
the first
two:
An
overly
collaborative
focus
creates
pressures
to
be silent
about and
not
encroach
upon
powers
with which
one
seeks collabo
ration.
In
contexts
where
these
pressures
are
consistently
heeded,
collaborative
engagement
can
become
a
key
strat
egy
of
governmentality
in
Michel
Foucault's
sense:
consti
tuting subjects
and
communities
whose
counterconducts
enable?more
than
they
dislodge?a subjugative
order.6
Investing inDemocracy makes an unparalleled contribu
tion
to
citizen
engagement
in
collaborative
governance.
In
order
to
sustain
and
further
such
initiatives,
we
must
interweave
them
in
a
broader web
of
political critique,
June
2010
|
Vol 8/No,
2
603
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Review
Symposium
|
Collaborative
/
=
:>xee
.3
o
.'.v^c G
xkxx-
v
\
experimentation,
and
contestation.
And
most
of
the
agency
for thiswill
have
to come
from
an
attentive,
imaginative,
energetic,
and
supple
demos
transforming
many
sectors
and
utilizing
many
tools. Sirianni
(an
advisor
to
the
Obama
2008
campaign)
ends his book
with
an
appeal
to
Barack
Obama
to
ensure that federal
agencies
enable the collab
orative 'we'
in
'Yes
we
can'
(p.
240).
That
Obama's
we
often
appears
to
tilt
towardWall
Street,
that
his rhetoric
and
practice
of
we can has shifted
to
a
technocratic
I
can, 7
and that
Siriannis
call has been
marginalized
is
significantly
due
to
the
fact that
the
political
discourse
of
collaboration
endorsed
by
Obama and
many
of
his
sup
porters
lacks
a
systemic critique
of economic
power
and
a
place
for conflictive
modes
of
political
engagement.
Lack
ing
a
demos born/e
in
a
complex
confidence
that
we
can,
no
president
can
carry
a
movement
of
democracy
forward. Such
a
demos does
not
yet
exist. Democratic
theory
can
contribute
to
its
emergence
by
calling
atten
tion
to
this
absence,
and
the
reasons
for
it,
and
the forms
of
contestation that
might
better
empower
ordinary
citi
zens
and
social
movements.
At
the
same
time,
we are
indebted
to
Sirianni for
his
sharp
illumination of
the
many
ways
in
which
we
are
already
becoming
far
more
than the
nothing
to
which
technocratic
power
would
consign
us.
Notes
1Wolin 1989.
2
For
a
review
of
recent
literature
on
community
organizing (including
a
discussion
of limitations
I
discuss
here,
see
Coles
2005
and
2006. For
an ex
tensive
discussion
of the literature
on
democratic
economic
practices
for
a
pluralist
commonwealth,
see
Alperovitz
2004.
For
a
discussion
that draws
upon
and
moves
beyond Alperovitz
in
the
context
of
democratic
organizing
stemming
from
the
Civil
Rights
movement,
see
Coles
2008.
3
For
a
profound
analysis
of these
interrelationships
of
contemporary
mega-state
power
and
inverted
totalitarianism that forms an indispensable back
ground
for
considering
ways
to
move
forth,
see
Wolin
2004,
Chapters
16
and
17.
4
Bacon
2008.
5
See:
http://www.b-sustainable.org/social
environment/income-distribution.
6
Foucault 2007.
7
See
Harry Boyte,
The
Work
Before
Us
Is
Our
Work,
Not
Just
His,
Minneapolis
Star
Tribune,
3
May
2009,
and Coles
2009.
References
Alperovitz,
Gar.
2004.
America
Beyond Capitalism:
Re
claiming
Our
Wealth,
Our
Liberty,
and
Our
Democ
racy.
Hoboken,
NJ:
John
Wiley.
Bacon,
David.
2008.
Illegal People:
How
Globalization
Creates
Migration
and Criminalizes
Immigrants.
Bos
ton:
Beacon.
Coles,
Romand.
2005.
Beyond
Gated Politics:
Reflections
for
the
Possibility of
emocracy. Minneapolis:
Univer
sity
of
Minnesota Press.
Coles,
Romand.
2006.
Of
Tensions and
Tricksters:
Grassroots
Democracy
Between
Theory
and
Practice.
Perspectives
on
Politics
4
(3):
547-61.
Coles,
Romand.
2008.
Awakening
to
the Call
of
Re
ceptive
Democratic
Progress.
The
Good
Society
17
(1):
43-51.
Coles,
Romand.
2009.
This
Song
Is
Old:
But Is
It
True?
The
Immanent Frame:
Secularism,
Religion,
and the
Public
Sphere.
Brooklyn,
NY:
Social Science Research
Council.
Foucault,
Michel.
2007.
Security,Territory,
opulation:
Lectures
at
the
College
de
France,
\911?V)1$>.
Trans
lated
by
Graham Burchell.
New
York: Picador.
Wolin,
Sheldon. 1989.
The
Presence
of
the
ast:
Essays
on
theState and the
Constitution.
Baltimore:
Johns
Hop
kins
University
Press.
Wolin,
Sheldon.
2004. Politics and
Vision:
Continuity
and
Innovation
inWestern
Political
Thought.
Prince
ton:
Princeton
University
Press.
604
Perspectives
on
Politics
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Patrick
J. Deneen
doi:10.1017/S1537592700000447
Carmen
Sirianni tackles
a
worrisome
problem
in
his
ambi
tious
book:
What
can
be
done
to
elevate
levels
of
civic
participation
in
the
world's oldest
liberal
democracy,
and
to
inculcate
in
future
generations
a
strong
sense
of
civic
obligation
and
concern
for the
common
weal?
Nearly
every
political
scientist
not
only
knows
but
in
some
form
or
another admires
Tocqueville's
classic
analysis
of modern
mass
democracy,
in
which he
commended
an
education
in
the arts
of association and
the
presence
of vibrant
and
active
civic
and
political
associations for
the
perpetuation
of
liberal
democracy.
Yet
studies
continue
to
show
declin
ing
levels
of
participation
and
membership
in
civil and
political
associations,
and
high
levels
of
mistrust
of and
alienation fromgovernment.While agreeing
on
the needed
cure
for the
ills of
an
apathetic
citizenry,
most
political
scientists
are
hard-pressed
to
recommend
a
means
for
improving
the
patient.
Siranni takes
the
radical
step
of
arguing
on
behalf
of
active
government
assistance
toward
the
fostering
of
civic
spiritedness.
Not
simply
content to
lament
the decline
of
civic
participation
and call
for
amorphous
increases
in
participation,
he has examined several
instances
in
which
government
provided
various
incentives
for,
and
even
financial
support
toward,
increasing
civic
participation
in
matters
of
local
and national
policy.
Given
how much of
contemporary life?from market economics to central
ization
to
mass-media
distraction?makes the
mainte
nance
of such
associations
increasingly
difficult,
it stands
to reason
that
it
may
require
government
itself
to
redress
the decline
of
civic
participation
in
the
workings
of
government.
Yet,
Tocqueville
noted
that
government
itselfwould
increasingly replace
associations
as
the
locus
of
our
civic
lives: It
is
easy
to
foresee that the
time
is
drawing
near
when
man
will be less and less able
to
produce,
by
him
self
alone,
the
commonest
necessaries of life. The
task of
the
governing
power
will
therefore
perpetually
increase,
and itsvery efforts ill extend it everyday. The more it
stands
in
the
place
of
associations,
the
more
will
individ
uals,
losing
the
notion of
combining
together,
require
its
assistance: these
are causes
and effects
that
unceasingly
create
each
other. 1
Sirianni,
while
noting
a
debt
to
Tocque
ville,
does
not
sufficiently
eed his
caution
that
the
gov
ernment
of
liberal
democracy
itself
increasingly
becomes
the
main
obstacle
to,
and
replacement
for,
the
very
par
ticipation
he
seeks
to
recommend.
Patrick
J.
Deneen
is
Associate
Professor
of
Government and
holds the
arkos and Eleni
Tsakopoulos-Kounalakis
Chair
in
Hellenic
Studies
at
Georgetown
University.
Sirianni's
faith
in
the
positive
role
to
be
played
by
gov
ernment
in
fostering
civic
engagement
blinds
him
to
its
inherent
dangers.
A
case
in
point:
Early
in
Investing
in
Democracy,
he
approvingly
quotes
from
the
former direc
torof the Environmental Protection
Agency
(EPA),
Wil
liam
Ruckelshaus,
who claimed that
only
when the federal
government
engages
in
the education
of the
citizenry
about
the
complexity
of
government
would
theUnited States
...
be
ready
for
self-government
p.
41).
Sirianni
responds,
No head
of
a
federal
agency,
to
my
knowledge,
has
ever
put
it
better.
In
effect,
only
with
the
assistance of the
federal
government
itselfwill
theAmerican
citizenry
be
capable
of
self-government.
I
think
many
would
find this
idea
a source
of
concern,
and would
decry
his lack of
curiosity
about
how
we
have arrived
at
a
point
at
which
leaders
of
a
government
constituted
by
the
people adjudge
that the
citizenry
may
yet
be
capable
of
self-government.
Sirainni's celebration
of
this
statement
suggests
that
he
wears
a
highly distorting
set
of
blinders.
In
fine,
this book
admirably
attempts
to
grapple
with
the
symptoms
of
civic
apathy
and
even
ignorance
in
advanced
liberal
democracies,
but
without
concern
for,
or
awareness
of,
the
deeper
systemic
causes
of that condition.
Toward the conclusion
of
the
book,
Sirianni
speaks
of
a
crisis of
democracy
(p.
239),
but
allows this
phrase
to
substitute
for serious
reflection about
the
nature
of that
crisis.
And without such
reflection,
the
book has the feel
of
someone
putting
Band-Aids
on
a
patient
who has
already
lost
most
of his blood.
What
we now
call liberal
democracy
was not at
it
incep
tion
called
democracy.
Itsmain aim
was
to
combine
a
theory
of
popular
legitimation
with
a
state
structure
that
would
provide political,
economic,
and
military
stability;
protect
individual
rights;
increasematerial
prosperity;
and
winnow
the
ambitious and talented
from
disparate places
and
put
them in service
of the
modern
state
and
its
larger
ambitions
for
national
greatness.
Encouraging
civic
partici
pation
was
not
on
its
ist f
desiderata; indeed,
for the
Found
ers
of the
United
States,
a
great
fear
was
the
sort
of
popular
agitation
that
had
manifested itself
n
Shay's rebellion,
the
proximate
cause
of
the
Constitutional
Convention.
Mad
ison
concluded
that
democracy ?by
which
he
meant
the
ancient
form
defined
by
direct
civic
participation?always
resulted
in
instability
and
stasis;
the
task
for the
Founders
was
to
design
a
system
thatwould elicit
the
occasional
sanc
tion of
the
citizenry
but leave
the
machinery
of
govern
ment
to
those who
could
refine
and
enlarge
the
public
opinion.
Madison's
view
of
the inherent
irrationality
f
gath
ered citizens
was
captured
most
expressively
in
Federalist
55,
in
which
he
wrote
that
even
had
every
Athenian
citi
zen
been
a
Socrates,
every
Athenian
assembly
would still
have been amob. The systemthatMadison designed had
the aim
of
suppressing
civic
engagement
by
making
gov
ernment
distant
and
complex
and
by
creating
a
substantial
and
rewarding
sphere
for
private
activity
that
would leave
June
2010
|
Vol
8/No.
2
60S
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