col application part 2, fsar - nrc

Revision 38-i

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4COL Application

Part 2, FSAR

CHAPTER 8

ELECTRIC POWER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Title Page

8.0 ELECTRIC POWER ............................................................................ 8.1-1

8.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 8.1-1

8.1.1 General .................................................................................... 8.1-1

8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description .................................................. 8.1-1

8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM ............................................................... 8.2-1

8.2.1.1 Transmission System .............................................................. 8.2-1

8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System .............................................................. 8.2-1

8.2.1.2.1 Switchyard ......................................................................... 8.2-4

8.2.1.2.1.1 Plant Switching Station ...................................................... 8.2-4

8.2.1.2.1.2 Unit Switchyards/Transformer Yards ................................. 8.2-7

8.2.1.2.2 Plant Switching Station and Transmission Lines Testing and Inspection ................................................................... 8.2-8

8.2.1.2.3 Communication with ERCOT/Oncor .................................. 8.2-9

8.2.2.2 Grid Reliability and Stability Analysis..................................... 8.2-11

8.2.3 Design Bases Requirements ................................................. 8.2-12

8.2.4 Combined License Information .............................................. 8.2-13

8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS .............................................................. 8.3-1

8.3.1.1 Description............................................................................... 8.3-1

8.3.1.1.9 Design Criteria for Class 1E Equipment ............................ 8.3-1

8.3.1.1.11 Grounding and Lightning Protection System ..................... 8.3-1

8.3.1.3.2 Short Circuit Studies .......................................................... 8.3-2

8.3.1.3.4 Equipment Protection and Coordination Studies ............... 8.3-2

8.3.1.3.5 Insulation Coordination (Surge and Lightning Protection) ......................................................................... 8.3-2

8.3.2.1.1 Class 1E DC Power System .............................................. 8.3-2

8.3.2.1.2 Non-Class 1E DC Power System ...................................... 8.3-3

8.3.2.3.2 Short Circuit Studies .......................................................... 8.3-3

8.3.4 Combined License Information ................................................ 8.3-3

8.4 STATION BLACKOUT......................................................................... 8.4-1


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38-ii

LIST OF TABLES

Number Title

8.2-201 345 kV Transmission Lines

8.2-202 Transmission Tie Lines

8.2-203 Failure Modes & Effects Analysis for Offsite Power Sources

8.3.1-1R Electrical Equipment Ratings - Component Data Main AC Power System (Nominal Values)

8.3.1-4R Electrical Load Distribution - Class 1E GTG Loading


Part 2, FSAR

LIST OF FIGURES

Number Title

Revision 38-iii

8.1-1R Simplified One Line Diagram Electric Power System

8.2-201 Relevant Portions of Oncor Transmission System Configuration

8.2-202 CPNPP Units 3 & 4 Offsite Power System Key One Line Diagram

8.2-203 Normal PPS Unit Switchyard One Line Diagram

8.2-204 Alternate PPS Unit Switchyard One Line Diagram

8.2-205 Plant Switching Station One Line Diagram

8.2-206 Plant Switching Station Layout

8.2-207 Unit 3 Unit Switchyard Layout

8.2-208 Unit 4 Unit Switchyard Layout

8.2-209 Logic Diagram – 345 kV Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Circuit Breakers

8.2-210 Logic Diagram – 345 kV Main Transformer Circuit Breaker

8.3.1-1R Onsite AC Electrical Distribution System

8.3.1-2R Logic Diagrams

8.3.1-201 Ground Grid and Lightning Protection System


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38-iv

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ac alternating current

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

CCVT coupling capacitor voltage transformer

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COL Combined License

CPNPP Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant

dc direct current

DCD Design Control Document

DFR digital fault recorder

ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas

ETAP Electrical Transient Analyzer Program

FMEA failure modes and effects analysis

GIB gas-insulated bus

GIS gas-insulated switchgear

GLBS generator load break switch

HV high voltage

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IPB isolated phase busduct

LOOP loss of offsite power

LV low voltage

MT main transformer

OLTC on-load tap changer

Oncor Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC

PPS preferred power supply

PUCT Public Utility Commission of Texas

RAT reserve auxiliary transformer

SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition

T/B turbine building

TSP transmission service provider

UAT unit auxiliary transformer


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.1-1

8.0 ELECTRIC POWER

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This section of the referenced Design Control Document (DCD) is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

8.1.1 General

Replace the fourth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.1.1 with the following.

Figure 8.1-1R is a simplified electrical one line diagram depicting the alternating current (ac) and direct current (dc) onsite and offsite electric power system including the site-specific switchyard.

8.1.2.1 Utility Power Grid Description

Replace the paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.1.2.1 with the following.

Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC (Oncor) is the transmission service provider (TSP) for the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP). Oncor operates the largest distribution and transmission system in Texas, providing power to three million electric delivery points over more than 101,000 miles of distribution and 14,000 miles of transmission lines. Oncor operates in a service area of east, west, and north central Texas and serves cities that include the Dallas-Fort Worth area and surrounding cities. The Oncor grid is connected to fossil-fueled plants, combustion turbine plants and nuclear plants supplying electric energy over a transmission system consisting of various voltages up to 345 kV. Oncor is a member of Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). ERCOT is comprised of members engaged in generation, transmission, distribution and marketing of electric energy in the state of Texas. ERCOT is the independent system operator that oversees all generation and transmission functions.

A new 345 kV switching station for CPNPP Units 3 and 4 (plant switching station) is constructed prior to fuel loading. The plant switching station is a part of the ERCOT grid and has four outgoing transmission circuits to remote substations as described in Section 8.2. In addition, the plant switching station has four independent overhead transmission tie lines, two for CPNPP Unit 3 and the other two for CPNPP Unit 4. The plant switching station has two main buses configured in a breaker and a half scheme. The switching station equipment shared between Unit 3 and 4 has the capacity and is configured such that sharing will not significantly impair the ability to provide offsite power in response to an accident in one unit and an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining unit and that adequate offsite power capacity exists to support both units during this scenario.

CP COL 8.2(3)

CP COL 8.2(1)

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Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-1

8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

8.2.1.1 Transmission System

Replace the paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.1 with the following.

Oncor is the TSP for CPNPP. Oncor operates the largest distribution and transmission system in Texas, providing power to three million electric delivery points over more than 101,000 miles of distribution and 14,000 miles of transmission lines. Oncor operates in a service area of east, west, and north central Texas and serves cities that include the Dallas-Fort Worth area and surrounding cities. The Oncor grid is connected to fossil-fueled plants, combustion turbine plants and nuclear plants supplying electric energy over a transmission system consisting of various voltages up to 345 kV. Oncor is a member of ERCOT. ERCOT is comprised of members engaged in generation, transmission, distribution and marketing of electric energy in the state of Texas. ERCOT is the independent system operator that oversees all generation and transmission functions. The relevant portions of the Oncor transmission system network configuration is shown in Figure 8.2-201.

A new Oncor 345 kV switching station for CPNPP Units 3 and 4 (plant switching station) is constructed prior to fuel loading. The plant switching station has four outgoing transmission lines to remote switching stations as indicated in Table 8.2-201.

The rights-of-way for the transmission lines listed in Table 8.2-201 is established and all four lines are constructed prior to fuel loading. These rights-of-way commence at the CPNPP property and continue towards the switching stations, listed in Table 8.2-201. The width of the rights-of-way is adequate for the planned transmission lines. The TSPs in the ERCOT region are subject to regulations of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) that controls new transmission facilities and needed interconnections to transmit power to and from the transmission grid. Any existing rights-of-way are utilized without compromising design basis criteria.

In addition, the plant switching station has four independent overhead transmission tie lines, two for CPNPP Unit 3 and two for CPNPP Unit 4, as indicated in Table 8.2-202.

8.2.1.2 Offsite Power System

Replace the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.

CP COL 8.2(1)

CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-2

The offsite power system is a nonsafety-related, non-class 1E system, beginning at the transmission grid and ending at the line-side terminals of the main power supply circuit breakers feeding the 13.8 kV and 6.9 kV buses, and at the terminals on the main transformer (MT) side of the generator load break switch (GLBS). The plant switching station is connected to the transmission grid by four outgoing transmission lines. The one line diagram of the offsite power system is shown in Figure 8.2-202. The plant switching station has two independent control houses (#1 and #2) that contain the control and protection equipment for the four outgoing transmission lines. The control and protection equipment for the DeCordova and Johnson lines are in control house #1, and those for the Parker and the Whitney lines are in control house #2. The transmission lines that are associated with different control houses are designed such that, availability of the two lines associated with one control house is not lost by any single failure that may cause failure of lines associated with the other control house.

For each unit, there are two 345 kV gas-insulated switchgear, one is for the normal preferred power supply (PPS) and the other is for alternate PPS, hereinafter called unit switchyard. The normal PPS unit switchyard is located on the southwest side of the turbine building (T/B), and the alternate PPS unit switchyard is located on the southeast side of the T/B. The one-line diagrams for the normal PPS and alternate PPS unit switchyards are shown in Figures 8.2-203 and 8.2-204, respectively.

There are two indoor gas-insulated 345 kV circuit breakers in the normal PPS unit switchyard. One breaker is on the high-voltage side of reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) 1 and RAT3, and the other is on the high voltage side of RAT2 and RAT4. The other sides of these two circuit breakers are connected to the overhead 345 kV transmission tie line going to the plant switching station. The 345 kV interconnections between the RATs, gas-insulated switchgear (GIS), and overhead transmission tie line are provided by gas-insulated bus (GIB).

There is one indoor gas-insulated 345 kV circuit breaker in the alternate PPS unit switchyard connecting the high-voltage side of the MT and the overhead 345 kV transmission tie line going to the plant switching station. The 345 kV interconnections between the MT, GIS, and overhead transmission tie line are provided by GIB.

The unit interface with the Oncor transmission system is at the connection to Oncor’s 345 kV overhead transmission tie line in the unit switchyards. The four unit switchyards and the four transmission tie lines between the unit switchyards and the plant switching station are physically separated.

Replace the first four sentences of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.

For each unit, offsite electric power is provided to the onsite power system from the grid and other generating stations by two physically independent

CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-3

transmission lines. During unit startup, shutdown, maintenance, and during all postulated accident conditions, offsite electric power can be supplied to each unit site from the plant switching station through two physically independent transmission tie lines. One of these two transmission tie lines connects to the high-voltage side of the MT via a 345 kV circuit breaker. The other transmission tie line connects to two 345 kV circuit breakers at the unit switchyard, one circuit breaker is for RAT1 and RAT3, and the other circuit breaker is for RAT2 and RAT4. Both of any two outgoing transmission lines between the plant switching station and the remote offsite switching stations adequately maintain the voltage within ±5 percent of 345 kV at the high voltage side terminals of the MTs and RATs, while supplying full auxiliary loads of both units for all normal, abnormal and postulated accident conditions.

Add the following information after the last sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2.

Neither the grid stability analysis in Subsection 8.2.2.2 nor the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.1 identified the non-safety related offsite power system as risk-significant during all modes of plant operation.

Add the following information after the last sentence of the eleventh paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2.

The force-cooled continuous-current rating of the iso-phase bus duct section between the main generator and the main transformer is 44.4 kA, which provides 5% margin with respect to the 42.2 kA continuous current rating of the main generator.

Replace the last sentence of the fifteenth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.

In case of a sudden pressure relay operation, the transformer is isolated.

Replace the second sentence of the eighteenth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2 with the following.

Minimum one-hour rated fire barriers are provided between all transformers. Figures 8.2-207 and 8.2-208 show physical layout of equipment in the Unit 3 and

CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)

STD COL 8.2(10)

CP COL 8.2(4)CP COL 8.2(5)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-4

Unit 4 unit switchyards/transformer yards, respectively. Cables associated with the normal and alternate PPS between unit switchyard and the electrical room in the T/B are routed in separate underground duct bank. Normal and alternate PPS cables are physically separated which minimizes the chance of simultaneous failure. The underground duct bank for these circuits is sealed to prevent degradation in wetted or submerged condition.

8.2.1.2.1 Switchyard

Replace the content of DCD Subsection 8.2.1.2.1 with the following.

8.2.1.2.1.1 Plant Switching Station

The plant switching station is located approximately half a mile south-west from the plant-site, within the CPNPP property. From the plant switching station, there are four outgoing transmission lines going to remote switching stations, and four transmission tie lines going to the four unit switchyards. There are two control houses in the plant switching station. The control and protection equipment associated with the DeCordova and Johnson transmission lines and the two normal PPS transmission tie lines are located in control house #1. The control and protection equipment associated with the Parker and Whitney transmission lines and the two alternate PPS transmission tie lines are located in control house #2. The control and protection circuit cables that are routed in the yard and associates with two different control houses are physically separated to avoid a common cause failure of the two control houses and the availability of the associated offsite power circuits. The four outgoing transmission lines to remote switching stations and the four transmission tie lines to the unit switchyards are installed on separate sets of transmission towers and do not cross each other. Any credible failure of one PPS circuit, including catastrophic failure of transmission towers, is not cause the failed circuit or tower to fall into PPS circuit for the same unit. The plant switching station, including the transmission lines, towers, protection relay systems, control houses, etc. are not specifically designed for earthquake, tornado or flooding; however, they are designed to the applicable industry standards and regulations to assure a safe and highly reliable offsite power system. Each power circuit of the normal and alternate PPS, originating from the ERCOT transmission grid and terminating at the line-side of the medium-voltage bus incoming circuit breakers, is designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (excluding earthquake, tornado or flooding) and protected from dynamic effects, and has sufficient capacity and capability to assure satisfactory operation of all safety loads and non safety loads, under normal, abnormal and postulated accident conditions. Lightning protection system is also provided as discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.1.11.

The breakers in the plant switching station are arranged in a breaker-and-a-half scheme having six bays. Of the six bays, two bays are provided with three circuit

CP COL 8.2(3)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-5

breakers and the remaining four bays are provided with two circuit breakers. Provision is made for adding the third circuit breaker in the two-circuit breaker bays to accommodate future growth. All 345 kV circuit breakers have dual trip coils. The switching station main buses are constructed of six-inch aluminum tubes with standard 345 kV spacing. All of the circuit breakers have a disconnect switch on each side to allow isolation or removal of a circuit breaker without affecting availability of each transmission line. The one line diagram and the physical layout drawing of the plant switching station are shown in Figures 8.2-205 and 8.2-206, respectively.

In order to avoid crossings of the 345 kV lines out of the plant switching station, a section of the two main buses is lengthened to allow several of the existing circuits to pass through (fly-over) the plant switching station. The section of bus is approximately 300 ft. long to allow space for the fly-over circuits. The fly-over circuits are double dead-ended between the two main buses to avoid a scenario that would allow a single failure of one of the lines to trip both of the main buses. Standard 345 kV substation dead ends are utilized for these terminations. The lines that pass through the station are the 345 kV CPNPP Units 1 and 2 – Parker 345 kV switching station line, the 345 kV CPNPP Units 1 and 2 – Comanche Switch line and the 138 kV CPNPP Units 1 and 2 – Stephenville line.

The plant switching station has two 25 ft. X 65 ft. control buildings. These buildings house the primary and backup line relaying panels, voltage transformer and current transformer indoor junction boxes, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) unit, digital fault recorder (DFR) unit, batteries and battery chargers and all ac and dc panels. Each building houses a single set of batteries and battery charger in its own battery room separate from the relay panel room. One building houses dc source #1 and the other houses dc source #2. To reduce the cable lengths of the dc supplies in one control building to panels in the other control building, a set of fused cables are brought from the dc source in each control building to the dc box in the relay panel room of the other control building. This allows for short cable runs to the relay panels in the other control building, while keeping the batteries in different buildings. A SCADA unit is installed in each control building, with the data circuit bridged between the two units. This prevents bringing all of the SCADA cable to one building. A similar design is used on the DFR, but the station switcher is used to connect both DFRs to one phone line. Each building has its own heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, portable fire extinguishers, and eyewash stations.

A fiber optic shield wire is installed on each of the four 345 kV tie lines between the plant switching station and the unit switchyards. These fibers are used for relay protection and for sending generator information to Oncor. Oncor has no direct control of any of the 345 kV circuit breakers located at the unit switchyards.

CP COL 8.2(3)CP COL 8.2(8)

CP COL 8.2(7)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-6

Each transmission line and the plant switching station buses are provided with primary and backup relay protection schemes. Each transmission line is protected by pilot protection using a directional comparison blocking scheme. Phase step-distance and ground directional-overcurrent protection are also provided as backup protection. Each plant switching station bus has dual independent differential protection schemes. Each transmission tie line has differential protection and phase step-distance and ground directional-overcurrent protection. The relay protection schemes for independent transmission lines are designed so that any single failure or incident, such as control house fire or cable dig-in, will not cause loss of both circuits in any combination of two independent transmission lines. The relay panels for independent transmission lines are physically located in separate control house and the control cables are physically separated. The design for every protection zone has fully redundant and electrically independent protection systems. This fully redundant concept is also applied to the breaker-failure schemes.

The primary ac power supply for the plant switching station is provided from existing local electric distribution system. The backup ac power is supplied by a separate power source from the primary ac power.

Any combination of two of the four outgoing transmission lines (DeCordova, Parker, Johnson, and Whitney), except for the combinations of DeCordova and Johnson and Parker and Whitney, are two independent offsite power circuits from the ERCOT transmission network to the plant switching station. Any credible single incident or single failure of a transmission line or a plant switching station component does not result in simultaneous failure of both circuits in any combination of two independent offsite power circuits. The FMEA presented in Table 8.2-203 indicates that at least one of the two independent offsite power circuits would remain available to perform its design basis functions under a postulated single incident or a single failure. The FMEA examines the various ways in which a failure may occur and the effects of this failure on the ability of the equipment to continue to perform its intended function. Each piece of critical equipment was reviewed to determine how it might fail. Physical as well as electrical failures were examined. Failures caused by external influences as well as failures due to overloading or over stressing of equipment were examined.

Each type of failure was evaluated to determine if it would affect any other equipment. For instance, if the trip out of a transmission line might cause other lines to be overloaded or interrupt an offsite power circuit.

The effects were analyzed to determine if critical functions of the plant switching station would be affected. There should be no single failure that results in un-availability of at least two power circuits and compromise the ability of the plant to maintain containment integrity and other vital functions. Failure modes and effects of the following equipment of the plant switching station were analyzed.

• Transmission line towers.

CP COL 8.2(9)

CP COL 8.2(11)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-7

• Transmission lines.

• Plant switching station main buses.

• 345 kV circuit breakers.

• 345 kV disconnect switches.

• Transmission line and bus relay systems within the plant switching station.

8.2.1.2.1.2 Unit Switchyards/Transformer Yards

The MTs, UATs, RATs, and the main generator excitation transformer are located outdoors in the transformer yard. There are two indoor GIS, the normal PPS GIS is located on the west side of the RATs, and the alternate PPS GIS located on the east side of the MTs. The two GIS buildings and the transformer yard are enclosed within a security fence that has controlled access. Three-hour rated fire barriers are provided between the transformers that are associated with the normal and alternate PPSs. There is a minimum one-hour rated fire barrier in between all transformers. The physical layouts of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 unit switchyards/transformer yards are shown in Figures 8.2-207 and 8.2-208, respectively.

The isolated phase busducts (IPBs) from the GLBS are connected to the low voltage (LV) side of the MTs and to high voltage (HV) side of the UATs. The MT circuit breaker in the GIS is connected to the HV side of the MTs by GIB. The alternate PPS GIS has one gas-insulated circuit breaker, designated as MT- CB, which connects the HV side of the MT to the Oncor alternate PPS transmission tie line. The normal PPS GIS has two gas-insulated circuit breakers, one designated as RAT-CB1 for RAT1 and RAT3, and the other designated as RAT-CB2 for RAT2 and RAT4. The RAT-CB1 connects the HV sides of RAT1 and RAT3 to the Oncor normal PPS transmission tie line. The RAT-CB2 connects the HV sides of RAT2 and RAT4 to the Oncor normal PPS transmission tie line. The breaker open/close logic diagrams for the unit switchyard circuit breakers are shown in Figures 8.2-209 and 8.2-210. The RAT-CB1 and RAT-CB2 has a continuous rating of 2000 amp and 63 kA short circuit rating. The MT-CB has a continuous rating of 4000 amp and 63 kA short circuit rating. Two trip coils are provided for each circuit breaker, actuated by the primary and back up relay protection schemes. The one line diagrams for the normal and alternate PPS GIS are shown in Figures 8.2-203 and 8.2-204, respectively. Each circuit breaker is provided with two motor-operated grounding type disconnect switches. Additional motor-operated grounding type disconnect switches are provided, as shown in the one line diagrams in order to isolate any section of the power circuit. Surge arresters are provided both at the transformer side and at the transmission tie line side to protect the equipment from damage due to lightning and switching surges.

CP COL 8.2(3)

CP COL 8.2(3)CP COL 8.2(7)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-8

Each unit switchyard has two sets of 125V dc batteries and two separate dc power distribution systems. Each battery system has its own 480V ac -125V dc battery charger. In addition, there is a spare battery charger that can be placed in service to replace any of the dedicated battery chargers. The batteries are sized conservatively to perform its design basis functions upon loss of the battery charger. The battery chargers are sized to charge a design basis discharged battery to 95 percent of its capacity within twenty-four hours. A primary and a backup relay protection scheme is provided for each of the transmission tie lines to the plant switching station. The dc control power for the primary and the backup protection scheme is provided from separate dc systems in each unit switchyard.

Four separate 480V ac power supply systems fed from four different non-Class 1E 480V load centers of each unit, are provided for the unit switchyards of each unit. Two systems are for the normal PPS unit switchyard and the other two for the alternate PPS unit switchyard. Within each unit switchyard, two separate low voltage ac power distribution systems provide power to two separate groups of electrical loads.

The normal PPS and the alternate PPS unit switchyards, the normal PPS and the alternate PPS transmission tie lines to the plant switching station, the low-voltage dc and ac power systems in the unit switchyards, are physically separated and do not share any common equipment. Hence, no FMEA is warranted for the equipment and circuits associated with the unit switchyards.

8.2.1.2.2 Plant Switching Station and Transmission Lines Testing and Inspection

An agreement between Luminant and Oncor for inspection, maintenance, calibration, and testing of transmission lines, and plant switching station, provides the procedure, policy and organization to carry out inspection, maintenance, calibration, and testing of transmission lines and plant switching station.

This agreement defines the interfaces and working relationship between Luminant and Oncor. As a service to Luminant, Oncor performs inspection, maintenance, calibration, and testing of Luminant transformer and circuit breaker assets at CPNPP. Luminant and Oncor are responsible for control of plant/grid interface activities. For reliability, Luminant and Oncor coordinate maintenance and testing of offsite power systems. Oncor establishes communication and coordination protocols for restoration of external power supply to the nuclear plant on a priority basis.

For performance of maintenance, testing, calibration and inspection, Oncor follows its own field test manuals, vendor manuals and drawings, industry’s maintenance practice and observes Federal Energy Regulatory Commission requirements and North American Electric Reliability Corporation reliability standard.

CP COL 8.2(8)CP COL 8.2(9)

CP COL 8.2(3)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-9

Oncor verifies that these test results demonstrate compliance with design requirements and takes corrective actions as necessary. Oncor plans and schedules maintenance activities, notifying the plant and transmission system operations group in advance. Oncor also procures necessary parts prior to the commencement of maintenance activities.

Transmission lines in the Oncor Electric Delivery transmission system are inspected through an aerial inspection twice per year. The inspection has a specific focus on vegetation management, inspection of structures and conductors, right-of-way encroachments, and any conditions that pose a danger to the public. Herbicide is used to control vegetation within the boundaries of the transmission line rights-of-way. Where herbicides cannot be applied, vegetation is cut and removed. This cutting and removal effort is extended beyond the formal right-of-way limit to address the presence of any danger trees which may adversely affect the operation of the transmission line.

The interconnecting plant switching station, as well as other substation facilities, has multiple levels of inspection and maintenance, including the following:

• Walk throughs and visual inspections of the entire substation facility.

• Relay functional tests.

• Oil sampling of power transformers. Oil samples are evaluated through the use of gas chromatography and dielectric breakdown analysis.

• Power circuit breaker maintenance is based on operating conditions and time and consists of visual inspection, diagnostic tests and internal inspections to determine the breakers operating conditions.

• A power test (Doble Test) is typically performed on oil filled equipment, along with other diagnostic tests to determine the transformers operating conditions.

• Thermography is used to identify potential thermal heating issues on buses, conductors, connectors, switches, transformers, and other equipment located within a plant switching station.

8.2.1.2.3 Communication with ERCOT/Oncor

The interfaces between CPNPP and Oncor are managed via a formal communication agreement. A reliability of the offsite power is managed by ERCOT, Oncor and CPNPP personnel through communications and actions governed and coordinated by the formal Interface Agreement.

The communication agreement specifies the responsibilities and communication methods among ERCOT, Oncor and CPNPP which have the responsibilities for

CP COL 8.2(1)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-10

the operation, maintenance, and engineering of transmission system. Planned activities and changes in plant structures, systems, and components (SSC) status which may affect grid stability/reliability are clearly identified and included in the communications. The main control room operators notify Oncor of any plant activity that may impact generation capability. The Oncor monitors transmission system conditions to ensure adequate voltage is maintained to support CPNPP, and notifies the main control room operators of conditions which will result in inadequate voltage support.

The instrumentation for monitoring and indicating the status such as breaker positions, bus and line voltages, frequency, watts and vars, etc., of the preferred power system ensure that any change in the preferred power system that would prevent it from performing its intended function is immediately identified by the main control room operator.

Methods and procedures for confirming the operational readiness of offsite power systems are provided to verify that main control room operators are aware of the capability of the offsite power system to supply power during operation and situation that can result in a loss of offsite power (LOOP) following a trip of the plant.

Adequate procedures, administrative controls, and protocols are implemented to ensure that no modifications of the offsite power system circuits credited for satisfying GDC 17 without the performance of a proper safety evaluation.

Grid reliability evaluations are performed for maintenance or modifications to the offsite power system, as part of the maintenance risk assessment required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.65 before performing “grid-risk-sensitive” maintenance activities. The results of the grid reliability evaluations are evaluated by the maintenance rule program which is described in Subsection 17.6.2.

Communication links exist between the main control room operators and ERCOT/Oncor as a means to obtain timely information on power grid operating conditions and status to verify the operability of the offsite power grid in accordance with the requirements of the technical specifications. Communications with ERCOT/Oncor exist for restoration of offsite power in the event of a LOOP or station blackout.

Real time analysis tools are provided to evaluate the impact of the loss or unavailability of various transmission system elements. The evaluation results of these analysis tools notify the main control room operators to provide compensatory actions for the event.

Add the following new subsections after DCD Subsection 8.2.2.1.CP COL 8.2(11)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-11

8.2.2.2 Grid Reliability and Stability Analysis

Oncor has performed a transient stability study for the proposed addition of CPNPP Units 3 and 4 generation facility to the ERCOT transmission network in accordance with BTP 8-3. The CPNPP Units 3 and 4 connect to the ERCOT network via four 345 kV transmission tie lines to the plant switching station and four 345 kV outgoing transmission lines, as discussed in Subsection 8.2.1.1. The purpose of this study is to determine if the expansion of this facility causes the proposed or existing nearby generators to experience transient instability for selected planning criteria contingencies. This study indicates that neither the proposed nor existing nearby generators experience transient instability for the selected planning criteria contingencies that have been considered.

This study, and its conclusions, is based on preliminary data and is subject to review using final data to be provided prior to the interconnection of the proposed generating facility expansion with the Oncor transmission system.

The pertinent details of the Oncor transient stability study are summarized below:

The study was conducted in accordance with the ERCOT Generation Interconnection or Change Request Procedure using a 2015 summer peak case projected from the 2012 ERCOT summer peak base case. The ERCOT dynamics database associated with the 2010 summer peak base case was modified for compatibility with the 2015 base case.

A series of contingencies consistent with the ERCOT planning criteria were applied to selected locations in the vicinity of CPNPP. The contingencies studied include the loss, as a result of a single event, of the largest generation capacity being supplied to the grid, removal of the largest load from the grid or loss of the most critical transmission line. The assumptions of this study are the following:

• All system elements were assumed to be in service prior to the contingency being simulated.

• Disturbances were modeled as close-in, normally-cleared faults by primary relaying and faults with stuck or hung breaker, cleared by back up protection.

• Normal clearing time for the primary relaying was assumed to be 4 cycles with one re-close attempt at 60 cycles.

• Selected machine rotor angles were monitored for indications of instability.

The expected contingencies are the following:

• Simultaneous trip of CPNPP Units 3 and 4 as the largest generator in the grid.


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-12

• Loss of the largest load in the grid.

The addition of the proposed CPNPP Units 3 and 4 at the Comanche Peak facility does not adversely impact the stability of the existing units and the new units in the area. The Comanche Peak generation remains stable for reasonably expected contingencies. These study cases include loss of the most heavily loaded transmission circuit connected to the plant switching station, loss of the largest capacity transmission circuit connected to the plant switching station and removal of the largest load from the system. In addition, in case of loss of the largest supply, i.e. CPNPP Units 3 and 4, the transmission system remains stable with slight voltage and frequency variation. The voltage low point is about 0.976 pu and frequency deviation from 60 Hz is only 0.24 Hz at the lowest point. In addition, the maximum frequency decay rate does not exceed 5 Hz/second that is assumed in the reactor coolant system flow analysis in Chapter 15. The grid stability analysis justifies the assumption used in Chapter 15 to power RCPs through the UATs for at least three seconds after a turbine generator trip.

Grid stability is evaluated on an ongoing basis based on load growth, addition of new transmission lines, addition of new generation capacities and for planned system changes.

The plant switching station and associated outgoing transmission lines and tie lines are newly constructed in CPNPP site and the transmission lines are connected to the four independent and separate local switching station. The transmission system reliability is evaluated in a similar manner as the CPNPP Units 1 and 2. CPNPP Units 1 and 2 have not experienced any LOOP event caused by both the transmission system accepting the unit’s output and the transmission system providing the preferred power for the unit’s loads, from 1986 to 2007. According to this experience data, the transmission system is expected to be highly reliable.

8.2.3 Design Bases Requirements

Replace the first sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.3 with the following.

A failure modes and effects analysis is provided in Subsection 8.2.1.2.1.1 and the offsite power system conforms to the following requirements.

Replace the last sentence of the fifth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.3 with the following.

A summary of a grid stability analysis is provided in Subsection 8.2.2.2 and the grid stability conforms to this requirement.

CP COL 8.2(11)

STD COL 8.2(11)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-13

Replace the last sentence of the eighth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.2.3 with the following.

A transmission system reliability analysis is provided in Subsection 8.2.2.2.

Condition monitoring of underground or inaccessible cables within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR50.65) is incorporated into the maintenance rule program. The cable condition monitoring program incorporates lessons learned from industry operating experience, address regulatory guidance, and utilizes information from detailed design and procurement documents to determine the appropriate inspections, tests, and cable monitoring criteria within the scope of the maintenance rule described in Subsection 17.6.2. The program takes into consideration Generic Letter 2007-01.

8.2.4 Combined License Information

Replace the content of DCD Subsection 8.2.4 with the following.

8.2(1) Utility power grid and transmission line

This Combined License (COL) Item is addressed in Subsections 8.1.2.1, 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.3, Table 8.2-201, Table 8.2-202, and Figure 8.2-201.

8.2(2) Deleted from the DCD.

8.2(3) Switchyard description

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.1.1, 8.2.1.2.1, 8.2.1.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.1.2, 8.2.1.2.2, Figure 8.1-1R, Figure 8.2-202, Figure 8.2-203, Figure 8.2-204, Figure 8.2-205, Figure 8.2-206, Figure 8.2-207, Figure 8.2-208, Figure 8.3.1-1R and Figure 8.3.1-2R.

8.2(4) Normal preferred power

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2, Figure 8.2-202, Figure 8.2-203, Figure 8.2-207 and Figure 8.2-208.

8.2(5) Alternate preferred power

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2, Figure 8.2-202, Figure 8.2-204, Figure 8.2-207 and Figure 8.2-208.


8.2(7) Protective relaying

STD COL 8.2(11)

CP COL 8.3(12)

CP COL 8.2(1)

CP COL 8.2(3)

CP COL 8.2(4)

CP COL 8.2(5)

CP COL 8.2(7)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-14

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.1.2, Figure 8.2-203, Figure 8.2-204, Figure 8.2-209 and Figure 8.2-210.

8.2(8) Switchyard dc power

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2.1.2.

8.2(9) Switchyard ac power

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2.1.2.

8.2(10) Transformer protection

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.1.2.

8.2(11) Stability and Reliability of the Offsite Transmission Power Systems

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.2.1.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2.3, 8.2.3 and Table 8.2-203.


CP COL 8.2(8)

CP COL 8.2(9)

STD COL 8.2(10)

CP COL 8.2(11)STD COL 8.2(11)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-15

Table 8.2-201

345 kV Transmission Lines

345 kVTransmission

Line

TransmissionLine

DesignationTermination

Point

Approx. Length(Miles)

ThermalRating(MVA)

Whitney W WhitneySwitching Station

45 1631

Johnson J Johnson Switching Station

22 1631

DeCordova D DeCordova switching Station

17 1969

Parker P Parker Switching Station

42 1631

CP COL 8.2(1)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.2-16

Table 8.2-202

Transmission Tie Lines

TransmissionTie Line

DesignationTermination

Point

Approx. Length(Miles)

ThermalRating(MVA)

Unit 3Normal PPS

Take-off Tower at Unit 3 Normal PPS unit Switchyard

0.55 1072

Unit 3Alternate PPS

Take-off Tower at Unit 3 Alternate PPS unit Switchyard

0.66 2986

Unit 4Normal PPS

Take-off Tower at Unit 4 Normal PPS unit Switchyard

0.30 1072

Unit 4Alternate PPS

Take-off Tower at Unit 4 Alternate PPS unit Switchyard

0.42 2986

CP COL 8.2(1)

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itchi

ng s

tatio

ns

are

suc

h th

at, u

nde

r no

rma

l co

nditi

ons

, in

th

e e

vent

of a

phy

sica

l fai

lure

of a

ny s

truc

ture

in a

ny o

f the

se fo

ur c

ircui

ts, t

he

rem

ain

ing

circ

uits

will

hav

e s

uffic

ient

cap

acity

to s

upp

ly C

PN

PP

Uni

ts 3

and

4 w

ith

the

req

uire

d p

ower

to m

ain

tain

con

tain

men

t in

tegr

ity a

nd o

the

r vi

tal f

unct

ion

s at

the

requ

ired

volta

ge.

The

act

ual r

outin

g o

f som

e o

r al

l of t

hes

e fo

ur c

ircu

its w

ill b

e su

bjec

t to

the

app

rova

l of t

he P

UC

T. F

inal

de

sign

of

circ

uits

sub

ject

to P

UC

T a

ppro

val w

ill

take

pla

ce a

fter

such

the

PU

CT

app

rova

l is

rece

ived

.

CP

CO

L 8.

2(11

)

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

18

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

plic

atio

nP

art

2, F

SA

R

Tra

nsm

issi

on

lines

P

rovi

de th

e so

urce

of p

ower

to

mai

nta

in

cont

ain

me

nt

inte

grity

and

oth

er

vita

l fu

nctio

ns

Loss

of a

tr

ansm

issi

on li

ne fo

r a

ny r

eas

on, s

uch

as

faul

ts, s

plic

e fa

ilure

, et

c.

CP

NP

P U

nits

3 a

nd 4

are

ea

ch s

upp

lied

from

the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n vi

a a

345

kV

n

orm

al p

refe

rred

pow

er s

upp

ly c

ircu

it a

nd a

345

kV

alte

rnat

e p

refe

rred

pow

er s

upp

ly

circ

uit.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ondi

tions

, a fa

ult

on o

ne o

f the

se c

ircu

its w

ill b

e cl

eare

d by

o

pen

ing

two

brea

kers

in th

e pl

ant s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n an

d o

ne b

rea

ker

in th

e u

nit

switc

hya

rd w

ith n

o m

ate

rial a

ffect

on

any

othe

r no

rmal

or

alte

rnat

e p

refe

rred

pow

er

supp

ly c

ircui

t. U

nde

r no

rmal

con

ditio

ns,

in th

e ev

ent o

f th

e fa

ilure

of a

nor

mal

or

alte

rnat

e pr

efer

red

pow

er s

upp

ly c

ircu

it to

a u

nit,

the

rem

aini

ng

pre

ferr

ed p

ower

su

pply

circ

uit t

o th

at u

nit w

ill h

ave

suffi

cien

t cap

aci

ty to

su

pply

the

requ

ired

pow

er to

m

aint

ain

cont

ainm

ent i

nteg

rity

and

othe

r vi

tal f

unct

ion

s at

the

requ

ired

volta

ge.

The

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n is

con

nec

ted

to fo

ur s

epa

rate

off-

site

345

kV

tran

smis

sion

n

etw

ork

switc

hin

g st

atio

ns v

ia fo

ur 3

45 k

V tr

ansm

issi

on c

ircui

ts. U

nde

r no

rmal

co

nditi

ons

, a fa

ult o

n an

y on

e of

thes

e c

ircui

ts is

cle

ared

by

open

ing

one

or

mor

e b

reak

ers

in th

e pl

ant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n an

d on

e or

mo

re b

reak

ers

in th

e of

fsite

sw

itch

ing

sta

tions

with

no

mat

eria

l affe

ct o

n th

e re

mai

ning

thre

e tr

ans

mis

sion

line

s.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, i

n th

e ev

ent

of f

ailu

re o

f any

one

of t

hese

four

circ

uits

, the

re

ma

inin

g th

ree

circ

uits

will

hav

e s

uffic

ient

cap

acity

to s

upp

ly th

e r

equi

red

pow

er to

C

PN

PP

Un

its 3

and

4 to

mai

ntai

n c

ont

ain

men

t int

egrit

y an

d o

ther

vita

l fun

ctio

ns a

t th

e r

equi

red

vo

ltage

.

Pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n b

us

Pro

vide

the

sour

ce o

f pow

er

to m

aint

ain

co

ntai

nm

ent

in

tegr

ity a

nd o

ther

vi

tal f

unc

tions

Los

s of

a b

us s

ect

ion

for

any

reas

on,

suc

h a

s fa

ults

, m

aint

enan

ce o

uta

ge,

etc.

The

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g s

tatio

n is

co

nstr

uct

ed u

sin

g a

“bre

aker

and

a h

alf”

sch

em

e, s

uch

th

at,

unde

r no

rma

l con

ditio

ns, i

n th

e e

vent

of t

he o

utag

e o

f an

y ci

rcui

t con

nec

ted

to

the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g s

tatio

n, th

e pl

ant s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n w

ill h

ave

su

ffici

ent c

apa

city

to

supp

ly th

e re

quire

d p

ower

to C

PN

PP

Uni

ts 3

an

d 4

to m

ain

tain

con

tain

men

t in

tegr

ity

and

oth

er v

ital f

unc

tions

at t

he r

equ

ired

volta

ge.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, a

faul

t on

a ci

rcui

t con

nect

ed to

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

is c

lear

ed b

y th

e op

eni

ng o

f tw

o br

eake

rs w

ith n

o m

ater

ial a

ffect

on

any

othe

r ci

rcui

t co

nnec

ted

to th

e pl

ant s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ondi

tions

, eith

er

bus

in th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n is

ca

pabl

e of

bei

ng

isol

ated

with

out m

ater

ially

affe

ctin

g th

e ot

her

bus

or th

e op

era

tion

of th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n.

Tab

le8.

2-20

3 (S

hee

t 2

of

6)

Fai

lure

Mo

des

& E

ffec

ts A

nal

ysis

fo

r O

ffsi

te P

ow

er S

ou

rces

Co

mp

on

ent

Fu

nct

ion

Fai

lure

Mo

de

Eff

ect

on

Saf

ety

Rel

ated

Fu

nct

ion

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

19

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

plic

atio

nP

art

2, F

SA

R

The

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n is

equ

ippe

d w

ith tw

o in

dep

end

ent b

atte

ry s

yste

ms.

Eac

h ba

ttery

sys

tem

is c

onne

cted

to a

sep

ara

te b

atte

ry c

harg

er.

The

rat

ing

of e

ach

bu

s in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n m

eets

or

exce

eds

the

ma

xim

um

calc

ula

ted

cu

rre

nt d

urin

g al

l exp

ecte

d op

erat

ing

con

ditio

ns.

The

mom

enta

ry r

atin

g of

eac

h bu

s in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g s

tatio

n m

eets

or

exc

eed

s th

e m

axim

um

cal

cula

ted

faul

t cur

rent

und

er

all

expe

cted

op

erat

ing

co

nditi

ons

.

The

vo

ltage

ra

tings

of e

ach

bus

and

all

insu

lato

rs in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

mee

ts

or

exce

eds

the

ma

xim

um e

xpec

ted

ope

ratin

g vo

ltage

of t

he p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, d

ue

to th

e us

e of

a “

bre

aker

and

a h

alf s

chem

e”, i

n th

e e

vent

of f

ailu

re o

f eith

er p

lan

t sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n b

us, t

he p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n w

ill

hav

e su

ffici

ent c

apac

ity to

su

pply

the

requ

ired

pow

er to

CP

NP

P U

nits

3 a

nd 4

to

mai

ntai

n co

ntai

nmen

t int

egrit

y an

d ot

her

vita

l fun

ctio

ns

at th

e re

quire

d vo

ltage

.

345

kV c

ircui

t b

reak

ers

in th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng

stat

ion

Fa

ult c

lear

ing

an

d sw

itchi

ng o

f eq

uip

men

t

Fai

lure

of t

he

brea

ker

due

to o

verlo

ad,

e

xce

ssiv

e fa

ult

curr

ent,

inte

rnal

, or

ext

ern

al e

lect

rical

fa

ilure

.

All

345

kV

bre

aker

s in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

are

equ

ippe

d w

ith d

ual t

rip c

oils

.

The

con

tinuo

us

curr

ent r

atin

g o

f th

e br

eake

rs in

the

plan

t sw

itch

ing

stat

ion

mee

ts o

r e

xce

eds

the

ma

xim

um c

alc

ula

ted

curr

ent

dur

ing

an

y si

ngl

e c

ontin

gen

cy o

per

atin

g

cond

ition

.

The

inte

rrup

ting

rat

ing

of t

he b

reak

ers

in th

e p

lan

t sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n m

eets

or

exc

eed

s th

e m

axim

um

cal

cula

ted

faul

t cur

rent

und

er

all

expe

cted

op

erat

ing

co

nditi

ons

.

The

vol

tag

e ra

ting

of th

e br

eake

rs in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n m

eets

or

exce

eds

the

m

axim

um

cal

cula

ted

oper

atin

g v

olta

ge o

f the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g s

tatio

n.

Tab

le8.

2-20

3 (S

hee

t 3

of

6)

Fai

lure

Mo

des

& E

ffec

ts A

nal

ysis

fo

r O

ffsi

te P

ow

er S

ou

rces

Co

mp

on

ent

Fu

nct

ion

Fai

lure

Mo

de

Eff

ect

on

Saf

ety

Rel

ated

Fu

nct

ion

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

20

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

plic

atio

nP

art

2, F

SA

R

The

rel

ayin

g fo

r e

ach

circ

uit c

onn

ect

ed to

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

is e

qui

ppe

d w

ith

bre

aker

failu

re p

rote

ctio

n. T

he o

per

atio

n o

f bre

ake

r fa

ilure

pro

tect

ion

trip

s al

l b

reak

ers

adja

cent

to th

e fa

iled

brea

ker

nece

ssar

y to

isol

ate

the

faile

d br

eak

er a

nd

oth

er fa

ulte

d eq

uip

men

t. U

nder

no

rmal

co

nditi

ons

, in

the

eve

nt o

f th

e op

era

tion

of

bre

aker

failu

re p

rote

ctio

n, th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng

sta

tion

will

hav

e su

ffici

ent

cap

acity

to

supp

ly th

e re

quire

d p

ower

to C

PN

PP

Uni

ts 3

an

d 4

to m

ain

tain

con

tain

men

t in

tegr

ity

and

oth

er v

ital f

unc

tions

at t

he r

equ

ired

volta

ge.

The

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n is

des

igne

d s

uch

tha

t a s

tuck

bre

ake

r, sl

ow b

reak

er, o

r re

lay

failu

re w

ill n

ot a

dver

sely

affe

ct m

ore

tha

n tw

o tr

ansm

issi

on

circ

uits

. Bec

ause

th

e p

lant

sw

itch

ing

sta

tion

is d

esig

ned

su

ch th

at t

he n

orm

al a

nd

alte

rna

te p

refe

rre

d p

ower

sup

ply

circ

uits

ass

ocia

ted

with

the

sam

e ge

ner

atin

g u

nit w

ill n

ot b

e co

nne

cted

in

the

sa

me

bay

in th

e p

lan

t sw

itchi

ng

stat

ion

, un

der

norm

al c

ondi

tion

s, in

the

even

t o

f the

loss

of t

wo

tran

smis

sion

circ

uits

con

nect

ed in

the

sam

e ba

y, th

e pl

ant

sw

itchi

ng

stat

ion

has

su

ffici

ent c

apa

city

to s

upp

ly th

e r

equ

ired

pow

er to

CP

NP

P U

nits

3 a

nd

4

to m

ain

tain

co

ntai

nmen

t in

tegr

ity a

nd

othe

r vi

tal f

unct

ions

at t

he r

equi

red

vol

tag

e.

Ea

ch b

reak

er in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

is e

quip

ped

with

a d

isco

nnec

t sw

itch

on

eac

h si

de o

f th

e br

eake

r to

allo

w th

e b

reak

er to

be

isol

ate

d fr

om th

e re

st o

f the

pla

nt

switc

hin

g st

atio

n eq

uip

men

t.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, d

ue

to th

e us

e of

a “

bre

aker

and

a h

alf”

sch

em

e a

nd th

e p

rovi

sion

of a

nor

mal

and

alte

rna

te p

refe

rre

d po

we

r su

ppl

y ci

rcui

t to

CP

NP

P U

nits

3

and

4, i

n th

e e

vent

of f

ailu

re o

f any

one

bre

ake

r in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

, th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n h

as s

uffic

ien

t cap

acity

to s

upp

ly th

e r

equi

red

pow

er to

CP

NP

P

Uni

ts 3

an

d 4

to m

ain

tain

con

tain

me

nt in

tegr

ity a

nd o

ther

vita

l fu

nctio

ns a

t the

re

quire

d vo

ltage

.

Tab

le8.

2-20

3 (S

hee

t 4

of

6)

Fai

lure

Mo

des

& E

ffec

ts A

nal

ysis

fo

r O

ffsi

te P

ow

er S

ou

rces

Co

mp

on

ent

Fu

nct

ion

Fai

lure

Mo

de

Eff

ect

on

Saf

ety

Rel

ated

Fu

nct

ion

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

21

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

plic

atio

nP

art

2, F

SA

R

345

kV

dis

conn

ect

switc

hes

in th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng

stat

ion

Iso

latio

n o

f eq

uip

men

tF

ailu

re o

f the

d

isco

nnec

t du

e to

o

verlo

adi

ng, f

aults

, ov

er s

tres

s, e

tc.

The

rat

ing

of t

he 3

45 k

V d

isco

nne

ct s

witc

hes

in th

e p

lan

t sw

itchi

ng

stat

ion

mee

ts o

r e

xce

eds

the

ma

xim

um c

alc

ula

ted

curr

ent

dur

ing

all

expe

cted

op

erat

ing

con

ditio

ns.

The

mom

enta

ry r

atin

g of

the

345

kV d

isco

nnec

t sw

itche

s in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g

stat

ion

mee

ts o

r e

xcee

ds th

e m

axim

um c

alc

ula

ted

fau

lt cu

rre

nt u

nde

r al

l exp

ecte

d o

pera

ting

cond

itio

ns.

The

vol

tag

e ra

ting

of th

e 3

45 k

V d

isco

nne

ct s

witc

hes

in th

e pl

ant s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n m

eets

or

exce

eds

the

max

imum

cal

cula

ted

ope

ratin

g vo

ltage

of t

he p

lant

sw

itchi

ng

stat

ion.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, d

ue

to th

e us

e of

a “

bre

aker

and

a h

alf”

sch

em

e a

nd th

e p

rovi

sion

of a

nor

mal

and

alte

rna

te p

refe

rre

d po

we

r su

ppl

y ci

rcui

t to

CP

NP

P U

nits

3

and

4, i

n th

e e

vent

of f

ailu

re o

f any

one

345

kV

dis

con

nect

sw

itch

in th

e p

lant

sw

itch

ing

stat

ion

, the

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n w

ill h

ave

suffi

cien

t cap

aci

ty to

sup

ply

the

requ

ired

pow

er to

CP

NP

P U

nits

3 a

nd

4 to

mai

nta

in c

onta

inm

ent

inte

grity

an

d ot

her

vita

l fun

ctio

ns a

t the

req

uire

d vo

ltage

.

Rel

ay s

yste

ms

in

the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

st

atio

n

Det

ect f

aults

and

op

era

te th

e

app

ropr

iate

br

eake

rs to

cle

ar

thos

e fa

ults

.

Fai

lure

to o

pera

te

dur

ing

a fa

ult

cond

itio

n.

Ea

ch 3

45 k

V tr

ansm

issi

on

line

co

nnec

ted

to th

e pl

ant s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n, a

s w

ell a

s e

ach

345

kV

bus

sec

tion

in th

e p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n, a

re e

quip

ped

with

prim

ary

and

back

up p

rote

ctiv

e re

lay

sche

mes

.

The

pri

ma

ry a

nd

back

up p

rote

ctiv

e re

lays

at t

he p

lant

sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n ar

e fr

om

diff

eren

t ma

nufa

ctur

ers

or, i

f fro

m th

e s

ame

man

ufac

ture

r, ar

e of

diff

eren

t des

ign,

su

ch th

at,

unde

r no

rma

l con

ditio

ns, a

“co

mm

on m

ode

failu

re”

will

not

cau

se th

ese

p

rote

ctiv

e s

yste

ms

to e

xpe

rienc

e s

imul

tane

ous

outa

ges.

The

prim

ary

an

d ba

ckup

rel

ays

at t

he

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n ar

e su

pplie

d b

y cu

rren

t fr

om d

iffer

ent s

ourc

es, i

.e.,

sepa

rate

cur

rent

tra

nsfo

rme

rs.

The

prim

ary

and

back

up

rela

ys a

t the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

me

asur

e p

owe

r sy

stem

vo

ltage

usi

ng d

iffer

ent

sou

rces

, i.e

. se

para

te c

oupl

ing

capa

cito

r vo

ltage

tran

sfor

mer

s (C

CV

Ts),

or

CC

VTs

with

sep

ara

te s

eco

nda

ry w

indi

ngs,

etc

.

Tab

le8.

2-20

3 (S

hee

t 5

of

6)

Fai

lure

Mo

des

& E

ffec

ts A

nal

ysis

fo

r O

ffsi

te P

ow

er S

ou

rces

Co

mp

on

ent

Fu

nct

ion

Fai

lure

Mo

de

Eff

ect

on

Saf

ety

Rel

ated

Fu

nct

ion

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

22

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

plic

atio

nP

art

2, F

SA

R

The

prim

ary

an

d ba

ckup

rel

ays

at t

he

pla

nt s

witc

hin

g st

atio

n ar

e su

pplie

d d

c po

wer

fr

om d

iffer

ent b

atte

ry s

yste

ms.

Th

ese

dc s

yste

ms

are

com

ple

tely

inde

pen

den

t fro

m

eac

h ot

her,

exce

pt th

at th

e ba

ttery

cha

rger

s a

re s

upp

lied

from

the

sam

e ac

sou

rce

with

a tr

ansf

er s

chem

e to

an

alte

rna

te a

c su

pply

if th

e no

rmal

su

pply

is in

terr

upte

d.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, t

he fa

ilure

of o

ne

dc

syst

em a

t the

pla

nt s

witc

hing

sta

tion

will

no

t affe

ct th

e ot

her.

The

prim

ary

an

d ba

ckup

rel

ayin

g s

che

me

s w

ill b

e in

depe

nde

ntly

pow

ered

from

se

para

te d

c sy

stem

s an

d op

erat

e se

para

tely

fuse

d a

nd in

dep

ende

nt t

rip c

oil

circ

uits

.

Tw

o in

depe

nden

t bre

aker

failu

re s

chem

es w

ill p

rovi

de e

ach

isol

ate

d co

nta

cts

tha

t will

re

-trip

ea

ch s

epar

ate

fuse

d a

nd

ind

epen

den

t trip

coi

l of t

he

asso

ciat

ed c

ircu

it br

eak

er.

Fai

lure

of a

circ

uit

bre

aker

trip

circ

uit w

ill n

ot a

ffect

the

oper

atio

n of

eith

er b

reak

er

failu

re s

chem

e or

the

ope

ratio

n of

the

oth

er

trip

circ

uit.

The

inte

nt o

f th

e de

sig

n of

the

prim

ary

and

bac

k u

p sy

stem

s at

the

plan

t sw

itch

ing

stat

ion

is to

ma

inta

in th

e av

aila

bili

ty o

f at l

east

one

pro

tect

ive

rel

ay s

yste

m.

Und

er n

orm

al c

ond

itio

ns, i

n th

e ev

ent

of f

ailu

re o

f eith

er

a pr

imar

y or

bac

kup

rel

ay

syst

em in

the

plan

t sw

itchi

ng s

tatio

n, th

e pl

ant s

witc

hing

sta

tion

will

hav

e su

ffici

ent

capa

city

to s

upp

ly th

e r

equ

ired

pow

er to

CP

NP

P U

nits

3 a

nd

4 to

mai

nta

in

cont

ain

men

t int

egrit

y an

d o

ther

vita

l fun

ctio

ns a

t the

req

uire

d vo

ltag

e.

Tab

le8.

2-20

3 (S

hee

t 6

of

6)

Fai

lure

Mo

des

& E

ffec

ts A

nal

ysis

fo

r O

ffsi

te P

ow

er S

ou

rces

Co

mp

on

ent

Fu

nct

ion

Fai

lure

Mo

de

Eff

ect

on

Saf

ety

Rel

ated

Fu

nct

ion

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

23

Sec

uri

ty-R

elat

ed In

form

atio

n –

Wit

hh

eld

Un

der

10

CF

R 2

.390

(d)(

1)

(SR

I)

Fig

ure

8.2-

201

Rel

evan

t P

ort

ion

s o

f O

nco

r Tr

ansm

issi

on

Sys

tem

Co

nfi

gu

rati

on

C

P C

OL

8.2(

1)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

24

Fig

ure

8.2-

202

CP

NP

P U

nit

s 3

& 4

Off

site

Po

wer

Sys

tem

Key

On

e L

ine

Dia

gra

m

UA

T1

UA

T2

UA

T3

UA

T4

GE

N 3

GLB

S

RA

T4

RA

T2

RA

T3

RA

T1

26kV

Iso-P

hase B

us

26

kV

Iso-

Phase B

us

MT

MT

To

Whitney

To

Johnson S

W

To

DeC

ord

ova

To

Park

er

EW

CP

NP

P 3

& 4

Sw

itch

ing

Sta

tion

UA

T1

UA

T2

UA

T3

UA

T4

GE

N 4

GLB

S

RA

T4

RA

T2

RA

T3

RA

T1

Un

it 3

Un

it S

witc

hya

rd/T

ran

sfo

rme

r Y

ard

Un

it 4

Un

it S

witc

hya

rd/T

ran

sfo

rme

r Y

ard

MT

-CB

MT

-CB

RA

T-C

B1

RA

T-

CB

2R

AT

-C

B2

RA

T-

CB

1

Alte

rna

te P

PS

Alte

rna

te P

PS

No

rma

l PP

S

No

rma

l PP

S

Futu

re

Futu

re

Futu

re

Futu

re

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

4)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(5)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

25

Fig

ure

8.2-

203

No

rmal

PP

S U

nit

Sw

itch

yard

On

e L

ine

Dia

gra

m

Dra

win

g Le

gend

CB

-Circ

uit B

reak

erC

omm

-C

omm

unic

atio

nD

S -

Dis

conn

ect S

witc

hFO

-Fi

ber-O

ptic

GIB

-G

as-In

sula

ted

Bus

GIS

-G

as-In

sula

ted

Switc

hgea

rG

S -G

roun

d Sw

itch

M -

Mot

or O

pera

tor

O/H

-O

verh

ead

PPS

-Pr

efer

red

Pow

er S

uppl

yR

AT

-Res

erve

Aux

iliary

Tra

nsfo

rmer

SA

-Sur

ge A

rrest

erV

T -V

olta

ge T

rans

form

erX

fmr -

Tran

sfor

mer

Fibe

r-Opt

icC

omm

Circ

uits

To C

PN

NP

3 &

434

5kV

Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n

GIB

-to-A

ir Te

rmin

atio

n

SA

M~G

S

GS

GIB

DS

Gas

-Insu

late

d S

witc

hgea

r (G

IS)

O/H

Tie

Lin

e

RA

T-C

B1

2000

A63

kAC

B

MMD

S

DS

MD

SM

DS

GS

GS

GSM

M

M

GS M

GS M

GSM

GSM

GSM

M

M

VT

GIB

GIB

SASA

~FO

Cab

les

~

GIB

-to-X

fmr

Term

inat

ion

RA

T-C

B2

2000

A63

kAC

B

MD

SM

DS

GS

GS

GS

DS

M

GS

MD

S

GSM

M

M

GS M

GSM

GSM

M

M

M

M

VT

M

M

VT

GIB

GIB

SASA

RAT

334

5-6.

9kV

53 M

VA

RAT

134

5-13

.8kV

72M

VA

RAT

434

5-6.

9kV

53 M

VA

RAT

234

5-13

.8kV

72M

VA

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

4)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(7)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

26

Fig

ure

8.2-

204

Alt

ern

ate

PP

S U

nit

Sw

itch

yard

On

e L

ine

Dia

gra

m

GLB

S

UA

T1U

AT2

UA

T3U

AT4

26-1

3.8k

V72

MV

A26

-13.

8kV

72M

VA

26kV

, 60H

z19

00M

VA

26-3

45kV

, 183

0 M

VA(3

Sin

gle-

Phas

e +

Spar

e@

610

MVA

Eac

h)

26-6

.9kV

53 M

VA26

-6.9

kV53

MV

A

Fibe

r-O

ptic

Com

m C

ircui

ts

To C

PN

NP

3 &

434

5kV

Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

nO

/H T

ie L

ine Gas

-Insu

late

d S

witc

hgea

r (G

IS)

SA

M~G

S

GS

GIB

-to-X

fmr

Term

inat

ion

SA

Dra

win

g Le

gend

CB

-Circ

uit B

reak

erC

omm

-C

omm

unic

atio

nD

L -D

isco

nnec

t Lin

kD

S -D

isco

nnec

t Sw

itch

FO -

Fibe

r-Opt

icG

IB -

Gas

-Insu

late

d Bu

sG

IS -

Gas

-Insu

late

d Sw

itchg

ear

GLB

S -G

ener

ator

Loa

d-Br

eak

Sw

GS

-Gro

und

Switc

hM

-M

otor

Ope

rato

rM

T -M

ain

Tran

sfor

mer

O/H

-O

verh

ead

PPS

-Pre

ferre

d P

ower

Sup

ply

SA -

Surg

e Ar

rest

erU

AT -

Uni

t Aux

iliary

Tra

nsfo

rmer

U/G

-U

nder

grou

ndVT

-Vo

ltage

Tra

nsfo

rmer

Xfm

r -Tr

ansf

orm

er

DS

DL

DL

DL

DL

GE

N

~FO

Cab

les

~G

IB-to

-Air

Term

inat

ion

MT-

CB

4000

A63

kAC

B

DS

DS

GS

GS

GS

M

M

VT

M

VT

M

M

M

M

MM

GSM

GIB

GIB

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

5)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(7)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

27

Fig

ure

8.2-

205

Pla

nt

Sw

itch

ing

Sta

tio

n O

ne

Lin

e D

iag

ram

(S

hee

t 1

of

2)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

28

Fig

ure

8.2-

205

Pla

nt

Sw

itch

ing

Sta

tio

n O

ne

Lin

e D

iag

ram

(S

hee

t 2

of

2)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

29

Sec

uri

ty-R

elat

ed In

form

atio

n –

Wit

hh

eld

Un

der

10

CF

R 2

.390

(d)(

1)

(SR

I)

Fig

ure

8.2-

206

Pla

nt

Sw

itch

ing

Sta

tio

n L

ayo

ut

(Sh

eet

1 o

f 2)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

30

Sec

uri

ty-R

elat

ed In

form

atio

n –

Wit

hh

eld

Un

der

10

CF

R 2

.390

(d)(

1)

(SR

I)

Fig

ure

8.2-

206

Pla

nt

Sw

itch

ing

Sta

tio

n L

ayo

ut

(Sh

eet

2 o

f 2)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

31

Fig

ure

8.2-

207

Un

it 3

Un

it S

wit

chya

rd L

ayo

ut

Tu

rbin

e B

uild

ing

Un

it 3

345

kVG

IS B

ldg

for

RA

Ts

Lege

ndC

C -

Con

trol

Cub

icle

DS

-D

isco

nnec

t S

witc

hE

X -

Exc

itatio

n T

rans

form

erF

R -

Fire

-Rat

edG

IB -

Gas

-Ins

ulat

ed B

usG

IS -

Gas

-Ins

ulat

ed S

witc

hgea

rM

T -

Mai

n T

rans

form

erN

GR

-N

eutr

al G

roun

ding

Res

isto

rP

PS

-P

refe

rred

Pow

er S

uppl

yR

AT

-R

eser

ve A

uxili

ary

Tra

nsfo

rmer

SA

-S

urge

Arr

este

rT

/B -

Tur

bine

Bui

ldin

gU

AT

-U

nit

Aux

iliar

y T

rans

form

er

Nor

mal

PP

SA

ltern

ate

PP

S

Roa

d

Roa

d

Road

Roa

d

Fen

ced

Are

a44

0.5

ft x

100

ft

80 f

t x 4

5 ft

Tak

eoff

Tow

er

SA

Fen

ced

Are

a15

5 ft

x 12

5 ft

Fen

ce

Fen

ce

Fence

Pip

e B

ridge

~~

3-H

r F

R W

all

3-H

r F

R W

all

Pla

nt

Nor

th

Not

e -

Fire

-rat

ed w

alls

bet

wee

n tr

ansf

orm

ers

and

stru

ctur

es a

nd b

etw

een

the

tran

sfor

mer

s ar

e in

acc

orda

nce

with

Reg

Gui

de 1

.189

and

N

FP

A 8

04.

Pro

visi

ons

for

drai

nage

and

oil

-sp

ill c

onta

inm

ent

are

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FP

A

804

and

IEE

E 9

80.

RA

T 3

RA

T 1

RA

T 4

RA

T 2

Roa

d

3-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

3-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

3-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

3-Hr FR Wall

Fen

ce

SA

SA

SA

H-F

ram

e T

ower

DS

DS

DS

GIB

-to

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Ter

min

atio

n

GIB

(ty

p)

GIB (typ)

1-H

rF

RW

all

Fence

Fen

ce

Fence

Fen

ceF

ence

DS

DS

DS

SA

SA

~ ~

GIB

(ty

p)

GIB

-to-

Air

Ter

min

atio

n

345

kVG

IS B

ldg

for

MT

's

NGR

NGR

NGR

NGR

CC

CC

CC

CC

Ph

AP

h B

Ph

CP

h A

Ph

BP

h C

AB

CA

BC A

BC

AB

C

UA

T

4U

AT

3

UA

T

2U

AT

1

EX

1-H

r W

all

1-H

r W

all

1-H

r W

all

1-H

r W

all

1-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

1-Hr FR Wall

NGR

NGR

NGR

CC

CC

CC

NGR

CC

3-H

r F

R W

all

GIB (typ)

Spa

reM

TM

T-B

MT-

AM

T-C

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

CC

UA

T R

emov

al P

ath

3-H

r W

all

UAT and EX

Removal Path

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

4)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(5)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

32

Fig

ure

8.2-

208

Un

it 4

Un

it S

wit

chya

rd L

ayo

ut

*:A

spa

re m

ain

trans

form

er is

inst

alle

d as

sha

red

by C

PN

PP

Uni

ts 3

and

4.

*

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

C

P C

OL

8.2(

4)

CP

CO

L 8.

2(5)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

33

Fig

ure

8.2-

209

Lo

gic

Dia

gra

m –

345

kV

Res

erve

Au

xilia

ry T

ran

sfo

rmer

Cir

cuit

Bre

aker

s

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

/ Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n P

rimar

y Li

ne P

rote

ctio

n

Res

erve

Aux

iliary

Tr

ansf

orm

er C

ircui

t B

reak

er 1

(RA

T_C

B1)

Clo

se

1O

pen

Res

erve

Aux

iliary

Tr

ansf

orm

er 1

,3 P

rote

ctio

n

Res

erve

Aux

iliary

Tr

ansf

orm

er C

ircui

t B

reak

er 2

(RA

T_C

B2)

Clo

se

1O

pen

RA

T_C

B1�

Ope

n

Res

erve

Aux

iliar

y Tr

ansf

orm

er 1

,3

Lock

out R

elay

(A)

Res

erve

Aux

iliar

y Tr

ansf

orm

er 1

,3

Lock

out R

elay

(B)

NO

T

OR

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

/ Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n B

uck-

Up

Line

Pro

tect

ion

RA

T_C

B1�

Clo

se

Syn

chro

niza

tion

Che

ck

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

Prim

ary

Bus

P

rote

ctio

n

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

Bac

k-U

p B

us

Pro

tect

ion

Res

erve

Aux

iliary

Tr

ansf

orm

er 2

,4 P

rote

ctio

n

RA

T_C

B2�

Ope

n

Res

erve

Aux

iliar

y Tr

ansf

orm

er 2

,4

Lock

out R

elay

(A)

Res

erve

Aux

iliar

y Tr

ansf

orm

er 2

,4

Lock

out R

elay

(B)

RA

T_C

B2�

Clo

se

Syn

chro

niza

tion

Che

ck

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

Prim

ary

Bus

P

rote

ctio

n

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

Bac

k-U

p B

us

Pro

tect

ion

AN

D

2 2

CP

CO

L 8.

2(7)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.2-

34

Fig

ure

8.2-

210

Lo

gic

Dia

gra

m –

345

kV

Mai

n T

ran

sfo

rmer

Cir

cuit

Bre

aker

Mai

n Tr

ansf

orm

er

Circ

uit B

reak

er

(MT_

CB)

Clo

se

1O

pen

Mai

n Tr

ansf

orm

er P

rote

ctio

n

Turb

ine

Gen

erat

or E

lect

rical

P

rote

ctio

n

Uni

t Aux

iliary

Tra

nsfo

rmer

P

rote

ctio

n

Mai

n Tr

ansf

orm

er S

yste

m

Lock

out R

elay

(A)

Mai

n Tr

ansf

orm

er S

yste

m

Lock

out R

elay

(B)

NO

T

OR

AN

D

Uni

t SW

YD

/Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n P

rimar

y Li

ne P

rote

ctio

n

Uni

t Sw

itchy

ard

/ Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n B

uck-

Up

Line

Pro

tect

ion

MT_

CB

�C

lose

MT_

CB

�O

pen

Syn

chro

niza

tion

Che

ck

Uni

t Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n P

rimar

y B

us

Pro

tect

ion

Uni

t Sw

itchi

ng S

tatio

n B

ack-

Up

Bus

P

rote

ctio

n

2

CP

CO

L 8.

2(7)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.3-1

8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS


8.3.1.1 Description

Replace the first sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1 with the following.

The onsite ac power system is supplied offsite power from the 345 kV transmission system by two independent connections to the transmission system.

Replace the seventh sentence of the second paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1 with the following.

The rated voltage of the high-voltage winding of the RAT is 345 kV.

8.3.1.1.9 Design Criteria for Class 1E Equipment

Replace the last sentence of the ninth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1.9 with the following.

Short circuit analysis for ac power system is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.2.

8.3.1.1.11 Grounding and Lightning Protection System

Replace the last paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.1.11 with the following.

The ground grid is designed in the shape of uniform square or rectangular meshes as shown in Figure 8.3.1-201. The layout of the air terminals is shown in Figure 8.3.1-201.

CP COL 8.3(1)

CP COL 8.3(1)

STD COL 8.3(3)

CP COL 8.3(2)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.3-2

8.3.1.3.2 Short Circuit Studies

Replace the last two sentences of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.3.2 with the following.

As a result of the studies, maximum short circuit current has been confirmed to satisfy short circuit interrupt rating of circuit breakers indicated in Table 8.3.1-1R.

8.3.1.3.4 Equipment Protection and Coordination Studies

Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.3.4 with the following.

Coordination of protective devices is confirmed as part of equipment procurement.

8.3.1.3.5 Insulation Coordination (Surge and Lightning Protection)

Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.1.3.5 with the following.

Surge arresters are selected to be compatible with lightning impulse insulation level of the 345 kV offsite power circuit so that the insulation of onsite power system is assured from lightning surge.

8.3.2.1.1 Class 1E DC Power System

Replace the last sentence of the third paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.2.1.1 with the following.

Short circuit analysis for dc power system is addressed in Subsection 8.3.2.3.2.

STD COL 8.3(3)

STD COL 8.3(10)

CP COL 8.3(11)

STD COL 8.3(8)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.3-3

8.3.2.1.2 Non-Class 1E DC Power System

Replace the last sentence of the fourth paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.2.1.2 with the following.

Short circuit analysis for dc power system is addressed in Subsection 8.3.2.3.2.

8.3.2.3.2 Short Circuit Studies

Replace the last two sentences of the first paragraph in DCD Subsection 8.3.2.3.2 with the following.

As a result of the studies, maximum short circuit current has been confirmed to satisfy short circuit interrupt rating of circuit breakers indicated in Table 8.3.2-3.

8.3.4 Combined License Information

Replace the content of DCD Subsection 8.3.4 with the following.

8.3(1) Transmission voltages

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.1 and in Table 8.3.1-1R.

8.3(2) Ground grid and lightning Protection

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.1.11 and in Figure 8.3.1-201.

8.3(3) Short Circuit analysis for ac power system

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.3.1.1.9 and 8.3.1.3.2.





8.3(8) Short circuit analysis for dc power system

STD COL 8.3(8)

STD COL 8.3(8)

CP COL 8.3(1)

CP COL 8.3(2)

STD COL 8.3(3)

STD COL 8.3(8)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.3-4

This COL Item is addressed in Subsections 8.3.2.1.1, 8.3.2.1.2 and 8.3.2.3.2.


8.3(10) Equipment Protection and Coordination Studies

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.4.

8.3(11) Insulation Coordination (Surge and Lightning Protection)

This COL Item is addressed in Subsection 8.3.1.3.5.

8.3(12) Cable monitoring program

This COL item is addressed in Subsection 8.2.3.

STD COL 8.3(10)

CP COL 8.3(11)

CP COL 8.3(12)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.3-5

Table 8.3.1-1R

Electrical Equipment Ratings - Component Data Main AC Power System (Nominal Values)

1. Main Transformer (MT)

Quantity Three single phase units(Besides one spare for the site)

MVA rating 1 phase 610MVA (3 phase 1830MVA)

Low voltage winding 26kV

High voltage winding 345kV

2. Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs) UAT1, 2 UAT3, 4

Quantity Two 3 phase, 2 winding units

Two 3 phase, 2 winding units

MVA rating 72MVA 53MVA

Low voltage winding 13.8kV 6.9kV

High voltage winding 26kV 26kV

On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC)

Provided on high voltage side


3. Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATs) RAT1, 2 RAT3, 4

Quantity Two 3 phase, 3 winding units (including delta tertiary winding)

Two 3 phase, 3 winding units(including delta tertiary winding)

MVA rating 72MVA 53MVA

Low voltage winding 13.8kV 6.9kV

High voltage winding 345kV 345kV

On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC)



4. Generator Load Break Switch (GLBS)

Rated Voltage Over 28kV

Rated Current Over 44.4kA

Rated Frequency 60Hz

CP SUP 8.3(1)

CP COL 8.3(1)

CP COL 8.3(1)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

6

Tab

le8.

3.1-

4R (

Sh

eet

1 o

f 4)

Ele

ctri

cal L

oad

Dis

trib

uti

on

- C

lass

1E

GT

G L

oad

ing

A C

lass

1E

GT

G

Load

Qua

ntity

In

stal

led

Ra

ted

Out

put

[kW

]

Load

In

put

[kW

]

Effi

cien

cy

[%]

Po

we

r F

acto

r

[%]

Loa

d F

acto

r

[%]

LOC

A C

onc

urre

nt w

ith a

LO

OP

LOO

P

Hot

Shu

tdow

nC

old

Shu

tdow

n

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

A S

afet

y In

ject

ion

Pum

p1

900

950

908

595

195

058

911

180

--

-0

--

-

A C

omp

onen

t Coo

ling

Wat

er P

ump

161

064

490

85

951

644

400

758

164

440

075

81

644

400

758

A E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ater

Pum

p1

650

686

908

595

168

642

780

81

686

427

808

168

642

780

8

A C

onta

inm

ent

Spr

ay/R

esid

ual H

eat R

emov

al P

ump

140

042

290

85

951

422

263

497

0-

--

142

226

349

7

A C

harg

ing

Pum

p1

820

866

908

595

0-

--

186

653

710

191

866

537

1019

A C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Ha

ndlin

g U

nit F

an1

8089

858

095

189

6811

21

8968

112

189

6811

2

A E

ssen

tial C

hille

r U

nit

129

032

485

80

951

324

243

405

132

424

340

51

324

243

405

A S

pent

Fue

l Pit

Pum

p1

230

257

858

095

0-

--

1(2

57)

(19

3)(3

22)

1(2

57)

(193

)(3

22)

A C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Ha

ndlin

g U

nit E

lect

rica

l Hea

ter

125

025

010

010

010

00

--

-0

--

-0

--

-

A P

ress

uriz

er H

eate

r (B

ack-

up)

156

256

210

010

010

00

--

-1

562

056

20

--

-

A E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ater

Pum

p C

oolin

g T

ower

Fan

215

016

885

80

952

336

252

420

233

625

242

02

336

252

420

Mot

or C

ontr

ol C

ente

rs (

A&

A1)

22

320

199

377

227

016

831

82

270

168

318

Tota

l37

7124

4144

9537

7720

9544

0236

3723

5843

37

(

):T

his

load

is s

tart

ed b

y m

anua

lly if

GT

G h

as n

eces

sary

mar

gin

afte

r co

mpl

etin

g a

utom

atic

load

seq

uenc

e.

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(6)

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(20)

ST

D C

OL

9.2(

20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

7

Tab

le 8

.3.1

-4R

(S

hee

t 2

of

4)

Ele

ctri

cal L

oad

Dis

trib

uti

on

- C

lass

1E

GT

G L

oad

ing

B C

lass

1E

GT

G

Load

Qua

ntity

In

stal

led

Ra

ted

Out

put

[kW

]

Load

In

put

[kW

]

Effi

cien

cy

[%]

Po

we

r F

acto

r

[%]

Loa

d F

acto

r

[%]

LOC

A C

onc

urre

nt w

ith a

LO

OP

LOO

P

Hot

Shu

tdow

nC

old

Shu

tdow

n

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qu

an

tity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

B S

afet

y In

ject

ion

Pum

p1

900

950

908

595

195

058

911

180

--

-0

--

-

B C

omp

onen

t Coo

ling

Wat

er P

ump

161

064

490

85

951

644

400

758

164

440

075

81

644

400

758

B E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ater

Pum

p1

650

686

908

595

168

642

780

81

686

427

808

168

642

780

8

B C

onta

inm

ent

Spr

ay/R

esid

ual H

eat R

emov

al P

ump

140

042

290

85

951

422

263

497

0-

--

142

226

349

7

B E

mer

gen

cy F

eed

Wat

er P

ump

159

047

590

85

731

475

295

559

147

529

555

90

--

-

B C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Ha

ndlin

g U

nit F

an1

8089

858

095

189

6811

21

8968

112

189

6811

2

B E

ssen

tial C

hille

r U

nit

129

032

485

80

951

324

243

405

132

424

340

51

324

243

405

A S

pent

Fue

l Pit

Pum

p1

230

257

858

095

0-

--

1(2

57)

(19

3)(3

22)

1(2

57)

(193

)(3

22)

B C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Ha

ndlin

g U

nit E

lect

rica

l Hea

ter

125

025

010

010

010

00

--

-0

--

-0

--

-

B P

ress

uriz

er H

eate

r (B

ack-

up)

156

256

210

010

010

00

--

-1

562

056

20

--

-

B E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ater

Pum

p C

oolin

g T

ower

Fan

215

016

885

80

952

336

252

420

233

625

242

02

336

252

420

Mot

or C

ontr

ol C

ente

rs (

B&

A1)

22

320

199

377

227

016

831

82

270

168

318

Tota

l42

4627

3650

5433

8618

5339

4227

7118

2133

18

(

): T

his

load

is s

tart

ed b

y m

anua

lly if

GT

G h

as n

eces

sary

mar

gin

afte

r co

mpl

etin

g a

utom

atic

load

seq

uenc

e.

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(6)

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(20)

ST

D C

OL

9.2(

20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

8

Tab

le 8

.3.1

-4R

(S

hee

t 3

of

4)

Ele

ctri

cal L

oad

Dis

trib

uti

on

- C

lass

1E

GT

G L

oad

ing

C C

lass

1E

GT

G

Load

Qua

ntity

In

stal

led

Ra

ted

Out

put

[kW

]

Load

In

put

[kW

]

Effi

cien

cy

[%]

Po

we

r F

acto

r

[%]

Loa

d F

acto

r

[%]

LOC

A C

onc

urre

nt w

ith a

LO

OP

LOO

P

Hot

Shu

tdow

nC

old

Shu

tdow

n

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qu

an

tity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

C S

afe

ty In

ject

ion

Pu

mp

190

095

090

85

951

950

589

1118

0-

--

0-

--

C C

ompo

nent

Coo

ling

Wat

er P

ump

161

064

490

85

951

644

400

758

164

440

075

81

644

400

758

C E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ate

r P

ump

165

068

690

85

951

686

427

808

168

642

780

81

686

427

808

C C

onta

inm

ent S

pray

/Res

idu

al H

eat

Rem

oval

Pu

mp

140

042

290

85

951

422

263

497

0-

--

142

226

349

7

C E

mer

genc

y F

eed

Wat

er P

ump

159

047

590

85

731

475

295

559

147

529

555

90

--

-

C C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Han

dlin

g U

nit

Fan

180

8985

80

951

8968

112

189

6811

21

8968

112

C E

ssen

tial C

hille

r U

nit

129

032

485

80

951

324

243

405

132

424

340

51

324

243

405

B S

pent

Fue

l Pit

Pum

p1

230

257

858

095

0-

--

1(2

57)

(19

3)(3

22)

1(2

57)

(193

)(3

22)

C C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Han

dlin

g U

nit

Ele

ctric

al H

eate

r1

250

250

100

100

100

0-

--

0-

--

0-

--

C P

ress

uriz

er H

eat

er (

Ba

ck-u

p)1

562

562

100

100

100

0-

--

156

20

562

0-

--

C E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ate

r P

ump

Coo

ling

Tow

er F

an2

150

168

858

095

233

625

242

02

336

252

420

233

625

242

0

Mot

or C

ontr

ol C

ente

rs (

C&

D1)

22

320

199

377

227

016

831

82

270

168

318

Tota

l42

4627

3650

5433

8618

5339

4227

7118

2133

18

(

):T

his

load

is s

tart

ed b

y m

anua

lly if

GT

G h

as n

eces

sary

mar

gin

afte

r co

mpl

etin

g a

utom

atic

load

seq

uenc

e.

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(6)

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(20)

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

9

Tab

le8.

3.1-

4R (

Sh

eet

4 o

f 4)

Ele

ctri

cal L

oad

Dis

trib

uti

on

- C

lass

1E

GT

G L

oad

ing

D C

lass

1E

GT

G

Load

Qua

ntity

In

stal

led

Ra

ted

Out

put

[kW

]

Load

In

put

[kW

]

Effi

cien

cy

[%]

Po

we

r F

acto

r

[%]

Loa

d F

acto

r

[%]

LOC

A C

onc

urre

nt w

ith a

LO

OP

LOO

P

Hot

Shu

tdow

nC

old

Shu

tdow

n

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qua

ntity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

Qu

an

tity

[kW

][k

VA

R]

[kV

A]

D S

afe

ty In

ject

ion

Pu

mp

190

095

090

85

951

950

589

1118

0-

--

0-

--

D C

ompo

nent

Coo

ling

Wat

er P

ump

161

064

490

85

951

644

400

758

164

440

075

81

644

400

758

D E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ate

r P

ump

165

068

690

85

951

686

427

808

168

642

780

81

686

427

808

D C

onta

inm

ent S

pray

/Res

idu

al H

eat

Rem

oval

Pu

mp

140

042

290

85

951

422

263

497

0-

--

142

226

349

7

D C

harg

ing

Pum

p1

820

866

908

595

0-

--

186

653

710

191

866

537

1019

D C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Han

dlin

g U

nit

Fan

180

8985

80

951

8968

112

189

6811

21

8968

112

D E

ssen

tial C

hille

r U

nit

129

032

485

80

951

324

243

405

132

424

340

51

324

243

405

B S

pent

Fue

l Pit

Pum

p1

230

257

858

095

0-

--

1(2

57)

(19

3)(3

22)

1(2

57)

(193

)(3

22)

D C

lass

1E

Ele

ctric

al R

oom

Air

Han

dlin

g U

nit

Ele

ctric

al H

eate

r1

250

250

100

100

100

0-

--

0-

--

0-

--

D P

ress

uriz

er H

eat

er (

Ba

ck-u

p)1

562

562

100

100

100

0-

--

156

20

562

0-

--

D E

ssen

tial S

ervi

ce W

ate

r P

ump

Coo

ling

Tow

er F

an2

150

168

858

095

233

625

242

02

336

252

420

233

625

242

0

Mot

or C

ontr

ol C

ente

rs (

D&

D1)

22

320

199

377

227

016

831

82

270

168

318

Tota

l37

7124

4144

9537

7720

9544

0236

3723

5843

37

(

): T

his

load

is s

tart

ed b

y m

anua

lly if

GT

G h

as n

eces

sary

mar

gin

afte

r co

mpl

etin

g a

utom

atic

load

seq

uenc

e.

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(6)

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(20)

ST

D C

OL

9.2

(20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

10

Fig

ure

8.3.

1-1R

On

site

AC

Ele

ctri

cal D

istr

ibu

tio

n S

yste

m (

Sh

eet

1 o

f 7)

Mai

n O

ne

Lin

e D

iag

ram

C

P C

OL

8.2(

3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

11

Fig

ure

8.3.

1-1R

On

site

AC

Ele

ctri

cal D

istr

ibu

tio

n S

yste

m (

Sh

eet

5 o

f 7)

Cla

ss 1

E 4

80V

Bu

ses

A a

nd

B O

ne

Lin

e D

iag

ram

S

TD

CO

L 9.

2(20

)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

12

Fig

ure

8.3.

1-1R

On

site

AC

Ele

ctri

cal D

istr

ibu

tio

n S

yste

m (

Sh

eet

6 o

f 7)

Cla

ss 1

E 4

80V

Bu

ses

C a

nd

D O

ne

Lin

e D

iag

ram

S

TD

CO

L 9.

2(20

)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

13

Fig

ure

8.3.

1-2R

Lo

gic

Dia

gra

ms

(Sh

eet

2 o

f 24

)O

ne

Lin

e D

iag

ram

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

14

Fig

ure

8.3

.1-2

R L

og

ic D

iag

ram

s (S

hee

t 3

of

24)

No

n-C

lass

1E

13.

8kV

Inco

min

g C

ircu

it B

reak

er T

rip

pin

g a

nd

Clo

sin

g

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

15

Fig

ure

8.3

.1-2

R L

og

ic D

iag

ram

s (S

hee

t 4

of

24)

No

n-C

lass

1E

6.9

kV In

com

ing

Cir

cuit

Bre

aker

(N

3 &

N4

bu

ses)

Tri

pp

ing

an

d C

losi

ng

C

P C

OL

8.2(

3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

16

Fig

ure

8.3

.1-2

R L

og

ic D

iag

ram

s (S

hee

t 5

of

24)

No

n-C

lass

1E

6.9

kV I

nco

min

g C

ircu

it B

reak

er (

N5

& N

6 b

use

s) T

rip

pin

g a

nd

Clo

sin

g

CP

CO

L 8.

2(3)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

17

Fig

ure

8.3

.1-2

R L

og

ic D

iag

ram

s (S

hee

t 18

of

24)

Cla

ss 1

E T

rain

A L

OO

P a

nd

LO

CA

Lo

ad S

equ

enci

ng

ST

DC

OL

9.2(

20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

18

Fig

ure

8.3

.1-2

R L

og

ic D

iag

ram

s (S

hee

t 19

of

24)

Cla

ss 1

E T

rain

B L

OO

P a

nd

LO

CA

Lo

ad S

equ

enci

ng

ST

D C

OL

9.2(

20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

19

Fig

ure

8.3.

1-2R

Lo

gic

Dia

gra

ms

(Sh

eet

20 o

f 24

)C

lass

1E

Tra

in C

LO

OP

an

d L

OC

A L

oad

Seq

uen

cin

g

ST

D C

OL

9.2(

20)

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

20

Fig

ure

8.3

.1-2

R L

og

ic D

iag

ram

s (S

hee

t 21

of

24)

Cla

ss 1

E T

rain

D L

OO

P a

nd

LO

CA

Lo

ad S

equ

enci

ng

S

TD

CO

L 9.

2(20

Co

man

che

Pea

k N

ucl

ear

Po

wer

Pla

nt,

Un

its

3 &

4C

OL

Ap

pli

cati

on

Par

t 2,

FS

AR

Rev

isio

n 3

8.3-

21

Sec

uri

ty-R

elat

ed In

form

atio

n –

Wit

hh

eld

Un

der

10

CF

R 2

.390

(d)(

1)

(SR

I)

Fig

ure

8.3.

1-20

1 G

rou

nd

Gri

d a

nd

Lig

htn

ing

Pro

tect

ion

Sys

tem

CP

CO

L 8.

3(2)


Part 2, FSAR

Revision 38.4-1

8.4 STATION BLACKOUT


Add the following text after the ninth paragraph of DCD Subsection 8.4.2.2.

The procedures to cope with SBO are addressed in Section 13.5 and the training is addressed in Section 13.2. In particular, although not specifically referenced, SBO procedures are discussed in FSAR Subsection 13.5.2.1. This subsection addresses Operating and Emergency Operating Procedures as well as the Procedure Generation Package. The Station Blackout Response Guideline, the AC Power Restoration Guideline, and a Severe Weather Guideline are covered by the discussions in FSAR 13.5.2.1.

CP SUP 8.4(1)

col application part 2, fsar - nrc

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