cognitive aspects of the translation process

Language & Communication, Vol. 10. No. I. pp. 19-36. 1990. Printed in Great Britain.

0?71-5309190 53.00 + 0.00 Pergamon Press plc

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE TRANSLATION PROCESS

WOLFRAM WILSS

(Translated by Roger C. Norton)

Translation has become a very important instrument of international communication in recent years. As a consequence there has been an increased commitment to scientific research concerning it. In the last 30 years the science of translation, influenced in no small part by machine translation, has actively contributed to ‘building the tower of science’ (Karl Popper) and broadened considerably the spectrum of inquiry into language, culture, communication, and computer science. This does not mean to suggest that our century is the first to devote intensive thought to translation. Since antiquity translation has repeatedly been the object of theoretical, methodological and praxis-related reflection concerning its various aspects, whether theological, philosophical, aesthetic, anthropological, or psychological (Wilss, 1977, 1982).

If we trace the cognitionally motivating interests of the modern science of translation, we arrive at the following conclusions: The question is no longer one of justifying its own position in regard to methodology and practice, as was so often the case in the past. Its goal now is to clarify the principles, structures, and categories of the act of translation. In accordance with the general contemporary perception of the problems involved, the science of translation attempts to establish comprehensive interactional categories and to develop a verifiable representational system to describe and explain the processes and results of translation. This representational system may be characterized as an objectification of reflections on the problematics of translation. It is a difficult undertaking because research in this field has increased in flexibility, complexity, wealth of perspective and preciseness of detail in recent years, leaving the way open to contradictions. As a result, discussion of translation science frequently develops into controversy over the ‘relevant’ points of reference in a particular case and is very likely to lead to endless and heated debate over the correctness of this or that theoretical or methodological perspective.

In contrast with the theories of other scientific disciplines, translation theory has not attained its goal if it is merely free of contradiction and is logical. A body of theory relating to translation should address it in all its manifestations and at the same time leave room for an understanding of the basic sociocultural position and value system of the translator as an individual. In this regard, translation science depends on cognitive psychology in the belief that it contains a scientific ‘central concept’ with both an interdisciplinary and unified research perspective. This perspective permits us to pursue the question of how the more or less structured knowledge sedimented in our memory is activated by external stimuli, i.e. by the text to be translated. The fascination with cognition that we have

Correspondence relating to this paper should be addressed to Wolfram Wilss, Irn Scheidter Eck 5,6602 Saarbriicken Dudweiler, Federal Republic of Germany.

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witnessed in recent years may be explained by the generally conceded integrative capacity of cognitive psychoIogy to describe action and behavior.

The effort toward cognitive embedding of the translation process finds justification in the fact that translation, like any type of language usage, is a goal-directed action. In the course of this action the translator makes an attempt, or an integrated series of attempts, within the framework of his or her potentialities and limitations to translate into a target language (in a functionally adequate way and for a specified addressee) a text that has been written by a source language ‘sender’ who has a particular communicative intention. In a pragmatic sense, therefore, we may conceive of translation as a particular type of linguistic activity that is dependent upon a given situation, is value-oriented, and subject to time limitation.

Such considerations are relatively new in transiation science. The attempt to develop a cognitive argumentation signifies a departure from all the obscure pronouncements that were until quite recently supposed to constitute transIation theory. These considerations attest to the presence now of a self-aware standard of current thinking whose concern is to comprehend a field of study particular to it alone.

The science of translation has, to be sure, not come very far in its effort to organize its research, despite a huge and growing flood of publications. In the judgment of most people, at least (Wilss, 1987), the reason is that translation resists to a large extent the development of particular scientific/cognitive forms and goals relevant to its praxis. People do, of course, accept the fact that the history of translation can be just as much a field of historical study as the history of language or the history of literature. But there is obvious skepticism toward the notion that the translations that one encounters, either as a reader or as a practicing translator, should be the object of a science whose results are supposed to be not only theoretical but actually applied. The laymanassumes, inter alia, that anyone can translate if he or she has sufficient knowledge of both the source and target Ianguages, and consults in case of doubt, a more or less reliable bilingual dictionary. For according to a dictum stiI1 frequently heard, it is largely only a question of mechanicaily reproducing a pre-formulated text in another language, preserving the meaning as consistently as possible.

Any practicing translator knows, of course, that translation involves more than just ‘reproduction’. ‘Reproduction’ is merely the final stage of a chain of mental operations in which processes of analysis, interpretation, comparison, analogy, inference, weighing of possibilities, planning, combining, etc. are interactively united. When the translator proceeds in a manner suited to the text, these processes yield a product that can withstand critical scrutiny. All the operations are cognitive and they are intermediary agents between comprehension of the source text and its (re-)production in the target text, and identify the translation process as a cognitive activity (Tommola, 1986). Furthermore, this activity cannot be described with any degree of completeness within the framework of a linear, left-to-right decoding/encoding model (Koschmieder, 1965; Kade, 1968; Wilss, 1977). Such a model shows too little differentiation. The empirical approach to translation processes- the ‘experimentum crucis’ of any model-proves it to be inappropriate to the object. It does not do justice to the translator’s cognitive achievement, either in handling the source text or in the production of an acceptable target text. It also does not give an adequate picture of the mental complexity of the translation process (Konigs, 1986; Krings, 1986). This complexity can be explained by the fact that two more or less divergent iinguistic quantities must be intertextualiy harmonized. This task forces translators, at least when

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE TRANSLATION PROCESS 21

they are not dealing with interlingually highly standarized texts, to draw upon their cognitive resources; but in any case, the task is only appro.~mately fulfiilable, because ordinarily there are, interlingually speaking, no ideal intersections. [The intertextuai problem of equivalence was expressed programmatically by Jakobson (1959) and Nida (1964) in their later much quoted formulations: ‘equivalence in difference’ and ‘closest natural equivalent’.]

If we decide to describe and explain translation processes by means of a cognitive framework of representation and legitimation, this has meaning only if we are prepared to investigate these processes in accordance with operational concepts. Such concepts are action, behavior, problem-solving, decision-makin g, creativity, intuition, and the strategies, methods, techniques, and routines of translation. These will be the topics considerd in the following discussion.

A definition of the translation process based on action theory might read as follows: translation is an action directed toward both the source text and the reader of the target language. Its procedure is determined by its function and it pursues a goal of enabling understanding between individuals of different linguistic communicative and cultural communities. In other words, translation is characterized by specific actional circumstances and preconditions. The most important actional circumstance is the dependence of the translation process upon the original text, which considerabiy restricts the translator’s freedom of choice. Translators do not work independently, nor are their actions directly attributable to themselves, which makes the definition of their role in the interlinguall intercultural communicative process so difficult; they work within the context of a mediative situation rather than a direct, actional situation. This means that they respond to this situation reactively on the basis of the linguistic extralingual or situational knowledge available to them, and within a framework of more or less binding conditions specific to a certain text and text-type, and to a certain receiver. Translation can be regarded as a specific case of ‘constituting a common horizon of action’ (Stierle, 1981, pp. 558f), in so far as the translator accommodates the source text to the reader of the target text. Like every text, a translation is part of an interactive procedural continuum shaped by the particular specification. The crucial determinant of the act of translation is the intent to create common co~u~cative conditions by means of he~eneutic-anemic and synthetical combination of mentaI operations based on a complex presuppositiona situation.

If in such situations the science of translation is to help translators to orient their actions, it must develop theories of procedure on an empirical foundation. Its goal will be to prepare practical, useful, efficient prescriptions for action as well as norms of behavior supported by background knowledge relevant to action and behavior. An extreme case of such theories would be a ‘technological theory’ such as that recently proposed by Nida:

It is best . . . to regard translation as essentially a technology in that it is based upon several different scientific disciplines, including especially linguistics, information theory, psychology, and anthropology. It is essentially the application of insights from a variety of scientific disciplines which makes possible both the study of the processes of translation and the development of useful pedagogical techniques for improving translator’s capacities for effective translation. One may say, therefore, that translation is essentially a skill, an art, and a technology, in the sense of a related set of techniques derived from the sciences of human behavior (Nida, 1982, p. 23).

Here we shall not concern ourselves further as to whether this technological understanding does full justice to the nature of the translation process. Our primary goal is solely to establish that translation is a specific form of linguistic activity and behavior. It differs from monolingual activity and behavior through the fact that translators carry out ‘code-

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switching’ processes; they are bound to the procedurality of comprehending the source text and of reproducing that text in the target language.

This double function requires dehberative action. Translators must objectivery weigh the reasons for or against a target Ianguage perspective, establish anticipatory hypotheses concerning their tasks and the consequences of their actions on the basis of well-reasoned cognitive criteria, and from these draw conclusions for their translating. This course of action is not determined so much by the question ‘Why?’ (discovering causal relationships) as by the question ‘To what end?’ (determining final concepts).

If translation is regarded as a deliberative linguistic process, this means that translators must not follow the path of least resistance or maintain an attitude of complacent opportunism. They must instead act with circumspection and demonstrate that they have the necessary foresight to bring the translation of a text to a convincing conclusion. At the same time the preparation and execution should not take more time than the particular commission allows. When translation is carried on for practical professional purposes, it is usually done on a piecework basis. In many cases time pressure is the primary factor (Henschelmann, 1974). The professional translator normalIy does not have as much time as might be desirable for research or for optiona interruptions of the reception and revision process, or for completing the work at leisure. Therefore, translators must make as strong effort to develop ‘minimal strategies’, i.e. to produce as efficiently as possible a translation that is acceptable in both content and style, according to the much-quoted motto of Nida and Taber:

Translation consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source- language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style (Nida and Taber, 1969, p. 12).

In the context of translation procedure this means that the translator must know as precisely as possible the variable of the sender and receiver of the object text in order to establish validity as a dependable communicator with a defined goal of action and a clear assessment of the source text sender and target text receiver as the other two members of the ‘triangular relationship’ characteristic of any translation process. This assessment of the other partners is determined not only by the expectations of the receiver of the target text, as has been stated recently from time to time, but also by the communicative intentions of the sender of the original text. Any translation, even a literary one, should be seen in the context of a ‘rttcriture’ referred to an original text, but this does not mean that translators must always have an affirmative attitude toward the text to be translated. Translators work with given linguistic data that can be reconstructed more or less systematically; ‘[the translator] responds through his actions to the questions and challenges of a text that is itself already a response to the questions and challenges of a situation’ (Harald Weinrich, F~u~k~~r~~~ Aiigemeine Zeitung 4/20/1968). This process of reconstruction encounters Emits beyond which a comprehensive monitoring of resuhs is no longer possible. For this reason, translators shouId have as concrete a conception as possible of their communicative partners; through this consciousness they are able to identify themselves as linguistic participants without surrendering their own identity.

Translators see what goes on around them and, within the framework of their cognitive capabilities, make observations concerning the facets of this world in terms of the target language. Thus, if we want to know what the connection is between the translator and the text to be translated, we must picture the translator as an observer whose task is to construct-to the degree possible-a ‘characteristic relationship’ (Horst Turk) between


source and target texts. I say ‘to the degree possible’, because the results of the translation process are not always coherent and predictable; they depend not only on the source text but also on the translator’s mind-set and specific evaluative inclinations.

Every translation is the result of a covariation pattern focused on a person and situation. Aspects of personality theory and situation theory must be interactively involved in determining the translator’s role in the translating process. The same is true in localizing from a critical standpoint the factors contributing to the specific form of translation. Any translation theory that abstracts from the person of the translator or is content to define the translator in terms of communication theory as a kind of ‘super-communicator’ is running the risk of falsifying or idealizing its research objective. Translation theory has in fact sometimes made its own task too easy in this regard and fallen prey to the ‘simplicist fallacy’ (for example, in the matter of faithful translation versus free). More recently, however, the theoretical approaches to translation have become more cautious, pluralistic, and also more relativistic. The translation theory of today had distanced itself more than ever from a monistic position. Scarely anyone would now think of explaining the translator’s actions within the context of a homogeneous motivation or a single rigid methodology. The spectrum of relevant texts and modes of procedure and behavior is too broad for that.

However desirable pluralization may be, I feel that the demand heard now and then for a basic right of codetermination on the part of translators in producing the target text must remain questionable. This demand is justified in cases where a translation must be made acceptable for the culture represented by the target text, but it tends to create the impression that translators either can or even must elevate themselves to judges of the text to be translated and to act in a manner that borders on arbitrariness. I see this danger also in the view ‘that the literary translation necessarily deviates from its model-in other words, that it articulates different qualities’ (Sonderforschungsbereich 309, 1987, XI). Arbitrariness can be defended only to the degree that a differentiation must be made between ‘arbitrary’ and ‘non-arbitrary’ activities according to whether they are intended by ‘the person performing or experiencing them and have a definite purpose for this person, who examines them for their functionality and corrects them where necessary’ (Heckhausen, 1980, p. 2). Translation does not depend exclusively on the evaluative judgments of the translator. Holz-Mantari errs in arguing (1984) that the source text has no intrinsic value of its own and is absolutely subordinate to the functionality of the target text (cf. Newmark, 1981, on the differentiation between semantic and communicative translation). In my opinion, the text being translated retains its original binding authority for the translator. This ceases only when it is incompatible with either practical reason or aesthetic principles, that is, when translators, in order to realize their conception and not put themselves in a questionable light, shift from the sphere of ‘recoding’ into that of ‘new coding’ (Kade, 1968) within the framework of their subjective notions of rational action (for example, in the transaction of literary or commercial texts or texts that are specifically sociocultural in character). A good illustration of a sociocultural shifting of the translational perspective is seen in a passage of the German translation of Winston Churchill’s autobiographical ‘My Early Life’. Churchill describes as follows one of the aspects of the reception of students at Harrow and Eton:

The Harrow custom of calling the roll is different from that of Eton. At Eton the boys stand in a cluster and lift their hots (my italics) when their names are called.

In the published German translation, the second sentence says: In Eton standen die Schiiler in Haufen beieinander und liifteten bei der Nennung ihres Namens die Mtitze.

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Of interest here in connection with our topic is the translation of ‘lift their hats’. There

are two explanations for the use of ‘Mtitze’ (cap) as an equivalent of ‘hat’. One possibility is that the translator did not know that Eton boys wear top-hats instead of caps; if so, one cannot avoid criticizing the translator’s knowledge of English customs. The second possibility, which is relevant to the principles of translation criticism, is that the translator very consciously transferred the passage in question into the milieu of the German Gymnasium of the 19th century, where the students did wear school caps. This would then

be a case of translating ‘prospectively’ instead of ‘retrospectively’ (Postgate, 1922). It is, of course, also conceivable (as Rudolf Soellner suggested to me) that it was not the translator but the publisher’s reader who shifted the perspective.

As a rule translators do not operate with their own coordinate system, but that of others. Their role consists of transmitting thoughts that do not originate with them to an audience they are unacquainted with. Translators are not text producers in the closer sense, but rather recipients and producers of a text, even when they are following their own formal, semantic,

and pragmatic conceptions. The nature of the often taut relationship between the source text producer and the translator is clarified in the following quotation from Winograd:

Language is a process of communication between intelligent active processors, in which both the producer and the comprehender perform complex cognitive operations. The producer begins with communicative goals, including effects to be achieved, information to be conveyed, and attitudes to be expressed. These include such things as: causing an action, either verbal or non-verbal, on the part of the comprehender; causing the comprehender to make inferences or have reactions, either about the subject matter or about the interaction between producer and comprehender; conveying information about some thing assumed to be known to the comprehender , getting the comprehender to be aware of some new thing known to the producer; and directing the comprehender’s attention to some thing or some of its properties, to establish context for a subsequent utterance (Winograd, 1983, p. 13f.).

The situation in which translators operate forces them to undertake actions in which they cannot give primary attention to themselves but to the object text. There is a causal

dynamic in the relations between source text, translator, and target language recipient, and these three variable elements influence each other in such a way that the translator

is a dependent variable between two independent variables-the source text and the receiver of the target text-and must act in coordination with them. A translation is always a reaction

to a precedent text which must form the starting point of the translator’s actions. For this reason I believe that the following programmatic statement goes too far:

Translations are texts ‘in their own right’. They are based on source material, but must function independently of them . . Target texts are produced by a translator under the primacy of the texts’ own scope and purpose (Holz-Manttari et al., 1986, p. 5).

Translators can be relatively free in their actions when, as indicated, there are no target text models-thus when, for whatever reason, they must personally determine the target text perspective in order to guarantee the functionality of their translation. In such cases, translators find themselves in a macrocontextual determinative situation. This is a constitutive characteristic of every act of translation in so far as the act can be understood as a cooperative undertaking and does not serve the self-profiling of the translator, as Cicero demonstrated in exemplary fashion in his postulate of oratorical translation. With his duality of ‘ut orator’ and ‘ut interpres’ in translation praxis he postulated two classes of equivalence. Apparently from a need for social recognition and a striving for rhetorical creativity, he uncompromisingly embraced the first-mentioned principle.

The function of the translator can be characterized by the question ‘What does the object

text express transactionally (semantically) and interactionally (pragmatically)?’ (Rrown and Yule, 1983). The supplementary question ‘What do I as a translator have to add?’ becomes


valid only within the scope of a given task of translation. Under certain circumstances, depending on the degree of professional competence possessed by the translator, the confrontation may induce a feeling of insecurity. In such a case the translator must accept ‘the risk of having no guarantee of attaining one’s goal’ (Blumenberg, 1986, p. 22).

How the translator is supposed to handle various work situations is-like the familiar discussion concerning the ever fresh topic of ‘equivalence’ in translation studies-very difficult to conceptualize. For translation is, despite or perhaps even because of its ‘relation to a foreign text’ (Broich, 1985, p. 32, n.), not a bookkeeping activity. Any aspiring translator needs experience, combinative imagination, and a wealth of methodological inventiveness to clearly hold his or her work to the parameters of the conditions imposed on it and to disengage it from them in conflict situations. Such situations arise when the translator must grasp the facts and value orientations expressed in the source language and transpose them into actions determined by the target text. Not every translator is equally successful in performing these operations. The act of translation is the function of an operative intelligence founded on varying quantities of linguistic, extralinguistic and situational knowledge.

The question of the degree that alternative possibilities enter into one’s consciousness during this process will have to be answered in regard mainly to the specific text-type. In technical texts it is definitely easier for the translator to make hypotheses concerning the function of the target text than in literary texts or texts where the extralinguistic reality cannot be transmitted directly but only through a cultural filter (Reiss and Vermeer, 1984). The clearer the externally imposed communicative points of reference become, creating an ever-lower threshold of perception, the greater are the translator’s feelings of security during the translation process and chances of creating an intertextual consensus that eliminates the danger of a conflict of values. The necessary first phase which prepares the way for this security of action is a comprehensive understanding of the source text.

The processes of textual comprehension can be laborious, but do not have to be so. They are relatively unproblematic when the receiver’s capacity to understand converges with the claims placed on one’s understanding by the text. I feel that Kaplan’s almost apodictic- sounding statement is valid only in such cases:

Language comprehension, one of our most intricate cognitive abilities, happens so automatically and Cth so little conscious effort that it is not easily susceptible to scientific observation or introspective analysis. Thus it is not surprising that there is still no satisfactory explanation of how the listener deciphers and assimilates the conceptual relationships that are conveyed by spoken and written language (Kaplan, 1975, p. 117).

Van Dijk and Kintsch use a different argumentation; although they place a high value on the degree to which the processes of comprehension and production are automatized they also speak of possible situations which involve complexities of comprehension:

. . . the production and comprehension of verbal utterances is an automatized activity. Unless an utterance has specifically difficult, problematic, or unusual properties, production and comprehension is not monitored at each step by the language user. If we do not know the meaning of a word, we may apply the strategy of asking somebody, consulting a dictionary, or guessing the meaning of the word from context, and if a sentence structure is particularly complex, we may-in written communication-backtrack and start reading again. Similarly, in discourse, we may have texts that are so complex that various external aids, such as schemata, summaries, or notes, are necessary to control the meaning of the text in production or comprehension. But such devices are rather special: understanding and speaking are usually almost automatic processes (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983, p. 70).

The goal of source text comprehension is to reconstruct the actional perspective of its author in a competent evaluative fashion and derive target orientations from it. In doing

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this, translators often find themselves in an imprecisely defined position between norm and freedom. We can distinguish two extreme situations in this regard: first, the substitution of facts within the context of (culturally) multilingually valid worlds, second, the modification of source text worlds by the transformation of monolingually represented words in the context of the target language’s linguistic, communicative and cultural community. Between them is a field of tension produced by varying predispositions concerning which translators must establish as much certainty as possible through an analysis of the source text that prepares the way for their translation. The success of the translator depends very definitely upon a capacity for cognitive calculation, and this calculation is based on translation as a directed linguistic action. This directed action operates, on one hand, between source language, author, and translator and, on the other, between translator and target text reader (or group of readers).

Important factors for effective translation of any type are: (1) The translator’s personal traits and qualifications: mental disposition; horizon of

experience in translating; ability to make macro- and microtextual decisions and to recognize regularities of transfer; level of expectations; recognition of textual norms; competence (subjectively assessed) vs difficulty of the text; interaction between motivation and cognition, etc.

(2) Linguistic and textual elements: compatibility (or incompatibility) of the text; degree of syntactic, lexical, and sociocultural contrastivity between the source language and the target language; variability and flexibility of the target language’s potential expression; complexity of the text.

The processes of consciousness that play a part in the course of translation are of differing nature; they can, but do not have to, lead to a homogeneous targeted result. All targeted results are acceptable or at least worthy of consideration as long as the translator can verifiably account for them with due regard to the author of the source text, the target language receiver, and, not least, to the translator.

Verifiability is dependent upon among other things, the problem-solving competence of the translator himself. In the science of translation there has been little said about problem-solving in the sense of a systematic descriptive method, perhaps because the content of translation teaching and learning has not been clearly established. The subject-matter indexes of Reiss and Vermeer (1984), Holz-MPntari (1984) and Vermeer (1986) do not mention the concept of problem-solving, nor is there any reference to it in Sell-Hornby’s programmatic introduction to her collection (1986). This does not mean that translation science has not been well aware of problems. There are innumerable titles in the field in which the word ‘problem’ or its equivalent appears (Lehmann, 1982). But the understanding of problems that we find in such publications is not uniform, and the proposals for the elaboration of translation problems or difficulties [cf. Nord’s (1987)] attempt to distinguish between the two terms have seemed largely to be one of only passing interest. This statement is not a value judgment but is intended merely to express the thought that the science of translation has apparently had great difficulty in defining an intersubjectively stable research paradigm for problem-solving. This is especially true of problem-solving in its important relationship to the teaching of translation, whose lack of conceptual and methodological certitude was recently discussed critically by Poulsen (1987).

When problem-solving methods are applied to translation, a distinction must be made between macrocontext and microcontext. For macrocontextual problem-solving operations,


the translator needs a plan that is oriented to the totality of the text to be translated and excludes arbitrary assignment of meaning. This means that the translator must gain a clear idea of what the content of the text implies, what its communicative purpose is and for what reader or group of readers the target text is intended. Here a rough orientation usually suffices, for which the Lasswell formula, with its seven peristatic determinants can be helpful as a problem-solving schema. It is obvious that texts of a specialized type of linguistic expression, such as technical, commercial, narrative, or literary, shouId as a rule be received as such. It is not likely that such texts will be regarded differently by the several pa~icipants in the communicative process-source text sender, translator, target text receiver. In other words, there exists in general a ‘constancy of function’ between source and target texts, even when they involve different cultural communities (Honig and Kussmaul, 1982). The translator must not undertake any fundamental ‘reader-based shifts’ (Blum-Kulka, 1986, p. 34). Variance of function is the exception rather than the rufe.

On the other hand, the handling of microcontextual problems often causes severe or even almost unsurmountable difficulties for even the experienced translator. These include, inter al& singular conditions of the individual text, such as semantic vagueness (but not semantic ambiguity, since the situational knowledge of the translator offers semanticizing assistance), syntactic complexity and syntactic ellipses, the distribution of thematic and rhematic information in sentence relations~ps, metaphoric~ expression, ironic incogruities, distorted or ineffective formulations, morphological idiosyncrasies, adjectival-substantive collocations, gerundial and participial constructions, etc. Here it becomes clear that general problem-solving methods as developed by the game theory and normative decision theory are of little help to translators when they encounter a conflict situation in their search for criteria of optimality. The reason is that the solution obtained for a microcontextual translation problem can be generalized only in limited fashion {in contrast with the generalization possible with grammatical rules). In other words, the more unique a translation problem is, the less practicable are any general problem-solving procedures, because the field of translation offers no systematic coordination of individual textual perspectives from general evaluative viewpoints (as exist, for example, in the game of chess). For this reason the problem-oriented science of translation has clearly distanced itself from traditional mechanistic-technocratic planning of translation, with its global conception of faithful or free translation from beginning to end.

The problem-solving method that translators select in a specific situation depends on their declarative and procedural knowledge (‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’). It may be considered certain-hypothetically-that translators do not always attain an acceptable result, at feast when dealing with texts that are difficult in content and form, in a single transfer attempt but rather in a series of reflexive transferal attempts, using self-corrective feedback. This is a procedure which Voegelin (1954) was apparently the first to discuss under the term ‘multiple stage translation’, and which is advantageous for the following reason: by means of self-applied (self-regulated) feedback involving a constant self- monitoring process of comparing the interim result attained at each transfer stage to one’s own performance standards, the translator can intervene correctively to improve the transfation product step by step (Freigang, 1981). All the intermediate stages taken together from an operative scaffolding that facilitates a progress from ‘minimal transfer’ (small textual units) through various ‘substance levels’ to ‘maximal transfer’ (large textual units) (Nida, 1964). The number of approach stages necessary in each case depends on individual experience. It gives the transIator the breadth of choice required to apply cognitive methods

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to difficult transferal situations. This procedure reminds us somewhat of the concept of cybernetics developed by Wiener (1948)-a term that he derived from the Greek word for helmsman, ‘Kybernetes’. A ship cannot sail toward its goal by the shortest route because it is at the mercy of wind, weather, and waves, and the helmsman must constantly change its direction. The result is a zig-zag course, which is certainly not optimal but is in any case the second best solution, since the direct way toward the goal is not available.

If we consider the method of ‘multiple stage translation’ a serious possibility in constructing a target language solution, this does not mean, of course, that we can schematically reduce translation problems to individual steps applicable to the translation process-steps that can be simply typified into a standard program with an exactly prescribed instructional sequence. This is not feasible if for no other reason than that a problem- solving method selected by a translator is merely a contingent course of action. It does not need by any means to be the only one possible, or even the best one, especially when the translator, for lack of knowledge, cannot develop problem-solving methods appropriate to the text. Such situations are conceivable at all levels of linguistics relevant to translation- morphology, lexicology, idiomatics and syntax. Any translator can remember occasions in which he or she knew that a translation problem was involved, but did not know at first how to solve it and arrive at the desired result. This is especially the case with texts marked by a wealth of associative and connotative overtones and undertones. Here the translation attains the dimensions of a language game that can no longer be logically defined, calculated, and verified with precision. The situation is different for texts in which the referential dimension is dominant or in which conventions relating to a specific text-type prevail and force the translator to operate within a semiotically restricted procedural context, as in the case of specialized texts with a sharply defined format or in other subtypes of utilitarian texts such as advertisements.

The range of application of problem-solving procedure is especially broad when few conditions are attached to its employment. A case par excellence is literal translation, which we can designate microcontextually as an elementary operation. In non-literal translation, on the other hand, the translator applies either syntactical-transpositional and/or semantic- modulatory methods. This means that non-literal translation requires more problem-solving than literal translation, whose importance for translation theory has often been either overstated or understated (Thome, 1981).

It would of course be an illusion to think that there can ever be a problem-solving model that serves every translational contingency and offers a well-defined institutionalized sequence of problem-solving operations. Such a model would be at most be conceivable in a problem-solving situation ‘with a closed problem area’. But translation is always, or almost always, a procedure ‘with an open problem area’ (Krause, 1982, p. 35). This suggests that translators must learn to develop problem-solving procedures that demonstrate their ability to steer a professional course on which they maintain an acceptable input-output relationship and at the same time produce competent decisions.

Competence in decision-making is necessary because every translator must function in a way that contributes to an expected or prescribed end result. Translation as a conscious and intentional production of a target text is only possible when translators can anticipatorily assess the effect and results of their work on the basis of informed decision-making, taking into account the particular ‘situational constraints’ (Sager, 1984, p. 342). They must weigh the strengths and weaknesses of their work methods and behave in such a way that a

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE TMNSLATION PROCESS 29

plausible, convincing result is attained. To do so, translators must rely upon themselves and their own competence. This competence must be of a quality that enables them to follow.their own procedural proclivities as they mediate between the source text author and the target text receiver, taking into account &ice’s principles of cooperation (1975) and specifically applying them to translation. In order to make the right decisions for the particular contractual situation, translators must orient themselves to procedurally important variables such as text-type, aspects of content and relationship, as well as stylistic values, in their double role as recipients of the source text and, at the same time, planner/producers of the target text.

We know little about the behavior of translators in decision-making situations. The science of translation has obviously not yet taken into account the comprehensive literature on decision theory that was produced in the 1960s and 1970s. Whether it can afford to disregard it much longer is a different question. The economic sciences played a leading role in the origination and rapid development of decision theory, but today, because of the broad spectrum of decision-making problems now being addressed, decision theory is a focus of discussion also in the computer sciences and in philosophy, mathematics, information theory, systems theory, and operations research. The aim of decision theory is to ascertain the prerequisites for conscious, well-considered, verifiable, comprehensible, and value- oriented decisions within a framework of alternative actions, and thereby to create the preconditions for rational, goal-directed decisional processes.

In my opinion, procedures for decision-making are not identical to those for problem- solving. But the boundary between them cannot always be clearly drawn, and they are therefore occasionally equated with each other. I personally consider problem-solving to be a more comprehensive concept. Decision-making processes do not begin until the area of decision is sufficiently defined within the structure of a problem-solving operation that prepares the way. It then becomes clear what factors and criteria for decision-making are operative in the particular course of action and what weight they will be given.

All this is easier to propose as desirable than to actually transform into reality in a translation. Translators often find themselves in a situation that forces them to progressively filter out, through comprehensive information-processing, norm-deviant variants from the possibilities available in their more or less open horizon of action. They then must select from the acceptable variants the one that most closely corresponds to their conception of an adequate target text. The decisionfor a variant signifies, of course, also a decision agai& all other possible variants, some of which might, under certain circumstances, be just as acceptable.

In doing this, we can distinguish between decisions made under relatively risk-free conditions, and those made under conditions of considerable risk. Decision-making faces many risks when translators are working under uncertain circumstances that prevent them from drafting an appropriate plan of action. Contrastingly, decisions entail few risks when translators have access to a relatively large amount of linguistic and extralinguistic information and can draw upon a large potential of knowledge and experience. Translators can avoid risks most easily (assuming they have the necessary linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge) when they are dealing with the language of technical and utilitarian texts, i.e. operating instructions, weather reports, resolutions, etc. In such cases, one can also use so-called ‘standard equivalents’ based on a regularized relationship between one’s own work and the relevant textual factors. This amounts to a routinization of the translation process

30 WOLFRAM WILSS

as far as decision-making is concerned; the translator is operating in an area in which the principle of procedural self-regulation prevails. In translating specialized texts there is no necessity of dealing with multiple textual perspectives and one can operate ‘without a viewpoint’, so to speak.

We do not know whether there is a straight-line, continuous growth from less to more competence in decision-making or whether this accumulative process is amenable to group guidance or, on the other hand, requires individualized translation instruction. To address this question, translation pedagogy would need ‘longitudinal studies’ (Corder, 1973) such as those advanced for some time now by applied linguistics. Such studies are difficult because the determination of the necessary experimental conditions presents methodological and economic problems. In any case, we cannot expect to learn much from simple hypothetical models. We cannot establish an absolute requirement that the translation process be decision-oriented, but must limit ourselves to essentials and rely on our ability to use improvisation and intuition.

As far as the logic of decision-making is concerned, the translator’s actions conform to the general experiential finding that every human being imparts a specific configuration to a bundle of perceptions and conceptions. Thus there is such a thing as a covariation between the individual and his or her decision-making behavior, or an effectivity of decision- making determined by the individual’s personal traits, so that a certain text, organized differently and referred to a different ‘life world’, can lead to different translations. Here the question arises whether a typology of translation might be written that distinguishes varying kinds of temperament. The prospective, goal-oriented translator can be contrasted with the retrospective, indecisive one who wavers in the preparation of the target text, exemplifying a state sometimes referred to as the ‘Pilatus syndrome’. We can speak of translator types that are stubborn, skeptical, hesitant, ambitious, sensitive, logical, inhibited, or inconsistent. All of these are behavioral aspects that would have to be discussed from the standpoint of a theory of the translator’s personal attributes in connection with the theory of personality developed in motivational research (Heckhausen, 1980). This would likely lead to the finding that many transitional situations are characterized by closely interwoven personal socioculturai, and intellectual dispositions that can scarcely be untangled-a milieu in which translators often can find their way only with difficulty.

Nevertheless, translators must engage their abilities as best they can to create a target text appropriate to the situation. If their sense of responsibility is insufficiently developed, a situation arises in which subjectivism becomes an ever stronger factor in their work and points the way toward arbitrary decision-making. For this reason, decisionistic attitudes that find justification only in themselves should yield to methodological considerations appropriate to the given situation. Such considerations would lessen the feeling of insecurity toward the text to be translated and increase the feeling of mastery, or relative mastery, of the text. This would signal in the translator’s profession the growth of a stronger sense of self-legitimation that could remove epistemological, cognitive-sociological, and psychological doubts as to whether objective findings concerning decision-making have any place in the framework of particular communicative interests.

Decision-making is discussed nowadays in discursive and algorithmic terms. The science of translation, oriented as it is toward decision-making, must come to grips with the computer sciences, regardless of whether this agrees with its self-image as an anthropological science. It will, of course, never become an exact science in the sense of scientism; it cannot


commit itself to procedures that are radical, naturalistic, prescribed, and non-deliverative, but it can and must develop heuristic methods for making appropriate decisions about translation. What the science of translation needs is not a ‘conceptual mask’ but a theory of practical knowledge.

This theory would include a confrontation with the extraordinarily difficult subject of creativity in translation. Although the idea of creativity is, to speak, an icon of the present day, the study of creativity is still a problematical area of psychology, with a multiplicity of different research methods, perspectives, and goals. Guilford, who is considered the father of creativity studies (1950), drew attention to this as early as two decades ago (1968), but in the meantime there has been no decisive change in the situation. Creativity is still a ‘smoke screen’-concept; this is due, among other things, to the fact that we lack clear conceptual and definitional distinctions between creativity, productivity, originality, and imagination (McFarland, 1985). To be sure, it is a matter of question whether such distinctions are possible at all, because of the difficulty in assigning precise meanings to these concepts. Although we know that creativity is an essential part of our life, we are still hard put to objectify the concept of creativity in a scientific way or to investigate the dimensions of human creativity. The reason is, perhaps, that under the influence of systems theory we have acquired a compulsion for epistemological methodizing and regularization, which Feyerabend recently attempted to challenge with his principle of ‘anything goes’ (1983).

In modern linguistics, especially in language theory, there has been intensive consideration of linguistic creativity both within and outside of the generative model. Since linguistic creativity expresses itself in certain forms of language use and since translation is a specific form of language use, it would have been incumbent upon the science of translation also to conduct a dialogue on the nature of translational creativity, but such a dialogue has not yet taken place. Creativity remains for the most part ‘terra incognita’. This can be gathered from, inter alia, the fact that in Lehmann’s Arbeitsbibliographie Uebersetten ‘Kreativitat’ (creativity) does not appear as a keyword in the subject matter index-nor, by the way, ‘Problemlosen’ (problem-solving), ‘Entscheidungsprozess’ (decision-making process), and ‘Intuition’. There are, to be sure, allusions here and there in the professional literature to creativity as a factor in the translation process (Recent examples: Snell-Homby, 1986, p. 189; Btihler, 1987, MS; Lilova, 1987, p. 17; Neubert, 1987; Nida, 1987, MS), but these quite incidental remarks are not informative enough if one really wants to know the characteristics of translational competence. So it is perhaps not surprising that in instances where attempts to define the concept of creativity in translation have been made, the authors exaggerate its complexity by drawing upon ideas from information theory:

Translation . . . is a creative process, consisting of the transformation of the units of (the) language . . . in which is encoded the sender’s message M, into units of another language . ., reproducing so far as possible a constant information I = I (Ludskanov, 1975, p. 6).

There are several reasons for this uncertainty in defining the concept of creativity in translation.

(1) Translation is a specific form that combines comprehension and invention. In the translation process a specific type of linguistic creativity is manifested-creativity in the individual-psychological sense, not in the generative sense. Translational creativity is by nature an elusive concept. It can neither be grasped conceptually nor exactly measured, weighted, or described. Which of our mental faculties should it be classified under? Creativity is obviously a mental ‘super-datum’, in which reason, understanding, intuition,

32 WOLFRAM WILSS

and imagination work together in an integrative way. Creativity in general, and transitional creativity in particular, cannot be predetermined. We cannot predict with any certainty what creative ideas we shall have tomorrow or whether our creative potential will permit us to do justice to our object text.

(2) The opinion may be argued that creativity is in contradiction to the nature of the translation process; its goal is to reproduce a source text in a target language. ‘The translator must be willing to express his own creativity through someone else’s creation’ (Nida, 1976, p. 58). In other words, translators must activate their own mental resources of creativity in a specific translational situation to produce a likeness of the source text in its semantic, functional and pragmatic aspects. Translation is a ‘transformative’ activity; its place is basically in the field of tension between creativity and re-creativity.

(3) Transitional creativity cannot be completely objectified, either inductively or deductively; no descriptive or explanatory system can be developed for it that will be theoretically founded and clearly verifiable by empirical means. The volatility of the concept of translational creativity appears to be confirmed by the fact that even today there is no definitive opinion as to whether translation is an art, a skill, or a scientific undertaking in the sense of possessing a methodology related to specific text-types and situations (Nida, 1976, 66ff.).

(4) There is obviously no homogeneous concept of translational creativity; translation involves various levels, areas, and manifestations of creativity.

We may perhaps approach the concept of translational creativity more closely if we keep in mind the fact that the translator can employ two different procedural approaches which can be subsumed gross0 modo under the concepts of translation method and translation technique. In my opinion, these two concepts are not equal in substance (Wilss, 1983). They represent differing stages of consciousness in the context of the action and behavior involved in translation. The processes constructed on them cannot be given exact limits in respect to each other; they represent, rather, a behavioral continuum ranging from the slow, hierarchically organized, cognitively demanding processes to those that are rapid, associatively accessible, and automatic.

The methods used in translation are always reflexive or ‘dependent on consciousness’. The translator sets them in motion when it is a question, firstly, of utilizing text analysis and transfer procedures heuristically to address the transactional and interactional aspects of a given translation situation, and, secondly, or working step by step toward an optimal and qualitatively verifiable product. A good example of this is the method of ‘multiple stage translation’, as previously discussed.

In contrast with translation methods, translation techniques are procedures characterized by routine and repetition, in which abstract contents of memory are automatically activated in a series of concrete actions. It is based on the principle that in similar or at least comparable conditions a similar or at least comparable result can be obtained regardless of the situation. Translation techniques represent a specific form of standardized information processing. They require a relativization of the concept that in a field of study like translation, scientific criteria such as objectivity and repitition cannot be used meaningfully (Mudersbach, 1987, MS).

To be sure, it is not logical to proceed toward general rules of translation procedure in every case. On the contrary, the important thing is to grasp the overall situation in each

COGNiTWE ASPECTS OF THE TRWSLATION PROCESS 33

translation project as precisely as possible in all its particulars and to reproduce it in the target language as honestly and as clearly contoured as possible. Translators do themselves a disservice if they restrict their creative potential through premature use of standard procedure and let the source text dictate, so to speak, how they are supposed to react. It is true that our linguistic roles are prescribed for us and that translation too is a kind of linguistic role-playing, but in the very consciousness of this role-playing there are possibilities and perspectives of creative action opened for the translator-creative action which is grounded in one’s own experience of the language, the text and the world and which contradicts the conception of translation as a stereotyped ‘activation of a frame by a frame’ (Vannerem and Snell-Hornby, 1986, p. 203).

Whenever creativity in translation is discussed, the concept of intuition must also be considered. Here we see a very similar picture. The concept of intuition in translation has also not been examined by translation science, because it cannot be precisely defined. Intuition has its traditional place where the chain of scientifically verifiable links of knowledge ends. Intuition is not the ability to construct solutions to problems in a rational manner but rather to generate them spontaneously when the situation demands.

Intuition is the converse of prototypical conception. This is true for intuition in translation as well as for any other form of intuition. All translators will orient themselves, whenever possible, toward the procedural patterns that they have acquired in a more or less systematic way, and they will practice a methodologically and linguistically institutionalized form of language usage. But they must always be prepared for situations that lie beyond the normal modes of translation regulated by methods and techniques. This is where the realm of intuitive translation begins.

When textual circumstances permit, translators call upon their intuition (in so far as they possess it and trust themselves to use it) and draw bold formulations that may not agree at all with the work of another translator. Such an approach is of course not without risk, which explains perhaps why intuition is much rarer in translation praxis that one might assume on the basis of the notorious characterization of the translation process as an intuitive linguistic act.

In the taxonomy of translational modalities-word-for-word translation, literal translation, methodologically controlIed translation in the sense of a creative and decision- oriented problem-solving strategy, routinized translation techniques, intuitive handling of translation problems-the intuitive approach represents the most differentiated stage in the development of forms of consciousness relating to translation. Intuition applied to translation produces modes of action which translators perform within the frame of their subjective attributes and knowledge apart from the expectancies associated with systems theory.

This circumstance confirms the fact that there is evidently no reliable way to reconstruct, mold, and operationalize the concept of intuition in translation. Reflection concerning cognition and translation cannot enter the scientifically inaccessible reaIm of intuition. To observe intuition and to speak scientifically of it are two different things, and any attempt to unite these two perspectives to the advantage of both can apparently not really succeed because of the inevitable imprecision of all inward perceptions.

As previously suggested, ideas based on intuition cannot be summoned upon command. They are unpredictable and can also, under certain circumstances, become dangerous sources of error: ‘Obviously, some intuitive leaps are ‘good’ and some are ‘bad’ in terms of how

34 WOLFRAM WILSS

they turn out. Some men are good intuiters; others should be warned off’ (Bruner, 1960, p. 60). To this extent we cannot rely upon intuition; it often helps us in an emergency, but without guarantee. Its use may arbitrarily produce results in a very definite situation in a very definite way. But this does not justify a general mistrust of intuition. Advocacy of intuition is not a statement against any clear mental and formulative processes in translating. Intuition stimulates a type of thinking and formulation that does not orient itself toward strictly normative methodology. It is a mode of behavior that frees one’s consciousness from an attachment to technicalized structures, theories, and models such as those that prevail in machine translation. Intuition opens up a world that transcends rationality and yet is founded on it, where translators must find their way just as in the world of rationally controlled problem-solving methods.

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cognitive aspects of the translation process

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