Coercive Measures

Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions

I. Military Intervention

A. Predicting intervention1. Interstate War Escalation: Joining an

ongoing armed conflicta. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention

b. Alliance portfolios predict side choice

What is an alliance portfolio?

All of the allies of a state

Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperation Better predictor

than dyadic alliance!

I. Military Intervention

A. Predicting intervention1. Interstate War Escalation: Joining an

ongoing armed conflicta. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention

b. Alliance portfolios predict side choice

c. More likely when existing parity between combatants

Balances of Power: Disparity and Parity

Disparity

Parity

I. Military Intervention

A. Predicting intervention1. Interstate War Escalation: Joining an

ongoing armed conflicta. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention

b. Alliance portfolios predict side choice

c. More likely when existing parity between combatants

d. Great powers intervene much more frequently!

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

Predictors (all prior to intervention): Battle-Deaths, Refugees/Displacement, Media

Reporting (US all types), Duration Cold War, Bilateral Colonial Ties, Contiguity, Civil

War State’s Rivals and Rivals’ Rivals, Parity, Bilateral FDI (military intervention only!), Prior Intervention.

Stronger rebels attract more pro-rebel intervention.

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

Inhibiting factors: Economic/Military power of target (government), Oil exports of CW state, Population/Density, Prior Great Power Intervention, Victory

Tough calls: Democracy of intervener and target (mixed – leans positive), Bilateral Trade (mixed)

B. When does intervention work?1. Who wins interstate wars?

a. Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars.

b. Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors)

c. Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)

Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

No Pro-Rebel Intervention

Pro-Rebel Intervention

No Pro-Government Intervention

119(60.41%)

24(12.18%)

Pro-Government Intervention

29(14.72%)

25(12.69%)

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

a. Does intervention lead to compromise?

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

Probability of Compromise, 1816-1997

Intervention for government

No intervention

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

b. Does intervention prolong wars?

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes

c. Is intervention getting more common?

Intervention Over Time

1825 - 1849

1850 - 1874

1875 - 1899

1900 - 1924

1925 - 1949

1950 - 1974

1975 - 1997

Number of Civil Wars 22 28 16 23 21 39 43

InterventionFrequency 36% 25% 31% 35% 24% 49% 51%

2. Intervention in Civil Wars

a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes

b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes

c. Is intervention getting more common? Yes

d. The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice

i. Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weak

ii. Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people

II. Sanctions and Pressure

A. Predicting Sanctions1. US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s

relationship with USa. Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant

b. Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

II. Sanctions and Pressure

A. Predicting Sanctions1. US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s

relationship with USa. Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant

b. Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

2. General: Asymmetric dependencea. If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you

b. If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you

c. Problem: Measuring dependence is hard

Example: US-South Africa

1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US trade

Issue: Apartheid US backs South Africa,

vetoes UN resolutions for sanctions

US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones)

Question: Why not sanction?

Answer: Minerals

USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals

Example: US-South Africa

US needed imports of critical minerals:

Example: US-South Africa

F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals(F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s)Titanium

5,366 lbs77%(Australia, South Africa)

Cobalt910 lbs73%(Norway, Finland)

Tantalum3 lbs80%(China)

Columbium171 lbs100%(Brazil)

Aluminum720 lbs100%(Australia)

Chromium1,656 lbs80%(South Africa)

Nickel5,024 lbs63%(Canada)

(Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine) JetEngine.wav

Best case: end trade = price increases

Worst case: end trade = inferior hardware

Example: US-South Africa

No: Fear of resource conflict nuclear proliferation 1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium 1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for

atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence) 1975-1976: US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK

terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid “laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western

defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation proliferation 1977-1979: US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear

test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test) 1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed 1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule

Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure?

B. Do sanctions work?

1. The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed (game theory)

B. Do sanctions work?

1. The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed (game theory)

2. Keys to successa. Sanction must be large % of target’s GDP

b. Sanction must not harm sender (very much)

c. Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender

3. Success usually takes less than 5 years

III. Foreign Aid

A. Predicting foreign aid1. In general (who gets the most aid?)

a. Free market countries (especially during Cold War)

b. Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization)

c. Poverty and Debt

2. Specific relationshipsa. US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003)

b. Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and trade

c. Western Europe: Former colonies

B. US Gives Low % of GDP for development…

…but still manages to be the largest donor

1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and diplomacy): Surprising stability

2. Long-Term Decline in Foreign Aid

3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

1st Israel Israel Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Israel Israel Israel

2nd Egypt Egypt Israel Israel Israel Afgh Afgh Egypt Egypt Afgh

3rd Jord Pak Egypt Afgh Afgh Israel Israel Afgh Afgh Egypt

Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?

C. Does foreign aid work?

1. Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative

a. More corrupt countries tend to attract US aidb. Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from

Australia and Scandinavia

2. Aid and growtha. “Good policies:” Aid may have positive effectb. “Bad policies:” Aid has no effectc. Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on

growth. Why?