Cod avoidance by area regulations in Kattegat – experiences for theimplementation of a discard ban in the EU

Søren Qvist Eliasen n

IFM, Aalborg University, A. C. Meyers Vænge 15, 2450 Copenhagen SV, Denmark

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 20 November 2013Received in revised form26 November 2013Accepted 26 November 2013Available online 20 December 2013

Keywords:Discard banRegional implementationArea closuresIncentivesFleet information systemMarine Strategy FrameworkDirective (MSFD)

a b s t r a c t

The article examines the experiences of two initiatives of cod avoidance by area regulations in theKattegat in the light of the upcoming discard ban in EU fisheries. The first section highlights elements ofthe discard ban in the reformed EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The second section presents twoinitiatives for cod avoidance in Kattegat; a fisher initiative sharing information about cod bycatch whichcould lead to real time closures in areas with high bycatch of juveniles, for vessels with low cod quota toavoid catch of all cod, and a Danish Swedish Government initiative of permanent and temporary areaclosures in Kattegat. The third section discusses the lessons learned in the light of implementation of thediscard ban. The fourth section sums up the lessons learned; Regional measures of implementation of thediscard ban should include all vessels with quota in the region to be regarded fair and the goals should beclear, not least when the descriptors of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, which might be moreintangible for the fishers, are part of the goal of the measures. If incentives created by the regulation arestable over at least a few years the fishers and fishers’ organisations are more capable at being activepartners in developing the systems that support the discard ban. An example from the examinedinitiatives are the outline of a fleet information system, providing the skipper with information abouthotspots of unwanted species allowing him to make a better plan for the selective fishery based on morequalified information.

& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Fishers try to avoid bycatch which cannot be commercialised orlegally landed. In general, unwanted bycatch are discarded (dis-charged overboard) either 'live' or 'dead' [1]. So far the EUCommon Fisheries Policy (CFP) has included obliged discards andset up measures to avoid it. On the one hand the fisher is obligedto discard catches below minimum landing sizes (MLS), andcatches exceeding the quota. On the other hand there are severalmeasures for reducing the unwanted bycatch; regulations of gearand mesh sizes and closures of certain areas for fishing activities,further high grading (optimising income from the quota by discardof small fish) is banned. The bycatch reducing measures have beensupported by control measures such as logbooks, control at seaand in land and still more advanced registrations using satelliteand lately trials of so-called full documentation based on com-bined electronic monitoring (satellite, sensors on machinery andvideo monitoring) [2], and still the discard has been registered ashigh in some fisheries and regarded politically as too high [3].

As discard is a tool for adjusting the fishers’ catches to the legallandings; implementing a discard ban will be a challenge for thefisheries and the fisheries management. The ban should beimplemented in an efficient way, still enabling a viable, economic-ally sustainable fishery. To support the ban, more bycatch reducingmeasures will probably be introduced, as well as new control andenforcement tools and organising ways. Many experiences can begained from countries with experiences of discard ban, such as theScandinavian countries [4], but while external experiences canbring new approaches, implementation might be easier if it isbased on structures and initiatives already familiar in the EUcontext.

First, the article will briefly discuss the coming discard ban (orobligation to land all catches) and the implementations as itappears based on the compromise text of June 2013. Second, itwill present the Kattegat mixed nephrops fishery and discuss twoinitiatives regarding reduction of bycatch and discard in Kattegat(within the context of cod recovery plans). The third sectiondiscusses experiences from these initiatives in the light of theimplementation of the discard ban in the coming Common Fish-eries Policy. The fourth concluding section will give a few recom-mendations of the implementation of the discard ban.

The article is based on publicly available sources (the text forthe coming CFP and description of the Danish Swedish agreement

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Marine Policy

0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.11.020

n Tel.: þ45 99 40 24 22.E-mail addresses: se@plan.aau.dk, soren@q-eliasen.dk

Marine Policy 45 (2014) 108–113

on closed areas in Kattegat) as well as unpublished documentsregarding the project “Selective Behaviour”. The content of thedocuments are supplemented by interviews with managers fromthe Danish Fishermen's Association at national and local level andnephrops fishers in the Kattegat region. These interviews wereconducted as a part of the INTERREG project ØBJ-FISK and FP7project SOCIOEC (Table 1).

2. The regulative context – the discard ban in the coming CFPand the implementation

The 2013–2022 reform of the EU CFP has been through a longprocess. In 2009 the EU commission launched a green paper inorder to raise a debate regarding the reform of the CFP [3]. Thegreen paper summarised the problems of the present fisheriespolicy, poor conditions in many EU fish stocks and fishing fleetsand opened a discussion of new solutions with regard to adecentralisation of decisions, higher level of industry responsibil-ity and elimination of discards. In 2011 a discard ban was regardedas a specific element of the revision of the CFP, as the EuropeanCommission [5] in a non-paper on discard discussed the imple-mentation of discard ban including the industry role in bottom upinitiatives, technical measures and control measures. In June 2013a compromise text between the EU Commission, the EU Parlia-ment and the Council of Ministers was made. The industryresponsibility from the green paper is reduced considerably inthis text. The discard ban and the implementation measures arepresented based on the final compromise text [6] (specific articlesmentioned in brackets below).

The discard ban is now labelled “obligation to land all catches”(article 15). The discard ban is to be implemented gradually from2015 to 2019 on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The discard ban regards“species defining the fisheries” (art 15, 1.b), meaning species whichare subject to catch limits (introduction, 18). However, there aresome exceptions; species with a high survival rate after discardingshould still be discarded (art 15. 1ter, 2), and under certaincircumstances species which are regarded as unavoidable to catchcan be discarded, if they are protected through multiannual plans.As all catches should be landed and the proposal introducesminimum conservation reference size (mcrs) in order to protectjuveniles from marine organisms. The catches below this mcrs levelshould be landed, but cannot be sold for human consumption (art15.5). In principle the fishery can only continue as long as there isquota left for all parts of the catch for individual vessels or groups ofvessels, depending on the principle for distribution of fishing rights.However, the text opens for some flexibility; e.g. it is possible tocount up to 9% bycatch species against the target species quota,depending on the conservation status of the bycatch species (art 15.4a), and up to 10% year-to-year flexibility of the quotas are allowed(art 15.4b). This flexibility is introduced, as the consequence for nothaving a quota for any of the species of catch limit and would be astop for fishing in areas with “risk” of catch of this species.

To ensure compliance, an effective system of control, inspectionand enforcement should be established. In this regard “modern,

effective technologies” are mentioned (introduction 48a and 49),which are later exemplified as “observers, CCTV and other underrespect of efficiency and proportionality” (art. 15, 8).

A central technical measure for conservation of marine biodiver-sity and for reducing unwanted catches is closures; limitation andprohibitions to fish for all or some gear types (article 7, 2 and article7a). Area closures and other implementation steps should be taken atregional level and member state level. The idea of any decentralisa-tion of decisions to regional levels, which was seen as a subject fordiscussion in the green paper, has in the compromise text beenreduced to regional cooperation on conservation measures (art. 17).This includes specific plans for the discard ban. Insofar as specifica-tions can be agreed on by all the relevant member states the RAC isconsulted for a recommendation (the Regional Advisory Council) andthis is proposed to the Commission for adoption. Individual Memberstates can adopt conservation measures under the condition thatthese will not affect fishing vessels of other Member states, if thesemeasures are not less restrictive than the general rules. Memberstates or regional groups of Member states can establish pilotprojects on alternative fishing management techniques and on gearsthat increase selectivity or minimise negative impact of fishingactivities on marine environment (art. 7 h).

3. Experiences of cod avoiding initiatives in Kattegat

The small sea area of Kattegat between Denmark and Swedenhas formed the basis for an intensive mixed bottom trawl fishery forcod and later nephrops. The fishery has had relatively high discardrates and has many experiences of bycatch reducing initiatives,taken by the authorities as well as by the fisher community (Fig. 1).

3.1. Physical and technical attributes

Kattegat is a sea area of 30,000 square kilometres, the ICESstatistical category IIIaS. The main commercial consumption speciesin Kattegat are nephrops, sole, herring, lumpfish, brill, plaice, turbotand cod, which make a total of more than 95% of the landing values.51 species from Kattegat were landed in Danish ports in 2011, mainlyin local ports for sale in regional auctions. The main commercialspecies in Kattegat has changed substantially over the last ten years,

Table 1Registered Danish catches (tons) in Kattegat, selected years. Source: Ministry ofFood, Agriculture and Fishery 2001, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2012.

Species/Year 2000 2005 2008 2010 2011

Nephrops 1452 1189 1430 1742 1137Plaice 1644 1100 866 415 316Cod 3285 593 274 111 96Sole 400 532 361 277 250Total ex sprat 17,952 17,113 12,374 8454 7452

Fig. 1. Map of Kattegat and the closed zones of the Danish–Swedish agreement(areas later slightly changed). Southern black area: permanently closed area.Northern grey area: closed for all types of fisheries (except cages for nephrops)January to March. Open for fishery using special selective gear during the rest of theyear. Grey lined area: closed for fisheries with non-selective gear January to March,open the rest of the year. Three important nephrops ports marked.Source: Ministry of food, agriculture and fishery 2008

S.Q. Eliasen / Marine Policy 45 (2014) 108–113 109

from cod to nephrops. The 2011 catch of cod was only 3% of the catchin 2000, while the catch volume of other important species such asplaice and sole also declined, though not as much. The total value ofconsumption species was € 18.5 million. Nephrops accounted for 63%and sole, 14% while cod were insignificant with less than 1% of thetotal landing value [7,8] (Table 1).

The discard rates in the mixed fishery for nephrops are high.The most important discard species in volume is nephrops ofwhich 75% in numbers and 55% in weight are discarded. But themain conservation focus has been cod with a bycatch of 50% inweight and up to 90% in numbers (based on discard data for 1998–2008, [9]). There are no official discard data for the period after2008, the level has probably decreased due to changes in gear;however, this is undocumented.

The dominant commercial fleet fishing for nephrops in Kattegatin 2011 were 50–70 minor side- and stern-trawlers of 10–18 m intotal length and a crew of 1–4 persons including the skipper. Thetrawlers often also held quota for fisheries in Skagerrak or theNorth Sea, in the Baltic Sea, but for most of the Kattegat fishersnephrops are the main target species.

The management has changed in this period. For protection ofjuvenile cod, the minimum mesh size in cod ends was raised from60 to 70 mm in 1989 and again to 90 mm in 2005. In 2004 a codrecovery plan encompassed the limitation of fishing effort(reduced days-at-sea) and new control measures such as require-ment of notification of landing volume and placing two hoursbefore arrival [10]. The days at sea regulations were fixed at acertain level depending on the type of gear. For the EU trawlers inKattegat using 90 mm trawl the yearly days-at-sea were at 108days in 2005, later decreasing to 71 days. If the trawl wassupplemented with a 120 mm square-mesh window in the toppanel, the maximum days-at-sea were increased by 30 days a year[11–13]. The 120 mm top panel was generally utilised after a fewyears [14].

The regulations following the cod recovery plan of 2004 did notlead to the intended reduction of fish mortality and rebuilding ofthe cod stocks. Thus, a new regulation [15] replaced the 2004regulation. Further, this regulation strengthened the fishing effortlimitations and procedures for the setting of TACs. If the stock ispredicted to be below the minimum spawning biomass, the fishingmortality should be reduced by 25% a year, in which case the TACand the fishing effort (days-at-sea) should be reduced by the samepercentage. Further, in 2008 the regulation of fishing opportunitiesstated: “When fishing in the Kattegat, a day present in the areaduring the period between 1 February 2008 and 30 April 2008shall be counted as 2.5 days” [16], 8.2, p. 119. This was the pressureinitiating the first example of the cod avoidance initiative: Selec-tive Behaviour. However, in the regulation Member States wereallowed to develop new mechanisms and thereby avoid theautomatic reduction of days-at-sea. This was the basis for thesecond bycatch reducing initiative: the Danish Swedish agreementof closed areas in Kattegat.

3.2. The initiative “Selective Behaviour”

The initiative to the project “Selective Behaviour” came fromthe fisher-owned Læsø Fiskeindustri (LF), the largest Danishprocessor of nephrops with facilities on the Island of Læsø, inSkagen and Frederikshavn (all in the Kattegat region see Fig. 1); aswell as in Peterhead, Scotland. The 2008 regulation of counting 2.5days-at-sea for each day in the spring would lead to lack ofresources in these months and could jeopardise the existence ofthe company. The industry and the owners (nephrops fishers)were convinced that a group of vessels especially targetingnephrops had a very low bycatch of cod. Therefore they wantedto establish a project which could a) document the low bycatch of

cod in a way which could convince the authorities (Danish and EU)and b) establish a structure which could support the low level ofbycatch of cod.

3.2.1. The content of “Selective Behaviour”The project consisted of three elements as described in a

document developed in cooperation with Aalborg University [17]:

1. Documentation of catches, discard and landings of cod. Docu-mented by landing data, discard data from the fisheries control,the discard survey programme with an oversampling in Katte-gat, and an expected reference fleet programme (which werenever realised though) and satellite based vessel monitoringsystem (VMS) at all included vessels (also for vessels below12 m) to document catch area.

2. Real-time closures of areas based on fishers’ reports of catch of cod,juvenile as well as cod over the Minimum Landing Size (MLS).

3. A practical and legitimising body based on a “Code of Conduct”for the participating vessels regarding being open for observers,taking VMS aboard and participating in the reporting of codcatches. Læsø Fiskeindustri would be responsible for the codeof conduct being respected by the participants.

The voluntary participants in the project would be vesselsfishing nephrops in Kattegat which would follow the code ofconduct. More specifically the participants would consist of twogroups:

� A “core group” of vessels with nephrops as a large part of theircatches and less than 5% cod (from Kattegat) in the landingvolume.

� The “reference groups” of vessels with a significant share ofnephrops in their landings, but with a more mixed fishery andmore than 5% cod in their landings and quotas. This groupshould contribute with documentation of the fisheries inKattegat (especially information about cod).

The first element of the project focused on documenting theclaimed low cod bycatch by the core group of vessels. Thedocumentation was established on extended use of existingregistrations and surveys. This approach was taken to avoid theapproach of “full documentation” based on electronic surveillanceby CCTV [2], which was seen as intimidating. Documentation oflow cod catch would not immediately influence the 2½ day perday-at-sea in the spring months. But the longer term purpose wasto get free days-at-sea for the core group vessels. The 2008regulation opened for free days-at-sea for vessels which docu-mented less than 5% cod, sole and plaice in the landings. The hopeof LF was to persuade the EU Commission to reformulate the lastpoint to be less than 5% cod (and exclude sole and plaice from thelimitation), as only the cod stock was in a critical situation inKattegat. This would give free days-at-sea for the core group offishers, and an all year continuous flow of resources for LF.

The second element of the project regarded establishing a systemof real-time closures of areas with many juvenile cod. The fishers ofthe project were supposed to report catches of cod in the nephropstrawl. A high level of cod under the MLS would then lead to theclosure of a predefined area for three weeks, after which it wouldautomatically reopen. Areas with juvenile cod would be closed for all,while areas with many cod over MLS would be closed on a voluntarybasis for the fishers targeting nephrops and less than 5% cod. The ideaof voluntary closures was not new to the fishers in the region whichhad discussed this measure in an other relation. Further the fishershad followed the recent development of a project of real-time closuresin Scotland, which was implemented from September 2007 [18]. The

S.Q. Eliasen / Marine Policy 45 (2014) 108–113110

LF project did not go any further in developing the real-time closuresconcerning predefining areas, defining bycatch levels to trigger aclosure or the practicalities of collecting data and managing closures,which are central elements in fleet communication systems [19–21].

The advantages of participating in the real-time closure systemfor the core group would be to get information about hotspots,areas with risk of relative high catch of cod, which wouldendanger the free days-at-sea as hoped for. For the referencegroup, with a higher quota and catch of cod, participation wouldnot only tell them where not to go (the juvenile hotspots), butinform about good places to go for catch of the cod quota. A moreindirect advantage for both groups would be securing the survivalof the local processing industry.

The third element was establishment of a “Code of Conduct”(CoC) for selective behaviour in the nephrops fishery, describingthe obligations of the participating vessels. It was seen as acollective responsibility to follow the code of conduct, but LFwas outwardly responsible towards authorities and others for thecollective selective behaviour as described in the code. If it wasviolated by individual vessels they would lose the right to fishunder the specific conditions that the project was hoping to obtainfor the participants, free days-at-sea or information about codabundance.

3.2.2. The outcome of the projectThe project was never implemented. No single reason has

been identified, but the following is of importance; the manage-rial pressure changed, the project faced internal organisationalproblems and another competing initiative gained politicalsupport.

The direct incentive for the project was already reduced after ayear, as the cost of 2½ days-at-sea/day in February-April wasremoved in the regulation for 2009 [22], which reduced the pressureat the LF processing plant. Nevertheless LF representatives continuedarguing politically in favour of the project. The project gained somesupport from the local as well as the national fishermen's associa-tions. But it never gained any top priority here. The project did notsolve the problem of reduced days-at-sea for all Kattegat trawlers; ifsuccessful, it was only for the part of the fleet targeting nephropsmainly in the Northern part of Kattegat. The reference group in theproject could gain information of areas of cod abundance. But theyand other non-participating Kattegat trawlers were reduced in days-at-sea according to the cod recovery plan. The national DanishFishermen´s Association was looking for more generic solutions toreduce the number of days-at-sea, as more selective gear, and theDanish and the Swedish Government agreement regarding closedareas in Kattegat is as described below [23].

In the Danish Ministry of Food there was some reluctanceregarding the project. The Ministry was already engaged in theDanish/Swedish initiative described below. Besides the Ministrypreferred not to rely on the proposed combination of existingcontrol data, but was engaged in another approach of directsurveillance for “full documentation” based on electronic monitor-ing of fisher behaviour based on VMS data, registration of deckmachinery and CCTV on deck. This was seen as a more confidentway of documentation and was a central tool for the Danishattempt to introduce catch quota management in the EU fisheriespolicy [2].

3.2.3. Lessons learned from project “Selective Behaviour”

� Level and form of documentation of behaviour and complianceare central issues. The fishers preferred extended registrationand documentation to avoid “full documentation”, based onelectronic surveillance, which they found intimidating.

� Fisher information sharing of catch composition can be used forofficial real-time closure to protect juveniles, but also for fisher-internal warning of high abundance of unwanted species.

� Fisher self-organisations often react on changed managementpressure. In a rapidly changing regulative environment thespecific incentives for the organisation can erode before it iseven established.

3.3. The Danish–Swedish agreement on closed areas in Kattegat

The cod recovery plan would lead to a 25% reduction of days-at-sea for trawlers in Kattegat. This challenged the Danish fisheryand the Danish Ministry to establish alternative measures. One ofthese was a bilateral agreement between the governments ofSweden and Denmark regarding closed areas for cod fishery inKattegat and in the northern part of Øresund. The plan was ineffect from January 1, 2009.

3.3.1. Content of the Danish–Swedish agreementThree types of closed areas were agreed upon: a permanent

closed area, identified as the most important spawning area forcod and closed for all types of fishery all year; an area closed for alltypes of fisheries (except cages for nephrops) in the period fromJanuary to March, but open for fisheries using special selectivegear during the rest of this year and finally a seasonal closed area(January to March), closed for fisheries with non-selective gear(see Fig. 1 for location of areas).

Closed areas are relatively easy to monitor by VMS and aircontrol. But for the fishers, the consequences of the closuresdiffered regionally. Especially the permanent closure (the red area)was a central fishing ground for the Danish fishers from Gilleleje(the North of Zeeland), while it had delimited importance for theSwedish fishers (with traditionally low activity in that area) andfor the Danish fishers from the Northern part of Kattegat [24].

3.3.2. Reactions and effects of the agreementThe fishers, especially those from the Southern Kattegat, did

not fully accept the agreement. Most violations of the closureswere seen in the Southern permanent closed area [25]. The mostremarkable case of illegal fishery in the closed area was docu-mented by GPS trackers placed in secrecy in Gilleleje vessels byactivists from Greenpeace. The GPS tracking over more than sixmonths showed several illegal entrances by more than five vessels.In an interview, one of the convicted fishers regrets the illegalfishing, but explains that he felt it was morally legalised by twofactors. First, the area is only closed to Danish and Swedish fishers,while a few German fishers with quotas in Kattegat fish entirelylegally in the area. Second, the closure is a part of the cod recoveryplan, but except for first quarter of the year, there is almost no codin the area, which is the traditionally good local fishing area fornephrops. The lower abundance of cod outside the first quarterwas also seen in the landing registrations from the trips of theirillegal fishing and the legal German fishing (interview Gillelejefisher Jan, 2012).

The effect of the closed areas were evaluated in 2012 conclud-ing that the fishing impact on cod was reduced to around 40% ofthe 2008 level, but the effect of closed areas could not bedisentangled from the use of selective gear and general decreasein the effort level. The evaluation found a low density of cod in thepermanently closed area in May to December as stated by thefishers [25].

The closures together with the use of 120 mm square meshpanel in the trawl and the quota flexibility in the transferablequota system lead to an acceptance from the EU Commission to setthe automatic reduction of days-at-sea in the cod recovery plan on

S.Q. Eliasen / Marine Policy 45 (2014) 108–113 111

hold in the period 2010–2013. In that way the closures contributedto reduce the pressure on days-at-sea for all Kattegat trawlers.

3.3.3. Lessons learned from the Danish–Swedish agreement

� Regulations which restrict some, but not all, EU fishers in an areaare regarded as unfair and increase risk of non-compliance.

� The specific elements of the regulation should be understand-able and logical to the fishers, otherwise the regulation loseslegitimacy and the risk of non-compliance increases.

� Discussion – lessons for regional implementation of the discardban in the EU.

The two examined initiatives address challenges for thenephrops bottom trawling due to a reduction in days-at-seafollowing the cod recovery plan for Kattegat, where a high fishingpressure on cod, partly due to bycatch, would automaticallyreduce the days-at-sea in the following year. Under a full mon-itored discard ban catch to or over the quota limit for any singlequota species will close fishing opportunities for the fisher whocannot avoid catch of this species – even if there is sufficient quotafor other species. Therefore systems for avoidance or reducedcatch of critical or choke species are decisive for the fishery. This isone of the central issues for the steps to implement the discardban at regional or national level.

3.4. Establishing organisations for industry responsibility

Although industry responsibility is not mentioned directly inthe CFP text it has been a political issue in the reform process. The“Selective Behaviour” behaviour exemplifies a voluntary, self-/co-managed system. The organisation to hold this was never estab-lished. But it was clear that it would take time. The incentives forthe individual participant should be clear. In this case the incen-tives differed between the processing industry, the core group offishers and the reference group of fishers. It was never tested if theincentives were strong enough for the fishers to take the troubleand risk of sharing information, because the initiating regulation(2.5 to 1 day-at sea in the spring) was changed after a year andanother measure (area closures) was implemented to reach thegoal of cod avoidance. This indicates that the industry needsrelatively stable incentives, as adjustments (and here buildingnew organisations) take time. If the incentives change rapidlycreation of new formal and informal institutions cannot take placeand become stabilised.

3.5. Tools for documentation

Efficient tools for documentation of behaviour and compliance areincreasingly important under a discard ban (de facto catch quotas) asall catches should be landed. The “Selective Behaviour” proposalillustrates that the fishers saw the political necessity of a higher levelof documentation. They proposed an extended use of the existingdata collection in order to avoid the full documentation approach ofCCTV and other electronic surveillance, which was seen as intimidat-ing. In the implementation of the discard ban, it is important todevelop tools for control which are effective and accepted asproportional by the fishing industry. The Selective Behaviour projectnever got the opportunity to develop the combined documentationapproach; therefore it still remains to be seen if this could be atrustworthy method of documentation under a discard ban.

3.6. Real time closure and fisher information systems

Real-time-closures have been used in various situations in EU inthe last years, e.g. in Scotland and Skagerrak [18,26] mainly in order

to avoid the catch of juveniles. Under a discard ban potentially allquota species and sizes can turn out to be critical (choke) speciesand close a fishery, especially in case of a mismatch between quotaand actual abundance. Therefore knowledge of areas of highabundance of actual critical species will be of importance for theskippers trip planning. There are attempts to model and foreseelocation of fish in a long-term perspective [27], but this modelling isnot yet realised. Therefore real-time warnings of hotspots (areaswith high density of the critical species), as in the “SelectiveBehaviour” project, can be a more appropriate answer to thechallenge. The hotspots could be avoided or targeted, dependingof the quota situation for the specific vessel.

A system for hotspot warning needs to be developed. The eLogdata might be sufficiently detailed (complemented by precise dataof catch location) to provide (almost) real-time data on fishdensity at specific locations. If systems for managing data anddefinitions of hotspots are clear, the maps of hotspots could behandled as a public good in line with weather forecasts. But if eLogdata is not sufficiently detailed, a voluntary system of reportinghas to be established. In a voluntary system incentives for theindividual fisher to participate and share information about catchvolume and locality have to be clear [21,28]. The skippers have totake the workload of a parallel reporting, and as many of theskippers regard catch data as confidential, collection and manage-ment of these data should be done by an independent operatortrusted by the participants [20]. A fleet information system mightbe a useful tool under a fully monitored discard ban. But modelsfor such information systems still have to be developed incooperation with the fishing industry.

3.7. Regional agreements should include all EU vessels in the region

The temporarily and permanently closed areas in Kattegat werea result of a bilateral agreement between Denmark and Sweden,not an EU level agreement. Therefore, it did not bind the Germanvessels with quotas in the area. The Danish fishers which normallyfished in the area felt this was not fair, and the legitimacy of theregulation decreased. This points at the need for getting regionalagreements with binding status for all EU vessels with fishingrights in the area, rather than using the opportunity to adoptconservation measures at national level “if they do not affectfishing vessels of other Member States” [6] p. 38]. Rules for someand not all vessels in the area undermine the legitimacy of theregulation and in this case at least, the compliance.

3.8. Clear goals for measures – taking MSFD into open consideration

The permanent closure of an area in the Southern part ofKattegat was argued for as a protection of cod. The fishers’experiences and Danish scientists supported a three monthclosure for protection of cod juveniles, but did not find anyarguments in cod protection for a permanent closure. The claimedgoal as perceived by the fishers (cod protection) for the measure(permanent closure) is contradicted by the fishers’ experiences.This contradiction leads to low legitimacy of the regulation andnon-compliance. Thus it is important to establish a commonunderstanding of goal and mean between the managers and theinvolved fisher groups.

The permanent closure was maintained after an evaluation in2012. The reasoning is not clear as the two groups of scientistswere disagreeing [25]. It could be that the goal of the closure haschanged over time and now also includes the goals of the MarineStrategy Framework Directive (MSFD) [29]. The evaluation of theDanish–Swedish closures also included an evaluation of effects forobtaining Good Environmental Status according to the descriptors,commercial stocks, biodiversity, food-web and sea-floor [25].

S.Q. Eliasen / Marine Policy 45 (2014) 108–113112

In the implementation of the discard ban (and other CFP measure)it seems to be important to be very explicit in the goals, especiallyif the goals reflect the broader MSFD descriptors.

4. Concluding remarks

A major challenge in the new CFP is an implementation of thediscard ban. Such implementation should be based on existingexperiences and structures if possible. Therefore two initiatives ofcod avoidance in Kattegat have been examined. This examinationprovides warnings and ideas. In the implementation of the discardban control measures should be effective, but still be regarded asproportional by the stakeholders. The implementation at regionallevel should take place in a process which ensures that themeasures are regarded as fair by covering all relevant fishers inthe region, not only fishers from one or few nations. Finally to berespected and gain legitimacy the implementation process shouldensure that the goals of the measures are clear. This is increasinglyimportant when the MSFD descriptors are included in the con-servation pillar of the CFP. While the commercial stock conserva-tion are clearly in the long-term interest of the fishers, otherdescriptors are more intangible to the fishers and in some casesthey might also contradict the long-term interest of certain groupsof fishers. Such an open and fair process should also lead toregulations, where the incentives created by the measures arestable for at least a few years. In such cases the fishers and fishers’organisations are more capable in being active partners in thedevelopment of measures to implement the discard ban. Theexamination revealed an example of a fisher initiated idea ofreal-time closure, which also holds the seed for a fleet informationsystem, which can provide the skipper with information abouthotspots of unwanted species and allow him to plan the selectivefishery on a better informed basis.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to acknowledge funding from the EU FP7SOCIOEC (Contract number 289192) and the INTERREG 4 projectØBJ FISK (Contract number 167206). He is grateful to PostdocTroels Hegland and to Professor Jesper Raakjær for helpful com-ments on earlier drafts.

References

[1] Rochet M, Trenkel VM. Factors for the variability of discards: assumptions andfield evidence. Can J Fish Aquat Sci 2005;62(1):224–35.

[2] Dalskov JKL. Final report of fully documented fishery. Report no.: DTU Aquareport no. 204-2009. Charlottenlund: National Institute of Aquatic Resources,Technical University of Denmark; 2009.

[3] European Commission. Green paper. Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy,COM 163. Brussels; 2009.

[4] Johnsen JP, Eliasen S. Solving complex fisheries management problems: whatthe EU can learn from the Nordic experiences of reduction of discards. MarPolicy 2011;35(2):130–9.

[5] European Commission. Non-paper on discards ban for discussion with thestakeholders in Brussels on 3 may 2011. Directorate-General for maritimeaffairs and fisheries policy. Development and co-ordination; 2011.

[6] Council of the European Union. Regulation proposal for a regulation of theEuropean parliament and of the council on the Common Fisheries Policy.

Approval of the final compromise text. 10269/13 PECHE 245 CODEC 1359;2013).

[7] Ministry of food, agriculture and fishery. Fiskeristatistisk årbog 2000, table 2.3.Fiskeridirektoratet; 2001.

[8] Ministry of food, agriculture and fishery. Fiskeristatistisk årbog 2011, table 2.3.Fiskeridirektoratet; 2012.

[9] Badminton. Bycatch and discards: management indicators, trends and loca-tion, work package 1 (WP1) – milestone report, table 3a, Kattegat (IIIa,IIIn).IJmuiden, NL: IMARES; 2010.

[10] Council regulation (EC) no. 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 establishingmeasures for the recovery of cod stocks; 2004.

[11] Council regulation (EC) no. 27/2005 of 22 December 2004. Fixing for 2005 thefishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks andgroups of fish stocks, applicable in community waters and, for communityvessels, in waters where catch limitations are required; 2004.

[12] Council regulation (EC) no. 51/2006 of 22 December 2005. Fixing for 2006 thefishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks andgroups of fish stocks, applicable in community waters and, for communityvessels, in waters where catch limitations are required; 2005.

[13] Council regulation (EC) no. 41/2007 of 21 December 2006. Fixing for 2007 thefishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks andgroups of fish stocks, applicable in community waters and, for communityvessels, in waters where catch limitations are required; 2006.

[14] Madsen N, Valentinsson D. Use of selective devices in trawls to supportrecovery of the Kattegat cod stock: a review of experiments and experience.ICES J Mar Sci: J Cons 2010;67(9):2042–50.

[15] Council regulation (EC) no. 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008. Establishing along-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks andrepealing regulation; 2008.

[16] Council regulation (EC) no. 40/2008 of 16 January 2008. Fixing for 2008 thefishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks andgroups of fish stocks, applicable in community waters and, for communityvessels, in waters where catch limitations are required; 2008.

[17] Eliasen S Raakjær J. “Selektiv adfærd” – dokumentation af størrelsen aftorskebifangsten i jomfruhummerfiskeriet i det nordlige Kattegat og enanalyse af adfærds- og redskabsselektivitet i dette fiskeri (selective behaviour– documentation of the volume of cod bycatch in the nephrops fishery in thenorthern Kattegat and an analysis of behavioural and gear selectivity in thisfishery); 2008. Unpublished.

[18] Scottish G. Real time closures. Available from: ⟨http://www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/fisheries/sea-fisheries/compliance/closures⟩; 2013. Sect. 9/24.

[19] Gauvin JR, Hilfinger K, Nerini M. Implementation of a voluntary bycatchavoidance program in the flatfish fisheries of the eastern bering sea. Solvingbycatch: consideration for today and tomorrow. Alaska Sea Grant ProgramReport 96-03. Fairbanks, AK: University of Alaska, Fairbanks; 1995; 79.

[20] Gilman EL, Dalzell P, Martin S. Fleet communication to abate fisheries bycatch.Mar Policy 2006;30(4):360–6.

[21] O'Keefe CE, Cadrin SX, Stokesbury KDE. Evaluating effectiveness of time/areaclosures, quotas/caps, and fleet communications to reduce fisheries bycatch.ICES J Mar Sci: J Cons 2013.

[22] Council regulation (EC) no. 43/2009 of 16 January 2009. Fixing for 2009 thefishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks andgroups of fish stocks, applicable in community waters and, for communityvessels, in waters where catch limitations are required; 2009.

[23] Andersen SE. Personal communication Chairman of the Danish fishermen'sassociation; November 11, 2013.

[24] Ministry of food, agriculture and fishery. Bekendtgørelse om forbud mod visseformer for fiskeri i nærmere afgrænsede områder i kattegat og nordlige del afØresund BEK nr 1415 af 23/12/2008. Lovtidende A; 2008.

[25] Sköld M, Vinther M, et al. Evaluation of closed areas in Kattegat to promotethe rebuilding of the cod stock. Report to Swedish ministry for rural affairsand the Danish ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries; June 2012.

[26] Real time closures. Ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries [Internet].Available from: ⟨http://agrifish.dk/⟩.

[27] Beyer JE, Pedersen MF, Wieland K, Andersen NG. Optimization of fisheriesresource exploitation in the Skagerrak (Oskar). DTU Aqua Report no. 239-2011.DTU Aqua; 2011.

[28] Haynie AC, Hicks RL, Schnier KE. Common property, information, andcooperation: commercial fishing in the Bering Sea. Ecol Econ 2009;69(2):406–13.

[29] Establishing a framework for community action in the field of marineenvironmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive). Directive2008/56/EC of European parliament and of the council. 164/19; 17 June, 2008.

S.Q. Eliasen / Marine Policy 45 (2014) 108–113 113