co-existence and prior rights agreements in the … and prior rights agreements in the pharma...
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Co-Existence and Prior Rights Agreements in the Pharma Industry
PTMG Conference Vienna, October 2013
Frank Meixner - Chief Trademark Counsel Bayer Group
• PTMG Conference Vienna, October 2013
Agenda A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Introduction
Contract type
Restraint of trade considerations
Typical clauses
Beware of potential downsides
Acknowledgements
Page 2
A. 1. Definition
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“Contract by which the owners of two similar or identical trademarks undertake to delimit their respective scope of activities under the trademark in order to avoid a market confusion and the filing of trademark actions” (Pollaud-Dulian, la Propriété intellectuelle)
“Contract by which in the mutual interest of the contractual parties the scope of use of their respective trademarks is determined in order to avoid confusion or conflicts” (BAT v. Commission 1985 Toltecs/Dorcet II)
A. 1 Definition
Other terms with identical or similar meaning:
Delimitation Agreements
Prior Rights Agreements - often used where
contract only limits registration and/or use of the
junior mark
Consent Agreements - Type of co-existence
agreement typically used to obtain registration
with corresponding right of use in countries with
ex officio examination for relative grounds refusal
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A. 2 Relevance
Estimates that co-existence agreements are
concluded in more than 50 % of all trademark
applications
High practical relevance is disproportionate to a
somewhat underdeveloped academic debate
Low number of court precedents
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Co-Existence Agreements are a success story
A. 2.1 Globalisation
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A growing need for global marks
increases number of conflicts
Linguistic and cultural hurdles in
some countries/regions further
reduce the number of available
candidates
Required global marketing
attractiveness
Regulatory admissibility as a
challenge with a lot of uncertainty
Page 6
A. 2.1 Globalisation
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trademark
availability
no linguistic or
cultural obstacles
acceptable regulatory
risk profile
attractive for
marketing Globalization
A. 2.2 Clogging of trademark registers
Shortage of available
trademarks due to
clogging of registers
Worsened by filing of
several fallback candidates
as a consequence of high
unpredictability of outcome
of regulatory approval
process
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A. 2.2 Clogging of trademark registers
Class 5
Other classes
784.820
(79.275)
1.594.628
(68.344)
1.001.605
(79.288) 888.373
(84.839)
461.898
(32.211)
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Statistics:
Active registered trademarks (2012)
DE US UK FR CTM
A. 2.2 Clogging of trademark registers
Class 5
Other classes
59.849
(2.271) 40.769
(1.819)
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New filings in 2012
DE US UK FR CTM
314.668
(15.094)
86.000
(5.300)
107.924
(10.433)
A. 2.2 Clogging of trademark registers
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Total
Class 5
DE US UK FR CTM +11,0
+6,1
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Growth rate (in %)
-6,6
+5,5
+4,3
-3,6
-5,7
+4,79
+2,4
+4,3
A. 2.3 More competitors from BRIC
and other countries
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Traditionally
pharmaceutical
companies
primarily
domiciled in
Europe,
US, Japan
New
multinational
players
(predominantly
generics) in
other regions
such as BRIC
Roll-out of global
mark from different
regions increases the
risk that
trademark conflict is
identified too late for a
switch
Co-existence agreement often the one and only solution
B. Contract classification
License § 30 MarkenG
trademark registration does not entitle
owner ability to grant a right to use
similar trademarks
conflicting trademarks exist
independently, junior trademark is not
a derivation of the prior trademark
only in exceptional case of identical
trademarks (cross-licensing)
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Germany
B. Contract classification
Settlement Agreement § 779 BGB
dispute over specific legal relationship
concessions of both parties
only used to settle pending legal
proceedings with mutual obligations
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Germany
B. Contract classification
Agreement Sui Generis
no specific provisions in German Civil
Code
provisions on general contract law are
applicable
supported by majority of academic
literature
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Germany
B. Contract classification
Settlement agreement Art. 2044 Code civil
a contract according to which the
parties terminate a disagreement and
prevent a dispute from arising
Unilateral contract Art. L 1103 Code Civil
where mutual concessions are
missing and only one party is bound
mere consent
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France
B. Contract classification
Settlement agreement (Apple Corp vs Apple
Computers [1991] 3 CULR 99; WWF Case [2001] EWHC CH 482)
„this was a settlement agreement. It was made on the footing that each party had some legitimate interest in its trademarks and logos which it wishes to protect. The agreement was drawn up specifically so as to avoid challenges and contests in a host of countries. It was implicit in such a settlement that the parties were not attempting a finite assessment of all their rights country by country …“
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United Kingdom
B. Contract classification
Trademark law is much more focused on
consumer protection rather than
trademarks as intangible assets
As a consequence, whether trademarks
really are the full property of their owners
unencumbered by public interest is
subject to debate
Consent agreement serves as evidence
that there is no likelihood of confusion in
order to convince the USPTO of
registrability of junior mark
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USA
B. Contract classification
No big debate about contract classification
except:
„Whereas a license brings the parties together into a common public image and a joint enterprise, a consent agreement keeps the parties apart at a defined distance.
A license integrates, while a consent differentiates”
Mc Carthy on Trademarks §18:79)
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USA
C. Restraint of trade considerations
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Trademarks are monopoly rights
Such monopolies by definition restrain free competition
C. Restraint of trade considerations
EC Toltecs/Dorcet II C 35/83
„delimitation agreements are lawful and useful if they serve to delimit in the mutual interest of the parties, the spheres within which their respective trademarks may be used, and are intended to avoid confusion or conflict between them“
But Art. 101 I TFEU is applicable if
dividing up of the market or
restricting competition in other ways
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European Union
C. Restraint of trade considerations
Germany: Federal Supreme Court KZR
71/08 Jette Joop
Is there an actual trademark conflict?
Does the conflict justify the contractual
delimitation?
„It is sufficient that the parties consider a conflict situation „seriously possible at the execution date of the agreement or that a serious reason based on objective facts exists …”
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Germany
C. Restraint of trade considerations
No likelihood of confusion
Territorial scope of the agreement is bigger
than actual conflict situation (no global scope
of delimitation in cases of purely national
conflict)
No-challenge clause prohibits attack on the
validity of the prior trademark on the basis of
non-use or vulgarization (not explicitly
confirmed by German courts)
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Germany
C. Restraint of trade considerations
France: Court of Appeal of Paris, 4th Chamber,
section A, 1 June 2005, 05/06010
„The admissibility of trademark coexistence agree-ments with the purpose of delimiting in the mutual interest of the parties, the sphere of use of their trademarks with a view to avoiding confusion and conflicts cannot be contested with the sole reservation that they do respect competition law. So that only agreements which are not aimed at protecting the implicit interests of a trademark, but at preventing or restricting in an abusive manner, marketing of com-petitive products, should be prohibited as constituting an abusive use of intellectual property rights.”
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France
C. Restraint of trade considerations
Exceeding the implicit interests of a trademark
(obligations clearly broader than what could
be requested under trademark law)
Aimed at preventing or restricting marketing of
competing products in a abusive manner
No-challenge clause prohibits attack on the
validity of the prior trademark on the basis of
non-use or vulgarization (not explicitly
confirmed by French courts)
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France
C. Restraint of trade considerations
UK: WWF (Justice Jacob [2001] EWHC CH
482)
IP rights by definition are an independent restraint on
trade
Settlement agreement must be more than an
undertaking not to infringe the right
It must be possible to independently define what it is
the restrained party must not do
Laws governing IP rights not always clear cut
In the interest of everyone it must be possible to settle
such disputes
As a principle high hurdle to nullify such agreements
based on restraint of trade considerations
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United Kingdom
C. Restraint of trade considerations
Restraint imposes a real fetter on the other party‘s
trade
Restraint goes beyond any reasonably arguable
scope of protection of the rights in issue
Under special circumstance even that can be
justified by restrainee by showing that restraint
provides a protection which he reasonably needs
Arguably a global settlement would not be deemed
void (“broad brush approach”)
No-challenge clause prohibits attack on the validity
of the prior trademark on the basis of non-use or
vulgarization (not explicitly confirmed by UK courts)
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United Kingdom
C. Restraint of trade considerations
Different approach: restraints in the
interest of consumer protection
The more the parties are restricted the
more is the consumer protected against
confusion
Antitrust law is rarely discussed in the
context of coexistence agreements
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USA
C. Restraint of trade considerations
Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc. (117 F. 3d at 59):
„antitrust laws do not guarantee competitors the right to compete free of encum-brances …. so long as competition as a whole is not significantly affected”
Coexistence presumptively valid under antitrust
law as long as someone can introduce a similar or
identical product under a different mark
Parties can bargain for a greater separation
between their respective uses than would be
required by general trademark and unfair
competition law
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USA
C. Restraint of trade considerations
Parties have significant discretion since
they know best how confusion can be
avoided
The parties‘ judgment should not be
replaced by USPTO or courts unless it is
a „naked“ consent agreement
Consumer confusion must be avoided
(e.g. no „naked“ consent)
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USA
D. Typical clauses
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1. Acknowledgement of prior right and no challenge clause
• Acknowledgement of
prior rights
• Undertaking of applicant
not to attack the prior
trademark to the extent
admissible under anti-
trust law
• Toleration of new
registrations and
modifications thereof
Priority No challenge Toleration
Applicant acknowledges the prior rights of Proprietor and
undertakes to refrain from asserting rights deriving from the
registration and/or use of Applicant‘s trademarks against
Proprietor‘s trademark and also to tolerate new registrations of
Proprietor‘s trademark and modifications thereof except for………
D. Typical clauses
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2. Delimitation
Means of delimitation used most often
Preferably not only right to use but also scope of registration
(list of goods) restricted
Reference to specific goods rather than classes
by Goods
Color
Size and position
Combination with other elements
by Marks
D. Typical clauses
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2. Delimitation
End consumer, professional users, B-to-B
E.g. pharmacies, hospitals, retail or drug stores, online etc.
Risk: unforeseen overlap by change of market environment
(e.g. liberalization of pharmacy market in Germany or France)
by Distribution channels / Clientele
Problematic under anti-trust law since it results in
partitioning of markets
Arguably admissible in conflict between earlier national mark of EU
member state and younger CTM
By Geographical territory
D. Typical clauses
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3. Cooperation
• Coexistence may be
problematic in countries
with a strict examination
for relative grounds for
refusal
• Coexistence agreement
usually not considered in
office proceedings
• Letter of Consent may be
necessary to overcome
office objection
Office examination Irrelevance of agreement LoC
At the request of either party, the other shall furnish all declarations
or documents (e.g. a Letter of Consent) reasonably necessary to
allow the other party to obtain the registration of its trademark,
provided that its scope complies with the terms of this Agreement.
The requesting party shall bear all reasonable costs incurred for
the delivery of such declarations / documents.
D. Typical clauses
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4. Validity for affiliates, successors in title
US Europe
• Presumption that successor steps
into the shoes of its predecessor or
assignor even without notice
(consumer protection)
• notice requirements in case of
assignment are recommended
• the general notion seems to be
that obligations cannot be
imposed on third parties
(assignees etc.) without their
explicit consent
This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding on the
parties, their legal successors, assignees, licensees as well as
associated companies. Where appropriate, the Parties undertake
to impose the obligations resulting from this Agreement on their
legal successors, assignees, licensees as well as associated
companies
D. Typical clauses
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5. Territorial scope
Principle Exception Risk
• Territorial scope limited to
countries where conflict
already exists
• Purely national conflict
often the beginning of
predictable global conflict
• Parties‘ wish to provide
for global solution of
conflict
• Anti-trust implications
since global agree-
ment not justified by
existing global conflict
This Agreement shall be valid for all countries, where the Proprietor
has acquired or will acquire prior rights. In countries where the
Applicant is entitled to or will acquire the prior rights, it shall allow
the Proprietor to register and use its trademark concerned under
equivalent provisions
D. Typical clauses
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6. Termination clause
as a principle parties intend to provide for permanent solution
underlying circumstances subject to unforeseen change
(especially non-use of mark by one party)
arguably in many jurisdictions coexistence agreement as continuing
obligation subject to termination
Termination should be clearly stipulated
This Agreement may be terminated by either party with …….
days prior written notice if the other party has finally given up
use of its trademarks
D. Typical clauses
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7. Choice of law and jurisdiction
often this last topic is difficult to be agreed on
preference of most parties for their home jurisdiction
Europeans often try to avoid US jurisdiction, neutral jurisdiction bears risks
difficult choice since it cannot be foreseen where conflict/breach of contract
will first occur
not all jurisdictions recognize validity
may have impact on ability to oppose
D. Typical clauses
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6. Termination clause
The evidence before me showed that each of the parties was overtly adamant that it did not whish to accept the other‘s jurisdiction or governing law, and could reach no agreement on any other jurisdiction or governing law. As a result [the agreement] contains no governing law clause and no jurisdiction clause. In addition, neither party wanted to give the other an advantage in terms of where the agreement was finalized. If their intention in doing so was to create obscurity and difficulty for lawyers to debate in future years, they have succeeded handsomely…
Apple Corp. vs. Apple Computer
E. Beware of potential downsides
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Dilution
• Coexistence as
reduction of scope
of protection
• Weakened
defense position in
future conflicts
Expansion
hurdle
• Restricted flexibility
in terms of further
expansion or
repositioning of the
mark
Goodwill
• Potential risk to
associated good-
will if trademarks
are too close and
the other side is
subject of a public
scandal
(see WWF case)
Regulatory
• Coexistence
agreement of
trademark priority
not considered by
regulatory bodies
• For patient safety
reasons trade-
marks may be too
close to coexist
• Regulatory appro-
val is at risk if other
party is first to
apply for regulatory
approval
F. Acknowledgements
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Simon Bentley,
Abel & Imray,
London
Jeffrey Gitchel,
Bayer Corp.,
Pittsburgh
Emmanuelle Tévenin
Gérard Lamoureux
Hirsch & Associés,
Paris