cmis report 2011

gt wwwacmcgovaugt wwwacmcgovau

Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar

Civil‑Military Effectiveness building tomorrowrsquos capabilities

Summary Report

2 ACMC Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar (CMIS)

Contents

Executive Summary 3

1 Introduction 6

2 Current trends future needs determining tomorrowrsquos civil‑military requirements 7

21 The economic needs of transition 7

22 Conditions of flux in humanitarianism 8

23 More natural disasters in more complex environments 9

24 Emerging concerns 10

3 Local‑level processes ownership in practice 11 31 Analysis 11

32 Capability 14

33 Emerging difficulties and dilemmas 15

4 New and non‑traditional players 16 41 Analysis 16

42 Capability 19


5 The importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness 21 51 Analysis 21

52 Capability 24


6 Prevention and preparedness for conflicts and disasters 27 61 Analysis 27

62 Capability 31


7 Civilndashmilitary guidelines from concept to practice 33 71 Analysis 33

8 The way ahead an agenda for civil‑military effectiveness 35 81 The top three priorities 35

References 36

Further reading 40

Relevant links 42


Executive SummaryDecades of peace operations stabilisation efforts and disaster relief have resulted in widespread agreement about the civil‑military imperative in international responses to natural disasters armed conflict and complex emergencies to be effective traditionally unconnected participants must now more often work in coordinated partnerships

Progress is being made to develop comprehensive integrated approaches at both the national (lsquowhole‑of‑governmentrsquo) and the international (lsquowhole‑of‑systemrsquo) levels But there are still questions remaining such as what next for civil‑military effectiveness What are the primary civil‑military capabilities What capabilities will be required in future conflicts and disasters Where should policy makers force developers planners practitioners and analysts focus their attention in the years to come

To examine these questions and advance this important discussion the Australian Civil‑Military Centre hosted the third annual Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar at Walsh Bay Sydney from 7 to 10 November 20111 Framed by the theme lsquoCivil‑Military Effectiveness building tomorrowrsquos capabilitiesrsquo the aim of the seminar was to highlight current trends in civil‑military practice and discuss future needs in seeking to avert mitigate and respond to conflicts and disasters

The seminar began with an examination of current global trends Prominent among those trends were the fragile reality faced by war‑torn states transitioning toward peace and development and their need for an integrated economic reconstruction effort the fluidity and uncertainty that characterise the current conflict stabilisation and international humanitarian arena reflected by such dynamics as the lsquosecuritisationrsquo of aid and proliferation of non‑traditional humanitarian actors and the increase in natural disasters in more complex environments notably urban and conflict‑affected environments

The seminar focused on five broad themes

gt local‑level processesmdashownership in practice

gt lsquonewrsquo and non‑traditional players

gt the importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness

gt prevention of and preparedness for conflicts and disasters

gt civil‑military guidelinesmdashfrom concept to practice

In the rush of foreign assistance that follows a crisis there has been a tendency to lsquocrowd outrsquo local ownership and to overwhelm and weaken local communities There is increasing attention to the question of local ownership and a growing consensus that sustainable peacebuilding is impossible without local ownership although difficulties remain The locally led peace processes in Bougainville and Solomon Islands represent rare but important experiences and potential models for future operations both within the Asia‑Pacific region and beyond Seminar

1 The summary reports from the first and second annual Civil‑Military Interaction Seminars are available at httpcivmilcoegovautagcentre‑publications


participants considered the question lsquoWhat innovations are needed to ensure that local priorities and preferences are directing international civil‑military responsesrsquo They looked at enhancing the host government role developing mechanisms for liaison and consultation with local communities including institutionalised engagement and improving local knowledge among international personnel Various emerging difficulties were addressed with measures suggested including preparing host countries for the onslaught of foreign aid during crises and avoiding aid dependencies and the emergence of local lsquopower blocsrsquo sustained by aid regimes

Natural disasters conflicts and complex emergencies are drawing a proliferation of new and non-traditional players with new constituencies and new agendas They include private military and security companies organised crime networks new and emerging non‑Western donorsmdashespecially emerging economies new and emerging NGOs such as religious or faith‑based organisations and lsquodigital humanitariansrsquomdashalso known as volunteer technical communities Participants considered the question lsquoWhat practical innovations can help to address criminal activitymdashincluding criminal violencemdashin conflict and disaster settingsrsquo They focused on improving understanding of the incentives and disincentives for criminal activity paying more attention to developing alternatives to criminal activity and using and supporting culturally appropriate responses to criminal activity notably community policing Participants remained aware that there is currently limited understanding of organised crime in conflict‑affected environments and acknowledged the dilemma that some criminal networks also provide critical social services in their communities

Information is an essential civil‑military capability Yet natural disasters conflicts and complex emergencies are often characterised by a dearth of it There are a multitude of calls for more and better more nuanced information Increasingly this information is being collected through non‑traditional meansmdashnotably social mediamdashoutside of official systems and often relies on local and volunteer communities Participants considered the questions lsquoWhat information do policy makers and practitioners wish forrsquo and lsquoWhat innovations might help to access itrsquo They considered the importance of timely accurate and verified information information to facilitate preparedness the utility of longitudinal data the benefits of using local data collectors and analysts creative thinking about information gathering and collection and being open to non‑traditional sources of information The concerns remaining were the unknowns about the new and evolving field of social media the digital divide the lack of clarity about the relationship between military actors open‑source information lsquodigital humanitariansrsquo and dealing with too much information

Conflict prevention and civil-military disaster preparedness are two fundamental civil‑military capabilities that are gradually being strengthened at the national regional and global levels but challenges remain Conflict prevention is difficult to sell Both it and disaster preparedness also are difficult to implement Participants considered the question lsquoWhat are the most promising opportunities for more effective conflict prevention and disaster preparednessrsquo On prevention they focused on local mechanisms regional arrangements improving early warning systems and advocating for the benefits of prevention Their innovations for preparedness included local monitoring mechanisms national and regional


disaster risk reduction plans raising awareness about national and regional models and best practice and existing national capacities and capabilities and regional preparedness exercises Various emerging difficulties and dilemmas were also considered including the sources of electoral violence and the capacity and capability gaps between local civilian authorities and national and foreign military forces in a disaster situation

Civil-military guidelines are widely considered to be a basic method for dealing with the complexity of civil‑military interaction The large assortment of civil‑military guidelines currently in circulation and use in the civil‑military arena reflects this thinking However guidelines alone are insufficient for building supporting and improving civil‑military interoperability seminar participants were adamant that opportunities for interaction and relationship buildingmdashincluding simple everyday forms such as sporting and social eventsmdashare also crucial especially before crises occur

Three clear priorities emerged from the Seminar which comprise the basis for a future civil‑military agenda First there was broad consensus that civil‑military actors need to build better civil‑military understanding so that they can lsquohit the ground runningrsquo when a crisis occurs Second the civil‑military community needs to improve its knowledge building and information sharing methods and networks Third the civil‑military community needs to institutionalise local ownership in all of its international activities

During the seminar one speaker asked lsquoIs this as good as it is going to get or can we do betterrsquo The clear response from all seminar participants was that we can do better


1 IntroductionThe 2011 Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar brought together 125 experts from 21 different countries among them Afghanistan Belize Kenya Indonesia Pakistan and the United States Those who attended represented a diverse range of organisations such as the African Union the African Standby Force the Australian Government the United Nations universities and non‑government organisations such as Oxfam World Vision and the International Committee of the Red Cross

The three‑day seminar focused on five broad themes






It began with a discussion of current trends and future needsmdashdetermining tomorrowrsquos civil‑military requirements Specific questions were used to facilitate examination of each theme There were panel discussions a debate on the private sector in conflict zones small group discussions facilitated by iMeet a collaborative technology session and various networking events such as the seminar dinner

The objectives of the 2011 seminar were to identify major capabilities for promoting future civil‑military effectiveness to highlight opportunities for overcoming capability constraints and to advance practical innovative methods of improving civil‑military practice The concept of capabilities was considered in broad terms encompassing areas of knowledge tools technologies and practical initiatives the civil‑military community itself principles guidelines and doctrine resources and time

This report2 draws on speakersrsquo presentations submissions from the small group discussions (collected through iMeet) the notes of the seminar rapporteur and other Australian Civil‑Military Centre staff as well as academic articles and analyses3 A number of chapters begin with lsquoword cloudsrsquo which were based on the group discussions on some of the seminar themes These lsquocloudsrsquo give greater prominence to words that appear more frequently in the discussion thus potentially highlighting those wordsrsquo greater importance in the framework of civil‑military interaction Text inserts also are used throughout the report to highlight comments made by speakers and participants during the seminar as well as information and analyses drawn from external sources Attribution is made in the footnotes where it is a published article or document attribution by name with no footnote means that the person cited made the statement at the seminar Non‑attributed quotes come from the plenary discussion or submissions made through iMeet some are paraphrased some are directly cited

2 This report was compiled by Sarah Shteir Research Project Officer Australian Civil‑Military Centre

3 The views expressed in the report are not necessarily representative of Australian government policy


2 Current trends future needs determining tomorrowrsquos civil‑military requirements

Decades of peace operations stabilisation efforts and disaster relief have resulted in widespread agreement about the civil‑military imperative in international responses to natural disasters armed conflict and complex emergencies to be effective traditionally unconnected participants must now more often work in coordinated partnerships Building on this widespread agreement civil‑military engagement has evolved into an important area of focus globally for policy makers and practitioners alike Conferences seminars training sessions and exercises are held and guidelines standard operating procedures reports and lessons learnt analyses are produced all aimed at building supporting and improving civil‑military interoperability

Today the question is no longer whether to promote civil‑military interaction but how to do that Asking how moves the spotlight from considering the need for and challenges of civil‑military interaction to a discussion of the primary civil‑military capabilities that are and will be required Where should policy makers force developers planners practitioners and analysts concentrate their attention in the coming years Considering current global trends is perhaps the first step in finding answers to this question The trends outlined here highlight strategic factors that will shape civil‑military engagement and practice in the years to come and the capabilities required to support this engagement

21 The economic needs of transition

The experiences of war‑torn states moving towards peace and development demonstrate the need for greater attention to be given to the economic dimensions of the civil‑military space For countries moving away from chaosmdashbe it Afghanistan South Sudan or Libyamdashfragility is the reality Before attaining a normal development path they must transition from the lsquoeconomics of warrsquo to economic reconstruction or what Dr Graciana del Castillo calls the lsquoeconomics of peacersquo In Dr del Castillorsquos view the lsquochallenge of this phase is to reactivate the economy while simultaneously consolidating peacersquo4

The concept of the economics of peace is based on the realisation that a development‑as‑usual approach to countries emerging from conflict does not work It requires an effort that is motivated by the primacy of peace (politics) not development and that humanitarian aid be phased out as soon as possible in order to avoid aid dependencies and economic distortions in the local economy both of which can retard and harm a countryrsquos reconstruction effort This must take place as part of a complex multilateral and multidimensional effort In other words what is needed is an integrated economic reconstruction effort in which lsquosecurity political social and economic issues are addressed together rather than

4 G del Castillo lsquoThe economics of peace Five rules for effective reconstructionrsquo United States Institute of Peace Special Report 286 September 2011 p1 The lsquoTen Commandmentsrsquo are drawn from del Castillorsquos seminar presentation and del Castillo lsquoThe Economics of Peace in Afghanistanrsquo Project Syndicate 13 September 2011 httpwwwproject‑syndicateorgcommentarythe‑economics‑of‑peace‑in‑afghanistan

The lsquoTen Commandmentsrsquo of the economics of peace1 It is better to lsquolet them do it rather

than do it better for themrsquo

2 Ensure integration rather than merely coordination

3 Design strategy according to resources and capabilities in the host country

4 Channel aid through the central government budget or local authorities

5 Ensure that aid moves rapidly from short‑term humanitarian action to reconstruction activity

6 Establish well‑planned and synchronised programs for DDR (disarmament demobilisation and re‑integration)

7 Establish different programs for higher level commanders

8 Increase support for NGOs with successful records

9 Establish economic reconstruction zones to lsquo jump startrsquo economic activity

10 Ensure that the political or peace objective prevails at all times (see note 4)


separatelyrsquo5 so that as del Castillo explains lsquoinclusive and sustainable growth is created and the population at large can have a stake in the peace process Extending humanitarian aid often creates attractive job opportunities for new graduates from universities in donor countries rather than jobs for the local population It is imperative that war‑torn countries reactivate investment and local jobs as soon as possible so that they can stand on their own feet and avoid aid dependencyrsquo In other words so that new graduates from new schools have jobs into which to go

22 Conditions of flux in humanitarianism

The humanitarian business has evolved into a multindashbillion dollar industry represented by increasingly structured and institutionalised organisations It has never been better equipped and better resourced but is it better at saving lives This question is encouraged by current dynamics in the humanitarian spacemdashsuch as the lsquosecuritisationrsquo of aid and the proliferation of non‑traditional humanitarian participants These dynamics reflect the fluidity and uncertainty that currently characterise the international humanitarian arena

As Dr Randolph Kent noted today the boundaries between humanitarian and military actors and agendas are more uncertain than ever before This is a direct consequence of the securitisation of aid which is an increasingly unavoidable reality in conflict‑affected environments such as Afghanistan Iraq Somalia and Sri Lanka In these environments humanitarian assistance has become a central tool in the military and political efforts of the US and other governments and military actors (in particular the US military) have become lsquomajor stakeholder[s] in the humanitarian systemrsquo6 As a result of this securitisation the boundaries between humanitarian action and lsquoa Northern security and political agendarsquo have become less discernible7 Although some humanitarian actors are able to maintain their independence Antonio Donini says lsquoeven those who try to distance themselves from politics or alignment with Western foreign policy objectives are part of a web of contacts contexts and values that are essentially of the Northrsquo8 This blurring of boundaries is reflected in trends in attacks against aid workers9 Researchers with the Humanitarian Policy Group note lsquohellip aid organisations are being attacked not just because they are perceived to be cooperating with

5 del Castillo lsquoThe economics of peacersquo p 2

6 E Ferris lsquo911 and Humanitarian Assistance A Disturbing Legacyrsquo Brookings UP FRONT (Blog) 1 September 2011 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsup‑frontposts20110901‑sept11‑ferris

7 A Donini et al lsquoHumanitarian Agenda 2015 Final ReportmdashThe state of the humanitarian enterprisersquo Feinstein International Center Tufts University Somerville MA March 2008 p 3

8 A Donini lsquoLocal perceptions of assistance to Afghanistanrsquo International Peacekeeping vol 14 no 1 p 159

9 Data in text insert from A Stoddard et al lsquoProviding aid in insecure environments 2009 updatemdashtrends in violence against aid workers and the operational responsersquo Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 34 Overseas Development Institute London April 2009 p1 Humanitarian Outcomes Aid Worker Security Database lsquoWorld Humanitarian Daymdashsecurity trendsrsquo 19 August 2010 p1

ldquoWhat does it mean when the face of US humanitarian aid is now a soldierrsquosrdquoDr Elizabeth Ferris (see note 6)

Trends in violence against aid workers

2009Two hundred and seventy‑eight humanitarians were victims of 139 serious security incidents

2008Two hundred and sixty aid workers were killed kidnapped or seriously injured

1999Sixty‑five humanitarians were involved in 34 incidents (see note 9)


Western political actors but because they are perceived as wholly a part of the Western agendarsquo10

The humanitarian arena is becoming increasingly diverse Recent natural disasters and continuing armed conflicts and complex emergencies have been characterised by a proliferation of non‑traditional humanitarian actors (see Chapter 4) Many of them represent new constituencies new agendas and new approaches to humanitarianism and their participation can be expected to add layers of complexity to already complicated civil‑military dimensions in the humanitarian arena Despite widespread concerns about accountability and transparency private military and security contactors have become part of the landscape in conflict‑affected environments and in the view of James Brown their numbers will greatly increase in the near future lsquoDigital humanitariansrsquo are emerging as increasingly important actors in their efforts to collect and verify information through social media technologies such as Facebook Twitter YouTube blogs and SMS for use in a humanitarian response effort (see Chapter 5) Muslim NGOs are increasing in number and assuming greater significance So too are non‑Western donors such as Brazil Russia India China South Africa and South Korea (the BRICSS) and the Gulf States Together these new players reflect a larger process of global power shifts and represent what Donini referred to as a challenge to the lsquodominant Western enterprisersquo

23 More natural disasters in more complex environments

Because of climate change in future we are likely to witness more sudden‑onset natural disasters of greater intensity and severity and in more complex environments including urban settings11 and conflict zones12 The unique characteristics of both urban and conflict‑affected environments present particular challenges for civil‑military disaster response

Those responding to disasters in urban areas face a different range of players and different vulnerabilities compared with non‑urban areas In the view of Dr Ferris urban settings are characterised by a more vocal and mobilised populace as well as a unique range of local actorsmdashincluding the different levels of government local businesses large and small political associations local NGOs and civil society organisations and often organised criminal networks such as gangs13 Urban populations notably slum dwellers also have different vulnerabilities such as limited access to clean water sanitation facilities and health care inadequate living space poor security and weak structural integrity14 These factors can have profound consequences for the wellbeing of inhabitants in the face of a natural disaster

Disasters in conflict‑affected environments present particular challenges for a civil‑military response For example the Haiti earthquake in 2010 drew attention to

10 Stoddard et al p 6

11 UN‑Habitat lsquoCities and land rightsrsquo urban WORLD vol 3 issue 1 February‑April 2011 p5

12 Dr Ferris noted in her presentation this will probably be accompanied by an increase in slow‑onset disasters such as rising sea levels and drought

13 E Ferris lsquoHaiti and future humanitarian disastersrsquo Brookings UPFRONT (Blog) 12 January 2011 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsup‑frontposts20110112‑haiti‑ferris

14 UN Millennium Project A home in the city Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers Earthscan London 2005

ldquoOne billion people (one third of the worldrsquos urban population) live in slumsrdquoDr Elizabeth Ferris (see note 13)

ldquoAlthough towns and cities constitute just 28 per cent of the earthrsquos surface since 2008 more than half of the global population now lives in urban areasrdquoUNndashHabitat Urban World (see note 11)

ldquoMilitary actors will increasingly be called to respond to disastersrdquoDr Elizabeth Ferris


the reality of a disaster occurring in a country hosting a UN peacekeeping operationmdash in this case the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti or MINUSTAH Peacekeeping personnel became both victims of and responders to the disaster Drawing on this experience UN peacekeeping operations are now being tasked to consider disaster management as part of their mandate

The Pakistan floods of 2010 highlight another set of dynamics based on the reality of a natural disaster occurring in a highly politicised and militarised environment and alongside a military offensive against an insurgency In this context the Pakistani military was both a principal responder and a combatant and the dynamics of the conflict had both a direct and an indirect effect on the disaster response effort In addition insecurity arising from the insurgencymdashincluding reported threats made by Pakistani Taliban members against international aid groupsmdashslowed the deployment of international staff thus hampering the international aid effort and the delivery of aid became an instrument for the insurgency with Pakistani Taliban members and NGOs associated with militant groups participating in the delivery of relief to local communities15 This relatively new area of experience for the global community warrants further attention

24 Emerging concerns

Presentations and the plenary discussion raised various concerns that present challenges for the civil‑military community and deserve greater attention

gt The far‑reaching lsquoripplersquo effects of disasters such as the Icelandic volcano highlight the need for a better understanding of what it means to be lsquoaffectedrsquo by natural disasters

gt More attention should be given to the range of difficulties that can arise in coordinating action between international actors and national governments when taking action in response to a disaster

gt More creativity is required when thinking about responding to disasters in conflict zones especially in connection with civil‑military relations

gt Disasters in complex environments such as urban areas present particular challenges that are unique to such settingsmdashthe range of local actors the extent of local mobilisation the security challenges presented by gangs and so on

gt The overlap of natural and technological disasters is a new phenomenon and presents significant and specific safety concerns for humanitarian personnel At present there is a reluctance to think about this in the humanitarian community Dr Ferrisrsquos view is that military thinking would be useful in this regard

gt Donini observed that in Afghanistan lsquothere are very few purist humanitarian players any morersquo Many NGOs are multi‑mandated and have responsibility for multiple programs simultaneously providing humanitarian aid and engaging in reconstruction activities without relevant training This requires more attention especially because it further blurs the already blurry divide between the humanitarian and politicalndashmilitary spaces

15 S Masood lsquoIn Pakistan Taliban Hint at Attacks on Relief Workersrsquo The New York Times 26 August 2010 viewed 8 December 2011 httpwwwnytimescom20100827worldasia27pstanhtml AB Ellick lsquoHard‑Line Islam Fills Void in Flooded Pakistanrsquo The New York Times 6 August 2010 httpwwwnytimescom20100807worldasia07pstanhtml_r=1

ldquoHow do we deal with disaster response in complex environments where responders themselves may also be victims

After the Haiti earthquake the MINUSTAH troops should have been moved out lsquoThey were victims MINUSTAH [troops] were not paying attention to the Haitians They were distracted They should have been sent away and ldquofreshrdquo troops brought inrsquordquoBrigadier General Earl Arthurs


3 Local‑level processes ownership in practice

Efforts in support of local ownership gt the UN Secretary‑Generalrsquos

2009 report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (the lsquoimperative of national ownershiprsquo) and 2010 progress report

gt report of the UN Secretary‑Generalrsquos Senior Advisory Group on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflictmdashrecommendations on enabling national ownership

gt the 2011 workshop hosted by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office on the meaning and practices of national ownership

gt Graciana del Castillorsquos lsquoTen Commandmentsrsquo

gt g7+ initiative

31 Analysis

No matter how well intentioned the international response to natural disasters armed conflicts and complex emergencies there has been a tendency in the words of one participant to lsquocrowd outrsquo local ownership lsquoWersquove been totally excluded from the relief effort Who knows what all these internationals are doing Itrsquos a new occupation of Haitirsquo complained a Haitian pastor Dr Ferris interviewed in Port‑au‑Prince in January 201116 These words represent a common sentiment of exclusion and marginalisation voiced by local communities receiving international aid in response to a natural disaster or following the end of conflict The exclusion and marginalisation are the consequence of an international aid regime that is says Donini more accountable to donors and parliamentarians than to local communities

In the words of Dr Susan Harris Rimmer foreign interventions and operations have a profound long‑term lsquocatalytic effectrsquo on host countries The Hon Paul Tovua articulated a similar sentiment but with different language lsquoA foreign visitor is like a pebble in waterrsquo In the immediate period following a large‑scale crisis the often lsquooverly zealousrsquo rush of assistance by foreigners can overwhelm local communities Frequent tours by dignitariesmdashcommon in the aftermath of disastersmdashcan also overwhelm communities As recalled by Jane Parfitt Christchurch New Zealand faced a steady stream of tours and requests for tours for ten weeks after the 2011 earthquake the logistics for which required taking staff away from critical recovery work In the longer term international interventions tend to weaken local actors through creating aid dependencies and introducing price and wage distortions

16 Quoted in E Ferris lsquoA research trip to Haiti Personal reflectionsrsquo Brookings Foreign Policy Trip Reports No 9 12 January 2011 httpwwwbrookingsedureports20110112_haiti_ferrisaspx

ldquoTwo-thirds of Liberiarsquos GDP is spent on the UN peacekeeping mission there UNMIL and most UNMIL money leaves the countryrdquoDr Graciana del Castillo


in the local economy This helps explain why the arrival of international aid is sometimes referred to as the lsquosecond wave of disasterrsquo

The question of local ownership is attracting growing attention especially in relation to post‑conflict peacebuilding There is an lsquoemerging consensus hellip that national ownership is a crucial prerequisite for sustainable post‑conflict peacebuildingrsquo based on the lsquocommonsense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to failrsquo17 The UN system is devoting increasing attention to improving understanding of this and of practices aimed at encouraging local ownership Experts such as Dr del Castillo are examining ways of preventing the dependencies so common in aid relationships and instead institutionalising local ownership (see the lsquoTen Commandmentsrsquo text insert in Chapter 2) Additionally fragile and conflict‑affected states are themselves mobilising around the principle of national ownership the g7+ a group of 19 fragile states was established in 2010 to lsquogives us a stronger voice to speak to the international community about our needs and circumstancesrsquo18

Despite this consensus the concept of local ownership remains beset by complexity and a long list of difficult questions many of which permeated the seminar discussions

gt Who does lsquolocalrsquo refer to

gt Does it mean central governments or local governments or communities and civil society19 or all of these

gt How do you ensure that local engagement is inclusive and not biased toward elite segments of the population

gt Who owns what

gt Who decides who owns what

gt What does this ownership look like

gt What happens when local ownership is exercised in a way that directly conflicts with norms of good governance

gt Is local ownership an absolute right or a conditional right20

gt What happens when local capacities are weak do not exist or have been completely overwhelmed as in cases of large‑scale disaster

gt How do you retain ownership in the face of a massive wave of well‑intended incoming foreign aid

17 R Machold and T Donais lsquoFrom rhetoric to practice operationalizing national ownership in post‑conflict peacebuildingrsquo workshop report workshop organized by UN Peacebuilding Support Office Wilfrid Laurier University and the City University of New Yorkrsquos Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies on the meanings and practices of national ownership in the context of post‑conflict peacebuilding 14 March 2011 New York June 2011 p 2

18 g7+ lsquoStatement by the g7+rsquo 10 April 2010 httpwwwg7plusorgnews‑articles2010410statement‑by‑the‑g7html

19 The workshop report by Machold and Donais makes the important point that the concept of lsquocivil societyrsquo like the concept of lsquolocalrsquo is similarly difficult to define p3

20 Machold and Donais p 6

ldquoThe [idea] of local ownership is very popular but very difficult to put into practicerdquo


gt How do you strike a balance between respecting and striving for local agency while remaining mindful that lives are in chaos and in need of humane and sensitive support

These hard questions reflect the reality that lsquoit remains far from clear how the concept [of national ownership] should be put into practicersquo21

Although examples of locally initiated and led international response efforts are rare they constitute important experiences and useful models for future operations The Bougainville peace process is a prominent example and one that was explored at the seminar The success of the regional intervention in Bougainville (the Truce and Peace Monitoring Groups 1997 to 2003) is often attributed to the locally owned and led nature of the peace process22 As the Hon James Tanis explained the peace process and subsequent regional intervention emerged from a widespread consensus among Bougainvillean actors that the war had to end There was also widespread agreement about the need for reconciliation a negotiation process with Papua New Guinea and a foreign peace force the requirements for which were expressed by the Bougainvillean parties to the conflict themselves Local ownership was further enabled by the diverse make‑up of the intervention force which said the Hon James Tanis had lsquorelevancersquo for different segments of the community Women in the local communities felt comfortable speaking to female Truce and Peace Monitoring Group members Much too has been written about the ability of Maori Fijian ni‑Vanuatu and Indigenous Australian members of the regional operation to develop a rapport with local communities given similar cultural backgrounds and in some cases linguistic familiarity This rapport23 or lsquorelevancersquo strengthened the bond between the local community and the foreign operation

In order to gain and ensure local ownership international actors must have local knowledge and access to local information They need an understanding of local history the often complicated layers and dynamics of the conflict existing formal and informal decision‑making structures (for example disaster management committees) and political social and cultural structures and processes Yet sudden deployment and limited training often prevent international actors from acquiring this knowledge before being deployed This operational realitymdashplus the need for accurate and timely local information and the imperative of national ownershipmdashdemands greater effort to capitalise on the expertise and knowledge of local players

Local actors including civil society organisations as well as members of diaspora communities have a lsquonatural cultural awareness that cannot be taughtrsquo In the context of highly politicised post‑conflict environmentsmdashSolomon Islands for examplemdashthe Hon Paul Tovua has suggested that much‑needed political


22 Much has been written about the locally‑led nature of the Bougainville peace process including V Boege lsquoHow to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post‑Conflict Hybrid Political Order ndashThe Case of Bougainvillersquo Journal of International Peacekeeping vol 14 2010 pp 330‑352 Text insert from p 341

23 M Wehner and D Denoon (eds) Without a Gun Australiansrsquo Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville 1997-2001 Pandanus Books Canberra 2001 pp 112 120

ldquoThe fact hellip that the Bougainvilleans at all times were in control of the extent and content of the activities of the external actors and that the peace-building process was owned by the parties directly involved hellip remained the main reason for the success of the external assistancerdquoV Boege 2010 (see note 22)

ldquoNeed to use personnel that have lived through the experience they are intervening inrdquo


expertise is often best found in local players who lsquoare more aware of political nuancesrsquo Regional players can also facilitate local ownership if they have shared or similar cultural characteristics In view of this they can sometimes present themselves as a lsquobridgersquo between the international effort and local communities For example there have been numerous references to the benefits of having personnel from Vanuatu Fiji and elsewhere in the Pacific involved in the interventions in Bougainville Timor‑Leste and Solomon Islands because of their similar cultural background and linguistic familiarity such as the ability to speak Pidgin24

32 Capability

In an effort to lsquodo more than pay simple lip service to the idea of local ownershiprsquo seminar participants considered the question lsquoWhat innovations are needed to ensure that local priorities and preferences are directing international civil‑military responsesrsquo The resultant suggestions are grouped here into a number of broad priority areas as follows

Supporting an enhanced decision-making role for the host governmentA number of senior participants called for enhancing the decision‑making role and power of the host government Dr del Castillo spoke forcefully about the need to channel aid through government at both the national and the local levels creating a stronger role for local government in managing the aid funds will help build strong leadership and lsquoownership will follow strong leadershiprsquo In the context of disaster response a second suggestion was to develop an inventory of deployable capabilities available to the local authorities and allow those authorities to decide what capabilities they need

Proactively liaising with and consulting local communitiesMany group discussions focused on the need to develop mechanisms for liaison and consultation with local communities Various suggestions focused on identifying andor establishing and using positions dedicated to liaison between international personnel and local communities Such positions include local points of contact and lsquoCIMIC [civil‑military cooperation] teamsrsquo Participants stressed the need for caution in engaging with communities in inclusive ways reconciling diverse opinions and priorities and ensuring that elite groups are not privileged over other segments of society In relation to trying to determine a communityrsquos priorities one suggestion was to lsquotriangulatersquo the proposals put forward by the local leadership with those of opposition groups and wider communities Another suggestion was to recognise and make use of genuinely neutral brokers in situations where local authority or local interests are contested

Augmenting knowledge and understanding of the local context and existinglocal capacitiesConsiderable emphasis was given to the need for international personnel to be better informed about the local context and existing local capacities Pre‑deployment briefings on local history and social and cultural factors were suggested To improve disaster preparedness it was noted that international

24 See egWehner and Denoon (eds) id Boege J Hutcheson lsquoThe Lessons of 2006 Army Operations in East Timor and Solomon Islandsrsquo Australian Army Journal vol 4 Winter 2007

ldquoWe need to move beyond lsquoparachuting-inrsquo expatsrdquo

ldquoWe need to open our eyes to existing local capacitiesrdquo


personnel should expand their understanding of existing local disaster response and management arrangements and priorities (which can help facilitate local direction setting) as well as their knowledge of gaps in such local arrangements and local hazards Finally if relationships with national and local authorities are established before a disaster occurs onersquos situational awareness during a crisis can be greatly improved

Establishing rules standards and expectations for international engagement with local communitiesVarious suggestions touched on the need to institutionalise engagement with local communities through the clear establishment of rules standards and expectations One suggestion involved the developing of international rules of engagement for guiding and managing relations with local communities Another involved incorporating in government reporting policy and other documents (such as ministerial and cabinet submissions) a requirement for local consultation A further suggestion dealt with the need to educate international politicians on the importance of seeking and taking into account advice from local actors and beneficiaries before taking any decisions

33 Emerging difficulties and dilemmas

In group discussions several particular challenges requiring further attention were identified

gt More work is needed to help prepare host countries and local communities for receiving foreign aid in times of large‑scale disaster

gt Humanitarian assistance should be transient The difficulty lies in determining how and when responsibility can and should revert from foreign hands to local authorities so as to avoid the development of dependencies

gt The delivery and presence of international aid create not only dependencies but also local lsquopower blocsrsquomdashthat is segments of the local population who directly benefit from the aid and thus have a vested interest in the continuation of the aid regime


4 New and non‑traditional players

ldquoJust because we will hire companies because there is no other option does not mean it is smart

You donrsquot know who they are what they are doing and you are responsible for what they dordquoTX Hammes

ldquoWersquore the only game in townrdquoMichael Stock President of Bancroft Global Development on Somalia (see note 28)

41 Analysis

Natural disasters armed conflict and complex emergencies are drawing a proliferation of lsquonewrsquo and non‑traditional playersmdashprivate military and security companies organised crime networks lsquodigital humanitariansrsquo (see Chapter 5) new and emerging non‑Western donors and new and emerging NGOs These actors come with new constituencies and new agendas and their participation can be expected to add layers of complexity to what are already complex civil‑military dimensions

Private military and security companiesPrivate military and security companies have become part of the landscape in conflict‑affected environments They provide much‑needed assistance such as logistical support operation of checkpoints de‑mining intelligence collection and training of security forces25 Governments have become dependent on them26 there is continuing demand for them and as James Brown noted their numbers are expected to increase in the near future These companies have been contracted by the governments of Australia Canada the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the United Nations27 to provide services in Bosnia Liberia Angola Timor‑Leste Iraq Afghanistan Cocircte drsquoIvoire Sierra Leone Nigeria Nepal and Sudan Private contractors currently outnumber troops in Iraq are serving as frontline mentors to African Union forces in the fight against the Islamist militant group al‑Shabaab in Somalia and are protecting Somali politicians and

25 L McCauley lsquoThe realities of privatised security within the civil‑military arenarsquo Civil‑Military Commentary 32011 Australian Civil‑Military Centre Queanbeyan NSW 2011

26 D Priest and WM Arkin lsquoNational Security Incrsquo Top Secret America A Washington Post Investigation 20 July 2010 The Washington Post httpprojectswashingtonpostcomtop‑secret‑americaarticlesnational‑security‑inc

27 McCauley


ldquoAdding civilians in military roles confuses objectivesrdquoProfessor Damien Kingsbury

battling armed Somali pirates28 The United States has made a policy decision that is based on the reality that private contractors will continue to be a major force in future conflicts Similarly in response to the growing problem of piracy the UK Government is planning to create increasing opportunities for private military and security companies reversing the current law to allow all British‑flagged vessels to use armed guards lsquoon the most hazardous shipping routesrsquo29

As was clearly demonstrated in the seminar debate the use and role of private military and security companies in conflict‑affected environments remains troubling and highly contentious for many30 There is continuing concern about a number of aspects of this

gt the repercussions of using lsquociviliansrsquo in military roles

gt the danger of contracting out such jobs as translation and interpretation to those lacking local cultural knowledge

gt the lack of oversight accountability and transparency

gt the role of politics and nepotism in granting and retaining contracts

gt ethical questions arising from the commercial motivations and interests of such companiesmdashincluding the unavoidable reality of their responsibility to shareholders

But regardless of these concerns these companies are here to stay As one participant noted lsquoWhether we have a place in our heart for private security companies is no longer the issuersquo The crucial concern is how to manage the reality of these companies and regulate their activities

Organised crime networksTodayrsquos conflict‑affected environments are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by organised crime networks The role and impacts of these networks are however poorly understood largely because of the dearth of reliable information (see Chapter 5) These networks can be involved in a range of illegal activities among them drug and human trafficking gang violence money laundering piracy and the arms trade Through their actions they can exacerbate the vulnerability of populations in crisis environments and make weak states weaker Professor Andrew Goldsmith noted that there is a growing effort to tackle organised crime through initiatives such as the West Africa Coast Initiative which has established Transnational Crime Units in Guinea‑Bissau Sierra Leone and Liberia The United Nations is also recognising the need for greater efforts to tackle the problem plans are being made to set up Serious

28 J Gettleman et al lsquoUS Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflictrsquo The New York Times 10 August 2011 httpwwwnytimescom20110811worldafrica11somaliahtmlref=africaamppagewanted=all

29 B Sims lsquoUK Government shifts policy on armed guards for commercial vesselsrsquo info4SECURITY 31 October 2011 viewed 10 December 2011 httpwwwinfo4securitycomstoryaspsectioncode=9ampstorycode=4128316ampc=1

30 The seminar debate demonstrated the importance of distinguishing private military and security companies from other private sector actors As Dr Kent emphasized small businesses local companies and in some cases extractor companies can play critical roles in supporting and providing local livelihoods including through remittances and may also be among the first responders in a crisis


Crime Support Units in peacekeeping operations to provide analysis and operational support for missions and host‑state police forces

New and emerging non-Western donorsNon‑Western donors especially emerging economies are becoming important in the international aid industry They include Brazil India Russia China South Africa South Korea Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia Kuwait Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and new members of the European Union31 Some are new donors others have long histories of giving aid and their changing economic situations are allowing them to assume greater prominence32 Brazil for example gave US$36 million in humanitarian aid in 2010 compared with US$800 000 in 2009 India was the largest government donor in response to the Pakistan floods in 2010 Russia is the lsquobiggest non‑Western contributorrsquo to OCHA the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and South Africa has plans to launch its own aid agency33

The emergence of these donors is creating a challenge to the lsquotraditional hegemony held by western donors over how and where aid is dispersedrsquo34 Because many are themselves recipients of aid they offer alternative approaches to aid delivery including a more lsquosolidarity‑basedrsquo and less top‑down approach and a more sensitive attitude to the politically charged question of sovereignty35 Many of them are irked by the Western domination of such intergovernmental bodies as the World Bank the International Monetary Fund36 and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD andmdashwith the exception of South Koreamdashgenerally avoid membership of these organisations altogether37 Instead they are turning to regional bodies such as ASEAN the Association of Southeast Asian Nations the Organisation of the Islamic Conference or the League of Arab States38 Their growing influence coupled with their alternative approaches to aid and concerns about the current multilateral structures suggest possible changes to existing multilateral aid coordination and governance bodies in the future39

31 K Smith lsquoHumanitarian aid and smaller donors diversity collective response and better datarsquo Global Humanitarian Assistance Blog 2 December 2010 httpwwwglobalhumanitarianassistanceorghumanitarian‑aid‑and‑the‑role‑of‑smaller‑non‑dac‑donors‑diversity‑collective‑response‑and‑better‑data‑1881html

32 World Bank World Development Report 2011 conflict security and development World Bank Washington DC 2011 p 38

33 IRIN lsquoWhorsquos who among the ldquonewrdquo donorsrsquo IRIN In‑Depth 19 October 2011 httpwwwirinnewsorgInDepthMainaspxindepthid=91ampreportid=94008

34 IRIN lsquoThe rise of the ldquonewrdquo donorsrsquo IRIN In‑Depth 19 October 2011 httpwwwirinnewsorgInDepthMainaspxindepthid=91ampreportid=94003

35 IRIN lsquoReaching out to ldquoemergingrdquo donorsrsquo IRIN 19 October 2011 httpwwwirinnewsorgReport94011AID‑POLICY‑Reaching‑out‑to‑quot‑emerging‑donors‑quot

36 IRIN lsquoThe rise of the ldquonewrdquo donorsrsquo

37 IRIN lsquoWhorsquos who among the ldquonewrdquo donorsrsquo

38 IRIN lsquoReaching out to ldquoemergingrdquo donorsrsquo

39 ibid

ldquoThe landscape of international power relations is also changing as low- and middle-income countries increase their share of global economic influence and their contributions to global policy thinking This shift requires a fundamental rethink of the approaches of international actors to manage global risks collectivelymdashand as equal partnersrdquo2011 World Development Report (see note 32)


New and emerging NGOsThe field of non‑government aid work is also diversifying Not only are new donors arising from emerging economies so too are non‑government aid organisations In the words of Claudia Meier of the Global Public Policy Institute lsquohellip maybe an Indian NGO the Chinese Red Cross the Red Crescents of the Gulf States [will emerge] hellip they are not fully there yet but there are lots of signs of their professionalisationrsquo40 There has also been a lsquodramatic increasersquo in both the number and visibility of religious or faith‑based organisations active in development and humanitarian aid (a burgeoning area of academic research)41 Muslim NGOs are an example in response to both the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods in Pakistan Muslim NGOs and Islamic trusts assumed significant responsibility during the relief efforts42 Although many such organisations have been providing aid for years they have become the object of increasing attention and wariness because of the association of some aid groups with militant and terrorist groups

42 Capability

To focus the discussion on lsquonewrsquo and non‑traditional players seminar participants considered the question lsquoWhat practical innovations can help to address criminal activitymdashincluding criminal violencemdashin conflict and disaster settingsrsquo The resultant suggestions are grouped here into a number of broad priority areas as follows

Improving understanding of the basic causes of criminal activityMany group discussions observed that a first basic step is to understand not only the incentives (such as economic forces) and disincentives for criminal activity but also the ethical and value systems that determine what constitutes lsquocriminal activityrsquo in the local population This well‑established understanding could be used to develop an early warning system for detecting potential trends toward criminalisation Such a system could incorporate Neighbourhood Watchndashlike structures

Paying greater attention to developing alternatives to criminal activityAlthough as Professor Goldsmith noted the prevailing focus to date has been biased in favour of containment of criminal violence group discussions reflected the need to move towards a more transformative approach that is sensitive to local livelihoods and the local environment Numerous suggestions focused on developing practical alternatives to criminal activity supporting the diversification of skills among the local population and alternative sources of incomemdashlsquoJobs Jobs Jobsrsquo in the view of one group

Using and supporting culturally appropriate responses to criminal activityMany group discussions were broadly based on the principle that local capacities resilience and coping strategies and customary laws and systems should be used and supported in any external efforts to combat criminal activity Community policing was often mentioned and it was suggested that dedicated liaison offices

40 Quoted in IRIN lsquoReaching out to ldquoemergingrdquo donorsrsquo

41 MJ Petersen lsquoInternational religious NGOs at the United Nations a study of a group of religious organisationsrsquo Journal of Humanitarian Assistance November 2010 pp 1 2

42 M Jafar lsquoMuslim NGOs take part in Pakistan flood reliefrsquo Al Arabiya News 20 August 2010 httpwwwalarabiyanetarticles20100820117141html

ldquoYou canrsquot eliminate criminal activities You need to identify alternativesrdquo

ldquoRespect cultural heritage and traditional policing mechanismsrdquo


be established to facilitate engagement between external players and existing local police structures Effective community policing is however possible only if local police are properly resourced and trained as one group noted



gt There is limited understanding of organised crime in conflict‑affected environmentsmdashincluding an understanding of the extent of the harm caused by criminal activity of this nature

gt Criminal networks including gangs might provide important social services that are not being provided through other channels Should these aid pathways be legitimised or marginalised Should alternative social safety nets be identified These are difficult questions that warrant attention

gt Greater understanding is needed in relation to military policing and its role in disasters and complex emergencies


5 The importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness

51 Analysis

Information is an essential civil‑military capability yet to date in the contexts of natural disaster armed conflict and complex emergency there has been a widespread dearth of it Practitioners and policy makers alike are in desperate need of more information lsquoWe didnrsquot know enough and we still donrsquot know enoughrsquo This oft‑quoted comment was made by the former commander to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) General Stanley McChrystal when speaking about the efforts of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan He went on to say lsquoMost of us me included had a very superficial understanding of the situation and history and we had a frighteningly simplistic view of recent history helliprsquo43

Gen McChrystalrsquos reflection and assessment have relevance and application to interventions far beyond the borders of Afghanistan The absence of information has proved a major weakness in efforts to tackle organised crime in countries such as Guinea‑Bissau It has led to a lack of understanding in the aid community about the post‑earthquake situation in Haiti In Bougainville there are no updated data on per capita income population age and geographic distribution and sources of income yet it is this type of information that is crucial for planning post‑conflict recovery there Professor Satish Chand has gone so far as to observe that data on which to base policy making are absent in most post‑conflict situations

In addition to recognition of the need for more information as Rebecca Shrimpton explained there is greater acknowledgment of the need for better informationmdash

43 Quoted in D Walsh lsquoUS had lsquofrighteningly simplisticrsquo view of Afghanistan says McChrystalrsquo The Guardian 7 October 2011 viewed 5 October 2012 httpwwwguardiancoukworld2011oct07us‑frighteningly‑simplistic‑afghanistan‑mcchrystalnewsfeed=true

ldquoA deficiency of information undermines the capacity to lsquoprevent prepare for and respond more effectively to conflicts and disasters helliprsquordquo

ldquoIn crisis the first essential thing you need is information not food or shelter Information will tell you where food and shelter is neededrdquoZainudin Malang


more nuanced information that will allow interventions to move beyond assumptions and talking about ideas in the abstract beyond simplistic and homogeneous understandings of local situations and local actors as lsquogoodrsquo and lsquobadrsquo A person who is a perpetrator of gang violence one afternoon a community leader the next morning and a priest the following afternoon challenges the mainstream tendency toward simplistic understanding of local actors As Dr Robert Muggah explored this reality prompts the question of who exactly we are talking about

There are also areas in which a wealth of information can present challenges In relation to peace and stabilisation operations for example Shrimpton observed lsquoWe underestimated how much information is out therersquo In the civil‑military community the challenge is to make sense of all this scattered information and build a shared understanding of the situation The Australian Civil‑Military Centrersquos Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project or MAPSOP is focused partly on drawing all this information together and turning it into strengthened comprehensive multi‑agency advice to decision makers

Not only is information itself an essential civil‑military capability so too are the skills required for obtaining that information Increasingly information is being collected through innovative and non‑traditional means often outside formal official systems In many cases these methods of information collection are evolving as technologies such as social media evolve Furthermore such methods are increasingly reliant on local communities they are based on the philosophy that people on the ground are a credible and important partner and source of information in a crisis As Heather Blanchard noted lsquoPeople on the ground are the best source of information in a crisisrsquo

The following examples provide evidence of a clear trend toward looking beyond government for information44

gt Community household surveys have proved an effective way of obtaining local information and insightful observations about a security and political situation A series of community‑level longitudinal surveys conducted before and after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti pointed to perceptions of sustained reductions in violence and insecurity This information was unexpected because it contradicted sensationalist media reporting of soaring crime rates Similarly revealing in a household survey measuring economic recovery in Bougainville data on the materials being used to build houses have proved very revealing about local perceptions of security According to Professor Chand information about the types of investments being made into homes serves as lsquoproxyrsquo data for the level of confidence communities have in the peace process The economic data can therefore be used to feed into a broader picture of the political ethnic and security situation in Bougainville

44 C Fugate lsquoUnderstanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the Aftermath of Disastersrsquo Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs Washington DC 5 May 2011 p 2 httpwwwhsgacsenategovsubcommitteesdisaster‑recovery‑and‑intergovernmental‑affairshearingsunderstanding‑the‑power‑of‑social‑media‑as‑a‑communications‑tool‑in‑the‑aftermath‑of‑disasters

ldquoThe public [is a] resource rather than a liabilityrdquoCraig Fugate US Federal Emergency Management Agency (see note 44)


gt Both these community‑level surveys relied on local surveying teamsmdashincluding in the case of Bougainville local graduate students Given this reliance on local communities for information the method also benefits from transparent outreach to communities explaining the objectives and methods of the survey project Professor Chand observed that the use of outreach by the Bougainville survey groupmdashthrough newspapers local chiefs and churchesmdashhelped them gain lsquoentryrsquo into the community

gt In Mindanao a grass‑roots initiative has established a network of provincial teams and local communities to monitor the ceasefire and share information and reports via SMS with relevant institutions including formal monitoring organisations such as ceasefire committees This initiative is a direct reaction to the dearth of information about the conflict SMS also functions as a practical mechanism for validating information through the triangulation of local sources The aim is to connect the local population and its knowledge of and proximity to events on the ground with the official response As Zainudin Malang observed lsquoPeople are the best source of information on the groundrsquo yet lsquothese key sources of information are not being tappedrsquo

gt More and more connected networks of volunteers or volunteer technical communities are using social media to gather information in support of lsquoofficialrsquo disaster‑ and conflict‑response efforts45 They represent a lsquonew whole avenue of digital responsersquo says Blanchard Sometimes called lsquodigital humanitariansrsquo connected communitiesmdashsuch as the Standby Taskforce Crisis Commons and Crisis Mappersmdashrely on volunteers to scan news media and on technologies such as Facebook Twitter YouTube blogs and SMS to collect verify and analyse information rapidly in real or near‑real time In some cases these informal networks are also lsquocreating datarsquo collecting and disseminating information about things such as what stores and businesses are open and closed and where people can charge their cell phones (a significant issue following the 2011 Japan earthquake) Once validated and fully lsquode‑identifiedrsquo this information is available for use by UN government and NGO actors to improve their situational awareness and guide their operational planning

Social media are being adopted and used by lsquoofficialrsquo systems and structures too In a global precedentndashsetting move the Media and Public Affairs Branch of the Queensland Police Service used the servicersquos recently established Facebook page Twitter account and YouTube channel to share real‑time information about the floods that devastated parts of the state in January 2011 A number of very clear benefits arose from this First it facilitated a much more lsquonimblersquo response which was more appropriate in a dynamic environment such as a flood compared with for example the slower process of writing minutes and having them cleared before dissemination This more nimble system also allowed the police to respond

45 This topic featured prominently during the Australian Civil‑Military Centrersquos Regional Senior Leaders Seminar in July 2011 This section draws upon the summary report from that seminar See Australian Civil‑Military Centre lsquoRegional Senior Leaders 2011 summary report strengthening civil‑military coordination for conflict and disaster managementrsquo Queanbeyan NSW 2011

The challenges of monitoring conflict in Mindanao gt repeated cycles of displacementmdash

inaccessible areas diverse ethno‑linguistic groups

gt politicisation of informationmdashwhich affects aid delivery

gt bridging the divide between conflict‑affected communities and the formal response effort

Activated connected communities gt Indian Ocean tsunami 2004

gt post‑election crisis in Kenya 2007ndash08

gt Sichuan earthquake 2008

gt crises in Tunisia Egypt Libya and Syria (2010ndash on‑going)


promptly to any inaccurate information Second social media are lsquoincredibly robustrsquo As the flooding progressed there was a huge spike in the number of visitors to the Facebook page and the Twitter site between December 2010 and January 2011 when the floods occurred the Facebook page went from 6400 fans (or lsquolikesrsquo) to 165 000 fans and the number of Twitter followers soared from 1200 to 11 00046 People were turning to Facebook and Twitter because the police were able to provide information directly to them in a way that had not been possible before including live streaming of press conferences and briefings by the Premier As Kym Charlton put it lsquoWersquore not relying on news bulletins Wersquore not relying on journalists making decisions about newsworthiness Wersquove hellip been able to go directly to the people when we need torsquo47 Furthermore visitors were able to augment the pool of available information by contributing information based on their own experience of the flooding Third the Facebook page allowed the Queensland Police Service to amplify its message to a much wider audience Beyond those local and international visitors who visited its page directly there was a much wider audience including those without social media who were reached through Twitter and international media (pulling information from the Facebook page) Through the use of this social technology the public and other media players helped the Queensland Police disseminate crucial information about the floods to those directly and indirectly affected

52 Capability

Seminar participants considered the questions lsquoWhat information do policy makers and practitioners wish forrsquo and lsquoWhat innovations might help to access itrsquo The resultant suggestions are grouped here into a number of broad priority areas as follows

Timely accurate and verified informationAlthough policy makers and practitioners might require different types of information regardless of the specific content they both need information that is provided promptly is accurate and verified and comes from a reliable and trusted source

Information aimed at improving preparednessTo improve preparedness basic information should be disseminated about the potential risks in given areasmdashsuch as mines swollen rivers and downed power lines This information could be followed with practice drills relating to earthquakes and bushfires for example

Longitudinal dataLongitudinal data collected through such rapid and cost‑effective methods as household surveys are a vital tool for tracking change and impacts

Using local data collectors and analystsInformation collection efforts should make use of local data collectors and analysts This represents good value for money provides employment

46 K Riordan lsquoPolice tweet on the beat during flood crisisrsquo ACB News 20 January 2011 httpwwwabcnetaunews2011‑01‑20police‑tweet‑on‑the‑beat‑during‑flood‑crisis1912328

47 Quoted in Riordan

ldquoDuring the height of the Queensland floods the Queensland Police Service had lsquo39 million story hits on their Facebook page in 24 hours and in one week more than 73 000 YouTube video viewsrsquordquoK Riordan ABC News (see note 46)

ldquoWhat is lsquorelevantrsquo information [We] need to challenge conventional understandingsrdquo


opportunities and capitalises on the expertise of locals who have a lsquonatural cultural awareness that cannot be taughtrsquo

Devoting resources and creativity to information collectionGathering and understanding data take time and this can be a particular concern in a crisis situation when time is limited More resources should be devoted to collection and analysis Greater creativity is needed in information gathering especially among government actors After all lsquoIt is not just about reading articlesrsquo Governments are especially well placed in view of their access to resources position and influence to develop and apply more creativity in enabling information gathering and collection

Being open to non-traditional sources of informationThe public constitutes an important source of information Together with official sources members of the public create a lsquoholistic understanding of a situationrsquo In Blanchardrsquos view the civil‑military community would benefit from improving its engagement with emerging sources of lsquonon‑officialrsquo information and analysis such as Crisis Commons and taking advantage of their lsquoskills networks and capabilitiesrsquo According to one group such volunteer technical communities have the skills time and willingness to help Because these communities use social media as a source of information a question was raised about the utility of military actors also using social media information for their operations In connection with incidents in Afghanistan in which large numbers of civilians have been killed because of a lack of information about the location of major community gatherings a specific question was raised lsquoShould the military consider obtaining information via social media in order to try and reduce civilian casualties in their area of operationsrsquo


Group discussions highlighted a number of particularly challenging matters that require further attention many of them relating to the use of social media

gt The field of social media is rapidly evolving but still very new Major questions need to be asked and answers sought Many of the questions relate to trust security and risks ethics and the trade‑off between verification and promptness Should mapping be done of internally displaced personsrsquo camps for example in the way it is done for larger crisis situations (for instance the Libya Crisis Map) Is this a good idea What are the risks to local data gatherers Social media can assist in the protection of civilians but they can also expose the same civilians to threats

gt Despite the rapidly expanding reach of social technologies the digital divide remains a serious problem In view of the increasing attention given to and the lsquotrendinessrsquo of social media in the global aid community there is concern that those who are not connected lsquodo not existrsquo

ldquoPublic policy makers should seek information that forces them to think outside the boxrdquo

ldquoAn 80 per cent solution executed on time is better than a 100 per cent solution executed laterdquo


gt There is a lack of clarity about the relationship between open‑source information and military players and processes and the relationship between digital humanitarians and military institutions In relation to the former the military concept of information as currency stands in sharp contrast to the philosophy behind open‑source information A question was posed lsquoDoes the military need to better understand its relationship with this informationrsquo In relation to the latter considering that digital humanitarians will most probably not volunteer their time and data to military institutions or operate in or on military information systems what is the ideal beneficial relationship between digital humanitarians and military institutions

gt Concern was expressed about whether social media fairly appropriately and accurately capture minority perspectives and matters to do with local ownership

gt Managing different information streams is difficult Information in large quantities can become lsquonoisersquo A question was asked lsquoHow do you deal with ldquonoiserdquo from an operational perspectiversquo Too much noise points to a lack of filters Applying filters is an important research topic especially in connection with verification mechanisms and the importance of trusted sources


6 Prevention and preparedness for conflicts and disasters

61 Analysis

The ability to foresee and prevent conflict and the ability to be properly prepared to endure and respond to a natural disaster are two fundamental civil‑military capabilities Overall these capabilities are gradually being strengthened at the national regional and global levels but there are considerable challenges

Conflict preventionPreventive action is slowly building in the global community with the strengthening of institutional capacity At a recent international conference on conflict prevention a UN official observed lsquoWe are living in a conflict prevention momentrsquo48

Within the UN system the past decade has seen the emergence of various new prevention actorsmdashfor example the Security Councilrsquos Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Department of Political Affairs Mediation Unit Beyond these dedicated capacities more systematic attention is being given to the question through the Secretary‑Generalrsquos reporting open Security Council debates on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy as well as new monthly Security Council lsquohorizon scanningrsquo sessions conducted by the Department of Political Affairs lsquoto discuss emerging and ongoing crisesrsquo49

At the regional level preventive capacity is being strengthened in regional bodies such as the European Union the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe the African Union the Economic Community of West African States and the Organization of American States Recent developments in the United

48 Quoted in P Romita lsquoThe UN Security Council and conflict prevention a primerrsquo International Peace Institute New York October 2011 p 1

49 Ibid

Prevention lsquosuccessesrsquo gt UN Preventive Deployment Force

to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1993 to 1999)

gt efforts to prevent pre‑referendum violence and conflict in Sudan (2011)

ldquoEnsuring that the full range of options is available requires a level of governmental organization that matches the methodical organization characteristic of mass killingsrdquoPresidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities 2011 (see note 51)


States are providing precedents for building preventive capacity within national governments in 2010 the first‑ever White House position of Director for War Crimes Atrocities and Civilian Protection was created50 and in 2011 the President issued a Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities that mandated the establishment of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board to facilitate whole‑of‑government coordination on this matter51

Despite the progress being made a wide range of major challenges remain for preventive action

gt Prevention is difficult to sell It is more cost effective than the alternative but it entails higher costs at the outset and is invisible and thus hard to measure and evaluate The challenge of making the case for preventive action is reflected in the question lsquoHow do you justify resourcing prevention when you canrsquot prove the non‑barking dogrsquo Although there is broad consensus on the importance of preventive action Dr Abiodun Williams noted that such action it is not always treated as a necessity or a lsquomust‑do priorityrsquo there is a gap between rhetoric and practice Political will is difficult to achieve given the short‑term horizons of politicians the challenge of selling conflict prevention to domestic constituents lsquoespecially in tough economic timesrsquo52 and the gulf separating decision makers from at‑risk communities This weak political will is undermined by concerns especially among non‑Western developing countries that lsquoconflict prevention could be abused as a pretext for the strong to violate the sovereignty of the weakrsquo concerns that have been lsquoarousedrsquo by recent interventions in Libya and Cocircte drsquoIvoire53

gt Despite new communication technologies and a proliferation of early warning actors there continues to be a lsquodisconnectrsquo between early warning and decisive preventive action Dr Williams noted that among the factors that might help explain this gap are ambiguity in early warnings poor analysis and information overload Within the UN system there are multiple currently stove‑piped streams of incoming informationmdashfrom peacekeeping missions political missions diplomatic missions the field offices of UN agencies funds and programs and so on Information overload is at present inevitable because the United Nations does not have its own intelligence capacity (a result of member state resistance) to manage this information flow

50 The White House Office of the Press Secretary lsquoFact sheet President Obama Directs New Steps to Prevent Mass Atrocities and Impose Consequences on Serious Human Rights Violatorsrsquo 4 August 2011 httpwwwwhitehousegovthe‑press‑office20110804fact‑sheet‑president‑obama‑directs‑new‑steps‑prevent‑mass‑atrocities‑and

51 The White House Office of the Press Secretary lsquoPresidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocitiesrsquo 4 August 2011 httpwwwwhitehousegovthe‑press‑office20110804presidential‑study‑directive‑mass‑atrocities

52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16

ldquoElections are divisive activities that create winners and losersrdquoProfessor William Maley

ldquoEveryone is looking to everyone else to take the first step in preventionrdquoProfessor William Maley


gt Preventing electoral violence is a complex challenge It necessitates more than the deployment of observers and ensuring sufficient security for the voters Professor William Maley noted that it also requires an effort to prepare societies for the fact that somebody has to lose and to encourage candidates to see the possibilities of life beyond the presidential office Additionally there is a need for a greater focus on and understanding of underlying tensions associated with matters such as land employment and inequities where elections can serve as a trigger for violence

The rise of new global powers such as the BRICSS presents a challenge for the continuing struggle to build political will for preventive action The crucial question as posed by Dr Williams concerns how we can encourage such powers to see that conflict prevention is in their strategic interests

Civilndashmilitary disaster preparednessThere is a complex and expanding range of coordination mechanisms principles and guidelines for facilitating and improving civil‑military disaster preparedness (see also Chapter 7) At the global level preparedness is guided by such tools as the Oslo and MCDA guidelines and supported by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs which houses a Military and Civil Defence Unit and is the primary UN agency for civil‑military coordination Unlike some regional tools and approaches the global guidance is based on the philosophy that lsquodisaster relief should be as civilian as possible and as military as necessaryrsquo in other words military assets should be used only when there is lsquono comparable civilian alternativersquo available54

At the regional level there is also considerable activity aimed at strengthening and institutionalising civil‑military disaster preparedness The AsiandashPacific and Caribbean regions are at the forefront of disaster preparedness and responsemdashunsurprising considering the disaster risks facing countries in these regions Multiple guidelines currently exist prepared by and for disparate actors There has been an ongoing multi‑year effort by the AsiandashPacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations to develop the AsiandashPacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations Other organisations that have developed or are developing guidelines are the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ASEAN the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission55

As was discussed during the 2010 seminar countries in the AsiandashPacific region are also strengthening their national disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction capacities Indonesia for example has increased its efforts to manage disasters and to reduce its reliance on foreign assistance including through the

54 Australian Civil‑Military Centre and Australian Council for International Development Same spacemdashdifferent mandates A civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in international disaster and conflict response 2012 pp 32 11

55 Among these guidelines are the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures including the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (tactical focus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (strategic focus)

Civilndashmilitary preparedness tools gt Oslo GuidelinesmdashGuidelines on

the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief

gt MCDAmdashGuidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies

gt Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys

gt APCndashMADROmdashAsiandashPacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations


development of permanent disaster management institutions at the national and sub‑national levels the drafting of disaster management legislation and the integration of disaster risk management and disaster risk reduction in national and sub‑national development plans A notable example of this is the newly established Indonesian Rapid Response and Assistance Force a civil‑military‑police interdisciplinary force Community‑initiated processes are also a crucial aspect of this focus The 2007 Indonesian Disaster Management Law provides for multi‑stakeholder disaster risk reduction forums at the national and sub‑national levels including civil society organisations

In the Caribbean disaster preparedness and response is institutionalised at the regional level through extensive cooperative mechanisms The reality of the region demands this nine out of 18 countries do not have a defence force and those forces that do exist are very small The focus as explained by Brigadier General Earl Arthurs is therefore on pooling resources at the regional level and standardising processes so that interoperability is ensured in the region Regional action is coordinated by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency and is built around the Caribbean Community lsquoDisciplined Forcesrsquo (the Defence Force the Coast Guard the Police Service and the Fire Department) and supported when required by numerous regional groupings including the Caribbean Community Disaster Relief Unit and regional search and rescue teams In contrast with the principle of last resort in international guidance in the Caribbean the Disciplined Forces are central institutions in formal disaster response structures and are entrenched in national legislation and disaster management plans

Although there are fewer examples of country‑specific coordination mechanisms and tools those that do exist are nonetheless noteworthy In Pakistan the Humanitarian Country Team drafted and formally adopted the Pakistan Civil‑Military Guidelines in 2010 just three months before the 2010 floods Drawn on existing global policy the guidelines are based on the principle that lsquomilitary and civil defence assets shall not be used to support humanitarian activitiesrsquo although they do outline the conditions under which use of military assets may be warranted56 According to Dr Andrew Wyllie although the Pakistani Government did not officially approve this guidance military personnel were found to use the guidelines during the flood response alongside humanitarian personnel

In Afghanistan a standard operating procedure recently developed by ISAF constitutes a unique tool57 Focused on ISAF support for disaster relief in the country the SOP acknowledges the lead roles of the Afghan Government and humanitarian community in disaster response and identifies ISAF as a last‑resort option that can be mobilised only through a joint request by the Afghan Government and OCHA the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

56 N Bennet lsquoCivilndashmilitary principles in the Pakistan flood responsersquo Humanitarian Exchange Magazine Issue 49 February 2011 httpwwwodihpnorgreportaspid=3167

57 This SOP exists alongside civil‑military guidelines developed under the leadership of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan with the involvement of ISAF the government and the humanitarian community


The drafting process for such tools is almost as important as the tools themselves However difficult and lengthy the process the drafting effort represents a helpful avenue for solidifying civil‑military understanding and relationships Although the Pakistan civilndashMilitary Guidelines were not endorsed by the government according to Dr Wyllie it lsquodidnrsquot matterrsquo it was more about consistency in approach and engaging the government in a conversation Much of the lsquopoint of [the] guidelines is the process that leads to the guidelines the process of talking about the principles [and] how to apply them helliprsquo

The international response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake highlights the reality that civil‑military engagement is inherently difficult and challenging regardless of the coordination mechanisms and guidelines that might exist According to Dr Wyllie at no stage was there a lsquoreal dialoguersquo between the humanitarian community and governments in relation to the civil‑military effort The fault lay on both sides Initially there was no dialogue between the arriving military personnel and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator The military lacked an understanding of the structures of humanitarian organisations yet the humanitarian community did not reach out to the troops to help guide their efforts After successfully securing and opening the airport the US military proceeded to clog the airspace and airport This was a direct result of the absence of a civil‑military dialogue Disappointing behaviour of this nature has not been unique to Haiti It draws attention to the fundamentally difficult nature of civil‑military engagement and provides a clear argument for improving relationships and interactions between civilian and military actors before crises occur

62 Capability

Seminar participants considered the question lsquoWhat are the most promising opportunities for more effective conflict prevention and disaster preparednessrsquo The resultant suggestions are grouped here into the categories of prevention and preparedness

PreventionSuggestions aimed at achieving more effective conflict prevention focused on local and regional mechanisms and resources and the need for advocacy

gt Develop local mechanisms for monitoring and anticipating conflicts

gt Focus greater attention on the role of formal regional arrangements such as the Economic Community of West African States and the East Africa Standby Force

gt Increase the investment of human and financial capital in early warning systems and planning

gt Develop an advocacy effort to communicate the benefits of investing in preventive action

PreparednessThe suggestions aimed at achieving more effective disaster preparedness focused in particular on efforts at the national and regional levels

gt Develop local mechanisms for monitoring and anticipating disasters

gt Countries should give priority to development of national and regional disaster risk reduction plans Once developed these plans should be circulated widely for information‑sharing purposes


gt Circulate details about national and regional approaches to disaster preparedness in order to raise awareness of different models and best practice and in order to ensure that disaster response interventions are sensitive to and complement existing approaches

gt Countries should identify the capacities and capabilities that exist in their respective regions This information should be integrated into national disaster preparedness planning efforts

gt Countries should make more use of regional exercises as a means of building disaster preparedness


Group discussions highlighted particular challenges that require further attention

gt At a time when elections are attracting considerable interest on the global agenda greater focus is needed in order to understand the links between structural considerations (such as land employment and inequities) and electoral violence

gt The capacity and capability gaps between local civilian authorities and national and international military forces in a disaster situation continue to create serious impediments to civil‑military engagement This puts local authorities at a disadvantage and undermines efforts to support and ensure local ownership


7 Civilndashmilitary guidelines from concept to practice

71 Analysis

The broad purpose of civil‑military guidelines is to help manage facilitate and improve collaboration between civilian and military actors operating in the same environment be it in the context of a natural disaster a complex emergency or armed conflict They offer a mechanism for planning education training and other pre‑deployment preparations as well as implementation There is a large assortment of existing civil‑military guidelines reflecting a widespread preference for guidelines as a basic method for dealing with the complexity of civil‑military interaction

Among the guidelines currently in circulation and use in the civil‑military arena are the following

gt The Australian Civil‑Military Centre and Australian Council for International Development Same spacemdashdifferent mandates A civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in international disaster and conflict response (2012)58

gt the AsiandashPacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations AsiandashPacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations (draft 80 2010)

gt OCHArsquos United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (2008)

gt the UK Ministry of Defencersquos Sharing the Space A Guide to Constructive Engagement with Non-Governmental Organisations and the Aid Community (2008)

gt World Visionrsquos lsquoHISS‑CAM A Decision‑making Toolrsquo (A tool for guiding World Vision staff in their interaction with military and other armed actors) (2008)

gt the OCHA and Inter‑Agency Standing Committee Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (2008)

gt the Oslo GuidelinesmdashGuidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (rev 2007)

gt OCHArsquos Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (2006)

gt the MCDA GuidelinesmdashGuidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (rev 2006)

gt the Inter‑Agency Standing Committeersquos Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys Discussion Paper and Non-binding Guidelines (2001)

58 This guide was published by the Australian Civil‑Military Centre and the Australian Council for International Development and developed in collaboration with the Australian Defence Force the Australian Federal Police AusAID Australian non‑government organisations and the Australian Red Cross Copies of the provisional draft were circulated to all seminar participants Since then the document has been finalised and published and is available for download from httpacmcgovaupublicationssame‑space‑different‑mandates

ldquoWill guidelines bring personnel on the ground clarity and certaintyrdquoProfessor Bruce Oswald


Developing and implementing guidelines is a complicated undertaking Guidelines can form the groundwork for the development of norms and as a result deciding who is best placed to develop the guidelines becomes a crucial step in this process The current efforts to develop guidelines for detention in military operations demonstrate the difficulty of the analytical exercise required For example when drafting guidelines nothing can be taken for granted Professor Bruce Oswald says basic but difficult questions need to be asked Who are detainees When does someone become a detainee Who is responsible for taking detainees in a conflict space Who is responsible for taking care of them What are the treatment obligations

Implementation of guidelines is similarly complicated Those attending the seminar were told there is a tendency to develop guidelines then lsquothrow them out therersquo and expect them to be implemented But guidelines are non‑binding and dependent on self‑policing so effort is required to ensure compliance Regular and continuing education and training should be provided in order to remind constituents of the lsquotermsrsquo of the guidelines Naming and shaming and peer pressure can also help encourage compliance Implementation should be actively monitored and an independent review should be carried out to assess the effectiveness of the guidelines

Experience shows though that guidelines alone are insufficient for building supporting and improving civil‑military interoperability Opportunities for interaction and relationship building are also essentialmdashin particular before crises occur Relationships and partnerships in the civil‑military community are themselves also a core capability At events hosted by the Australian Civil‑Military Centre secondments liaisons and exchanges joint and integrated training and exercises and co‑location are regularly identified as good practice and priorities for future action59 Simple everyday forms of civil‑military interaction are also important and should be given prioritymdashfor example sporting and social events and everyday interaction at work As Lieutenant General Jasbir Lidder observed a more interactive interpersonal environment should be encouraged at work and greater efforts should be made to personally meet work contacts rather than rely on email Interaction of this kind enables people to better understand their counterpartsrsquo organisational philosophies practices and procedures and operational language facilitates the development of a common understanding between diverse actors and can break down stereotypes and misperceptions all of which is necessary if interoperability is to be maximised

59 See lsquoRegional Senior Leaders 2011 summary reportrsquo lsquoCivil‑Military Interaction Seminar 2010 summary report advancing civil‑military effectiveness in conflicts and disasters from theory to practice Australian Civil‑Military Centre Queanbeyan NSW June 2011 (text insert)

In the multi-agency Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands the civilian Special Coordinator and the police and military commanders are co-located This has proved hugely beneficial for civil-military coordination in the missionAustralian Civil‑Military Centre (see note 59)

ldquoThose to whom guidelines apply need to be the ones to develop themrdquo


8 The way ahead an agenda for civil‑military effectiveness

For the final session of the 2011 seminar participants were asked several questions

gt What next

gt What are the key capabilities for future civil‑military effectiveness

gt What opportunities exist to overcome existing capability constraints

gt What practical innovative solutions might improve civil‑military practice

In the discussion that followed participants identified a list of priorities for action in the civil‑military community during the next few yearsmdashthe beginnings of a future civil‑military agenda During the seminar one speaker asked lsquoIs this as good as it is going to get or can we do betterrsquo There was clear consensus among seminar participants that we can do better

81 The top three priorities

Doing more to build civil-military understanding before crises occurWe need to build a better shared understanding of the mandates roles responsibilities and language of the various civil‑military actors so that they can lsquohit the ground runningrsquo when there is a crisis This understanding can be built through ensuring civil‑military interaction in pre‑crisis efforts for disaster risk reduction early warning and contingency planning Joint and integrated civil‑military training exercises simulations and other education programs are further crucial avenues for facilitating interaction Such programs need to be widely availablemdashperhaps even mandatorymdashand geared toward both strategic and operational leaders and decision makers and field‑level staff

Improving our knowledge-building and information-sharing methods and networksThe civil‑military community needs to have a more explicit and more proactive focus on knowledge building and improving its information‑sharing methods and networks One important step here would be to better connect with unofficial information communities such as volunteer technical communities They potentially offer new ways of thinking about information and have adopted innovative approaches to information collection analysis and dissemination Their use of social technologies presents many possibilities for improving the transfer of knowledge between communities and practitioners Another way of improving knowledge building and information sharing is through establishing dedicated communities of practice at the regional level or among a coalition of partners A post‑seminar interactive online forum for those who attended a seminar such as this one is a simple example of such an approach

Institutionalising local ownershipInvolving local actors and taking advantage of their expertise and knowledge must become central to all international activities More attention should be given to understanding the perspectives of local players and communities as well as the local social cultural and political dynamics One practical way of institutionalising local ownership is to ensure that local NGOs and civil society organisations are included in the UN Cluster system Early identification and definition of exit strategies is another way of institutionalising local ownership it forces an operation to focus on the transition to local management and the need to prevent aid dependencies on the part of government and communities in the case of aid operations


ReferencesAsiandashPacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations

lsquoAsiandashPacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operationsrsquo draft 80 2010 httpochaonlineunorgroapAPCMADROtabid7303languageen‑USDefaultaspx

Australian Civil‑Military Centre lsquoRegional Senior Leaders 2011 summary report strengthening civil‑military coordination for conflict and disaster managementrsquo Australian Civil‑Military Centre Queanbeyan NSW 2011

lsquoCivil‑Military Interaction Seminar 2010 summary report advancing civil‑military effectiveness in conflicts and disasters from theory to practicersquo Australian Civil‑Military Centre Queanbeyan NSW June 2011

Australian Civil‑Military Centre and Australian Council for International Development Same spacemdashdifferent mandates A civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in international disaster and conflict response Queanbeyan NSW 2012

Bennet N lsquoCivilndashmilitary principles in the Pakistan flood responsersquo Humanitarian Exchange Magazine Issue 49 February 2011 httpwwwodihpnorgreportaspid=3167

Boege V lsquoHow to Maintain Peace and Security in a Post‑Conflict Hybrid Political Order ndashThe Case of Bougainvillersquo Journal of International Peacekeeping vol 14 2010 pp 330‑352

del Castillo G lsquoThe economics of peace Five rules for effective reconstructionrsquo United States Institute of Peace Special Report 286 September 2011

lsquoThe Economics of Peace in Afghanistanrsquo Project Syndicate 13 September 2011 httpwwwproject‑syndicateorgcommentarythe‑economics‑of‑peace‑in‑afghanistan

Donini A lsquoLocal perceptions of assistance to Afghanistanrsquo International Peacekeeping vol 14 no 1 pp 158‑172

Donini A Fast L Hansen G Harris S Minear L Mowjee T Wilder A lsquoHumanitarian Agenda 2015 Final ReportmdashThe state of the humanitarian enterprisersquo Feinstein International Center Tufts University Somerville MA March 2008

AB Ellick lsquoHard‑Line Islam Fills Void in Flooded Pakistanrsquo The New York Times 6 August 2010 httpwwwnytimescom20100807worldasia07pstanhtml_r=1

Ferris E lsquo911 and Humanitarian Assistance A Disturbing Legacyrsquo Brookings UP FRONT (Blog) 1 September 2011 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsup‑frontposts20110901‑sept11‑ferris

lsquoHaiti and future humanitarian disastersrsquo Brookings UPFRONT (Blog) 12 January 2011 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsup‑frontposts20110112‑haiti‑ferris

lsquoA research trip to Haiti Personal reflectionsrsquo Brookings Foreign Policy Trip Reports No 9 12 January 2011 httpwwwbrookingsedureports20110112_haiti_ferrisaspx


Fugate C lsquoUnderstanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the Aftermath of Disastersrsquo Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs Washington DC 5 May 2011 p 2 httpwwwhsgacsenategovsubcommitteesdisaster‑recovery‑and‑intergovernmental‑affairshearingsunderstanding‑the‑power‑of‑social‑media‑as‑a‑communications‑tool‑in‑the‑aftermath‑of‑disasters

g7+ lsquoStatement by the g7+rsquo 10 April 2010 httpwwwg7plusorgnews‑articles2010410statement‑by‑the‑g7html

Gettleman J Mazzetti M Schmitt E lsquoUS Relies on Contractors in Somalia Conflictrsquo The New York Times 10 August 2011 httpwwwnytimescom20110811worldafrica11somaliahtmlref=africaamppagewanted=all

Humanitarian Outcomes Aid Worker Security Database lsquoWorld Humanitarian Daymdashsecurity trendsrsquo 19 August 2010

J Hutcheson lsquoThe Lessons of 2006 Army Operations in East Timor and Solomon Islandsrsquo Australian Army Journal vol 4 Winter 2007 pp 93‑106

IRIN lsquoWhorsquos who among the ldquonewrdquo donorsrsquo IRIN In‑Depth 19 October 2011 httpwwwirinnewsorgInDepthMainaspxindepthid=91ampreportid=94008

The rise of the ldquonewrdquo donorsrsquo IRIN In‑Depth 19 October 2011 httpwwwirinnewsorgInDepthMainaspxindepthid=91ampreportid=94003

lsquoReaching out to ldquoemergingrdquo donorsrsquo IRIN 19 October 2011 httpwwwirinnewsorgReport94011AID‑POLICY‑Reaching‑out‑to‑quot‑emerging‑donors‑quot

Jafar M lsquoMuslim NGOs take part in Pakistan flood reliefrsquo Al Arabiya News 20 August 2010 httpwwwalarabiyanetarticles20100820117141html

Machold R amp Donais T lsquoFrom rhetoric to practice operationalizing national ownership in post‑conflict peacebuildingrsquo Workshop report workshop organized by UN Peacebuilding Support Office Wilfrid Laurier University and the City University of New Yorkrsquos Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies on the meanings and practices of national ownership in the context of post‑conflict peacebuilding 14 March 2011 New York httpwwwunorgenpeacebuildingpbsapdfnational_ownership_reportpdf

Masood S lsquoIn Pakistan Taliban Hint at Attacks on Relief Workersrsquo The New York Times 26 August 2010 httpwwwnytimescom20100827worldasia27pstanhtml

McCauley L Civil-Military Commentary 32011 the realities of privatised security within the civil-military arena Australian Civil‑Military Centre Queanbeyan NSW 2011

MCDA GuidelinesmdashlsquoGuidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergenciesrsquo rev 2006 httpwwwunochaorgwhat‑we‑docoordination‑toolsUN‑CMCoordpublications


Oslo GuidelinesmdashlsquoGuidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Reliefrsquo rev 11 November 2007 httpwwwreliefwebintrwlibnsfdb900sidAMMF‑6VXJVG$fileOCHA‑Nov2006pdfopenelement

Petersen MJ lsquoInternational religious NGOs at the United Nations a study of a group of religious organisationsrsquo Journal of Humanitarian Assistance November 2010 httpsitestuftsedujhaarchives847

Priest D and Arkin WM lsquoNational Security Incrsquo Top Secret America A Washington Post Investigation 20 July 2010 The Washington Post httpprojectswashingtonpostcomtop‑secret‑americaarticlesnational‑security‑inc

Riordan K lsquoPolice tweet on the beat during flood crisisrsquo ACB News 20 January 2011 httpwwwabcnetaunews2011‑01‑20police‑tweet‑on‑the‑beat‑during‑flood‑crisis1912328

Romita P lsquoThe UN Security Council and conflict prevention a primerrsquo International Peace Institute New York October 2011

Sims B lsquoUK Government shifts policy on armed guards for commercial vesselsrsquo info4SECURITY 31 October 2011 viewed 10 December 2011 httpwwwinfo4securitycomstoryaspsectioncode=9ampstorycode=4128316ampc=1

Smith K lsquoHumanitarian aid and smaller donors diversity collective response and better datarsquo Global Humanitarian Assistance Blog 2 December 2010 httpwwwglobalhumanitarianassistanceorghumanitarian‑aid‑and‑the‑role‑of‑smaller‑non‑dac‑donors‑diversity‑collective‑response‑and‑better‑data‑1881html

Stoddard A Harmer A DiDomenico V lsquoProviding aid in insecure environments 2009 updatemdashtrends in violence against aid workers and the operational responsersquo Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 34 Overseas Development Institute London April 2009

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Sharing the Space A Guide to Constructive Engagement with Non-Governmental Organisations and the Aid Community 2008 httpwwwmodukDefenceInternetMicroSiteDCDCOurPublicationsConceptsSharingTheSpaceAGuideToConstructiveEngagementWith NongovernmentalOrganisationsAndTheAidCommunityhtm

UN General AssemblySecurity Council lsquoCivilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict Independent report of the Senior Advisory Grouprsquo A65747ndashS201185 22 February 2011

lsquoProgress report of the Secretary‑General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflictrsquo A64866ndashS2010386 16 July 2010

lsquoReport of the Secretary‑General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflictrsquo A63881ndashS2009304 11 June 2009

UN‑Habitat lsquoCities and land rightsrsquo urban WORLD vol 3 issue 1 February‑April 2011

UN Inter‑Agency Standing Committeersquos Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys Discussion Paper and Non-binding Guidelines 2001 httpwwwhumanitarianinfoorgiascpageloaderaspxpage=content‑products‑productsampproductcatid=8

UN Millennium Project A home in the city Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers Earthscan London 2005


UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook 2008 httpreliefwebintreportworldcivil‑military‑coordination‑officer‑field‑handbook

lsquoGuidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groupsrsquo 2006 httpochaonlineunorghumanitariannegotiationsindexhtml

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UN Inter‑Agency Standing Committee lsquoCivil‑Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergenciesrsquo 2008 httpwwwunochaorgwhat‑we‑docoordination‑toolsUN‑CMCoordpublications

UN Secretary‑General Report of the UN Secretary-Generalrsquos Senior Advisory Group on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict UN New York 2011

Walsh D lsquoUS had lsquofrighteningly simplisticrsquo view of Afghanistan says McChrystalrsquo The Guardian 7 October 2011 httpwwwguardiancoukworld2011oct07us‑frighteningly‑simplistic‑afghanistan‑mcchrystalnewsfeed=true

Wehner M and Denoon D (eds) Without a Gun Australiansrsquo Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville 1997-2001 Pandanus Books Canberra 2001

The White House Office of the Press Secretary lsquoFact sheet President Obama Directs New Steps to Prevent Mass Atrocities and Impose Consequences on Serious Human Rights Violatorsrsquo 4 August 2011 httpwwwwhitehousegovthe‑press‑office20110804fact‑sheet‑president‑obama‑directs‑new‑steps‑prevent‑mass‑atrocities‑and

lsquoPresidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocitiesrsquo 4 August 2011 httpwwwwhitehousegovthe‑press‑office20110804presidential‑study‑directive‑mass‑atrocities

World Bank World Development Report 2011 conflict security and development World Bank Washington DC 2011

World Vision International lsquoHISS‑CAM A Decision‑making Toolrsquo 2008


Further readingBarakat S amp Zyck S Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-affected Environments

Kuwait Programme on Development Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States London School of Economics 2010

Collinson S Elhawary S lsquoHumanitarian Space A Review of Trends and Issuesrsquo Humanitarian Policy Group Report 32 Overseas Development Institute London April 2012

Donini A lsquoHumanitarian Agenda 2015 principles power and perceptionsmdashAfghanistan humanitarianism under threatrsquo Briefing paper Feinstein International Center Tufts University Somerville MA March 2009 httpwikisuittuftseduconfluencedownloadattachments22520580Donini‑Afghanistanpdf

Fishstein P lsquoWinning Hearts and Minds Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Balkh Provincersquo Feinstein International Center Tufts University Somerville MA November 2010 httpswikisuittuftseduconfluencepagesviewpageactionpageId=42671653

Gompelman G lsquoWinning Hearts and Minds Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistanrsquos Faryab Provincersquo Feinstein International Center Tufts University Somerville MA January 2011 httpswikisuittuftseduconfluencepagesviewpageactionpageId=42009162

Gumedze S (Ed) From Market for Force to Market for Peace private military and security companies in peacekeeping operations Monograph 183 Institute for Security Studies Pretoria 2011

Hess M Laanela TP Maley M lsquoPreparing for Elections in Afghanistan Prospects and ChallengesmdashSummary Reportrsquo Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific and Asia‑Pacific College of Diplomacy Canberra 2012

International Committee of the Red Cross Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict International Committee of the Red Cross Geneva August 2009

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies lsquoIntroduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistancersquo 2008 httpwwwifrcorgPageFiles41203introduction‑guidelines‑enpdf

Melloul K lsquoAccidental partners Listening to the Australian defence and police experience of the security‑development nexus in conflict‑affected and fragile statesrsquo Product of Trust Fund cooperation between AusAID and the World Bankrsquos Fragile and Conflict‑Affected Countries Group prepared on behalf of the World Bank October 2010

Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development amp United Nations Development Programme Investing in Security a global assessment of armed violence reduction initiatives 2011 httpwwwoecdorgdataoecd10048927716pdf


Oxfam lsquoEngaging with communities the next challenge for peacekeepingrsquo Briefing paper Summary November 2010 httpwwwoxfamorgukresourcespolicyconflict_disastersdownloadsbp141‑engaging‑with‑communities‑221110‑summ‑enpdf

Pingeot L lsquoDangerous Partnership Private Military amp Security Companies and the UNrsquo Global Policy Forum and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation New York June 2012

Save the Children At a Crossroads humanitarianism for the next decade 2010 httpwwwsavethechildrenorguken54_12550htm

Solomon Islands Government amp RAMSI lsquoPartnership framework between Solomon Islands Government and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islandsrsquo April 2009 httpwwwramsiorgaboutpartnership‑frameworkhtml

UN Office on Drugs and Crime Organized Crime and Instability in Central Africa a threat assessment 2011 httpwwwhumansecuritygatewaycomdocumentsUNODC_OrganizedCrimeandInstabilityinCentralAfrica_AThreatAssessmentpdf


Relevant linksAustralian Civil‑Military Centre httpwwwacmcgovau

Australian Civil‑Military Centrersquos Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP)httpacmcgovauour‑work‑and‑focusmultiagency‑peace‑and‑stabilisation‑operations‑project‑mapsop

CrisisCommonshttpcrisiscommonsorg

Crisis Mappershttpwwwcrisismappersnet

Libya Crisis Map OCHAhttplibyacrisismapnet

Mindanao monitoring NGOhttpblogminhracorg

Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocidehttpwwwunorgenpreventgenocideadviserindexshtml

Queensland Police Service Facebook pagehttpwwwfacebookcomQueenslandPolice

The Standby Task Forcehttpblogstandbytaskforcecom

UN Department of Political AffairsmdashPeacemaking and Conflict Preventionhttpwwwunorgwcmcontentsiteundpamainissuespeacemaking

UN inter‑agency framework teamhttpwwwuneporgconflictsanddisastersPortals6documentsFRAMEWORK_TEAM_FLYER‑1Oct10pdf

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)httpwwwunorgenpeacekeepingmissionsminustah

West Africa Coast Initiativehttpwwwunodcorgwestandcentralafricaenwest‑africa‑coast‑initiativehtml

Working Group on the Use of MercenarieshttpwwwohchrorgENIssuesMercenariesWGMercenariesPagesWGMercenariesIndexaspx

Executive Summary

1Introduction

2Current trends future needs determining tomorrowrsquos civilndashmilitary requirements

21The economic needs of transition

22Conditions of flux in humanitarianism

23More natural disasters in more complex environments

24Emerging concerns

3Local-level processes ownership in practice

31Analysis

32Capability

33Emerging difficulties and dilemmas

4New and non-traditional players

41Analysis

42Capability


5The importance of information in civilndashmilitary effectiveness

51Analysis

52Capability


6Prevention and preparedness for conflicts and disasters

61Analysis

62Capability


7Civilndashmilitary guidelines from concept to practice

71Analysis

8The way ahead an agenda for civilndashmilitary effectiveness

81The top three priorities

References

Further reading

Relevant links


Contents

Executive Summary 3

1 Introduction 6

2 Current trends future needs determining tomorrowrsquos civil‑military requirements 7

21 The economic needs of transition 7

22 Conditions of flux in humanitarianism 8

23 More natural disasters in more complex environments 9

24 Emerging concerns 10

3 Local‑level processes ownership in practice 11 31 Analysis 11

32 Capability 14


4 New and non‑traditional players 16 41 Analysis 16

42 Capability 19


5 The importance of information in civil‑military effectiveness 21 51 Analysis 21

52 Capability 24


6 Prevention and preparedness for conflicts and disasters 27 61 Analysis 27

62 Capability 31


7 Civilndashmilitary guidelines from concept to practice 33 71 Analysis 33

8 The way ahead an agenda for civil‑military effectiveness 35 81 The top three priorities 35

References 36

Further reading 40

Relevant links 42











































































































gt g7+ initiative

31 Analysis












gt Who owns what

























32 Capability





















41 Analysis





27 McCauley



























39 ibid




42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links











































































































gt g7+ initiative

31 Analysis












gt Who owns what

























32 Capability





















41 Analysis





27 McCauley



























39 ibid




42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links








gt Who owns what

























32 Capability





















41 Analysis





27 McCauley



























39 ibid




42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links














32 Capability





















41 Analysis





27 McCauley



























39 ibid




42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links














41 Analysis





27 McCauley



























39 ibid




42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links



























39 ibid




42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links



42 Capability



















51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links










51 Analysis































52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links

























52 Capability


























61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links

















61 Analysis






49 Ibid












52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links








52 Romita p17

53 Romita p16


























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links
























62 Capability




















71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links











71 Analysis

























gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links











gt What next




































































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links




























































































Executive Summary

1Introduction





24Emerging concerns


31Analysis

32Capability



41Analysis

42Capability



51Analysis

52Capability



61Analysis

62Capability



71Analysis



References

Further reading

Relevant links

cmis report 2011

Education

dilemmasgroup discussions highlighted

traditionally unconnected participants

feinstein international center

al arabiya news

final reportthe state

dilemmasin group discussions

wilfrid laurier university

agency standing committees