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WHY BIGGER ISN’T BETTER:

THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR—

1999 UPDATE

CLIFFORD COBB, GARY SUE GOODMAN, AND MATHIS WACKERNAGEL

NOVEMBER

REDEFINING PROGRESS

REDEFINING PROGRESS

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© REDEFINING PROGRESS 1999

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Redefining Progress gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Ford Foundation and the Merck Family Fund. We also thank

those who provided the research, comments, and wise counsel that made the GPI update possible, including: Jack Appleyard, Diana

Deumling, Elisa Freeling, Diana Glanternik, Ansje Miller, Judith Silverstein, and many others who contributed to this effort.

C L I F F O R D C O B B

Clifford Cobb has been associated with Redefining Progress since its founding in 1994.

He is a graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, where he earned a master’s

degree in public policy. He pioneered the alternative to the gross domestic product and

was one of the key researchers and co-authors for the October 1995 cover story in the

Atlantic Monthly, “If the Economy Is Up, Why Is America Down?” He also contributed

to RP’s report on an environmental tax reform in California, “Greening the Golden

State.” Mr. Cobb’s work has been published widely. He contributed to the ground-

breaking book, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the

Environment, and a Sustainable Future, written by Herman Daly and John Cobb, Jr., pub-

lished in 1989. He is also a co-author of the Green National Product and author of

Responsive Schools, Renewed Communities, an analysis of education vouchers from a

communitarian perspective. Since 1996, Mr. Cobb has been on the board of the Robert

Schalkenbach Foundation, which is devoted to promoting the ideas of Henry George, a

nineteenth century social reformer.

G A R Y S U E G O O D M A N

Gary Sue Goodman is a writer, teacher, and educational consultant with particular inter-

est in women’s issues, cross-cultural/interracial dynamics, the writing process, and efforts

to protect the environment. She earned her doctorate in modern thought and literature

at Stanford University, with a specialization in interdisciplinary feminist studies. She

teaches advanced expository writing, gender studies, and multiethnic literature at the

University of California at Davis. She also works as a freelance writer and editor for

Redefining Progress and other progressive nonprofit organizations.

M A T H I S W A C K E R N A G E L

Mathis Wackernagel is the director of the Indicators Program at Redefining Progress.After receiving his degree in mechanical engineering from the Swiss Federal Institute ofTechnology, he earned his doctorate in community and regional planning at theUniversity of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. There, working with ProfessorWilliam Rees, he developed the “Ecological Footprint” concept as his doctoral disserta-tion, which has now become a widely used sustainability measure. Dr. Wackernagel hasworked on sustainability issues for a number of organizations in France, Canada, CostaRica, Mexico, and the United States, and has lectured for community groups, NGOs, andmore than 70 universities in 17 countries. He has authored, or contributed to, over twodozen academic articles and co-authored various books on sustainability, including OurEcological Footprint. He also directs the Centre for Sustainability Studies at AnáhuacUniversity of Xalapa, Mexico.

V

TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

I. WHY ECONOMIC GROWTH ALONE DOES NOT EQUAL PROGRESS 1

| THE GDP AS A FLAWED MEASURE OF THE ECONOMY—AND OF PROGRESS 1

II. THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR: SUMMARY OF METHOD 3

III. THE 1998 TRENDS 5

| READING THE NUMBERS 9

| INCOME GAP WIDENS 9

| PROSPERITY THROUGH SHORT-TERM THINKING 10

| FAILURE TO INVEST IN FUTURE PRODUCTIVITY 10

| INCREASING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF AMERICAN ASSETS 11

| DEPLETION OF THE COUNTRY‘S NATURAL CAPITAL 11

| SOCIAL IMPROVEMENTS 13

| ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 15

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 17

ENDNOTES 19

BACKGROUND READING 20

APPENDIX 21

CASE STUDY: FOOD FOR THOUGHT: THE GDP IS PADDED WITH FAT—OURS 25

| SURPLUS FOOD 25

| EXCESS WEIGHT 26

| PAY THE DOCTOR 26

| BUYING WEIGHT LOSS 28

REFERENCES 30

CASE STUDY: CONSUMING KIDS 33

| CHILD’S PLAY 35

| YOU ARE WHAT YOU EAT 35

| BUYING SELF-WORTH 36

| TAKE IT AND RUN 37

| PAYING WITH PLASTIC 38

REFERENCES 41

I . W H Y E C O N O M I C G R O W T H A L O N E D O E S N O T E Q UA L P R O G R E S S

Imagine receiving an annual holiday letter from distant friends, reporting the best

year ever for their family, because they spent more money this year than ever before. It

began during the unusually rainy winter sparked by El Niño, when the roof sprang leaks

and their yard in the East Bay hills started to slide: The many layers of roofing had to be

stripped to the rafters before the roof could be reconstructed, and engineers were

required to keep the yard from eroding away. Shortly after, Jane broke her leg in a car

accident: A hospital stay, surgery, physical therapy, and replacing the car took a bite out

of their savings. Jane, of course, couldn’t maintain her usual routine of caring for their

two small children, shopping, cooking, and cleaning duties, so they hired people to help.

Then they were robbed and replaced a computer, two TVs, a VCR, and a video camera;

they also bought a home security system, to keep these new purchases safe.

Essentially, Jane and John’s equating money spent with well-being is like using the

gross domestic product (GDP) as the barometer of nation’s economic health. The GDP

is simply a gross tally of money spent—goods and services purchased by households or

government and business investments, regardless of whether they enhance our well-

being or not. Designed as a planning tool to guide the massive production effort for

World War II, the GDP was never intended to be a yardstick of economic progress; yet,

gradually it has assumed totemic stature as the ultimate measure of economic success.

When it rises, the media applaud and politicians rush to take credit. When it falls, there

is hand-wringing and general alarm.

THE GDP AS A FL AWED MEASURE OF THE ECONOMY—AND OFPROGRESS

As a measure of economic health, the GDP is badly flawed. First by counting only

monetary transactions as economic activity, the GDP omits much of what people value

and activities that serve basic needs. For example, it doesn’t count free services, such as

community volunteer work or caring for children or elderly parents in the home—ser-

vices that would show up in the GDP if they were paid for. It also ignores the value of

leisure time spent in recreation, relaxation, or with family and friends. The GDP omits

1WHY ECONOMIC GROWTH ALONE DOES NOT EQUAL PROGRESS

The GDP was never intend-ed to be a yardstick of eco-nomic progress; yet,gradually it has assumedtotemic stature as the ulti-mate measure of economicsuccess.

crucial contributions of the environment, such as pure air and water, moderate climate,

and protection from the sun’s harmful rays, even though these services, which the earth

provides for free, become expensive if they need to be bought instead. It is appropriate

that an economic indicator include such measures, because common sense and history

tell us that the economy is a tool to address needs and enhance well-being, not an end in

itself.

More significantly, the GDP fails to distinguish between monetary transactions

that genuinely add to well-being and those that diminish it, try to maintain the status

quo, or make up for degraded conditions. Much that contributes to economic growth is

perceived by most people as losses rather than gains: fixing blunders from the past, bor-

rowing from the future, and shifting activities from the unpaid household or community

sector to the monetized economy. For example, the GDP treats crime, divorce, legal fees,

and other signs of social breakdown as economic gains. Car wrecks, medical costs, locks

and security systems, and insurance are also pluses to the GDP.

Further, the GDP ignores the environmental costs of economic activities. It takes

no account of the depletion of natural resources used to produce goods and services:

For example, the harvesting of ancient redwood trees adds the market value of the wood

to the GDP. The GDP counts pollution as a double gain to the economy: The produc-

tion of oil that creates pollution adds to the GDP; then the clean-up of toxic waste sites

or the Exxon Valdez oil spill ups the GDP even more. In treating the depletion or degra-

dation of our natural resources as income rather than depreciation of an asset, the GDP

violates both basic accounting principles and common sense.

To the GDP, every transaction is positive as long as money changes hands. No

wonder the GDP rises continuously, adding everything as a gain, making no distinction

between costs and benefits, well-being or decline. And no wonder that, while media and

politicians crow about economic growth, many Americans feel strangely ambivalent or

left out.

The economy is a tool toaddress needs and enhancewell-being, not an end initself.

No wonder that, whilemedia and politicians crowabout economic growth,many Americans feelstrangely ambivalent orleft out.

2 REDEFINING PROGRESSWHY BIGGER ISN’T BETTER THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR—1999 UPDATE

I I . T H E G E N U I N E P R O G R E S S I N D I C AT O R : S U M M A R Y O F M E T H O D

To address the inadequacies of the GDP as a guide for public policy, the Genuine

Progress Indicator was developed in 1994 by Redefining Progress, a nonprofit, nonparti-

san public policy institute designed to stimulate public discourse on the type of future

that Americans desire and how to achieve it.1 Founded on the conviction that the

nation’s economy and political culture are increasingly at odds with its best values and

aspirations, Redefining Progress uses research and public education to promote integrat-

ed policy approaches to social, economic, and environmental problems and to advance

the principles of enterprise, responsibility, and stewardship.

The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) takes from the GDP the financial transac-

tions that are relevant to well-being. It then adjusts them for aspects of the economy

that the GDP ignores. The GPI thus reveals the relationship between factors convention-

ally defined as purely economic and those traditionally defined as purely social and envi-

ronmental.

Like the GDP, the GPI begins with the nation’s personal consumption expendi-

tures. But the GPI assesses the well-being of households, rather than focusing exclusively

on the number of dollars they spend. While the GDP then adds the nation’s spending on

investment and government, the GPI considers most of those expenditures defensive,

and thus begins with only personal consumption expenditures as its base.

Personal consumption expenditures are then adjusted for income distribution

using the Gini coefficient (see below under “Income Gap Widens”). It is often assumed

that the rising GDP lifts all boats, but this is not necessarily true. From 1973 to 1993, for

example, while the GDP rose by 55%, real wages declined by 3.4%. In the 1980s alone,

the poorest fifth of American families lost 0.5% of their income each year, while the top

5% of households increased their real income by 3.9% per year. Growth did not benefit

everyone, and a true measure of well-being should take this inequality into account.

Because the GDP makes no distinction between transactions that contribute to or

diminish well-being, it operates like a business income statement that adds expenses to

income instead of subtracting them. The GPI, on the other hand, differentiates between

what most people perceive as positive and negative economic transactions, and between

the costs of producing economic benefits and the benefits themselves. It adds up the

3THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR: SUMMARY OF METHOD

Growth did not benefiteveryone, and a true mea-sure of well-being shouldtake this inequality intoaccount.

The GPI differentiatesbetween what most peopleperceive as positive andnegative economic transac-tions, and between thecosts of producing econom-ic benefits and the benefitsthemselves.

value of products and services consumed in the economy—whether or not money

changes hands.

Using personal consumption expenditures adjusted for income inequality as its

base, the GPI then adds or subtracts categories of spending based on whether they

enhance or detract from our nation’s well-being.

The following nonmonetary benefits—ignored by the GDP—are included in

the GPI:

1. the value of time spent on household work, parenting, and volunteer work.

2. the value of services of consumer durables (such as cars and refrigerators).

3. services of highways and streets.

The GPI then subtracts three categories of expenses that do not improve well-

being:

1. defensive expenditures, defined as money spent to maintain the household’s

level of comfort, security, or satisfaction, in the face of declines in quality of life

due to such factors as crime, auto accidents, or pollution. Examples include

personal water filters, locks or security systems, hospital bills from auto acci-

dents, or the cost of repainting houses damaged by air pollution.

2. social costs, such as the cost of divorce, household costs of crime, or loss of

leisure time.

3. the depreciation of environmental assets and natural resources, including loss

of farmland, wetlands, and old-growth forests; reduction of stocks of natural

resources, such as fossil fuels or other mineral deposits; and damaging effects of

wastes and pollution.

(See Table A-1: The GPI Components and Their Change from 1997 to 1998 and Table

A-2: Summary of the Valuation Method for Each GPI Component.)


As human illness can beconcealed by a surfaceappearance of health, eco-nomic robustness as mea-sured by the GDP masks afragile state of economicgrowth that cannot be sus-tained.

5THE 1998 TRENDS

I I I . T H E 19 9 8 T R E N D S

The data in our 1998 update highlight the need for an alternative measure of

economic vitality. As human illness can be concealed by a surface appearance of health,

economic robustness as measured by the GDP masks a fragile state of economic growth

that cannot be sustained.

F IGURE 1 : GPI : ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

YEAR

1992

DO

LLA

RS

PER

CA

PITA

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) PER CAPITA

GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR (GPI) PER CAPITA

6

TABLE 1 : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT VERSUS GENUINE PROGRESS , 1950 TO 1998

GDP GPI GDP PER CAPITA GPI PER CAPITA

billions of 1992 dollars billions of 1992 dollars 1992 dollars per capita 1992 dollars per capita

1950 1,611 810 10,582 5,317

1960 2,263 1,226 12,525 6,783

1970 3,398 1,781 16,569 8,686

1980 4,615 1,982 20,310 8,722

1990 6,136 1,965 24,600 7,879

1998 7,552 1,770 27,939 6,549

TOTAL

CHANGE +5,941 +960 +17,357 +1,232

1950–1998

As conventionally measured, 1998 was quite a good year for the economy. The

GDP rose by 3.9% (after adjusting for inflation), just as it did in 1997. In per capita

terms, this corresponds to an impressive 3% growth rate. These were the two highest

growth years in a decade. But before we congratulate ourselves on a highly productive

economy, we have to ask what grew, who benefited, and at what cost to our social and

environmental health.

REDEFINING PROGRESSWHY BIGGER ISN’T BETTER THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR—1999 UPDATE

7THE 1998 TRENDS

In 1998, official reports celebrated a booming economy, and the stock market kept

reaching record highs. However, the GPI, the measure of household well-being, contin-

ued to slide, as it has for more than two decades (see figure 1). While the GDP rose from

$20,310 per capita in 1980 to $27,939 per capita in 1988, the GPI fell from $8,722 per

capita in 1980 to $6,649 per capita in 1998 (all given in 1992 dollars; see table 1).

There was a hopeful sign: The GPI fell at a slower rate that it has in ten years—by

only 1%. Perhaps that may signal a bottoming out and even a future rise in the GPI, but

starts in this direction in previous years have proven false.

F IGURE 2 : DIFFERENCE IN ANNUAL GROWTH R ATES : GDP AND GPI

4.0%

3.0%

2.0%

1.0%

0

-1.0%

-2.0%

-3.0%

YEARS

1950–60 1960–70 1970–80 1980–90 1990–98

CHANGE IN PER CAPITA GPI CHANGE IN PER CAPITA GDP

PERC

ENTA

GE

AN

NU

AL

CH

AN

GE

2.5%

1.7%

2.5%

2.8%

0.0%

2.1%

-1.0%

1.9%

-2.3%

1.6%


TABLE 2 : THE 1998 GPI ACCOUNT

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS

(1992 dollars)

Personal Consumption 5,153

Income Distribution 118

Personal Consumption Adjusted for Income Inequality 4,385

ADJUSTMENTS

Value of Housework and Parenting +1,911

Services of Consumer Durables +592

Services of Highways and Streets +95

Value of Volunteer Work +88

Net Capital Investment +45

Cost of Household Pollution Abatement -12

Cost of Noise Pollution -16

Cost of Crime -28

Cost of Air Pollution -38

Cost of Water Pollution -50

Cost of Family Breakdown -59

Loss of Old-Growth Forests -83

Cost of Underemployment -112

Cost of Austomobile Accidents -126

Loss of Farmland -130

Net Foreign Lending or Borrowing -238

Loss of Leisure Time -276

Cost of Ozone Depletion -306

Loss of Wetlands -363

Cost of Commuting -386

Cost of Consumer Durables -737

Cost of Long-term Environmental Damage -1,054

Depletion of Nonrenewable Resources -1,333

NET GENUINE PROGRESS 1,770

We’re buying short-termprosperity with long-termdebts.

9THE 1998 TRENDS

READING THE NUMBERS

Instead of true progress, our current spending spree reflects a carpe diem mentali-

ty. We’re buying short-term prosperity with long-term debts. Using the Genuine

Progress Indicator to analyze current economic trends uncovers these short-sighted fiscal

strategies: consume excessively, borrow from foreign countries, buy on credit, deplete

resources, don’t invest in future productivity, and distribute the wealth unequally. In

effect, let future generations suffer the consequences.

The GPI declined at a slower rate in 1998, primarily due to the growth of the

GDP’s largest component, household consumption. In 1998, personal consumption

expenditures grew 4.9%, up from rates of 3.4% and 3.2% in the previous two years.

More than simply observing the rise or fall of the whole GPI, examining the

changes in specific components reveals the true state of the economy and its future per-

formance capacity.

The GPI declined because it includes increasing social, economic, and environ-

mental costs that the continued growth of the GDP ignores. Three main factors help to

explain why, despite the claims to a robust economy, many people feel uneasy, less well-

off, or left behind by the apparent wave of prosperity. First, the economic growth is not

distributed equally: Some have prospered while others work two jobs to get by. Second,

this growth is purchased by increasing financial debts to the future, through overseas

borrowing and failing to invest enough in future productivity. Third, the costs of growth

include degradation of natural assets and depletion of natural resources, an ecological

“borrowing” from the future that we can never hope to repay.

INCOME GAP WIDENS

Compared to 1997, the distribution of income was slightly more even in 1998.

According to the Gini coefficient, a standard economic measure, income distribution

improved slightly, moving from 0.459 in 1997 to 0.456 in 1998 (0 would mean every

household received an equal income and 1 would mean that the richest household

received all the income). But the continued long-term trend toward greater inequality

has pulled the GPI down since the mid-1970s: The Gini coefficient rose from 0.397 in

1975 to 0.428 in 1990.

What this means in human terms is that the rich are getting richer while the rest

of us are treading water or losing ground. Gains from the growth in GDP have accrued

increasingly to the highest income earners in America, leaving the poor further and fur-

ther behind. From 1975 to 1998, the proportion of total income received by the poorest

fifth of the population dropped from 4.4% to 3.6%, while the proportion received by the

richest fifth increased from 43.2% to 49.2%.

The significance of this long-term trend toward greater inequality is revealed when

we consider how more equal distribution of income would have affected the GPI. For

example, a return to the income distribution of 1992 would have raised the 1998 GPI by

11% above 1997. Had we miraculously returned to the income distribution of 1968, the

year of greatest income equality since 1950 (indicated by a Gini coefficient of 0.388), the

1998 GPI would have been about 43% higher. (See Figure 3: What If the Past Had Been

Different?)

Part of this widening gap between rich and poor in the 1990s derived from the

tremendous surge in the value of equities. From 1990 to 1997, the market value of

domestic corporations almost tripled, rising from $3,452 billion to $10,293 billion (in

1992 dollars). Obviously, the much-trumpeted stock market rise exacerbated the already

widening gap between those who have inherited or invested in stocks in recent decades,

and those who have barely gotten by. While the GPI reflects the widening economic gap

in monetary terms, we should also consider the social costs of this increased inequality

on which we can’t place a dollar value: increased alienation between rich and poor,

heightened social conflict, resentment, and despair.

PROSPERIT Y THROUGH SHORT-TERM THINKING

If the tremendous growth in the stock market had resulted in equivalent invest-

ments in future productivity, that might indicate that the recent growth of economic

activities could continue. Instead, we’ve purchased that growth by borrowing from the

future in two significant ways: failing to invest in business capital and borrowing from

overseas.

FAILURE TO INVEST IN FUTURE PRODUCTIVIT Y

As a sign of the short-term mentality, much of the recent growth has been chan-

neled into consumption rather than investment: paying higher dividends to stockholders

instead of reinvesting more in business capital (buildings, technology, and equipment).

In capital investments in business, as measured by net additions to capital stock, the

1990s have fallen behind the 1980s. While the net additions to capital stock grew at $60

to $80 billion per year in the 1980s, this annual investment has fallen to only $45 or $50

billion per year since 1992. If capital investments had grown by $65 billion in 1998, the

GPI would have held steady instead of falling (see figure 3).

Along with indicating a short-term, self-indulgent mentality, this failure to invest

in the future suggests that the stock market rise may represent a temporary bubble.

Without reinvestment, the growth is unlikely to continue.


Relying on foreigninvestors to pump up ourstock market is equivalentto borrowing now to payfor increased consumptionand forcing future genera-tions to pay the interest.

While we have added tofuture generations’ debtburden by failing to rein-vest in business and bor-rowing from foreigncountries, increased con-sumption has also depletedthe legacy of natural assetsthat will be inherited byour children.

11THE 1998 TRENDS

INCREASING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF AMERIC AN ASSETS

Another factor that suggests that the bubble must eventually burst is the tremen-

dous increase in foreign ownership of American assets. In recent years, a severe trade

imbalance between the United States and the rest of the world has rapidly increased. As

a result, foreign capital pouring into the States in 1997 and 1998 contributed greatly to

the dramatic stock market rise. But this growth in paper value from foreign investment

does not represent enduring economic strength. It actually means that foreign owner-

ship of U.S. assets grew rapidly compared to assets held by Americans overseas. When

these foreign owners are eventually paid off (with interest and dividends), the investment

funds will flow out of the United States again. Relying on foreign investors to pump up

our stock market is equivalent to borrowing now to pay for increased consumption and

forcing future generations to pay the interest.

In 1998 the growth in foreign ownership of the economy had a considerable effect

on the GPI. If the net international position had not changed from 1997, the GPI would

have risen by 6.6% to over $1.9 trillion, and per capita GPI would have grown by 5.6%.

Instead, the per capita GPI fell by 2.1% (see table A-1 in the appendix and figure 3).

Since the GPI is calculated to smooth out short-term fluctuations and reveal long-run

trends, the declining international net position last year was actually worse than this

number suggests; in fact, the increase in foreign borrowing was nearly three times greater

in 1998 than it was in 1996.

While we have essentially financed our economic growth by borrowing overseas,

the rise in paper wealth created an illusory sense of prosperity, which in turn fostered

increased consumption, particularly by the wealthiest households. But this process is

unsustainable. While we have added to future generations’ debt burden by failing to

reinvest in business and borrowing from foreign countries, increased consumption has

also depleted the legacy of natural assets that will be inherited by our children.

DEPLETION OF THE COUNTRY ’S NATUR AL C APITAL

Resource depletion remains one of the primary factors that contribute to the GPI’s

decline. Resource depletion takes a variety of forms. The GPI takes into account perma-

nent losses (reductions in stock) of farmland, wetlands, forests, and minerals. In each

case, it treats the loss on a cumulative basis. Resource depletion positively affects the

economy in the year the resource is consumed (showing up as a financial transaction in

the GDP), but it negatively affects people in all future years, by making the resource

unavailable for use.

For example, farmland is lost when soil is eroded or compacted and when build-

ings or highways pave over farms at the urban fringe. In the year of erosion or conver-

sion, the GDP may show a gain from higher production, but the loss of production

capacity will last hundreds of years and counts as a loss in all future years. In the GPI,

the damage from loss of farmland rose 1.9% in 1998.

Diminishing wetlands not only reduces wildlife habitat and recreational opportu-

nities for bird-watchers and hunters; it also reduces the capacity of nature to mitigate

floods and to draw pollutants out of drinking water. The costs associated with loss of

wetlands increased 3.7% in 1998.

The loss of old-growth forests has been a frequent news story in the 1990s. The

cutting of these forests means the elimination of certain species that cannot be replaced.

It also entails the loss of recreational opportunities. In addition, ecological damage

occurs in all forests (not just old growth) when roads are built, leading to erosion and

downstream siltation of rivers. The costs of forest losses increased 1% in 1998.

These losses directly impact the well-being of households. Most Americans see

the landscape as a precious national heritage that is our responsibility to respect and pro-

tect—we increasingly understand that wanton squandering of resources often means

irrevocably damaged ecosystems and loss of ecosystem services (such as clean air and

water). Aside from recognizing the loss of potential uses of this rich legacy of resources,

the loss of plant and animal diversity and deterioration of the environment have a pow-

erful emotional and moral impact on many who feel that we are failing to fulfill our

responsibilities as stewards by passing on to future generations a diminished and dam-

aged earth.

The loss that most people think of when they hear about “resource depletion” is

the reduction of mineral deposits. In dollar terms, the most important form of mineral

depletion in the U.S. is the pumping of oil and gas from the ground. The costs of deple-

tion of mineral resources increased 4.0% in 1998.

The GPI treats resource depletion as a negative factor, pure and simple.2 In the

same manner that borrowing financial resources from other countries for short-term

prosperity masks the nation’s long-term debts, drawing down the stock of the natural

heritage imposes unseen economic costs—it creates the need to replace the services of

that resource through other means in the future. The two transactions are more alike

than might seem obvious at first glance. If loss of topsoil or depletion of oil and natural

gas increases U.S. dependence on imports of food or fossil fuels from other countries, the

financial result is the same as when the nation borrows to sustain its short-term prosper-

ity. In both cases, the long-term sustainability of current consumption patterns is com-

promised.

One aim of the GPI is to assess the ability of the economy to grow (as measured

by increased personal consumption) without causing a corresponding loss of raw materi-


By using natural resourcesonly at or below the rate ofreplacement, we couldavoid bankrupting futuregenerations and leave thelegacy of natural capitalintact.

13THE 1998 TRENDS

als for production. When the GPI declines, that means in part that increased consump-

tion is being paid for by increased use of raw materials. Historically, the U.S. rate of

mineral depletion has tended to parallel the growth rate of the GDP, but this relationship

is not necessary: It reflects our high reliance on fossil fuels and materials in production.

A more energy-efficient and materials-efficient economy would raise the GPI and

increase the well-being of households, because our growth would be more ecologically

sustainable. By using natural resources only at or below the rate of replacement, we

could avoid bankrupting future generations and leave the legacy of natural capital intact.

SOCIAL IMPROVEMENTS

Along with warning that economic growth can’t be sustained indefinitely because

we are living beyond our economic and environmental means, the 1998 data also suggest

that the well-being of households has improved. In particular, the GPI suggests modest

progress in certain measures of social and environmental well-being.

Although the distribution of income to the poor and the rich continues to show

increasing inequality, involuntary underemployment has dropped in recent years. This

category includes not only the officially unemployed, but also discouraged workers who

have not looked for jobs, plus people who are working part time and would prefer full-

time work. Since 1993, the social cost of underemployment has plummeted 35%,

including an 8% reduction from 1997 to 1998.

The cost of crime to households has also dropped. From 1981 to 1994, the social

cost of crime rose by 29%. That includes the direct household losses from burglaries, car

thefts, and so on, plus the defensive expenses of avoiding crime by buying locks and

home security systems. From 1994 to 1998, there was a reduction of 9% in these costs to

households, which included a reduction of 1% from 1997 to 1998. (Because the GPI

assesses the well-being of households and doesn’t count defensive expenditures as gains,

the growing government cost of prisons does not affect the GPI; however, the rapid

growth of prisons does contribute to the GDP.)

Several components of the GPI attempt to measure social costs of family break-

down, using as proxies the costs of divorce and the hours of television watched. The

effects on the 1998 GPI of these components are mixed. During the 1980s, the GPI

showed a relatively consistent rate of growth of 0.5% per year in the costs of family

breakdown, but since 1994 these costs have stabilized. The total number of divorces fell

from a peak of 1.21 million in 1992 to 1.13 million in 1998.

But the amount of family time devoted to television watching increased over the

same period, suggesting a continued negative trend toward more socialization of chil-

dren by television. As a result of increased television viewing and the powerful influence

of peers on children’s values, even parents who deliberately resist the influence of com-

mercial television and the barrage of advertisements equating happiness with consump-

tion find their children vulnerable to this message. By effectively targeting each new gen-

eration, advertising produces a continuous stream of consumers to impel the rising GDP.

(See “Consuming Kids” in the appendix.)

Another measure of the quality of family life, the total hours of unpaid house-

work, has grown. This “shadow work”—shopping, cooking, cleaning, taking the children

to sports practice or music lessons, household repairs, gardening, and all the other tasks

of unpaid housework—sustains us and enables the market sector of the economy to

function. The largest unacknowledged sector of the social economy, this work is still

largely performed by women and ignored in standard economic accounts. In fact, when

unpaid housework is transferred to the market sector where money changes hands, it

contributes to the GDP. The GPI considers this unpaid work a service that has monetary

value, as well as moral and emotional value, that enhances the well-being of households.

In the GPI, the value of this unpaid housework has continued to grow gradually,

increasing 8% from 1992 to 1998 and 1.3% from 1997 to 1998. However, this increase in

unpaid work does not indicate a rise in the average hours of housework per household.

Rather it reflects an increased number of households: The increase is approximately

proportional to the population growth in the same period.

Another indication of improved quality of life is a rise in volunteer time. The

GDP also overlooks the volunteer sector—the hours donated under the auspices of civic,

nonprofit, and religious groups, which contribute significantly to community well-being.

This includes both the time spent by volunteer boards managing civic and religious

organizations and the public services that these organizations provide to their communi-

ties. While from 1989 to 1993 the time devoted to volunteerism declined, between 1993

and 1995, the rate of volunteerism increased by more than 2.5% per year, and it contin-

ued to grow at 0.8% through 1998.

Taken together, these components indicate improvements in the quality of daily

life for many Americans: Less underemployment, divorce, and household costs of crime,

and more time devoted to both household work and volunteer work suggest greater well-

being and stronger social cohesion.

However, improvement in these social factors may reflect that most Americans are

working more and more, with employment, household work, and volunteer work com-

bined. In fact, the total annual hours of work by each member of the labor force who is

working as much as he or she wants has steadily climbed: from 2,678 hours per year in

1970 to 2,797 in 1980, to 2,829 in 1990, and to 2,871 in 1998. That means a decline in

leisure hours (not counting changes in household or volunteer work) of 4.5% in the

1970s, 1.2% in the 1980s, and 1.5% in the 1990s. Because demands for income are rising

with consumption, many feel more pressured to meet inflated expectations: Increased


15THE 1998 TRENDS

work hours and declining leisure may feel more like a perpetual treadmill than a signifi-

cant improvement in their quality of life.

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

Although we continue to erode our natural capital by using natural resources

faster than the rate of replacement, the GPI does show the effects of increased awareness

that the resources and carrying capacity of the earth have limits.

One of the greatest success stories of modern times is the reduction of some local-

ized forms of environmental damage, particularly the improvement in air quality. The

GPI also shows the continuation of a long-term trend to reduce the costs of air pollu-

tion. From 1970 to 1998, the costs of health effects, damage to crops, cleaning, and other

costs associated with air pollution have fallen a total of 58%. From 1997 to 1998, these

costs dropped 1.3%. Although air quality has recently received a lot of media coverage,

GPI numbers suggest that the most damaging effects of air pollution on health and agri-

cultural productivity have been curtailed, a genuine improvement in quality of life.

Along with genuine gains from environmentalist policies, the GPI also underlines

the difficulty in correcting damage to the environment, even if continued pollution is

stopped. Some environmental problems are cumulative: Activity one year continues to

cause damage several years down the road. This includes activities such as emission of

greenhouse gases (which slowly but irrevocably affect the earth’s climate), the stockpiling

of radioactive wastes (with no long-term solution in sight), and the accumulation of

CFC gases in the upper atmosphere that allow increased deadly ultra-violet radiation to

reach the earth. Although the emission of CFC gases has been largely stabilized by an

international agreement preventing further production of the most harmful CFCs, the

cumulative costs continue to appear as a loss in the GPI. These losses are growing at less

than 1% per year. But the costs of other long-term atmospheric damage, particularly the

contribution of gases to climate change, increase by more than 2% per year.

I V. I M P L I C AT I O N S F O R T H E F U T U R E

The growth or decline of the GPI is based on the interplay of economic, social, and

environmental factors. If the conventionally measured economy (GDP) grew without

overseas borrowing, loss of social capital, or depletion of resources and environmental

assets, then the GPI would grow along with it. Yet, when those liabilities increase along

with the GDP, the net effect is determined by the balance of gains and losses among all

the components.

As the 1999 update demonstrates, the long-term downward trend of the GPI since

the mid-1970s was not necessary and could have been prevented. To illustrate, three vari-

ants were tested to show the influence of changes in the past on the 1998 GPI:

1. if the annual emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels had been restricted

to the level in 1950.

2. if income inequality had not deteriorated since 1968.

3. if trade deficits and surpluses had balanced each other out on average.

Figure 3 on the next page shows how each of these changes alone and the three

changes compounded would have affected the GPI. Under these three hypothetical condi-

tions, the GPI would have grown roughly proportionately to the GDP from 1950 until

today.

17IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Policies that would cause the GPI to grow are those that enhance capital, minimize

resource depletion or environmental damage, promote growth from capital investment

rather than foreign borrowing, and redistribute income to those with below-average

incomes. If these policies were carried out without slowing the rate of conventional eco-

nomic growth, the GPI would rise. However, if growth-oriented policies exacerbate

financial, social, and environmental liabilities, then the GPI will continue the downward

trend begun in the mid-1970s.


F IGURE 3 : WHAT IF THE PAST HAD BEEN DIFFERENT?

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

GDP PER CAPITA GPI PER CAPITA

CONSTANT ENERGY USE BALANCED TRADE

EQUITY OF 1968 COMBINATION GPI OF ALL 3

1992

DO

LLA

RS

PER

CA

PITA

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) PER CAPITA

GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR (GPI) PER CAPITA

19ENDNOTES

E N D N O T E S

1. The GPI builds on work first presented in Daly and Cobb 1989.2. Including components to account for depletion is a standard accounting convention, similar to sub-

tracting depreciation from the gross domestic product to estimate the net domestic product. There iscontroversy, however, over whether resource discoveries should be treated as additions to the originalstock, as the U.S. Bureau of Analysis did in the first official “Green GDP” in 1994. Redefining Progressconsiders this methodology appropriate for an individual firm, but not for society as a whole: it createsan illusion that humans can actually add to the stock of wealth bestowed by nature. In the GPI, mineraldiscoveries are not treated as additions to the stock of the earth’s resources, because that stock is actual-ly of a fixed, if unknown, size. The GPI assumes a fixed but unspecified base from which depletions aresubtracted.


B AC KG R O U N D R E A D I N G

ANIELSKI, MARK, AND JONATHAN ROWE

1999. The Genuine Progress Indicator—1998 Update. San Francisco: Redefining Progress.

COBB, CLIFFORD, TED HALSTEAD, AND JONATHAN ROWE

1995. The Genuine Progress Indicator: Summary of Data and Methodology. San Francisco: Redefining Progress.

COBB, CLIFFORD, TED HALSTEAD, AND JONATHAN ROWE

1995. “If the Economy Is Up, Why Is America Down?” Atlantic Monthly, October.

DALY, HERMAN E., AND JOHN B. COBB, JR., WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY CLIFFORD W. COBB

1989. For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable

Future. Boston: Beacon Press.

MIRINGOFF, MARC, AND MARQUE-LUISA MIRINGOFF

1999. The Social Health of the Nation: How America Is Really Doing. New York: Oxford University Press.

NORDHAUS, WILLIAM D., AND EDWARD C. KOKKELENBERG (EDITORS)

1999. Nature’s Numbers: Expanding the U.S. National Economic Accounts to Include the Environment.

Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

VAN DIEREN, WOUTER (EDITOR)

1995. Taking Nature into Account: Toward a Sustainable National Income. A Report to the Club of Rome.

New York: Copernicus.

21APPENDIX

A P P E N D I X

Table A-1 shows the contribution to the GPI from five different perspectives.

Column 1 shows the absolute dollar amount of each category as it is added to (or sub-

tracted from) the overall GPI balance. For example, services of consumer durables

increased the GPI by $592 billion in 1998. Column 2 gives the percentage contribution

of each component. For example, the cost of family breakdown reduces the GPI by 3%.

Column 3 shows the absolute dollar amount the component changed from 1997 to 1998.

For example, an additional $13 billion worth of leisure time was lost in the one-year

period, increasing the total loss of leisure time from $263 billion to $276 billion.

Column 4 shows the magnitude by which one component has changed over the one-year

period. For example, the cost of consumer durables has increased by 10.2% in one year.

Column 5 presents the number of percentage points the GPI would have increased if the

component had not changed over the 1997–1998 period (ceteris paribus, that is, assum-

ing all the other columns remained as presented). For example, if the cost of underem-

ployment had not decreased by $10 billion, the GPI would have lost 1.7 percentage

points (rather than the 1.1 percentage points it actually lost).

REDEFINING PROGRESSWHY BIGGER ISN’T BETTER THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICATOR—1999 UPDATE

22

TABLE A-1: THE GPI COMPONENTS AND THEIR CHANGE FROM 1997 TO 1998

GPI components Absolute value Contribution to Change Magnitude of GPI change,

in 1998 the 1998 GPI 1997–1998 component’s change if component had

(expressed in 1997–1998 remained at 1997

1992 dollars) in billion dollars in percent in billion dollars in percent level in percent

Personal Consumption 5,153 240 4.9% -14.5%

Income Distribution 118 1 0.7% 1.6%

Weighted Personal 4,385 248% 231 5.6% -14.0%

Consumption

Value of Housework 1,911 108% 24 1.3% -2.5%

and Parenting

Value of Volunteer Work 88 5% 1 0.8% -1.2%

Services of Consumer 592 33% 35 6.3% -3.1%

Durables

Services of Highways 95 5% 5 5.1% -1.4%

and Streets

Cost of Crime -28 -2% 0 1.0% -1.1%

Cost of Family Breakdown -59 -3% 0 0.2% -1.1%

Loss of Leisure Time -276 -16% -13 4.8% -0.4%

Cost of Underemployment -112 -6% 10 8.1% -1.7%

Cost of Consumer Durables -737 -42% -68 10.2% 2.7%

Cost of Commuting -386 -22% -11 2.9% -0.5%

Cost of Household Pollution -12 -1% -1 6.5% -1.1%

Abatement

Cost of Automobile -126 -7% -6 4.7% -0.8%

Accidents

Cost of Water Pollution -50 -3% 0 0.0% -1.1%

Cost of Air Pollution -38 -2% 1 1.3% -1.1%

Cost of Noise Pollution -16 -1% 0 1.0% -1.1%

Loss of Wetlands -363 -20% -13 3.7% -0.4%

Loss of Farmland -130 -7% -2 1.9% -1.0%

Depletion of Nonrenewable -1,333 -75% -51 4.0% 1.8%

Resources

Cost of Long-term -1,054 -60% -24 2.3% 0.2%

Environmental Damage

Cost of Ozone Depletion -306 -17% -1 0.2% -1.1%

Loss of Old-Growth Forests -83 -5% -1 1.0% -1.1%

Net Capital Investment 45 3% 1 1.8% -1.2%

Net Foreign Lending -238 -13% -137 137.1% 6.6%

or Borrowing

Genuine Progress Indicator 1,770 100% -20 1.1%

Per Capita GPI (in dollars) 6,549 -137 2.1%

Gross Domestic Product 7,552 282 3.9%

Per Capita GDP (in dollars) 27,939 787 2.9%

23APPENDIX

TABLE A -2 : SUMMARY OF THE VALUATION METHOD FOR EACH GPI COMPONENT

GPI CONTRIBUTIONS CALCULATION METHOD

Personal Consumption component of GDP (68 percent of GDP in 1998)

Income Distribution Gini coefficient of distribution of income among households used as index number

Weighted Personal Consumption consumption divided by income distribution index

Value of Housework and Parenting estimated number of hours per year times fixed dollar amount

Value of Volunteer Work estimated number of hours per year times fixed dollar amount

Services of Consumer Durables stock of cars, furniture, etc. times fixed percentage

Services of Highways and Streets stock of highways times fixed percentage

Cost of Crime direct cost to households plus defensive expenditures to avoid crime

Cost of Family Breakdown divorce costs (lawyers plus effect on kids) plus imputed cost of TV watching

Loss of Leisure Time difference between hours of leisure in 1969 and in other years times $11.20 per

hour times labor force

Cost of Underemployment members of labor force working fewer hours than they want times the number of

"constrained hours" per year they aren't working times $11.20

Cost of Consumer Durables spending on cars, furniture, etc. (offsets services of consumer durables)

Cost of Commuting out-of-pocket cost plus value of time spent commuting

Cost of Household Pollution Abatement spending by households on pollution abatement equipment—mostly for vehicles

Cost of Automobile Accidents vehicle damage and hospital costs

Cost of Water Pollution loss of water quality plus siltation

Cost of Air Pollution damage to vegetation, structures, and aesthetics, soiling of cloth materials, acid

rain, loss of urban property values (not health or mortality cost)

Cost of Noise Pollution reduced quality of human environment

Loss of Wetlands annualized value of the cumulative loss of services (purification, flood control,

wildlife habitat) with value increasing exponentially as a result of scarcity value

Loss of Farmland annualized value of the cumulative loss of soil productivity based on assumption

that inherent soil fertility will have greater value in the future as fertilizer and

other inputs become more costly (soil erosion, soil compaction, urbanization)

Depletion of Nonrenewable Resources annualized value of the cumulative loss of potential services of resources that

have been permanently lost (measured as increasing cost of what would be

required to replace the cumulative quantity of energy resources produced domestically)

Cost of Long-term Environmental Damage present value of the cumulative expected costs of future damage from climate

change and nuclear waste management (fossil fuel and nuclear energy consump-

tion times fixed dollar value per unit)

Cost of Ozone Depletion cumulative world production of CFC-11 and CFC-12 times fixed dollar amount per

unit

Loss of Old-Growth Forests cumulative value of the loss of ecological services from old-growth forest plus

damage from forest roads

Net Capital Investment change in stock of fixed capital minus change in stock of capital required for new

workers equals net additional stock available for all workers (swings modified by

use of rolling averages)

Net Foreign Lending or Borrowing change in the net international position (corresponds to change in current trade

balance) smoothed by using a five-year rolling average


C A S E S T U D I E S

Read on for two examples of absurd contributions to the GDP, illustrating its defi-

ciency as a measure of progress.

“Food for Thought: The GDP Is Padded with Fat—Ours” provides data demon-

strating the absurdity of counting all growth in consumption as progress. The food

industry illustrates the differences between consumption that adds and detracts from

genuine quality of life and demonstrates the self-replicating, self-expanding nature of

economic growth.

“Consuming Kids” further highlights the need to distinguish between different

types of consumption, with different effects on the consumers’ physical, mental, and psy-

chological health. It also demonstrates how children are being socialized to buy and to

buy into the idea that consumption is the route to happiness as well as the index of

progress. Meanwhile, advertising creates a continuous flow of consumers to perpetuate

the pattern of empty economic growth.

25CASE STUDY: FOOD FOR THOUGHT: THE GDP IS PADDED WITH FAT—OURS

C A S E S T U DY:FOOD FOR THOUGHT: THE GDP IS PADDED WITH FAT—OURS

America is growing and growth is good, so America must be better off. This is

what politicians would have us believe when they refer to the rise in the closely moni-

tored barometer of economic prosperity, the gross domestic product (GDP). But what

does a growing GDP really measure? It measures money changing hands, regardless of

whether the transactions truly add to progress.

Consider this example: Americans spend $30 to 50 billion a year on dieting, try-

ing to get rid of the extra growth around their midsections (Berg 1997). When it comes

to food, the all-too-common cycle of overeating or eating poorly, buying diet products

and exercise machines, paying the medical bills for obesity and poor nutrition, and then

eating more for consolation hardly adds up to progress. That growth is unwanted by the

American people, but every dollar spent advertising food products, gaining weight, and

then trying to shed those unwanted pounds contributes to the GDP.

SURPLUS FOOD

Unless we’ve grown our own food, each bite that we take is digested by the GDP.

Including agriculture, restaurants, and the like, $700 billion flowed through the U.S. food

industry last year (Rowe and Silverstein 1999). No one will contest the need for a strong

food industry, but as with other financial transactions counted as progress by the GDP,

not all food-related purchases really increase well-being.

The thriving food industry nourishes what Marion Nestle, the head of the

Department of Nutrition at New York University, calls the 3,800-calorie-a-day problem.

America’s food producers produce enough food to supply 3,800 calories every day to

every American (Perl 1999). However, the average woman only needs 2,000 calories a

day, the average man 2,500, and children even less.

So what happens to all of this extra food we produce? Some is exported, but the

food industry spends $10 billion each year in direct advertising and another $20 billion

on coupons, games, and other gimmicks trying to convince Americans to absorb the sur-

plus calories (Nestle 1998). Psychologists have found that when food is put in front of

people, they will eat it—whether they are hungry or not. In the end, 40% of Americans

admit that they eat more calories than they should (USDA 1997).

EXCESS WEIGHT

And so we grow. As the GDP goes up, so does the percentage of overweight

Americans. According to the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey

(NHANES III), over half (55%) of American adults are currently overweight or obese

(severely overweight) (National Institutes of Health 1998). While the GDP nearly tripled

from 1960 to 1994 (in inflation-adjusted dollars), the rates of obese Americans nearly dou-

bled, increasing from 12.8% to 22.5% of adults (Flegal et al. 1998). Evidence suggests an

accelerating upward trend since 1994. According to the journal of the American Medical

Association, the prevalence of obesity increased by 6% between 1991 and 1998 (Mokdad et

al. 1999).

No demographic group is immune. The data show that obesity increased in every

state, in both sexes, and across all age groups, races, educational levels, and smoking status-

es (Mokdad et al. 1999).

Similar trends of increasing numbers of overweight and obese Americans are also

showing up in children. Two successive Surgeons General have pronounced childhood

obesity an "epidemic." Indeed, over the last two decades, the number of overweight chil-

dren has increased by more than 50%, and the number of obese (extremely overweight)

children has nearly doubled to roughly 14% of children and 12% of adolescents. Less than

a third of children ages 6 to 17 meet the minimum standards for cardiovascular fitness,

flexibility, and strength (CDC 1997).

Evidence of our increasing size takes many forms. Seats in sports stadiums, con-

cert venues, movie theaters, and airplanes are becoming more capacious, as the old stan-

dard of 18 inches no longer comfortably accommodates the expanding American girth. In

1992, more than twenty automotive and apparel companies sponsored a project to take

new measurements of the American physique and develop new standards, updating those

developed by the U.S. military in 1947 (Abend 1993). Trade magazines report an ongoing

controversy in the apparel industry over the new standards for women’s clothing sizes,

developed partly because of the aging population and partly to address the confusion

caused when designers make clothing two sizes larger than the label indicates. One

instructor at the New York Fashion Institute explained the psychological ploy: "A lot of

times in designer houses the cut is a bit fuller to make the woman feel she is wearing a

smaller size" (Abend 1993). Inflate the sizes and sales rise, contributing to economic

growth.

PAY THE DOCTOR

Denial may sell clothes, but it cannot protect us from the health consequences and

the economic costs associated with being overweight. Being overweight raises children’s


risks for serious illness. Type II diabetes alone, the type associated with weight problems,

has quadrupled among kids since 1982, which boosts spending on pharmaceuticals and

other health costs (National Institutes of Health 1995). Evidence also suggests that risks

for high cholesterol, clogged arteries, and heart disease begin in childhood, with poor

diets and sedentary lifestyles (Vessey 1998).

Overweight people run a higher risk of premature death, according to a recent

American Cancer Society study, the largest ever done on obesity and mortality. "The evi-

dence is now compelling and irrefutable," says the lead researcher, Dr. JoAnn Manson of

the American Cancer Society. "Obesity is probably the second-leading preventable cause

of death in the United States after cigarette smoking" (Associated Press 1999). Obesity

leads to such serious diseases as type II diabetes, gallbladder disease, heart disease, breast

and colon cancer, and higher risk of stroke. An estimated 300,000 Americans die each

year from the combined effects of an unhealthy diet and inactivity (McGinnis 1993).

These health misfortunes of Americans plump up the GDP as well. Medical

spending on diseases associated with obesity amounted to $51.6 billion in 1995, includ-

ing medical costs for obesity-related heart disease, cancer, stroke, and hypertension.

These costs represent 5.7% of national health expenditures within the United States

(Wolf and Colditz 1998). Although this spending contributes to the GDP, it would be

tough to argue that it makes us better off.

The indirect costs of obesity, such as lost productivity, are also substantial, and

may have an even greater impact, both on the overall economy and on society, than

direct medical spending. Obesity exacted another $47.6 billion in such costs in 1995

(Wolf and Colditz 1998), for a total cost of $99.2 billion.

But the costs and effects of a poor diet go beyond obesity. Diets high in calories,

fat, cholesterol, and salt, and low in fiber and nutrition, contribute to heart disease, cer-

tain types of cancer, stroke, diabetes, hypertension, and osteoporosis, as well as to obesi-

ty. Taken together, these health conditions cost an estimated $250 billion each year in

medical spending and lost productivity (Frazao 1996).

More than two-thirds of Americans are trying to lose or maintain their weight,

according to a recent study of more than one million Americans by Mary K. Serdula at

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. They spend $33 billion each year on

weight-loss products and services (Serdula 1999). The medical costs associated with diet-

ing are harder to count, but evidence suggests that dieting itself can undermine health:

one recent study found that radical reductions in calorie intake reduce the effectiveness

of protective cells in the immune system that fight viruses and tumors (USDA 1997).

If eating too many calories and leading a sedentary lifestyle lead to weight gain,

it only makes sense that moderately limiting calorie intake and increasing physical activi-

ty would lead to weight loss. In fact, that is what both the U.S. Department of

Agriculture’s Dietary Guidelines and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute’s


Clinical Guidelines recommend. Yet only one in five people in the U.S. who are actively

trying to control their weight follow these recommendations (Serdula 1999).

Eating fewer calories and exercising for at least thirty minutes each day do not

require spending any money. In fact, this dieting regime could even decrease spending

on food. If more dieters followed the recommended guidelines, they would probably

have more success at achieving their weight-loss goals and could reduce the $33 billion

spent on dieting in the process. Not to mention the costs of roughly 110,000 liposuc-

tions last year, at $2,000 or more apiece (Rowe and Silverstein 1999).

BUYING WEIGHT LOSS

But so many Americans are habituated to buying solutions to problems that they

prefer diet drinks disguised as pop or milkshakes and even surgery to altering their

unhealthy eating habits and sedentary lifestyles. No pain. Just gain.

Retail trade magazines report record expansion in sales of weight control prod-

ucts, now a billion-dollar business. For example, sales in the "meal replacement" catego-

ry—including products such as Slim Fast Food’s Meal on the Go, USA Nutritional’s

MaxiFat Burning System, and CyperGenics’ Super Weight Loss Shakes—hit $957 million

in 1998, a 28.5% increase over 1997. Diet pill sales rose 4.9% to $153.8 million in the

same period (Chain Drug Review 1999). Consumers spent another $3.5 million on

home exercise equipment in 1995 (Business Wire 1996), and $5 billion in 1997 (Business

Wire 1998). One trade magazine hailed this remarkable growth, calling the treadmill

"the exercise machine of the nineties," unwittingly coining an apt symbol for our current

sense of progress (Business Wire 1998).

While many Americans eat too many calories and spend money trying to lose

the excess weight that results, 10% of Americans are going hungry or do not have

enough food for an active and healthy life (USDA 1999). Nationally, 9.7% of households

were rated "food insecure" in 1996-1998, according to a recent USDA study of census sta-

tistics (USDA 1999). But the GDP is blind to how food is distributed. It goes up just as

much when some go hungry and some overeat as when everyone has a reasonable

amount.

If increasing the size of our economy means spending lots of money on empty

calories and then more money to get rid of the results, it is no wonder that eating disor-

ders are increasing and appearing in younger and younger children. Researchers have

found that almost half of American elementary students between the first and third

grades want to be thinner (Mellin et al.). Further, cases of anorexia and bulimia have

doubled in the past ten years, according to the National Institute of Mental Health, with

the sharpest increases in teenage girls (Schuster 1999). "Bulimia may be the trademark


affliction of the growth era," as Jonathan Rowe and Judith Silverstein (1999) assert. "It is

a disease of literal obedience to the schizoid messages that barrage young girls: indulge

yourselves wantonly but also be taut and svelte."

Scanning through magazines for teenage girls and women, one finds advertising

for high-calorie energy drinks as well as svelte models touting the benefits of diet shakes.

Both sales show up in the GDP. If we were attending to genuine progress, as does the

GPI, overeating, then dieting, then treating eating disorders and surgically removing

excess fat would be considered a net loss for our psyches, our perceptions of ourselves,

and our well-being. The physical and mental health costs of our dysfunctional relation-

ship with food should not be included in any true measure of progress.


R E F E R E N C E S

ABEND, JULES

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ASSOCIATED PRESS

1999. "Study Provides Best Evidence That Obesity Can Shorten Life." Dallas Morning News, 7 October.

BERG, FRANCES M.

1997. Afraid to Eat; Children and Teens in Weight Crisis. Hettinger, N.D.: Healthy Weight Network.

BUSINESS WIRE

1998. "Treadmill Popularity Helps Manufacturers’ Sales of Fitness Equipment Pass 3-Billion Mark in ’97." 26 May.

———. 1996. "Sales of Fitness Equipment Increased in 1995 as Spending Continued on Serious Machines for Home

Use." 3 June.

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

1997. "Update: Prevalence of Overweight among Children, Adolescents, and Adults—U.S. 1988–1994." Morbidity

and Mortality Weekly Report 46(9)(7 March):199–202.

CHAIN DRUG REVIEW

1999. "Weight Loss Hits New Heights." Chain Drug Review 21(7):50.

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FRAZAO, ELIZABETH

1996. "The American Diet: A Costly Health Problem." Food Review, January.

MCGINNIS, J. M., AND W. H. FOEGE

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1999: <http://www.edap.org/stats.html>.


MOKDAD, ALI H., MARY K. SERDULA, WILLIAM H. DIETZ, BARBARA A. BOWMAN, JAMES S. MARKS, AND JEFFREY

P. KOPLAN

1999. "The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in the United States, 1991–1998." Journal of the American Medical

Association 282(16):1519–1522.

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH. NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INSTITUTE

1998. National Institutes of Health Guidelines. [WWW Document]. Accessed 23 October 1999:

<http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_guidelines.pdf>.

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF DIABETES AND DIGESTIVE AND KIDNEY DISEASES

1995. Diabetes in America. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: National Institutes of Health.

NESTLE, MARION

1998. "Toward More Healthful Dietary Patterns—A Matter of Policy; Commentary on Lowfat Milk." Public Health

Reports 113(5):420.

PERL, REBECCA

1999. "Americans Are Eating More and Exercising Less." Weekly Edition: The Best of NPR News, 2 October.

ROWE, JONATHAN, AND JUDITH SILVERSTEIN

1999. "The GDP Myth: Why ‘Growth’ Isn’t Always a Good Thing." Washington Monthly, March 17–21.

SCHUSTER, KAROLY

1999. "The Dark Side of Nutrition." Food Management 34(6):34–39.

SERDULA, MARY K., ALI H. MOKDAD, DAVID F. WILLIAMSON, DEBORAH A.GALUSKA, JAMES M. MENDLEIN, AND

GRETORY W. HEATH

1999. "Prevalence of Attempting Weight Loss and Strategies for Controlling Weight." Journal of the American Medical

Association 282(14):1353–1358.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

1997. Human Nutrition, ARS Quarterly Report, April–June.

———. 1999. "Fact Sheet on State Food Insecurity Rankings: State Prevalence Rates of Food Insecurity, Average

1996–8." Release No. f414.99. [WWW Document]. Accessed 15 October 1999: <http://www.usda.gov/news/releas-

es/1999/10/f414>.

VESSEY, JUDITH A., PAULA K. YIM-CHIPLIS, AND NANCY R. MACKENZIE

1998. "Effects of Television Viewing on Children’s Development." Pediatric Nursing 23:483.

WOLF, A. M., AND G. A. COLDITZ

1998. "Current Estimates of the Economic Costs of Obesity in the United States." Obesity Research 6:97–106.

31REFERENCES FOR CASE STUDY: FOOD FOR THOUGHT: THE GDP IS PADDED WITH FAT—OURS

33

C ASE STUDY:CONSUMING KIDS

Long before children know how to read and write, they are learning the ABCs of

consumption. Popular culture and role models suggest that buying things is the root of

all happiness, and that kids can’t live without the latest breakfast cereal or toy. Stuff is

good, more is better, too much is just enough.

In fact, children’s spending has been on the rise since the 1960s. This increased

personal consumption, according to conventional economic measures such as the GDP,

is equated with progress. But are kids progressing? Are they better off? Statistics con-

cerning their physical and mental health, their eating, smoking, and drinking habits,

their mounting debts, and their suicide rates say no.

Children’s aggregate spending has recently increased exponentially, according to

Texas A&M marketing professor James McNeal, the nation’s leading researcher on mar-

keting that targets children. Children ages 2 to 14 directly influenced parental spending

of $188 billion in 1997 and indirectly influenced $300 billion more, while controlling

their own purchases of $25 billion (McNeal 1999a). Between 1994 and 1998, teen spend-

ing also jumped, from $63 billion to $94 billion a year (Zollo 1995 and 1999).

CASE STUDY: CONSUMING KIDS


The standard economic assumption that consumers represent rational people,

making decisions in their own self-interest, probably fits few human beings—but cer-

tainly breaks down when it comes to children and teens.

Both self-reports and documented behaviors of American youth show that seeking

pleasure and peer approval from mood-altering—even addictive—substances often leads

them to ignore well-known and serious risks to health. The percentage of high school

students who smoke increased between 1992 and 1998. In 1998, despite prolific warn-

ings of the health hazards of smoking from school programs, flashy media campaigns,

and high-profile law suits, 9% of eighth graders, 16% of tenth graders, and 22% of

twelfth graders still reported smoking daily in the previous month. The percentage of

high school seniors reporting heavy drinking also increased, from 28% in 1993 to 32% in

1998 (National Institute on Drug Abuse 1999).

F IGURE 1 : TOTAL SPENDING BY CHILDREN

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1968 1978 1984 1989 1994 1997 2001 (PROJ)

BIL

LIO

NS

OF

DO

LLA

RS

YEAR

35CASE STUDY: CONSUMING KIDS

CHILD’S PL AY

Children’s games appear harmless in comparison to these patterns of teen con-

sumption, but are they? Even a casual glance at the amazing trends in children’s toys in

the past few decades calls this into question. The habit of dealing with emotional prob-

lems by buying something to change one’s mood or self-image doesn’t start with

teenagers.

Remember Hula-Hoops? A lot of empty hoopla compared to the recent lucrative

fads, with kids en masse hopscotching from Cabbage Patch Dolls, to Ninja Turtles, to

Beanie Babies, to Pokemons. It’s not kid stuff to the toy-makers, however. Profits from

Cabbage Patch Kids reportedly reached $4 billion in the 80s (Augusta [Ga.] Chronicle

1999). At the end of this year, Ty Inc. is retiring Beanie Babies, after three boom years of

earning about $250 million per year since their debut. In this business, that’s a long

time, as one trade observer noted: "They got 3 good years out of this. I mean Tickle Me

Elmo dolls was [popular] for what, 4 months?" (Jamieson 1999). Contributions to the

GDP from sales of these tiny toys are huge. Meanwhile, children quickly learn the

importance of owning the hottest new items.

Yet "classic toys" retain their appeal, and some make strong impressions, flaunting

fantastic bodies that may undermine kids’ self-esteem. Despite the well-publicized cri-

tiques of Barbie’s implausible proportions and the distorted sense of the female body she

engenders in young girls, spending on Barbie dolls increased from $263 million in 1980

to $1.2 billion in 1994 (Cross 1997). Newer on the horizon are the equivalent "action

figures" for boys, which advertise similarly extreme fantasy physiques for males.

Recently, researchers Harrison Pope and Roberto Olivardia observed how action figures

have bulked up. Seeing this as significant and symbolic, they measured the toys’ dimen-

sions and did the math: "The original G.I. Joe is a wimp compared with the updated

model. The new Batman has the proportion of a 30-inch waist, 57-inch chest and 27-

inch biceps. His is a body as improbable as Barbie’s" (San Francisco Examiner 1999; Hall

1999). But implausibility doesn’t protect boys’ self-esteem, which Harrison and

Olivardia believe has plummeted, possibly contributing to escalating violence among

male teens (San Francisco Examiner 1999).

YOU ARE WHAT YOU EAT

Junk food grabs the highest share in the children’s market at 34.6%. It even ranks

above spending on toys, games, and crafts, which garner a combined share of 31.3%

(McNeal 1992). This aspect of children’s consumption merits a further look: Why do

children make such choices? How do they affect their physical health?


Not surprisingly, children’s snack selection and food requests—mostly for sweet-

ened cereals, candy, and salty snack foods—parallel the products advertised on their

favorite television shows and influence their families’ purchasing habits. American chil-

dren watch an average of 21 to 28 hours of television each week. By high school gradua-

tion, the typical teen will have spent 12,000 hours in school and watched between 15,000

and 18,000 hours of television. With up to 21 ads per hour in TV programming for chil-

dren, 16% of children’s viewing time is actually devoted to advertising. The average

American child sees over 10,000 commercials a year, a large proportion of which are

devoted to selling food products, many high in calories, cholesterol, sugar, and salt, but

low in nutrients (Vessey 1998).

No wonder that children’s obesity has been ranked "an epidemic" by two Surgeons

General, and the health problems and costs associated with excess weight are increasing

at an alarming rate. (See "Food for Thought" for more information and discussion of

these trends.) Television watching is a likely and significant contributor to the declining

health of American youth: One study found that obesity risks among adolescents

increased with higher average hours of television viewing (Vessey 1998). In part, this

higher risk derives from munching snack foods and drinking soft drinks during the

sedentary hours in front of the tube.

The trend towards more inactive entertainment is exacerbated by the increasing

popularity of computers and video games. One-third of teenagers own their own com-

puters and 17% own modems (TRU 1999a). As more teens have cyber access, stationary

hours spent surfing the Internet, playing computer games online, and chatting with

friends electronically soar. "Today’s teens are growing up in the time of computer inter-

activity," says Peter Zollo, president of Teenage Research Unlimited (TRU 1999a). This

greater "computer interactivity" obviously contributes to physical inactivity, thus to

increased health problems associated with a sedentary life.

BUYING SELF -WORTH

At the same time as advertising encourages unsophisticated consumers to buy

products that damage their physical health, the ads themselves erode kids’ self-esteem.

They catch children in a vicious cycle, encouraging them to eat foods and live lifestyles

that induce weight gain, while teaching them to see thin as attractive and fat as repulsive,

by using stereotypically thin women and super-fit muscular men in advertising and

shows. The more a child’s self-confidence declines, the more vulnerable he or she may

be to messages linking consumption and happiness. For example, researchers have

found that overweight children are influenced more by the covert messages in food

advertisements than are average weight children (Vessey 1998).


There is also evidence that children increasingly measure self-worth by the prod-

ucts they own. According to a poll commissioned by the Center for a New American

Dream, almost two-thirds of parents worry that their own children define their self-

worth in terms of possessions, and feel that this problem has worsened over time.

Nevertheless, the same parents have found their kids’ entreaties hard to resist: More than

half of the parents admitted to buying their child a product that they disapproved of,

because the child wanted it in order to fit in with his or her friends (Center for a New

American Dream 1999).

An increase in children’s spending on clothing also reflects the need to look styl-

ish, keep up with trends, and try to purchase a sense of belonging and acceptance.

Spending on apparel is currently the fastest-growing category in children’s consumption

(McNeal 1998). From the mid- to late 1980s alone, the percentage of children’s spending

devoted to clothing rose sharply from an insignificant share to 11.5%. The increased

clothing sales could reflect the "needs for identification (with certain others) and separa-

tion (from certain others)," as well as the need to look stylish to bolster self-esteem

(McNeal 1992). By the time they become teenagers, clothing overtakes food as the high-

est spending category, accounting for more than a third of their consumption (Chain

Drug Review 1999). Not surprisingly, male and female teens spend their money in dif-

ferent ways: Female teens buy more clothes, while male teens buy more food and enter-

tainment (Zollo 1995).

TAKE IT AND RUN

Given the obsession with brand names as a boost to self-esteem, we shouldn’t be

surprised to see the new trend that police call "fashion crime." For example, in January

1999, three teenagers were shot within twenty minutes in Prince George’s County, a

Washington suburb—all for their Eddie Bauer jackets (Rowe and Silverstein 1999).

No doubt, in these times of alleged prosperity, many parents and children are feel-

ing the squeeze of limited economic resources and escalating desires, perceived as needs.

The GDP is blind to income distribution, while the GPI takes it into account as a crucial

measure of well-being. Compared to 1997, the distribution of income was slightly more

even in 1998, as Why Bigger Isn’t Better: The Genuine Progress Indicator 1999 Update

reports. But this slight improvement has done little to impact the long-term trend that

has consistently widened the income gap since 1968 (see Why Bigger Isn’t Better for fur-

ther discussion and evidence). Similarly, from 1997 to 1998, numbers of poor children

and their poverty rate dropped slightly, from 14.1 million (19.9%) in 1997 to 13.5 mil-

lion (18.9%) in 1998. Until the last two years, the child poverty rate had not dropped

below 20% since 1980. However, in long-term trends, the child poverty rate rose from


15.1% in 1970 to 18.3% in 1980, and to 20% in 1990, so this dip below 20% is merely a

return to the levels of the 1980s (U.S. Census 1999).

Although in general crime rates have been falling, there is evidence that this may

not improve the well-being of the young. The nation’s violent crime rate fell 7% in 1998

and was 27% lower than in 1993. There were significant decreases in every major type of

violent and property crime measured in the 1997 Criminal Victimization survey, and vir-

tually every demographic group experienced substantial drops in violent victimization,

according to a Bureau of Justice Statistics press release (U.S. Department of Justice 1999).

However, the most recent special report, "Age Patterns of Serious Violent Crime," reveals

that crimes disproportionately targeted the young. People under age 25 were the most

vulnerable to serious violent crime between 1992 and 1994: People ages 12 to 24 suf-

fered almost half of the total violent crimes, half of the robberies, and almost 56% of

rapes and sexual assaults, although they made up less than a quarter of the population

considered (victims under the age of 12 are not counted) (U.S. Department of Justice

1997a).

Further, while the total arrests for violent crime dropped, arrests of people under

15 for violent crimes have increased, from 4.7% of the total arrests in 1980 to 5.3% in

1997. In an era of alleged prosperity, the increasing desire for material goods well

beyond people’s actual income levels may maintain crime rates, especially among youth

with passionate desires, limited resources, and compromised impulse control.

PAYING WITH PL ASTIC

For the more fortunate—or better credit risks—banks make it easier to legally

gratify those unaffordable desires, by paying with plastic. Already, "35% of teens are

interested in getting credit cards in their own names," according to Teenage Research

Unlimited, and 32% of teens ages 18 and 19 already have them (TRU 1999b). For youth

who gain access to college, access to credit cards often follows: In one survey of college

undergraduates at three universities, Georgetown sociology professor Robert Manning

found 70% have credit cards. "It’s easier for unemployed students to get credit than low-

to middle-income families," Manning reports (Brobeck and Gillis 1999).

While some argue that youth can learn fiscal responsibility from this power to buy

on credit, evidence shows disturbing trends. In fact, these trends have prompted the

Consumer Federation of America to lobby Congress to require parental approval or min-

imum income levels for minors to get their own credit cards. From 1996 to 1997,

Manning found the average college student’s credit card debt had risen from $1,879 to

$2,226 (Brobeck and Gillis 1999). Other studies report that the college student’s average

unpaid balance is $1,366; fully 16% pay only the monthly minimum; and 80% don’t


know how long it takes to pay off a balance of $1,000, by making only minimum month-

ly payments (Weissman 1999).

Perhaps they will learn, but meanwhile, escalating anxiety about debt interrupts

many students’ college education. About half of all students who drop out of college,

according to the 1998 National Student Loan Survey, are impelled by their anxiety about

debts.

If they make it to the degree, college graduates find themselves spending on aver-

age $150 a month repaying their education loans, but nearly five times as much—$700 a

month—paying off their other debts (Consumer Reports 1999). Though this burden

may be partly attributed to high college costs, student spending patterns on nonessential

items suggest that many youth also have difficulty controlling their spending when credit

cards give them carte blanche (Weissman 1999). Sadly, those students represent the suc-

cess stories.

Bankruptcies filed by people under age 25 have grown by 50% since 1991, accord-

ing to Harvard Law School professor and bankruptcy expert Elizabeth Warren, and she

expects another 100,000 youth to file for bankruptcy this year (Consumer Reports 1999).

In more tragic cases, desperation over their uncontrollably mounting debts has con-

tributed to suicides. At the University of Oklahoma alone, a junior who racked up

$10,000 in debt on a dozen credit cards despaired of paying them off on minimum wage

earnings and hanged himself. So did a freshman, who maxed out her credit card in less

than four months and hanged herself, leaving $2,500 worth of credit card bills displayed

on her bed (Brobeck and Gillis 1999).

LOSING THEIR WAY

Other trends in children’s and teens’ psychological health clearly contradict the

supposed benefits of increased spending. Elliot Gershon, former chief of the clinical psy-

chogenetics branch of the National Institute of Mental Health, observed in 1989 that the

trend of American children suffering from some form of depression was "rising almost

exponentially and shows no signs of letting up" (Lankard 1999). Sales of antidepressants

reveal the accuracy of this prediction. In 1998, three types of antidepressant drugs,

Prozac, Zoloft, and Paxil, were wildly popular, with sales over $1 billion (Moore 1999).

Currently, six million American children under age 12 are taking Prozac or other anti-

depressants (Lankard 1999).

Along with this alarming evidence of depression, youth suicides have also soared.

Although total suicide rates in the U.S. have remained remarkably consistent in the last

decade, youth suicides of youth between 15 and 19 years old have tripled since 1950, ris-

ing from 2.7 per 100,000 in 1950 to 5.9 in 1970 and 11.1 in 1990, then falling to 10.5 in


1995 (U.S. Department of Justice 1997b). Although historically lower than those of

white youth, suicides rates for black youth, between ages 10 and 19, more than doubled,

from 2.1 per 100,000 in 1980 to 4.5 per 100,000 in 1995 (Butterfield 1999).

No doubt, one contributor to increased suicide is increased access to guns. In

1987, an estimated 400,000 youngsters carried handguns to school (Parenthood Web

1999). By 1998, that statistic had increased to one million (Parents Resource Institute for

Drug Education 1999). In Night Falls Fast: Understanding Suicide, Dr. Kay Redfield

Jamison explains: "For young people in particular, who have a very impulsive element to

their suicide, having access to a means of suicide that is quick and irrevocable like a gun

is an unnecessary risk" (quoted in Butterfield 1999). Even if they are primarily impul-

sive, these increased suicides certainly reinforce the impression that increased consump-

tion is not improving the quality of life for American youth.

Have American youth achieved progress in the last decade? Their spending pat-

terns say yes. The GDP and the economy say yes. Common sense, however, says no.

Increased disposable income may be an economic benefit, but children’s spending pat-

terns—on more junk food, more cigarettes, liquor, and drugs—and their rising physical

and mental health problems should be counted as social costs, and should depress a

measure of progress.

41REFERENCES FOR CASE STUDY: CONSUMING KIDS

REFERENCES

AUGUSTA (GA.) CHRONICLE

1999. "Toy Trends." Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle, 2 September, page A7.

BROBECK, STEPHEN, AND JACK GILLIS

1999. "Credit Card Debt Imposes Huge Costs on Many College Students." Study sponsored by Consumer

Federation of America. [WWW Document]. Accessed 23 October 1999: <http://www.consumerfed.org>.

BUTTERFIELD, FOX

1999. "Firearms Used More for Suicide." San Francisco Examiner, 17 October, page A6.

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN DREAM

1999. "Kids and Commercialism Release." News release. Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Dream.

CHAIN DRUG REVIEW

1999. "The Scoop on Teens." Chain Drug Review, 1 March, 29.

CONSUMER REPORTS

1999. "The New Rules of Borrowing." Consumer Reports 64(7):12.

CROSS, GARY

1997. Kid’s Stuff: Toys and the Changing World of American Childhood. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

HALL, STEPHEN S.

1999. "The Troubled Life of Boys: The Bully in the Mirror." NY Times Magazine, 22 August, page 31.

JAMIESON, ROBERT

1999. "Retirement of Beanie Babies Is Sewn Up with Mystery." Seattle Post Intelligencer, 2 September, page E1.

LANKARD, CHRISTINE

1999. "Youths Markedly Depressed." Daily Oklahoman, 4 October.

MCNEAL, JAMES

1992. Kids as Customers: A Handbook of Marketing to Children. New York: Lexington Books.

———. 1998. "Tapping the Kids’ Three Markets." American Demographics, April, 36.

———. 1999a. "Out of the Mouths of Babes." Brandmarketing, January, 14.

———. 1999b. The Kids’ Market: Myths and Realities. Ithaca: Paramount Market Publishing, Inc.

MOORE, THOMAS

1999. "It’s What’s in Your Head." Washingtonian, October, 45.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (NIDA)

1999. National Survey Results on Drug Use from the Monitoring the Future Survey, 1975–1998, Vol. I, Secondary School

Students. Washington, D.C.: NIDA.

PARENTHOOD WEB

1999. "Children and Firearms." [WWW Document]. Accessed 14 October 1999: <http://parenthoodweb.com/arti-

cles/phw308.htm>.

PARENTS RESOURCE INSTITUTE FOR DRUG EDUCATION

1999. "Guns, Gangs, Harmful Threats, and Injury are Part of Teen Lives." News release, 21 April. [WWW

Document]. Accessed 15 October 1999: <http://www.prideusa.org>.

ROWE, JONATHAN, AND SILVERSTEIN, JUDITH

1999. "The GDP Myth." Washington Monthly, March 17–21.

SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER

1999. "Boys’ Bodies and Bad Behavior." Editorial. San Francisco Examiner, August 31, page A-18.

TEENAGE RESEARCH UNLIMITED

1999a. Press release: "Teenage Adventures in Cyberspace." [WWW Document]. Accessed 20 October 1999:

<http://www.teenresearch.com/adobe/Cyberspace.PDF>.

———. 1999b. Press release: "Teens Spend $141 Billion in 1998." [WWW Document]. Accessed 20 October 1999:

<http://www.teenresearch.com/news/indexnews.html>.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU

1998. Poverty in the United States, 1998 [WWW Document]. Accessed 23 October 1999:

<http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p60-207.pdf>.


43

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS

1997a. "Age Patterns of Victims of Serious Violent Crime" (September). [WWW Document]. Accessed 23 October

1999: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/apvsvc.txt>.

———. 1997b. "Suicide Rates: Persons 15-24 Years of Age: 1950-1995." Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.

———. 1999. "U.S. Violent Crime Rate Fell 7 percent in 1998; 27 percent Lower Than in 1993." News release, 18 July.

[WWW Document]. Accessed 25 October 1999: <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/cv98.pr>.

VESSEY, JUDITH A., ET AL.

1998. "Effects of Television Viewing on Children’s Development." Pediatric Nursing, September 1.

WEISSMAN, RACHEL

1999. "School Daze." American Demographics, August.

ZOLLO, PETER

1995. "Talking to Teens." American Demographics, November.

———. 1999. Wise Up to Teens: Insights into Marketing and Advertising to Teenagers, 2nd Edition. Ithaca: New Strategist

Publications.

REFERENCES FOR CASE STUDY: CONSUMING KIDS


Redefining Progress advocates for progress for people and nature, not just for the

economy. It believes that genuine progress would move the U.S. toward a society that

provides for all its peoples’ material needs; operates democratically and transparently;

appreciates individual, religious, and cultural differences; broadens access to informa-

tion, choice, and opportunity; and, all the while, restores and sustains a vibrant natural

environment.

We are misled when we equate "progress" with the growth of our globalizing economy,

which favors delivering financial returns to investors through expanding markets even

when environmental quality and the quality of people’s lives are sacrificed. Economic

gain at the expense of a healthy environment, people, households, and communities is

not progress. Indeed, it imperils the very future of humanity.

Redefining Progress asserts that we have a moral obligation to address the needs of

people and nature. It advocates the development of accurate monetary and nonmone-

tary indicators of how we are doing, as well as incentive-based policies that will

stimulate genuine progress. It focuses its efforts largely on the United States, knowing

that redefining progress here will have enormous global repercussions.

In its first five years, RP has enjoyed great success with such highlights as the Genuine

Progress Indicator (and related Atlantic Monthly feature article), the subsequent launch

and support of the Community Indicators Network, the Economists' Statement on

Climate Change, and the development and promotion of Environmental Tax Reform

(ETR), to name a few. RP's work has been featured in many of the nation's top

newspapers, magazines, and television news programs, and has drawn support from

diverse constituencies, including mainstream economists, corporate executives, environ-

mentalists, public officials, professors, and social justice organizations, among others.

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