EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIALOGUE OF VALIDITY:BUILDING VALIDITY IN

EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

MUSTAFA ÇAKIR

Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey

The notioti of validity iti the social sciences is evolving and isinfluenced by philosophy of science, critiques of objectivity, andepistemological debates. Methodology for validation of theknowledge claims is diverse across different philosophies of sci-ence. In other words, definition and the way to establish ofvalidity have evolved as epistemology of science changed. Inthis paper, I attempt to explain the nature of knowledge, outlinethe central premises of several philosophies of science (e.g.,logical positivism, post positivism, scientific realism, postmod-ernism, and hermeneutics) and their positions on the issue ofvalidity, provide a history of test validation from the beginningof educational and psychological testing until the present, withemphasize on changes in epistemology of knowledge. The con-cepts, methods, and processes of validation are central toeducational and other social research, it is important to examineeach epistemology that lie at the heart of both natural and socialscience.

Keywords: Validity, Epistemology of Knowledge, EducationalResearch

IntroductionUnderstanding and views of the nature

of knowledge has evolved during 20th cen-tury, each philosophy introduced newperspectives on notion of "truth". Corre-spondingly, discourse of what constitute avalid knowledge has also evolved alongwith understandings and beliefs about thenature of truth. Epistemology is the theo-ry of scientific knowledge. It has to do withnature, validity, and limitations of inquiry.In some contexts it also includes ontolog-ical dimensions such as the nature ofreality. Methodology for validation of theknowledge claims is diverse across dif-ferent philosophies of science. In otherwords, definition and the way to establishof validity has evolved and changed asepistemology of science changed. In this

paper, I will attempt to explain the natureof knowledge, outline the central premis-es of several philosophies of science andtheir positions on the issue of validity, pro-vide a history of test validation from thebeginning of educational and psycholog-ical testing until the present, withemphasize on changes in epistemology ofknowledge.

I will focus on the philosophy of scienceissues and attempt to relate them to theinterpretation of concept of validity. Eachepistemology raises new questions andbrings back long-standing debates that lieat the heart of both natural and social sci-ence. The concept, method, and processof validation are central to educational andother social research.

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Science, Objectivism, and RelativismObjectivity is defined, as a method of

acquiring knowledge by reasoning solelybased on the facts of reality and in accor-dance with the laws of logic (Phillips,2000). Modem social science seeks to pro-duce objective theory that can bechallenged on the basis of data. Data andevidence are the basis for choosingbetween two competing theories (Messick,1989). There have been severe attacks onthe premises on objectivism from variouspoints of view (Rorty, 1980), is it possibleto obtain an objective knowledge when allobservation is potentially contaminated,whether by our theories or our worldviewor our past experiences? The process offorming concepts and making conceptualintegrations is fallible. We might be unableto obtain certain relevant data and we alsoknow that every fact is itself theory laden,a constmction without meaning indepen-dent of language and context (Kuhn, 1996).The thesis of incommensurability of rivaltheories implies that since the advocatesof different paradigms often subscribe todifferent methodological standards andhave different sets of cognitive values, fulltranslation between rival paradigms isimpossible (Kuhn, 1996).

Objectivist (Protagonist) position advo-cates that reason can reveal tme knowledgeand relativist (Antagonist) position advo-cates that all knowledge claims are relativeto individual and cultural bias and there-fore true knowledge is not possible. Duringthe historical course both epistemologyhas been influenced by events in the phi-losophy of science. Some events, such asKuhn's (1996) study of history of science

and the formation of the sociology ofknowledge have strengthened the relativistposition while logical positivism provid-ed support for objectivist position. Logicalpositivism in the 1920s and 1930s reaf-firmed and refined the commitment toobservations as foundation for tmth. Bythe late 1950s and 1960s, the idea thatobservations were mirror reflections ofextemal reality became increasingly underattack (Rorty, 1980). Finally conclusionwas that observations do not produce"facts", because of the fact that observa-tions are dependent in the varioustheoretical and cultural schemes that theobserver brings into the situation. Knowl-edge is a matter of communication betweenindividuals who share decisions and actions(Rorty, 1980).

Evolution of ScientificThought - Positivism to HermeneuticsAs an introduction to the multiple dis-

courses of validation, the followingdiscussion examines the evolution of sci-entific thought from logical positivism topost positivism, scientific realism, post-modemism and hermeneutics positions asdefined by Bemstein and Gadamer. Dur-ing the early part of 20th century "logicalpositivism" has dominated discussions ofscientific epistemology. Developed by theVienna Circle logical positivism acceptedas its central doctrine Wittgenstein's ver-ification theory of meaning. Positivism hastwo fundamental doctrines. They are name-ly (a) propositions of existential importhave an exclusively empirical reference,and (b) this empirical reference can be con-clusively shown by logical analysis

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(Weinberg, 1960). For positivist somethingis meaningful if and only if it is logicallytrue or else is empirically verifiable.

Unlike positivists, Karl Popper accept-ed the fact that "observation alwayspresupposes the existence of some systemof expectations". When a theory's predic-tions are falsified, it is to be ruthlesslyrejected. Theories that survive falsifica-tion are said to be corroborated andtentatively accepted (Popper, 1999). Histheory was developed directly opposed toall attempts to operate the idea that induc-tive logic. As opposed to logical positivistPopper admits that metaphysics has valuefor empirical science by stating:

"Scientific discovery is impossiblewithout faith in ideas which are ofa purely speculative kind; a faithwhich is completely unwanted fromthe point of view science, and which,to extent, is metaphysical" (Popper,1999).

Popper accepts a system as scientific onlyif it is capable of being tested by experi-ence. Therefore, he suggests, not theverifiability but the falsifiability of asystem is to be taken as a criterion ofdemarcation. Popper's criterion of demar-cation is based upon an asymmetrybetween verifiability and falsifiability.Although natural laws or theories for log-ical reasons are not verifiable, they are inan asymmetrical way falsifiable. How dowe decide that scientific statements do notcall for any further test, it is simply mat-ter of convention. Both the verifiabilityand falsifiability views of meaning arebased on the distinction between theoret-ical and observational terms. Both views

assume that observations can be suffi-ciently independent of presumptions in thetheory to be useful in tesfing its validity.However, theories are not value - neutral,neither observations nor meanings are the-ory - independent, being infiuenced by theworld view of the theory; methodologyitself is not theory - neutral and hence isincapable of generating a neutral set offacts for appraising competing theories.

Fundamental to the Thomas Kuhn'sargument is the concept of a "paradigm."A paradigm constitutes the worldview ofa scientific community. In his influentialbook Kuhn (1996) describes normal(everyday) scientific research as occurringwithin a paradigm or worldview that com-prises a strong network of conceptual,theoretical, instrumental, and metaphysi-cal commitments. Paradigm is what themembers of a scientific community share.These paradigms determine the nature ofthe problems addressed, how phenomenaare viewed, what counts as solution, andthe criteria of acceptability for theories(Kuhn, 1996). Philosophers of science haverepeatedly showed that more than one the-oretical construction can always be placedupon a given collection of data. Once ithas achieved the status of paradigm, a the-ory is declared invalid only if an altematecandidate is available to take its place(Kuhn, 1996). To reject one paradigm with-out simultaneously accepting another is toreject science itself.

Kuhn claimed that rival paradigms arealways incommensurable. That is, there isno completely neutral standpoint fromwhich one can judge the relative worth ofthe two paradigms. Successive paradigms

Epistemological Dialogue... 7 667

tell us different things about the populationof the universe and about that population'sbehavior. What a man sees depends bothupon what he looks at and also upon whathis previous conceptual experience. Incom-mensurability comes in three basicvarieties:• Incommensurability of Standards or

Cognitive Values• Incommensurability of Language• Incommensurability of Experience

Meaning and understanding arefundamental concepts in Gadamer's philo-sophical hermeneutics. All understandinginvolves interpretation and all interpreta-tion involves understanding. We are alwaysunderstanding and interpreting in the lightof our anticipatory prejudgments and prej-udices, which are themselves changing inthe course of history (Bernstein, 1991).Meaning comes to realization only in andthrough the "happening" of understand-ing.

"Understanding must be conceivedas a part of process of the cominginto being of meaning, in which thesignificance of all statements isformed and made complete" (Bern-stein, 1991).This also can be misinterpreted as a

type of relativism. Gadamer's reflectionson language, horizons, and historicity con-tribute to undermining relativism.Understanding is limited but not closed; itis open to appropriating what is alien. Notheoretical algorithm can provide "a pointby point comparison between theories orcultures". In essence, what is meant by"incommensurability," then, is not thatrational comparison between paradigms is

impossible, but rather that there is no meta-linguistic formula for problem solving thatmight be employed to compare standardsand values in all possible contexts (Bern-stein, 1991).

"We must avoid the fallacy of think-ing that since there are no fixed,determinate rules for distinguishingbetter from worse interpretations,there is consequently no rational wayof making and warranting such prac-tical comparative judgments"(Bernstein, 1991).Gadamer's hermeneutics will reveal that

what is called the "incommensurability ofparadigms" has nothing to do with rela-tivism. Instead of saying that individualsare "locked" within socially constructedpoints of view, incommensurability char-acterizes the "openness" of one'sperspective. It renders dialogue with the"other" not only possible, but never end-ing. A horizon is limited but it is open. Weare not trapped in our horizon, which ischanging and fluid, instead it functions asa window.

Theories of IVuth and Validity ConcernsAs a word "validity" has been used in

so many difl'erent meanings in social sci-ences. One reason could be we invent newwords for new kinds of validity concernsand redefine or use old words in new ways.Validity is not clearly deñned in logiceither. Usually it is defined by an example,such as; a valid deductive conclusion isalways true when the premises are true(Enerstvedt, 1989). From this example itis very important to be aware of that a validconclusion does not need to be true rather

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it has to be in accordance with the mies.The mies of validity are constmcted in thescientific community. What is valid knowl-edge? Answer involves the philosophicalquesfion of what is tmth. Validity and tmthare not the same rather validity is the log-ical as well as the pragmatic criteria oftmth.

Tmth requires a distinct object and sub-ject so that someone can stand outside anddiscover what is tme (Patton, 1990). Sincethis is not possible, what can be done isthat a community of knowledge may estab-lish a consensus of language and valuesmaking it possible to communicate certaintruths that hold for that community at aspecific place and time. We can as wellname this consensus as a paradigm.

Within philosophy, three classicaltheory of truth are determined: "corre-spondence theory", the "coherence theory",and the "pragmatic theory of tmth" (Kvale,1992). Textbook presentations of validityin social science have been based on a cor-respondence theory of truth within thecontext of positivist epistemologicalassumptions. The correspondence theoryof truth concerns whether a knowledgestatement corresponds to the objectiveworld and interprets validity as if weobserve what we want to observe. Thecoherence theory refers to the consisten-cy and intemal logic of a statement. Thecoherence theory of tmth requires somelogical associations for a statement to beconsidered as tme. Statement has to be incoherence in a system with other state-ments. Logical validity is said to be highif the correlation between two tests is high.The pragmafic theory relates the tmth of

a knowledge statement to its practical con-sequences. It asserts that what is tme canbe verified in practice and can be shownto be useful for certain purposes. To prag-matists, tmth is whatever assists us to takeactions that produce the desired results(Kvale, 1992).

The correspondence theory of tmth isa realisfic theory as it makes the distinc-tion between a theory and the facts, whichthe theory describes; and it makes it pos-sible to say that a theory is tme, or false.It allows us to speak of a reality differentfrom the theory (Messick, 1989). Althoughwe have no criterion of tmth, and no meansof being even quite sure of the falsity of atheory, it is easier to find out that a theoryis false than to find out that it is tme. Wehave even good reasons to think that mostof our theories-even our best theories are,strictly speaking, false, for they oversim-plify or idealize the facts (Popper, 1999).

Popper accepts the correspondence the-ory of tmth; believe in absolute objectivetruth. The aim of science, for him, is tofind theories, which get nearer to the tmth.On the other hand, Kuhn rejects the notionthat tmth, in the sense of correspondenceto nature, is central to the debate betweencompeting paradigms. Kuhn's objectionwas not just that no theory might be clos-er to tmth than another. It was that there isno basis on which to judge that theoriesare closer to the tmth (Kuhn, 1996).

As a consequence of giving up a cor-respondence theory of truth, validationbecomes investigation, providing argu-ments, questioning and theoreticallyinterpreting research findings.

In an introduction of his book. Against

Epistemological Diaiogue... 7 669

Method, Feyerabend (1994) tells us thatthe whole book tries to establish the the-sis that

"The events, procedures, and resultsthat constitute the sciences have nocommon structure; there are no ele-ments that occur in every scientificinvestigation but are missing else-where".Against Method's attack on method-

ological unity suggests that there is nosingle scientific method. In other wordsthere can be many different kinds of sci-ence. Science, according to Feyerabend,exhibits neither methodological nor theo-retical unity. Feyerabend (1994) admittedto having been a relativist, although insist-ing that even in his most extravagantlyrelativistic moods, he never endorsed theidea that any standpoint is as good as anyother.

A Brief History of Concept of Validity:from Early Conceptions of Validity to

Messick's Multi-Facet Model of Validity

a) Early Conceptions of Validity inPsychometrics Theory

From the earliest days of educationaland psychological testing, validation pro-cedures tried to show the usefulness of atest by correlating test scores with an exter-nal criterion. These correlational studiesreported "validity coefficients", which pro-vided an index of the degree to which atest measured what it purported to mea-sure. In 1946, Guilford definition ofvalidity was "in a very general sense, a testis valid for anything with which it corre-lates". In his recommendations Rulon

(1946) stated some instruments are "obvi-ously valid" and need no further study,some researchers used the term "face valid-ity" for this quality. Mosier (1947)identified three distinct implication typi-cally attributed to the term "face validity":1) validity by assumption, 2) validity bydefinition, and 3) appearance of validity.He dismissed this "type" of validity as a"pernicious fallacy." In 1950, Crutondefined validity as the correlation ofobserved scores on the test with true scoresin criterion. One major problem with valid-ity coefficients was demonstrating therelevance of the chosen criterion to the pur-pose of the testing (Suen, 2003). Another,even more serious problem was demon-strating the validity of the criterion itself.

In 1951, American Psychological Asso-ciation (APA) commissioned a panel tooffer test standards to be used in the con-struction, use, and interpretation ofpsychological tests. The first product fromthe Committee was the Technical Recom-mendations for Psychological Tests andDiagnostic Techniques: A PreliminaryProposal (APA, 1952). This publicationsuggested four categories of validity: pre-dictive validity, status validity, contentvalidity, and congruent validity. In 1954,a joint committee of the APA, AmericanEducational Research Association(AERA), and the National Council onMeasurements Used in Education (NCME)was formed, and published the TechnicalRecommendations for Psychological Testsand Diagnostic Techniques (APA, 1954).There were several modifications to the1952 proposed recommendations. Forexample, "Congruent validity" was

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renamed "constmct validity", and "statusvalidity" was renamed "concurrent valid-ity." Concurrent validity defined as thecorrelation among predictor scores and thecriterion scores that observed at the sametime. Concurrent validity used for predic-tive purposes.

In 1966, APA, AERA, and NCMErevised the 1954 Technical Recommenda-tions and published the Standards forEducational and Psychological Tests andManuals (Moss, 1992). They reduced thefour "types" of validity to three "aspects"of validity, subsuming concurrent and pre-dictive validities under the rubric of"criterion-related validity" (as suggestedby Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). Anothermodification incorporated into the 1966Standards was the notion that test userswere also responsible for maintainingvalidity. For the first time responsibilitywas given to the test users and burden ofestablishing validity placed on both testpublishers' and test users' shoulders.

Criterion-related validity is the degreeto which scores obtained on one test ormeasure correlates with an existing exter-nal criterion measure of the same traits,attributes, or behavior (Suen, 2003). Con-stmct-related validity is the extent to whichan instrument measures a theoretical,abstract construct. Construct validationimplies constmction of what Cronbach andMeehl (1955) call a nomological network-an interlocking system of laws. It involvescorrelations with other measures of theconstmct and logical analysis of their rela-tionships.

Concept of constmct validity is opento arguments for postmodem emphasis on

the social constmction of knowledge. Cron-bach, who introduced the concept, has laterargued for an extended concept of con-stmct validity: it is an open process whereto validate is to investigate - "...validationis more than corroboration; it is a processfor developing sounder interpretations ofobservations". In an article where he arguesthat value free standards for validity is acontradiction in terms, Cronbach concludeswith a discursive concept of validity rest-ing upon public discussion:

In 1974, AERA, APA, and NCMErevised the 1966 Standards, and publishedthe Standards for Educational and Psy-chological Tests. This revision retained thenotion of three unique "aspects" of valid-ity. After publication of the 1974 Standards,two schools of thought emerged regardingvalidation theory: one school promotingthe idea that validity consisted of three"separate but equal" aspects; the otherschool advocating a unitary conceptual-ization centered on construct validity.Standards for Educational and Psycho-logical Testing (1985) emphasized aunitary conceptualization of validity. Inthis version, the "aspects" of validity denot-ed in the 1971 Standards were describedas "categories" of validation. All validityis of one kind, namely constmct validity.Other so-called separate types of validity- whether labeled content validity, criteri-on-related validity, consequential validity,or whatever - cannot stand alone in valid-ity arguments. Rather, these so-calledvalidity types refer to complementaryforms of evidence to be integrated into anoverall judgment of constmct validity.

Epistemological Dialogue... /671

Table 1 : Messick's faeets of validity

Test interpretation Test use

Evidential basis

Consequential basis

Construct validity

Value implications

Construct validity

+ Relevance/utility

Social consequences

Note. From "Validity" by S. Messick, 1989b, In: R.L. Linn (Ed) Educational measurement, p.2O.

b) Messick's Multi-Facet Model of ValidityOne of the most influential psychome-

tricticans of the second half of the twentiethcentury, Samuel Messick, has argued thatvalidity is a unitary concept -all validity isconstruct validity. Messick (1989) arguesthat the traditional conception of validityfails to take into account both evidence ofthe value implications of score meaningas a basis for action and the social conse-quences of score use (Messick, 1989).

A definition of validity is provided byMessick (1989) states that validity is "anintegrated evaluative judgment of thedegree to which empirical evidence andtheoretical rationales support the adequa-cy and appropriateness of inferences andactions based upon test scores or othermodes of assessment (Messick, 1989)."

Messick asserted that different formsof evidence of validity do not constitutedifferent kinds of validity. While he main-tained that different types of inferencesderived from test scores might require dif-ferent forms of evidence, he rejectedlabeling these forms of evidence "validi-ty". He characterizes validity in a twodimensional table that distinguishesbetween interpretation and use on the onehand and the evidential and consequential

bases on the other.Messick (1989) is careful to note that

validity judgments are on going acfionsand validation an evolving process, alwaysopen to new evidence and theories. Prac-tically speaking then, validation is matterof making the most reasonable case withthe available evidence while recognizingthat these judgments will evolve as newevidence is brought to our attention. Mes-sick's other major contribution was to stressthat validity is not a quality of a test. It isnot the test that is or is not valid. What areor are not valid are the inferences that wedraw using the test results.

In a postmodem era the conception ofknowledge as a mirror of reality is replacedby knowledge as a linguistic and socialconstruction of reality. There is a focusupon interpretation and negotiation of themeaning of the lived world (Rosenau,1992). Truth is constituted through a dia-logue; valid knowledge claims emerge asconflicting interpretations and action pos-sibilities are discussed and negotiatedamong the members of a community. Apostmodem approach to validation doesnot secure unambiguous knowledge. Thequest for absolute certain knowledge isreplaced by a conception of defensible

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knowledge claims. Validation becomes theissue of choosing among competing andfalsifiable interpretations, of examiningand providing arguments for the relativecredibility of alternative knowledge claims(Polkinghome, 1992).

ConclusionThe notion of validity in the social sci-

ences is evolving and is influenced byphilosophy of science, critiques of objec-tivity, and epistemological debates(Geisinger, 1992). Epistemology is con-cerned with origin, nature, Hmits, methods,and justification of human knowledge.Kuhn (1996), Popper (1999), and othershave noted that observations are alwaysinterpreted in the context of a priori knowl-edge. Since the social disciplines areconcerned with human beings, hermeneu-tical dimension is more important in thesocial disciplines than in the natural sci-ences.

One of the primary themes that under-lie Messick's validity theory is representedin the Singerian approach to inquiry (Mes-sick, 1989) where one method of inquiryis evaluated in terms of another to highlightthe assumptions and values underlyingeach. As Messick describes it:

"A Singerian inquiring system startswith the set of other inquiring systems...and applies any system recursively toanother system, including itself. The intentis to elucidate the distinctive technical andvalue assumptions underlying each sys-tem application and to integrate thescientific and ethical implications of theinquiry." (Messick, 1989), p. 32).

Since there is no method that is notinfected with error, any given method can-

not yield, by itself, true foundation for theknowledge. Therefore, any method shouldbe crosschecked against other methods.Campbell and Fiske (1959) introduced theconcept of convergent and discriminantvalidation. Convergent validity requiresfor different methods that was intended tomeasure same construct to have relativelyhigh intercorrelations, while discriminantvalidity requires for similar methods thatwas intended to measure differentconstructs to have relatively low intercor-relations (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).Convergent validation is an example of tri-angulation. The premise of triangulationis that the bias of any method can be over-come by triangulating with very differentmethod, in view of the fact that it is veryunlikely for two very different methods tohave same bias.

In the evidential basis of Messick'smodel, value-neutral as well as theory-neu-tral facts are problematic, so validity is notreally independent of values. Furthermore,in the consequential basis of the model,validity is not only dependent on valuesbut also on evidence of consequences andof preconditions (Messick, 1989). The jus-tification of values is not a simple matter.The problem is that many important val-ues are likely to remain relative to theircommunity of believers or stakeholders.As Martin & Kleindorfer (1987) stated;"Values are beyond full explication. Mostof the decision-making action is to befound in the never-ending process of trans-lating values into goals".

Messick's (1989) theory is so power-ful because his theoretical universeincorporates three distinct views of scien-tific theories: the realist, the constructivist.

Epistemological Dialogue... /673

and the critical realist (or critical rational-ist). The realist view is that theories can betested against facts that exist independentof theories about them. The constmctivistview does not deny the existence of a sep-arate reality, but simply denies that thereare independent facts against which theo-ries can be tested. The third view, criticalrealism, holds that theories can be testedagainst corresponding facts, despite thefact that they are not fully independent ofthe theory. For the realist, theoretical termsare direct conjectures about unobservedattributes that exist independent of scien-fific theory. The realist accepts that suchconjectures cannot be verified, and insteadsubmits them to critical tests. The con-stmctivist judge tmth by the standard ofconsistency between statements and theusefulness of the resulting coherent set ofbeliefs. We do test conjectures againstobservafions, but not in the unproblemat-ic way that the realist envisioned. Rather,the process of testing is itself nested in aspecific set of pre-existing practices. Thisis the constmctivist's contribution to thesynthesis. The hope is that although theprocedures for testing conjectures are rel-ative to our specific practices, they willstill lead to rational decisions about theconjectures. The function of test valida-tion is to collect evidence and argumentsin support of, or counter to, proposed inter-pretations and uses of test scores (Messick,1989). Messick's Singerian approach toinquiry is a powerful means of maintain-ing the openness of validity theory.Evidence derived from any of the researchtraditions is important for validity. It servesboth a critical and a generative function, by

simultaneously encouraging us to consid-er alternative methodologies andscrutinizing our own taken for grantedpractices for critique. All of these sourcesof evidence have respectable foundationsand all have their limitations. The majorlimitation is shortsightedness with respectto other possibilities (Messick, 1989). Thisapproach allows us to maintain validitytheory as an ongoing accomplishment andalways open to other perspecfives.

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