clarifying the policy broker in the advocacy coalition...
TRANSCRIPT
Clarifying the Policy Broker in the Advocacy Coalition Framework
Presented at the International Conference on Public Policy
Grenoble, France
June 26-28, 2013
Duane Bratt, PhD
Department of Policy Studies
Mount Royal University
Calgary, Alberta, Canada
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was designed by Paul Sabatier and Hank
Jenkins-Smith in the late 1980s to “help explain coalition structure and behaviour, the role of
scientific and technical information in policy, policy-oriented learning, and belief and policy
change in contentious policy subsystems.”1 They define an advocacy coalition as a set of “actors
from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of
basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the
rules, budgets and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over
time.”2 Advocacy coalitions also “engage in a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over
time.”3 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith recognize that “in most subsystems, the number of politically
significant advocacy coalitions will be quite small.”4
The ACF is a very complex framework with many different components: competing
coalitions with resources, belief systems, and guidance instruments; stable parameters; external
events, and other features. One of the important features of the ACF are policy brokers who
mediate between the advocacy coalitions. They were conceived of elected officials, senior civil
servants, and regulatory bodies. Policy brokers seek compromise between the competing
advocacy coalitions. “The distinction between ‘advocate’ and ‘broker,’ however, rests on a
continuum. Many brokers will have some policy bent, while advocates may show some serious
concern with system maintenance.”5 In other words, senior civil servants may be brokers, but
they may also advocate specific policies. For example, bureaucrats in departments of energy may
1 University of Colorado Denver, School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework.”
2 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier, “The Study of Public Policy Processes,” in Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, eds., Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Framework (Westview Press: Boulder, CO,
1993), 5. 3 Paul A. Sabatier, “Policy Change over a Decade or More,” in Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, eds., Policy
Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Framework (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1993), 5. 4 Sabatier, “Policy Change over a Decade or More,” 26.
5 Sabatier, “Policy Change over a Decade or More,” 27.
be sympathetic to the pro-nuclear coalition, while the allegiance of bureaucrats in the
departments of the environment may lie with the anti-nuclear coalition.
While policy brokers are important, they also remain one of the most underdeveloped
aspects of the ACF. Even Paul Sabatier has admitted that many ACF applications overlook the
role of policy brokers.6 The best study on policy brokers was done in an examination of Swiss
climate change policy by Karin Ingold and Frédéric Varone. Ingold and Varone point out that the
“ACF is lacking when it comes to explaining (1) the mere existence of policy brokers (Who are
policy brokers? What are their belief systems?); (2) their behavior during the policy-making
processes (Do they have a strategic interest-based behavior to increase their power or are they
oriented toward the search of stability within a policy subsystem?); and (3) their influence on
policy outputs in different political systems (Under which institutional rules do policy brokers
have an influence?).” To address these criticisms, Ingold and Varone successfully tested a set of
hypotheses through a case study of Switzerland’s climate change policy. The first hypothesis
showed that policy brokers are not disinterested actors but, in fact, pursue their material self-
interests and act strategically when they seek compromise between advocacy coalitions. The
second hypothesis showed that policy brokers will use specific institutional rules to prevent
conflict between the advocacy coalitions.7
This study, using the case of the Canadian nuclear sector, provides more clarity on the
concept of policy brokers. It builds and expands upon the initial work by Ingold and Varone in
exploring policy brokers especially in the role of material interests and institutional self-interest
in guiding policy broker behaviour. In the process, it also raises some important questions.
6 Christopher M. Weible, Paul A. Sabatier, and Kelly McQueen, “Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the
Advocacy Coalition Framework,” The Policy Studies Journal 37/1 (2009), 132. 7 Karin Ingold and Frédéric Varone, “Treating Policy Brokers Seriously: Evidence from the Climate Policy,”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22/2 (April 2012), 319-346.
Second, it makes two hypotheses: 1) “in a sector that is emerging and unsettled, policy brokers
will try to broker a compromise between the advocacy coalitions through specific tools;” and 2)
“in a sector that is stable and marked by a high degree of the devil shift, policy brokers will
abandon efforts at compromise and instead make decisions that force them to choose between
coalitions.”
Structure of the Canadian Nuclear Sector
Before beginning the theoretical discussion on the role of policy brokers, it is important
to quickly outline the structure of the Canadian nuclear sector. Canada has been involved in
nuclear energy since the Manhattan Project during World War II. It has had research reactors
since the 1940s and was one of the first countries in the world to produce electricity from nuclear
fission. It is the home of the CANDU reactor, a unique heavy water type model that operates in
Canada, Argentina, China, India, Pakistan, Romania, and South Korea. Canada has 22 power
reactors in three provinces (Ontario, New Brunswick, and Quebec) that produce 14% of
Canada’s electricity and over 50% in Ontario, which is the country’s most populace province and
the centre of its manufacturing sector. For decades, Canada was the largest producer of uranium,
and is currently second in the world behind Kazakhstan. Most of these uranium mines are in
northern Saskatchewan, although earlier mines operated in northern Ontario and the Northwest
Territories. Finally, there is a thriving nuclear manufacturing sector made up of over 100
companies.
The pro-nuclear coalition is composed of the nuclear industry, unions of nuclear workers,
and the nuclear scientific community. The Canadian nuclear industry is dominated by federal and
provincial Crown corporations. The federal government owns Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
(AECL) which operates the Chalk River Laboratories that includes the NRU research reactor. It
also used to own AECL’s reactor division, which designs the CANDU reactor, but in 2011 this
was privatized when it was sold to engineering giant SNC-Lavalin and became CANDU Energy.
The provinces, through electricity monopolies, own all of the power reactors: Provincial crown
corporations are major players in the Canadian nuclear sector: Ontario Power Generation (OPG)
owns all of the nuclear power plants in Ontario,8 NB Power owns the Point Lepreau reactor in
New Brunswick, and Hydro-Quebec owns the Gentilly-2 reactor in Quebec. Other major
companies include Cameco, the world’s largest uranium producer, and Bruce Power, which
operates eight reactors in Ontario. The Canadian Nuclear Association (CNA) is the industry’s
collective voice. In many policy subsystems, unions and industry are in different advocacy
coalitions, but in the nuclear sector they are allied within the pro-nuclear coalition. The major
union is the Canadian Nuclear Workers Council (CNWC), which was formed in 1993 by the
major unions that represent workers in the various sectors of the Canadian nuclear industry:
electric power utilities, uranium mining and processing, medical isotope production, and nuclear
research. The final members of the pro-nuclear coalition are the nuclear scientists, primarily
physicists, chemists, and engineers, who are organized within the Canadian Nuclear Society.
The anti-nuclear coalition is largely comprised of public interest groups. The foremost
group is the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (CCNR), which was established in
1975, and acts as an umbrella organization for the entire anti-nuclear movement. The CCNR, led
by Gordon Edwards a long-time anti-nuclear activist who also teaches mathematics at Vanier
College in Montreal, and concerns itself with all aspects of the nuclear sector: uranium mining,
8 Bruce Power, a private sector firm, operates the eight Bruce reactors on a long-term lease, but OPG remains the
owner of the plants.
the link between the peaceful and military application of the atom, government subsidies to the
Canadian nuclear industry, Canadian nuclear exports, the economics of nuclear power, the
negative environmental consequences of nuclear power, and the problems of disposing nuclear
waste. Many other environmental organizations have been quite active in the past two decades in
the domestic nuclear debate, for example, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, the Pembina Institute,
Energy Probe, and Friends of the Earth. Norm Rubin (president of Energy Probe), David Martin
(nuclear policy consultant with the Sierra Club and founder of the Campaign for a Nuclear
Phaseout), and Shawn Patrick Stensil (specialist in nuclear issues for Greenpeace) are all
recognized as high-profile critics of Canada’s nuclear policies. These national environmental
groups provide technical and public relations support to local grassroots organizations in each
province, organizations like the Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta (CNFA) and
Saskatchewan’s Inter-Church Uranium Committee Educational Co-operative (ICUCEC).
The members of both the pro-nuclear coalition and the anti-nuclear coalition are united in
their policy beliefs. These are summarized in Table 1.
[Place Table 1 about here]
Material Interests and the Behaviour of Policy Brokers
There are a number of questions that get raised about the behaviour of policy brokers.
Are policy brokers purely neutral actors who seek compromise between competing advocacy
coalitions? Do they have leanings, either subtle or overt, favouring a particular advocacy
coalition? Or do they have independent interests separate from the advocacy coalitions? If they
pursue self-interest, is it due to material interests or ideological ones? What mechanisms do
policy brokers use to advance their position? Ingold and Varone, as mentioned in the
introduction, argue that policy brokers “use their belief independence to pursue their (material)
self-interests and act strategically as policy brokers to seek stability between advocacy
coalitions.”9
However, in my analysis of the Canadian nuclear sector, policy brokers have a clear
material interest because there are state-owned corporations that are major members of the pro-
nuclear coalition. As mentioned earlier, provincial crown corporations are major players in the
Canadian nuclear sector with OPG, NB Power, and Hydro-Quebec owning all of Canada’s
nuclear power plants. Even in provinces, without nuclear plants, such as Saskatchewan, there is a
provincial crown (SaskPower) which has a monopoly over electricity generation. The only
exception is Alberta which has a private sector electricity market. Unlike Ingold and Varone, I
argue that policy brokers, when they have a clear material interest, do not behave as neutral
arbiters, but instead tend to favour the coalition that matches their material interest.
How can provincial premiers, cabinet ministers, and senior civil servants be neutral
brokers in a sector if they are also simultaneously the owner of the major industry group in the
pro-nuclear coalition? Many observers do not see the government as independent neutral policy
brokers mediating between coalitions, but rather, due to their role as owners, as members of the
pro-nuclear coalitions. For example, Cranford Pratt, in articulating his dominant-class theory, has
written that “the literature on the role of interest groups and lobbying in Canada frequently
acknowledges that business interest groups have a much more intimate and influential access to
policy-makers than do public interest groups or other economic interest groups such as consumer
associations and the trade unions.” Adding to their influence is the view that “many
9 Ingold and Varone, “Treating Policy Brokers Seriously,” 5.
governmental departments and divisions within those departments have developed close links
with the sectors of the Canadian economy that directly relate to their responsibilities.”10
This is
obviously exacerbated in the case of state-owned enterprises. While, Pratt was writing in general
terms about the influence of business groups in the policy process, others have made the case
specifically about the nuclear sector. Morrison and Wonder wrote in 1978 that “those opposed to
nuclear exports are likely to be the most visible in the domestic political scene. However, those
who favour exports have greater economic clout and more technical expertise. The entrenched
position of the pro-export interests within the government suggests that policy will tend to be
dictated more by economic than security considerations. It is only when the nation’s vital
political interests are perceived to be at stake in international activities that the prime minister’s
advisors and External Affairs will dominate the policy process.”11
This situation becomes even more complex when there is a split between levels of
government. The Canadian nuclear sector provides two good examples of this phenomenon. The
first example occurred when Ontario pursued a new nuclear build in 2009. OPG (solely owned
by the Ontario government) would own and operate the reactor, and AECL (at the time, solely
owned by the Canadian government) was bidding to build the reactors. This created tension
between the provincial and federal governments. In previous builds, it was a closed process and
AECL, as Canada’s national nuclear company, was automatically awarded the contract.
However, in this case, Ontario used the open bid process, in large part, to force the federal
government (which because of its ownership of AECL had a vested interest in them winning the
contract) to commit more dollars to the new nuclear-build project. Ultimately, Ontario suspended
10
Cranford Pratt, “Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism,” in Pratt, eds., Internationalism under Strain:
The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (University of Toronto Press: Toronto,
1989), 54-5 11
Robert Morrison and Edward F. Wonder, Canada’s Nuclear Export Policy (Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs: Ottawa, 1978), 8.
the project because the bids were too high. Ontario Energy Minister George Smitherman
emphasized that AECL had to bring its price down “substantially, certainly a measure of many
billions. We’ll know the right price when we see it and we ain’t seen it yet.”12
An additional
concern of Ontario surrounded the future of AECL, which had not yet been privatized, and there
was a great deal of uncertainty about the future of the company at the time. Smitherman touched
on both points when he asserted that “the government of Canada needs to do the work that
they’re doing now to clarify the future ownership of AECL, and when they have clarified that, to
sharpen their pencils substantially so that the people of the province of Ontario can renew their
nuclear fleet with two new units from that company.”13
Premier Dalton McGuinty added that
“Ottawa will determine whether the province moves forward with nuclear power.”14
In contrast,
the federal government had told AECL that its bid must provide a commercial rate of return and
that its price must recover all costs, rather than spreading them out over future sales. A secret
briefing paper prepared by NRCan maintained that “while Ontario is likely to ask AECL to
lower its price, the government would need to ensure the project is commercial to preserve
AECL’s value as it is restructured and to avoid [federal taxpayers] subsidizing Ontario
taxpayers.”15
The second example occurred during the refurbishment of the Point Lepreau reactor in
2008-2012 in New Brunswick led to significant delays and cost overruns of over a billion
dollars. This led to a bitter dispute between NB Power, the owner of the Point Lepreau reactor,
and AECL, who was contracted to complete the refurbishment. This dispute escalated to a higher
level when the owners of the companies -- the New Brunswick government and the federal
12
Quoted in Rob Ferguson, “Ontario Shelves Costly Nukes,” Toronto Star, 30 June 2009. 13
Quoted in Shawn McCarthy and Karen Howlett, “AECL’s Future in Doubt as Ontario Suspends Nuclear Power
Plans,” Globe and Mail, 30 June 2009. 14
Quoted in Andy Frame, “Risky Political Strategies Could Turn Out the Lights,” Toronto Star, 15 July 2009. 15
Quoted in McCarthy and Howlett, “AECL’s Future in Doubt.”
government -- became involved. In September 2009, New Brunswick Premier Shawn Graham
wrote to Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper demanding that the federal government fully
compensate, beyond the original contract’s contingency provisions, NB Power for the delays.16
Harper responded that the refurbishment delays were also costing the federal government “a lot
of money.” The contract between NB Power and AECL “imposes significant obligations on the
federal government and we will be respecting those contractual obligations.”17
The policy brokers in these two cases were not trying to achieve a compromise between
the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear coalitions, instead the provincial governments (Ontario and New
Brunswick) and the federal governments were leaders in the pro-nuclear coalition. This raises an
important question: Was there even a policy broker when the dispute was between different
levels of government? Who mediates between the policy brokers? For example, Lisa Raitt, the
federal natural resources minister with responsibility for AECL, claimed that the problems over
the Point Lepreau refurbishment were the exclusive responsibility of AECL and NB Power, who
were both “autonomous agencies.”18
If the federal minister responsible for nuclear energy was
abdicating a policy broker role the question is, who, if anyone, would be the policy broker in this
situation? The Supreme Court?
16
New Brunswick, Office of the Premier, “Letter to the Right Honourable Stephen Harper,” 15 September 2009.
Accessed on 28 October 2009 at http://www.cbc.ca/news/pdf/letters-to-pm.pdf 17
Quoted in Chris Morris, “Lepreau Costing Feds As Well – Harper,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 29 September
2009. 18
Quoted in Quentin Casey, “Dropping the Ball,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 15 September 2009.
Institutional Self-Interest
Almost every policy sector has a government regulatory body which enforces legislation
with quasi-judicial powers. These regulatory agencies act as policy brokers. The Canadian
nuclear sector is regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). The CNSC,
previously called the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), was created in 1946. Today, its
purpose is enforce the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) by “protect[ing] the health,
safety and security of Canadians as well as the environment, and respect[ing] Canada's
international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Like several other regulatory
bodies, the CNSC has been granted quasi-judicial powers, which means that it can “judge
specific cases involving the granting, denial, or removal of licenses, the approval of rates or fares
and the censuring of failure to comply with terms of licenses.”19
More recently, the CNSC has
been granted the power to levy fines of up to $100, 000 per offence against licensees.20
The
CNSC authorizes five types of licenses: a license to prepare site, a license to construct, a license
to operate, a license to decommission, and a license to abandon a site. Although the process is
the same, there are obviously regulatory differences between a uranium mine, a power reactor,
and a research reactor. The process to award, deny, or renew a license involves public hearings
and the submission of evidence by stakeholders. It is the CNSC Tribunal, a seven-person board
chaired by the president, that makes the final licensing decisions.21
19
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 8 January 2009. Accessed on 21 July 2009 from http://www.cnsc-
ccsn.gc.ca. 20
Government of Canada, “Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission),” Canada Gazette (16 February 2013). Accessed on 31 May 2013 from http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-
pr/p1/2013/2013-02-16/html/reg2-eng.html 21
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 8 January 2009. Accessed on 21 July 2009 from http://www.cnsc-
ccsn.gc.ca.
Taking some insights from public choice theory, the CNSC has an institutional self-
interest in ensuring the existence, and even expansion, of the Canadian nuclear sector. After all,
the more reactors that are operating, the more jobs and the higher the budget for the agency in
charge of regulating nuclear energy there will be. In addition, many regulators previously
worked in the nuclear industry or have a scientific interest in nuclear energy. In this perspective,
the CNSC, instead of being a broker between the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, is, in fact, part
of the pro-nuclear coalition. Cranford Pratt has written that “close relationships often develop
between government regulatory agencies and the industries they are intended to regulate.”22
An
independent report by the Institute on Governance commissioned by the CNSC noted that
historically the commission has “put more focus on communicating with licensees than with
NGOs and the broader public, and this may have contributed to the perception among NGOs that
the CNSC has too close a relationship with industry.”23
For example, the report noted that senior
CNSC officials often meet privately with industry to discuss licensing procedures, but that this
was not consistently done with interest groups. David Martin, energy co-ordinator for the Sierra
Club, remarked that “the only time we’ve had any direct contact with Linda Keen [then President
of the CNSC] has been through the regulatory processes where she’s sat on the commission.”
Martin believed that “when you understand that they’re conducting these meetings effectively in
secret, and you combine that with the increasing regulatory leniency that [the commission] is
showing to the nuclear industry, I think two and two makes four. This is an agency that has been
seriously co-opted, and is in serious need of reform.”24
22
Pratt, “Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism,” 55. 23
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Regulatory Independence: Law, Practice, and Perception – A Report to
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, August 2007, 21. 24
Quoted in Sue Bailey and Jim Bronskill, “Nuclear Watchdog Too Close to Industry, Report Suggests,” Globe and
Mail, 9 October 2007, A8.
Hypothesis #1: Brokering Consensus
Hypothesis #1 is “in a sector that is emerging and unsettled, policy brokers will try to
broker a compromise between the advocacy coalitions through specific tools.” Although northern
Saskatchewan was the centre of Canada’s uranium industry, the province did not have any power
reactors nor an existing manufacturing capacity for nuclear components. Alberta was even more
virgin territory because it did not even have uranium mines. By 2007-2008 there was growing
interest in building nuclear reactors in both provinces, but the nuclear sector was emerging and
unsettled. Therefore, the policy brokers in both provinces took steps to broker a compromise
through the establishment of expert panels and public consultation processes. The actual design
of the panels and public consultations were different in the two provinces, but in both cases the
goal was the same, an effort by the policy brokers to broker a compromise between the advocacy
coalitions.
In November 2008, the Saskatchewan government appointed an expert panel, dominated
by the CEOs of the major nuclear companies, to examine the nuclear sector. The Uranium
Development Partnership (UDP) was mandated to make recommendations to the government on
value-added opportunities in the uranium industry: exploration and mining, conversion,
enrichment, reactor fuel manufacturing, and the use of nuclear reactors. The UDP report, which
was released on March 31, 2009, made 40 findings and provided 20 specific recommendations
across five sections: exploration and mining, uranium upgrading, nuclear power generation, used
fuel management, and research & development. The UDP found that “the high-priority
opportunities for Saskatchewan appear to be exploration, mining, nuclear power generation, and
hosting a used fuel repository.”25
The Saskatchewan government appointed Dan Perrins, the respected former head of the
Saskatchewan Public Service, to lead a public consultation process to gather input on the UDP
report. The consultation period was held between April 6, 2009 and July 31, 2009. It included the
following devices: a major stakeholder conference in Saskatoon, hearings in Saskatoon and
Regina (the two largest cities), 13 community meetings across the province, an opportunity for
individual stakeholder organizations to provide oral and/or written submissions, and a special
opportunity for presentations from First Nations and Métis groups.26
A special website was also
created that would contain “the full report, presentation materials, online input opportunities, and
ultimately, the results of the public input.”27
Over 2,600 people attended the public meetings and
almost 1,300 people responded by letter or email.28
On September 15, 2009, the Saskatchewan
government released The Future of Uranium, Dan Perrins’ UDP public consultation report.29
The
UDP was written by the pro-nuclear coalition, but the people who attended the public hearings
were largely from the anti-nuclear coalition. 88% of the participants in the public consultation
process opposed the overall thrust of the UDP report and 85% were specifically opposed to
nuclear generation in the province. However, as Perrins noted in his report, “the responses
summarized are not necessarily representative of the Saskatchewan population and cannot be
25
Uranium Development Partnership, Capturing the full potential of the uranium value chain in Saskatchewan, (31
March 2009), 90. Accessed on 14 April 2009 at http://www.gov.sk.ca 26
Saskatchewan, “Public Consultation to Follow Release of Uranium Development Partnership Report,” News
Release (3 April 2009). Accessed on 6 April 2009 at http://www.gov.sk.ca 27
http://www.saskuranium.ca 28
Dan Perrins, The Future of Uranium: Public Consultation Process (31 August 2009), 19. Accessed on 15
September 2009 from http://www.gov.sk.ca 29
Perrins, The Future of Uranium.
linked back to the population with any statistical reliability” (emphasis added).30
Subsequent
public opinion polling would show that the overall Saskatchewan population was slightly
supportive of nuclear energy.31
On December 17, 2009, the Saskatchewan government outlined its strategic direction for
uranium development in the province:
Continue to facilitate the uranium exploration and mining that has taken place in
Saskatchewan for over 50 years.
Encourage investment in nuclear research, development and training opportunities,
specifically in the areas of mining, neutron science, isotopes, small scale reactor
design and enrichment.
Reserve decisions on supporting Saskatchewan communities interested in hosting
nuclear waste management facilities to when such proposals are advanced in a
regulatory process; and
Direct SaskPower to continue including nuclear power in the range of energy options
available for additional baseload generation capacity in the medium and long term
after 2020 (Saskatchewan, 2009a).
This strategic plan revealed the Saskatchewan government’s efforts at brokering a compromise
between the pro and anti-nuclear coalitions. On the one hand, it endorsed the vast majority of the
UDP’s recommendations (favouring the pro-nuclear coalition), but on the other hand, it delayed
(possibly indefinitely) the most important one – building a nuclear power plant by 2020 –
(favouring the anti-nuclear coalition).
The reaction to the Saskatchewan government’s announcement, which was mixed, further
reflected this compromise. Bruce Power, the company which sought to build a reactor in the
province, viewed “this announcement as not being very far off our take on what potential there is
in Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan obviously continues to consider nuclear energy as part of its
30
Perrins, The Future of Uranium, 36. 31
Saskatchewan, The Government’s Strategic Direction on Uranium Development (17 December 2009). Accessed
on 17 December 2009 at http://www.gov.sk.ca/adx/aspx/adxGetMedia.aspx?mediaId=1029&PN=Shared
mix. Nothing has been ruled out. We don’t see it really changing that much as we’ve always
looked at 2020 and beyond.” Meanwhile, Ann Coxworth, of the Saskatchewan Environmental
Society, said that “nuclear power has been the elephant in the room in all of our thinking about
energy planning for the next decade and while the elephant hasn’t been killed, it’s securely
locked up in its cage.” However, other members of the anti-nuclear coalition wanted “the door
completely shut on it.” Some members of the pro-nuclear coalition were also upset with the
government. For instance, the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce was disappointed that the
government based its decision on cost, “but when you start to take into account the carbon costs,
you take into account escalating infrastructure costs for any type of new power supply, they
should have done full due diligence. They’ve written it off for reasons that are unknown to us.”32
In April 2008 the Alberta government appointed the Nuclear Power Expert Panel
(NPEP), chaired by former federal Conservative Cabinet Minister Harvey Andre, to prepare a
comprehensive report on nuclear energy in Alberta. The NPEP would examine: environmental,
health and safety issues; waste management; comparing nuclear energy with other electricity
generation technologies; current and future nuclear power generation being used in Canada and
around the world; Alberta’s future electricity needs; and social issues/concerns related to nuclear
energy.33
Unlike the Saskatchewan UDP, the Alberta report would not make any
recommendations; instead the panel’s mandate was to “prepare a balanced and objective Report
for the government of Alberta on factual issues pertinent to the use of nuclear power to supply
electricity in Alberta.”34
In addition, the NPEP was formed with academics not nuclear industry
32
Angela Hall, “Saskatchewan government says no to nuclear power,” Regina Leader-Post (18 December 2009). 33
Alberta, “Expert panel to develop comprehensive research paper on nuclear power,” News Release (23 April
2008). Accessed 29 April 2008 at http://www.energy.alberta.ca
34 Alberta, Nuclear Power Expert Panel Order (23 April 2008). Accessed on 28 April 2008 at
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Org/pdfs/MO_31_Nuclear_Expert_Panel.pdf
CEOs. The panel’s findings would be used as the basis for a public consultation process that
would gather input from Albertans.
The NPEP was released by the Alberta government on March 26, 2009.35
It did not
contain any recommendations, but it did make some important conclusions that would frame the
debate over the development of nuclear energy in Alberta. These are the key conclusions of the
NPEP: Alberta will need additional electricity; all technologies have trade-offs; building a power
plant is a private sector decision, but regulated by government; nuclear power has existed around
the world for over 50 years; nuclear energy, unlike other mainstream electricity sources, does not
release carbon dioxide; and nuclear waste is a major concern.
The NPEP served as the basis for a “multi-faceted consultation process” that was
designed to gather the views of Albertans on nuclear power. Innovative Research Group, an
independent research firm, was commissioned by the government to collect the data and provide
a summary to the government.36
The process, which took place between April 27 and June 1,
2009 included a telephone survey (1, 024 people), twenty randomly selected discussion groups
(193 individuals), stakeholder discussion groups (First Nations and Métis, community, business,
environmental, and all of the province’s anti-nuclear groups), and an online and mail-in
questionnaire (3, 615 responses).37
But, unlike the situation in Saskatchewan, there were no
public hearings.
35
Alberta, Nuclear Power Expert Panel: Report on Nuclear Power and Alberta (February 2009). Accessed 15
March 2009 at http://www.energy.alberta.ca 36
Alberta, Alberta Nuclear Consultation (April 2009). Accessed 28 April 2009 at http://www.energy.alberta.ca 37
Innovative Research Group Inc., Alberta Nuclear Consultation. Report prepared for: The Alberta Government –
Department of Energy (2009). Accessed on 14 December 2009 at
http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Electricity/pdfs/AlbertaNuclearConsultationFull.pdf
On December 14, 2009, the Alberta government reflected a compromise between the pro
and anti-nuclear coalitions when it announced its conditional support for nuclear energy.
“Alberta,” as Energy Minister Mel Knight explained, “will maintain its existing policy where
power generation options are proposed by the private sector in the province and considered on a
case-by-case basis. We will work with the federal government regarding any nuclear power
application to ensure provincial rules and environmental standards are respected. Further, we will
not invest public dollars in any nuclear power proposals.” Knight also referenced the split
between pro and anti-nuclear coalitions when he said “Albertans have told us that we shouldn’t
be closed to new generation technologies that could provide clean, low-emission power. At the
same time Albertans have identified concerns with nuclear power that potential future applicants
will need to fully address.”38
The reaction to the Alberta government’s announcement reflected the efforts at a
compromise. Bruce Power, who sought to build reactors in the province, saw the decision as a
green light. Duncan Hawthorne, Bruce Power’s CEO, stated that [i]t’s encouraging to see the
door remain open for us to demonstrate we can bring value to the province and help Alberta meet
its future energy needs without contributing to greenhouse gas emissions.” Local anti-nuclear
groups were outraged with Adele Boucher Rymhs, president of the Coalition for a Nuclear Free
Alberta, arguing that “[t]he government didn’t listen.” Similarly, Elena Schacherl, the founder of
Citizens Advocating for the Use of Sustainable Energy, complained that the government
“ignored the 55 per cent opposition to nuclear from the 3, 600 Albertans who filled out the
consultation workbook.” For Schacherl, the“[t]he consultation results were the culmination of a
process that right from the start suggested that the government had already made up its mind
38
Alberta, “Province releases results of nuclear consultation,” News Release (14 December 2009).
about nuclear. They set out to convince rather than consult Albertans.” In contrast, the large
environmental groups (Sierra Club and Pembina Institute) argued that “[n]ot providing public
dollars to subsidize the nuclear industry hits the final nail in the nuclear energy coffin for the
province.”39
Despite the government approval, Bruce Power eventually decided to withdraw from its
reactor proposal in Alberta. Although no public explanation was provided, Bruce Power’s
decision-making calculus was probably based on low natural gas prices. High natural gas prices
were a driver for the interest in nuclear energy in Alberta in 2007-2009. However, the recent
drop in natural gas prices, largely due to the discovery of shale gas in large parts of the United
States, has greatly diminished that interest. Natural gas prices had been relatively high since
2003 and had peaked in price at $9.84/gj in July 2008. At which point they had started a steady
decline and by October 2011 the price was $3.17/gj. In fact, natural gas had not been above $6/gj
since December 2008.40
Gas-fired plants, due to their peaking ability, relatively lower rate of
GHG emissions (at least in comparison to coal), and superior construction timelines, are the
major competitor to nuclear. Therefore, low natural gas prices are an economic incentive to build
gas-fired plants as opposed to nuclear power plants.
Hypothesis #2: Decision-Makers
Hypothesis #2 is “in a sector that is stable and marked by a high degree of the devil shift,
policy brokers will abandon efforts at compromise and instead make decisions that force them to
39
Jason Fekete, “Alberta would welcome private nuclear power,” Calgary Herald (15 December 2009). 40
Alberta, “Alberta Gas Reference Price History,” (5 December 2011). Accessed 3 January 2012 at
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/NaturalGas/1322.asp
choose between coalitions.” The devil shift is defined as “the tendency for actors to view their
opponents as less trustworthy, more evil, and more powerful than they probably are.”41
The
Canadian nuclear sector exhibits many of the outcomes of the devil shift: “polarized coordination
patterns between rival coalitions, minimal communication channels between opponents, venue
shopping, and long-term disagreement about major policies in the subsystem.”42
For example,
Steve Coupland, manager of issues and policy development with Bruce Power and also an
executive member with the CNA, described the “hard core” of anti-nuclear activists in this way:
“how do you deal with people who want to put your entire industry out of business and
characterize you as liars and criminals.”43
Meanwhile Pat McNamara, a prominent anti-nuclear
activist who has battled the nuclear industry in Port Hope, Ontario and Grand Prairie, Alberta,
has written that “the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Health Canada, Natural Resources
Canada and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited are corrupt and incompetent regarding their
responsibility to protect us from the nuclear industry. They are guilty of a nuclear genocide in
Canada.”44
It has been very difficult for brokers to find a compromise between the pro-nuclear
and anti-nuclear coalitions because of the high degree of conflict between them, owing to the
complete incompatibility between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear actors on the deep core of basic
values and principles.
Ingold and Varone argued that “if the political system offers several institutionalized
veto points to advocacy coalitions engaging in the “devil shift,” then policy brokers attempt to
prevent advocacy coalitions from activating veto points and therefore have a great influence on
41
Sabatier and Weible, “Innovations and Clarifications,” 194. 42
Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, “Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 132-3. 43
Interview with Steve Coupland, manager of issues and policy development at Bruce Power, Calgary, 20 October
2009. 44
Pat McNamara, “Nuclear Genocide in Canada,” 22 March 200. Accessed on 22 December 2010 at
http://www.porthopehistory.com/nucleargenocide/nucleargenocide_index.htm
the final policy output.”45
However, the evidence from the Canadian nuclear sector, and likely
other highly contentious policy sectors such as abortion or capital punishment, is that the devil
shift often prevents compromises from occurring. When this happens, policy brokers will instead
choose one coalition over the other. In the Canadian nuclear sector, the provincial policy brokers
decided to refurbish nuclear reactors in New Brunswick and Ontario to the relief of the pro-
nuclear coalition and the outrage of the anti-nuclear coalition. It was the provincial policy
brokers who considered, and then abandoned, building new nuclear reactors in Ontario which
disappointed the pro-nuclear coalition and pleased the anti-nuclear coalition.
With policy brokers acting more like decision-makers than brokering compromise, the
competing coalitions will devote their energy to trying to alter the views of policy brokers. The
pro and anti-nuclear coalitions in Canada have been unable to change the views of their
opponents. However, the pro-nuclear coalition has had some limited success in changing the
views of the policy brokers. In Ontario, the anti-nuclear coalition had the upper hand for much of
the 1990s: Bob Rae’s New Democratic Party (NDP) government (1990-95) was largely
sympathetic to the policy beliefs of the anti-nuclear coalition. In addition, the delays and cost
overruns with the Darlington reactors in the late 1980s and early 1990s provided strong evidence
of the problems with nuclear power. Finally, the Mike Harris Progressive Conservative
government had to temporarily shut down seven reactors in 1997 owing to poor performance.
Since then, the pro-nuclear coalition has gradually gained the upper hand. It convinced the Harris
government to begin the process of restarting several of the reactors that had been shut down.
Then it convinced the Liberal government of Dalton McGuinty government, in the early part of
the 21st century, to begin a long-term plan to refurbish most of Ontario’s existing reactors and to
build new ones. The pro-nuclear coalition was able to accomplish this by improving the
45
Ingold and Varone, “Treating Policy Brokers Seriously,” 7.
performance of its nuclear fleet (especially after the arrival of Bruce Power and the attitudinal
change within OPG), by maintaining a strong safety record, and by marshalling evidence about
climate change. The pro-nuclear coalition also worked hard at changing public attitudes towards
nuclear energy in the hopes that public opinion would alter the views of policy brokers.
Conclusion
Policy brokers remain a fuzzy concept in the ACF literature. While there have been some
attempts, mainly by Ingold and Varone, to add some clarify to the concept, it remains
underdeveloped. This paper, using the Canadian nuclear sector, advances the policy brokers
concept in two major ways. First, it has shown that some policy brokers may have either a
material interest (a state-owned enterprise that is a member of a particular coalition) or
institutional self-interest (a regulatory body that might want to maintain the existence of its
policy sector). When these situations occur, policy brokers do not use their strategic interests to
seek stability in the subsystem as Ingold and Varone argue, but instead use their strategic
interests to act as a member, either tacitly or not, of one of the advocacy coalitions. It also raises
some questions about when two competing policy subsystems (ie., Canadian nuclear sector vs
Ontario or New Brunswick nuclear sector) clash. Who can be the policy brokers when there is
this type of inter-sectoral dispute? Second, it presents two hypotheses regarding when policy
brokers either attempt to broker a compromise between the advocacy coalitions or make
decisions that choose between those coalitions. The variable that explains the different approach
is whether the sector is emerging and unsettled, or established, stable, and with a high degree of
the devil shift. In the former, it is compromise and in the later, policy makers become decision
makers.
TABLE 1
The Canadian Nuclear Sector and the
Advocacy Coalition Framework
Elements of ACF Pro-Nuclear Coalition Anti-Nuclear Coalition
Actors Nuclear Industry (CNA,
AECL, Bruce Power, etc.)
Nuclear Unions (CNWC)
Nuclear scientists (CNS)
Officials in the
Department(s) of Energy
Anti-nuclear groups
(CCNR, CNP)
Environmental
organizations
(Pembina, Sierra
Club)
Officials in the
Department(s) of
Environment
Policy Beliefs Nuclear energy is a safe
and economical form of
electricity.
Nuclear energy does not
emit greenhouse gases, so it
can address the problem of
climate change.
Nuclear energy contributes
to the Canadian economy
through jobs and the GDP.
Nuclear energy has resulted
in technological spin-offs.
The CANDU is prestigious
to Canada.
Nuclear energy does not
lead to weapons
proliferation.
Nuclear waste issue has
been exaggerated; it is
being managed.
Renewable energy has
significant flaws
Nuclear reactors are
unsafe (Chernobyl,
Fukushima-Daiichi).
The entire fuel cycle
creates radiation,
which causes
cancer.
Reactors produce
nuclear waste that
lasts for hundreds of
thousands of years.
Nuclear energy is
not a solution to
climate change, and
instead resources
should be devoted to
conservation and
renewable energy
sources.
There is a clear link
between civilian
nuclear energy and
military nuclear
bombs.
Nuclear energy is
uneconomical and is
highly subsidized by
the government.
