Civil War:Problems and Solutions

John LeeFlorida State University

Department of Political ScienceSpring 2011

Map found in Buhang and Gates 2002, based on data by Gleditsch.

•What is a Civil War?

Types of Conflict

• Interstate Conflict – Between two states (e.g. Germany v. United States).

• Intrastate Conflict – Between a state and a non-state actor within the state’s designated territory (e.g. Sri Lanka v. LTTE).

• Extrastate Conflict – Between a state and a non-state actor outside the state’s designated territory (e.g. Present United States v. Taliban).

What is a State?

1. Defined Territory

2. Permanent Population

3. A Government

4. Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States

Treaty of Montevideo (1933)

Civil War

• Small and Singer (1982) define civil war as “any armed conflict that involves*…+– Military action internal to the metropole

– The active participation of national government

– Effective resistance by both sides (210)”

• What is effective resistance? How many deaths are required? Do civilian deaths count?

Stats Notes

Sambanis 2004

•What causes Civil Wars?

Primary Commodities

• Primary commodities are raw/unprocessed materials (e.g. oil, fresh fruit).

• Dependence on primary commodities causes civil war.

– “primary commodity exports substantially increase conflict risk. We have interpreted this as being due to the opportunities such commodities provide for extortion, making rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, n/a).”

Collier & Hoeffler 2004Rare Events Logit1960-1999

(1) Primary Commodities

• Collier & Hoeffler 2004’s findings receive media attention, but are they conclusive?

(1a) Oil

• Oil signifies weaker governments with large revenue sources. Thus, rebels should be more likely to fight since the prize is greater and the costs are lower.

• Do primary commodities matter? Or, is it just the presence of oil that matters?

Fearon 2005

Oil/Primary Commodities

• Neither has robust impact on the occurrence of civil wars.

Natural Disasters

• “nature induced cataclysmic events that overwhelm local capacity (Nel & Richards 2008, 162).”

• Types of natural disasters include: hydro-meteorological, geological, and other (e.g. famine, epidemics).

(2) Natural Disasters

• How do natural disasters increase the probability of civil war (Nel and Righarts2008)?

1. Natural disasters lead to resource scarcity which creates an incentive for war as groups compete over resources.

2. Natural disasters diminish a state’s capacity to rule, creating an opportunity for rebellion.

Nel and Righarts (2008)

(3) Economic Capacity or lack thereof

• The stronger a country’s economy the more capable it is to fight off rebellions (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). As a result, rebels don’t attack strong states.

(4) Population

• As a country increases in population the probability of civil war increases because there are more potential victims (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

Hegre and Sambanis (2006)

(5) Gender Inequality

• Structural violence is required to keep women and men in their separate spheres. Societies that allow for such inequality tolerate violate more frequently than other societies (Caprioli 2005).

• Female/male inequality implies a greater probability of intrastate conflict.

– Studies argue that this extends to interstate conflict.

Caprioli 2005

What factors affect the intensity of civil wars?

1.) Location represents distance from capital.2.) Absolute Scope represents absolute area of conflict zone. Relative Scope

represents the area of conflict zone as proportion of total land.3.) Identity equals one if rebels come from different ethnic group.4.) Incompatibility equals one if rebellion is over territory.

For other variable descriptions, etc see Buhaug and Gates (2002).

• How are Civil Wars Ended?

Puzzle

• Why do interstate wars reach settlements more frequently than intrastate wars?

• “Between 1940 and 1990 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions (Walter 1997, 335).”

Flawed Rationalist Explanations

1. Expected Utility of winning Civil War is too high to pass up.

2. Issue indivisibility.

3. Poor communication.

Flawed Ideational Explanations

1. Issues are “close to the heart.” No compromise.

Commitment Problems

• Civil war negotiations fail because the one side can not credibly commit to any agreement.

• Walter (1997) argues that “*n+egotiations fail because civil war opponents are asked to do what they consider unthinkable. At a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces and prepare for peace (335-336).”

Walter 1997

Solutions

1. Third Party Guarantor – Some other state (not involved in conflict) must enforce agreement on both parties.

To be successful Walter (1997) suggests that outside state must…

1. Have significant interest in conflict’s resolution.

2. Be ready to use force.

3. Signal Resolve.

Walter 1997

Regan 2002

Solutions

2. Partition – “Stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves (Kaufmann 1996, 137).”

Why Partition?

1. “in ethnic wars both hypernationalistmobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard. (Kaufmann 1996, 137).”

2. “Intermingled population settlement patterns create real security dilemmas that intensify violence motive ethnic “cleansing,” and prevent deescalation unless the groups are separated (Kaufmann 1996, 137).”

Sambanis2000

Solutions

3. In Group Policing – Each ethnic group punishes its own members for transgressions against other ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin1996).

Works Cited

• Buhang, Halvard, and Scott Gates. 2002. “The Geography of Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research. 4: 417-433.• Caprioli, M. 2005. “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict.”

International Studies Quarterly. 49: 161-178.• Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers. 56(4): 563-

595.• Fearon, James. 2005. “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 49: 483-507.• Fearon, James D., and Latitin, David D. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” American Political Science

Review. 90: 715-735.• Hegre, Havard, and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset.”

Journal of Conflict Resolution. 50: 508-535.• Kauffmann, Chaim. 1996. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” International Security. 20:

136-175. • Nel, Phllip, and Righarts, Marjolein. 2008. “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict.” International

Studies Quarterly. 52: 159-182.• Regan, Patrick M. 2002. “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict

Resolution. 46: 55-73.• Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical

Literature.” World Politics. 52: 437-483.• Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational

Definition.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 48: 814-585.• Small, Melvin, and J David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980. Beverly Hills, CA:

Sage.• Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization. 51: 335-364.