civil procedure recent jurisprudence

8/19/2019 Civil Procedure Recent jurisprudence

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1 | P a g e CANCINO | CASE DIGEST | CIVIL PROCEDURE

Civil Procedure

Digested Cases

2015-2016

ATTY. CHRISTIAN “KIT” G. VILLASIS

University of Santo TomasFaculty of Civil Law


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PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE V. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL.

FACTS:

Margarita Jose (Margarita) entered into a contract in which she sold for P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 uponthe execution of the deed and the balance ofP80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land and that

should come a time that Margarita become incapacitated, her son and counsel, Juvenal, and her daughter,petitioner Priscilla, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

When Margarita and Juvenal died, Priscilla being Margarita’s sole surviving heir, stepped into the shoes of hermother being the responsible to fulfill the conditions of sale. However, Priscilla did not comply with theresponsibility to cause the registration of the properties. As a consequence, Javellana filed an action for specificperformance, injunction, and damages against her; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registrationproceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating thatthe complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

Priscilla’s motion to dismiss was denied by the court a quo. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the

RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion forreconsideration. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla countered that the RTC order was notappealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.

During the pendency of the appeal, Javellana likewise filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. As tothe notice on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the RTC "forfurther proceedings in accordance with law." The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo decision denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal a finalorder and thus, appealable.

HELD: YES

The Supreme Court emphasized the distinctions between a final order and an interlocutory order is that the firstdisposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothingmore to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does notcompletely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.

An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the

judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: doesthe order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If itdoes, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. The denial of Javellana’s motion forreconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No.79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.


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FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO v M.L. DE LA ROSA, et.al, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by respondent Jose R. Victoriano, in the CFI of the City of Manila, against petitionerFredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action, first is to declare the validity

contract of sale, between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica second, two parcels of land in theManotoc subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, with acombined area of 480 sqm. , which land was then sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S.

Alvero, for P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and another to declare said subsequent sale null and void. On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitted that she sold said land to Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944, due to the urgent need of funds to provide for herself and family, andthat she did not remember the previous sale; offered to repurchase said land from Alvero in the sum of P5,000,but that the latter refused to accept the offer. Alvero, in his answer said complaint was false and denied theallegations made therein, and claimed that he is the exclusive owner of the land in question.

Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa of the CFI of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in this case, rendered his

decision, in which it was declared that the two (2) parcels of land in question, with a combined area of 480square meters had been sold by Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano, since October 1, 1940, for the sum ofP6,000, on the condition that the purchaser should make a down payment of P1,700, and a monthly payment ofP76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments; that Jose R. Victoriano shall continue paying monthly payments untilDecember, 1941, but due to the war-time conditions present, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to suspend suchpayments until the restoration of peace; that immediately after said sale of said land to him, Jose R. Victorianotook possession thereof and made improvements thereon to the amount of P800, and continued occupying saidproperty until December, 1944, when he abandoned the same to go to evacuation places, but returned thereto inFebruary, 1945; that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten the sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold thesame for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwardsoffered to repurchase said property from him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after

liberation; that Fredesvindo S. Alvero presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of Deedsof the City of Manila, on January 3, 1945, and took possession of said property in December, 1944, butafterwards found Jose R. Victoriano in the premises in February, 1945; that in the contract of sale executed byMargarita Villarica, in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, it was agreed that, upon failure of the purchaser to makepayments of three (3) successive mothly installments, the vendor would be free to sell the property again,forfeiting the payments made, except in the case of force majeure; that there was really a verbal agreementbetween Margarita Villarica and Jose Victoriano, made in February, 1942, for the suspension of the payment ofthe monthly installments until the restoration of peace; and that although Jose R. Victoriano had presented thedeed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of Deeds, in Pasig, Rizal, like Fredesvindo S. Alvero, he hadalso failed to secure the transfer of title to his name. And considering that Jose R. Victoriano's document wasolder than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that he had taken possession of said property, since October 1,

1940, the respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title overthe property in question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim.

On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, hefiled a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and of said order he wasnotified on January 7, 1946. On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record onappeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond. On January 14, 1946, Jose R.

Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the

very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, fornot filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and

buried the following day. On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered thedismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in duetime, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late. On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the


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reconsideration of the said order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition forreconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.On February 11, 1946, therespondents filed their answer to the petition for certiorari, alleging (1) that said petition is defective in form as

well as in substance; (2) that there has been no excusable negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuseof discretion on the part of the respondent judge, in the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is defective in form as well as in substance

HELD: YES.

The notice of appeal was filed out of time.

To compute the time in perfecting petitioner’s appeal, said appeal was commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore,his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, hence already filed beyond what is required,and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.

Such failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the judgment tobecome final and executory, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore thejurisdiction, which has been lost. Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect oflaw.


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DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:

Dominador Bustos an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the CFI of Pampanga and prayed that therecord of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order thatthe petitioner herein might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony,on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel,appeared at the preliminary investigation. Bustos entered the plea of not guilty after said charges against him.

Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could beexamined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutorobjected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, which provides

“Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which aparty relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"

The objection was still sustained denying the motion for reconsideration of the accused herein. In view thereof,the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of thepeace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court contravene section 13, Article VIII, of theConstitution which deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.

HELD: NO.Section 11, Rule 108 is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right.

Justice Tuason citing the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs.Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional rightof an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will theabsence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witness. As a matter of fact,preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of anaccused under the due process clause to a fair trial."

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminaryinvestigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed ofthe charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged.

It is fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sounddiscretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's right inthe preliminary investigation.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and deniedeven any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation tocompel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew. Upon the foregoing considerations, the presentpetition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.


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PANAY RAILWAYS INC., v. HEVA MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, and SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT and

EDMUNDO DAYOT, G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012

FACTS :

PRI, petitioner, entered into a loan agreement subject to real estate mortgage with Traders Royal Bank (TRB)amounting to P20, 000,000.00. The Real Estate Mortgage covers several parcels of land which includes Lot No.6153. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D.

Due to PRI’s failure to pay it obligations, the properties were extra judicially foreclosed by the TRB. The bankbeing the highest bidder and purchaser a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of. The sale of land in dispute

was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the TCT covering the mortgagedproperties. Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the basis of a Deed of Sale andan Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to exercise the right to redeem the properties. The

corresponding TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the bank.

TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through itsduly authorized manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance of counsel, filed a Manifestation andMotion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Thepertinent portions of the Manifestation and Motion state:

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4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be the registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159, and Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-84236; T-84237, T-

84238 and T-45724 respectively, free of liens and encumbrances, except that portion sold to Shell Co. found inLot 5. That Petitioner (TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful ownership and immediate physicalpossession of said real properties.

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It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included some excluded propertiesin the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract toSell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T-89624; and Declaration ofOwnership of Real Property with Reconveyance plus Damages.

Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on these grounds: (1) petitioner had no legalcapacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioners claim or demand;(3) petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondents. It held that theManifestation and Motion filed by petitioner was a judicial admission of TRBs ownership of the disputedproperties. The trial court pointed out that the Manifestation was executed by petitioners duly authorizedrepresentative with the assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner fromclaiming otherwise.

On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately

thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.


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The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondents. It held that the Manifestation andMotion filed by petitioner was a judicial admission of TRBs ownership of the disputed properties. The trialcourt pointed out that the Manifestation was executed by petitioners duly authorized representative with theassistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise.

In its Opposition, petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Courtthat became effective only on 1 July 1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by the court personnel

that docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended that therequirement for the payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberalinterpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.

On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the RevisedRules of Court.

Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction overthe case after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing torelax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.

On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.

On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamusunder Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial courthad acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.

On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision on the Petition. It held that while the failure of petitionerto pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of theappeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CAand not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion indismissing the appeal and set aside the latters assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.

Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.

It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CAs Decision, this Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.)No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion,dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within thereglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000 was issued on 29 August 2000 and was addressed to alllower courts.

By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the

assailed Amended Decision in the present Petition granting respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

The CAs action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000should not be given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider the case as exceptionallymeritorious. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize himself with theRevised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He

was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of the case.

On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs dismissal of the Notice of Appeal


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HELD: NO.

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending andunresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.

The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactiveapplication to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adverselyaffected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right mayattach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that a person has no vested right in anyparticular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal,of any other than the existing rules of procedure. More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was notable to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTCdismissed the Notice of Appeal.

The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal has no merit. When this Courtaccordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTCs dismissal of the action may beconsidered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when itsustained the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of itsDecision.

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fees isan indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only uponthe payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory

privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.

We have repeatedly stated that the term substantial justice is not a magic wand that would automatically compelthis Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because theirnon-observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are required to befollowed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of aninjustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedureprescribed.

We cannot consider counsels failure to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court as a persuasivereason to relax the application of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This

principle is based on the rule that any act performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or impliedauthority is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitionermay result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.


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FELIX MARTOS, JIMMY ECLANA, RODEL PILONES, RONALDO NOVAL, JONATHANPAILAGO, ERNESTO MONTANO, DOYONG JOSE, DEO MAMALATEO, ROSELO MAGNO,

BONNIE SANTILLAN, ARSENIO GONZALES, ALEX EDRADAN, MICHAEL ERASCA,

MARLON MONTANO, VICENTE OLIVEROS, REYNALDO LAMBOSON, DOMINGO ROTA,EDDIE ROTA, ZALDY OLIVEROS, ANTONIO NATIL, HERMIE BUISON, ROGER BUISON,

MARIANO LAZATE, JUAN VILLABER, LIMUEL LLANETA, LITO BANTILO, TERSO GARAY,ROWEL BESTOLO, JERRY YORTAS, PASTOR PANTIG, GAVINO NICOLAS, RAFAEL VILLA,

FELIX YORTAS, MELVIN GARAY, NEIL DOMINGUEZ REYNALDO EVANGELISTA, JR., JOSE RAMOS, ELVIN ROSALES, JUN GRANEHO, DANNY ASPARES, SALVEDOR TONLOC,

ROLANDO EVANGELISTA, RICKY M. FRANCISCO, EDUARDO ALEGRIA, SALVADORSANTOS, GREG BISONIA, RUFO CARBILLO, MARVIN MONTERO, DANILO BESSIRE, ALLAN CABALLERO, ORLANDO LIMOS, EDGARDO BICLAR, MANDY MAMALATEO, ALFRED GAJO, ERIC CASTRENCE, ANTHONY MOLINA JAIME SALIM, ROY SILVA,

DANIKO BEGORIE, PEPING CELISANA, ERIC RONDA, RUFI CARBANILLO, ROWEL BATA,

RICARDI TOLENTINO, ARNEL ARDINEZ, FERDINAND R. ARANDIA, ROMEO R. GARBO, ANTONIO ROTA, REYNIELANDRE QUINTANILLA, JOSELITO HILARIO, JIMMY

CAMPANA, DANILO LIDO-AN, EMERSON PENAFLOR, CESAR PABALINAS, JONATHANMELCHOR, ALEX DAVID, EUTIQUIO ALCALA, MICHAEL CARANDANG, EDUARDO

MANUEL, RAMON EVANGELISTA, RUBEN MENDOZA, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RICKYRAMOS, ROBERTO NOVELLA RUBEN CONDE, DANILO POLISTICO,

DOMINGMMENDOZA, FERNANDO SAN GABRIEL, AND DOMINGO ROTO,G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012

FACTS:Questioned in this Petition for Review is the July 31, 2009 Decision of the CA and its June 17, 2010 Resolution,

which reversed and set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision and October 28, 2008, Resolution of the NLRC; andreinstated the May 23, 2003 Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The dispositive portion of the CA Decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered, as follows:1. Declaring the complainant Felix Martos was illegally dismissed and ordering respondent New San JoseBuilders, Inc. to pay him his separation pay, backwages, salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentiveleave pay, and attorney’s fees in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS and 50/1000 (P260, 661.50).

The awards for separation pay, backwages and the corresponding attorney’s fees are subject to furthercomputation until the decision in this case becomes final and executory; and

2. Dismissing the complaints/claim of the other complainants without prejudice.SO ORDERED.

New San Jose Builders, Inc., petitioner, is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws ofthe Philippines and is engaged in the construction of road, bridges, buildings, and low cost houses primarily forthe government. One of the projects of petitioner is the San Jose Plains Project (SJPP), located in Montalban,Rizal. SJPP, which is also known as the "Erap City" calls for the construction of low cost housing, which arebeing turned over to the National Housing Authority (NHA) to be awarded to deserving poor families.

When petitioner was forced to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP project due to lack offunds of the NHA. The workers were informed that many of them [would] be laid off and the rest would be

reassigned to other projects. Juan Villaber, Terso Garay, Rowell Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael Villa, and MelvinGaray were laid off. While on the other hand, Felix Martos, Ariel Dominguez, Greg Bisonia, Allan Caballera,Orlando Limos, Mandy Mamalateo, Eric Castrence, Anthony Molina, and Roy Silva were among those who


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were retained and were issued new appointment papers to their respective assignments, indicating therein thatthey are project employees. However, they refused to sign the appointment papers as project employees andsubsequently refused to continue to work.

On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed before the NLRC.

Petitioner denied that private respondents were illegally dismissed, and alleged that they were project employees,

whose employments were automatically terminated upon completion of the project for which they were hired.On the other hand, private respondents claim that petitioner hired them as regular employees, continuously and

without interruption, until their dismissal on February 28, 2002.

Subsequently, the 3 Complaints were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Facundo Leda.

LA handed down a decision declaring, among others, that petitioner Felix Martos (Martos) was illegallydismissed and entitled to separation pay, backwages and other monetary benefits; and dismissing, withoutprejudice, the complaints/claims of the other complainants (petitioners).

Both parties appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. Petitioners appealed that part which dismissed all the

complaints, without prejudice, except that of Martos. On the other hand, New San Jose Builders, Inc.(respondent) appealed that part which held that Martos was its regular employee and that he was illegallydismissed.

The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the complaints of petitionersdespite their failure to verify the same. Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the position paper andhis counsel never offered any explanation for his failure to secure the verification of the others. The CA alsoheld that the NLR C gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of petitioners’ appeal because Rule 41,Section 1(h) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which is suppletory, provides that no appeal maybe taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice.

Nevertheless, the CA stated that the factual circumstances of Martos’ employment and his dismissal from workcould not equally apply to petitioners because they were not similarly situated. The NLRC did not even botherto look at the evidence on record and inappropriately granted monetary awards to petitioners who had eitherdenied having filed a case or withdrawn the case against respondent. According to the CA, the position papersshould have covered only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that mighthave been amicably settled.

With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was a regular employee of respondent and his termination wasillegal. It explained that Martos should have been considered a regular employee because there was no indicationthat he was merely a project employee when he was hired. To show otherwise, respondent should havepresented his employment contract for the alleged specific project and the successive employment contracts for

the different projects or phases for which he was hired. In the absence of such document, he could not beconsidered such an employee because his work was necessary and desirable to the respondent’s usual businessand that he was not required to sign any employment contract fixing a definite period or duration of hisengagement. Thus, Martos already attained the status of a regular employee. Moreover, the CA noted thatrespondent did not report the termination of Martos’ supposed project employment to the Department ofLabor and Employment (DOLE), as required under Department Order No. 19.

Being a regular employee, the CA concluded that he was constructively dismissed when he was asked to sign anew appointment paper indicating therein that he was a project employee and that his appointment would beco-terminus with the project.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the complaints filed by those petitioners who failed to

verify their position papers; and


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(2) Whether or not Martos should be reinstated.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The Court agrees with the respondent.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when

otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied byaffidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein aretrue and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.A pleading required to be verified

which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" orlacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in thecomplaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto andsimultaneously filed therewith:

(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pendingtherein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shallreport that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleadinghas been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint orother initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwiseprovided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of

the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the correspondingadministrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberateforum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute directcontempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x. [Emphases supplied]

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in thepleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that thepleading is filed in good faith. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one whohas ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible. The lone

signature of Martos would have been sufficient if he was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them.Unfortunately, petitioners failed to adduce proof that he was so authorized.

The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formaldeficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it atleast connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that rulesof procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; hence, their rigid applicationmay, for deserving reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in thenormal course. They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance, consistent

with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6.14 Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allowsfor such liberality.


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Considering that the dismissal of the other complaints by the LA was without prejudice, the other complainantsshould have taken the necessary steps to rectify their procedural mistake after the decision of the LA wasrendered.

(2) No. The Court agrees that the reinstatement being sought by him was no longer practicable because ofstrained relation between the parties. Indeed, he can no longer question this fact. This issue was never raised ortaken up on appeal before the NLRC. It was only after he lost the appeal in the CA that he raised it.

Thus, the Court deems it fair to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. In addition to his separation pay.Martos is also entitled to payment of full backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and attorney’sfees.

The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longerpractical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded ifthe employee decides not to be reinstated. Under the doctrine of stained relations, the payment of separationpay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter opinion is no longer desirable or

viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be highly oppressive workenvironment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly revolting obligation of maintaining inits employ a worker it could no longer trust.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED

Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual v.Sps. Marilyn Lim and George Lim and the Registry of Deeds ofValenzuela City, G.R. No. 191837, September 19, 2012

Facts:

The case involves a parcel of land located in Valenzuela City registered under the name of the Spouses Lim (orprivate respondents). The petitioner filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform (RARAD) forRegion IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located in Valenzuela City against one Deato.

At that time, the property was under Deato’s name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold theproperty to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on December 2004 leading to the issuance of a TCT in favorof the private respondents. Thus, the petitioner filed a motion on March 2005 to implead the Spouses Lim.

The petition was granted by the Regional Adjudicator (RA). The dispositive portion of the decision includes,that the petitioner is the tenant of the subject land by succession from her deceased father and that she shouldbe subrogated to the rights of the private respondents. The judgment of the RA became final. Thus,Consolacion filed a motion for execution to which a writ of execution was issued by the RA on January 2008.

Seven days after, the petitioner filed a petition against the private respondents and the Registrar of Deedspraying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P10million which sheundertook to tender, declare the property redeemed and cancel the TCT.

CA: Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA did not give duecourse to the petition due to the following technical grounds: a) failure of counsel to indicate in the petition hisMCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number and b) the jurat of Consolacion’s verification andcertification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identityapart from her community tax certificate. She moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be denied due to the unexplained failure to comply with basic proceduralrequirements of the Rules of Court.


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Held: Yes, the petition should be denied.

Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but no evidence was even presented duringthe trial. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance ofprocedural rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling needmeriting the relaxation of the rules. The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were

liberally construe. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavyburden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s intent “to forge abastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.” This Court will not condone a cavalier attitudetowards procedural rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not atliberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking onliberal construction. While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, sheis bound by such.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Migrant Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 159593, October 12,2006

Facts:

MPC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of power generation and subsequent sale thereof. It isregistered with the BIR as VAT registered entity.

MPC filed an application for a tax refund of the unutilized VAT paid on capital goods. MPC however, did not wait for an answer from the BIR and filed a petition for review in order to toll the running period for claimingthe refund.

The BIR Commissioner raised as a defense that the application for refund is still pending and thereforepremature and that MPC should have produced evidence to prove that it is entitled for refund.

While the case was pending, Revenue Officers investigated MPC’s application and recommended that MPC’sinput taxes should be reduced by P49, 616.40 for unapplied input taxes on capital goods. A third party audit wasalso conducted and found that the input taxes only amounted to P28, 745,502.

The Court of Tax Appeals rule in favor of MPC and granted the tax refund. The Court of Appeals denied theBIR’s petition for review, declaring that the BIR cannot validly change its theory on the case on appeal.

ISSUE:

1) WON the observance of procedural rules should be relaxed.

2) WON MPC is a public utility and is exempt from paying VAT and is not entitled to a refund.

HELD

1) No, the settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Itaffirms that “courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.

Such a rule has been expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whichprovides – SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has filed a motionfor new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that hasbeen raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

2) No, The CTA found that MPC is registered as a VAT-taxpayer, as evidenced by its Certificate ofRegistration, issued by the BIR Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 60, on 26 January 1996. The BIR


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Commissioner does not contest this fact, and does not offer any explanation as to why the BIR RDO hadapproved the registration of MPC as a VAT-taxpayer. Well-settled principle in this jurisdiction is that this Courtis bound by the findings of fact of the CTA. Only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, arereviewable by this Court. Findings of fact of the CTA are not to be disturbed unless clearly shown to beunsupported by substantial evidence.

SM Land, Inc., et al. v. City of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 197151

FACTS:

Tax Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011, which amended Ordinance No. 7794, also known as the Revenue Code ofManila, herein respondent City of Manila assessed herein petitioners, together with their other sister companies,increased rates of business taxes for the year 2003 and the first to third quarters of 2004. Petitioners and theirsister companies paid the additional taxes under protest.

Petitioners filed for a tax credit or refund of the increased business taxes which they paid for the periodabovementioned. However, the City Treasurer denied their claim.

Petitioners and their sister companies filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City aComplaint for Refund and/or Issuance of Tax Credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. RTC rendered a summaryjudgment in favor of herein petitioners.

However, in the case of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila the RTC held that Tax OrdinanceNos. 7988 and 8011, null and void. Thus, Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied thesame.

The CTA Second Division sustained the ruling of the RTC that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 are null and void. The CTA Second Division denied said claim because of their failure to comply with the provisions of theRules of Court requiring verification and submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping. The CTA SecondDivision noted that petitioners failed to attach to the complaint filed with the RTC their respective Secretary'sCertificates authorizing their supposed representative, a certain Atty. Rex Enrico V. Cruz III (Atty. Cruz), to filethe said complaint in their behalf. The CTA also observed that in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint, petitioner SM Land, Inc. was not included in the list of corporationsrepresented by the person who executed the said Verification and Certification.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc rendered its assailedDecision affirming in toto the judgment of the CTA Second Division.

ISSUE:

WON section 11, republic act no. 1125, as amended by republic act no. 9282, clearly did not intend for thethirty (30)-day period to appeal decisions of the regional trial court to the cta to be extendible

HELD:

The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ insistence that the 30-day period to appeal decisions of the RTC tothe CTA is non-extendible.

Petitioners cited cases decided by this Court wherein it was held that the 30-day period within which to file anappeal with the CTA is jurisdictional and non-extendible. However, these rulings had been superseded by this


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Court's decision in the case of City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., as correctly cited by theCTA En Banc. Suffice it to say that this Court's ruling in the said case is instructive, to wit:x x x x

The period to appeal the decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA via a Petition for Review is specificallygoverned by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, and Section 3 (a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA.

It is crystal clear from the afore-quoted provisions that to appeal an adverse decision or ruling of the RTC to the

CTA, the taxpayer must file a Petition for Review with the CTA within 30 days from receipt of said adversedecision or ruling of the RTC. It is also true that the same provisions are silent as to whether such 30-day periodcan be extended or not. However, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282 does state that the Petition for Reviewshall be filed with the CTA following the procedure analogous to Rule 42 of the RevisedRules of Civil Procedure.

Following by analogy, Section 1, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the 30-day original period forfiling a Petition for Review with the CTA under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, as implemented bySection 3 (a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, may be extended for a period of 15 days. No furtherextension shall be allowed thereafter, except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extendedperiod shall not exceed 15 days.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioners' contention in its second argument that there are compellingreasons in the present case which justify the relaxation of the rules on verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is mandatory,nonetheless, the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and, thus, defeat the objective of preventingthe undesirable practice of forum shopping.

Edgardo Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, G.R. No.170354, June 30, 2006

FACTS:

Pinga, petitioner, and Saavedra were named as defendants in an injunction case filed by respondent Heirs ofSantiago. It was alleged in the complaint dated 1998 that Pinga and Saavedra had been unlawlly entering thecoco lands of the respondents cutting trees and bamboo grass and gathering fruits of the trees therein.

In his answer with counterclaim, Pinga disputed the ownership over the property by the respondent and claimedthe same was owned by his father who was already in possession thereof since 1930s. Furthermore, Pingaalleged in 1968, there was already an order ejecting the respondents from the property.

Due to the several faults of the Respondent (as plaintiff), as when they failed to present evidence, on 2004, the

RTC ordered the dismissal of the action on the ground of Plaintiff's fault to prosecute the case for unreasonablelength of time. At the same time, RTC also allowed Pinga to present his evidence ex parte with respect to hiscounterclaim.

The Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, not to seek that their complaint be reinstated, but prayinginstead that the entire action be dismissed and Petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. Theyargued that the order of the RTC in allowing Pinga to present evidence ex parte would circumvent the principlelaid down in established jurisprudence which holds that a counterclaim cannot exist independently from theprincipal complaint and be adjudicated separately.

RTC granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent on the ground that there was no

Opposition filed by Pinga. Thus, Pinga moved to reconsider the order granting the earlier motion forreconsideration by the respondents but it was denied. Hence, Pinga filed a petition under Rule 45 to theSupreme Court.


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ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.

RULING: NO.

The dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.

Under Sec. 3 Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentationof his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules orany order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice tothe right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of anadjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The Court compared the same with the earlier 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure which was silent on the effect ofsuch dismissal due to failure to prosecute on the pending counterclaims. As a result, there arose what one

authority on remedial law characterized as "the nagging question of whether or not the dismissal of thecomplaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim."

The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course todefendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unlessfrom his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of hiscounterclaim.

The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains an equitable disposition of the counterclaimsby ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival ofthe main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand

independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules.

In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of Lilibeth O. Ladaga vs.Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu, G.R. No. 189689-91, November 13, 2012

Facts:Petitioners share the common names included in what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division(10thID). They perceive that bythe inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplaineddisappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their life, liberty and security. ATTY. LILIBETH O.LADAGA (Atty.Ladaga), first came toknow of theexistence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May

21, 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO OUSTPGMAON 30NOV 2007.

Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before the members ofthe Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The Commission onHuman Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the matter. According to Atty.Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her dutites and functions, she has not committed any actagainst national security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said that sometimein May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to bargeinto their house.

Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB List. In hispetition, he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a publicinterest or human rights lawyer. The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly


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shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can belinked directly to the OB List.

A case was filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issuedseparate Writs of Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written return. In the return of therespondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show that they wereresponsible for the alleged threats. After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC finding

no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributableto the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. Thus, petition for writ was denied.

Issues: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Writ of Amparo.

Held: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated pursuant in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforceddisappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, orthreats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, is not one toissue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.

The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven bysubstantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper andappropriateSubstantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.

The Petitioners were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights tolife, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough evidence forthe issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

Audi AG v. Hon. Jules A. Mejia, in his capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos City; Auto ProminenceCorporation; and Proton Pilipinas Corporation

G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007

Facts:

Audi AG, a non-resident foreign company engaged in the manufacture of Audi brand cars, which is not licensedto do business in the Philippines but is suing on an isolated transaction.

Audi AG entered into an Assembly and Distributorship Agreement with Proton. According to the agreement,(1) Proton shall be the sole assembler and distributor of Audi cars in the Philippines; and(2) Audi AG will make representations that Proton will be the exclusive assembler and distributor of Audi carsand local parts manufacturer for export purposes.

Relying on Audi AG’s representations, Proton borrowed money to buy (1) assembly plant and distrib utorship,(2) tools and equipment, (3) showrooms and offices, and (4) license fees and brochures, etc.

Proton later discovers that Audi AG did not include the Philippines in its ASEAN Assembly Strategy program,but only Malaysia. Furthermore letter was later sent by Audi AG terminating the agreements.

Auto Prominence and Proton filed a complaint for specific performance and injunction (with application for TRO and preliminary injunction) against petitioner Audi AG with the RTC, Alaminos City.

After hearing, the Judge ordered the issuance of a TRO and the maintenance of the status quo ante, even priorto the raffle of the case. Audi AG filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. The


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respondents challenged the Petition for being filed without a prior Motion for Reconsideration and failure toobserve the hierarchy of courts, among others.

Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held: YES.

Petitioner failed to file with the trial court the requisite motion for reconsideration of the challenged Orderbefore resorting to the instant recourse. A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before anaggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure, as amended.

The argument that a motion for reconsideration is unnecessary cannot be accepted. Petitioner may not arrogateunto itself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. Its submission runscounter to the purpose of the rule that a motion for reconsideration would afford the erring court or agency anopportunity to rectify the error/s it may have committed without the intervention of a higher court. Suchmotion is not only an expeditious remedy of an aggrieved party but also obviates an improvident and

unnecessary recourse to appellate proceedings.

The petitioner by filing directly with this Court its petition, has ignored the established rule on hierarchy ofcourts. AG should have filed the petition before the Court of Appeals instead. Procedural rules are not to bedisdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. It ensures theeffective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,COMELEC COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., respondents., G. R. No.

151992. September 18, 2002Facts:

Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996,"providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of fundstherefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters."

Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated resolution approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions acomputerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. The idea is to have a national registration of voters

whereby each registrant's fingerprints will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion of

registration, compared and matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof andcounterfeit-resistant voter's identification card will then be issues to each registrant as a visual record of theregistration.

On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installationsof information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS Project.[6] Private respondentPhotokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of thebidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesosgarnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder.

Thus, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252, which approves the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA.

The parties then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. RodrigoD. Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.However, underRepublic Act No. 8760[8] the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was


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only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds(CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.

Subsequently, the COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum to the COMELEC enbanc expressing her objections to the contract. PHOTOKINA, meanwhile, as the winning bidder, wrote severalletters to the COMELEC requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail. Then ChairmanBenipayo announced that the VRIS Project has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside. He further

announced his plan to re-engineer the entire modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing hisintention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the Triple E Vision.

On October 2, 2001, Senator Edgardo J. Angara directed the creation of a technical working group to assist theCOMELEC in evaluating all programs for the modernization of the COMELEC, which will also consider thePHOTOKINA contract as an alternative program, and various competing programs for thepurpose.PHOTOKINA then filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a petition formandamus, prohibition and damages (with prayer for temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitoryinjunction and preliminary mandatory injunction) against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners.PHOTOKINA alleged three causes of action: first, the deliberate refusal of the COMELEC and itsCommissioners to formalize the contract rendered nugatory the perfected contract between them; second, in

announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and that he has plans to re-engineer the COMELECs entiremodernization program, Chairman Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the COMELECsfailure to perform its duty under the contract has caused PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spentsubstantial time and resources in the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.

Respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed Resolution granting PHOTOKINAsapplication for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction which: (1) grant the application for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction; and (2) deny the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminarymandatory injunction. Hence, let a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issue which enjoins respondents,their agents, successors and assigns from replacing the VRIS Project upon petitioners posting of a bond in theamount of P20,000,000.00, which bond shall answer for whatever damages which may be sustained by reason of

the issuance of the said writ, if it turns out that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration.

On February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the COMELECsOmnibus Motion and, this time, granting PHOTOKINAs application for a writ of preliminary mandatoryinjunction which : (1) deny Respondents Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of this case and for thereconsideration of this Courts Resolution granting the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction; (2) grantPetitioners Motion dated January 2, 2002 insofar as it prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatoryinjunction; (3) Grant the prayer for the reduction of the preliminary prohibitory injunction bond fromP20,000,000.00 to P10,000,000.00; (4) Clarify its Resolution dated December 19, 2001 to the extent that the writ

of preliminary prohibitory injunction will also enjoin Respondents, their agents, successors and assigns fromdisregarding the contract for the VRIS Project between Petitioner and Respondent COMELEC; (5) denyPetitioners motion to declare Respondents in default.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of thenCOMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A.

Tuason, Jr..

Petitioners contend that: (1) a petition for mandamus and prohibition does not lie to enforce contractualobligations, hence, PHOTOKINAs proper recourse before the Regional Trial Court should have been an actionfor specific performance; (2) respondent judge, by issuing the injunctive writs, already assumed that the VRIS

Project was lawfully awarded by the COMELEC to PHOTOKINA, and that there is a valid perfected contractbetween them, thus, manifesting her prejudgment; and (3) injunctive writs should not be issued when an action


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for damages can adequately compensate for the injuries. Petitioners pray that the two assailed Resolutions benullified and Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 be dismissed outright.

In refutation of petitioners arguments, PHOTOKINA contends that mandamus is an appropriate remedy since what is involved in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 is the performance of a ministerial duty.PHOTOKINA maintains that mandamus may be availed of by private parties to compel public officers to acton a contract entered into pursuant to law.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Issues: Whether or not the OSG has no standing to file the present petition since its legal position is contrary to thatespoused by the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners.

Whether or not there is a breach of violation of hierarchy of Courts.

Whether or not a petition for mandamus is the appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations.

Whether or not a successful bidder may compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it

notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

Held:

1. No, the OSG has standing to file the present petition.

In Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled:

"x x x It is incumbent upon him (Solicitor General) to present to the court what he considers would legallyuphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a clients position. x x x.

"In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the issues he found merit in the cause ofthe petitioner based on the applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to represent the petitioner as hedid by filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the petitioner even if in so doing hisrepresentation runs against the interests of the CSC.

"This is not the first time that the Office of the Solicitor General has taken a position adverse to his clients likethe CSC, the National Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even the People of the Philippines.

Hence, while petitioners stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners, still, the OSG mayrepresent the COMELEC as long as in its assessment, such would be for the best interest of the government.For, indeed, in the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the Republic of the

Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides. Moreover, it must be emphasized that petitioners arealso public officials entitled to be represented by the OSG. Under Executive Order No. 292[30] and PresidentialDecree No. 478,[31] the OSG is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officialsor agents. This mandate includes the three petitioners[32] who have been impleaded as public respondents inSpecial Civil Action No. Q-01-45405.

2. There is no violation of the hierarch of Courts.Suffice it to say that it is not an iron-clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted withcases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with thejudicial determination of the case.[33] The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State thatquestions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this

case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our countrys election process, aproject that has long been overdue.


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3. No, mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce the COMELEC's alleged contractual obligations withPHOTOKINA.No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance ofcontractual obligations.[34] As early as 1924, Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,[35] already set forth thejustification of this rule, thus:Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus isnot the appropriate, or even an admissible remedy. It is manifest that whatever rights the petitioner may have,upon the facts stated, are derived from her contract with the city; and no rule of law is better settled than thatmandamus never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts. x x x The petitioners remedy, if any she

has, is by an original action in the Court of First Instance to compel the city to pay the agreed price or to paydamages for the breach of contract.

"x x x. As said in Lowe vs. Phelps (14 Bush, 642):It must, therefore, appear upon every application for a mandamus that it is the legal duty of the respondent todo that which it is sought to compel him to do, and that he has upon proper application refused to perform thatduty.' (Citing numerous authorities).

"It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a mere contract right, or to take the place of theother remedies provided by law for the adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at the case from the standpointof appellant, it involves nothing more than an ordinary breach of contract. If, as contended, the appellant had a

valid contract with the school board, it also had an adequate remedy at law to recover damages for its breach;and to permit the writ of mandamus to be used for the purpose of enforcing a mere contract right would be a

wide departure from the settled practice in respect to the character of cases in which relief by mandamus may beobtained."In Parrott vs. City of Bridgeport (44 Conn., 180), the writ was refused where the petitioner sought to compel acity to construct a public street in a certain manner agreeably to the terms of a special agreement between thepetitioner and the city. In the course of the opinion the court said:

"* * * The duty, therefore, if any, which rests upon the city in this regard, is one which it owes to the petitioneras an individual, not to the public, and the special contract is the foundation upon which it rests. But the writ ofmandamus has never been considered as an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of contract rights of a

private and personal nature and obligations which rest wholly upon contract and which involve no questions ofpublic trusts or official duty. Indeed, strictly speaking, it never lies where the party aggrieved has adequateremedy at law, and its aid is only to be invoked to prevent an absolute failure of justice in cases where ordinarylegal processes furnish no relief. (Emphasis supplied)

Akin to the Court's rulings cited above, the Court hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce theCOMELEC's alleged contractual obligations with PHOTOKINA. It has other adequate remedy in law.Moreover, the judicial caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner's right is foundedclearly in law and not when it is doubtful. Legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are

well-defined, clear and certain. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also

because it is illegal and against public policy.

Of course, there are cases in which the writ of mandamus has been used to compel public officers to performcertain acts, but it will be generally observed that in such cases, the contracts have been completely performedby the petitioner, and nothing remained to be done except for the government to make compensation. Theseexceptional cases are cited in Isada vs. Bocar[46] where the act of the respondent public officer has the effect ofsetting aside contracts already in the process of consummation. In contrast with Isada, the alleged contract herehas not yet been fully performed by PHOTOKINA; and though it avers readiness to perform, petitioners raisedserious questions as to its validity. Their posture is tenable.

4. PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the

contractEnshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Thus, in the execution of governmentcontracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their


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expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.Complementary to the foregoingconstitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law and administrative issuances that are designed toeffectuate the above mandate in a detailed manner.[48] Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book Vof ExecutiveOrder No. 292, otherwise known as "Administrative Code of 1987," provide:"SEC. 46.

Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shallbe entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of otherobligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure; and x x x

"SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of a contract for personalservice, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumptionfor three (3) months, or banking transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involvingthe expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the properaccounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation thatfunds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposedcontract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification bythe auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it,shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall notthereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the government agency

concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.

Hence, the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to orconditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The intent is to impose such conditions as apriori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract.[49] Using this as our premise, we cannot accede toPHOTOKINA's contention that there is already a perfected contract.In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding stage. The firststep of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids comply with the requirements.

The BAC shall rate a bid "passed" only if it complies with all the requirements and the submitted price does notexceed the approved budget for the contract."

Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid inthe amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760,[53] the only fund appropriated forthe project was P1 Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds[54] (CAF) only P1.2 BillionPesos was available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS Project.

There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. Hence, the BAC should have rejected the bid forbeing excessive[55] or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law,the same is null and void.

The objections of then Chairman Demetriou to the implementation of the VRIS Project, ardently carried on byher successor Chairman Benipayo, are therefore in order.Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the

contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficientappropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract wouldinevitably suffer the vice of nullity. Of course, the Court is not saying that the party who contracts with thegovernment has no other recourse in law. The law itself affords him the remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No. 292explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void,and the officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for anyconsequent damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties." So when thecontracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in excess of or beyond the limits of hiscontracting authority, the Government is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in suchcase were a private one, whereupon, he binds only himself, and thus, assumes personal liability thereunder.[63]Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.

The authority of public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden ofresponsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the legality,


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propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that theGovernment may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action.

In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalizethe contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project,the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing thequestioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action

No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially wheredisbursement of public funds is concerned.

United Claimants Association of NEA v. National Electrification Administration, G.R. NO. 187107, January 31, 2012

FACTS:Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation created in accordance withPresidential Decree No. 269. Under PD 269, the NEA Board is empowered to organize or reorganize NEA’sstaffing structure.

In order to enhance and accelerate the electrification of the whole country, including the privatization of theNational Power Corporation, RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001(EPIRA Law), was enacted. The said law provides for the framework for the restructuring of the electric powerindustry, and that the DOE shall, in consultation with the electric power industry participants and end-users,promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Subsequently, the Rules and Regulations toimplement RA 9136 were issued wherein it was provided that all the NEA employees and officers areconsidered terminated and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant. Meanwhile, former President GloriaMacapagal- Arroyo issued EO 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization plan. Thereafter, theNEA implemented an early retirement program denominated as the "Early Leavers Program," giving incentivesto those who availed of it and left NEA before the effectivity of the reorganization plan. The other employees

were subsequently terminated. Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from theiremployment with the implementation of the assailed resolutions.

Petitioners initiated an original action for Injunction with the Supreme Court to restrain and/or prevent theimplementation of NEA Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board. Petitioners contend that TheNEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees, Executive Order No. 119 did not grant theNEA Board the power to terminate all NEA employees, and the assailed resolution were carried out in badfaith. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition, thatInjunction is improper since that assailed resolutions have long been implemented, and the assailed resolution

was carried out in good faith.

ISSUE(s):(1) WON the Court has jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the action for injunction was filed directly withthe SC without regard to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.(2) WON Injunction is still available in the case at bar.(3) WON the NEA NEA Board had the power to pass the assailed resolution terminating all of its employees.

RULING(s):

(1) YES. While it is true that by virtue of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should havebeen filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts maybe set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the

employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissedfrom employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.


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(2) YES. As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception tothe rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evadingreview. Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board may have long beenimplemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated by other government agencies in thereorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of injunction.(3) YES. In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, the Court upheld the dismissal of allthe employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In ruling that the power of reorganization includes the

power of removal, the Court explained that Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidationof offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss ofone’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose ofeconomy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, itis void ab initio.

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY, petitioners,vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO., INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 127371. April 25, 2002.

Facts:

Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for the power sector and issued aCabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which provides:

“Continue direct connection for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding of12 January 1981, until such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that direct connection ofindustry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or cooperative. Determinationshall be based in the utility or cooperatives meeting the standards of financial and technical capability withsatisfactory guarantees of non-prejudice to industry to be set in consultation with NPC and relevant governmentagencies and reviewed periodically by the regulatory board.”

Pursuant to such Cabinet Mem

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