REP vs.NORA FE SAGUN G.R. No. 187567 92012)

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City[3] and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance[4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.[11]

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioner’s election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner

has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.[12]

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.[13] There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.[14] This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic[15] citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines,[16] where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the court’s competence.

As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

x x x x

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that “[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the

Philippines.[17] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that “[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are Philippine citizens.[18] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.[19]

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.[20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.[21] But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22] enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.[23]

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien.[24] Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election.[25] Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.[26]

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or

correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.[27] Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,[28] the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RENALD F. VILANDO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES

G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 80623 issued on May 18, 2007.

On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);4 Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);5 and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41).6 These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her.

HELD:

It should be noted that Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.9 Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime.11 For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."12 The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilando’s argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.

In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.13

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichong’s father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held in Limkaichong v. Comelec,14 thus:

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,15 where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.16 The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.17 Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.18

Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father – Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.

Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is not a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case.19

Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that "a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals."20 Under the present situation, there is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face:

As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 that were offered in evidence, far from proving an invalid oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization, being public records, they do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for the conferment of status of the father of respondent as naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrary declaration by a competent court, the Tribunal presumes the validity of the CFI Orders of July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sy’s acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization are themselves proofs of the actual conferment of naturalization.21

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.

Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter’s affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-born status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos. The following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.22

Vilando’s assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such.23 1avvphi1

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship.24 For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.25 Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichong’s mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.26 In this case, there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto petition.

In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007

This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:

SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised:

(1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional?

(2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate.

X X X X

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

ROSELLER DE GUZMAN VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009

Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition[4] for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.

In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.[5] Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and in dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being moot.

Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[9] and Mercado v. Manzano,[10] that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the motion for reconsideration because at that time, there was a pending election protest which was later decided in his favor.

Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Court’s rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship; and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position under Section 40[11] of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being moot; and 2) whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.

An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.[12] In this case, the pendency of petitioner’s election protest assailing the results of the election did not render moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioner’s citizenship did not become moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election protest. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: “An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines.”[13] It bears stressing that the Regional Trial Court later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest and declared him the winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of petitioner’s citizenship was clearly necessary. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration solely on the ground that the same was rendered moot because he lost to private respondent.

Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.[14]

Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural bo rn Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[16] the Court ruled that a candidate’s oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon.

Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. “Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” I think it’s very good, ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. … I think it’s already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah… but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No…no, renouncing foreign citizenship.

x x x x

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. What’s your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano…

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is declared DISQUALIFIED from running for Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections because of his failure to renounce his foreign citizenship pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

REPUBLIC VS. KERRY LAO ONG G.R. No. 175430 June 18, 2012

Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the government’s favor and against the applicant.[1] The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.

Factual Antecedents

On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,[5] filed a Petition for Naturalization.[6] The case was docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law,[7] the petition was published in the Official Gazette[8] and a newspaper of general circulation,[9] and posted in a public place for three consecutive weeks,[10] six months before the initial hearing.[11] The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and authorized[12] the city prosecutor to appear on its behalf.[13] Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings below.

Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.[14] He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration[15] and a native-born certificate of residence[16] from the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently residing[17] in the Philippines from birth up to the present.[18] Ong can speak[19] and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.[20] He took his elementary[21] and high school[22] studies at the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.[23]

On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen.[24] They have four children,[25] namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),[26] Kimberley Grace (born on May 15, 1984),[27] Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),[28] and Kevin Griffith (born on August 21, 1993),[29] who were all born and raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled[30] at the Sacred Heart School for Boys[31] and Sacred Heart School for Girls.[32] At the time of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Niño Village, Banilad, Cebu City.

Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a “businessman/business manager” since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.[39] When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978.[40] Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business. [41]

As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997.[42] Based on these returns, Ong’s gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997.

Respondent further testified that he socializes[43] with Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas.[44] He is a member of the Alert/ React VII Communications Group and the Masonic organization.[45]

Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove[46] that he is of sound physical and mental health.[47] As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation,[48] the Philippine National Police,[49] the trial courts,[50] and the barangay,[51] he has no criminal record or pending criminal charges.[52]

Republic’s Appeal

On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed

to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong’s petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.[62]

The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial court’s finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business or trade.[63]

Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a higher standard of income for applicants for naturalization.[64] He likewise conceded that the legal definition of lucrative income is the existence of an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses.[65] It is his position that his income, together with that of his wife, created an appreciable margin over their expenses.[66] Moreover, the steady increase in his income, as evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully employed.

Ruling

The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.[79] Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.[80] The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.[81]

In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ong’s compliance with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, which provides:

SECTION 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

x x x x

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

x x x x[82]

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” means “not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an

appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge.”[83] His income should permit “him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.”[84]

Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial “for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.”[85] Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.[86]

Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses testified that Ong is a businessman but none of them identified Ong’s business or described its nature. The Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own (leasing of office space).

The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of “some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation.” Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization.

The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial court’s decision. The trial court held that respondent Ong “is a businessman engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989”[89] but did not cite the evidence, which supports such finding. After poring over the records, the Court finds that the reason for the lack of citation is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial court’s conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an assertion found in Ong’s petition for naturalization.[90] But, on the witness stand, Ong did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he had been a businessman since he graduated from college, which was in 1978.[91]

Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are Ong’s tax returns), mistakenly found that Ong “derives an average annual income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos.”[92] This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The cited tax returns show that Ong’s gross annual income for the years 1994 to 1997 were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00, and P128,000.00, respectively. The average annual income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only, not P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears that the trial court again derived its conclusion from an assertion in Ong’s petition,[93] but not from the evidence.

As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong has a known business or trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether Ong’s income, as evidenced by his tax returns, can be considered lucrative in

1996. In determining this issue, the CA considered the ages of Ong’s children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the fact that Ong’s wife was also employed at that time. It then concluded that there is an appreciable margin of Ong’s income over his expenses.[94]

The Court finds the appellate court’s decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouse’s income in its assessment of Ong’s lucrative income.[95] Second, it failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ong’s expenses vis-à-vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ong’s children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ong’s income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.

Ong’s gross income might have been sufficient to meet his family’s basic needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his family’s expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his family “with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work.”[96]

Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law.[97]

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a review of the factual findings of the courts below.[98] In the first place, the trial court and appellate court’s decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or factual basis, which is a known exception[99] to the general rule that only questions of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.

Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant’s qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court.[100] Indeed, “[a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence.”[101] In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold

that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a “known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation” to qualify for naturalization.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.