cicovaki transdisciplinarity as an interactive method

8/8/2019 CICOVAKI Transdisciplinarity as an Interactive Method

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Integral Leadership ReviewContact Russ Volckmann, Publisher and Editor [email protected]

Transdisciplinarity As An Interactive Method: ACritical Reflection On The Three Pillars Of

Transdisciplinarity

Predrag Cicovacki

We are witnessing, I am convinced, the first stages of new and extremely promising revolution. This movemenpromotes a new approach to human knowledgeranginfrom and including natural sciences, social sciences anhumanitiesand, indeed, a new approach to humanity i

general. The temporary name of this revolution transdisciplinarity, and one of its most importanpioneers and champions is the quantum physicist BasaraNicolescu. As the author ofLa Transdisciplinarit, thinitial manifesto of the transdisciplinary movement, hcontinues to develop this new vision of human knowledgand a new approach to the world in which we livtogether. The goal of my paper is to contribute to th

development of this new paradigm by offering a sympathetic yet critica

reflection on the fundamental philosophical and methodological aspects otransdisciplinarity. I will begin (section I) by discussing the wortransdisciplinary and will argue that transdisciplinarity should be understooas an interactive method. After that, I will consider (in sections II-IV) the socalled three pillars of transdisciplinarity: the levels of Reality, the logic of thincluded middle, and complexity, which Nicolescu claims determine thmethodology of transdisciplinary research.What is at least initially unclear artwo questions: First, why are there exactly three pillars, rather than two, or fouor any other number? Second, why these particular pillars, rather than an

others? After suggesting why Nicolescus three pillars should be renamed atransdisciplinary ontology, transdisciplinary logic, and transdisciplinarepistemology, I will in the end (in section V) insist that there is a need for thfourth pillar as well. Nicolescu himself often emphasizes the value aspect otransdisciplinarity, namely that it is a way of self-transformation, orientetowards the knowledge of the self, the unity of knowledge, and the creation of new art of living.(1) For this reason transdisciplinarity requires the fourth pillaas well, a new transdisciplinary theory of values.

I. Transdisciplinarity and Interaction

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The prefix trans indicates that transdisciplinarity concerns that which is aonce between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond adisciplines. Its goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one othe imperatives is the unity of knowledge.(2) There are many reasons to avoithe trap of increasingly fragmented disciplinary research, and eveinterdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches do not offer fully satisfactor

solutions to this problem. Interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary inquirieremain fixed on a few aspects of reality and do not attempt to understand it as whole. But a deeper problem, which is perhaps the reason for our fragmenteapproach, concerns our basic assumptions about the nature of reality. A briereminder on the two most often accepted modelsone classical and one modercan illustrate the point in question:(3)

Model 1The ancient and scholastic view of the priority of object over subjecBeing and thinking are not ontological equals. Being is treated as having its owfirmly established identity and unity, independent of and indifferent to whetheit is known. To be is to be a definite kind of thing. If our thinking is to discloswhat being is, it must adjust itself to the properties of being.

Model 2The modern view of the epistemological prevalence of subject oveobject: Being and thinking are not epistemological equals. Thinking has prioritover being, insofar as it is more easily accessible than being. In order to bknown, being must adjust to the structures of thinking. To be is to be an objecof possible knowledge; it is to be knowable as a certain kind of thing.

There are at least three shared assumptions in these models that no longer looacceptable. The first is that according to both models reality is understood asomething static, not dynamic. The second assumption entails the completseparation of thinking and being, of subject and object. The third is that thermust be a hierarchical relation between subject and object, between thinkinand being; one of them is taken to be dominant, without considering whethethey may be in a cooperative rather than competitive relation with each other.

All of these assumptions have been justly criticized. Nicolescu, for example, ofte

speaks about Nature, rather than reality, andwith full awareness that it is pleonasmemphasizes the expression living Nature.(4) He is right to insithat, the study of living Nature asks for a new methodologytransdisciplinarmethodologywhich is different from the methodology of modern science anthe methodology of the ancient science of being. It is the coevolution of thhuman being and of the universe which asks for a new methodology.(5)

I am convinced that Nicolescu is right, yet instead of a fairly general phrascoevolution, it is more precise to use the word interaction, which he himseuses more frequently.(6) We do not have a complete and comprehensiv




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understanding of interactive relations, but several elementary points are clear.

Interactions are dynamic, not static, relations. Their conditions,parameters, or even objectives can change with different circumstanceand over a period of time, without thereby interrupting interactiverelations themselves.

Interactive relations are always reciprocal; this is what distinguishes

them from one-directional relations, such as actions or reactions. Thisreciprocity can take many forms, depending of the elements or forcesinvolved. We can distinguish, for instance, between interdependence,interchange, intercourse, interlinking, interfusing, interplaying, etc.

The positive value of interactive relations is expressed and measurednot in oppositional or hierarchical, but in cooperative terms. It isexpressed and measured not through zero-sum hierarchies and powerrelations, such as losing and winning, controlling and being

controlled, manipulating or being manipulated, etc. The positive valueof interactions is shown in terms of proper functioning and fitting,balance and harmony, authenticity and growth.

Interactions can take place between quite heterogeneous elements andforces; homogeneity is not a prerequisite for interaction. This meansthat in our attempts to understand reality, we can observe interactionsbetween the inorganic and the organic, between the organic and thepsychic, or between the psychic and the spiritual, without having toforce every phenomenon into any of the often artificially defended

monisms, whether of a materialistic kind (as in modern science), or ofan idealistic kind (as in Leibniz or Hegel).

For an interactive transdisciplinary methodology, a genuine pluralistic andynamic approach to reality is the foundation of all research and of everattempt to understand our place and role in that reality. But to see in more detawhat this interactive transdisciplinary methodology amounts to, we need to taka closer look at each of the proposed pillars of transdisciplinarity.

II. Levels of Reality and Transdisciplinary Ontology

The first, and perhaps the most fundamental, of the three pillars otransdisciplinarity is the view that reality is multi-dimensional, that it hadifferent and mutually irreducible levels. Thinking primarily of the differenc between the quantum and microphysical levels of reality, Nicolescu maintainthat two levels of Reality are different if, while passing from one to the othethere is a break in the laws and a break in fundamental concepts (such as, foexample, causality).(7) The idea is that, regardless of the capabilities of ouintelligence and the actual level of our knowledge, the very structure of reality




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discontinuous, and yet that this discontinuity does not prevent different layerfrom coexisting and interacting in a variety of ways.

Nicolescu points out that the existence of different levels of Reality has beeaffirmed by different traditions and civilizations, but this affirmation wafounded either on religious dogma or on the exploration of the interiouniverse.(8) Rigorous attempts to handle several difficult problems in quantum

physics and mathematics have given a new credibility to this old view, which haalways lingered in the undercurrents of Western views of reality, but hasup tnownever emerged as the predominant paradigm. Nicolescu is obviouslinspired by Kurt Gdel and his insight that a sufficiently rich system of axiominevitably leads to results which would be either undecidable ocontradictory.(9) Nicolescu also singles out the contributions of HeisenbergPauli and Bohr. He cites with approval Heisenbergs conception of the threregions of reality: (i) that of classical physics, (ii) that of quantum physics biology and psychic phenomena, and (iii) that of religious, philosophical an

artistic experience. Nicolescu himself proposes a distinction between ObjectivNature, Subjective Nature, and Trans-Nature, which taken together define livinNature, and toward the examination of which is the transdisciplinary methodirected.

In his article Three Pillars of Transdisciplinarity, Seb Henagulph points outhat a significant contribution toward our understanding of the different levels oreality is made not only by mathematicians and physicists; he brings to ouattention the contributions by Arthur Koestler (holons), Ken Wilber (FouQuadrants of the Kosmos), and others.(10) By going back to ancient historyHenagulph reminds us that in Western philosophy there have always existedifferent approaches to reality and various understandings of it. He singles ou Aristotle and Heraclitus as the representatives of the two opposed approachestatic and rational vs. relational and intuitive. Transdisciplinarity certainly doenot exclude rationality. Rather, in it relational, intuitive, and interactive featurehave a leading role.(11)

Let us add a few more remarks concerning the contribution that philosopherhave made toward our understanding of the multi-dimensionality of reality

Nicolescu mentions Edmund Husserl and other scholars [who] have detectethe existence of different levels of perception by the subject-observer of Realityand correctly adds that these thinkers were pioneers in the exploration of multidimensional and multireferential reality. Unfortunately, they have beemarginalized by academic philosophers and misunderstood by physicists, witeach area being trapped in its respective specialization.(12)

I am citing Nicolescus reference to Husserl because I would like to call attentioto the work of a philosopher who further developed Husserls phenomenologica




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method and whose enormous philosophical opus is centered on the idea omultilayered reality. The name of this now unjustly neglected philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950).(13) His revolutionary works emerged in ththirties and forties of the twentieth century, at the same time when physics waopening new frontiers of a complex multidimensional reality. Since I believe thaHartmanns insights could be of extreme importance for the further developmenof the transdisciplinary vision, I will outline several of his central ontologica

doctrines.(14)

In the history of Western philosophy and science we find various kinds omonisms and dualisms trying to capture the structure of reality, but Hartmanthinks that they are all based on oversimplifications and distortions; theinvolve prejudice in favor of simplicity. Hartmann argues in favor oontological pluralism; he thinks that our map of the real being must be compleand multidimensional, for reality displays a multiplicity of forms that cannot breduced to one or two ultimate principles. According to Hartmann,

phenomenological analysis clearly reveals four distinguishable and irreduciblstrata of reality: inorganic, organic, psychic, and spiritual. It is easy tdistinguish between inanimate objects, plants, animals, and man (as aindividual and as a member of society). All four strata are interconnected ancan be compared in terms of their respective strength and height within thehierarchy. In terms of height, spirit is above all other strata, but it cannot exiswithout them; the higher strata are attached to and dependent on the lower fotheir energies and support. In terms of strength, the following principle holdthe lower the strata, the stronger and more basic they are. The lower strata ar

always included in the higher ones, but not the other way around.

The phenomenological analysis of the real world shows that it is botheterogeneous and united, and the central ontological aporia of the real world to understand how its deepest heterogeneity does not preclude its unity. Thfundamental task of Hartmanns new ontology is twofold. First, it has to discerthe basic categories of each stratum. Second, their mutual relations must also bdetermined. The former task is predominantly concerned with the categoriadifferences of the individual strata, the latter with their essentiainterconnectedness.

Like Aristotle and unlike Kant, Hartmann treats categories as the determinantof the specifics of being, not as concepts of the understanding. In Hartmann view, Kant does not sufficiently distinguish between our concepts of categorieand categories themselves. Categories themselves are not mere forms imposed bthe mind, nor do they determine in the way that causes, reasons, grounds, opurposes do. They are universal principles of being that have no independenexistence aside from the things and events they determine; categories are noapplied to reality by the mind but are inherent in things and events the




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determine.

In two of his ontological worksDer Aufbau der realen Welt and Neue Wege deOntologieHartmann distinguishes the categories specific for each stratum oreality. As the categories of the corporeal world he identifies: space and timprocess and condition, substantiality, causality, and reciprocity, as well adynamic structure and dynamic equilibrium. The categories of the animat

nature include: adaptation and purposiveness, metabolism, self-regulation anself-restoration, the life of the species, the constancy of the species an variations. The categories of the psychic reality involve: act and conteconsciousness and unconsciousness, pleasure and displeasure. Finally, thcategories of the spirit are: thought, knowledge, will, freedom, judgmenevaluation, and personality. There are no dominant categories within a singlstratum, but they all jointly determine everything. As a result, it is impossible tgrasp a single category by itself.

In addition to the categories specific to each stratum, Hartmann detects somcategories that run through the entire sequence of strata, although in varyinforms. Such categories are: unity and multiplicity, concord and discordiscretion and continuity, substratum and relation, element and structure, formand matter, inner and outer, determination and dependence, identity andifference, generality and individuality, as well as the modal categories and thenegative counterparts.

The most unifying theme in Hartmanns pluralistic picture of the real world that of a Heraclitan opposition and dynamic balance. Opposition is not to b

confused with contradiction, which Hartmann believes exists only in thoughEvery known structure in the real world, from atoms and solar systems, tanimals and man, displays a complicated array of counter-forces and alwayattempts to maintain a balance. For Hartmann, there is no independencwithout dependence; more precisely, all that there is, is a partial independencand partial dependence, and they complement each other very well. Foinstance, there are two ways in which the higher mode of being is dependent othe lower: the first is existential (spirit cannot exist without a supportinconsciousness and, indirectly, a body), and the second is limiting in terms o

content and structure (the lower mode of being provides matter and serves as basis for reshaping and rebuilding of the higher form of being). These two formof dependence can also be used to illustrate the basic laws regulating the mutuarelationship of the different strata of reality. They are the law of recurrencewhich guarantees a partial continuity between the various strata, and the law onovelty, which ensures diversity. (The law of recurrence states that the lowecategories penetrate into the higher strata, but not the higher into the lower. Thlaw of novelty is simply the emergence of higher categories into the higheontological stratum.) The determining power of matter does not extend beyon




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its limiting function; it does not prevent the novelty of the higher form, burather merely limits its scope. Thus the real world is not governed either bmatter or by spirit. It can be ruled neither from below nor from above, for everstratum, besides continuity, includes a certain irreducible specificity. In the fuagreement with the advocates of transdisciplinarity, Hartmann maintains thathe real world is an intricate, perplexing, multilayered and dynamic unity iheterogeneity.

III. Included Middle and Transdisciplinary Logic

Hartmanns view that the foundations of logicits laws and structuresarultimately ontological rather than mental, would resonate well with NicolescuThe author of La transdisciplinarit maintains that it is precisely thacceptance of a more complex, multidimensional reality which allowed StphanLupasco to make a decisive break with the traditional logic of the excludemiddle.(16) Nicolescu has in mind the recognition of the coexistence of th

quantum world and the macrophysical world, and how that acceptance led to resolution of what was then considered the intellectual scandal provoked by number of untenable pairs of contradictories: wave and corpuscle, continuity andiscontinuity, reversibility and irreversibility of time, and so on. Althougnumerous experiments in quantum physics have clearly indicated thsimultaneous presence of both elements, these pairs appear mutuallcontradictory when they are analyzed by classical logic. This logic is founded othree axioms: (i) The axiom of identity: A is A; (ii) the axiom of noncontradiction: A is not non-A; and (iii) the axiom of the excluded middle: Therexists no third term T which is at the same time A and non-A.

Lupasco developed the logic of the included middle: there exists a third term that is at the same time A and non-A. He thereby resolved the problems ocontradictory pairs, by using the idea of multilayered reality. As Nicolescexplains: The third dynamic, that of the T-state, is exercised at another level oReality, where that which appears to be disunited (wave or corpuscle) is in facunited (quanton), and that which appears contradictory is perceived as noncontradictory.(17)

Nicolescu points out that although Lupascos new logic has had a powerfualbeit underground, impact among psychologists, sociologists, artists, anhistorians of religion, it has been marginalized by physicists anphilosophers.(18) It may be more accurate to say, however, that philosopherhave been too preoccupied with their own objections to classical logic and theown attempts to develop a viable alternative to it.

Let me mention a few examples. The principle of the excluded middle, togethe with the principle of bivalence (Every statement is either true or false), ha




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recently come under attack by prominent logicians and philosophers olanguage, such as Michael Dummett.(19) The reason for this attack shoulsound familiar: the dynamic flow of many processes in reality makes it difficulif not impossible, to establish whether many of our statements are eithedeterminately true or false.

The other two principles, the principle of identity and the principle of non

contradiction, have also been under a critical scrutiny for a long timHartmann, for instance, challenged the alleged tautological character of botprinciples. The claim A is A is not an empty tautology, according to Hartmannfor it asserts that A is in one certain respect identical with something with whicit need not be identical in another respect. The propositions A is B and A is Cdo not separate the subject A into two different beings. The real principle oidentity should be expressed as A1 is A2, and this principle is basic insofar as functions as the ground of any judgment whatsoever.(20)

What Hartmann has in mind in these sketchy remarks may be reconstructed ithe following way. What am I doing when I state, for example after we finish chess game, These pieces are heavy? First, I direct my audience toward thdefinite aspects of the perceptual field and direct attention toward some specifoccurrences in it. I thereby establish temporary boundaries of the perceptuafield: in this specific case, we are not talking about the weight of the chessboaror about the specific position of the pieces on the board. Second, by means ovarious concepts I identify the perceived objects as belonging to a certain type oobjects (rather than to any other type). Had my intentions been different, thespieces could have been identified not as chess pieces but as pieces of wood, apieces of different colors and shapes, or as toys with which my children like tplay. Had my intentions been different, I would not have focused on that ondefinite characteristic of these pieces; rather I could have considered whethethey are new or old, expensive or cheap, big or small. By asserting that thespieces are heavy, I compare them with and differentiate them from some othepieces. Thus, declarative statements always purport to establish what is the casand this involves identifying what is the case and differentiating it from othethings and events. This process is never the one of establishing a simple identit(of the kind: A is A) or a simple difference (of the kind: A is not B), but rather o

relating different aspects of the same thing together: thus: A1 is A2, but A1 is noB1.

Hartmann holds a similar view with regard to the principle of non-contradictionConsidered in itself, it cannot be recognized that A is not non-A, for eversynthetic judgment has the form A is non-A. Is it evident that A cannot at thsame time be B and non-B? Obviously not, answers Hartmann. Thindispensability of the principle of non-contradiction is not based on its allegetautological nature, but again on its function: only under the assumption of it




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absolute validity can the uniformity of things and judgments be preserved. Bu whether such uniformity really exists in being or in the logical realm, anwhether such a presupposition should, indeed, be taken for granted, we cannoprove it from the principle itself. Nor can we, according to Hartmann, establish in any other satisfactory way. Just as the principles of knowledge need nothemselves be known, the principles of rationality need not themselves brational.

One of those who seriously challenged classical logicalthough he does not gevery good press with Nicolescuwas Hegel.(21) The German philosopher clearlrecognized that life is not constrained by the principles of logic and that therare oppositions and antinomies everywhere in reality. Any living organism violates the principle of non-contradiction since it simultaneously contaiseveral stages of its development: any growing A is also a not-A, both in termof embodying a pre-A and an after-A.(22) It is only when our naturallinteractive mind closes itself to the possibilities of reciprocal relation with realit

that it starts imposing its own preconceived and rigid categories onto the worldbe they appropriate or inappropriate, or more or less appropriate. But the all-ornothing character of the basic principles of classical logic does not apply well tnatural processes, which allow almost infinite shadings and degrees.

As Hegel, Hartmann, Dummett and other philosophers have argued, classiclogic should not be confused for the science of thinking, for the laws of logic arnot the laws of our actual thinking. All of this does not show that the standarprinciples of classical logic are false or inappropriate. But it certainly means thawe should be far more cautious about the range of their proper application. Nodoes this criticism intend to imply that we do not need any logic and rationalityIf anything, we need more logic and rationality. But we need logic anrationality that are not separated from the interactive processes taking place ireality. We need logic and rationality open to the dynamism of life and willing tparticipate in that dynamism. This indeed may be the only way for logic anrationality to be of value in our transdisciplinary pursuit of truth.

IV. Complexity and Transdisciplinary Epistemology

Of the three pillars of transdisciplinarity postulated by Nicolescu, the third onecomplexityis the least clear. Quantum physics undoubtedly leads us to realizthat the universe is far more complex than we have previously suspected, buthis insight has already been captured by the first pillar: the fact that reality multidimensional certainly entails that the universe is a complex whole. Thsecond pillar also points toward complexity, this time concerning our thinking oreality. We have seen how some of the principles of classical logic need to brevised, but their revision has to extend also toup to now mostly uncontestedyet fundamentalthe principle of sufficient reason.(23) This principle is one




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the most often used when it comes to explaining the overall structure of thuniverse, but it has also had the most detrimental and arresting affects on outhinking. The reason for this is that the principle of sufficient reason tends tturn the world into a closed, static and rationally organized system. But this inot what the world is; the world is full of leaps, as well as accidental happeningchance and luck.

To clarify this dynamism, Nicolescu introduces the distinction betweeObjective Nature, Subjective Nature and Trans-Nature,(24) but I musadmit that I have a problem with this triad. Following Lupascos new logiNicolescu somewhat mechanically interprets everything through the prism otriadic relations, without even trying to see whether some relations can bexplained in simpler, binary terms. And we have already seen in the previousection that even some problems regarding the principle of non-contradictiocan be resolved by remaining on the same level of reality.

Regardless of whether we insist on binary, or triadic, or some other relations, thkey point concerns the interactive relation between subject and object, man anthe world. The mind should not be understood as separated from the bodyahas so often been donenor is it separated from other layers and aspects oreality. As a matter of fact, the mind is tied to reality in innumerable ways anfunctions interactively. As Hartmann expressed it, man is placed in the midst o[the world], and is dependent upon it in many incalculable ways.(25) Just athe senses are capacities for interaction, so is the mind. The mind is the capacitto be open, to interact with perceived differences and grasp their underlyinsimilarities and connections. These differences may originate and be perceiveanywhere: in our own thoughts, in our bodies, in other minds and bodies, in thimmediate or mediate environment.(26)

Following our previous discussion, the third pillar should be more correctunderstood as a transdisciplinary epistemology, rather than as complexit According to such an epistemology, cognition itself should be understood as kind of interaction: it is a form of interacting with other forms of interaction. Icognitive experience we do not, strictly speaking, respond to individual anisolated objects; we respond to the relations they have with other objects an

with us.

How can we go beyond these initial remarks and get a better grasp of what transdisciplinary interactive epistemologyand accompanying conception otruthwould amount to? Perhaps by pointing out that one of the deepest truttraps in past thinking about the nature of truth has been to assume that it musdepend either on the way the world is, or on the way we are and think about th world.(27) But why should that be so? Since the relation of being dependenadmits of degrees, in principle it is possible that truth depends both on the wa




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the world is and on the way we are and think about it.

In this particular respect, all traditional theories of truth are one-sided aninadequate. It is not so much that they completely miss the nature of truth; it irather that they capture only a few of the relevant aspects and disregard aothers. For instance, correspondence theories correctly emphasize that trutdepends on the way the world is. But they mistakenly separate man from th

world, and alienate thinking and judging from their objects. Thus they try define truth as a dubious pictorial or geometrical congruence betweecognitions and objects. Coherence theories, by contrast, correctly emphasize threlevance of our conceptual apparatus and background knowledge. Yet theinflate the relevance of the subjective factors and underestimate the degree t which truth depends on the way the world is. As a result, they sever ties witreality and make true judgments appear to belong to a consistent but perhapfictional story. Pragmatists correctly underline the functional role of truth, itconnectedness to our needs, intentions and goals, and its relevance for practica

orientation in the world. Their shortcomings are that they tend to ignore some othe constraints on the side of the object.

What are those constraints? Roughly speaking, they are the subjective anobjective conditions that both create the possibility of objective truth value animpose some limitations on what is true or false. Let us first consider thconstraints on the side of the subject.

(S1) First, there is a certain plasticity, or flexibility, ofthe subject. It is manifested by the degree of fluidity or

rigidity of the subjects goals, intentions, andexpectations. Rigidly defined expectations and goals blind us to certain aspects of the situation presented.Fluid and flexible expectations and goals make us open-minded to unexpected things.

(S2) Further, there is the question of the respectivesimplicity or complexity of the subject. It is notmeasured by the number of components or parts

involved, but by the complexity and sophistication oftheir background knowledge. An amateur chess player would not recognize a certain pattern of pieces as theSicilian Defense; a person not familiar with chess at all would not recognize a certain pattern of pieces as acheckmate.

(S3) Finally, there are constraints having to do with theavailability and structure of the cognitive apparatus.




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Our senses are structured so as to make only certaindimensions of observed reality accessible. The nature ofour intellectual abilities similarly opens some vistas andcloses off others.

What about the constraints on the side of the object? The senses provide thneeded cognitive material which, when properly formed, leads to cognitiv

contents and judgments. The material provided by the senses, thunderdetermined objects of empirical intuition, has a potential to be determinein various ways. But these underdetermined objects must also impose somlimitations on the possibilities on the formation of objectively valid judgmentHere are a few such constrains.

(O1) One of them concerns the plasticity, or the level ofunderdetermination, of the observed objects or events. Asimple curved line is normally more plastic than an

equally simple straight line. The shape of a cloud ismore plastic than the shape of a square. All objects andevents have their own specific degree of plasticity whichfunctions as a limiting factor in our attempts to perceiveand grasp those objects and events.

(O2) Furthermore, there are constraints that deal withthe respective simplicity or complexity of objects orevents we try to grasp in our cognitions. Objects andevents contain more or fewer components. A geometrical

figure involves more components than a straight line; achessboard involves more components than one of itssquares. More complex objects and events offer moreresistance to our attempts to grasp and illuminate them.

(O3) There is also a level of relative accessability orinaccessability of observed objects or events. It is easierto grasp one billiard ball hitting another, than theaction on a football field; it is easier to grasp a

straightforward opening move in chess than one thatstarts a complex combination. Without attempting topostulate here some invisible essences of things, it may be that there are layers of reality that aretemporarilyor permanentlyinaccessible to all of our cognitiveadvances. As Heisenberg summed it up, We have toremember that what we observe is not nature in itselfbut nature exposed to our method of questioning.(28)




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If we would like to express the interactive relation between the listed subjectivand objective constraints in a more formal manner, we could evoke BertranRussells famous propositional function: f(x).(29) The subjective constraints arroughly analogous to the function f, and the objective constraints arrepresented by the variable x. The subjective and objective elements permeateach other and interact in order to create judgments with a determinable trutvalue. More generally, thought and being are different in the way in which f an

x in the interactive propositional function f(x) are different. Differenthowever, does not mean completely ontologically and functionally independenand separate. Rather, f and x work together and create a certain harmontogether. Indeed, although distinguishable, f and x need each other andepend on each other. Kants famous dictum concerning concepts and intuitionfinds its full application here: functions without variables are empty, variable without functions are blind. It cannot be said that one is more important thathe other, or that one dominates over the other, for they have different roles, anone without the other is incomplete. Only in their interaction can they full

realize their potential and fulfill their roles.

According to this approach, the issues of truth and falsity became dependent othe presence or absence of a harmonious relation between f and x, and trutitself can be defined as their harmonious interaction. This means that oustatements (judgments, propositions, theories) are true when (i) we recognizthe challenges which the situations in which we find ourselves pose to us [thinteraction element], and (ii) we respond to the spirit of the challenges we fac[the harmony element]. By contrast, our judgments can go wrong for tw

different reasons. They are false (mistaken, erroneous) when we responinappropriately and violatively to the task at hand [interaction but no harmonyThey are illusory when, blinded by our own conceptions, interests or ideals, wdo not even recognize the challenges posed to us by the situations in which wfind ourselves [no interaction]. Harmony and disharmony clearly allow odegrees. An interaction can be more or less harmonious. It can also be partiallharmonious and partially not. If so, then truth and falsity are really only thextreme values or points on a scale that contains many intermediate shades anpossibilities.

V. Toward a Transdisciplinary Theory of Values

Transdisciplinarity is far more than a method. It is far more than a guideline foconducting research and collecting knowledge. When Nicolescu names one of thintroductory chapters of the Manifesto Tomorrow May Be Too Late, he voices concern shared by many about the direction in which our fragmented scienceand, indeed, our whole disoriented civilization is going. The overwhelminresponse to the outcry of the Manifesto is the best evidence that Nicolescuconcerns are shared with countless other scientists, artists and intellectuals.




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Nicolescu argues that the potential for self-destructionmaterial, biologicaand spiritualis the product of a blind but triumphant technoscience, obedienonly to the implacable logic of utilitarianism.(30) Almost a century ago, AlberSchweitzerone of the true predecessors of transdisciplinaritysimilarldiagnosed the decay of our civilization by pointing out that the interaction omaterial and spiritual has assumed a most unhealthy attitude.(31Transdisciplinarity intends to correct this imbalance, not only by emphasizinthe inalienable rights and values of the inner person, but alsovery much in thspirit of Schweitzerby reestablishing our sense of wonder and reintroducinour appreciation for the sacred. The sacred is not to be understood in a strictlreligious sense, since transdisciplinarity aspires to be transreligious, just as attempts to be transcultural and transnational. Transdisciplinarity aspiretoward the establishment of a harmonious coexistence with living Nature.(32)

There is a problem here, however, and it does not reside in the transdisciplinar vision itself, but in its full articulation and realization. Even Nicolescu himse

does not seem aware of the magnitude of the problem, since he does not find necessary to establish as the fourth pillar of transdisciplinarity one that wouldeal with values and their systematic examination. We cannot get very far witthe declaration that transdisciplinarity affirms the presence of the sacred, or thatransdisciplinarity strongly favors rigor, openness, and tolerance. There is a neefor serious and systematic discussions about what the sacred involves, as well asystematic inquiry about how the sacred is related to other human values anendeavors. Similarly, rigor, openness and tolerance are steps in the righdirection, but a fully developed map of values and a comprehensive examinatio

of their nature is needed.

Surprisingly, when we look back at the history of our civilization, it is hard tfind any other discipline more neglected, and involving more prejudices anconfusions, than axiology. The Greek word axios means being worthy anestimable, and it has the same roots with two other words well known to usaxon and axioma. Axon is translated as axis. Taken literally, axon refers to thstraight line, real or imaginary, passing through a body, around which revolves, or may be imagined to revolve. (As an example, we can think here o

the axis of the earth). Taken symbolically, axis refers to a turning point ocondition, around which something (say, our lives) may turn and depend upon Axioma is the Greek word for axiom, and it means authority, an authoritativsentence. A combination of these words should clearly indicate how valuefunction and how they relate to facts. Values are not facts. They are not aontological Atlas on whose shoulders the earth stands, but rather serve tprovide a center which gives us a sense of orientation. Values provide an axis oorientation for our lives, for our attitudes and our deeds, for our decisions abou what is right and wrong, valuable or not. Values also provide an authoritativ voice based on which we can make proper choices concerning how to live ou




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lives and further develop our humanity.

Considering how obviously important axiology is, how then could it be that it one of the least developed disciplines? A full answer would demand a long andetailed study. For a short answer, it may suffice to remind ourselves that woften forget the wisdom behind the old proverb that a stick always has twends, on which Nicolescu also relies in his explanation of the central tenants o

transdisciplinarity. Through the history of our civilization, values and facts havfrequently been contrasted and it has often been attempted to derive one fromthe other. One model has been Platonic and has been advocated by idealists ovarious brands: values are above facts and beings, and facts and beings are reonly to the extent that they imitate and participate in those ideal values. Thsecond model is the reversal of the first, and has been championed by thproponents of modern science (empiricists, positivists, and pragmatists): factand being, are above values, and values either derive from facts, or must at leasbe justified by facts. There have also been those who had realized that the stic

must have two ends, and that all attempts to derive values from facts, or factfrom values, must be futile. The efforts of Max Scheler andeven more sooNicolai Hartmann must be mentioned here, but their works nevertheless create puzzling impression. According to their views, facts belong to the real worldvalues to the ideal, but it is not quite clear how they could relate to and interacwith each other.

In accordance with our previous discussion, I believe that a transdisciplinartheory of values must also be based on an interactive relationship of facts anvalues. How is it to be done? We have already indicated that the basic functioof the mind in judging the world and collecting knowledge of it is identificationwe need to identify what we are observing, by classifying it and recognizing howsimilar and how different it is from other things and events we observe. Whe we are dealing with values, by contrast, the basic function of the mind orientation: values are like a coordinate system for the map of reality we artrying to assemble. Values do not give us a sense of what is and what is not, buonly of what is valuable and what is not. Since they have different functions, threlationship between facts and values is not hierarchical, nor can one be reduceto, or derived from the other. Their relationship is dynamic, reciprocal, anmutually supportive. Their relationship is interactive.

We are far from any developed transdisciplinary and interactive theory of value but the skeleton of such a theory need not be equally obscure. The centrproblems of such a theory are the following three. First, it has to explain thnature of values by contrasting them to non-values (such as facts), and bshowing how they are mutually related. Put differently, we need to figure out thontological status of values, as well as whether and how their validity can bobjective. Second, the nature of values should further be clarified by explainin




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the contrast between positive and negative values, as well as between varioukinds of positive values. More specific issues under this rubric would involve: thdistinction between intrinsic and non-intrinsic (e.g., instrumental) values, anthe distinctions between means and ends on the one hand, and parts and wholeon the other. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the nature of values shoulbe further elaborated by examining conflicts between various positive values. Ithis part, the plurality of values must also be considered in its various aspect

not only that we need to distinguish between moral and non-moral values, but would also be useful to establish a full scale of values. We would presumabnever find an a priori fixed scale, such as the one in which Scheler believed whehe distinguished between pleasure values, vital values, spiritual values and th values of the holy.(33) Nevertheless, even more flexible and changeabcomparisons of values would be most useful.

Such comparisons would be most useful in the context of unavoidable conflicts opositive values. In the face of the threatening dilemmas that we confront a

individuals and as a civilization, it is of utmost interest to learn more not onlabout whether and how such conflicts arise, but also about whether and howthey can, in principle, be resolved. One of the deepest problems of our time is thproblem of orientation, the problem of choosing and pursuing the proper art oliving. As Nicolescu correctly observes, this problem is intensified and magnifienot only because of our real potential of self-destruction, but also because of thlack of universal values and depreciation of the spiritual and the sacred. In thabsence of any appreciation of such values, in the absence of any clear vision of new art of living and the lack of a genuine commitment that would put a fre

and spontaneous development of individual personality in the center of avalues, we are walking on a very dangerous tightrope. As Nicolescu puts it: Whave not advanced at all on great metaphysical questions, yet we permourselves to intervene in the very depths of our biological being. In the name owhat?(34)

Nicolescu puts his finger here on something extremely important, yet he doenot go deep enough in dealing with the issues involved. Of course, considerinhow serious the threat of self-destruction is, his question In the name of what?is by no means rhetorical. Taking into account that there is every indication tha

as a civilization we have neither the insight nor the courage to understand anconfront our bleak predicament, the possibility of our collective self-destructioseems even more threatening than the scary prospects of genetic engineering. we are realistic and serious, we have every reason to suspect that humanity wiself-destruct. Taking into consideration our apathy, moral cowardice, culpablignorance and deadly weaponry, and factoring in the effects of increasinecological degradation and the unstoppable demographic explosion, it is not aall improbable that humanity will not survive even the twenty-first century.




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And yet, it is important to realize that the issue is not black or white, either-onegative versus positive values. The dilemma does not concern a choice betweea negative and a positive value, but rather a choice between various positivvalues. Even if we are not going to find them satisfactory, there are answers tthe question: In the name of what? They may be: in the name of humacuriosity; or in the name of increasing our power over people and the ability tcontrol and manipulate them; or in the name of short-term gains; or in th

name of curing curable diseases; or, more generally, in the name of idealistiattempts to fix those human faults that perhaps could be fixed by means ogenetic engineering.

As in all truly difficult dilemmas, the choices have to be made betweconflicting positive values. And it is all the more difficult to make them, becauseas Nicolescu correctly observes, we have not advanced at all on the greametaphysical questions. What great metaphysical questions? Here are a fewsamples: Is the world fully rational? Is there a higher meaning inherent in th

world and its events? What if the world is partially (or completely) irrationaWhat if there is no higher (or any other) meaning inherent in the world and ievents?

If we would like to expand this list of the great metaphysical questions on whic we have not advanced, and keeping in mind the threatening possibility of seldestruction, our list would also have to include various questions concerning thvalue of human life: Does human life have an intrinsic or absolute value? Whiit is clear that, prima facie, life is a value and death is disvalue, it should also bclear that we may overestimate the value of life (e.g., when health is taken as thhighest good and a vital value is promoted too high, beyond its proper measureand also that we can underestimate its value (e.g., when all value is carried oveinto the life beyond, as in various forms of asceticism).

Our stance is additionally complicated by two further realizations. The first othem is that, throughout its history, humanity has not really succeeded ireforming itself and that the battle to improve humanity is never definitely wonThe second is yet another historical warning, namely that it is quite possiblthat the genuine and deep conflicts of values could not be principally resolved:

may be that we should renounce the ideal of a unified hierarchy of values.(35)

Keeping these issues in mind, we can see better different kinds of complication behind Nicolescus concerns. He is justifiably wondering about in the name what we are risking the destruction of human race and its biologirestructuring. Yet, as long as we do not have satisfactory answers to thmentioned metaphysical questions, we can with equal justification, and similaconfusion, also ask: In the name of what should humanity be preserved anremain intact?




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These concerns make it more obvious, I hope, why we need a transdisciplinartheory of values, and also why such a discipline is of central importance. Howelse could transdisciplinarity, understood as a method, even attempt to bring ucloser to a genuine resolution to these and other difficult metaphysicaquestions? How else would we prevent a new and revolutionary movemen which we now call transdisciplinarity to turn into one more of those countlesisms it is supposed to replace? How else would we avoid being disappointe

one more time, by yet another illusory hope and unfulfilled promise? Threlevance of transdisciplinarity and its further fate will depend on whether it caprovide genuine and satisfactory solution to these genuine and disturbinpuzzles.

As Nicolescu correctly observes, our situation is truly paradoxical: [E]verythinis in place for self-destruction, but everything is also in place for positivchangeThe global challenge of death has its counterpart in a visionartranspersonal, and planetary consciousness, which could be nourished by th

miraculous growth of knowledge. We do not know which way the balance maswing.(36)

Indeed, we do not know that. Nor do we know whether we still have enougcourage and wisdom to reawaken our sense of wonder and our appreciation othe sacred, to dedicate ourselves toward building a new kind of humanity. If wdo not find it out soon, tomorrow may be too late.

^ - ^

Predrag Cicovacki is professor of philosophy at the College of the Holy Croswhere he served as Director of Peace and Conflict Studies (2000-2003) and wathe Editor-in-Chief ofDiotima: A Philosophical Review. He is the author oover fifty philosophy papers published in English, Serbian, German, RussianChinese, and Slovenian. Cicovacki is the author of the following book

Anamorphosis: Kant on Knowledge and Ignorance (1997), The WorlWe Live In: A Philosophical Crossword Puzzle (2002), and BetweeTruth and Illusion: Kant at the Crossroads of Modernity (2002), an

Dostoevsky and the Affirmation of Life (forthcoming). He is the editor o

Essays by Lewis White Beck: Fifty Years as a Philosopher (1998), Kant's LegacyEssays in Honor of Lewis White Beck (2001),Destined for Evil? ThTwentieth-Century Responses (2005), and Albert Schweitzers EthicaVision: A Sourcebook (2009). He is currently preparing his own book oSchweitzer as moral philosopher.

^ - ^

NOTES




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(1) Basarab Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, trans. KarenClaire Voss (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), p. 45.

(2) Quoted from Nicolescus paper The Transdisciplinary Evolution of thUniversity: Condition for Sustainable Development, posted on the internet sitewww.perso.club-internet.fr/nicol/ciret/bulletin/b12/b12c8.htm.

(3) Nicolescu,Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, p. 44.

(4) I discuss these models in my article New Ways of Ontology The Ways oInteraction, Axiomathes, 12: 2001, pp. 159-170. This article is inspired bNicolai Hartmanns bookNew Ways of Ontology, trans. Reinhard C. Kuh(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953).

(5) See Nicolescu, op. cit., p. 65. See also chapter 3 of the same book, pp. 9-14.

(6) Ibid., pp. 64-65. As Joseph Chilton Pearce expressed it in his bookMagica

Child(New York: Bantam Books, 1980), pp. 39-40: How do we believe that wcan predict and control the natural forces of the universe? Through cleveintellectual manipulations and tool usage. We accept this notion so completelbecause we have been conditioned to believe implicitly that only by so using ouintelligence can we, in fact, survive nature. Interaction between the mind-braiand its source of information has been rigorously, religiously denied by Westerlogic, if not most cultural logic. Interaction with the living earth would implthat the earth responded in kind, interacting with us. And the one cardinal rulof all classical Western academic belief, which is very much in power over ou

minds today, is that the mind has absolutely no relation to the world other thato be informed of that world through the senses and to make some sort ointelligent reaction to that information. This belief has automatically robbed uof personal power.

(7) Nicolescu himself uses the word interaction more frequently; see op. cit., pp17, 18, 35, 36, and passim. The following presentation of various characteristicof interactive relations relies on my book, Between Truth and Illusion

Kant at the Crossroads of Modernity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

2002), pp. 161 ff. For further discussion of the nature of interactive relations, sePearce, op. cit., pp. 7, 18, 23-25, 28-31, 39-40, 114 and passim.

(8) Nicolescu, op. cit., p. 21.

(9) Ibid., p. 22.

(10) Compare this with the old approach, as Nicolescu presents it on p. 10 othe Manifesto. To appreciate Nicolescus three pillars of transdisciplinarity, wcan also compare them with what could be called the three pillars of the old wa




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of thinking, as they are identified by Isaiah Berlin: in the first place that agenuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest beinnecessarily errors; in the second place that there must be a dependable pattowards the discovery of these truths; in the third place that the true answerswhen found, must necessarily be compatible with one another and form a singl whole, for one truth cannot be incompatible with another. Quoted from ThPursuit of the Ideal, in Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, edited b

Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998p. 5.

(11) Seb Henagulph, Three Pillars of Transdisciplinarity www.goodshare.com/pillars.htm. For further discussion of similar issues, sPearce, Magical Child, and Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature:

Necessary Unity (New York: Dutton, 1979).

(12) For more on this issue, see Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art

Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values(New York: BantamBooks, 1981), pp. 60-61 and passim. See also Carl Gustav Jung, Two Kinds oThinking, in Symbols of Transformation, trans. R.F.C. Hull (PrincetonPrinceton University Press, 1971; vol. 5 of the Collected Works), pp. 7-33.


(14) Hartmann dedicated most of the last twenty years of his life to his work oontology. His most important ontological books of that period are: ZuGrundlegung der Ontologie (1935), Mglichkeit und Wirklichke

(1938), Der Aufbau der realen Welt(1940),Neue Wege der Ontologi(1943), and Die Philosophie der Natur(1950). Related works also includGrundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921), Die Philosophides deutschen Idealismus (vol. I 1923; vol. II 1929), Das Problem degeistigen Sein (1933), and Teleologisches Denken (1944). This is a trulastonishing opus for one thinker.

(15)My presentation here borrows from my article A Forgotten Giant NicolaHartmann (Part II),Diotima: A Philosophical Review, 3: 2002, No. 2, pp

87-102. For more comprehensive introductions into Hartmanns philosophy, sefor instance, W.H. Werkmeister, Nicolai Hartmanns New Ontolo(Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1990), and Martin Morgenstern

Nicolai Hartmann. Zur Einfhrung (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1997).

(16) Nicolescu, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

(17) Ibid., p. 29.

(18) Ibid., p. 28.




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(19) For Dummetts attack on the principle of the excluded middle and thprinciple of bivalance, see his The Logical Basis of Metaphysic(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 9-10, 17, 74-75, and passimDummett argues that anti-realism leads to the rejection of these two principlebut R. Walker insists that realists may also have good reasons to reject them; sehis book The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism

Idealism (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 32 ff.

(20) Hartmann, Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (4th edBerlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1949), ch. 34, section (h).

(21) See Nicolescu, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

(22) Hegel captures this idea in the following way: The bud disappears in th bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted bthe latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its tur

as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they alssupplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluinature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they do only do noconflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessitalone constitutes the life of the whole;Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.VMiller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), section 2.

(23) For useful discussions of the relevance of this principle for Wester

philosophy and science, see Arthur O. Lovejoys classic The Great Chain oBeing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).

(24) See, for instance, Nicolescu, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

(25) Hartmann, New Ways of Ontology, p. 29. See also his books DaProblem des geistigen Seins, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1949), pp85 ff., andPhilosophie der Natur(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1950), pp. 52ff.

(26) For the view that the mind is by its nature interactive, see, for instancPearce, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 23-31, 39-40, and passim. See also Gregory Bateson anMary Catherine Bateson, Angles Fear: Towards an Epistemology of th

Sacred(New York: Bantam, 1988), pp. 17 ff.

(27) I borrow the phase truth traps from Pirsigs book,Zen and the Art o Motorcycle Maintenance, pp. 288-289, and passim. In the followinpresentation of the various kind of constraints, I rely on my article Rethinkinthe Concept of Truth: A Critique of Deflationism, The Truth and Its Natur




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(If Any), ed. J. Peregrin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), pp. 203-221, and my booBetween Truth and Illusion, pp. 26-31.

(28) Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution i Modern Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 58. For a furthediscussion of some of the previously mentioned constraints, see N.R. HansonThe Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959

esp. ch. 1; and Hartmann,Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, 3rd ed. (Berlin Walter de Gruyter, 1948), pp. 191-203. Instead of talking about objecticonstraints, Hartmann talks about resistance and unyielding of objects.

(29) See Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (New York: W.WNorton, 1903), pp. 82-88, and Russell,Introduction to Mathematics (NeYork: Macmillan, 1919), pp. 155-166.


(31) Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, trans. C.T. Campio(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1987), p. 1.

(32) Instead of Nicolescus transdisciplinarity, in the related context Hartmanuses the word morality and argues that moral philosophy signifies a new kind olove for the task in hand, a new devotion, a new reverence for what is great. Fothe world to which such an attitude will open is once more great, as a whole anits smallest part, and is filled with treasure, unexhausted and inexhaustible

Ethics, trans. Stanton Coit (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), vol. I, p. 91.

(33) See Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics oValues, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: NorthwesterUniversity Press, 1973), pp. 89-100.


(35) The historian of ideas who was very vocal in raising these concerns waIsaiah Berlin; see, for instance, his already cited The Pursuit of the Ideal.



cicovaki transdisciplinarity as an interactive method

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