cia deception maxims: fact and folklore

8/20/2019 CIA Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore

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Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research paper:

Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore, April 1980

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The Coal

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3/63

Approv€d for

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_AP..RJ98lL


4/63

DECEPTION RESE RCH PROGR M

June

98

DECEPTION

MAXIMS

FACT AND FOLKLORE

Office of Research and Developmen

Everest Consulting Associates

Princeton Jct.

New

Jersey

and

Mathtech

Inc.

Princeton

New

Jersey

and

OAD/ClA

Analytic

Methodology

Research Division

J

/

Central Intelligence Ageflcy Washington

D

20505.

Telephone

703)

351-3458


5/63

C 36554

This documenr

is

a research

paper

prepared

by

the 6ecept. on Research

Program staff of the Office of Research and Development

of

the Central

Intelligence Agency.

s

such, the views

and

conclusions contained herein are

those of the research

staff and should not

be interpreted as necessarify

representing the

official

position, either e)(pressed or implied, of the Centraf

Intelligence Agency.

The Dancing F


6/63

C00036554

DECEPTION MAXIMS FACT ND FOLKLORE

BSTR CT

T h ~ deceptions maxims discussed

in

th i s

repor t

represent

the

synthesis

of

a

number

o f

h is to r ica l case

s tud ies . These case s tudies are pa r t o f an ORD

exploratory research

program

on

deception

t

i s

ant icipated t ha t these maxims and other re su l t s

from

th i s

research wil l aid in te l l igence analysts in thinking

about

the problem o f deception and in detect ing

analyzing and

evaluat ing

foreign deception

schemes

relevant

to

curren t in te l l igence problems

Deception Research

Program

June 1981


7/63

C 0 0 0 3 6 5 5 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

INTRODUC rION

AN ASIDE:

REMARKS ON THE DATA BASE

2

THE DECEPTION

MAXIMS

4

Maxim 1 :

Magruder•s

Pr inc ip l e - - t he

Explo i ta t ion o f

Preconcep t ions 5

Maxim

2:

Limita t ions to Human Informat ion

Process ing

1

Maxim 3: The M ~ l t i p l e Forms o f Surpr ise 5

Maxim 4: Jones Lemma 21

Maxim

5:

A

Choice

Among

Types

o f

Decept ion

22

Maxim

6: A x e l ~ o d s Contr ibu t ion : The

Husbanding

o f

Asse ts 2 7

Maxim

:

\

Sequencing

Rule 3 2

Maxim

8: The

Importance o f

Feedback 33

Maxim 9 The Monkey' s Paw 3 6

Maxim 10: Care in the Design o f

Planned

Placement of Deceptive Material 41

TURNING THESE AROUND: IMPLICATIONS FOR

C O U N T E R - D E C E ~ T I O N

A NEED TO BROADEN

THE

PERSPECTIVE

FOOTNOTES

PEFERENCES

46

6

48

51


8/63

c o o 6 3 6 5 . s 4 · ~

1

2.

3.

4.

s.

Figures

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEPTION,

PRECONCEPTION AND

SURPRISE

THE LORE OF SMALL NUMBERS: SOME

EVIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL MILITARY

D I M E ~ S I O N

12

D E S E ~ S I T I Z T I O N BY FALSE ALERTS--SOME

HISTORICAL

QUOTJ S AND

A TONQUE-IN-CHEEK

DECISION

RULE FOR

THEIR

ELIMINATION

17

DECEPTION, CRY-WOLF

SYNDROME

AND

SUR

PRISE:

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

IN

SUPPORT

OF FOLKLORE

18

A C O ~ C I S E STATEMENT OF AXELROD S

GAME

31


9/63

C 0 0 0 3 6 5 5 4 . . . ~ . . _

_ _

_______________

Introduction

The past several years have witnessed a

substantial

growth of in teres t in the

role

and e f f i c ~ y of deception

and

surprise

in military

and

pol i t ica l a f fa i rs . This

growth

has

been reflected in an increased number

of

scholarly

analyses

on the

subject

and spurred

by the

release

o f

some of the most cl ')sely held secrets of

World War I I .

2

As well , pol i t ica l sc ien t is ts ,

sociologiats, in tel l iqence analysts, and others

have

explored

and

codified

theory

and

hypotheses

relevant to

misperception, fa i lures and cognitive biases in

in tel l i9ence analyses, and other

re la ted topics.

3

I t

seems appropriate to explore, in tegrate ,

and summarize

t h i s

work into a unified ody of knowled9·e. To

help

catalyze th is synthesis, several

hypotheses

or maxims

relevant to deception and

surprise

are

offered

herein.

These

maxims

have

been

dis t i l l ed

from

histor ical

accounts, summarized from analyt ical exposi t ions, and

extracted from conversations with some of the

leading

deception

planners

of World War

II

vintage. They

are

ventured as

hypotheses

for further test in9

and

analysis,

much in the

sp i r i t

of Jerv is useful Hypotheses on

M:i.sperception

(14) a work which influer ced both

format

and

content of

this paper. The

wisdom of some

of

these

l


10/63

•,-.-. ._._. ._._ _ .......___________________

maxims, however, can be supported from historical

evidence. Others emer9e from re levant social science

theory, decision analysis , and/or

game

theory.

Finally,

some

are· suggested by

anecdotal

r n a t ~ r i a . l

and,

though

plausible, are

untested

and of unknown generality.

An 1 .s

i de Remarks fi the Data

Elsewhere

in th is

paper,

reference

will

be

made

to

analyses based upon an historical data base.

This

data

base

was

prepared by Dr. Barton

Whaley

then

of

M.I.T.,

as

pa r t

o f an

ongoing research

ef fo r t

on

deception.

From Alam e l

Halfa to

Y\lgoslavia,

the

data

base

currently consists o f over f i f t y quant i ta t ive and

quali tat ive at t r ibutes o f

232

mili tary ~ n g a g e r n e n t s over

the

period 1914

to

1973. Data

elements

include

categorical attr ibutes (e.q. , was deception ~ m p l o y e d

was

surprise

achieved, did

the

attack

plan

ref lec t

the

opponent s preconceptions,

etc .

as well

as

quanti ta t ive

variables (e .q. ,

strengths, casualties,

etc. . For many

entr ies in th i s data

base, there is 9eneral agreement

among

the various source materials consulted. For some,

however, the

data were

more

ambiguous or even

contradictory. Finally,

there

are

cases

for which

some

data a re

missing

en t i re ly

and

reasonable

est imates

2


11/63

C00036554

inser ted and/or indirect evidence used as

a

surrogate.

Despite these diff icul t ies the evidence for m ny

of

the

conclusions

drawn

in

th i s

paper

i s

suff icient ly

strong

that

t he

analysis i s

robust

to even substantial

errors

of omission/commission.

Both strategic

and

tact ical

level engagements on

land,

sea,

and air

are

include-d.

In analyzing a subset of

these data

in his

manuscript, Stratagem, Dr. Whaley

presented

numerous

cross-tabulations, sor ts , counts,

trends,

etc.

as

raw

or

summarized

data

but

omitted

vari1.::ms

s ta t i s t ica l

tes ts

of

hypothesis. This oruission was je l iberate , reflecting

two

considerations;

First ,

the

major

batt les

consti tuted nearly an

exhaustive

sample.

4

I f

the

population

i s

viewed as

f ini te

i . e .

only those

bat t les

tha t actual ly took

place

in

th is

time

period, then

s ta t i s t i ca l

tes ts

are

unnecessary as

the variances

of

a l l

est imates

are

essent ial ly

zero. This was the assumption in

Whaley s

original

analysis.

However

i£ the

batt les themselves are

regarded as a sample from a

larger population

-

i . e . bat t le si tuat ions tha t

might

have occur.red, then s ta t i s t i ca l methods are

appropriate

and,

indeed, are necessary.


12/63

C00036554

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Second, the t ac t ica l en9a9ements

contained

in the

data base const i tute what

i s termed

a convenience

sample

rather

than

a random

sample

in te r a l ia

a

function of data avai labi l i ty and may

not

be ful ly

representative. Thus,

s ta t i s t i ca l

tes ts o f

hypotheses

could be misleadinq - - but

then

so too

would

be counts,

cross-tabulations, e tc .

Th

Js, the

view taken in

th i s paper

is tha t

s ta t i s t i ca l

tes ts are

appropriate provided the resu l t s

are in te rp re ted with due

caut ion

considering the

inherent

data

l imitat ions .

The analyses

here should be

termed exploratory rather than adjudicatory. Absent

the

select ion

and

analysis

of a

t ruly

ra:idom

sample, an

act ivi ty

perhaps impossible

in principle,

th is data

base

i s sui generis,

one

of

a kind. I t would

be

imprudent

to

fa i l

to consider such conclusions as

may

follow

from

analysis

of

these.data.

The

~ c e p t i o n

Maxims

The

following

section contains

ten

principles or

maxims

tha t

are relevant

to

deception. No claim

is

offered tha t th i s is

a

minimal, suff ic ien t se t , tha t

these

~ r i n i p l e s are

ent i rely

self-consistent

or

tha t

4

Lili

·


13/63

C00036554

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

they are a l l

a t

the

same

level of genera l i ty .

In

formulating these , severa l

balances had

to be

s t ruck -

-

balances

between

generality

and

usefulness,

l eve l

of

abstraction nd

i n t e re s t ,

br1adth versus deta i l nd the

l ike. Doubtless other observers or analysts would

phrase these somewhat

differently and/or

sh i f t the

balance

o f

emphasis

among

them. Nonetheless ,

t i s e l

t h a t these serve

as

a

useful

f i r .s t

approximation

to

bui ld

theory

upon.

axim LMagruder s Princ ip le- - the Exploi ta t ion

o f

Preconcept ions

•

I t is generally easier

to

induce an opponent

to maintain a preex i s t ing

b e l i e f t han

to

present not ional evidence to change t h a t

bel ief . Thus, t may

be

more f rui t ful to

exo.mine how an opponent s exis t in9 bel iefs

can

be tu rne

to

advantage than

to at tempt to

a l t e r these views.

Perhaps

the most str iking

application

o f

th is

principle

in

mili tary

deception

is tc be found in the

select ion of the invasion s i te and cover plan for the

D

Day invasion

a t

Normandy. I t

i s wel l es tab l i shed t h a t

Hit le r and most (but not al l ) of his senior mi l i t a ry


14/63

C00036554

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

advisors

believed

that the most

l ikely place

for the

All ied invasion

o f Europe

would be in the

Pas de

Calais

region

(see,

for

example,

El l i s

(16)t .

Moreover,

the

All ies were

aware of

t h i s be l i e f . According to Cave

Brown ( 17) , they knew--from Ultra , and pa r t i cu la r ly

from the in te rcep ts

o f

Baron Oshima' s ( the Japanese

ambassador

a t

Berlin)

t ra f f ic - -what

l i t le r

expected

the

Allies to do. He expected

them to

land a t the Pas de

Calais

which

he considered the logical

p¢int

o f

a t tack .

11

Indeed,

so

s t rong

was th is

preconception,

tha t

for

several days af ter

the

invasion

a t Normandy (see, Speer

(18 ) ) :

• . . Hit le r remained

convinced tha t the

invas ion

was

merely feint whose purpose was to t r ick him into

deploying his defensive forces wrongly

. . • . The

Navy,

too, considered the terrain unfavorable for

large-scale

landings,

he declared. For

the

time

being he expected the decis ive assau l t to

take

pl&ce

in

the

v ic in i ty

of

C a l a i s ~

though he

determined the

enemy,

too,

would

pr9ve him :Q,

have been

r ight . For

there , around

Calais, bet tad

ever Sinee 1942

been

emplacing

the

heaviest model

9'\lM

under man1• fee t o f concre te to destroy

an

er..emy

landing f lee t ." (Emphasis added)

This

preconception formed

the bas i s for an

elaborate deception

plan

keyed to reinf?rcement

of th i s

be l i e f . I f ,

accordinq to Jerv i s (hypothesis No.

1


15/63

(19)), actors tend to

perceive what

they expect,

then

these expectations

furn:i.sh

qreater

leverage

to

a

deception plan--a form

of

mental ju j i t su. Such a maxim,

termed

Magruder's

Principlc

5

by Lewin,

appears to be

well appreciated y

deception

planners, and

i s

c ~ n s i s t e n t

with numerous

studies

on the psychology

of

perception. David

Mure

(23), for

example, recal led that

one of Brigadier Dudley Clarke's inf lexible

rules for

development

of

cover

plans

was

tha t

al l

cover

plans

should e based

on what

the

enemy

himself

not only

believes

t >ut hopes

for.

Clarke

was

one

of the leading

deception

archi tee ts for t.he

Brit ish

in North Africa

and

the

Middle

East

and,

according to some, the

bes t

deception planner in WWII

(63).

There

is a m ~ l e

historical evidence

to

confirm

the

eff icacy

of

Magruder's

Principle. Figure 1 contains

entries

from

the historical data

base

deGcribed

previously.

These entries (including both strategic

and

tac t ica l cases) are

categorized

accordin9 to whether or

not

deception

was employed,

whether or not plans

were

keyed to enemy preconceptions and

whether

or

not

surprise

was

achieved. Analyses of these data,

shown

also

on i ~ ~ r e l , enable two conclusions to be drawn.

Firs t ,

·his torically,

deception schemes have more often


16/63

C00036554

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

•

FIGURE 1:

WA> DCCC '? lotir

~ ~ = - w ~ : i : ; - :

I

I

U:lkr.'"°n

Ti:it.•l•

I

r

\ l b t q t ah

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

DECEPTION,

PRECONCEPTION, AND SURPRISE

A .

AAW

OATA

l f f l •r.

rL,Mf i

l';f:V'Cl.I

WAS

StlRNUSf. ACJUT."JCOl

r

1.J f;N•-' Y ;.LS

--

-

-

- - · :'

• 1C6

•

D

llO

17

•

•

21

V:nl\:n¢'Vf

•

I

0

I

- -

t•

•

0

•

I

•

.,

l

6

Unl.noow-n

12

0

,.

• •

I

l

0

0

l

I

Ont.novn

0

0

'

I

l

lS<

I

•

U l

B.

ANO S O ~ E C O ~ C L U S I O N S

Mistor ica l ly ,

deception

schemP.s

have more

o ~ t e n

been keyed

to

enemy preconceptions •••

. • . and when deception

i s keyed

to

enemy

p r e ~ < I Q c e p t i o n s the proba

bi l i ty of s ~ r p r i s e

i s

g r ~ a t e r

Supportin9 Data:

C••oe•

'ott'.ue:

d t : ~ ~ ~ t i o n .

U

k;\()lroi?\

s Q h a ~

ht / \

•mplo,r•_c -..

t::J:'TLO : '() tSP' 't

J p z c Q ~ C : t f ' ' : ' . J O ~ S J '01'.\L

111

100

R e l e v a ~ t Sta t i s t ic :

(otiSt:,,_\'ID

t:KP£C"f£0

COOHT

C O C ~ : ' f

UN;JC:P ~ l J U .

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Yet

110

H. i

1;0

I

H.5

'J"ot,•J.I

lll

U L I

c o ~ ; u t . • d \l'a:ue

o f

s ~ • t i . t t i c

2 (11 . 6 5 . ~ - . 5 1 • (U ·U - ' - . »

2

• t• • l

lt

• IS.S tS+'S • ,,..,

).: (.01) • J .U

Support ing Data :

C atn tr.l.e.re -:


17/63

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

than not

been

keyed

to

enemy preconceptions--according

to the

data in 110

out of

131 or 84

percent)

o f

the

cases.

This

supports

the

asser t ion

tha t

deception

planners

subscribe to the principle. Second, these data

support

the

conclusion

tha t when deception is keyed to

enemy preconceptions, the probabi l i ty o f surprise is

greater . Though the overal l degree ~

success

(measured

y the

fract ion

o f cases

resul t ing

in surprise)

usinq

deception

i s large, 123 out

o f

131

(or

94

percent)

of

the cases,

a

more

disaggregated analysis

i s

possible.

Specifically, when deception was keyed

to

exis t ing

be l i e f , surprise

resul ted

in 106

out o f 110

or 96

percent)

o f

the

bat t les , w:i1ereas, when th i s was

not

the

case, surprise

resul ted

in

only

17

out

of 21

(or

81

percent)

of the ba t t l e s - -a s t a t i s t i ca l l y s igni f icant

difference (but

recal l

ea r l i e r

disclaimers)

i f th i s were

a

random sample.

puzzl ing

aspect o f

the raw

data

concern.S those s i tua t ions where deception was

not

employed and plans

were

consis tent

with preconceptions.

t would be expected

tha t

th i s would have a

low

incidence

of surprise ,

ye t a l l eight

cases bewarP. o f

small

sample s izes)

resulted in surprise--weak support

for what some observers have

termed, the

inevi tab i l i ty

o f surprise.

The

next principle suggests

some reasons

tha t

help

explain the

prevalence of

surprise .

9


18/63

Maxim

2:

Limi ta t ions to Human Informat ion ~ r o e s s i n g

• There are

severa l

l imi ta t ions to human

information

processing

t h a t

are explo i tab le

in the

design

o f decept ion schemes--amon9

these1 the

law of

small

numbers and

susceptabi l i ty

to

condit ioning.

Ma: iy barriers

or l imi t s

to

human

information

processing

and decision

making

have

been

explored

in

the

literat1Jre (see, Kirk 15 ) and

Slovic

(24) for

useful

surveys).

Thou9h a

confusin9,

sometimes

ambiguous and

overlapping

wel te r

o f names for various

defects /character is t ics

o f information

processing

e .g . ,

pounded

rat ional i ty ,

percep tua l readiness,

premature closure , 9roupthink,

11

evoked se t ,

anchor

and

adjustment , and

a t t r i b u t i o n theory

to c i t e only a few

examples) may serve to

coruplicate

a clear understanding

of

the

matter , t i s pos s ib l e to e x t r a c t

several

concepts which may explain an almost universal

v u ln e rab i l i t y

to

decept ion . Firs t in tui t ive

p ro b ab i l i s t i c judgments of ten show subs tan t ia l biaf ies .

Equally,

sub jec t ive

s tanda r ds

fo r

analyzing the adequacy

of evidence

are

poor and

sometimes i l l -def ined .

11

.fhe law o f small numbers i s

the

name given

y

Tversky

and Kahneman

(25)

to describe one pathology in

10


19/63

00036554•nm-.

. . . . . _ . . .

_. . ._ . ._

. . .

______________

intuit ive

inference.

Originally

adduced from an

analysis of the deficiencies in research design of the

experiments o f psychologists which showed t h a t these

scient iets

had seriously incorrect notions about

the

amount

o f

error and

unreliabil i ty

inherent in

small

samples

of

data

(24),

th is cognitive bias appears to

be

quite widespread.

I t i s not

diff icul t

to f ind instances of

the

same

phenomenon in

poli t ical /mil i tary

decison

making. Fi9Ure

2 provides three interest ing examples.

the

lack

of

alertness of German

troops on

the eve

of

the Normandy

invasion, Sta l in s be l ie f tha t the

Germans

would issue

an ultimatum

prior

to any invasion of Russia, and the

view expressed y

some

analysts

that

Krushchev

would

not

place offensive missi les in Cuba.

In

each example a

c r i t i c a l

inference

was

drawn

on the basis

o f a

very

small

sample

s ize .

Later

in

th i s

discussion,

the

resu l t s

o f Axelrod

will

be

summarized

which

cal l to

question whether

any

inference can

be

drawn from the

data in

these

examples. I t is suff ic ient in this

context to note

the

imprecision of binomial estimates

from

small

sample

s izes .

6

Another

l imitat ion

of human

information processing

relevant to

deception planning

is

the

frequent

inabi l i ty

11


20/63

-

- - - - - -

-

- - - -

-

- - - -

FIGURE

2: THE 'LORE'

OF SMALl NUMBERS:

SOME EVIDENCE

D.l.MENSION

. . . . . . . ea

J n; .n.y,

tM

fl'l:•••lO'l'I at

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Clprratlo"'

MtlNU"OfH,

Utfl Ciff'tuft

l 'rtNakcm tJf

llt.1••0:,, l t41

IN THE

POLITICAL

MlLITARY

(Emphasis

added.)

OUOH ,

All

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t. •

cl\aift

Oil

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21/63

C00036554

of

actcrs

to detect small changes in

observables,

even

i the

cumulative

change over time is

large.

This is

the

counterpart

to

Jervis '

Hypothesis

tt3

(26),

actors

can

~ o r e easi ly

assimilate

into

their

established image

of

another

actor

information

contradict in9

that

image i

the information

is transmitted ~ n d considered b i t by bi t

than i it comes a l l

a t

once.

n This is

the basis for the

use of conditionin9 as a deception technique.

Conditionin9 or gradual acclimatization

has

an

important

place

in

the

design

of

deception

schemes.

There are numerous

instances

of

i t s

succcessful

application.

One

now-classic

application of this

principle was made

in

the breakout of the German ships

SCHARNHORST GNEISENAU and PRINZ EUGEN from Brest

on

12

February

1942. The breakout was

fac i l i ta ted by

jamming

the Brit ish radar. ordinar i ly th is would have been a

s i q n i f i ~ n t t ip off

that

somethin9

was

amiss,

but

the

Bri t ish radar

operators dismissed

it as

caused by

atmospheric

disturbance. This error

was

the resu l t

of a

carefully orchestrated German ruse

directed

by

General

Wolfgang

Martini, the

ead

of

the Luftwaffe

Signals

service. As Potter (27) observed:

J\t

dawn each day

durin9

Janum.ry English radi. '

stat ions

had

a few

Jninutes

or jam.ming deliberately

13


22/63

made to appear

l ike

atmospherics.

Every

day the

length of the

jamminq increased sl ight ly.

y

February

Bri t i sh radar operators were weari ly

aecustomed

to

th is

in terference.

They

reported

it

as

caused by atmospher ic condi t ions . u

Nor

did

the

Germans

have any monopoly on the concept.

t was frequently employed by

the

R F

for fe in ts

o r

diversionary

opera t ions . one

s ign i f i can t

example was

in

the

Bri t i sh

a t tack

on

Peenemunde

on

17

August 1943.

As

Irving

(28) recounted:

l 'he

• • •

ser i es o f

minor

at tacks on Ber l in

demonstrdted

the

thought

and

preparat ion

~ h i h had

gone in to t.he a t tack on Peenemunde. Si r

Arthur

Harcis had been

dispatching

seven or

e igh t

Mos qui toes

almost every

night to

attack

Berl in . . •

each

night the

Mosqui

toes fo l lowed the

same nor the r ly t rack

into Berlin; each

night

the

sirens

a t Peenemunde

howled; and each night the

hundreds o f sc ien t i s t s

and engineers clambered

frenziedly in to

the i r

she l t e rs . This was what

bomber

command

in tended .

This

ruse was

s ingu la r ly successfu l .

At t.he

co s t

o f one a i r c r a f t

l o s t

to a German f i g h t e r , the e ig h t

Mosquito bombers used in the divers ion lured 203

e n ~ m y

f ighters to Berlin.

Of

97 Brit ish bombers dispatched

to Peenemunde, 40 (6.7%)

were

l o s t

and

32 damaged

and

a l l but 26

managed

to

at tack

the t a rge t .

Except for

faul ty t iming by

the

l a s t bomber wave, few would have

been l o s t over the

t a rg e t i t se l f ,

a

savin9 o f

almost

14


23/63

...

half . And except for

the

Bri t ish ruse,

t

i s quite

possible, as

one German

post-mortem claimed, tha t

an

additional 160 bombers would have been shot down (29,

30) .

A £inal

remark re la t ive

to the f r ~ i l t i s

of

human

informat ion

processing; a reading o f the

l i t e ra ture

suggests the

hypothes i s tha t ac tors

te:nd

to dismiss

unlikelx events as

impossible

events .

• such a concept

favors

bold

and imaginative strategies such

as

Hannibal

crossing

the

Alps

or

the landing

a t Inchon.

A

s imilar

thought

prompted Handel's second paradox re levant to

se lf -decept ion

(31):

Paradox 2: The

greater the

r i sk ,

the l e s s l i ke ly

t

seems, and the less risky t actual ly becomes.

Thus, the

g r ea t e r the

r i sk ,

the

smal ler t

becomes.

Maxim

3:

Multiple Forms

of Surprise

•

surprise can be achieved in many forms.

In

mil i tary engagements, these forms include

locat ion, s t rength, intent ion,

style , and

t iming. Should t not prove a t t rac t ive or

f eas ib l e to achieve

su r p r i s e

in · a l l

dimensions,

t

may

s t i l l

be

possible

to

1 5 .


24/63

0 0 0 3 6 5 5 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

achieve

surprise

in

a t

leas t

one of these.

Thus, for example, i intent.ions

cannot

be

concealed, it may

still

be possible to conceal

timing

cry-wolf syndrome), place, strength

or s ty l e .

This

asser t ion

i s for

the most part

self-evident.

n

in te res t ing aspect of the closing sentence which

re la tes

to the

phenomenon

of

conditioning i s

the

debi l i ta t ing effec t .

o f the

cry-wolf

syndrome.

Figure

3

provides several quotes tha t i l lus t ra te the

desensitizing

effect

of false alerts; a t Pearl Harbor,

Darwin, Korea, Vietnam,

and

Is rae l 1973. The

parallel ism of

the quotations

i s s t r ik ing.

There can be

no

doubt tha t

cry-wolf

is an

established element in the folklore of indications and

warning. Equally, there

should

be

no

doubt tha t such

concern

i s jus t i f ied

by

his tor ica l

evidence. Figure

4

shows various cross

tabluations and

a

s ta t i s t i ca l

analys:l.s o f the

his tor ica l

data

involving deception,

fa l se a le r t s

and

result ing surpr ise . In part icular , the

data

show tha t when one

or

more false

a ler ts

preceded

th

mili tary engagement described in the

case

the

defini t ion of cry-wol f

in the

table) , surprise

resu l ted

in

9 percent of the cases.

\ ere th is

was not

16


25/63

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- -

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FIGURE

3: DESENSITIZATION BY FALSE ALERTS--SOME HISTORICAL

QUOTES

AND

A

TONGUE-IN-CHEE <

DEG SION

RULE

FOR THEIR

ELIMINATION

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26/63

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CRY-WOLF SYNDROME

AND SURPRISE:

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF FOLKLORE

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27/63

C00036554

the case, surpr ise resul ted

in 67

percent of the cases,

a difference s igni f icant in both

pract ical

and

s ta t i s t i ca l terms--and indeed,

i s

comparable,

though

of

somewhat

less

magnitude

than

the ef fec t o f

deception

on

surprise.

The empirical evidence i s also consis tent with

(though

t

does not prove in

a s t a t i s t i ca l sense)

the

hypothesis t h a t the combined effec ts of

fa lse

aler t s and

ct.her deception are grea te r than i t h ~ r fac tor taken

singly-- leading to surpr ise in 3

out

of 3 cases.

In view

of

th is finding, t i s an in te res t ing

curiosi ty tha t

del iberate

desensit izat ion

by

false

aler t s was

only rarely

an

in tegral

par t

of the

deception

plan. That i s , in

almost

a l l those

cases

involving

false a le r t s and deception, the genera t ion o f fa lse

alerts was not an explici t par t of the plan (though the

architects of

the

plan

were sometimes

aware o f the

vict im's

false a ler ts .

In

some

1ses the

cry-wolf

ef fect

was a byproduct

of the

deception

e f fo r t . Thus,

in

the Peenemunde raid described

ea r l i e r , the

sc ient i s t s

and enginee=s a t Feenemunde were as much the vict ims of

the condit ioning as the German a i r defenses, as revealed

y th i s ext rac t of Professor Werner von Braun's diary

(32) ; At

t h a t

moment the a i r

ra id

s i rens

sound

••• f i r s t

19


28/63

C00036554

of

al l I go to

my

room;

there s

no

hurry,

th is

i s

not

the

f i r s t

t ime, i t ' s only

been

a warning

•••

a number of

men

. • . are standing around, looking up a t the sky and

cracking jokes .

But

the

purpose

0£

the


29/63

above, though the Axelrod analysis

did

not

address

explici t ly the cry-wolf

syndrome.

Maxim 4;

Jones'

Lemma

• Deception

becomes more

di f f i cu l t

as the number

of

channels

of

information available to the

victim

increases.

However within l imits , the

greater the number

of o n t r ~ l l e d channels the

greater the

l ikelihood

of the deception being

believed.

This maxim

i s

christened Jones' Lenuna because t

has

been bes t and

of t -a r t i cu la t ed by Professor

R. V.

Jones, one

of the key figures in Brit ish

scienti

f ie

intel l igence during

World War II .

Jones'

remarks (35)

fu r ther i l l u s t r a t e the idea:

The ease of detecting

counterfeit.s

i s much

greater

when

different

channels

of

examination

are

used

simultaneously. This is why telephonic

hoaxes are

so

easy-- there

i s

no accompanying visua l appearance

to be counterfeited.

Metal

st£ips were most

successful

when only

radar and t h a t

o f one

frequency, w s employed.

Conversely

the most

successful naval mines were those which would only

detonate when several di f fe ren t

kinds

o f

s ignal

magnetic, hydrodynamic, and acoustic, were

received simultaneously. A decoy which simulates

a l l these

signals is 9ett in9 very l ike a

ship.

From these

considerations, incidental ly,

we

can

draw a ra ther

important

conclus ion about

the

detection

of targets in defense

and attack:

that

as

many

dif ferent

physical

means

of

detection

as


30/63

C00036554

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

pcssible should be used in para l le l . I t may

t he re fo re ,

be b e t t e r i n

some

ci rcums tances

to

develop two or three

independent

means

of

detec t ion, instead

of

putt ing the

same to ta l

e f fo r t

in to

the

development

of

one

alone.

Maxim

5: _ Choice

mong TYPes

o Deception

• Where

possible the object ive

of

the

deception

planner

should

be to reduce the

ambiguity

in

the

mind

of the

victim1

to

force

him

to seize

upon a notional

world view

as being correct -

not

making

him

less

cer ta in o f

the t ruth,

but

more

cer ta in o f

a

p ar t i cu l a r falsehood.

However,

increasing the

range of a l ternat ives

and/or the evidence

to support

any

of many

incorrect al ternat ives- - in

the

jargon

' increas ing

the noise• --may

have par t icula r

use when the victim already has

several

elements of t ru th in

his

possession.

At

the

r i sk

of

burdening

the

world

with

further

nomenclature, t

is

convenient (as

suggested y

Daniel,

e t . a l . (36))

to

classify deception into two

types:

A

( fo r

ar.ibiguity)

deception,

and M ( for

misdirection)

deception. A-deception

increases the ambiguity in the

vic t im s

mind

and

lowers the probabi l i ty of

a correct

perception y dilut ion o r mult ipl icat ion of

22


31/63

0 365 54

I

I

I

I

I

I

alternatives . M-deception

reduces

the

ambiguity in

the

vict im's

mind

by

having him become

convinced

of a

p ar t i cu l a r

falsehood.

(Either

form of

decept ion

can be

accomplished, incidental ly,

by

te l l ing

only the t ru th-

as

Lewin (

9)

quoted one of the A Force deception

experts ,

t ruths do not

consti tute the t ru th . )

A-deception can

function

by

al ter ing

the

probabil i t ies attached

to various

outcomes in the mind

of the

opponent,

dilut ing or burying useful information

in

noise

and/or

y

al ter ing

the

perceived range

of

options and outcomes available

to

the opponent. Roberta

Wohlstet ter 's

(5)

classic

analysis

of the Pearl Harbor

surprise o r ~ o w e d

the

concepts

o f

s igna l and noise from

communications theory. Her dictum, nto understand the

fac t of

surpr ise t is necessary to

examine

the

characterist ics of the noise

as

well

as

the signals tha t

af ter

the

event,

are

clearly

seen

to

herald the

at tack ,

has

a corollary to

the

effec t tha t noise can be created

y the decept ion- archi tect

to overpower

or

swamp the

signal . Jervis (37)

also

remarks on the advantages of

ambiguity in

i n t e rna t iona l

re la t ions .

Eric

Ambler, in

a

recent novel

ent i t led ,

Send No

More Roses,

1

(38) stated

the principle of

A-deception elegantly

and simply by

having

one of the

s tory ' s protagonists muse: we gave

23


32/63

00036554.

him a Kaleidoscope to

play

with and he used

t

as a

looking gla5s.

A simple example

o f

an

at tack/defense

game wil l

show the act ive principle . suppose the

at tacker

has

a

choice

between

two

locations.

Likewise,

the

defender

can choose

to

defend ei ther location

for i l lus t ra t ive

purposes,

the option

of al locat ing some o f his

forces to

each location i s

omitted).

Success i s defined as an

at tack

against

an

undefended

location. I t i s apparent

from

thir:;

construct

t ha t

c e t e ~ i s

paribus, the

at tacker

has a 50/50

chance

of choosing an undefended location.

But, what

i f

the a t tacker could convince the

defender

tha t

there

were

three possible loca t ions for the at tack?

Here

t

follows tha t the success probabi l i ty climbs to

2/3,

and

so forth,

reaching

unity as a mathematical

l imi t when the number o f

threatened

s i t e s grows

a r b i t r a r i l y

lar9e.

I t

i s

o f

course,

necessary

t ha t

the opt ions

in troduced

be both individual ly and

col lec t ive ly credible

to

the vict im.

As a pract ica l

matter

the

number

o f threats cannot grow

a rb i t ra r i ly

large. Cruickshank 39),

for

example, recounts how th i s

was appreciated y deception planners in connection with

the invasion o f Sic i ly :

? 4


33/63

C00036554

8

____________

I t

was

decided, very wisely, t.hat

to mount

so

m ny

threats in the Mediterranean would s tretch t he

Germans•

credul i ty

too

far .

Moreover,

the fact

that Sici ly

was

almost

the

only

objective not

threatened

might

lead

them

to

guess

the

t r u th . To

prevent th i s

the

simulated threats to nor th and

west France,

Pa,ntel leria and

Lampedusa were

abandoned.

Though the foregoinq

discussion i s

del iberately

(over)simplified1

it

clearly i l lustrates

the

principle

o f

A-deception.

As

an

aside

to

those readers with

a

mathematical

bent, it is

temptin9

to use concepts from information

theory

in order to

character ize or quantify the

uncertainty/ambiguity produced by A-deception.

Though

it

may

be

a

convenient

mental

shorthand, it

lacks

operational

significance, as Vazsonyi (40) has shown in

a

decision-theoretic

context. Specif ical ly ,

he

shows

via

a

eimple (and

highly readable)

example

tha t

the

benefi ts

(value

or ut i l i ty} of information

systems

. . £

not d h e c t l ~ related

to

~ o n c e p t s of uncertainty,

reduction of Wiener-Shannon ~ n c e r t a i n t y Qf_ ent ropy . t

i s

in fact ,

t r iv ia l ly

easy to construct decision

theoret ic

examples where

the entropy i s high yet the

value of information

i s zero, as well as problems

where

the

entropy

is

low

and

the

value

o f

information

i s

high.

25


34/63

C00036554

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

The value of information

(and/or

costs of

.misinformation)

i s a composite functic-n

o f

the a pr io r i

probabil i t ies of

chance

events

in

the

decis ion

t ree

and

the ut i l i ty or value attached to

these

outcomes--a

re la t ion

that

is not captured by the usual information

measures.

In contrast to A-deception, ~ d e c e p t i o n (or

misdirection)

reduces

uncerta inty--after Whaley,

the

ult imate

9oal

of stratagem

i s to make

the

enemy

quite

certain,

very

decisive,

and

wrong

(emphasis

in

original) .

In

the

attackjdef 'ense

game,

M-deception

would involve convincing

the

vict im to defend

one s i te

then

attack the

other. To

the extent

th is

can

be

achieved, the value of the game also approaches

unity.

Deception schemes used in pract ice are typical ly

composites of

the

two variants , usually

with

one or

the

other

type

dominant.

such

was

the

case

a t

Normandy,

for

example, The multiple at tack location threats in the

in i t i a l stages

are evidence

of

A-deception. In

the

end.

phases howeve:c, Normandy \fas predo::ninently an -

deception. w know of no data tha t direct ly address the

re la t ive

efficacy _of these t)'pes, though there

are

normative arguments in favor of M-aeception ( 4 .

DecepHon

professionals

seem

to

pre er

M-deception,

6


35/63

though t

can

be

alleged

tha t

th i s

ref lec ts s t y l i s t i c

motives. Who can re s i s t t.he ult imate triumph of uthe

st.ing:?

Maxim 6: Axelrod's Contribution: The Husbanding of

Assets

• There

are circumstances where

deception

assets should be

husbanded

despi te the costs

of maintenance

and r isk

of

waste,

awaiting a

more

f ru i t fu l

use.

Such

decisions are

often

susceptible to rat ional

analysis.

WINDOW

la te r r e n m e ~

CHAFF by the Americans. was

eas i ly

the most

cost effect ive ECM/deception device

introduced

in

World

War

II 29) .

I t

was

developed

independently by the Brit ish, the Germans who ca l led t

DUppel) , and the Japanese who

cal led t

Giman-shi,

meaninq

deceiving

paper

(41).

There

was

i n i t i a l l y

a

9reat debate amongst the

Bri t i sh

as

to

whether and/or

when t should be used. This

concern

arose because the

Bri t i sh did

not

have a

countermeasure and

feared German

repr isa l . The same

concern

was f e l t in Germany where,

under

Go rin9

1

s

orders, a l l

the relevant reports

concerning German developments were

destroyed.

The

Brit ish debate, which

lasted

some 16 months, culminated

27


36/63

C00036554•

in C h u r c h i l l s d e c i s i o n to Open t.he Window (42) .

Shortly thereafter , t

was

used by the RAF to 9rea t

e f f e c t

on

the

n igh t

o f

24/25

J u l y

1943

i n

a

ra id

on

Hamburg.

Whether

th i s delay in

deployment was an

enlightened

decision

(as

has been arqued by Price (43)

and by

Watson-Watt

(44) or, (

l ike tt.e Colonel

on

the

River

Kwai

some

of

our own author i t ies

[a reference

to

Watson-Watt] most closely associated with radar could

hardly

bring themselves to

face

a

c o u ~ t e r m e s u r e . .

a] . • .

system

they

had

b u i l t up

(4

5))

a

case

o f

emotion

dominating

reason as

Jones has

arqued,

t furnishes

a

concrete i l lus t ra t ion

of

a more 9eneral dilemma.

That

i s ,

h o ~

and when

to

employ a

depreciable

asset

tha t is

perhaps

costly to

maintain.

I t

i s

also

interest ing to note

that

concern over

whether an asse t

w i l l become

valueless once used or

tha t ,

upon

compromise

an

effective

countermeasure can

and

will be developed

are

often

overly

pessimis t ic .

In

spite o f

the

agonizin9 over the f i r s t use of

CHAFF

t

i s

s t i l l

considered effect ive in

today 's

sophist icated

electronic

warfare environment. Similarly, in

the

use

o f double agents,

a

ref usal

to

bel ieve the asset i s

other

than

genuine

has been

observed to continue

in

the

f ace

o f

strong

evidence of h o s t i l e control .

8


37/63

Axelrod 1)

furnishes other cx1JJnples of

this

same

type; ~ p l o y m n t of Ultra in World war II the Syrian

decis ion

to

withhold use

o f

i t s

new

S M

a i r

defense

despite

losses

unt i l

the opportune

t ime

in the

1973

war and

the use o f double agents by Sri

t a in

in

connection with the Normandy

deception.

He

a lso

presents a

simple

yet

useful mathematical

model to gain

quan t i ta t ive ins igh t in to the

problem. A

concise

technical statement o f t h i s

model and

solut ion

i s

provided

in

Figure

5.

The

essence

o f

the

problem

examined

by

the model i s th i s : should

a

given

opportuni ty be

taken

~ · l

an

immediate gain

achieved

even

though the

asse t may subsequently

be

valueless o r

should the

asse t be

saved

in expectat ion o f be t t e r gains

to

come?

If the asset is saved rather than

used,

there

i s

a

cQst o f maintenance

and

r i sk o f compromise. The

optimal

solut ion

t >

t h i s

problem

takes the

form:

i f

the

value of the oppor tuni ty

exceeds

a threshold t ha t

can be

calculated, in pr inc ip le use

the

asse t otherwise save

it he optimal threshold i s

a function o f the

dis t r ibu t ion

o f

opportuni t ies

r i sks

o f compromise, and

costs of maintenance.

Cete r i s

Paribus, the optimal

threshold

29


38/63

C00036554

•

FIGURE 5:

A

CONCISE

STATI:;;.t;.;NT OF ~ E L R O D S \;Ai·iE

1. The

player

is

presented with an in f in i te s e q u e ~ e

of opportuni t ies ,

i= l ,2 , •••

2

When

an

opportuni ty

i s

presented the pla je r

can e lec t t o

use the

re

source,

and receive a value, E x ~ where E i s a known

constant

{the en-

I

enhancement factor)

and x i

i s tne outcome or

value

of the i t h opportun

i ty .

Alterna t ive ly ,

the player can

wait

and d ~ f e r

a decision

unt i l the

I

next

opportuni ty,

in which

case

a

cost ,

-x i , must be

paid.

J ,

the

resource i s •used

0

on

any

oppor tuni ty , there

i s a

probabi l i ty ,

Q

that

t survives and

can

b e used

again,

and l •Q

t ha t the game

wi l l

terminate .

• · I f the resource i s •savedQ on any t r i a l , there i s

a

probabi l i ty , 0 ,

tha t the game wil l terminate , and

1-0

that

t

wil l

continue

unt i l the

next

t r i a l . Equivalent ly,

D can

be viewed as

a

discount fac tor from

t r i a l to t r i a l .

S. The

•.ralues

n

successive

t r i a l s

are

independer.t

' i th

known

and

common

dens1ty function, f(x}.

6.

The

opt imal

policy is to

define

a

threshold, t , and

use the

resource i f

r . i ~ t .

otherwise to

save

t

7. ' 'he ·.ralue of the 9arr.e, V t • ) , and the optima1threshold, t* , can be

d e t e ~ m i n e d

y

univariate optimizat ion of the

funct ion:

v ~ { t )

D+(l-D)( l-Q)p(t)

where p(t)=f

f(x)dx,

t:

'

S ( t ) ~ J xf(x)dx and

t

t

~ { t ) = J

x f ( x } d x

0

for

continuous

distribution or appropriate sums

for

d i sc re t e dis t r ibu

t ions .

tn


39/63

C00036554

•

increases as the l ikel ihood of

compromise

given

use increases- - i . e . ,

i

the asset i s

less

l i ke ly

to

be

able

to

be used

aqain,

b i99er stakes are required to jus t i fy i t s use,

and

• decreases as the

discount:.

factor increases

and/or

the

cost of maintenance

increases .

Both

of

these r e su l t s

are in

accord with

i n tu i t i on .

What i s

somewhat

unexpected,

however, i s

tha t ,

for

opportunity

dis t r ibu t ions

that

are

highly

skewed

many

opportunit ies

of

low

value and

progressively fewer

of

hi9h value)

as

might

be

expected in

prac t ice , the

opt imal thresholo i s not highly

sens i t ive

to the above

factors . Moreovert

for highly

skewed dist r ibut ions of

future opportunity the analysis shows t h a t it pays

to

wait for high stakes (bi9 opportunit ies) despite

r i sks

of compromise and/or costs of maintenance. This l a t t e r

f inding i s

pa r t i cu la r ly

intriquinq as,

according

to

Axelrod

46) ;

uTurning the perspect ive around, one

can see tha t

it

would

be a

mistake

to evaluate the opponent's

resources

for surprise y what you have seen

when

the stakes were low or moderate. e may be

ra t ional ly waiting for

an

event with sufficient ly

large stakes

to

jus t i fy

the

exploi tat ion

of

whatever resource

for

surprise he has.

31


40/63

Thus ( reca l l the discussion re9ardin9 the law

of

small

numbers), not only i s t

hazardous

to draw

inferences

£rom

l imited data,

9iven

an

assumed

constancy

in

stakes,

but

also

ra t ional analysis su99ests

t ha t

an opponent's

behavior may well be di f fe rent when the stakes

are

high.

That

i s ,

pr ior

experience m y simply be i r relevant .

Maxim 7:

sequencing Rule

•

Deception ac t ivi t ies shouJd be sequenced so as

to

maximize

the

persistence

of

the

incorrect

hypothesis(es) for as long

as

possible. In

other

words,

Red-handed

a c t i v i t i e s

should

be deferred to the l as t possible

ins tant .

This

principle follows from Je rv i s Hypothesis No.

14,

a-ctors

tend to overlook the

fac t

t ha t evidence

consis tent with

the i r theories

may

also be

consis tent

with

other

views. (47) .

Jervis

i l l u s t ra t ed th i s

With

an

example from World

War

I I - - the All ied

surpr ise a t

the

German at tack on

Norway.

According to his sources, the

Allies had detected German ships moving towards Norway

but m is in terpreted

the

fac t

because they had

expected

an

attempt to

break through the

All ied

blockade in to the

At lan t i c .

The

poin t i s ra i sed

in

Je rv i s

paper as a

fa l lacy in

the

in te rpre ta t ion of

evidence.

In t h i s

32


41/63

context, however,

it

i s an active principle designed to

exploi t

th i s tendency to misperception.

Successful deception planners have always

understood

th is

principle in tu i t ive ly . While

discussing

a deception

operation which

took

place

short ly af te r

Anzio in the I ta l ian campaign, Sir David

Hunt

observed

almost

as an

aside

(48),

This shows, incidental ly , one of the reasons why

we decided

a9ainst

l ead ing

with

the

l e f t

handed

punch from Aazio: tha t the enemy reserves

were in

tha t neighborhood. I t also shows t ~ e advantage o f

the deception

plan

in tha t

an

at tack in

st rength on

the

Rapidq front would

e x a c ~ l X what the

enem1

would expect as

the f i r s t

move

in an at tack even i

the main mov w s to be

a

seaborne landing or

~ p T O n

from the bndgeheaq. Af t e r

a l l we h ~ d

done exactly

the

same

a t

the

time of

the

Anzio

l anding in January. Accordingly he might be

expected

to

be slow to

put

in h i ~ reserves against

it

unt i l

we

had

shown

our hand. (Emphasis

added)

Deferrin9 the r iskier

poLtions

of a deception may

also have the

advantage

tha t even i f the deception

plan

i s

compromised,

the opponent wil l

have

i n su f f i c i en t time

to

recover and

take appropriate act ion.

Maxim B:

The Importance 2 Feedback

33


42/63

•

A scheme to ensure

c c u r ~ t e

feedback increases

the chance of success

in

deception.

The

above principle is logical ly

vi r tua l ly

se l f -

evident. Such an idea has evolved independently in many

discipl ines. I t pervades most of control theory, has a

counterpart termed

11

the value

of perfect information° in

decision theory, and

i s

a

central

idea in the

theory

of

9 ames

(par t icular ly extended games). As

Comebacks t

is

a

Bri t ish

contr ibut ion to

the

jargon of

the

espionage/covert

action trade

(49).

Perhaps the most dramatic

example

of the

role

of

feedback

in wartime

deception was

the

in te l l i9ence

provided by ULTRA the

top

secre t espionage and

cryptographic breakthrough tha t enabled the

Bri t ish

to

read

the German Codes. In the view of many, ULTRA

information was

a key

element in the success of the

.Allied

invasion

o Normandy.

As

Lewin

SO)

remarked:

ti [Colonel .John] Bevan, head of LCS, and [Lt .-Col .

T.A.]

Robertson, head of Bia

section

of MIS, have

joint ly t e s t i f i ed to the author t ha t without ULTRA

the grea t o f d e c e p t i o ~ ~ p u n round Germans

could

never

have

been

devised .

Yet

without the i r

effor ts , OVERLORD

might

have been a disaster .

(Emphasis added.)

Even

a t

the simplest

operat ional

level ,

feedback

34


43/63

answers

the

quest ion , Is anybody l i s t en ing?

( i . e . ,

i s

this channel effective) , a s i _ } ~ 9:.1: .< to the design of

effective

deception.

I t

i s an

in te res t ing

footnote

to

the overall success of

the

Allied

D-Day

deceptions that

those directed a t orway

were

not successful . According

to Kahn

(51):

most of the energetic Al l i ed

radio

deception

in

the

north of Bri ta in to simulate the

preparations

o f

an

invas ion force

went unheard y the Germans.

The reasons seem to be

tha t not one

of

the

radio

reconnaissance

uni

t s

o f the

German

20th

Army,

occupyin9

Norway, was

paying

the l eas t b i t

o f

at tent ion: al l were far away

in

Finland, facing

eas t

and i s ten ing hard to the Russians. The

consequence

was t ha t

Roenne

concluded t ha t

any

landings in

orway

would be secondary;

Meyer

Detr inq concurred. Hitler believed the same thin9,

s ince

he

thought

the

main

invas ion

would

come

in

F ~ a n c e

Yet he never withdrew a

single

soldier

from

orway

to oppose th is main assault . Why?

Because

i t

was hi s

zone

o f dest iny in

the

war owing

to

i t s ab i l i ty

to protect

his shipments

o f

Finnish

nickel ore,

his

northern f lank, and

his

U-boat

departures. But All ied deception had nothing

to

do

with

a l l this .

Hit le r

kept

major

forces

in Norway

en t i r e l y on

his

own

vol i t ion .

This

i s an interest ing example of how deceptions

can

seem to fa i l , yet

succeed. In

pract ical terms, such

m i s i n t ~ r p r e t t i o n s o f

our

observed

response, or lack

thereof, often resu l t from

less

than perfect

understanding and modeling of the

deception

t a rge t .

35


44/63

I ron ica l ly the All ies knew through

ULTR

tha t German

t roops remained in Norway and

concluded on the bas is o f

th is

feedback

t ha t

the

deception

was

successful .

s Lewin

(52) noted:

On

Sherlock Holmes famous

principle

about

the

importance

o f

the dog t h a t did

not bark in the

night, the significant fac t for the deceivers in

London was that no

such

major movement of troops

from

Norway

was

disclosed on Ult ra up

to

and beyond

the tirne of

D-Day. Here

was cl inching evidence

tha t the

deception

plans were

working.

--evider.ce cons is ten t with

one hypothesis

rnay

also

be

consistent with

other

views (where have you read th i s

before?).

Maxim 9:

The

o n k e ~ Paw

• Deception effor t s

may prod1.:.ce

subtle

and

unwanted

side ef fects .

Planners

should be

sens i t ive to such

poss ib i l i t i e s

and, where

prudent, take s teps to minimize these counter

productive aspects.

Deception secur i ty

is one

of

the causes of

such

s ide-e ffec ts .

One o f

the

card ina l principles o f

deception folklore i s

that

deception security

is

of

the

36


45/63

highest importance.

I t

is generally

acknowledged

tha t

the

number of

witt ing

personnel should be

minimized,

even

to

the

point

of

misleading

your

own forces.

Professor

R.V.

Jones,

with a keen eye o f irony

recounts

one example

where concern over securi ty as

well

as .

uncertainty

of

success

o f

a

deception

operation resul ted

in an

unnecessary

mobi l iza t ion of forces.

Ci

t ing

an

example from World War I Jones writes (53):

[another

fe in t took place in

August

1916]

•• . with

the

object of

re l ieving pressure on the

Bri t ish

front l ine

by diver t ing

German t roops

to

prepare

fol . a

Bri t ish invasion

o f

North Belgium.

Hall

bui l t

up

the

in tel l igence picture for the Germans

by providing clues tha t would lead

them

s tep by

s tep

to

the desired conclusion. Besides care ful ly

spread

rumors,

Hall arranged for

signals to be

sent

to

ships in the bogus code ins t ruc t ing

them

for

the i r tasks

in

conveying the

invasion f lee t in the

qroups s tar t ing

from

Harwich, Dover, and

the

mouth

of the Thames,

where

a f l ee t of ~ o n t o r s and tugs

was being concentrated. As the f inal touch, he

orranged

for

a bogus

edi t ion

of

the

Daily

Mail to

be

printed

and withdrawn,

allowing

a few

copies

to

be sent

to

Hollandi

some

of these appeared to be of

a l a te r

censored edi t ion, the others

uncensored.

The censored copies had one item missing, of

which

the

headline

ran, East

Coast

Ready. Great

Mili tary Preparations. Flat

Bottom

Boats, and the

ar t ic le

reported the large concentrat ion

o f

troops

in

the

eastern and southeastern counties. Can

we

see

here

the ancestor of the deception plan for

D-

Day in

1944?

The

ruse

was

successful,

and

the Germans

moved

a

large

number of troops to

the

Belgian

coast ; but

t had an

awkward

consequence.

Sr i

t i sh

agents

began to repor t

German troop movements,

and

our

7


46/63

554

aut.hori t i e s

who

were unaware of Hal l s e f fo r t s

concluded tha t the

Germans must be

intending

an

invasion of England, 9ivin9 r i se to the worst

scare

in 8ri ta in in World War

I .

Hall could not

be

absolutely

certa in

tha t

his

ef for ts

were

the only

cause o the

Ge1 man movements

and so he had to

watch

in s i lence.

11

Another example of a possible unwant. d side

effec t

of

a

deception operation occurred

fa i r ly

frequently in

World War I

I .

As Cruickshank notes ( 61};

When

the propagandists

implemented

a

deception

plan they had

to

s teer a d i f f i c u l t middle course

between convincing the Germans tha t an Allied

a t tack was imminent, and encouraging resis tance

groups

to

90 into act ion in

support

of an at tack

tha t

would never mater ia l ize , who would then find

themselves

exposed

to the fu l l weight of German

repr isa ls . In any case, it

was

bad for morale i

hopes of l ibe ra t ion were

raised

by

the

voice of

London' only to be dashed

.••

But in France PWE had

already

cried

'Wolf' twice . . . and there was a

rea l

danger tha t French

res is tance

would

cease

to

believe anything London said.

Fortunately,

th i s problem was

ant ic ipated

and elegant ly

countered,

In

connection

with the

otherwise

unsuccessful operation

STARKEY for instance,

the

BBC

broadcast

the

sub t l e

message (62);

Be careful of German

provocation.

We have learned

tha t the

Germans

are

c i rcula t ing inspired rumours

t h a t

we

are

concentrat ing

armies

on

our

coasts

with

38


47/63

fr.tentions

of

invading

the continent. Take no

not ice

as these provocat ions

are

intended

to

create among you manifestat ions and d i so rder s which

t ~ Germans wil l use s

an

excuse

for repressive

measures

aga ins t

you.

Be

discipl ined1

use

dis

cret ion,

and maintain order,

foe when

the

time

comes

for

action

you wil l be advised in advance.

thus leaving t

to

the

Germans

to

decide the

significance

of

the message and the poss ib i l i ty t might

be a clever

ruse

while

ensuring

tha t

the resistance

leaders had

no

basis for

action

whatever inference

they

drew vis-a -vis the

imminence o f invasion.

Another example

of

the Monkey's Paw phenomenon

concerns the unanticipated consequences o f

an otherwise

successful

German use of

decoy

V-2 s i tes . As

recounted

by

Jones (54):

Here the

Germans,

perhaps following the i r

e..


48/63

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

es t imate the number o f rockets

s ~ o r e eas t

o f the

Seine,

and

hence to es t imate the intended monthly

ra te o f

f i re . The

answer

came out a t about 800;

af te r the war we found t h a t

the

in tended ra te o f

f i r e

had

been

900

a

month.

e

had

therefore

managed

to

achieve

a

12

percent

accuracy

in our

est imate, which would not have been possib le

had

the Germans not t r i ed to

deceive

us .

A f inal example offered in t h i s connect ion

dates

from 1940 / l in Eas t Afr ica . Gen.

Wavell

wanted the

I ta l ians to

bel ieve t ha t he was planning

to

a t tack them

in Abyssinia from the south o f a posi t ion. In t h i s

way

he hoped to diver t I t a l i an forces from t he point of

in tended a t tack in the nor th .

But,

according

tQ Mure

(64

emphasis

added):

"The deception went

very

well and the

I ta l ians

f e l l

for the s to ry o f the a t tack in

the

south, with a

r esu l t which was exact ly the r e v e ~ s e o f what Wavell

wanted.

They

draw back in the

south,

presumably

in

the expectat ion t ha t the a t tack

there

was

bound

to

succeed and

the damage

to t he i r forces would be

l es s

i

a

withdrawal

was

made

perhaps

to

a

shor te r

l i n e and no pitched ba t t l e was jo ined. At the same

t ime,

they sen t what

they

could spare to re in force

the

Northe1-n

Flank where they did

not expect an

at tack but which was

the

t rue Bri t i sh object ive.

The valuable lesson learned was tha t the decept ion

plan

must

be

based

£

you want the

enemy

Q

~ · never

£

what ~ O l f him Q

th ink.

Next

t ime,

a l so in

Abyss1n1a, Dudley arranged for the

I ta l ians to f ind out exac t ly

where

the Bri t i sh

a t t a c k

was

to be made

and

th i s

ensured t h a t

there

was no opposi t ion "

40


49/63

The point to

be

drawn

from the fore9oin9

examples

is tha t

there

may

be subtle

costs to a deception which

should

e n t e ~

in to

the

deceiver 's

cos t /benef i t calculus.

I t i s

unreal is t ic

to expect tha t a l l

o f these

possib i l i t ies can

be

foreseen b

in i t io . Nonetheless, a

sensi t iv i ty

to such possib i l i t ies

i s

desirable.

Maxim 10:

care in

the

Design o f Planned Placement

of Deceptive Material

•

Great

ca re

must

be

exercised

in

the

design

of

schemes

to

leak notional plans. Apparent

windfalls

11

are subject to close scrutiny

and

often

disbelieved.

Genuine leaks often occur

under circumstances

thought

improbable.

l wo incidents can serve to

i l lus t ra te

th i s

pr inc ip le .

Ear ly

in

World

War I I a

Cerman a i rc ra f t

heading for Cologne became los t and made a forced

landing

near

Malines

in

Sel9iu.m. The

three passengers,

two

Wehrmacht officers

and a

Luftwaffe Major, were soon

arres ted

by Belgian author i t ies .

Taken to

the police

stat ion

and l e f t alone brief ly they made an attempt to

burn some documents

they

cia deception maxims: fact and folklore

Documents