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Supporting the IISecret War"

CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974 (U)·William M. Leary

"Air America, an airlinesecretly owned by the

CIA, was a vitalcomponent in the

Agency's operations in, Laos.

"

·William M. Leary is a Professor ofHistory at the University of Georgia.

The largest paramilitary operationsever undertaken by the CIA tookplace in the small Southeast AsianKingdom of Laos. For more than 13years, the Agency directed nativeforces that fough t major North Viet­namese units to a standstill. Althoughthe country eventually fell to theCommunists) the CIA remainedproud of its accomplishments inLaos. As Director of Central Intelli­gence (DCI) Richard Helms laterobserved: "This was a major opera­tion for the Agency.... It tookmanpower; it took specially qualifiedmanpower; it was dangerous; it wasdifficult." The CIA, he contended,did "a superb job." 1

Air America, an airline secretlyownedby [he CIA) was a vital component inthe Agency)s operations in Laos. Bythe summer of 1970, the airline hadsome two dozen twin-engine trans..ports, another two dozen shore..takeoff-and-Ianding (STOL) aircraft,and some 30 helicopters dedicated tooperations in Laos. There were morethan 300 pilots, copilots, flightmechanics, and air-freight specialisesflying out of Laos and Thailand. Dur­ing 1970, Air America airdropped orlanded 46 million pounds of food­stuffs-mainly rice-in Laos.Helicopter flight time reached morechan 4,000 hours a month in the sameyear. Air America crews transportedtens of thousands of troops and refu­gees) flewemergency medevacmissions and rescued downed airmenthroughout Laos, inserted andextracted road-watch teams) flewnighttime airdrop missions over theHo Chi Minh Trail, monitored sen..sors along infiltration routes,conducted a highly successful photore..

connaissance program, and engaged innumerous clandestine missions usingnight-vision glasses and state-of... the...artelectronic equipment. Without AirAmerica's presence, the CIA's effort inLaos could not have been sustained.

A Distorted View

Air America's public image has faredpoorly. The 1990 movie Air Americais largely responsible for this. It fea­tured a cynical CIA officer whoarranged for the airline to flyopiumto the administrative capital of Vien­tiane for a corru p[ Asian general­loosely modeled on Hmong leaderYang PaD-where he manufactured itinto heroin in a factory just down thestreet from the favorite bar ofAirAmerica's pilots. The Asia general, inreturn, supplied men to fight the war,plus a financial kickback to the CIA.Ultimately, we learn that the Com­munist versus anti-Communist warin Laos was merely a facade for thereal war, which was fought for can ...trol of the area's opium fields.

Air America pilots in this film are por­trayed as skilled at landing damagedairplanes, but basically a wildly unpro·fessional menagerie of party animals,including few borderline psychotics.These ill-disciplined airmen are notthe villainsof the Story; theyaremerely pawns in a drug game that theyeither disdain or oppose outright.

ABum Rap

The connection among Air America,the CIA, and (he drug trade in Laoslingers in the public mind.

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"The film, according to the credits,was based on Christopher Robbins'sbook about the airline, first pub­lished in 1979 under {he title AirAmerica/: Although Robbins laterclaimed chat the movie distorted hisbook,3 it followed closely the book'stheme if notits details. Both movieand book contend that the CTA con­doned a drug trade conducted by aLaotian client, both agree that AirAmerica provided the essential trans­portation for the trade, and "bothportray the pilots sympathetically.

Robbins provides factual details thatthe movie lacks, Citing Alfred W.McCoy's 1972 study, The Politics ofHeroin in Southeast Asia, he relateshow Air America helicopters col­leered the opium harvests of 1970and 1971, then flew the crop to YangPao's base at Long Tieng in themountains of northern Laos, where itwas turned into heroin at the gen~

eral's drug laboratory.f

My nearly twO decades of researchindicate that Air America was notinvolved in the drug trade, AsJosephWestermeyer, who spent the years1965 to 1975 in Laos as a .physician,public health worker, and researcher,wrote in Poppies, Pipes, and People:"American-owned airlines neverknowingly transported opium in orQueof Laos. nor did their Americanpilots ever profit from its transport.Yet undoubtedly everyplane in Laoscarried opium at some time,unknown to the pilot and his superi­ors-just as had virtually everypedicab, every Mekong River sam­pan, and every missionary jeepbetween China and the Gulf ofS· ,,5lam.

If the CIA was not involvedin thedrug trade, it did know about it. Asformer OCT William Colby acknowl­edged, the Agency did little about it

52

,The story ofthe real AirAmerica begins in

1950, when the CIAdecided that it required

an air transportcapability to conductcovert operations inAsia in support of US

policy objectives.

"during the 1960s, but later it tookaction against the traders as drugs

. became a problem among the troopsin Vietnam. The CIA's main focus inLaos remained on fighting the war,not on policing the drug trade.6

How It Began

'The story of the real Air Americabegins in 1950, when the CIAdecided that it required an air trans­port capability to conduct covertoperations in Asia in supporc of USpolicy objectives. In August 1950, theAgency secretly purchased rheassetsof Civil Air Transport (CAT), an air­line that had been started in Chinaafter World War II by Gen. Claire L.Chennault and Whiting WiHauer.CAT would continue to flycornmer­cial routes throughout Asia, acting inevery way as a privately owned com­mercial airline. At the same time,under the corporate guise of CA'rIncorporated, it provided airplanesand crews for secret intelligenceoperations.I

In the 1950s, the CIA's air propri­etary, as it was known in [he lexiconof intelligence, was used for a varietyor covert missions, During cheKorean war, for example, it mademore than 100 hazardous overflightsof mainland China, airdroppingagents and supplies.

Supporting the French

CAT also became involved in theFrench war against Communistinsurgen{s in Indochina. I n April1953, the French appealed co Presi­dent Eisenhower for the use of USAir Force C-119 transports and crewsto fly tanks and heavy equipment totheir hard-pressed forces in Laos."Having such equipment," theFrench emphasized, "might mean thedifference between holding and los­ing Laos.u8

While reluctant to commit Americanmilitary personnel to the war inIndochina, the Eisenhower adminis..nation was anxious to assist (heFrench, This led to a decision to useCAT pilots [0 flyan airlift in US AirForce-supplied C.. 119s. In earlyMay, a group of CAT personnelarrived at Clark Air Force Base in thePhilippines for 72 hours of concen­trated ground and flight school onthe unfamiliar C-119s. On 5 May,they flew SlX of the transports, nowbearing the tricolored roundels of theFrench Air Force, to Gia Lam air­base, outside Hanoi.

Operation SQUAW began the nextday. It continued unti116 Jufy, withCA~r pilots making numerous air­drops to French croops in Laos. Withthe waning of the Vietrninh offen­sive) which was more due to theweather than French resistance, theCAT crews were withdrawn.9

The war in Indochina, however, con­tinued to go badlyfor the French. InNovember 1953) French paratroopersoccupied Dier Bien Phu in northwest­ern Vietnam, 10 miles from the Laosborder, and establishedan airhead.Gen. Henri Navarre, French militarycommander, wanted to lure the Viet­minh into a setpiece battle in whichsuperior French firepower could. be

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AirOperations

G l.11 f o f

Thailand

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148~62 'R01.(14) 1·99

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1.50Kllomet~

j .i 150 Milos

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o1

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f\ .:

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Boundary ~prc'scntatlon Isnotn~'CssDNl)\auu,orltativa.

Unelassilled

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AirOperations

"used to good effect. Among the manymistakesmade by the French in plac­ing their troops 220 miles from Hanoiwas their miscalculation of the airtransport resources needed to keeptheir isolated forces supplied. Col.Jean-Louis Niece, head of the FrenchAir T ransporcCommand in Indoch­ina, lacked sufficient aircrews to meetthe Army's demands. Unless addi­tional assistance could be obtained, theFrench garrison could not be kept .supplied.10

In early January 1954, Washingtonalerted CAT for a possible return toIndochina. Under a contract signedwith French authorities on 3 March,CAT would supply 24 pilots to oper­ate 12 C.. 119s that would bemaintained by US Air Force person­nel. Operations from Hanoi's Cat Biairfield to Dien Bien Phu got underway just as the Vietrninh began theirassault on (he French posicion.Between 13 March and the fall ofDien Bien Phu on 7 May,CAT pilotsflew 682 airdrop missions [0 the belea­guered French troops. One plane wasshot down in early May) and the twopilots were killed; many other C-119ssuffered heavyflak damage, and onepilot was severely wounded.

CA~r operations continued inIndochina after the fall of Dien BienPhu. Between mid-May and mid­August, C-119s dropped supplies toisolated French outposts and deliv­ered loads throughout the country.CAT also supplied 12 C-46s forOperation COGNAC, the evacua­tion of people from North Vietnamto South Vietnam following the sign­ing of the Geneva Agreement on 21July 1954. Between 22 August and 4October, CAT flew 19,808 men,women, and children out of NorthVietnam. It also carried members ofthe CIA's Saigon Military Mission

54

Laotian independence. suited the policy of the

United States, so long asthe governmentremained non­

Communist.

"north of the 17th parallel. Atternptsby the CIA to establish staybehindparamilitary networks in the north.however, proved futile.I I

Concern About Laos

The Geneva Conference of 1954, inaddition to dividing Vietnam at the17th parallel, confirmed [he status ofLaos as an independent state. Thenation would be ruled by the RoyalLao Government from Vientiane onthe Mekong River. Members of thepro-Communise Pathet Lao wouldregroup in the northern provinces ofSam Neua and Phong Salypendingintegration into the central regime.The French were allowed to main..rain a small militarypresence in thecountry to train the Royal Lao Army(FAR).

Laotian independence suited the pol..icy of the United States, so long asthe government remained non...Com­munist. Laos represented one of (hedominos in Southeast Asia that con­cerned President Eisenhower andSecretary of State John Foster Dulles.Although the country had lirrleintrinsic value, its geographical posi­tion placed it in the center of (heCold War in Southeast Asia. If Laosfell to the Communists, Thailandmight be next, according co the dom­ino theory. And the collapse ofThailand would lead. [0 Communistdomination ofSoutheast Asia":-andperhaps beyond.12

US Aid

Under an agreement signed in 1950,the United States had been supply... ·ing economic and military aid to .Laos. Following the Geneva Confer­ence, Washington decided co expandthis program. In January 1955, itestablished the United States Opera...tions Mission (USOM) in Vientianeto administer economic assistance. Atthe end of the year, the ProgramsEvaluation Office (PEO)-s[affed byreserve or retired military officers andakin to a Military Assistance Advi­sory Group-was set up withinUSOM to handle military aid. l 3

CAT soon became involved inUSOM's aid program. In July 1955.USOM officials learned that a ricefailure threatened famine in severalprovinces in Laos. As a number ofthese areas were in remote, moun­tainous regions, airdrops would bethe only feasible means to deliveringessential supplies of rice and salt.Three CAT C-46s arrived at thenortheastern railhead of Udorn,Thailand, on 11 September co beginthe airlift. By the end of the month,CAT had flown more {han 200 mis­sions to 25 reception areas, delivering1,000 tons of emergency food. Con-ducted smoothly and efficiently, thisairdrop relief operation marked thebeginning of CAT's-and, later, AirAmcrica's-s-support of US assistanceprograms in Laos.14

CAT)s permanent presence in Laosbegan on 1July 1957, when Bruce B.Blevins brought C-47 B-817 to Vien..tiane [0 servicea new contract withthe US Embassy. Blevinsfound flyingconditions primitive in Laos. At leastVientiane had a pierced steel plankrunway and the only control tower inLaos. Elsewhere, he usually landed ondire strips chathad been built to

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support Japanese fighters duringWorld War II. There were no aero­nautical charts available, so he had touse French topographical maps. Theonly radio aid to navigation in thecountry was a 25-watt nondirectionalbeacon at Vientiane that was operatedby employees ofAir Laos, the coun­cry's commercial airline, who turned iton when it suited them. I5

Between 1957 and 1959, the unsta­ble political situation in Laos led to agrowlng American presence in thecountry as the United Staresincreased its support of the FAR. AirAmerica-s-rhe name changed on 26March 1959,primarily to avoid con­fusion about the air ~roprietary's

operations in Japan 1 -providedessential transportation for theexpanding American effort in Laos.The airline's C-47sand C-46s passedmore frequently through Vientiane 'tofulfill urgent airdrop requests. Blevinsalso was kept busy, landing through­out the country and makingnumerous airdrops to isolated FARposes. He developed an especiallyclose relationship with a CIA caseofficer who had arrived in October1958 and who was assigned to sup"POrt Capt. Kong Le's parachutebattalion. The case officer frequentlycalled on Blevins to carry personneland supplies.

The summer of 1959 saw the intro­duction into Laos of a US SpecialForces Group, codenamed Hotfoot,under the command of Lt. Col.Arthur "Bull" Sinlons. TwelveMobile Training Teams took upduties at Vientiane, Luan~ Prabang,Savannekhet, and Pakse. 1 Theappearance of the Americans coin­cided with (he outbreak of fightingbetween the FAR and Pather Lao. Inlight of these developments, CIA

"By June 1960, it hadbecome clear that

helicopters would forma permanent part ofAir

America's operationsin Laos.

"officials in Laos requested additionalair transport resources.

Increasing Air Support

In August 1959,CIA headquartersordered its air proprietary to send twopilots co Japan for helicopter training.Robert E. Rousselor, vicepresident foroperations, remembers being calledinto PresidentHugh L. Grundy'sofficein Taipei and shown the rnes­sage. The requirement had "come outof the blue.n He assumed that the CIAhad a specialoperation in mind thatcalled for the use of a helicopter andchat it would be "a one-time deal." Lit...de did Rousselor realize that this wouldbe the beginning of a ma~or rotary- .wing operation in Laos. 1

Eventually, four CAT pilots weretrained on US Air Force H-19A heli­copters in Japan and the Philippines.The CAT contingent did not reachLaos until March 1960. Due co theoperating limitations of the H-19s,the underpowered helicopters couldfly only at lower elevations in thecountry. Generally, they were used tocarry CIA case officers to meetings inoutlying areas and to distribute leaf­lets during elections.19

ByJune 1960, it had become clear(hat helicopters would form a perma­nent part of Air America's operationsin Laos. Ir was equally apparent thatneither the underpowered H-19s northe inexperienced Air America rotary­wing pilots could do the job. Both

Air Operations

Rousselot and the CIA recognizedthat better equipment and properlytrained pilots were needed to acco~­

plish the mission. Rousselor hiredfour experienced US Marine Corpshelicopter pilots who obtained theirdischarges in Okinawa to fly theH-19s. Later in the year, the CIAarranged for the Marine Corps totransfer four UH..34 helicopters toAir America to replace the H-19s.20

The Melio Courier

At the same time that Air Americawas trying to develop a rotary-wingcapability in Laos, the company alsowas raking steps to introduce STOLaircraft 'inro the country. Maj. HarryC. Aderholt) a US Air Force detaileewith rhe CIA, had supervised thedevelopment of the Helio Courierwhile serving with the Agency)s airbranch. Convinced that the aircraftcould survive the short, rugged air..strips often found in remote areas, hebecame the foremost advocate for AirAmerica's adoption of the HelioCouricr.21

Air Americaobtained a Helio for tri­als in Laos in the fall of 1959. TheSTOL program got off co a poorstart. The Helie's engines provedtemperamental, frequently develop­ing vapor locks on starting. Mud,rocks, and gravel tended to block theaircraft's crosswind landing gear. Therudder needed modification so that, itwould not jam. Also, the first pilotswho flew the airplane were used tomultiengine transports and did notreceive adequate training on an air..plane that demanded special handlingtechniques.

AirAmerica carneclose to abandoningthe Helio. It wassavedby Aderholt,

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'I

Approved for Release: 2015/02/11 C05460723..... __. _,...._.. _.. .._~__. .~_.__~_._.~. _

i1irOperations

,\~{ A.ln«:.!-.,i ltJ {·.h".!\ Sali111'\u(\bi 1 H.J~. 196t. Thl' ~~h;rttcl''''''' man at lh~ left j~ Ed~.lf "Pop" Buell, scrn«t lJSAU) Qffi ..~I.:,I.tt S.un ThcHlg P11~HqI•.llllfh·'''f Il.i·Le. l~d.lH.\ldt. (l,i)

\\'hn bclicv,..d in the..' ,1ir":"J!C's (;lp~lbil·

ity and \V.l~ d~'t\"rrnith:d (0 ~~:t~ it work,;lJh.: hy ROll':lS\:loL ,\ ho f\.:~ln7d that the,'I A \~\)uld t.~jv.~ tht' ~'l {)l, mission h}

'1 ri\'.11l..·()tnf.:~rl\:.~,..J)ird (,\: Son-·if AirI\{n<.:rir..:~~ provl,:·t.! H1ClpJhk of doing the:job. E,l!'l~r ill 19(}O. RUll~S(~I()t assign(.xlRon.dd J. :)lltphili. J. tJlen{~dli~hr.

pi-tnt' pilot, to rhe prol<..'ct~ BothAdt..T­holt JIltl R()tl,~<:kH :lg1"\.": that it wasSlltphlll'J\ ~kiEflll ,-k'nHH1"~n;J.tH)n ()ftht~

L\tt"iol\.Iln~H!' l..\tp~1hiHry or the S'l'()L

56

~llf(ralt ihnlcd rh\'" (.:lA, to grc;:dvexpand the ~)l'ograrn, ,. .

Supporting tile Anti.:·ConullUllists

in ,AUgll~l 1960, Pn,'!"idl.'rll Fi~~i1­

howt.:r" cnn:1plaincd at :1 I'rcs~conference that "1..10\ is J vcrv con ..·fu,(.:d,i\\httivfl .. '~ C..ivil war had

broken out between rhc ncut r(~1 i~t

({)(c,.;" of par\{troop commander KOll!4L\,· and righi\\'in~ (;:.:n. I'houmiNosa\'~tn. '11K Cunununi« I\nh\.'lLao 'lupponcd J'ong 1c, while tht, t:Srnilitary ~lPd ClA lined up behindPhourni. As j\dn1. Harry f). f~lc

C:uloJll,H",dt'r in C:hit-fof rhe l'a(ifi,Flet-r (·xpl;tjnt·d: "Phourui IS no<.;<.~orgt· \\',l~hlngr\Ht. However, hi.:' i~

anti-t .ornmunisr. which is what

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Air Operations

counts most in the sad Laossituation. ,,22

As Phoumi prepared {O march onVientiane from his base in Savanna­khet, US assistance to the rightwinggeneral increased sharply. SpecialForces personnel conducted inten­sive training of Phourni's troops,while Air America transport flew insupplies from Bangkok. Phourni alsoobtained support from his closefriend, Thai Prime Minister MarshalSarir Thanarat, who sent teams fromthe elite Police Aerial ReinforcementUnit to work with Phourni's soldiers.

Heavy fighting took place in Decem.ber as General Phoumi drove KongLe out of Vientiane. By the end ofthe year, Kong Le-who was nowreceivingsupport from a Soviet air­lift-had retreated north to thePlaine des [arres (POJ), securing thevital airfield complex in that area.23

The appearance of the Sovietsalarmed American military authori­ties. Admiral Felt cabled the JointChiefs of Staff on 29 December;UWith full realization of the serious­ness of the decision to intervene, Ibelieve strongly that we must inter­vene now or give up northern Laos."Chief of Naval Operations Adm.Arleigh Burke agreed. "If we loseLaos," he told the Joint Chiefs on 31December, "we will probably loseThailand and the rest of SoutheastAsia. We will have demonstrated tothe world chat we cannot or will notstand when challenged.U The effect)Burke warned, would soon be feltthroughout Asia, Latin America, andAfrica.24

In preparation for possible US mili­tary intervention in Laos, the JointChiefs ordered the emergency rnobili­zation of a cask force at Subic Bayin

the Philippines. On New Year's day,the American warships left port andheaded north. At the same time) Pres­ident Eisenhower was looking forways to stabilize the situation in Laoswithout the need to introduce Ameri­can [TOOpS into the conflict. Hetherefore viewed with favor a pro­posal by the CIA to arm and trainHmong tribesmen.

The PARU Program

The Hmong project was primarilythe work of CIA paramilitary special­ise James W. (Bill) Lair. A veteran ofWorld War II, Lair had joined theCIA at the outbreak of the Koreanwar. Assigned to Thailand, he hadworked as a civilian instructor withthe Thai Police Department in aCIA-sponsored program to enhancethe organization's ability to deal withthreats from Communist insurgents.Attached to the Border Police, Lairsoon encountered the problem ofassisting remote border outposts.When police units in outlying areasof Thailand were attacked by Com­munist guerrillas) it often took a weekto get reinforcements to the stations.He argued that it would be better tohave a parachute-trained unit forsuch emergencies. Although the ThaiArmy was not happy about theappearance of a paramilitary policeorganization, the Thai Governmentapproved its creation. Aware of {heArmy's sensitivity, Lair selected aninnocuous name for the new organi­zation: Police Aerial ReinforcementUnit (PARU).25

Lair was proud of his role in develop­ing the PARU program. He selected atraining camp in south Thailand andinitiated a rigorous program to createan elite paramilitary force. At onepoint, the PARU program was in

danger of losing CIA support. It wassaved through the intervention ofDesmond FitzGerald, chief of the FarEast Division in the Clandestine Ser­vice. By 1960, the PARU forcenumbered more than 400 highlytrained individuals.

Enter Vang Pao

The key to the Hmong program wasYang Pao, a Hmong military leaderwho commanded the FAR's lOthInfantry Battalion on the PO]. A tal­ented and ambitious officer, YangPao early had come to the attentionof Americans in Laos. In April 1957,the PEO had selected him to attend asix-month counterinsurgency train­ing program at the Scout Ranger Base .in Manila.

When fighting broke out in Laosatthe end of 1959, Yang Pao hadgrown concerned [hat the Hmongwere likely to suffer reprisals from theCommunists because of the Hrnongs'previous close association with theFrench. Encouraged by GeneralPhourni and assisted by a US SpecialForces team) he began to organize aHmong staybehind force on thesoutheastern edge of the POJ. If theCommunists occupied the Plaine,Yang Pao intended to relocate theHmong to seven strategic mountain­tops surrounding the PD} and carryon the fighr.26 .

Aware that Yang Pao was seekingGeneral Phoumi's assistance, Lairdecided to look into the possibility of.an expanded program with theHmong commander. In late Decem .. \ber 1959, Lair met with Yang Pao.VP, as he was known to the Ameri­cans) said that he either had to fightthe Communists or leave the coun...try; if the United States supplied the

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"weapons, Vang Pao said that hewould fight and chat he could easilyraise an army of 10,060.

Impressed with the Hmong com­mander, Lair returned to Vientianeand reported the contact to stationchief Gordon L. Jorgensen. As it hap­pened, Desmond FiezGerald waspassing through Vientiane en route toVietnam. jorgensensuggesred that heand Lair get together with FitzGer­ald for dinner. FitzGerald told Lairthat the PARV's assistance to Gen­eral Phoumi during his campaignagainst Kong Le had been wortheverything that the CIA had spent onthe program. Lair then outlined aprogram to support the Hmong.FitzGerald asked him to write up theproposal and send it coWashingcon.27

Although Lair "never thought theywould do ir," he quickly dispatchedan IS-page cable. A positive answer,he recalled, came back "surprisinglysoon." Lair's proposal also gained the.support of Admiral Felt and the StateDepartment. President Eisenhower,looking for ways to avoid directAmerican involvement in Laos, waswilling to go along with the CIA'sscheme.28

Backing the Resistance

With authorization to arm and train1,000 H mong as a test of the can..cepr. Lair again visited Yang Pao andarranged for an arms drop at PaDong, a mountaintop base south ofthe PO]. In January 1961, Air Amer­ica delivered weapons to the first 300trainees. The program nearly got offto a disastrous start when an AirAmerica helicopter, carrying Lair andthe PARU training team, crashed

58

As the Hmong forcegrew, so did Air

America's presence inLaos.

"after failing to clear a ridgeline whenapproaching the Hmong camp. For­tunately, there were no injuries.29

The PARU team conducted a three­day training program for the Hmong,involving the use of their weaponsand basic ambush techniques. Lairalso asked Yang Pao (0 select 20 menout of [he 300 for training as radiooperators. These individuals weresent to the PARUtraining camp insouth Thailand for instruction.

With the Hmong scattered on moun ..tainous terrain surrounding the PO])Lair recognized from the beginningrhat good communications would becrucial for effectiveoperations, andhe turned to Air America. In the earlymonths of 1961, Air America hadonlya handful of helicopters andSTOL aircraft available to supportCIA operations in Laos. ~rhischanged in early March, when thenew administration of PresidentKennedy became alarmed after KongLe and the Parher Lao captured a keyroad junction and threatened Vien­tiane and the royal capita] at "LuangPrabang. Kennedy again placed USmilitary forces in the region on alert,and he also authorized the transfer of14 UH-34 helicopters from theMarine Corps to Air America to beflown by Marine, Army, and Navy"volunteers.u30

On 29 March 1961, Clarence J.Abadie led a flight of 16 UH-34sfrom Bangkok coAir America's newforward operating base at Udorn in

northeastern Thailand, 40 milessouth of Vientiane. The helicopterforces soon became involved in sup­porting Hmong forces engaged in afierce battle with the Pathet Lao at Pa

.. Dong. On 30 May, [he first AirAmerica helicopter pilots died inLaos, when Charles Mateer andWalter Wizbowski crashed in badweather while trying to land suppliesto the besieged Hmong.3 1

Driven from Pa Dong, Yang Paomoved his headquarters to Pha Khao,10 miles to the southwest. In July,Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdalereported to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,President Kennedy's military adviser,that 13 PARU teams (99 men) were

, working with the Hmong, assisted bynine US Special Forces personnel.N lne CIA case officers were assignedto the Hmong program, with twobackups in Vientiane. More than ,9,000 Hmong had been equipped forguerrilla operations, with the possibil­ity of securing 4,000 additionalrecruits,32

As the Hmong force grew, so did AirAmerica's presence in Laos. To con­nect the scattered Hmong outpOStsthat were separated by mountainousterrain, Lair ordered the construc­tion of a chain of airstrips, labeledVictor Sites (later called Lima Sites),that could be used by Air America'sSTOL airplanes. In April 1961, Wil­liam R. Anderscvic had arrived inVientiane to take charge of AirAmerica's Helio program. Under-hisdirection, the number of STOL siresexpanded rapidly. Andersevic wouldlocate suitable areas, then arrange forlocal people to cut down trees andlevel the ground as best they couldwith their primitive equipment. Bythe summer of 1961, Andcrsevic hadgiven Lair a firm foundation uponwhich (0 build what would become

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an extensive network of STaL fields33throughout northern Laos.

Air America transports .alsowere thekey to feeding the people in theHmong villages where [he men had:gone off co fight. Lair had e~liste)?the assistance of Edgar M. ( Pop )Buell to deal with this program. AnIndiana farmer who had arrived inLaos in June 1960 to work with theInternational volunteer Service, BuelJproved an inspired choice for thetask. After a two-month trek aroundthe perimeter of the PO], Buellarranged through Lair for Air Amer..ica to make scheduled airdrops of riceto the Hmong villages.34

The Diplomatic Track

While the Hmong program wasexpanding) President Kennedy hadbeen seeking a diplomatic solution tothe situation in Laos. At a meeting inVienna in June 1961, Kennedy andSoviet Prime Minister NikitaKhrushchev issued a joint statementof support for "a neutral and inde­pendent Laos." At the same time,negoti,3{OrS met in Geneva to try towork out a settlement to (he 'problem.

On 23 July 1962) a formal" Declara­tion on the Neutrality of Laos"wassigned in Geneva. It provided for acoalition government and the with­drawal of all foreign troops from thecountry by 7 October. The UnitedStates pulled out its 666 militaryadvisers and support staff) and AirAmerica stopped dropping weaponsto the Hmong. Assistant Secretary ofState Averill Harriman, who wasintent on ensuring US compliancewith the Geneva accords, allowed theCIA to retain only two men in Laos

60

"While the Hmongprogram was

expanding, PresidentKennedy had been

seeking a diplomaticsolution to the

situation in Laos.

"to monitor Communist compliance. h h 35Wit t e agreement. ,

Air America's operations declinedsharply in 1963. Restricted to foodresupply to the Hrnong, which aver­aged 40 tons a month by summer,the airline laid off people and moth­balled airplanes. By May 1963,thenumber of UH-34s assigned toUdorn had dropped from 18 to 6.Flight hours, which had averaged2,000 per month before the Genevaaccords) dropped co 600. Ashelicop­ter pilot Harry Casterlin wrote to hisparents: "There are 37 ofus over hereand not enough work.... We aredoing virtually no flying in Laos

»36anymore.

A Broken Agreement

Reports reachingCIA Headquartersfrom its two officers in Laossuggestedthat the apparent quiet wasdeceptive.It soon becameclear that 7,000 NorthVietnameseArmy (NYA) troops hadnor left the country. In fact. the NYAwasexpanding its areasof control,attacking both neutralist and Hmongpositions throughout Laos. As Hmongammunition storesdwindled, WilliamColby, who was head of the CIA's Far ,East Division, pleaded to Harriman toallow the resumption of air shipments."My arguments became more force­ful,U Colby recalled, "reflectingtheintense cablesI was receiving from thetwo CIA officers who were still up in

the hills observingand reporting onwhat washappening.U Harriman reluc..randy approved anAir America arm.sdrop-along with instructions that It

be used for purely defense purposes.Further shipments followed. As Colbypointed out, however, Harriman per­sonallyapproved U each and everyclandestinesupply flight and itscargo.n37

Increasing Conflict

As Hanoi sent additional troops intoLaos during 1963, [he Kennedyadministration authorized the CIA toincrease the size of the Hmong army,now headquartered in the valley ofLong Tieng. By the end of the year) areported 20,000 Hmong were armed.They acted as guerrillas, blowing upNVA supply depots, ambushingtrucks, mining roads, and generallyharassing the stronger enemy force.Air America again took a greater rolein the slowly expanding conflict.«The war is going great guns now,"helicopter pilot Casterlin informedhis parents in November 1963."Don't be misled [by new reports]that I am only carrying rice on mymissions as wars aren't won byrice.n38

Full-scale fighting broke out in Laosin March 1964, when North Viee..namese and Parhet Lao forcesattacked across the POJ.By mid­May, the Communists had takencontrol of the strategic region, bring..ing an end to the already shakycoalition government.

Search and Rescue

While contemplating direct Ameri­can .milirary intervention) President

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Johnson ordered Navy and Air Forcereconnaissance flights over the PO] toprovide intelligence and to sendHanoi "a message of Americanresolve." On 6 June, a naval recon­naissance aircraft was shot down overthe PO]. As the military serviceslacked a search-and-rescue capabilityin Laos, Air America undertook theresponsibilicy.39

The unsuccessful attempt to rescue Lt.Charles E. Klusmann-who laterescaped from his captors40-markedthe beginning of what was perhaps themost demanding and hazardous ofAirAmerica's operations in Laos. The air­line's pilots were neither trained norproperly equipped for the dangeroussearch-and-rescue task, but there wasno one else to do the job. This mis­sion became even more difficultduring the first half of 1965, when theair war expanded into the northwest­ern portion of North Vietnarn.

As Air America crews in helicopters,transports, and T-28s risked theirlives to save downed US airmen,rumors grew chat the civilian pilotswere receiving a bounty of $1.500 foreach rescue. This story apparentlyoriginated with a US Air Force' cap­tain in the air attache's office inVientiane. Charged with briefing mil­itary pilots on rescue capabilities inLaos, he visited Air Force bases andUS Navycarriers, spreading (he wordchat airmen who were shot downoverLaos did not have to worry abou t

being picked up: AirAmerica's pilots,would be there to get them out, com­peting for the $1.500 bonus. 41

When the scary reached Air America,it created a good deal of resentment.In June 1965, after an especially haz­ardous long-range mission into NorthVietnam in which two helicopterswere badly shot up and a local Lao

'"The CIA was largelyresponsible for

conducting militaryoperations in Laos, butthe USAmbassador was

the ~an in charge.

"commander killed in what turned outto be a successful rescue of two AirForce officers from a downed F-4C,one of the Air America helicopterpilots wrote: "The AF doesn't, I'msure, appreciate what we are doing forthem at great risk co ourselves....What makes us mad is that the AFthinks we get $1,500 for a pickup.We get nothing-but ulcers.,,42

Not Very Secret

The year 1965 marked the beginningof major military activity in whatbecame known as the secret war inLaos. Although the full extent of theconflict was not revealed to theAmerican people until 1969..70, thewar was not all chat secret. News ofthe fighting frequently found its wayinto the pages of The Bangkok Post,TheNew York Times, and other news­papers. Congress certainly was keptwell informed. As former CIA Direc­tor Richard Helms has pointed out,the Appropriations subcommitteesthat provided the funds for the warwere briefed regularly. Also, SenatorStuart Symington and other Con­gressmen visited Laos and gave everyindication ofapproving what was

'- happening. They believed, Helmsnoted, that "It was a much cheaperand better way to fight a war inSoutheast Asia than to commit Amer..ican troops. ,,43

The CIA was largely responsible for'conducting military operations inLaos, but the US Ambassador was the

Air Operations

man in charge. The secret war in Laos,author Charles Stevenson has empha­sized, "was William Sullivan's war."Ambassador from December 1964 toMarch 1969, Sullivan insisted on anefficient, closely controlled countryteam, "There wasn't a bag of ricedropped in Laos that he didn't knowabout," observed Assistant Secretaryof State William Bundy. Sullivanimposed two conditions upon hissubordinates. First, the thin fiction ofthe Geneva accords had to be main ..rained to avoid possible embarrass...ment to the Lao and Soviet Govern­ments; military operations, therefore,had to be carried out in relativesecrecy. Second, no regular USground troops were to becomeinvolved. In general, AmbassadorSullivan, and his successor,G. McMurtrie Godley, successfullycarried out chis policy.44

Activity at Udorn

The Ambassador in Vientiane dele­gated responsibility for the tacticalconduct of the' war to his CIA sra...tion chief. The primary headquartersfor supervising the war, however) wasin Udorn, Thailand. Located adja­cent to the Air America parking rampat Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base,the 4802nd Joint Liaison Detach­ment was the CIA's command centerfor military operations in Laos. Lairwas in charge of the 4802nd until thesummer of 1968, when he wasreplaced by his longtime deputy,Lloyd ("Pat") Landry.

Both Lair and Landry had excellentrapport with Gen. Vhoon Yasawatdi,commander of "Headquarters 333" atUdorn, the Thai organization in chargeof their forces in Laos. The Thai gen­eral, who had direct, private accesscoboth the Lao and Thai prime

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rninistcr-, h.{d been itkntified bvones..'t1i·,H C:L\uftltt'f as "rhe singk~n,osr.~tntport-.HH.I)h~)!t.,t in the 1..410~ \,.. .

"if)rH~gi ,J.t'll.

Weather and the War

The early years of the war took on u\~a~on.!l aspect, [Juring tlH' dr:

G2

period. which las.ed lrom October to:\'L~r, the North \li~t'n.1l1h·St~ .mdPathcr Laowent on t.h~ ()h~nsivt\

applying pressure on rhe 1-1 tnong innorthern Laos 4lnd on g,.lv\,.'nunentt()rCt'~ rhroughour the (QUIHTV,

[)ul'ing the ~lon~onH7 Ll~tillg' IrornJune to September, the anti-Comrnu­nisrs rook advaruage of the mobilityprovided by Air Arneri ...:a and struckt.tccp into crH..·q,y"o(.;cupi~d territory.

The situation was J rrurrur image ofVietnam. In L.10~1 the Communistsacted as fa <':0n\'~11 tinual III ifirarv furct"

and were tied to fixt·d supply line,.;.1"he: Hrnung, ..rr lc.:a.st at first', COUfl­

tcred with g~!crrilla tact in"

l he limited nature of the war \<\'.1-"

rt'Ht.'ctcd in' (he n){)dl~S( l(J~.)t..·s-~-Jt k:astmodest in comparison ('0 \Vh~H \"'-;,sahead -- "tufl~tt.~J by Air Arnerica

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during 1965) 1966) and 1967. Despitea rapid growth in personnel, Air Amer...ica lostonly 11 crew members in Laosduring these three years, five of whichwere due co enemy action.

North Vietnamese Pressure

The character of the war began tochange in 1968. The North Vietnam ...ese, impatient with the progress ofthe Parher Lao, introduced majornew combat forces into Laos andtook control of the year's dry seasonoffensive. By mid...March, they hadcaptured a strategic,valley north ofLuang Prabang', successfully assaulteda key navigational facility that wasused by the US Air Force for bomb­ing North Vietnam, and threatenedto push the Hmong out of theirmountaintop strongholds surround­ing the PO).

On 21 March 1968, CIA Headquar ..rers issued a Special NationalIntelligence Estimate (SNIE) to tOp"

level policymakers in Washington onCommunist Intentions in Laos.Despite the presence of 35,000 NVAtroops in the country, CIA analystsconcluded that Hanoi was mainlyinteresred in protecting its supplyroures to South Vietnam and did notwish to destroy the general frame..work of the 1962 Geneva .settlemenc.46

Events soon proved the SNIE to becorrect. The NYA offensiveendedwith the onset of the monsoon inMay. The Hmong, however, had,suf­fered heavy casualties, losing morethan 1.000 men since January,including many top commanders. Arecruitment drive turned up only 300replacements: 30 percent werebetween the ages of 10 and 14, 30

percent were 15 and 16, while theremaining 40 percent were all over35. According to "Pop" Buell, thosebetween those ages were all dead.47

Offensive andCounteroffensive

Asthe strength of the Hmong waned,the United States cried to redress thegrowing imbalance of forces in thefield through increased use of air­power. Between 1965 and 1968, therate of sorties in Laos had remainedfairly constant at 10 to 20 a day. In1969, the race reached 300 per day.48

During the rainy season of 1969,Vang Pao abandoned the use of guer­rilla tactics arid launched a majoroffensiveagainst the NVAlPathet Laoforces, using the increased airpowerto support a drive against enemypositions on the PD]. OperationAbout Face was a huge success. TheHmong reclaimed the entire PDj forthe first time since 1960, capturing1,700 tons of food, 2,500 tons ofammunition, 640 heavy wea~ons,

and 25 Soviet PT..76 tanks.4

But the victory was short ... lived. InJanuary 1970, the NVA brought intwo divisions that quickly regained allthe lost ground and threatened themajor Hmong base at Long Tieng.For the first time, B-52s were used toblunt the enemy drive.

NYA strength in Laoshad reached67,000 men, but CIA analysts contin­ued to argue chat the enemy did notwant to risk a decisive action. "TheCommunists believe that when theyobtain their objectives in South Viet­nam," the CIA's Office of NationalEstimates predicted in April 1970)"Laoswill fall into their hands.,,50

Losing Ground

The monsoon season of 1971 saw thelast major offensive operations by theHrnong, now assisted by growingnumbers of Thai volunteer battal­ions, trained and paid by the CIA.Vang Pao again captured the PO) inJuly and established a network ofartillery srrongpoints, manned byThai gunners. Yang Pao's hope ofretaining the POJ during the dry sea...son proved abortive. In December1971. the North Vietnameselaunched a coordinated assaultagainst the artillery bases. Using tanksand 130-mm guns that outranged theThai artillery, the NVA quicklyrecaptured the PDl.51

The last days of 1971 and earlymonths of 1972 saw increased enemypressure on the main Hrnong base atLong Tieng. Air America sufferedheavy lossesduring this period. InDecember alone, 24 aircraft were hitby ground fire and three were shotdown. Between December and April,six Air America crew members died'in Laos.52

The war also went badly in southernLaos, where the CIA recruited,trained, advised, and paid indigenouspersonnel that were organized intoSpecial Guerrilla Units. Heavy fight­ing cook place in 1971' for control ofthe strategic Bolovens Plateau, withAir America providing the essentialair transport for the CIA-led forces.By (he end of the year, however, (heNVA clearly held [he upper hand fol...lowing the capture of Paksong, 25mileseast of the Mekong River townof Pakse, on 28 December. 53

On 24 April 1972, Air America's vicepresident for flight operations sent atelex message addressed to all crewmembers. Noting that "the past few

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OHHlTh, hah' pruJu\. ~ti .in appJHin~~

[(iii In live'! ,ltld SCI hH/\ injuries," h\.'lJrt~cl1 .If! Hight crew... .urdsupervisorsttl n",(ppl,.~is': th\.' t:t~1or~ "whi... h fl1~d;c:

ilving in our on,-·~ ..Hlonl\.l p.ttticubdy\loforgi\ ing prt)h::,siGn. \'X'I: art: (;llk·dupun to pcrt~)! Itl under pns,~ibly th",nIO!,l dint,uh- l'nVirt~IHnt:nt.ll coruli..I ion, in t he world (.",'nsid..:ting th ......\.-I)nlhil1.1Cicn of h.'Jllute, mounturn­

\)U~ r<.'f' a11"1 , ab\,-n,;.,· ..· of modernnJ\"t~ ltior:.tl/conlnlunicati()n~and air

t1nfll~ control f~lCj~itit:S, .1~·d\"c pr~~~-·

t:ut(' of hl.)~('jl,· \lrnh·d f~)n.~:,;~ ;lh~t'n\-l~

uf ad~~l'!;Jrt· nl,,'ans of rt'p-\"lding .indt()rel_.~uttn~.~ the \Jl i,,'d .i,..\hol1al

wvarher aud \Vilhb•.lnd tnar~;inal .ijf'"

fld\t, ;111\1 bnd'ng /n1H~."', to n.im« ,1

t~'w <:x~uHpk:'\.'~ Ev<.:rYOltl.:1 hc v.vrm-d,

~Jlould ("'t~tci..,(;' C(tr~l1lt C.lutitln \v!t,'ji

OHldtKting f1i~ht \)rwr~Hidn~ if)f.~H\~_ t,-i

Closing Down

/\1 tlt<: .\~Hlll: tina.: dl,l; Ail .\IH~..ri(atlC\\·" \.\,,'I'c.: h,'iuf' runilidl:d JhOlll the

h..t/..tl'duu, II IlU/l~ of {IPl'LI(fl>II\ inl.aos, 1)('1 i ll'Jrn\ \\',b d(,("iding rl1 ...·tJh~ of 1ht~ air IJrupl i~.:l J r~. t)t. 21April 1q~'.2, h...· l~J1J\."d .1 h:flgttl\"d...+t.l(l..' \, ilhtll the (~L\ over tlu. corr-

t..inucd lh.'l'd t~)r a ,,(H'l'] t .lirlif[r.'p~d,iljty, and 111.' ordt'l,l:d tht' -\g\.ltl)

to di'"l'\t irsf~l of ()\\'ntT~hip Zll,d

;1

t~--~-~---. -~---------------~--~~._-----------------------~--~-~~~

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control of Air America and relatedcompanies. Air America would beretained only until the end of the warin Sourheast Asia.55

On 27 January 1973, the Paris agree­ment on Vietnam was concluded,providing for the withdrawal of Amer­ican troops. The following month, acease-fire agreement was signed inVientiane, leading to the formation ofa coalition governlnent for Laos.AIthough the end of the war wasclearly in sight, Air America contin­ued to lose people. Indeed, it issomewhat ironic that Air America suf­fered its heaviest losses in the rwo yearsfollowing the CIA's decision to termi­nate the company. Between April1972, when Helms issued his orders,and June 1974, when Air America leftthe country, 23 crew members died inAight operations in Laos.

On 3 June 1974, the lase Air Amer..ica aircraft crossed the border FromLaos into Thailand. The end wentwell, Air America's operations officein Vientiane informedWashington ... "and the departureofAAM from Laos was without inci­dent, although some lumps are visiblein the throats of those who pur somuch of themselves into the opera..rion over (he years.... We grieve forthose missing and dead in Laos andregret chat they coo could not haveenjoyed today." In all, 100 Air Amer..ica personnel had died in Laos.56

The base at Udorn shut down at theend ofJune. Operations in Vietnamcontinued until the fall of Saigon inApril 1975. When plans for a newscaybehind company in Thailand,staffed by a contingent of select heli­copter and transport pilots fellthrough, all Air America personnelwere discharged. The company finally

closed its doors on 30 ] une 1976,returning over $20 million to the USTreasury.57

A Distinguished Record

CAT/Air America performedsuperbly for the CIA. The skilled air­crews and ground personnel of the airproprietary had given CIA the airtransport capability that it requiredfor a variety of covert operations inAsia. Although the air complex hadcaused legal problems for the CIA'sDirectorate of Administration, thereis no question that personnel in theDirectorate of Operations consideredCAT/Air America as an essential toolfor their work.

During the war in Laos, Air Americawas called upon [0 perform paramili­tary (asks at great risks co the aircrcwsinvolv~d.AJthough lacking the disci­pline found in a militaryorganization, the personnel of the airproprietary nonetheless continued toplace their lives at hazard for years.Some Air America pilots flew in Laosfor more than a decade, bravingenemy fire and surmounting chal­lenging operational conditions withrare skill and determination. Aspointed out by a senior Agency offi­cial during the dedication of a plaqueto Air America personnel at CIAHeadquarters in May 1988: "The air­crew, maintenance, and otherprofessional aviation skills theyapplied on our behalf were extraordi­nary. But, above all, they brought adedication to our mission and thehighest standards of personal couragein the conduct of that mission.uS8

The exploirs of eAT/Air Americaform a unique chapter in the history

of air transport, one that deserves bet­ter than a m isleadi ng, mediocremovie.

NOTES

1. Ted Gininger, interview with Rich­ard Helms, 16 September 1981, OralHistory Program, Lyndon BainesJohnson Presidential Library, Austin.TX. For recent studies of the war inLaos, seeTimothy N. Castle, At Warin theShadowo/Vietnam.· U.S. Mili...tary Aid to the Royal Lao Gouernment(New York; Columbia UniversityPress, 1993); Jan Hamilton-Merritt,Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, TheAmericans, and Secret Wars for Laos.1942-1992 (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1993); KennethConboy and James Morrison, ShadowWar.' The CIAsSecret War in Laos(Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995);and Roger Warner, Shootingat theMoon.' TheStoryofAmericasClandes­tine War in Laos (South Royalton,VT: Steerforth Press, 1996), which isthe revisededition of Back Fire: TheCIASSecret War in Laos andIts Linksto the Warin Vietnam (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1995).

2. Christopher Robbins, Air America:TheStory oftheCIAsSecret Airlines(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,1979).

3. See Robbins, "'Air America' Doesn'tFlyRight,» The New York Times, 28August 1990.

4. Robbins, Air America, p. 138.

5. Joseph Westermeyer, Poppies, Pipes,and People: Opium and Its Use in Laos(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), p. 51.

6. Ted Gittinger, interview with Will­iam Colby, 2 June 1981, OralHistory Program, LB] Library.

7. For a detailed account of eAT, seePerilous Missions.' Civil Air Transport

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and CIA CovertOperations in Aria(University of Alabama Press, 1984).

8~ Sec Department of Defense, UnitedStates- Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967,12 books (Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1971), Book 9, p. 38.

9. Leary, Perilous Missions, pp. 164-67.

10. Bernard Fall, H(l{in a Very SmallPlace: TheSiege ofDim Bien Phu(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966),remains the standard account of thebattle.

11. Leary,Perilous Missions, pp. 181-92.

12. In US policy toward Laos,seeArthurJ. Dammen, Conflict in Laos: ThePol­icyofNeutralization, revised edition(New York: Praeger, 1971), andCharles A. Stevenson, The End ofNowhere: AmericanPolicy TowardLaos Since J954(Boston: BeaconPress, 1973).

13. Castle, At War in the Shadowo/Viet­nam, pp. 16..17.

14. "Rice Drop Over Laos," CAT Butlt~

tin 8 (December 1955), pp. 4-5.

15. Learyinterviewwith Blevins, 11July1987.

16. See "Minutes of Meeting on NameChange." 4 April 1959.in microfilmcollection of Air Americalegalrecords, in the author's possession.

17. See Conboyand Morrison, ShadowWar, pp. 20-21.

18. Leary interviewwith Rousselot, 10August 1987.

I 19. Leary interviewwith Dale D. Will..iamson, chief pilot of the firsthelicopter contingent to Laos, 13July1987.

20. Learyinterviewwith Rousselor, 10August 1987.

66

21. Leary interview with Aderholt, 28August 1990.

22. PublicPapers ofthe Presidents oftheUnited States, Dwight D. Eisenhower,1960-61. (Washington, DC: Govern­ment Printing Office, 1961), p. 641;Felt is quoted in EdwardJ. Mareldaand Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The UnitedStates Navy and the Vietnam Conflict:FromMilitary Assistance to Combat(Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1986), pp. 24-25.

23. Stevenson,Endof Notobere, pp. 110­20.

24. Felt and Burkeare quoted in Maroldaand Fitzgerald. UnitedState)Navy,p.55.

25. Leary interview with Lair) 3 July1993. Lair's story is best coldinWarner, Shooting at theMoon.

26. Jack F. Mathews to the author,15 February 1998.

27. Learyinterviewwith Lair, 3 July1993.

28. Ibid.

29. Hamilton-Merritr, Tragic Moun­tains,pp. 86..94.

30. Castle, At War in theShadow of Viet­nam, pp. 29-30, 43-44.

31. Abadie to Leary. 10June 1990;Hamilron-Merritr, Tragic Mountains,p.l08.

32. Lansdaleto Taylor, "Resources forUnconventional Warfare in S. E.Asia," n.d, [july 1961], in ThePenta­gonPapers - New York Times Edition(New York: Bantam books. 1971, pp.130-38.

33. Leary interviewwith Andresevic,19June 1987.

34. On Buell,see Don A. Schanche, Mis­terPop (New York; David McKay,

1970), and Warner, Shootingat th«Moon, passim.

35. William Colby, Honorable Men: My, Lift in the CIA (New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1978), pp. 19]-93.

36. Casrerlin to his parents, 24 January1963, copy provided to the author byCaptain Casterline

37. Colby, Honorable Men, pp. 192-95.

38. Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Moun­tains, pp. 113-26; Casterlin to hisparents, 11, November 1963.

39. Mareldaand Fitzgerald. UnitedStatesNavy, p. 378.

40. For Klusrnann's account of hisescape,see his "The Price of Free­dom," Air AmericaLog /4 (October ..December 1997), pp. 12..15.

41. Leary interviewwith James L.Mullen, whoworked in AirAmer­ica's Flight Information Center in1965.13 July 1987.

42. Casterlin, "For Posterity," 21 June1965.

43. Gittinger interview with Helms,16 September 1981.

44. Stevenson, EndofNowhtre, pp. 208­18.

45. See the informative staff report of avisit to Laos by James G. Lowensreinand Richard M. Moose: US SenateSubcornrnitreeon US SecurityAgree­ments and Commitments Abroad ofthe Committee on Foreign Relations,Laos: April /97J, 92nd Cong., lstsess., 1971; Leary interview with Lan­dry, 3 July 1993.

46. CIA, Special National IntelligenceEstimate 58",60, Communist Inten­tionsin Leos, 21 March 1968,Declassified Documents ReferenceSystem (DDRS), 1989: 1865. For adetailed accountof the grou~d war in

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Laos, see Conboy and Morrison,Shadow War.

47. Robert Shaplen, Time Out ofHand,Revolution and Reaction in SoutheastAsia (New York: Harper and Row,1969), pp. 347·48.

48. Raphael Littauerand NormanUphoff (eds.). The Air Warin Indoch­ina, revisededition (Boston: BeaconPress, 1972), p. 79.

49. CIA, SNIE 14.3-1-70, North Vi'fl­

namese Intentions: Indochina, 3 June1970, DDRS 1980: 324.

SQ.. CIA, Office of National Estimates,Stocktakingin Indochina, 17 April1970, DDRS 1977: 270C.

51. Leary, "The CIA and the (SecretWar'in Laos: The Battle for SkylineRidge,1971-1972," TheJournal ofMi/itaryHistory 59 Ouly 1995): 505-18:

52. The Washington Post, 21 January1972

1,

53. On the war in the south, seeSoutchayVongsavanh, ccRLG Mili­tary Operations and Activities in the

Laotian Panhandle," Indochina Mono­graphs (Washington, DC: ArmyCenter of MilitaryHistory. 1981);and Conboy and Morrison, ShadowWllr.

54. AVPFO/DFD TPE [0 All ChiefPilots,27 April 1972, the papersofDavid H. Hickler, Air AmericaArchives, University of Texas atDallas.

55. United States Senate, SelectCommit­tee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect to Intelli...gence Operations [theChurchCommittee], Foreign and-MilitaryInttLLigtnc( - Book I - FinalRflJ.ort[No. 94·755], 94ch Cong., 2 d sess.(WaShington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1976), p. 241.

56. Telex, VP-NTD UTH to ChiefExecutive Office,3 June 1974, Hick­ler Papers.

57. 57.UnicedStates Senate, Foreign andMilitary intelligence, p. 239.

58. RemarksbyJamesN,.Glerum at theannual ceremony for CIA employeeswho lost their livesin line of duty,31 May 1988.

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