china’s political stability and comprehensive national...
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China’s Political Stability and Comprehensive National Power:
A Case Study of the Conflict in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region*
Wuttikorn Chuwattananurak†
Naresuan University
ABSTRACT
The concept of comprehensive national power (CNP) is proposed and developed by several Chinese
scholars and institutes. Many material capabilities, for example, economic growth, military might, etc.,
are thus incorporated into the concept to measure China's national power vis-à-vis other major powers,
especially the U.S. This paper, however, contends that understanding China's CNP through material
capabilities is only a part of the story. Yet, China's political stability is by no means assured and fully
incorporated into the concept. China has undoubtedly faced many threats and challenges to political
stability. This paper argues that, apart from Taiwan's controversial status and Tibet's sovereignty
debate, the conflict in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region not only threatens its political stability, but
also affects its CNP as a whole.
Since initiating the open door policy and economic reforms in 1978, China has shifted from a centrally
planned to a market based economy and experienced rapid economic growth and remarkable social
development. China’s economy has grown about 10% a year for over three decades. Life expectancy
of its population increases from 69.7 years old in 1991 to 73.3 in 2010 (The World Bank 2011).
Military expenditure has been growing year by year from USD 16,600 million in 1989 to USD
129,272 million in 2011, ranked second in the world’s top military spenders (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute 2011). China is a home to the world’s largest population of nearly 1.4 billion
(Population Reference Bureau 2012), covering the total area of over 9 million square kilometers,
ranked third after Russia and Canada. China also enjoys its international status as one of the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and one of five nuclear-weapon states under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Currently, China is the world’s second largest economy by GDP
size after the U.S.
With the remarkable success in economic growth and considerable political and diplomatic influences
on the world stage, ‘China’s rise’ becomes one of the most significant international relations narratives
in the twenty-first century. While most western scholarly literatures have focused on the questions of
whether China’s rise will be peaceful or violent, or how the U.S., other great powers and its
* Paper presented at the 23rd World Congress of Political Science, July 19-24, 2014, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Parts of
this paper are based on the research project supported by Naresuan University grant R2556C008. The author would like to
thank Tirote Thongnuan for his support and assistance. † Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, Naresuan University, Mueang,
Phitsanulok 65000 Thailand. Email: [email protected], [email protected]
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neighboring countries should accommodate or interact with the rising power (Choo 2009; Johnston
and Ross 1999; Kang 2007; Kirshner 2010; Li 2009; Ross and Feng 2008; Shiraishi 2012; Tammen
and Kugler 2006; Zhu 2005), several Chinese scholars have instead tried to attain a deeper
understanding of such phenomenon and China itself through the concept of comprehensive national
power (CNP) in order to measure China’s national power vis-à-vis other major powers, especially the
U.S.
However, this paper contends that understanding China's CNP through material capabilities, for
example, economic growth, military might, is only a part of the story. Yet, China's political stability is
by no means assured and fully incorporated into the concept. China has undoubtedly faced many
threats and challenges to political stability. Apart from Taiwan's controversial status and Tibet's
sovereignty debate, the conflict in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (henceforth referred to as
‘Xinjiang’) also represents a major headache for China. Not only does it threaten China’s political
stability, it also affects China’s CNP as a whole.
The first part of this paper will explore the concept of the comprehensive national power (CNP)
developed by Chinese scholars and institutes, while the significance and the need for incorporating
China’s political stability into the concept will be elaborated in the second part. The third part will
examine the conflict in Xinjiang as a case study to show how seriously China’s political stability has
been threatened. Implications of the Xinjiang case for China’s CNP will be discussed in the final part,
including the conclusion.
The Concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)
The concept of comprehensive national power (CNP) or zonghe guoli was first introduced in China by
1984 when Deng Xiaoping had called some Chinese scholars to explore the future security
environment as a part of the study of China’s strategic defense for the year 2000 (Pillsbury 2000, 225).
The CNP is the comprehensive national strength in various aspects. It includes territory, population,
natural resources, military power, economic wealth, political power, social conditions, domestic
politics, foreign policy, cultural influence, education, etc. (Pillsbury 2000, 203; Qiu邱 1998, 16; Mori
2007, 27). According to Hu Angang and Men Honghua of Tsinghua University, the CNP is defined as
the quantity of nation’s total power or strength in terms of economy, military might, science and
technology, resources, influences (Hu and Men 2004, 2). It is thus the aggregate of all these factors, as
Deng Xiaoping stated: "In measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively
and from all sides." (Pillsbury 2000, 204). From the Chinese perspective, measuring the CNP has two
main objectives: calculating the capabilities of great powers as to who would win or lose if there is a
war; and evaluating the potential of its strategic partners as well as adversaries.
The concept of CNP has been proposed and developed by several Chinese scholars from various
academic think tanks and institutions, including the Academy of Military Science of the People’s
Liberation Army (AMS PLA). Huang Shuofeng of the AMS PLA rejects the equation of national
power developed by Western scholars (Pillsbury 2000, 225). For him, the national power index
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developed by Ray Cline, a former high-ranking CIA official, lacks dynamics since the component of
science and technology is overemphasized (See Nye 2011, 4). Wilhelm Fucks’s proposal, which
heavily focused on material or hard power, also disregarded spirit or soft power (Tellis, et al. 2000, 29).
Developed by Huang, his CNP Index System comprises four major index subsystems: (1) material or
hard power index subsystem e.g. natural resources, economic wealth, science and technology, national
defense (2) spirit or soft power index subsystem e.g. political power, foreign affairs, culture, education
(3) coordinated power index subsystem e.g. the line of command, administration, leadership in policy
decision-making, and (4) the environmental index subsystem e.g. international environment. Moreover,
each of the components of the major subindexes is itself a sub-subindex, and together, they all form
what Huang refers to as a CNP appraisal index system. Political power subsystem, for instance,
includes national strategy goals, political stability, nation’s leadership, decision-making capability, etc.
(Golden 2011, 98; Pillsbury 2000, 222-224). According to Huang, the U.S. still ranks first in 2020,
followed by China, Germany and Japan, respectively (Ghosh 2009, 44-45; Golden 2011, 104), but if
China’s economy grows higher than 5.8% a year, China is likely to overtake the U.S.
China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) also developed its own CNP concept. There are 8
components with 64 indicators:
1. Natural resources, including human resources (total population, life expectancy, etc.), land
resources (total land area, forest area, etc.), energy resources (coals, crude oil, natural gas, etc.)
2. Economic activities, including economic strength (GDP per capita, etc.), economic structure
(proportion of tertiary sector as a percentage of GDP)
3. Foreign economic activities, including international reserves, gold reserves, etc.
4. Science and technology, including proportion of research and development in the GDP, number of
scientists and engineers, etc.
5. Social development level, including education (expenditure in education per capita, etc.),
culture (literacy, etc.), health care (expenditure in health care per capita, number of physicians [per
1,000 population]), communications (number of mobile phone users [per 100 population]), and
urbanization
6. Military capability, including military manpower, military expenditure, number of nuclear warheads,
etc.
7. Government regulation and control capability, including proportion of government expenditure as a
percentage of GDP, etc.
8. Foreign affairs capability (Pillsbury 1999, 111; Pillsbury 2000, 229)
The researchers also determined the weighted coefficients for the different components. With the total
weighted coefficient of 1.00, for instance, the component of natural resources has weighted coefficient
of 0.08; and that of economic activities 0.28. Additionally, the different indexes within each of the
major factors are assigned weights. For example, within the science and technology factor, both the
index for proportion of research and development in the GDP and that for technology personnel have
weighted coefficients of 0.30. Unlike Huang, the CNP ranking by the CASS made projections that
Japan will rank first in 2020, while China ranks seventh (Golden 2011, 104). However, both Huang
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and the CASS share a common view. They refuted the unipolarity led by the U.S. and attempted to
show that America is in decline.
Similar to the study of the CASS, the CNP proposed by Hu Angang and Men Honghua of Tsinghua
University comprise 8 types of resources with 23 indicators:
1. Economic resources e.g. GDP and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
2. Human capital e.g. total population and total workforce
3. Natural resources e.g. total cultivation area, total use of fresh water by volume, electric power
consumption, etc.
4. Capital e.g. foreign direct investment (FDI), market capitalization, etc.
5. Knowledge and technology e.g. number of patents, number of personal computers, number of
Internet host, government expenditure in R&D, etc.
6. Government resources e.g. central government expenditure
7. Military resources e.g. military expenditure, military manpower
8. Foreign relations e.g. total imports and exports, total number of receipt of royalty and license fee,
etc.
By measuring the CNP, each type of resources has different weighted average. For example, both
natural resources and human capital have weighted average of 0.1, while economic resources and
knowledge and technology have 0.2 (Hu and Men 2004, 20-21). The weighted average of Hu and Men
is quite similar to the weighted coefficients developed by the CASS. However, according to Hu and
Men, the U.S. remained the world’s superpower between 1980-1998 (Hu and Men 2004, 23-24), and
has now remained so.
Apart from the AMS PLA by Huang, the CASS, and Hu and Men, China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) and Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University adopted a relatively simple
approach to measure the CNP. The CICIR scores the CNP with 6 major factors: manpower, natural
resources, economy, politics, military, history, and culture. It was found that by the 2020s, China’s
CNP will be behind only the U.S. CNP (Ghosh 2009, 46-47). Yan Xuetong, however, calculated the
CNP by incorporating distinct types of power. The military expenditure, number of nuclear warheads,
and total military manpower represent the military power. Political power is epitomized by the status
as a permanent member of the UNSC, and the economic power can be measured through the GDP. In
Yan’s view, despite the fact that China’s CNP still follows the U.S. CNP, China’s comprehensive
power is relatively strong in all aspects. Moreover, with the different political systems of the two
countries, China has a stronger political mobilization capability than the U.S. since China possesses
more administrative mechanisms to mobilize its people. Yet, in the realm of international affairs,
China’s political mobilization capability is weaker than that of the U.S. (Yan 2006, 18-21).
However, although there is no consensus among Chinese scholars about the components, indicators
and factors in their CNP concept, material capabilities such as military might and economic wealth
remain the predominant factors for the CNP assessment. In spite of its tangibility and measurability,
material capabilities beg a lot of questions and face many challenges, for example, how China’s total
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GDP is distributed amongst its population, how China prospers without raising income inequality, or
even how China can overcome the dilemma by reconciling the economic development and the
environmental protection. The genuine CNP assessment should rely not only on the factors from
which a country would earn or benefit, but also on those of which that country would have to pay a
price. Non-material capabilities such as culture, historical background, natural disasters,
environmental degradation, and political stability, thus, need to be incorporated into the concept as
well. While some were successfully encompassed, ‘political stability’ still falls short of an ideal.
China’s Political Stability
Despite political stability not fully incorporated into the CNP concept, Zheng Shiping (2012)
attempted to assess China’s political stability and place China on the global scale of comparisons with
other countries, both advanced and developing, in the world, including the so-called BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa). With the analysis based on 12 sets of fragility and instability
indexes, including Political Instability Index (PII) of the Economist Intelligence Unit, Failed States
Index (FSI) of Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, Global Political Risk Index (GPRI) of Euroasia
Group, he found that China has faced many threats or challenges to political stability. However, with
China being no longer more politically unstable or fragile than Russia and India, he finally concluded
that China has no reasons for celebration and, at the same time, for paranoia (Zheng 2012, 1, 12). If so,
what prevents China from celebrating its political stability?
Among 12 sets of fragility/instability indexes, China is ranked the worst on the Failed States Index
(FSI) developed by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace. The FSI measures a country’s risk for
internal conflict based on a total of 12 indicators of vulnerability: four for social, two for economic,
and six for political. Social vulnerability indicators include demographic pressure, refugees and
internally displaced persons, group grievance and human flight. Uneven development and poverty and
economic decline are included in economic vulnerability indicators. Importantly, political
vulnerability indicators cover legitimacy of the state, public services, human rights and the rule of law,
security apparatus, factionalized elite, and external intervention. With the FSI, among the BRICS,
China is viewed as the most vulnerable and unstable (Zheng 2012, 6-7).
According to Table 1 regarding the FSI rankings of China between 2006-2013, it is evident that China
is socially vulnerable to demographic pressures (such as diseases, natural disasters, environment,
pollution, water scarcity, etc.) and group grievance (such as ethnic violence, discrimination,
powerlessness, religious violence, etc.). Economic vulnerability in terms of uneven development (such
as income inequality, urban-rural service distribution, etc.) is also critical for China. Above all, China
has suffered the political vulnerability regarding human rights and the rule of law, and the legitimacy
of the state. However, it should be noted that when China has a relatively high score of the FSI, it does
not mean that the Chinese state fails or will soon collapse. On the other hand, the FSI is about to
demonstrate that China is now facing many vulnerabilities and challenges to its political stability.
Failure to address them would result not only in tremendous economic and human losses as China had
suffered throughout the 19th and 20th century, but also in its CNP and rising power in this century.
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Table 1 Failed States Index Rankings of China between 2006-2013
Year
Ch
ina
’s R
an
kin
g
Nu
mb
er o
f
Co
un
trie
s
Dem
og
rap
hic
Pre
ssu
res
Ref
ug
ees
an
d I
DP
s
Gro
up
Gri
eva
nce
Hu
ma
n F
lig
ht
Un
even
Dev
elo
pm
ent
Po
ver
ty a
nd
Eco
no
mic
Dec
lin
e
Leg
itim
acy
of
the
Sta
te
Pu
bli
c S
erv
ices
Hu
ma
n R
igh
ts a
nd
th
e
Ru
le o
f L
aw
Sec
uri
ty A
pp
ara
tus
Fa
ctio
na
lize
d E
lite
Ex
tern
al
Inte
rv
enti
on
To
tal
(Ov
era
ll o
f 12
0)
2006 57 146 8.5 5.1 8.0 6.6 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.3 9.0 5.5 8.0 2.3 82.5
2007 62 176 8.7 5.1 8.0 6.5 9.0 4.0 8.5 6.5 9.0 5.3 7.5 3.1 81.2
2008 68 177 8.8 5.1 7.8 6.3 9.0 4.0 8.3 6.6 8.9 5.2 7.0 3.3 80.3
2009 56 177 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3 84.6
2010 62 182 8.8 6.6 8.0 5.9 9.0 4.3 8.3 7.0 9.0 5.8 7.2 3.1 83.0
2011 72 182 8.2 6.2 7.9 5.6 8.6 4.4 7.9 6.6 8.8 5.7 6.9 3.3 80.1
2012 76 177 7.9 5.9 7.9 5.3 8.3 3.9 7.9 6.3 8.6 6.0 6.9 3.5 78.3
2013 66 178 8.1 6.1 8.3 5.0 8.0 3.6 8.1 6.8 9.4 6.5 7.2 3.8 80.9
Average 69 179.75 8.25 6.2 8.025 5.45 8.475 4.05 8.05 6.675 8.95 6.0 7.05 3.425 80.575
Remarks: For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable)
and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale
of 0-120.
Sources: The Fund for Peace 2006-2013 (Table created by the author)
After almost a century of major upheavals and political turmoil and the victory of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in mainland China in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was
established. The first task for the CCP was to incorporate and unite all separate territories into one.
The CCP put a lot of efforts into controlling Mongolia and intended to integrate it as a part of
Republican China. However, after being under intense pressure from the Soviet Union, Mongolia as
the Soviet sattelite achieved independence and was recognized by China in 1950. To prevent Mongolia
from being an independent state or being incorporated as a part of its neighboring countries, the CCP
had mobilized its capabilities to take control over the rest. Inner Mongolia had been under control
before gaining independence or becoming as a part of newly independent Mongolia. The Uygur
movements for establishing Eastern Turkestan Republic were deterred and rebellions in Xinjiang were
suppressed. The aim of the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama to achieve independence was not
successful. The Nationalist forces in Taiwan were attacked but not completely defeated due to the
Korean War and the containment policy led by the U.S. (Rossabi 2014, 371-376).
The CCP also faced several major crises after it had come to power. The failure of the Great Leap
Forward led to the tragic consequences, causing over 36 million people to death because of famine and
torture for those who were against the policy (Yang 2013, 13). Over a million people were killed
during the Cultural Revolution, and more than 3 millions suffered imprisonment, seizure of property,
torture or general humiliation (Ebrey, Walthall and Palais 2009, 472). The CCP was widely
condemned and the economic sanctions was imposed by international community after the 1989
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massacre in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Even a highly centralized unitary state under the rule of the
CCP was challenged after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991 (Lam 2006). However, despite the fact that the CCP went through such unpleasant experiences
and succeeded in stabilizing its ultimate power by maintaining the economic growth, the issues
pertaining territorial integrity have not yet been assured.
The principle of territorial integrity is one of the cornerstones in the UN system as well as the post-
Second World War international order. Apart from the references to the territorial integrity in the
context of the prohibition of the use of force, and the limitation on the right of self-determination
appeared in the UN Charter and its declarations (Zacher 2001, 221; Vidmar 2012, 707-709), the
territorial integrity relates to the right of existence of the state. It enables the state to exert its
sovereignty, ensure its own survival, represent its people, and preserve the unity or completeness of its
territory (Ouali 2006, 635)
The territorial integrity is then inseparable from the principle of state sovereignty. The state always
claims its authority and legitimacy to have relations with other states and, at the same time, claims its
authority and control over territory and its citizens. As Stephen D. Krasner asserts, there are four forms
of state sovereignty: (1) International legal sovereignty, which relates to the matters of the recognition
of a state e.g. political independence, state capacity to preserve territorial integrity, the existence of the
government and its population; (2) Wesphalian sovereignty, which concerns about the autonomy of
the state e.g. the respect of the principle of non-interference; (3) Domestic sovereignty, which is
referred to as the exertion of authority of the state and its capabilities to control its domestic affairs;
and (4) Interdependence sovereignty, which pertains to the state control over the flow of information,
thoughts, people, pollution, or even the capital (Krasner 2009, 179-180). The territorial integrity,
therefore, involves not only the relations between states in the realm of international affairs, but also
the role and responsibility of state to exert and preserve its authority in the realm of domestic ones.
How is the territorial integrity related to political stability, particularly in the case of China? When the
state is politically unstable, it is unable to fully exert its authority and sovereignty, represent its
citizens, and maintain unity or completeness of its territory. Political instability, in addition, provides
room for the intervention from outside (Fravel 2007, 715). Political stability thus is the prerequisite for
the state to be immune from the threats from outside and the challenges from within, particularly the
problematic territory that is not fully incorporated or perfectly integrated. For China, as mentioned
earlier, the issue of territorial integrity directly affects and relates to its political stability. First, apart
from human rights, corruption, or democratization, the territorial integrity has become one of the
major concerns for the Chinese regime. Second, analyzing the territorial integrity through state-society
relations could demonstrate the grievance and tention between ethnic groups as well as political
vulnerabilities which pose a threat to China’s political stability, particularly in terms of authority and
legitimacy of the state. Third, pursuing the stability by maintaining China’s territorial integrity is one
of the main objectives for the Chinese communist regime. Failure to do so will beg a question of its
existence and survival. Lastly, the territorial integrity is viewed as one of the core goals to be made in
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a nation’s foreign policy, especially the great powers. It would be difficult for the rising power to play
a leading role on the world stage as long as its territorial integrity is still under threat.
Although Hong Kong and Macau were successfully incorporated as an integral part of the PRC in
1997 and 1999, respectively, China’s territorial integrity remains unfulfilled. The Taiwan issue causes
great uncertainty for its status. The Tibet problem arises due to mutual suspicion. More importantly,
the Xinjiang conflict is aroused by discontent and hostility.
This paper, however, argues that, among those three conundrums, the Taiwan issue and the Tibet
problem, which attract worldwide attention, are likely to come up with a peaceful or political solution.
Not only is the war costly, causing everyone to suffer loss and damage, the rise of China is also a
major determinant of shaping relations between them.
In the case of Taiwan, it might be true that the strategy of buying time works. It does, but only in the
short-term period, and if achieving independence is set to be the ultimate goal for some Taiwanese, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in particular, it does not mean that they will attain the goal if they
pull all their resources. Importantly, the current international context, which is much different from
that in the Cold War, also makes the pursuit of eventual independence become harder. First, Taiwan’s
political status depends upon ‘the interpretation’ of the concerned declarations and treaties such as the
1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, and the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. At that
time, both sides made an accusation against each other as the rebels (Chiu 1973). The Chinese
communists viewed the attempts to take Taiwan back as a part of their internal war which continued
from the civil war in 1945-1949. The Chinese nationalists, in contrast, viewed that as an act of
aggression against their sovereignty. Different interpretation leads to different perception. However,
such dispute could be settled by a peaceful means. The problem is Taiwan is not yet ready for that.
Second, Taiwan’s political status needs to be given recognition as an independent entity from the
international community. Recently, Taiwan has been recognized by only a handful of small states
while the One China policy is adopted, willingly or necessarily, by most of the UN member states.
Furthermore, the PRC, as one of five permanent members of the UNSC, can put diplomatic or political
pressure on Taiwan if there is any movement to achieve their independence. For those small states, the
PRC may have to establish the diplomatic relations and support aids or assistances in a more flexible
way. Whatever the PRC did for Haiti during the 2010 earthquake is viewed as a constructive
engagement. Everything needs time. Third, this issue is also complicated by the U.S. involvement.
Without the U.S. assistance, Taiwan would have been a part of the PRC long time ago (Yahuda 2000,
33). Even though there is a close tie between the U.S. and Taiwan and it is stated in the 1955 Mutual
Defense Treaty that the U.S. will protect Taiwan and the Pescadores if they are invaded by the Chinese
communists, Taiwan should not be assured of such guarantee. The normalization of the U.S.-China
relations in 1969 that purged Taiwan from the UN membership and the seat of the permanent members
of the UNSC in 1971 would help Taiwan learn a lesson. Interest always prevails. To the U.S., Taiwan
is only a part of its interest for strategic balancing in East Asia with Beijing (Moore 2007, 182),
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particularly its interest pertaining the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. If so, the U.S.
would focus on Beijing, not Taiwan.
Fourth, China’s rising military power makes it now different from what it was in the 1950s. A political
reality that Taiwan should bear in mind is that although Beijing keeps a peaceful option open, it is also
ready to use forces to take Taiwan if it has no option (Mearsheimer 2014, 31), as Zhou Enlai said, “ …
the fact that Taiwain is part of China will remain unchanged forever … and that all the people of our
country will certainly fight as one man and to the end to liberate Taiwan.” (Chiu 1973, 117). To the
CCP, the Taiwan issue is not just a matter of territorial integrity. Letting Taiwan go independent
would be a disaster for the survival of the CCP as well. If the war erupts, there is no guarantee how
long and how much the U.S. will support and assist Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan is not as significant to
the U.S. as Japan and South Korea. It will be too risky if the U.S. allows Taiwan to develop its own
nuclear program. Doing so will not only increase the nuclear proliferation in East Asia, but also trigger
a nuclear first-strike retaliatory attack from Beijing. The rise of China is, therefore, directly related to
the future of Taiwan. As John J. Mearsheimer asserts, “ … a powerful China isn’t just a problem for
Taiwan. It is a nightmare.” (Mearsheimer 2014, 37-39)
Lastly, the Ma government’s rapprochement policy with mainland China is seen as a positive sign of
cross-strait stability. Government agencies of both sides have established direct communication
channel in dealing with each other (Hu 2013, 224). Cross-strait economic relations have been
improved and boosted, ranging from direct flights, the establishment of tourism liaison offices in
Beijing and Taipei, or the signing of Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010.
However, improved and closer cross-strait relations would be double-edged. On the one hand, the CCP
may seek this opportunity to raise the future of Taiwan on the table (Lee 2013, 83). On the other hand,
Taiwan’s increasing dependency on mainland China may habour resentment among the Kuomintang
(KMT) supporters as a result of stronger Taiwaness identity (Qi 2013, 130-131). Since 2001, the PRC
has replaced the U.S. and become Taiwan’s largest export market. In 2011, Taiwan enjoyed the largest
trade surplus with the PRC. More than half of Taiwan’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) went to
mainland China (Lee 2013, 81-82). Economically, Taipei is now too dependent on Beijing.
The best choice for Taiwan at present and in the foreseeable future is to maintain its status quo: de
facto independence, but if the rise of China has a profound impact on cross-strait relations, Hong Kong
strategy would be the second best solution (Mearsheimer 2014, 39). Although the Taiwan issue
becomes a major concern for China’s core interest and territorial integrity, the peaceful or political
solution is still possible. Accordingly, Taiwan would not pose a threat or challenge to China’s political
stability in the foreseeable future. Waging war with the rising China is a kind of committing suicide.
The Tibet issue, nevertheless, poses a lesser concern for the PRC and the CCP in particular. Despite
the fact that the 14th Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, is the main actor to attract worldwide
attention to the Tibet issue, since the bloodshed unrest in 1959, which saw the Dalai Lama living in
exile in India, there has been no significant progress in solving the Tibet issue. In addition, the
increasing role in the world affairs of the rising China has limited the negotiating power of the leaders
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in exile to seek the autonomy under the Chinese consitution for Tibetans. Like the Taiwan issue, even
though the Tibet is viewed as a major concern for China’s territorial integrity, it does not pose any
significant and direct threat to China’s political stability and, to a greater extent, the CCP.
First, compared to the militarily rising China, the exiled Tibetan leaders and its government in exile
are not in the position to compete. China’s occupation of Tibet in 1951 and the bloodshed unrest in
1959, despite the relatively weak Chinese communist regime at that time, was perhaps fresh in their
mind. Importantly, the spiritual leader and the Tibetan government in exile have always portrayed
themselves as calm and peaceful, so only a peaceful and political solution is attainable for them and all
Tibetans. Second, there are disagreements among the exiled Tibetan leaders about the goal and future
of Tibet. The Dalai Lama has so far taken a more moderate approach to seeking autonomy under the
Chinese constitution for all Tibetans. Against the Dalai Lama’s wishes, some young exiled leaders and
exiled Tibetans seek to achieve independence. Split by ideological differences is a reason why there is
no significant progress in the Tibet issue in recent years (Burke 2014). However, the frustration and
hardship among Tibetans in China are about to continue. Over a humdred of people who have had set
themselves on fire in Tibet since 2009 would urge their exiled leaders and fellows not to be hesitant.
Time buying may work for Taiwan, but not for Tibet.
Third, the Dalai Lama has been playing an active role in attracting worldwide attention to the Tibet
issue such as human rights, environmental damage, or later genuine autonomy. He delivered speeches
around the world (such as at the U.S. Congress in 1987, the European Parliament in 1988) (Barnett
2009, 14), won the Noble Peace Prize in 1989 (Nobelprize.org 2013), and received a visit from many
world leaders. However, what the Tibetan leader has obtained is only ‘sympathy’ and ‘moral support’
for the Tibet cause. Interest always prevails. For example, when the Dalai Lama met the U.S. President
Obama in February 2014, the U.S. President reiterated the status of Tibet as a part of China and said
he does not support any attempt to gain independence. He also supported the Dalai Lama’s moderate
approach and a talk between the exiled Tibetan leaders and the Chinese government (The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary 2014). In fact, the U.S. did not want the Tibet issue to upset its
relationship with China. In the other case, the Norwegian government did not send their
representatives to meet the Dalai Lama when he reached the country on the occasion of the 25th
Anniversary of his Nobel Peace Prize in May 2014 because it was afraid that its salmon exports to
China would be affected. After the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Chinese dissident Liu
Xiaobo, the Chinese government imposed an unofficial partial trade embargo on Norwegian salmon
and froze trade talks. At that time, the market share of Norwegian salmon exports to China accounted
for 92% worth over 45 million pound a year, but over the following three years, it fell to 29%
(Sutterud and Ulven 2014). Furthermore, after the PRC has replaced Taiwan as the permanent member
of the UNSC since 1971, there has not been any single UNSC resolution regarding Tibet. Therefore,
the international community is not the place where the Dalai Lama as well as the exiled leaders should
pin all their hope on.
Fourth, the Sinicization of Tibetans in China becomes more crucial. While most of the exiled Tibetans
try to introduce Tibetan identity and nationalism to the world, only a handful of Tibetans in China,
[11]
particularly Tibetan intellectuals, know the Tibetan language. Most Tibetans cannot read or speak their
own language. The Chinese language becomes the means of communication between the exiled
Tibetans and Tibetans who are living in China. The loss of language identity is the first sign of identity
losses (Wang and Shakya 2009, 133-134, 137-140). If their national identity is not well preserved, it
would be difficult for Tibetans to cliam such identity for autonomy or even independence.
Lastly, the rise of China is also a nightmare for Tibet. In the past, when China was relatively weak and
unstable, it is the Chinese government that tried to initate talk with the exile Tibetan leaders. The first
talk was held in 1979, followed by another two rounds in 1982 and 1984 until all talks ended in 1985.
Eight rounds of talk were resumed again between 2002 to 2008 without any solution (Barnett 2009,
14-15). After several failed talks and the rise of China, it was Tibet that tried to resume talk with
Beijing. Now the Tibetan side is not strong as it was many decades ago. However, as the rising power,
it does not mean that China can do whatever it wants. The March 2008 incident gave the CCP a lesson
that the phenomenon of Tibetan nationalism and the idea of Tibet as a distinct nation should not be
underestimated. As long as the Tibet issue remains a major concern that can pose challenges to
China’s territorial integrity and international status (Sautman 2011, 123) and there is still room for
talks, both sides, not just the Tibetan side, should use it well and in time.
China’s Political Stability and the Conflict in Xinjiang
Whilst there is room for talks in the case of Taiwan and Tibet, there is no availability in the case of
Xinjiang. Even Xinjiang was incorporated as a part of China like other regions, it has never been fully
integrated. The conflict and the resistance in Xinjiang are unique and violent. The sense of ethnic
identity and nationalism among Uygur people remains strong and powerful. The resentment and
discontent are widespread, and the hatred and hostility among ethnic groups are deep and outright. The
conflict in Xinjiang is viewed as a major headache for the CCP and the most serious threat to China’s
political stability and territorial integrity.
Pre-1949 Xinjiang: Han Rule, Uygur Resist
When the Uygur region was fully incorporated under the control of the Qing government in 1760, that
region was renamed ‘Xinjiang,’ which means ‘New Dominion or New Frontier’ (Gladney 2011, 90).
Xinjiang, together with other regions such as Mongolia and Tibet, was under the Court of Colonial
Affairs. The conciliatory policy was seen as the effective means, for the Qing government, to win the
hearts of the leaders of all regions. Every year, the leaders were invited to make a courtesy call to see
the emperor as well as exchange goods and trade. The emperor also held a great feast for all regional
leaders and invited them to go hunting. All expenses were responsible by the emperor. The Qing
government also continued the Beg system that allows the Uygur leaders to have the authority and
play a major role in local administration with the Han and Manchu (Zhang 2006, 181-183, 190-191). It
can be argued that Qing policy and goals toward Xinjiang after its conquest were not only seeking the
territorial incorporation of the region, but also the assimilation of its population (Clarke 2007, 266).
[12]
With the uniqueness of culture, religion, and language, Xinjiang is different from other regions in
China and is never fully incorporated under the Chinese rule. After the defeat in the Opium War and
the Western imperialist pressure, China at that time was politically unstable. Chinese control over
Xinjiang was considerably weak after the rebellions in Shaanxi and Gansu in 1862, and finally ended
after the full occupation of Xinjiang by Yakub Beg, the former general of Khokand. Relations with
Britain and the conclusion of a treaty with Russia in 1872, in one sense, acknowledged Yakub Beg’s
de facto legitimacy of his control of Xinjiang. However, Yakub Beg’s rebellion reignited court debate
regarding the desirability of retaining Xinjiang (Clarke 2007, 267-268). Some argued that Xinjiang
was uncilivilzed and underdeveloped. Military action in Xinjiang would usher in a financial crisis and
become an expensive burden for the Qing government. However, with the strategic reason by
regarding Xinjiang as the frontier to protect China proper from external threat, the Qing government
then decided to regain Xinjiang and succeeded in 1884. The re-conquest of Xinjiang and the
establishment of Xinjiang province became the turning point of the Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Post-
Yakub Beg Xinjiang was integrated as an integral part of Qing territory and under the advocates of the
sinicization of Xinjiang such as Han immigration and settlement, restructuring of the region’s
administration by appointing Han Chinese governor, or the promotion of Han culture by forcing Uygur
children to study Confucian texts, instead of Islamic ones, on the assumption that Islamic culture
seemed to have caused the instability (Jia 2011, 4-5, 11-12; Clarke 2007, 268). Ironically, adopting all
those policies based on such assumption has caused instability to the Chinese regime later on.
After the Chinese Revolution in 1911, which led to the establishment of the Republic of China,
Xinjiang remained under the Chinese rule by Governor Yang Zengxin until his death in 1928.
However, the fight between the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and the Communists which either could
establish their absolute power in China made the Chinese rule in Xinjiang become weak. The group of
Amirs of Hotan supported by General Ma Zhongying of the Hui Muslim army declared Turkish
Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan as an independent state in 1933 with the aim of establishing the
regime under the Islamic law and calling for economic, educational and social reforms. However, the
Islamic Republic had lasted only a few months before it was taken by the earlier supporter General Ma
Zhongying, who later lost his strategic balance and was defeated by the warlord Sheng Shicai. Under
Sheng Shicai’s regime, he was militarily supported by the Soviet Union with the exchange of
economic and trade agreements about oil and mineral resources. Like the Qing government, Sheng
also adopted conciliatory policy. Khoja Niyaz, former president of the Islamic Republic, was invited
for a high position in the government. Uygur culture was promoted. Turki-language schools and
Islamic teaching schools (madrassas) were opened while Turki-language newspapers and Uighur
Progress Union were established. (Dillon 2004, 20-21; Clarke 2007, 273; Clarke 2013, 114). However,
Xinjiang was still under the Chinese rule and that was not what the Uygur ever wanted.
The Chinese rule in Xinjiang became weak again after the civil war between the Nationalists and the
Communists erupted. Failure of the Nationalists to suppress the rebellions in Ili (Yili in Chinese),
Tacheng and Altay in 1944 provided the opportunity for the Uygurs to declare Eastern Turkestan
Republic (ETR) as an independent state once again in 1944 (Dillon 2004, 33) and enjoyed its
independence for nearly 5 years. However, after the victory of the Communists, which led to the
[13]
establishment of the PRC in 1949, the ETR leaders surrendered themselves to the Communists and
agreed to go to Beijing for a talk regarding the future of Xinjiang. Unfortunately, they were killed
when the aircraft they were travelling crashed. Their deaths are still seen by many Uygurs as the
deliberate elimination by the Chinese authorities with a claim that the ETR leadership tried to seek
genuine autonomy or independence. However, some of those closely connected with the ETR believe
to this day that their leaders never made it to the aircraft and were killed on the orders of Stalin, but the
Chinese authorities simply regarded it as an accident (Dillon 2004, 34-35).
During the Chinese rule in Xinjiang in pre-1949, there were always the rebellions to destablize the
regime and the attempts to achieve independence when China was politically unstable or the window
of opportunity was open. The death of the ETR leaders was not the end of the conflict and resistance
to the Chinese regime in Xinjiang. Rather, it was just the beginning.
Xinjiang, 1949-1990: Autonomous Region without Genuine Autonomy
The incorporation of Xinjiang as an integral part of China was well established after the peaceful
liberation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Xinjiang had completed in 1949. The PRC under
the leadership of the CCP continued to integrate Xinjiang by completing the Qing government’s
unfinished mission – the sinicization of Xinjiang – to ensure the region’s territorial integrity. In March
1950, the policy of cultural assimilation was implemented when the CCP encouraged the immigration
of a large number of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. Counter-revolutionaries such as landlords, Muslim
ulama in sedentary agricultural areas, nomadic peoples who have feudal and traditionalist elements are
primarily targeted for suppression during 1950-1952, followed by the land reforms during 1952-1953
(Forbes 2010, 227). However, the first major incident of resistance to the CCP control over Xinjiang
was the Hotan uprising of December 1954 in southern Xinjiang by the Amin group. They were against
the CCP policies, particularly the Han immigration and declared their intention of establishing the
Islamic state. Over 140 rebels were arrested but later were released while the core rebels remained in
custody (Dillon 2004, 52-55).
To ensure the consolidation of CCP power in Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps (XPCC) or the bingtuan, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established
in 1954 and 1955, respectively. For the XPCC, it has its own administration, equivalent of the
province and under the direct control of Beijing, not the XUAR. The main objective of XPCC is
twofold: to open cultivation areas and to guard the frontier. As a result, the XPCC has a dual
responsibilities of development and defense. In peacetime, the XPCC has a mandate to develop the
cultivation areas for agriculture, farming and animal husbandary, but if there is a conflict or tension,
the XPCC will turn itself to restore order and stability (Kerr and Swinton 2008, 120). In 2005, the
XPCC employed more than 2.5 million under the command of 14 divisions with 179 regiment-level
farms and ranches. It has its own 1,339 enterprises and companies, including a number of schools,
universities, hospitals and research institutes (People's Daily 2007). It has also its own courts, prisons
and more than 120,000 police forces and militaty troops. The economic proportion of the XPCC is
about one-sixth of the total GDP in Xinjiang (The Economist 2013). The XPCC is thus one of the most
[14]
powerful government agencies in Xinjiang, apart from the CCP party organization and the XUAR as
one of the XPCC senior executives said, “Once you step on the land of Xinjiang, you have to come to
our company … We are everywhere here.” (Fenby 2012, 110). However, only a few Uygurs are
employed. In one view, the XPCC is the so-called another branch of the CCP party organization to
ensure the order and stability in Xinjiang (The Economist 2013).
Apart from the XPCC, there was also restructuring of the region’s administration. Xinjiang province
was transformed to XUAR in order to administer the regions with ethnic differences. Although the
idea of ‘nationality’ was influenced by the Soviet model, the autonomous region in the Chinese sense
is another story. For the Soviet model, non-Russian ethnic groups are allowed to establish their own
republic, but for the PRC, all non-Han ethnic groups are under the leadership of the CCP and have the
autonomy only at the provincial and local level (Millward and Tursan 2004, 91). This CCP action was
definitely contrary to its policy in the 1930s as appeared in the article 14 of its 1931 constitution
mentioning that “The Party recognized the right of self-determination of the national minorities in
China, their right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent state for
each minority.” (Saich 1996, 555). Despite the fact that the Uygurs have been appointed to the
important positions e.g. the chairperson of People’s Council or the XUAR governor, the ultimate
power is still in the hands of the CCP party secretary in Xinjian, who have already been Han Chinese.
In the Chinese view, the autonomous region is not the region with autonomy as generally understood.
Rather, it is just a region with ethnic groups as the majority of the population.
Apart from a sense of frustration among the Uygur population living in the autonomous region without
genuine autonomy, the discontent among the Uygurs increased and was widespread due to the
Hundred Flowers campaign, the Great Leap Forward policy and the Cultural Revolution. During the
Hundred Flowers campaign, the leaders of the CCP encouraged intellectuals and non-party members
to criticize the government and offer advice. In Xinjiang, there was the storm of criticism that
followed the campaign such as the environment degradation done by the XPCC, the demand for
genuine autonomy and authority for non-Han population, the demand for the expulsion of Han
Chinese from Xinjiang and the declaration of a newly independent state. However, when Mao Zedong
perceived it as a threat to his regime and halted in 1957, he began an ‘Anti-Rightist’ campaign and
silenced any opposition. A number of local nationalists were arrested and suppressed for fear that the
opposition view in Xinjiang, especially from the Uygurs, might threaten its stability and territorial
unity. Muslim political leaders were purged from their power, including Seypidin Ezizi, the
chairperson of People’s Council in Xinjiang. It is believed that there were 1,613 local nationalists
arrested and sent to the labor camp for thought reform (Millward and Tursan 2004, 93). Furthermore,
the implementation and repercussion of the Great Leap Forward policy exacerbated the situation in
Xinjiang. The unfair grain rationing system, the immigration of over million Han Chinese to Xinjiang
resulting from famine in their home province, and the competition between the XPCC and the local
ethnic minorities for cultivation areas, water supplies and aninal husbandry caused a major disturbance
in 1962 when the protesters set fire to the government and communist party buildings in Yining
(Chang 1997, 406). The disturbance also created fear which caused more than 60,000 Uygurs and
Kazaks to flee to the Soviet-satellite Kazakstan. For Xinjiang, the situation became more complicated
[15]
as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. The immigration of Uygurs and Kazaks aroused suspicions among
the CCP leaders towards Soviet intention and ethnic minorities, the Uygurs in particular, after the
Soviet silently approved of the Uygur movements and organizations in its territory such as Turkestan
People’s Liberation Committee to destabilize the CCP. The Soviet support for such movements, in one
view, did shape the Uygur identity, which later has become one of major motives for the resistance
and anti-Chinese movements since the 1990s (Clarke 2013, 119-120; Dillon 2004, 56).
The Cultural Revolution was regarded as one of tragedies in Chinese history. Not only did Han
Chinese fight and destroy each other, but the Uygurs were also threatened and their culture and
identity were humiliated by the leftists and the Red Guards. A number of copies of the Quran were
burnt. Muslim imams were intimidated. Muslim mosques were destroyed. Ethnic minority intellectuals
were humiliated. Pigs were penned in the mosques. Uygur Muslim girls were forced to cut their long
hair, and the ethnic minorities were prohibited from wearing their traditional dress. All these came
from the xenophobic reactions of Jiang Qing, a leader of the so-called Gang of Four (Clarke 2013, 120;
Millward and Tursan 2004, 97). However, the political turmoil in China gave a group of the Uygurs
the opportunity to establish Eastern Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party (ETPRP) between 1967-
1968. It rejected the Chinese rule in Xinjiang and called for reestablishment of the ETR, which had
collapsed earlier. It is believed that the Party received tremendous support from the Soviet Union and
had around 300 members. There were party branches in many cities in Xinjiang e.g. Urumqi, Yining,
Aksu, Tacheng. However, after the new CCP leaders had regained its power, the ETPRP was later
suppressed by the PLA (Dillon 2004, 58). The Cultural Revolution also excacerbated the social and
economic situation which led to the ethnic tension between Han Chinese and Uygurs, for example
workers in Shihezi and oil-field workers in Karamay went on strike in 1974, or the unrest in 1975
when there was an order that all workers, including the Muslim had to work on Fridays (Chang 1997;
Clarke 2003, 210).
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, economic development and modernization, instead of the
ideology of class struggle, have become the key to solving the ethnic conflict and tension. The
government policy towards ethnic and religious groups was relaxed. Muslim mosques were reopened.
Islamic religious seminars were allowed. Copies of the Quran were reprinted. The proportion of non-
Han Chinese government officials were increased, and the ethnic minorities were given a greater role
in the party organization. Despite the approval of liberal and reformist CCP Secretary General Hu
Yaobang, the appointment of ethnic minorities as the First Secretary of Party Committee at every
level., after the compromise among conservatives and liberals in the CCP, the position of the First
Secretary of Regional Party Committee was still monopolized by Han Chinese (Clarke 2013, 121;
Rodriguez 2013, 136; Bovingdon 2010, 347-348). Despite the reform, the monopoly of the ultimate
political power in the hands of Han Chinese upset the Uygurs with the feeling that Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region is not for the Uygurs. It is not genuinely autonomous either. (Bovingdon 2010,
342). With the upset and frustration of Chinese monopoly of political power in Xinjiang, and the
government relaxed policy towards ethnic and religious groups, there were the underground
movements in Xinjiang. Many Islamic schools were secretly opened, including one run by Abdul
Hakeem, leader of Islamic Party of Turkestan or Turkestan Islamic Movement in the 1940s. Among
[16]
his most significant students was Hasan Mahsum, who studied at a school in Kargilik or Yecheng and
later became the founder of Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in 1997.
Deep discontent and widespread resentment among the Uygurs erupted again when the CCP continued
the immigration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang for the sake of economic development and cultural
assimilation. The conflict and tension between Han Chinese and the Uygurs led to the disturbances in
Aksu in 1980, Kashkar in 1980 and 1981, and the rebellion seeking independence in Payzawat or
Jiashi county in 1982. The 1981 violent disturbance in Kashgar was the most violent incident in
Xinjiang since 1949 as a result of a criminal trial in which a young Han man was accused of killing a
Uygur youth during a fight. Serious riots spread throughout the whole part of Kashgar city. People
were armed with knives, cudgels, and whips. They were shouting “Down with the Han”, “Down with
the Heidaye (Chinese) government”, and “Long Live the Republic of Uyguristan”. Over 600 people
were attacked, over 200 injured, and 2 people dead. The continued immigration policy came in the
hope that the majority of immigrant Han Chinese would help maintain order and stability in Xinjiang
like its success story in the case of Inner Mongolia which the Mongol population recently accounts for
only 14% of total population in the region. It is estimated that between 1940-1982, the proportion of
Han Chinese and Hui Muslim immigrants to Xinjiang increased over 2500% and 520%, respectively.
During 1990-2000, the number of immigrant Han Chinese to Xinjiang increased from 5.69 million
people in 1990 to 7.49 million people in 2000, accounting for 40% of total population in Xinjiang.
(Clarke 2013, 124; Dillon 2006, 103; Gladney 2004, 112-113; Dillon 2004, 59-60). In addition, the
ethnic nationalism among young Uygurs also increased. In 1985, Uygur students in Beijing protested
against the use of Xinjiang as a base for nuclear testing. A month later, over 2,000 students from seven
universities in Urumqi demonstrated during the local elections when the regional governor was
replaced by Tomur Dawamat, an Uygur but a protégé of the Han CCP Secretary Wang Enmao. They
chanted slogans such as “Han out of Xinjiang”, “Independence, Freedom and Sovereignty for
Xinjiang”, and “Long Live Xinjiang’s Independence” (Dillon 2004, 60). However, after the fall of the
Soviet Union, the ethnic nationalism among the Uygurs became stronger and more powerful.
Xinjiang, 1990-2001: Hopeless Hope
The victory of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan over the Soviet Union, the unrests in Baren of Kizilsu
Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture or Yili in 1990, and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, which led to
the emergence of the newly independent states in Central Asia such as Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan lit the candle of hope among the Uygurs that China would not be unassailable. There were
several movements and organizations for achieving independence such as Uyghur Liberation
Organization (ULO) and International Uyghur Union (IUU) in Kazakstan. In Xinjiang, apart from
street protests, the attack to the government and party buildings and the confrontation with the police
forces, there were around 80 violent unrests and bombings between March-May 1992 in Urumqi,
Kashgar, Yining, Hotan, Kuchar, Korla, Chochek and Bortala with total damage of several million
Chinese yuan.
[17]
The violent incidents in Xinjiang continued from 1993 to 1996. The government building in Kashgar
was bombed in 1993. It was followed by the confrontation between Chinese police forces and the
Kazakhs in Yining demanding the establishment of their own republic as a part of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), and a wave of bombings in many cities along the Tarim Basin or
Altishahr in Southern Xinjiang. In 1995, there were major disturbances in Yining when over 50,000
people protested against the Chinese rule over Xinjiang, followed by the strike of over 100,000
teachers, workers, and shop owners calling the end of Chinese rule in Xinjiang and incorporating
Xinjiang as a part of Kazakstan. In Zhaosu and Gongliu, Chinese government officials and police
stations were surrounded by more than 3,000 people. Some guns and police vehicles were stolen. It is
believed that only in Zhaosu, over 220 people were killed and injured. Over 8,500 rounds of
ammunition were fired, and more than 20,000 troops were called from both in Xinjiang and Lanzhou
province. In addition, there were the protest in Hotan in July 1995 after a Muslim imam was arrested,
as well as the disturbances by separatist groups between February-April 1996 in Aksu (Dillon 2004,
66-70; Dillon 2006, 107-108).
To restore order and stability to Xinjiang, the CCP then issued the CCP Central Committee Document
No.7 (Document No.7) in March 1996. It viewed that national separatism and illegal religious
activities are the main threats to the stability of Xinjiang. And the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign was lauched
after that (Wang 2010, 54; Jones-Leaning and Pratt 2012, 331). More than 18,000 troops were sent to
18 problematic counties. A mass of 20,000 people at every local level distributed over 1.547 million
propaganda leaflets and more than 120,000 local activists worked together with party members and
militia to maintain order in the local areas (Tong 2010a, 7). However, the insurrection, led by the
ETIM erupted again in February 1997, considered to be the most violent confrontation between the
Uygurs and the Chinese forces. It is estimated that over 400 people were killed (300 of them were
Uygurs), but the CCP Secretary in Xinjiang Wang Lequan denied the figure (Dillon 2006, 109-110).
He only mentioned that apart from the damage of properties, buildings and vehicles, 198 people were
injured, 50 people seriously injured, and 7 ‘bystanders’ killed (Tong 2010b, 4).
Although the members of the ETIM were suppressed or killed, and a number of weapons and thousand
rounds of ammunition were seized, stability and order in Xinjiang was not yet restored. Between
February-April 1998, there were 14 bomb explosions in Kargilik or Yecheng, causing 8 people to die.
The total damage worth USD 120,000, including the government buildings such as Public Security
Bureau. Between July and September 1999, the government offcials and buildings and Han Chinese
were attacked, while the cotton warehouses in Hotan were burned. One people was killed (probably
the terrorist leader) and 21 people were arrested (Millward and Tursan 2004, 18-19).
However, apart from the Strike Hard campaign, one of the most intrumental and significant factors for
China to suppress terrorist and separatist movements in Xinjiang is to cooperate with its Central Asian
neighbors. Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) was established in
1996. It was later renamed Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 after the inclusion of
Uzbekistan. It can be argued that among all disputes and conflict between China and its neighboring
countries such as the civil war in Tajikistan, the conflict in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the unstable
[18]
situation in Ferghana Valley bordering Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the conflict and tension
in the countries bordering Xinjiang is what the Chinese authorities were concerned about most (Clarke
2003, 215). China’s leading role in the SCO has been considerably successful. Since its establishment,
the Uygur movements in its Central Asian neighbors have been limited. Exiled Uygurs in Kazakstan
were deported to China. Uygur terrorists in Kyrgyzstan were detained (Rodriguez 2013, 140). Only a
few Uygur newspapers were allowed to publish. Institute of Uyghur Studies in Almalty was closed
and merged into Institute of Oriental Studies, which focuses on the promotion of Uygur culture (Berlie
2004, 129-130).
However, even though the hope among Uygurs for their independence has not yet fulfilled, their
discontent and resentment against the Chinese rule and its assimilation policy remain deep and strong.
China’s ethnic discrimination against the Uygurs after 9/11 not only exacerabates the chronic conflict
in Xinjiang and the tension between ethnic groups, particularly between Han Chinese and the Uygurs,
but also brings a new episode of resistance and instability in Xinjiang and the rest of China.
Xinjiang in the Post—9/11 Era: Three Evils Are Everything
In the post-9/11 era, which saw the U.S.-led anti-terrorist wars throughout the world, the U.S.
declaured the terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda and those involved or genetically related to Al
Qaeda as the major threats to the U.S. benefits and security. After the arrest of the ETIM members
with the severe charge of plotting against the attack of the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 2002, the
U.S. included the ETIM in the Terrorist Exclusion List, which made it possible for the U.S. to seize
property and freeze any financial transactions (U.S. Department of State 2004). The ETIM, to the
U.S., was closely related to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan (U.S. Department of the
Treasury 2002), although Hasan Mahsum, the group leader who was later killed by the Pakistani force
in October 2003, rejected the close ties (Davis 2008, 22).
The inclusion of the ETIM in the aforementioned list is therefore related to China’s interest, which
issued the document concerning Eastern Turkestan terrorism in 2002 entitled “Eastern Turkistan
Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.” The objective was to pressure and discredit any
Uygur-led groups or movements which had weakened China’s authority and legitimacy over Xinjiang
throughout the 1990s (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2002).
Besides the ETIM, China included East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), World Uyghur
Youth Congress, Eastern Turkistan Information Center, United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan
(URFET), Uyghur Liberation Organization and other groups such as East Turkistan Islamic Party of
Allah and Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (Millward 2004, 23-27). However, the U.S. rejected the
inclusion of ETLO in the list as well as the deportation of an Uygur native who had been arrested in
Afghanistan as China requested (Davis 2008, 22). The WUYC, according to the understanding of the
press outside China, organizes political activities such as a regular meeting of World Uyghur Leader
and Youth Congress, while the ETIC, whose office is in Munich, is generally known as the unit which
reports news and issues related to Uygur people and Xinjiang on the website. Therefore, both the
[19]
WUYC and the ETIC denied all the allegations of terrorism made against them (Millward 2004, 27-
28).
What can be clearly noticed about the reaction of the CCP to the conflict in Xinjiang after the 9/11
attack is the CCP’s frequent use of ‘Eastern Turkestan’ to relate with any movement of organizations
and groups for terrorism, separatism or extremism, which are considered to be the ‘Three Evils’. This
is to distinguish it from ‘Xinjiang’ and display the reaction of the majority of Uygur people to be
attached with China. The CCP also uses the word ‘terrorism’ extensively to label organizations or
groups suspected of masterminding the attacks or riots despite the fact that they were previously
perceived as being organized by the criminals or being categorized as criminal activities (Shichor 2006,
101). Labelling them as ‘terrorists’ may justify China’s more violent suppression, but that cannot
restore stability in Xinjiang.
While riots may be associated with terrorism, they are sometimes a criminal act with no clear political
or separatist goals. In the case of Xinjiang, Islam and Jihad are used by some groups to achieve
poltical goals or establish the identity of the Uygur people rather than to act in the name of God since
most Uygur are not radical or possess extreme religious ideas, which is well noted, even by Chinese
local officers (Shichor 2006, 105).
Although several violent incidents erupted in the early 1990s, thanks to the effective suppression
policy and the close relations with other neighboring countries in Central Asia, the situation in
Xinjiang became less aggravated and could not be labeled as ‘terrorism’ (Millward 2009, 348).
However, China’s hosting the 2008 Olympic Games became a major condition for some Uygur to
weaken China’s authority and legitimacy, for example:
- The attempted hijack and attack of the plane from Urumqi to Beijing in March 2008 by two
passengers, one of whom was a 19-year-old Uygur girl who later confessed to hijacking
and attacking the plane.
- The attack of 70 members of People’s Armed Police Forces (PAPF) during the morning
military exercise on August 4th 2008 in Kashgar, only 4 days prior to the Olympic opening
ceremony, killing 17 and injuring 15 police officers. Two attackers, a truck driver and a
vegetable vendor, were sentenced to death by a local court 5 days later and were executed
on that same day.
- At least 12 bomb explosions in several spots including supermarkets, hotels and the
government office in Kuqa county on August 10th 2008, killing 8 people, 7 of whom were
suspected of being assailants and 1 of whom was a security officer. 10 more people were
killed during the attack with the police officers, while two of them were arrested and three
of them made their escape.
The Chinese authority identified that the three incidents above could be part of the ETIM’s terrorist
plan to disrupt the Olympic Games, while some Western analysts doubted that the ETIM was behind it,
particularly the incident in Kashgar. However, the ETIM did not claim responsibility for the incidents
[20]
(Gunaratna, Acharya and Pengxin 2010, 75-77). The irony is that prior to this, the ETIM claimed
responsibility for several incidents which occurred outside Xinjiang such as the explosion in Shanghai
on May 5th 2008, the attack of the police booth in Wenzhou, Zhejiang on July 17th 2008, the bomb
attack of the plastic factory in Guangzhou on the same day, and the explosion on 3 buses in Kunming
on July 21st 2008. The explosion in Kunming gave a warning signal to the Chinese government that
attacks of the Olympic venues might be possible, but the Chinese authority denied those claims and
viewed that those incidents were no more than crime, accidents or attempts of some Han people to call
for attention (Gunaratna, Acharya and Pengxin 2010, 78-79). Not only do those discriminatory views
fail to establish stability in Xinjiang and win the hearts of Uygur people, but they also widen the ethic
and hatred gaps between Han and Uygur people, as evidenced by the unrest in Urumqi in July 2009.
The unrest was not only a consequence of the incident at Xuri Toy Factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong
on June 26th 2009 after the news (whether it was true or a rumor) about at least two Han women who
were raped by the Uygurs was spread (Watts 2009), but it was the most violent conflict in Xinjiang
since the Baren unrest in 1990. Both incidents in Shaoguan and Urumqi marks several significant
points as follows:
First, the policy implementation of China still reflects discrimation and double standards against ethnic
minorities, particularly the Uygurs. While the protest staged by Uygur people on July 5th 2009 in order
to demand that the Chinese government account for the incident at Xuri Toy Factory was suppressed
by the Chinese government, with 197 people being killed, 1700 injured, and 331 shops and 1,325 cars
destroyed and burnt down, several hundred Han Chinese who staged a protest to seek revenge by
beating an Uygur vendor on the pavement two days later were not prosecuted. Moreover, while images
of the bodies of Han Chinese covered with blood were presented, images of violence depicted through
Uygur people who were attacked by Han Chinese have been banned from being broadcast (Millward
2009, 352, 354; Watts 2009).
Second, the internalization of the Xinjiang problem is a double-edged sword to the CCP. The CCP has
always reiterated that the Xinjiang problem is China’s internal affairs. When the violent incident
occured, the CCP put their efforts into terminating all internet connections and telephone lines
throughout Xinjiang. The Chinese authorities surprisingly invited the foreign press and media to visit
Xinjiang on July 6th 2009 and made a news report to the world community. On the one hand, the
Chinese government was praised by the foreign media for its transparency and opening of Xinjiang.
On the other hand, the incident regarding unarmed protestors beaten with a cudgel and punched by
local police and over 200 Uygur women demanding that the Chinese authorities release their male
relatives who had been arrested earlier were broadcasted worldwide (Bovingdon 2010, 349-350).
Third, the 2009 Urumqi conflict is not only the Uygurs problem, but also the Han problem in Xinjiang.
For Han Chinese in Xinjiang, they have portrayed themselves as the major actors who support the
nation-building in an ethnic region or a special region which is remote and both culturally and
physically barren. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the central government to support and improve
their livelihood (Cliff 2012). Stability in Xinjiang is what the central government has to pay for the
service as long as the stability and the development are the core interest of the CCP for their ultimate
[21]
power and survival. The purge of Wang Lequan from the position of Party Secretary in Xinjiang by
Han demand illustrates not only the failure of Wang Lequan to guarantee the safety and livelihood of
Han settlers, but also the bargaining power among Han Chinese in Xinjiang as a partnership of
stability in Xinjiang.
Fourth, both incidents in Shaoguan and Urumqi showed deep hatred and hostility among ethnic groups,
especially between the Uygurs and Han Chinese. A local Han man in Shaoguan who participated in
the assault as he was angered by the rapes having gone unpunished said,“I just wanted to beat them. I
hate Xinjiang people. Seven or eight of us beat a person together. Some Xinjiang people hid under
their beds. We used iron bars to batter them to death and then dragged them out and put the bodies
together.” Another Han man who was furious when the government was lying about the death toll said,
“When I see the news and they say only two people died, I am so angry.” Because he claimed that he
helped to kill 7 or 8 Uygurs, battering them until they stopped screaming. He thought the death toll is
more than 30 (Watts 2009). During the unrest in Urumqi, the Uygurs kept shouting “Kill the Han,
smash the Hui, drive the Mongol out!” Although there was the switch between the ethnic group or the
verb, the cause “Kill the Han” always came first (Palmer 2013). However, if the CCP is still showing
disregard for this concern, and keeps waiting until Xinjiang is stabilized after the majority of Han
Chinese, the 2009 unrest in Urumqi will not definitely be the last violent one. Compared to other
ethnic minorities including the Tibetans, the sense of ethnic identity and nationalism among the
Uygurs remains remain strong and powerful (Wang and Shakya 2009, 135).
Lastly, the 2009 Urumqi unrest evidently showed the deep tension between the Uygurs and Han
Chinese without any signs of separatist sentiment, jihadism or even Islamic terrorism which have
always been perceived by the Chinese authorities. Uygur protestors’ waving the Chinese flag by
signaled that they wished to cooperate rather than separate from China. The view that the 2009
Urumqi unrest was regarded as terrorism and separatism is a big mistake. The allegation by the
Chinese authorities that Rebiya Kadeer, the chairperson of World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and WUC
members, was a terrorist and separatist served to raise her international profile. On July 5th 2009, she
became more famous and attracted more attention from the public than she was on July 4th. This is
thanks not to the unrest but to statements from the PRC and the Chinese press. (Millward 2009, 335-
336; Xinhuanet 2013a).
However, the ‘Three Evils’ remained a political rhetoric and instrument for the CCP to suppress the
riots in Xinjiang or conducted by the Uygurs. On the contrary, there were several violent incidents
conducted by Han Chinese but were not perceived or viewed by the Chinese authority as the ‘Three
Evils.’ On July 10th 2013, there was a bomb explosion at the Beijing airport detonated by the
wheelchair-bound Ji Zhongxing, demanding justice after his petition for the punishment of security
guard had been ignored. After the Beijing court has sentenced him to 6 years’ imprisionment, he
received a lot of sympathy from the public. His act was not viewed by the Chinese or even the Chinese
authorities as extremism (Boehler 2013; Ding 2013).
[22]
Since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in late 2012, the rhetoric of ‘Three Evils’ has become more
obvious and the hardline suppression policy has been adopted as the key to ensuring China’s stability
and development (Buckley 2013; Xinhuanet 2013b). The attack in Lukqun township, Turpan on June
26th 2013 marked the most serious riot since the 2009 Urumqi unrest, when the religious extremists led
by Ahmatniyaz Sidiq and 17 members attacked the police station, government building, private shop
and beauty salon. Many cars and motorcycles were burnt and destroyed, and several government
officials and innocent people were killed. After the attack, 24 people were killed (16 Uygurs and 8
Han), and five of them were decapitated. 21 people were injured and at least 4 attackers were arrested
(Xinhuanet 2013c). It was followed by the attack on police station in Kargilik or Yecheng on August
20th 2013, killing 16 people (15 Uygurs and 1 Han police officer) (Hoshur 2013).
The most deadly incident that challenged China’s stability and legitimacy as well as the images of the
CCP was the Mercedes-Benz SUV car attack in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on October 28th 2013,
killing 5 people and injuring 42 people. Meng Jianzhu, a member of Standing Committee of Political
Bureau, claimed that the attack was premediated and masterminded by the ETIM, while that allegation
remained in doubt among experts. A former classmate of the driver, Usmen Hasan, believed that the
attacker might have been motivated by vengeance for a brother killed in a mysterious traffic accident
several years earlier (Rajagopalan 2013; Jacobs 2013). If the assumption of Hasan’s former classmate
is correct, it may prove that the CCP’s assumption is wrong. The CCP believes that the improved
livelihood under the scheme of economic development is the major determinant of achieving ethnic
unity and stability. Moreover, General Peng Yong, Commander-in-Chief of People’s Liberation Army
in Xinjiang was removed from his position 6 days later (Jacobs 2013).
After the attack in October in Beijing, there were many violent incidents in Xinjiang and other major
cities in China. There was a bomb explosion near the CCP building in Taiyuan, Shanxi on November
6th 2013, killing 1 people and injuring 8 people. Over 20 vehicles were damaged (Beech 2013). There
was also an attack at the railway station in Kunming, Yunnan, in March 2014, killing 29 people and
injuring 130 people (China Daily 2014a). It was followed by the explosion at Urumqi railway station
on April 30th 2014, killing 2 people and injuring 79 people (China Daily 2014b), and the attack at
Guangzhou railway station on May 6th 2014, injuring 6 people. All the three attacks were viewed by
the CCP as the ‘Three Evils’, particularly as terrorism premediated by the Uygur extremists and the
ETIM. However, the U.S. called on China to provide more proof about such claims, believing the
attack in Urumqi was not regarded as terrorism (Areddy 2014).
It can be argued that apart from the assimilation policy and the lack of genuine autonomy, the ethnic
disrimination is also a major factor that exacerbates the conflict in Xinjiang and creates deeper
discontent and resentment among the Uygurs in recent years. Although there were violent attacks, they
were done by only a few while most of Uygurs wish to live and cooperate with the CCP and Han
Chinese. In the case of Xinjiang, ethnic unity does not ensure political stability and territorial integrity.
Ethnic diversity does.
[23]
The Conflict in Xinjiang and Its Implications for China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP)
Besides the conflicts in Taiwan and Tibet, the conflict in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is not
only a crucial case study that indicates China’s political stability inconnection with territory integrity,
but it also affects and correlates with China’s comprehensive national power in various components
and indicators. The components which will be taken into consideration are population and human
resources, economic development and growth, education and culture, science and technology, military
capability and government expenditure.
As regards population and human resources, the ethnic conflict and tension in Xinjiang have made a
profound impact on population and human resources as evidenced by several riots which claim many
lives and cause a number of injuries, for example, the Kashgar riot in 1981, where 600 people were
attacked, causing 200 injuries and 2 deaths, the riot in Zhaosu, Ili in 1995, which produced an
estimated number of 220 deaths and injuries, the Yining riot in 1997, where 198 people were injured,
50 of them seriously, and 2 were killed (according to some sources, there were as many as 400 deaths,
300 of whom were Uygur people), and the riot in July 2009, where 197 people were killed and over
1,700 people were injured. Although the Xinjiang riots have caused from time to time the number of
deaths and injuries which seem small when compared with those numbers caused by crimes or natural
disasters such as the major earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, those people (including those of Uygurs) as
an indispensable factor in considering comprehensive national power should not have died or been
injured for no reason if Xinjiang were to achieve sustainable stability. In addition, even though there is
no systematic collection of statistical data regarding the age of people killed and injured in the riots,
those affceted by the riots are likely to belong to the working-age population and are somewhat crucial
to China’s economic development and growth.
The conflict in Xinjiang also mirrors certain consequences of China’s economic development and
growth. The GDP Per Capita of Xinjiang people has multiplied since China initiated the open door
policy and economic reforms in 1978, and Xinjiang is not the region with some of the lowest GDP Per
Capita as evidenced by its GDP Per Capita of USD 5,372, which, despite lower than that of the
Chinese population of USD 6,091, is much higher than the GDP Per Capita of the people in Guizhou
of only USD 3,100. However, the massive income gap and the unequal development rate among cities
in Xinjiang have led to the ethnic tension and conflict. While Xinjiang is a region rich in natural
resources and energy resources such as coals, oil and natural gas as well as one of the world’s 5 largest
coal producers by volume (Collins and Erickson 2012) and China’s largest oil and natural gas
producers (Yuan 2014), wealth is solely attributed to cities in the north of Xinjiang i.e. Karamay,
Shihezi, Urumqi and other areas ruled by the XPCC whose population are mostly Han Chinese.
Karamay has an average GDP Per Capita of USD 21,389, which is even higher than that of the people
in Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai whereas cities in the south of Xinjiang, where 80 percent of the
population is Uygur, lag behind those in the north in terms of an average GDP Per Capita. Kashgar,
Kizilsu Kyrgyz or Yili and Hotan in particular have an average GDP Per Capita of only USD 2,030,
1,725 and 1,111, respectively (Lee 2014, 11), which means that even though Karamay and Hotan are
in the same region, their GDP Per Capita are 20 times different.
[24]
Besides, when urbanization, one indicator used to measure the CNP, is taken into consideration, it was
found that in the year 2000, Xinjiang was ranked 17th in terms of an urbanization rate at the percentage
of 33.82, while Tibet was the bottommost with the percentage of only 18.93. Regarding the ratio of
city and rural incomes, Xinjiang had level of 3.60, which was the fourth most critical after Tibet,
Yunnan and Guizhou. Despite the fact that Xinjiang has a rather high urbanization rate, such
development is likely to distribute wealth to the Han people in the northern city areas, while people in
the southern rural areas who are predominantly ethnic minoritiess, partiuclarly the Uygurs, do not
benefit from such economic wealth and are still impoverished. Although Uygur people account for 47
percent of the total population in Xinjiang, only 19.76 percent live in the city areas. More importantly,
the economic system in the south relies heavily on agriculture, making most employment mainly at the
primary sector (Cao 2010, 971-972; Cheng 2011), but in the industrial and service sectors, the ethnic
minorities are employed at a minimal rate. The arson of cotton stocks from July to September 1999
was a good reflection of frustration. As cotton is a significant cash crop of Xinjiang and employment
is mostly offered to Han immigrants from other neighboring regions, the sustainable CNP has to be
derived from equal economic development which is not solely granted to any particular group of
people or city.
Unequal development also corresponds with the level of education which is one of the CNP’s
components. According to the study of Timothy A. Grose (2010), although the number of Uygur
people who received primary education increased from 37% in 1982 to 43% in 1990 and those who
received tertiary education from 0.1% to 2.1%, education among the Uygurs still lag behind that of
Han people, particular in the high school and tertiary levels. In 2006, only 6.9% of Uygur people over
15 years of age finished high school and only 3.1% graduated from universities. The reason behind a
small increase in the proportion of people who receive education is not only the finiancial restrictions,
but also the fact that the government attempts to integrate culture by making knowledge of the Chinese
language an important requirement for every ethnic minorities who want to study in the tertiary level
which instead erects educational barriers. It was found that 82% of Uygur people over 15 years of age
are illiterate and approximately 10.8% have difficulty reading Chinese. Some Uygur people view such
requirement as unfair as stated by one Uygur graduate from a university in Beijing who is currently
working for a government newspaper in Urumqi “There are nearly 10 million Uygurs in Xinjiang, but
we cannot use our own language … We are all nationalities, but only in China are we a minority.”
Besides, the government’s Xinjiang Class Project in 2000, which granted students in Xinjiang who are
mostly Uygurs an educational opportunity to further their studies in the high school level at schools in
the eastern cities of China such as Beijing and Shanghai in order to promote unity between Han and
Uygur, produced a contary effect. Most Uygur students were opposed to such cultural integration by
maintaining their use of the Uygur dialect for communication outside of the classroom and in their
daily lives. Meanwhile, some of the students who finshed their high school were willing to return to
their hometown with a determination to develop Xinjiang for Xinjiang, not Xinjiang for China (Grose
2010, 99-101, 104-105). It is evident that not only did the government’s cultural integration through
education have an impact on the educational level and the literacy rate amongst the Uygur population,
it had become a factor promoting resistance and ethnic tension which ultimately led to the conflict that
destroyed Xinjiang’s stability.
[25]
Xinjiang riots have caused an impact on the components in science and technology which play a part
in measuring the CNP. During the riots in July 2009, besides a considerable number of death tolls and
injuries, the government disabled the Internet connection and shut down all the telephone systems in
Xinjiang, particularly in Urumqi, where the Internet connection was disabled for almost a year and
prevented all the websites with Xinjiang-based domain and web servers from accessing information.
Such an Internet cut-off not only directly affected the development of economy, education and tourism
in Xinjiang, but it also decreased the number of Internet and telephone users, which is one of the
components for measuring the CNP.
Military capability, particularly in terms of military expenditure, has also been affected by the conflict
and political instability in Xinjiang. While Xinjiang is the region bordering other neighboring
countries in Central Asia which are already prone to unstable political situations and requires more
military and police forces for territorial defences than other regions (Fravel 2007, 724), with an
estimated number of PLA and PAPF in Xinjiang around 250,000 to 500,000 (Bachman 2004, 180), the
conflict and political instability in Xinjiang emphasizes the need for that. Therefore, China’s military
expenditure as part of measuring the CNP is not fully allocated for developing military capability as it
needs to be partly allocated for maintaining the stability and suppressing the conflict in Xinjiang. This
can be supported by the Yining riot in 1995, which costed more than 20,000 military forces and 8,500
rounds of ammunition in the suppression, the 1996 government policy of sending 18,000 military
forces to 18 problematic counties in 5 regions, and the recruitment of 120,000 local activists to
cooperate with party members and militia to maintain order and stability. Meanwhile, the great
miliatary exercise of the People’s Liberation Army in Xinjiang with 50,000 military forces displaying
military capability through powerful weapons in the heart of Kashgar for almost a month in 2001
(Davis 2008, 18) seemed to be a budget-consuming mission. Although it is common for the amount of
money to be spent on such a military exercise, the conflict and the political stability which arise in
Xinjiang might motivate the government to demonstrate its military capability to the opposition groups
as Kashgar is not only the center of Southern Xinjiang, whose people are predominantly Uygur, but it
used to be meaningul to the Uygur people as a Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan in 1933.
One major reason why the central government has to maintain its budget allocation in support of the
existence of XPCC or the bigtuan, which comprises 120,000 military forces, is the political instability
in Xinjiang, and it is the instability that is regarded as a guarantee that XPCC will definitely receive
continuous budget supports from the government.
The conflict in Xinjiang which clearly correlates with and affects the components for measuring the
CNP is the government regulation and control capability as considered from the central and local
government expenditure. In lieu of allocating budget for developing the country as a whole, the
government has to overspend the budget on compensation of loss and disaster relief, for example, the
recruitment, development and training of government staff to serve the demand for the lost number of
forces, the restoration of basic infrastructure, facilities and government offices which were destroyed
such as the offices of the government and the Communist Party, the police stations and the railway
stations, or even the construction and restoration of the mosques which were ruined or destroyed as a
result of the change in the government policy or the instability in China, particularly during the
[26]
Cultural Revolution. In addition, the budget has to be allocated for XPCC, as evidenced by the Yining
incident in 1962, where government buildings and those of the Communist Party were burnt down, 80
explosions in several cities in Xinjiang from March to May 1992, which cost several million Chinese
yuans in loss, 14 bombings in Kargilik or Yecheng, which cost more than USD 120,000 including
government buildings, or the attack on the PAPF in August, for example.
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