China’s Emerging Overseas Chinese Policy in the Late 1970sand Implications for Ethnic Chinese Communities in Vietnam and Kampuchea

Ian LamontALM CandidateMay 17, 2005

ilamont@fas.harvard.edu

Hist E-1834Chinese Emigration in Modern Times

Professor Philip KuhnSpring 2005

1

China’s modern policies toward overseas Chinese are rooted in the changes that

affected the country in the late 1970s. The death of Chairman Mao Zedong and the shift

away from the leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution resulted the revival of official

bodies concerned with overseas Chinese, and strongly worded new policies that

proclaimed solidarity, friendship, and support with ethnic Chinese everywhere.

But were the new overseas Chinese policies implemented in an even manner? For

two Southeast Asian countries in the late 1970s, the answer is no. During this period, the

People’s Republic of China treated the persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and

Kampuchea (Cambodia) quite differently. China excoriated Vietnam for its persecution of

its large ethnic Chinese community, while never mentioning the killing of hundreds of

thousands of Chinese in Kampuchea.

Beijing’s divergent policies regarding overseas Chinese in Vietnam and Kampuchea

have been noted before, not only by Western scholars but also by Vietnamese officials

who used the issue as a lever in bilateral negotiations with China at the time. Western

research and Vietnamese and Chinese primary sources are helpful in understanding

Beijing’s overseas Chinese policy, but they are not supported by empirical evidence

beyond population and data relating to refugees. Is there any other way to measure the

PRC’s overseas Chinese policy? I believe there is, by employing a computer-assisted

evaluation of coverage of the two countries by China’s official state run media outlet, the

Xinhua News Agency, specifically its English-language service.

Manual and automated content analysis of media sources has been a staple of

media studies and international relations for decades. The study of history, however,

tends to view mass media in a different light. Old media content is often evaluated as

individual primary sources — a news article about the Titanic, an essay by Zhou Enlai, a

runaway slave advertisement by Thomas Jefferson — but are seldom examined in

aggregate. This is beginning to change, as news media are distributed electronically.

2

Print media content is often stored in databases, and after a few decades passes from

the realm of current affairs into historical record. These electronic resources are easily

searchable, and can be parsed with software tools that can reveal patterns not readily

apparent in selective manual sampling of old media.

It is my belief that a structured, computer-assisted analysis of the electronic archives

of the Xinhua General Overseas News Service from the late 1970s can help us better

understand China’s emerging overseas Chinese policy, and the extent to which it was

upheld in dealings with Kampuchea and Vietnam. My content analysis of Xinhua will be

augmented by more traditional historical methods of research, including references to

individual Xinhua news items. I will also cite scholarly literature on the PRC’s overseas

Chinese policy, the nature of Chinese mass media and Xinhua’s English wire service,

trilateral relations between China, Vietnam, and Kampuchea.

Overseas Chinese Communities in Vietnam and Kampuchea

In the mid to late 1970s, Vietnam and Kampuchea were similar in several respects,

besides their proximity in mainland Southeast Asia. Both countries had sizable Chinese

communities, numbering between 430,000 and 450,000 in Kampuchea in 1975, and 1.2

million in Vietnam. Marxist governments ruled both countries — Kampuchea by the

radical Communist movement known as the Khmer Rouge, and Vietnam by a

Communist government that had forcibly united North and South Vietnam in April 1975

after a long civil war. Additionally, both the Khmer Rouge and the Socialist Republic of

Vietnam actively persecuted ethnic Chinese living within their respective areas of control

in the mid to late 1970s, resulting in the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands

of ethnic Chinese from each country and the deaths of an estimated 215,000

Kampuchean ethnic Chinese1 and approximately 30,000 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.2

3

Vietnam’s Chinese population at the time of reunification 1975 was concentrated in

what had been South Vietnam. Only 200,000 lived in the north, compared to about one

million in the south. Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese, whom the Vietnamese government refers

to as “Hoa,” have a long-standing presence in the country. This has much to do with

Vietnam’s proximity to China. For many centuries, Vietnam had been a tributary state to

successive Chinese dynasties, and had sometimes been subjugated by and warred with

its larger neighbor. Vietnam’s long coast facing the South China Sea and along trade

routes to Southeast Asia had facilitated cultural contact, immigration, and trade. During

the French colonial period (1862-1954) ethnic Chinese solidified as merchant class.3

Following independence in 1954, the civil war between North Vietnam and the South

Vietnam heightened the differences between ethnic Chinese communities in the two

areas, as well as differences with indigenous Vietnamese. In communist North Vietnam,

socialization of the economy meant that there were not as many opportunities for

capitalist endeavors. Many were fishermen or factory workers. In South Vietnam, where

most ethnic Chinese lived, Chinese dominated commercial life.

Relatively few ethnic Chinese fought for either side during the civil war, although

many gave material or other forms of support. This was owing to the complicated

situation regarding citizenship following independence from France in 1954. The

government in Hanoi, either out of sense of Marxist solidarity with Beijing, or some

lingering sense of subservience to China, opted to give Beijing some say over the

treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. The communist parties of North Vietnam and

China worked out an agreement in early 1955 whereby Chinese residents were to be

administered by Hanoi, and were to be treated the same as Vietnamese. According to

the agreement, Chinese could voluntarily adopt Vietnamese citizenship after a period of

ideological education. The 1955 agreement between Hanoi and Beijing deferred the

issue of how to treat ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam until after reunification.

4

Furthermore, during the civil war, male Chinese residents who had not adopted

Vietnamese citizenship did not have to enlist in the North Vietnamese Army.

In South Vietnam, Saigon initially took an aggressive stance on the issue of

nationality. The 1955 Nationality Law stated that children of mixed marriages were

Vietnamese citizens by default. The following year, a presidential decree stated that all

ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam were Vietnamese citizens. This was a retroactive policy.

The same year, ethnic Chinese were required to adopt Vietnamese names. Chinese

language schools were ordered shut. Additionally, in an attempt to force Vietnamese

citizenship upon ethnic Chinese, “foreigners” were banned from 11 trades dominated by

ethnic Chinese.4

Taiwan, which at the time was recognized by most non-Communist states as China’s

government in exile, told Saigon that nationality disputes had to be resolved via bilateral

negotiations. South Vietnam refused, saying the issue of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam was

an internal dispute. Communist China also protested the “brutal encroachment upon the

legitimate rights of the overseas Chinese in South Vietnam,” which was echoed by the

North Vietnamese government and Vietcong resistance in the South.5

However, it was not complaints from Taipei, Beijing, or Hanoi that forced Saigon’s

hand, but rather the actions of the Chinese community itself, which used its economic

muscle to force the regime to greatly soften its stance on citizenship issues. They closed

businesses, withdrew money from banks, and practically shut down entire segments of

the South Vietnamese economy. The government relented. Chinese schools were

allowed to stay open. Ethnic Chinese were also exempted from getting Vietnamese

identity cards, which meant they could avoid military service. The question of citizenship

was quietly shelved, as the civil war began to dominate the national discussion.6

If the government in Hanoi thought these issues could be worked out following their

victory in the south, it must have been given pause for thought as the first North

5

Vietnamese Army units rolled through Cholon (Saigon’s Chinese district) in April 1975.

Streets were lined with PRC flags and portraits of Mao Zedong. Ethnic Chinese

sympathies were again called in to question the following year, when the government’s

call for all ethnic Chinese to register as Vietnamese citizens was resisted.7

In the meantime, the new government was also attempting to transform the capitalist

economy of liberated provinces and raise agricultural production. In September 1975 the

government forced everyone to convert their old South Vietnamese currency, and put a

portion into state-controlled bank accounts. Companies also had to register ownership of

cars, machinery, and other property. Consumer cooperatives were established in

Saigon, which had since been renamed Ho Chi Minh City. In June of 1976, special taxes

were levied on profits.

As for agricultural reform, one new policy had a very direct effect on ethnic Chinese

communities: the creation of New Economic Zones (NEZ). NEZ were established in rural

areas that had been depopulated during the war. The idea was to repopulate them with

newly idled urban dwellers, which of course had a disproportionate effect on ethnic

Chinese from Cholon and provincial cities.8

Nevertheless, ethnic Chinese in southern Vietnam largely put up with these changes

through the end of 1977. A handful fled by boat to Hong Kong or stable counties in

Southeast Asia, but many apparently felt the situation was tolerable. This sentiment

would soon change.

On Vietnam’s border with Kampuchea, a series of cross-border raids by Khmer

Rouge forces on Vietnamese villages blew up into a full-scale war by September 1977.

Large numbers of Vietnamese troops crossed into Kampuchea. This affected the ethnic

Chinese community in several ways: By early 1978, the Vietnamese government had

begun to draft ethnic Chinese into the army to support the war, and also began to force

ethnic Chinese to move to NEZs that had been set up along the Kampuchean border.

6

In late 1977, ethnic Chinese in northern Vietnam began crossing into southern

China, driven partially by rumors of impending war between Vietnam and China. The

rumors suggested that Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea would prompt a military

response by Kampuchea’s close ally and supporter, China. Vietnam suspected China’s

hand in the rumors, and also questioned ethnic Chinese loyalties in the north. In the last

three months of 1977, ethnic Chinese in the North were put under surveillance, expelled

from the Vietnamese Communist Party, and forbidden from speaking Chinese in public.

In addition, thousands living in the five Vietnamese provinces bordering China were

moved away from the area as “security risks.”9

The suspicions were extended to ethnic Chinese in the South. Chinese were

physically harassed, and their property seized. More drastic restrictions came in March

1978: the Vietnamese government forbade all private trade and big business activities.

Police cordoned off Cholon, and looted private businesses and residences. Some

residents resisted and were killed.10

These events convinced many ethnic Chinese that there was no future in Vietnam,

and the trickle of emigrants soon turned to a flood. Ethnic Chinese in the north preferred

the land border; about 70,000 crossed in April and May of 1978, and 90,000 more in

June and July.11 200,000 crossed by the time China closed the border on July 12, and

afterwards an additional 40,000 snuck across or were forced across by Vietnamese

border guards. Vietnam viewed the Chinese (and 30,000 members of minority tribes)

who wanted to flee as traitors, and did not attempt to stop them from leaving.12

In the South, ethnic Chinese escaped by boat. After March 1978 an estimated 5,000

left every month. This figure increased after China closed its land border and ethnic

Chinese from the north began to leave by boat as well. An estimated 306,851 people

fled Vietnam by boat between April 30, 1975, and September 30, 1979, 60-70% of whom

were ethnic Chinese. Owing to the poor condition of the evacuation vessels, an

7

estimated 10% of those who left by boat drowned or died at sea, approximately 31,000

people. The total number of ethnic Chinese leaving Vietnam by land and sea to

September 1979 was between 432,000 and 466,000 people,13 although significant

numbers continued to flee well into 1980. The exodus slowed as international pressure

was brought to bear, Vietnam’s conflicts with China and the Khmer Rouge died down,

and restrictions on small-scale commercial activities were lifted.

In Kampuchea, ethnic Chinese were also subject to persecution during this period,

but to a far more serious degree. Like Vietnam, Kampuchea had been part of France’s

colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. However, its ethnic Chinese population was not

as large as that of Vietnam, nor did it maintain the same degree of cultural and economic

connections with China as did ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.

Until 1970, many ethnic Chinese lived in rural areas of Kampuchea, and worked in

agricultural trades or small shops. Civil war and unrest caused by American bombing in

border areas with Vietnam resulted in most ethnic Chinese relocating to Phnom Penh

and larger provincial towns. By 1975, an estimated 430,000 ethnic Chinese lived in

Kampuchea, mostly in urban areas.

The Khmer Rouge, a radical Maoist movement led by the notorious Pol Pot, came to

power in April 1975 and promptly turned Kampuchean society upside-down. Under the

direction of the paranoid Khmer Rouge leadership, private enterprise was forbidden and

currency was abolished. People living in cities were ordered to the countryside to till the

land. Over the next three and a half years, hundreds of thousands of political opponents,

people with suspected bourgeois tendencies, and anyone else who dared to resist were

murdered outright. Many more died from starvation or disease. As many as 1.5 million

Kampucheans died in all.

Central Khmer Rouge policies did not single out ethnic Chinese for murder or abuse.

Nevertheless, ethnic Chinese suffered disproportionately by stint of the fact that most

8

were engaged in “bourgeois” occupations, were not accustomed to hard agricultural

labor, and were often targeted by local Khmer in the countryside who resented

newcomers from the cities. In addition, some ethnic Chinese were killed for speaking

Chinese, or for being suspected of harboring loyalties to the People’s Republic of China,

even though the two countries were allies. About half of all ethnic Chinese were killed or

died during Khmer Rouge rule, or about 215,000 people.14

China’s New Overseas Chinese Policy

While these disasters were unfolding for overseas Chinese in Kampuchea and

Vietnam, China was emerging from the Cultural Revolution and reforming policies

relating to overseas Chinese. The Overseas Affairs Commission had been abolished in

1969 and its bureaucrats purged. Following the deaths of Premier Zhou Enlai and

Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, and an interim period in which factions within the party

vied for control, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s new leader and set the country on a

road to reform and recovery under the “Four Modernizations” to reinvigorate agriculture,

industry, science and technology, and defense.

Overseas Chinese were almost immediately considered as a source of support, and

welcomed with promises of solidarity and a chance to reconnect with the motherland. In

early 1978 the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was re-established. A People’s

Daily editorial on January 4, 1978 outlined the new policies governing the PRC’s

attitudes toward overseas Chinese. The editorial recognized that overseas Chinese are

“part of the Chinese nation … with their destiny closely linked with that of the

motherland.” It directly tied overseas Chinese to realizing the goals of the four

modernizations, noting that returned overseas Chinese were a “significant force in

China’s Socialist revolution and construction.” Additionally, the editorial noted that the

PRC would protect the interests and rights of overseas Chinese still holding Chinese

9

citizenship, and those having family members in China. Overseas Chinese who wanted

to return were welcomed to help rebuild the motherland. Even those who had adopted

foreign citizenship were still China’s “kinsfolk and friends.”15

On February 26, 1978, Premier Hua Guofeng further elaborated overseas Chinese

policies to the 1st Session of the 5th National People’s Congress. In an apparent

reference to the situation of overseas Chinese in Vietnam, Hua stated that China

opposed any attempt to force overseas Chinese to change citizenship.16

Using Xinhua as a Barometer of Policy

Despite China’s stated goals of offering support to overseas Chinese, its reactions to

the humanitarian disasters unfolding in Kampuchea and Vietnam were quite different.

China’s actions regarding the persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam included a shrill

publicity campaign and the dispatch of vessels to Vietnamese waters to bring overseas

Chinese home. However, of the unfolding genocide in Kampuchea, China said nothing.

This disconnect between Beijing’s stated overseas Chinese policy and actual

practice in Vietnam and Cambodia has previously been noted. Besides recent scholarly

analysis, Vietnam itself remarked upon China’s apparent double standard in Kampuchea

as the crisis unfolded. However, to my knowledge, no one has used a study of Xinhua

content to analyze China’s policies toward the two populations of overseas Chinese.

I have created a methodology to do just that. It involves examining the English-

language Xinhua service and applying computer-assisted content analysis techniques.

My methodology involved searching the Lexis Nexis Academic database of Xinhua

stories from January 1 1977 to December 31, 1979, and, using Microsoft Excel,

summing up the number of stories that mention different combinations of the terms

Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Overseas Chinese. I then applied simple statistical methods

10

to measure their relative importance to each other for each month of the three-year

period under study.

Using state-run media as a barometer of PRC policy is not new.17 Nor should it be

surprising, considering the close relationship between Chinese media and the Chinese

Communist Party. Lenin articulated the three purposes of journalism, namely, to

disseminate propaganda, agitate the people, and further the goals of party

organization.18 These ideas were held very dear by Mao Zedong himself: Much of his

early party work involved writing articles for party-affiliated publications.

One state-run media organization has special prominence among the leadership and

populace: The Xinhua (New China) News Service. Xinhua is the official news agency of

the central government. Established in 1931 as the Red China News Service, it was

renamed the Xinhua News Service in 1937. After the 1949 founding of the People’s

Republic of China, Xinhua became country’s national news agency, “authorized to issue

communiqués, statements and important news on foreign affairs and to provide

domestic and international news for newspapers and broadcasting stations across the

country.”19

Xinhua articles never contain objective analysis of PRC foreign policy, or criticism:

foreign news is meant to serve Chinese foreign policy. Xinhua editors hold nightly

meetings to discuss coverage, and “sometimes are notified by the government about

what kinds of foreign news to select or emphasize.”20 In the late 1970s and 1980s,

following the post-Cultural Revolution reopening of college and university journalism

programs, student journalists were required to study Marxism-Leninism and party policy,

and follow the principles of “positive propaganda,” which highlights “situations that can

mobilize and inspire the people.” Journalists worked closely with national, provincial, and

local propaganda departments, whose staff were often graduates of journalism programs

themselves. While strict Soviet-style press censorship does not exist in China, “Chinese

11

reporters, editors, and media officials exercise voluntary self-censorship. Experienced

reporters and editors know clearly what to do and what not do in order to achieve the

Communist Party’s goals.”21

Besides Xinhua’s domestic news service, aimed at the Chinese population, it also

has several foreign language wire services that compile news about China and the world

for international distribution. The aim of the service is to let foreigners and foreign

governments better understand the China’s people, policies, and cultural life.22

My content analysis was designed to measure and compare the number of

references to overseas Chinese, Vietnam, and Kampuchea, as well as combinations of

the three terms, over a 36-month period beginning in January 1977 (Appendix A

describes the methodology used). It quickly became apparent that news items about

overseas Chinese in any context were rare. Of the 14,292 Xinhua stories surveyed in

1977, only 109, or 0.76%, mentioned overseas Chinese. In 1978, the number of Xinhua

news items increased dramatically, to 19,751 (an increase of 38%) and the number of

overseas Chinese items more than doubled, to 261, but was still just 1.32% of the total.23

In 1979, 20,615 Xinhua news items were published, but just 191, or 0.93%, mentioned

overseas Chinese (see Appendix B, Data Tables for 1977, 1978, and 1979).24

By comparison, mentions of the United States were far more frequent, totaling 1,104

in 1977 (7.72% of the total), 1,471 in 1978 (7.45% of the total), and 1,966 in 1979

(9.54% of the total). Stories mentioning India were also more frequent, ranging between

1.32% to 2.14% for the three years under study. Stories which mentioned “grain” and

“China”, which presumably had a strong domestic emphasis, also had a more prominent

presence in Xinhua, reaching 2.46% of all news items in 1977, followed by 1.93% in

1978, and 1.79% in 1979 (see Appendix D, Xinhua Keyword Yearly Comparison Table).

News items that mentioned both overseas Chinese and Kampuchea were almost

nonexistent, totaling just 31 for the entire three-year period (see Appendix B). The

12

character of these stories is telling. In 1977, the four news items were about PRC

political events — two stories about Hua Guofeng, one about a commemoration

ceremony for Zhou Enlai, and one story about the PRC’s National Day. All mentioned

Kampuchea and overseas Chinese as separate entities and in passing. The number of

news items mentioning both terms rose to 16 items in 1978 and 11 in 1979, but the

emphasis was on Vietnam and the overseas Chinese crisis there — Vietnam’s invasion

of Kampuchea was often mentioned in the same news item as an additional black stain

on Vietnam’s character, or Xinhua reported the Khmer Rouge’s reaction to the crisis.

There is not one Xinhua story during the three-year period that explores the treatment of

overseas Chinese in Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge rule. As far as Xinhua (or the

government of the People’s Republic of China) was concerned, it was a non-issue.

Xinhua’s coverage of overseas Chinese in neighboring Vietnam was far more

extensive, with the exception of 1977, when there were only six news items. Much like

the coverage of Kampuchea that year, the few news items that mentioned overseas

Chinese and Vietnam in 1977 were all lightweight political pieces that separately cite the

involvement or support of Vietnam and overseas Chinese — “Chinese Embassies Show

Film in Memory of Chairman Mao,” published on Feb. 14, 1977, is a typical example.

However, in 1978, news items mentioning both terms shot to 78. The coverage in

1978 was overwhelmingly about the border crisis and China’s direct criticism of

Vietnam’s treatment of overseas Chinese. It was during this time when several new

terms entered Xinhua’s lexicon to describe overseas Chinese in Vietnam: “Victimized

Chinese” and “Persecuted Chinese.” There was a marked spike of such articles between

May, about when China first publicly complained about the thousands of ethnic Chinese

crossing into China, and September, when the last of several rounds of high-level

bilateral talks to resolve the crisis ended in failure (see Appendix B, 1978 Data Table,

and Appendix C, Xinhua References to Vietnam, Kampuchea, Overseas Chinese).

13

In late 1978 and into 1979 there were a trickle of stories about overseas Chinese in

Vietnam, but almost all were about international reaction to the Vietnamese

government’s creation of the boat people crisis and to Vietnam’s invasion of

Kampuchea. In other words, after September 1978, China rarely directly criticized

Vietnam on its treatment of overseas Chinese, but instead used indirect criticism in the

form of other countries’ condemnation of Vietnam on the boat people issue and the war

with Kampuchea.

Analysis of a Shift in Xinhua’s Coverage of Vietnam

This spike of critical Xinhua articles in 1978 warrants special analysis. The

persecution of overseas Chinese in Vietnam began in late 1977, and continued into

1980, yet it was only during this relatively short period in mid-1978 that China directly

took Vietnam to task for its shoddy treatment of overseas Chinese.

Two reasons can explain the lack of direct criticism prior to 1978: the absence of a

coordinated overseas Chinese policy, and China’s attempts to mediate the growing crisis

through diplomatic channels.25 The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was re-

established at the beginning of 1978, and while Xinhua mentioned its creation, it did not

bring up the problems facing overseas Chinese in Vietnam for four months.

Why the delay? I surmise that China was still attempting back-channel approaches to

resolve the situation, including the use of an economic carrot-and-stick approach (it

signed a bilateral trade and economic agreement with Vietnam in January 1978, but

cancelled it a few months later). Furthermore, I believe the central government wanted to

give the relaunched Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission a few months to get up to

speed in terms of organization and mission before throwing it into the fray.

It was the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission that first publicly complained about

the border crisis on April 30. In late May the Xinhua English news service started

14

reporting on the story almost every day. The bilateral talks which took place throughout

the summer at first saw the two sides trading blame over who was responsible for the

exodus of ethnic Chinese. China stated Vietnam had broken the terms of the 1955

agreement between Beijing and Hanoi governing the citizenship of ethnic Chinese. It

also said the Vietnamese government was treating ethnic Chinese “residents” unfairly, a

situation that the PRC would not tolerate. Beijing said ethnic Chinese should be allowed

to gradually obtain citizenship, and not be forced to do so. Vietnam claimed nationality

was an internal issue, and accused China of sending agents to stir up ethnic Chinese.

In the final series of talks in September, the two sides tied what had been a bilateral

dispute to larger international issues. Beijing denounced Hanoi’s links with Moscow and

its conflict with Kampuchea, and further charged Vietnam with wanting to create a

Southeast Asian federation. Vietnam pointed to China’s apparent hypocrisy on the issue

of overseas Chinese: Why didn’t China protest the treatment of overseas Chinese in

Kampuchea, many of whom had fled to Vietnam? PRC diplomats responded that unlike

in Vietnam, ethnic Chinese in Kampuchea were not specifically targeted for abuse.26

Vietnam’s accusations were seldom mentioned in Xinhua wire service reports that

summer, except to be criticized (e.g., “Viet Nam Uses Chinese Residents Question As

‘Political Trump Card,’ Says Chinese Negotiator,” September 19, 1978). Otherwise, most

Xinhua English-language wire stories that mentioned overseas Chinese and Vietnam

during this period played on several common themes: the Vietnamese government’s

persecution of ethnic Chinese, refugees’ tales of horror from no-man’s land at the

border, and China’s efforts to help ethnic Chinese.

Xinhua made no mention of Vietnam’s accusation of Beijing’s double standard in

Kampuchea. I believe there are several reasons for this. Reporting this inside China

would suggest that some official policy statements were empty words, and in the post-

Mao era, the new regime was eager to cement its domestic reputation. Additionally,

15

broadcasting such news could also lead the Chinese populace to reason that in certain

countries China was willing to put the interests of foreigners ahead of ethnic Chinese.

As for Xinhua’s English-language service, revealing or debating Vietnam’s claim

could potentially exacerbate the anxieties of ethnic Chinese in other Southeast Asian

countries, whom the government was anxious to court. It could also complicate foreign

policy goals in Southeast Asia — memories of China’s actions during the political crisis

in Indonesia in the mid-1960s were still fresh in many Southeast Asian capitals, and

Beijing did not want to scare any more countries into Moscow’s sphere.

After September 1978, Xinhua’s English service abruptly ended the wave of direct

criticism of Vietnam on this issue. Until the end of 1979 there was only a smattering of

news items that mentioned Vietnam and Overseas Chinese, usually in the context of the

refugee crisis, which was often tied to Vietnam’s military involvement in Kampuchea.

These news items almost always highlighted foreign criticism of Vietnam, rather than

direct vitriol from Beijing. Some examples: “Venezuelan Committee Denounces Soviet-

Vietnamese Invasion of Kampuchea” (January 31, 1979), “Nepalese Weekly Condemns

Viet Nam's Aggression against Kampuchea and China” (February 27, 1979), and

“French Paper Exposes Vietnamese Export of Refugees” (June 16, 1979).

Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978 and near defeat of China’s Khmer

Rouge allies provided a pretext for a Chinese invasion of Northern Vietnam. The number

of Xinhua stories that mentioned Vietnam or Kampuchea rocketed as a result. January

1979 was the peak month; there were 329 Xinhua news items that mentioned Vietnam

(about 20% of the total) and 434 that mentioned Kampuchea (about 27% of the total)

(see Appendix B, 1979 Data Table, and Appendix C, Xinhua References to Vietnam,

Kampuchea, Overseas Chinese). Yet, as noted in the preceding paragraph, only a

handful mentioned overseas Chinese as well, and usually in an indirect fashion. It is

almost as if Xinhua, and by extension, the Chinese government, was taking deliberate

16

care to avoid giving opinions about the continuing overseas Chinese refugee crisis and

Vietnam’s treatment of ethnic Chinese, even though these issues contributed to the

deterioration of relations between the two sides.

I believe there are four reasons why Xinhua avoided direct criticism of Vietnam on

the ethnic Chinese crisis post-September 1978. First, in the summer of 1978, China had

found this method to be ineffective in reducing the number of refugees and stabilizing

relations with Vietnam. It may have even made things worse for ethnic Chinese and

increased Vietnam’s suspicion of China’s motives.

Second, prodding Vietnam on this issue during the summer of 1978 had eventually

resulted in Vietnam bringing up an extremely uncomfortable question: Why was China

so keen to berate Vietnam over its treatment of ethnic Chinese, but say nothing about

the deaths and forced migration of ethnic Chinese in Kampuchea? This touched a third

rail of Chinese foreign policy — China’s extreme sensitivity to other countries criticizing

domestic policies, especially regarding human rights and separatist movements, and

Beijing’s pains to avoid the appearance of meddling in the internal affairs of other

countries. China had been caught out on this issue before. In the mid 1960s in

Indonesia, China’s evacuation of ethnic Chinese and alleged involvement in Indonesia’s

internal political life had badly hurt its profile in Southeast Asia. Many Southeast Asian

countries viewed with suspicion any moves on the part of Beijing to extend influence to

ethnic Chinese communities, and by September 1978, after needling from Hanoi on this

point, China likely wanted its state-run propaganda machine to pull back on this issue to

avoid damaging relations with other Southeast Asian countries and head off wider

criticism of its apparent double standards in Vietnam and Kampuchea.

Third, the nature of the refugee crisis changed after China closed the land border in

July of 1978. While there were some scuffles at the border afterwards, and incidences of

refugees skirting border posts or being forced across, the exodus of ethnic Chinese from

17

northern Vietnam shifted to the sea. Some went to China by boat, but most went to Hong

Kong or other parts of Southeast Asia.27 This reduced the pressure on China to cope

with ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam.

Fourth, although the refugee crisis had contributed to the bad blood between

Vietnam and China, bilateral relations took a turn for the worse in late 1978/early 1979

following Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea and China’s subsequent invasion of

northern Vietnam. It is not surprising that Xinhua’s coverage of large-scale military

conflict would overshadow a slow-moving refugee crisis. Additionally, I believe Xinhua,

acting in the interest of the Chinese leadership, did not want to indicate that there was

any link between the refugee crisis/Vietnam’s treatment of ethnic Chinese and China’s

invasion of Northern Vietnam. Making this connection would only give Vietnam an

excuse to accelerate the persecution of ethnic Chinese and push more of them into the

war zone, and after hostilities were over, use those who still remained as a lever to

extract better treatment or more concessions from China. Hence, China’s brief invasion

of Vietnam was officially in “self defense,”28 but there is a strong indication that

Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea and near-defeat of the Khmer Rouge also played a

role in the Chinese attack. Most Xinhua news items during this period show a high

correlation with the Kampuchean issue: approximately 60% of all news items that

mention Vietnam in February and March 1979 (the months when China occupied

northern Vietnam) also mention Kampuchea (see Appendix B, 1979 Data Table).

Conclusion

One question remains unanswered: Why did China in the late 1970s treat the

persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam differently than the genocide of ethnic Chinese

in Kampuchea?

18

I believe the answer can be found in China’s foreign policy goals, which outweighed

Beijing’s stated desire to improve relations with overseas Chinese. In the 1970s China

was concerned with the Soviet Union’s growing partnership with Vietnam. A serious

rivalry between the two Communist superpowers had emerged in the early 1960s, and

over the following two decades smaller Communist states had to choose sides.

North Vietnam was able to take a middle ground while it fought the United States and

South Vietnam. It served as an intermediary between the two sides in the 1960s, and

even managed to get Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in bringing war materiel to the

front.29 In the late 1960s, Hanoi began to tilt toward Moscow’s sphere, and its relations

with Beijing began to slide. Hanoi’s centrist Communist leadership was alarmed by the

ultraleftist policies of China during the Cultural Revolution, as well as the emergence of a

cult of personality around Mao Zedong. It also distrusted China’s realignment with the

United States in the early 1970s, believing that Beijing was putting short-term national

interests ahead of long-term Communist goals.30 Territorial disputes in the South China

Sea also contributed to the deterioration in relations in the 1970s, as did Vietnam’s

admission into Comecon, the Soviet-sponsored economic alliance, and of course the

issues surrounding ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.

Another major foreign policy issue Kampuchea. In the early 1970s, both North

Vietnam and China had supported the Khmer Rouge while it was still a radical

Communist rebel movement in the Kampuchean countryside. After the Khmer Rouge

took control of the country in 1975, China became Kampuchea’s primary supporter while

the country descended into madness. Thousands of Chinese military and civilian

advisors were dispatched to the country, as well as regular shipments of weapons and

oil. In return, Kampuchea shipped rubber and natural products used to make Chinese

medicine, including herbs and geckos.31 Vietnam supported the new regime for a few

years, but this changed after repeated Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnamese villages and

19

the deaths of thousands of civilians. Vietnam suspected a Chinese hand in the

Kampuchean attacks.

By 1978, China had a new overseas Chinese policy in place, which stated support of

ethnic Chinese abroad. In Kampuchea, China had thousands of military and civilian

advisors in the country. It had to know about the deaths of thousands of ethnic Chinese

there. But in the face of growing Soviet influence in Vietnam, and Vietnam’s increasing

hostility toward China, Beijing needed the Kampuchean alliance. It was prudent to

remain silent about the deaths of ethnic Chinese. At the same time, Vietnam’s alignment

with the USSR, and Vietnam’s conflict with Kampuchea, was threatening to China. The

persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam was worth exploiting in the press and in

bilateral negotiations, at least for a time. The issue was de-emphasized in late 1978, as

China realized confronting Vietnam on the issue was counterproductive, and full-fledged

military hostilities between the two sides overshadowed the overseas Chinese issue.

It is for these reasons that I believe China’s overseas Chinese policy in the late

1970s is closely connected to China’s foreign policy. Computer-assisted content analysis

of China’s state-run press agency provides a new tool to examine China’s policies in

these fields, and I anticipate that such methods will be increasingly used in the future, as

mass media is stored in digital form, easily subject to compter-assited examination.

1 Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge,1975-79 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 2962 Ramses Amer, The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Forum,1991), p. 107. Most died at sea attempting to flee the country.3 During the French colonial period, the Qing and Republican governments regarded ethnic Chinese livingin Vietnam with an unusual degree of paternalism. During negotiations for the Treaty of Tianjin (1885), theCommercial Convention (1886), the Convention of Nanjing (1930) and the Chongqing Agreement (1946)China sought from France special status for ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, including the right to freely engagein desired occupations, avoid discriminatory taxes, and maintain Chinese schools. Chang Pao-min, Beijing,Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese. Berkeley (Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California,Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1982), p. 54 Chang Pao-min, p. 115 Chang Pao-min, p. 146 Chang Pao-min, p. 147 Chang Pao-min, p. 17

20

8 Amer, pp. 26-299 Chang Pao-min, p. 2410 Chang Pao-min, p. 2711 Chang Pao-min, p. 3012 Amer, p. 7813 Amer, p. 10714 Kiernan, p. 29515 “Liao Cheng-Chih On Guidelines And Policies On Work Concerning Overseas Chinese Affairs,” XinhuaGeneral Overseas News Service, January 4, 1978.16 Chang Pao-min, p. 2617 See Robert Stone, “Speaking to the Foreign Audience: Chinese Foreign Policy Concerns as Expressed inChina Daily, January 1989-June 1993,” Gazette: The International Journal for Communications Studies(Leiden, Netherlands) 53 (1994): 43-52, and Lu Xinlu, “What Does China Want the World to Know: AContent Analysis of CNN World Report Sent by the People’s Republic of China,” Gazette: TheInternational Journal for Communications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 58 (1996): 173-18718 J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: the Media and Public Policy (White Plains, NY: LongmanPublishing USA, 1995), p. 21119 Chang Won Ho, Mass Media in China: the History and the Future (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State UniversityPress, 1989), p. 6620 Chang Won Ho, p. 7421 Chang Won Ho, p. 25622 Despite publishing 50,000 to 60,000 “words” per day in the late 1980s, it is not known how many Xinhuastories were rebroadcast abroad or prompted follow-up stories by foreign media outlets. At this time, mostof Xinhua’s paying clients were located in Africa and South America. Further, the articles were (and stillare) quite boring in terms of subject matter and writing style. Breaking news is rare. Bylines are not used.Domestic stories concentrate on economic and social progress in China, while the guidelines for foreigncoverage are to uphold China’s national independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, and to supportthe struggles of all peoples, especially those in the third world for “independence, emancipation, socialjustice, and economic and cultural progress.” Chang Won Ho, pp. 68-7223 The relative increase is partially due to the reopening of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission andthe activities of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission officials beginning in January 1978, as well as theoverseas Chinese refugee crisis on China’s land border with Vietnam.24 The results for the last year were particularly surprising to me, as by 1979 the central government wasfully oriented toward promoting the four modernizations, and that was the year that the first four “specialeconomic zones” to attract foreign investment were created in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. I can onlyspeculate that the significance of creating SEZs in areas which had strong ties to overseas communities wasmore appreciated on a provincial level than by the central government. Because Xinhua is oriented towardcentral government policies rather than provincial-level policies, the SEZs’ overseas Chinese connectionwas overlooked or underreported. It is also possible that Xinhua did not want to be seen as giving anyspecial attention to overseas Chinese.25 Amer, p. 4426 Amer, p. 7627 Chang Pao-min p. 5828 “Statement By Xinhua News Agency Upon Authorization,” Xinhua General News Agency, March 6,1979.29 Stephen Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture And The Causes Of War (Stanford,Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999) p. 13030 Morris, p. 14431 Morris, p. 133