china's new mercantilism in china

Chinarsquos New Mercantilism inCentral AfricaJONATHAN HOLSLAG

ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is twofold On one hand it elu-cidates the goals and dynamics of Chinarsquos foreign trade pol-icy since the 1990s On the other hand it assesses the impactof this strategy on the development of the Central AfricanRegion as a case for Chinarsquos influence on other developingcountries We observe that China is pursuing a pragmaticmercantilist policy that combines a wide array of diplomaticand economic devices As a result the Peoplersquos Republic gainsground slowly but surely However Chinarsquos ascent does notlift the Central African states to a more favourable positionin the global division of labour We conclude that Chinarsquosrise confirms the current economic position of African coun-tries that of a commodity supplier and a modest consumerrsquosmarket

Introduction

In 1963 Deng Xiaoping stated that he wanted his country ldquoto be amongthe advanced countries in the world through forty years of hard workingrdquo1

African and Asian Studies volume 5 no 2 also available online

copy 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden see wwwbrillnl

Jonathan Holslag Free University Brussels (VUB) specializes in Chinarsquos foreign pol-icy His mailing address Mechelsestraat 45 3000 Leuven Belgium E-mail jhol-slagvubacbe Tel ++32477 63 82 61

I would like to thank Jan Gorus and Gustaaf Geeraerts both professors at the FreeUniversity Brussels (VUB) for their advice I am also grateful to the reviewers of thisjournal (African and Asian) for their constructive comments

1 Deng Xiaoping Be Realistic Look at the Future Main points of a speech on indus-trial development at the meeting held by the Industrial Decision Drafting CommitteeAugust 20 1963

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM 33

134 bull Jonathan Holslag

Four decades passed by and China indeed has been growing spectacularlySince the mid-1990s however Chinarsquos economic transformation hasentered a new stadium Ever since the governmentrsquos orientation shiftedfrom an obsession with growth rates to the ambition to make growthsustainable One of the key ambitions was to create direct links to over-seas markets It took only a short time before international attention wasdrawn to blatant Chinese investments in pariah states such as Sudan andIran Chinarsquos economic engagement in Asia turned into a hot issue aswell Though in several regions commercial activities escaped attentiondespite the Peoplersquos Republic (PRC) and is gaining ground there as wellIn this article we assess the impact of Chinarsquos ldquogo-outrdquo policy on oneparticular region Central Africa The seven states mentioned in this sur-vey constitute a rich sample of what the African continent has or hasnot to offer2 They comprise resource-abundant states as well as com-modity-poor markets stable and war-rigged societies countries that maketheir income from the export of agricultural yields and small oil statesetc This pattern card also allows us to let a wider array of Chinarsquos eco-nomic interests and aspirations come into play Consequently it permitsus also to assess the impact of the Peoplersquos Republicrsquos commercial offensivefrom more perspectives Thus the objective of this article is twofold Onone hand we try to explain the goals and dynamics of Chinarsquos actualforeign trade policy On the other we assess the impact of this strategyon the development of the Central African Region as a case for theinfluence on other developing countries

To start with Chinarsquos ldquogo-outrdquo policy is contextualized concisely inthe theoretical perspective of neo-mercantilism In the second and third sec-tion we focus on the Peoplersquos Republicrsquos trade policy toward the CentralAfrican Region what are its targets and what are the devices at its dis-posal to materialize these aims In this regard we will stress that Beijingis pursuing a dynamic mercantilism and that Chinarsquos economic activityin Central Africa arises out of a well-conceived political strategy Onone hand the government stimulates companies to swarm out via diplo-

2 The 7 countries are Burundi the Central African Republic (CAR) the Republicof Congo (ROC) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) Gabon Rwandaand Uganda It should be noted that within the geo-political morphology of Africa asdefined by formal colonial powers and accepted in the global international relationsUganda is not considered part of Central African region It is located in East Africaand it is also part of the Great Lakes Region of Africa However in terms of its ethnic and cultural ramifications and within the current geo-political economy it hasbeen playing an important role in the re-definition of politics in several Central Africancountries

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 134

Chinarsquos New Mercantilism in Central Africa bull 135

matic financial and logistical assistance On the other it is a directplayer too given the fact that political officials are the helm of severalstrategic important state owned enterprises (SOE) Fourth we try to mea-sure to which extent this policy bears fruit

Is China capable in hammering out a trade regime that is favourableto its needs In order to answer this question we analyze as well theoverall trade balance as the position and progress of Chinese compa-nies in particular key-sectors such as minerals oil infrastructure con-struction telecommunication etc The last section considers the influenceof the Chinese economic involvement on the development of the CentralAfrican Region Here we will argue that commercial relations do notturn out to be that beneficial to the local societies as the Chinese polit-ical leaders promise in their well-known ldquowin-winrdquo discourse We endwith the conclusion that the economic relations between the PRC andthe Central African countries can be considered as a case that demon-strates the entry of a new era in the global division of labour Whereasthe West the respective core of our economic world system out sourcesa vast part of its industrial activity to China the latter is obliged to keepthe ovens burning and to pursue an expansionist economic policy tosafeguard its surging interests For African markets however Chinarsquosascent does not generate many new incentives to mature themselves

Chinarsquos New Mercantilism

The core thesis of mercantilism is that governments should maintain apivotal role in the development of a strong national economy Strongstate strong economy Actually that is about the only assumption

Table 1A trade profile of the region Source World Bank (2005)

UNDP (2005) WTO (2005)

Value added as ( of GDP)Agriculture Industry Services Exports Main export goods (goods

( of GDP) and share in total export)

Burundi 49 19 32 7 Coffee (65) and tea (16) CAR 61 25 14 24 Minerals (60) and coffee (4)DROC 58 19 23 19 Minerals (70) and logs (10)

estimatesROC 6 61 33 78 Oil (67) and cotton (6)Gabon 62 Oil (55) and timber (16)Rwanda 42 22 36 9 Coffee (41) and manufactures

(33)Uganda 33 22 45 51 Coffee (15) and manufactures

(11)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 135


mercantilists agree on For the rest numerous interpretations exist con-cerning the different modi in which mercantilism materializes the stateand non-state actors that influence policy-making the question whethermercantilism is good bad or both etc This plethora of discourses enticedTerence W Hutchinson to write that ldquoMercantilism is one of the mostunpleasant and obscure lsquoismsrsquo in our dictionaryrdquo Nonetheless terms andmodels are attempts to make conceptual continuity a bit more discretenot reality The multitude of notions reflects the unabated efforts tomatch a strong paradigm to the intricate flows of reality Among therecent derivates of mercantilism the so-called Asian developmental statemodel is most prominent This Asian blend of mercantilism aims atdeveloping strategies for national prosperity in a context of intensifyingtrans-national competition and a highly fluid globalized economy It com-prises two key features On one hand it promotes openness and com-pliance to international liberalist standards in order to lure in foreigncapital and to gain access to overseas consumer markets On the otherhand the state plays a vital role in mooring the accumulated wealth andcreating a well-off society through guidance and redistribution Asianmercantilism suggests a compromise between two extremes of full inte-gration in the globalized capitalist economy and economic autonomy3

With regard to the foreign trade policy of these states economic-diplo-matic activities therefore cannot be conceptualized as pure market-basedtransactions4 Instead they should be viewed as politically mediated inter-actions between different nation-states that surpass profit maximization5

Which factors explain the emergence of this new wave of mercantilismSeveral scholars highlight the cultural fundaments of this policy Confucianand legalist values are common to many Asian nations Both emphasizethe inferiority of individual profits to the general interest that is repre-sented by a responsible and capable government6 Others point at theinternal constellation of economic interests Jayasuriya Kanishka forinstance construes Asian mercantilism as embedded in a trade-off betweennationalist-internationalist interest groups7 Concluding Asian develop-

3 Jackson Robert and Soslashrensen Georg 2003 p 2084 See Dong Qi and Ma Xiaoye 2004 Wu Friedrich 2005 Wang Xiaozu Xu Lixin

Colin and Zhy Tian 2004 5 Yeung TH lsquoStrategic Governance and Economic Diplomacy in Chinarsquo in East

Asia vol 21 (1) 20046 See for instance Katayama Seiichi and Heinrich W Ursprung 2000 Chu Ke

Young 2001 7 See Jayasuriya Kanishka 2004 Kennedy Scott 2005 McGuire Martin C and

Ohta Hiroshi 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 136


mentalism provides a potent alternative for the omnipresent monopoly cap-

italism8 Whereas monopoly capitalism implies ldquogiant corporationsrdquo coax-ing the state to prop their rush for the creation of surplus neo-mercantiliststates set up their own ldquobig businessrdquo in order to escape the vagaries ofunbound commerce9 Capitalism appears to be addressed only as a meansnot as an end The final goal of the new Asian mercantilism is to thriveon globalization without seizing the capacity to steer and without fallingfor the dependency trap

Can China be categorized as a new mercantilist economy Let us con-cisely match up the two main features to the economic reality of thisparticular country On one hand the Peoplersquos Republic did break throughits economic isolation Nowadays we can observe that China is eager toget rid of its import and export restrictions and that it attempts to com-ply with international norms and standards Scott Kennedy for instanceexplains that Chinarsquos leaders underwent fundamental ldquolearningrdquo andmoved from protectionism to fair trade10 Alastair Iain Johnston arguesthat the Peoplersquos Republic gradually embraced the global capitalist insti-tutions their norms open capital flows and transparency11 Chen Zhiminin turn stresses the ascent of a ldquopositive nationalismrdquo aiming at coop-eration and integration in world economy12 On the other hand the cen-tral government holds tenaciously to its gatekeeper position It makesitself indispensable by maintaining the monopoly over trade regulationthe monetary policy the redistribution of capital In this regard BhallaSurjit for example refers to China manipulating its currency to pro-mote exports13 Ross Lester and King Susan focus on the protectionistmeasures to ease the external pressures on weak interest groups14 Numerous

8 On monopoly capital see Baran Paul A and Sweezy Paul M Monopoly CapitalMonthly Review Press New YorkLondon 1966 For a recent summary see SweezyPaul M lsquoMonopoly Capitalismrsquo Monthly Review October 2004 pp 78-85

9 On this argument see for instance the numerous country-by-country analyses inHewison Kevin and Robison Richard ed East Asia and the Trials of Neo-Liberalism a spe-cial issue of the Journal of Development Studies vol 41 (2) 2005

10 Kennedy Scott lsquoChinarsquos porous protectionism the Changing political economy oftrade policyrsquo in Political Science Quarterly 2005 vol 120 (3)

11 Johnston Alastair I lsquoIs China a Status Quo Powerrsquo in International Security 27 (4)2003 pp 5-56

12 Chen Zhimin lsquoNationalism Internationalism and Chinese Foreign policyrsquo Journalof Contemporary China vol 14 (42) 2005 pp 35-53

13 Surjit Bhalla Chinese Mercantilism Currency Wars and how the East was LostICRIER New Delhi 1998 pp 4-12

14 Ross Lester and King Susan lsquoModern Protectionism Chinarsquos Own AntidumpingRegulationsrsquo in China Business Review vol 26 2005 pp 30-33

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 137


publications also mention the state pursuing an ardent charm-offensivetoward overseas markets15 It is this issue that will form the point ofdeparture of this case study Let us look at this issue from nearby andapply this ldquogo-outrdquo policy to the Central African Region

Chinarsquos Trade Policy toward the Central African Region

At first sight Chinarsquos stake in Central Africa does not appear to be thatdifferent from other economic powers the PRCrsquos commercial relationswith the region only amount to 015 percent of its total trade volumeThis is comparable to the European Union and the United States Buthere the comparison ends Beyond the macro-figures China does havesome particular interests in Central Africa First China is still juvenilewhen it comes to projection of economic power on overseas marketsHence it is seductive to focus more on economies in which strongWestern firms are not much interested Second nowhere in the worldis the consumption of raw commodities raising as dramatically as in thePeoplersquos Republic every opportunity to meet this demand is welcomeWhile Chinarsquos initial opening-up strategy mainly focused on the attrac-tion of foreign investors nowadays it increasingly wants its own com-panies to explore foreign markets Hitherto the corner stone of Chinarsquosdevelopment strategy was to spur domestic production output Thereforeit counted on foreign enterprises not only to invest but also to managethe retail of the produced goods on overseas markets Recently howeverthe Peoplersquos Republic appears to have entered a new stadium of foreigntrade policy in which it attempts to conquer foreign markets by itselfIn 2001 the Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo officially announcedhis two-way investment strategy It was an explicit dictate of the Partythat the ldquoinvite-inrdquo approach had to be complemented by a ldquogo-outrdquostrategy This shift can be explained from two important considerations

First the country is eager to diminish its over-dependence on foreignconcerns and to build an autonomous capacity to operate abroad Inother terms it wants to promote trade-ownership In 2001 Chinarsquos coastalprovinces started actively ldquoto establish a group of overseas productionbases to boost its transfer of matured industries to overseas and theexport of raw materials equipment and spare partsrdquo The state-con-trolled newspaper the Peoplersquos Daily explained this evolution as followsldquoA batch of industry leaders with international brand competitiveness

15 See for instance UNCTAD 2003 Medeiros Evan and Fravel Taylor 2003 DongQi and Ma Xiaoye 2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 138


have emerged from the light industry textile household appliance andmachinery sectors These companies are able to go into the global mar-ket to secure broader space for structural adjustment and optimal allo-cation of resourcesrdquo16 Understandably trade ownership can be approachedfrom an outward and an inward perspective

The former implies Chinarsquos eagerness to discover new consumer mar-kets and lucrative markets for Chinese exporters It is well known thata substantial share of Chinarsquos Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 344 per-cent consists of export the largest part of its new jobs are provided byindustries whorsquos main activity is to process consumption goods destinedfor overseas markets Nowadays foreign or international corporationsmanage 60 percent of Chinarsquos export volume In se this does not has tobe a problem Nevertheless on the long haul it is all but certain if theseWal-Mart-type companies will also keep their production activity in ChinaThe PRC can only remain to be the worldrsquos factory if it succeeds tocement its own production capacity and if it achieves to create its ownchannels to make way into export markets At first sight Central Africaseems not to fit in this aspiration it concerns an impoverished regionand thus does not have that much purchasing power Even though itremains a profitable market to tap First China has a strong standingas a supplier of affordable goods and services Whereas China does nothave sufficient branding capacity to penetrate the markets of industrial-ized countries itself cheap Chinese fabricates such as consumption prod-ucts and inexpensive robust machines find their way easily to Africancountries without having to resort on foreign retailers ldquoOur textile com-panies do not earn a cent more with a Nike logo so if they can selltheir fabricates themselves they are eager to do itrdquo a Chinese diplomatsummarized17 Second the Central African economies form a testing lab-oratory for higher-standard firms Whereas not yet competitive on Westernmarkets Chinese companies can gain experience and reputation throughlimited investments and undertakings in developing countries

The latter the inward perspective mainly relates to the supply ofstrategic important and often scarce goods raw commodities to be specificLet us focus concisely on the evolution of Chinarsquos need for raw mate-rials how Chinarsquos demand for commodities translates into commercialaspirations was already described supra A recent CLSA report predictsthat Chinarsquos consumption of steel iron ore nickel copper aluminium

16 lsquoGo Global investment strategy needed for Chinese enterprisesrsquo in Peoplersquos DailyDecember 12 2001

17 Conversation with Chinese diplomat Brussels November 11 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139


and oil will grow at double-digit annual rates for the next five yearstaking an annual growth of the Chinese economy of 7 to 9 percent forgranted until 2010 Over the past twenty years Chinarsquos primary energyconsumption increased by 70 percent Whereas it still possesses an abun-dance of coal reserves it is running out of oil and natural gas depositsBy result the PRC has to rely more and more on foreign providers In1993 it became a net-importer of oil For natural gas too its surplus isdiminishing Nowadays 47 percent of the amount of the oil it consumesoriginates from foreign wells for 2020 the government estimates to haveto import 60 percent of its oil18 Annually 4 million new cars hit theroad the gasoline consumption is expected to grow 63 percent eachyear Another cause for Chinarsquos surging oil appetite concerns the pro-duction of petroleum derivates in the chemical industry still good foras much as 70 percent of the average oil demand Petroleum is alsoreplacing coal as an energy source for heating

18 Development Research Center of the State Council Chinarsquos energy strategy StateCouncil Beijing 2003 p 11

16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

Total (mio USD) Share in world trade ()

Figure 1Chinarsquos import of minerals Source UNCTAD (2004)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140


The industrial boom requires masses of other raw materials as wellChina is likely to overtake the US as top consumer of aluminium withintwo years Demand for copper will also surge at annual rates of 10 per-cent or above due to Chinarsquos growing power network and constructionboom Experts assess that by 2010 China will have to import 57 per-cent of its iron ore 70 percent of its copper and 80 percent of its alu-minium and a substantial amount of other minerals such as cobalt andniobium (tantalum) to sustain its production19 On the whole Chinarsquosimport of minerals annually grows 216 percent previous decade itsshare in the worldrsquos total mineral imports surged from 36 to 98 per-cent (see graph supra)20 According to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)Chinarsquos demand for imported industrial wood timber paper and pulpwill increase by at least 33 percent within the next five years from thecurrent 94 million cubic meters to 125 million cubic meters China alsohas an interest in promoting agricultural and horticultural cooperationFirst Chinarsquos fertile land is under increasing pressure due to overpopu-lation and pollution Second the appetite for exclusive exotic productsis growing given the fact that a new class of tasteful affluents is devel-oping Third many Chinese officials and farmers think of investing inAfrica in order to cope with the challenges brought by the WTO entry21

On 28 September 2002 Chinarsquos Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs LiZhaoxing announced ldquoChina will make agricultural co-operation withAfrica a key area of co-operation in the coming yearsrdquo

With regard to the import of primary goods trade-ownership impliesthat China is eager to take control of the foreign sources of these com-modities by itself Why is this propensity and what does it mean Beijingopts for a control-over-the-well-strategy because it does not have confidencein the liberal approach of the commodity market First the up-streamactivity the excavation of recourses is seldom liable to the free-marketprinciples but rather in the grip of monopolies and state control22 It isstill the hosting governments that have to grant concessions to foreigncompanies eying at their resources Often exploitation contracts requiremuch more than a strong market position political and geostrategic rea-sons as well play a predominant role Second China does not want tobe dependent on the dominant international concerns as its supplier Thirdcontrol over the up-stream processes also permits to keep down-stream

19 lsquoChina to slow mineral importsrsquo Peoplersquos Daily June 1 200520 UNCTAD 2005 p 521 Muekalia DJ 200422 Fieldhouse D 2000

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141


prices in check Whereas Beijing is aware of the fact that market-tiedprices of petrol gas iron and other commodities are crucial to curbover-consumption the limiting of inflation is even more imperative ris-ing prices and low wages are a dangerous cocktail for social unrestFourth Chinese companies involved in up-stream activities are oftenquite recently junior players on the international market Hitherto theywere chiefly occupied with interior resources since these domestic sourcesare depleting fast they have to make up lost ground very swiftly andcarve out their own part of foreign assets Finally a foot on the groundin resource producing countries also permits to sketch out a long-termpolicy and to anticipate on trends in the interior demand Hence theaspiration to have a certain control of supply will spur China to stim-ulate its companies to hunt for their share of the commodity marketnevertheless it will simultaneously open up its markets to foreign suppliers23

International concerns are stimulated to invest downstream activities suchas processing and distribution as well as to participate in upstream activ-ities These investments ought to be beneficial in terms of the infusionof capital in expensive infrastructure projects such as the construction ofpipelines and refineries They are also necessary to infuse know-how forinstance China has not much experience and skills in offshore excava-tion The UNCOAL affaire also made many policymakers in Beijingaware of the fact that too much government control might raise suspi-cion and restrain overseas activity24 To come to conclusion China hasto balance between the long-term strategic objective to foster a certaindegree of trade ownership on one hand and on the other hand the neces-sity to involve foreign or international concerns with the purpose of mak-ing swift headway to meet the immediate needs of its booming economyCooperation cannot be shunned Yet on the long haul the need is forcompetitive devices with the purpose of pursuing an autonomous andenergetic foreign trade policy

In this context too Central Africa has not that much to offer Eventhough countries such as the DROC are dubbed as ldquogeological scan-dalsrdquo or ldquonatural treasuresrdquo the volumes of natural resources in thisregion just constitute a limited share of the worldrsquos total deposits Takeoil for instance Central African countries possess barely 06 percent ofthe worldwide oil stock Since 1999 the annual production in the ROC

23 See for instance State Council Chinarsquos Policy on Mineral Resources Information Officeof the State Council of the Peoplersquos Republic of China Beijing 1994 chapter 4

24 The US Congress barred a Chinese oil company to take over the American energyfirm UNCOAL

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142


and Gabon declined by respectively 182 and 294 percent Except forcobalt (2470 percent) and diamonds (1800 percent) the regionrsquos min-ing output contributes only very modestly to the worldrsquos aggregate totalcopper 634 percent tantalum 372 percent and gold 002 percent25

Most of these commodities can be found much nearer for instance inAustralia Canada Indonesia Myanmar and Russia Nonetheless theselimited assets remain to be an interesting investment for Chinese com-panies First in this area they do not have to face that much competi-tion from more potent international concerns the big international playersare not prepared to invest as much in the less productive sources herethan in the bonanzas elsewhere and are concerned having affected theirimage in dealing with war-shattered and corruption mired countriesSecond the impoverished governments of this region are easier to dealwith compared to larger suppliers in which their omnipotent monopo-lies control most upstream activities Lastly China as most other pow-ers attaches great importance to diversife its lines of supply and to limitdependence on a limited number of countries

The Devices of Chinarsquos New Mercantilism

Before discussing the specific tools that China applies in foreign tradeoffensive let us first pore briefly over some institutional aspects of theforeign economic policy The governing regime of the PRC comprisesthree institutional pillars the Party the government and the militaryEven though all three actors have their say the national foreign tradepolicy remains to be final responsibility of the National State Councilthe apex of the national government The revised Foreign Trade Lawof 1994 iterates ldquoThe State Council is in charge of the administrationof the foreign trade of the entire countryrdquo26 Under the aegis of theCouncil the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry ofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) are in charge ofthe execution of the national policy However China is not a monolithThe constitution of 1982 formally divided the state in several sub-statelevels Each unit is entitled with several authorities that permit it to setits own agenda to promote local development They are also permittedto lobby at the national level to match the foreign trade policy in theirfavour27 to participate in the implementation of the nationrsquos foreign

25 USG Geological Mineral Survey Yearbook USG Washington 2004 various pages26 Peoplersquos Congress Foreign trade law of the PRC the Standing Committee of the Eight

National Peoplersquos Congress Beijing 1994 art 327 For instance provinces lobbied for preferential policies to attract foreign investments

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143


policy and to manage non-governmental activities to promote their mar-ket abroad28 Still at the end the central government remains the pri-mary actor Let us now move to the concrete instruments of Chinarsquosgo-out policy To start we focus on the guiding and supportive role ofthe government how it takes the vanguard in the promotion of favourablecontacts and how it conceives an official discourse to convince Africancountries of its benevolent intentions Subsequently we concentrate onthe promotion of permanent contacts through the establishment of regionalforums state owned companies the financial backing of Chinese invest-ments abroad the promotion of business exchanges development coop-eration military cooperation cultural bounds etc

Chinese top-politicians and senior officials themselves are very vigor-ous to pave the way for the extension of political and commercial rela-tions with Africa First there are the numerous state-to-state visits fromwhich the significance cannot be underestimated High-level contactsunderline the importance a state attaches to its relations with anotherThey promote business relations through the participation of extensivetrade delegations certainly in state-to-state visits They also form incen-tives that can bolster mutual trust and good will and add leverage toattempts to get access to a given market Despite the fact that PresidentHu Jintao only paid three of its 32 state-to-state visits to African coun-tries the sequence of other high-level visits to the area is dense Between1990 and 2003 states of the Central African Region received 34 high-level officials such as ministers vice-ministers and members of the corenational political bodies From the other side every actual state-leaderfrom the region who left for Beijing and paid tribute to China vowedto the One-China Principle and offered or assented more economic coop-eration In November 2001 Rwandarsquos President Paul Kagame visitedChina In July 2004 Ugandarsquos President Museveni was hosted He signedan extensive Agreement of Economic and Technological Cooperationand another one on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of InvestmentThe consecutive month CARrsquos President Francois Bozize agreed tostrengthen bi-lateral cooperation in fields such as agriculture infrastruc-ture and energy During his visit to China in July 2005 President Joseph

such as the development of transportation infrastructure the establishment of ExclusiveEconomic Zones (EEZ) credits etc See for instance Cheung PT and Tang JT lsquoTheexternal relations of Chinarsquos provincesrsquo in Lampton DM ed The making of Chinese for-

eign and security policy Stanford University Press Stanford 2001 pp 91-123 Yang DBeyond Beijing liberalization and the regions in China Routledge 1997 chapter 1 Saich TGovernance and politics of China Palgrave Macmillan New York 2004 chapter 5

28 See Cheung PT and Tang JT op cit pp 98-99

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144


Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC) signed anagreement on technologic and economic cooperation and acquiesced tofurther relations in the field of human resources development agricul-ture infrastructure construction and cooperation between their militariesHu Jintao from his side promised to encourage Chinese companies toinvest in the DROC and join the DROCrsquos economic reconstruction29

In September 2005 President Denis Sassou-Nguesso from the ROCcalled for Beijing and signed two concrete partnerships one on the con-struction of a 500 km-long road between the cities of Brazzaville andPointe-Noire and another on the elaboration of the national electricitytransportation grid30 In addition to these particular events ChinarsquosForeign Affairs Ministry has established regular consulting mechanismswith 24 African countryrsquos corresponding ministries

In 2004 delegations of diplomats from inter alia the Republic of CongoBurundi Gabon Rwanda and Central Africa were invited to discussfurther possibilities to advance political and economic cooperation31 Apartfrom bilateral contacts China is increasingly present in multilateral forumssuch as the African Union the South African Development Community(SADC) and the Southern African Development Cooperation Significantin this regard was the recent remark of SADC chair Paul Berenger ldquoInparticularly it is my intention during my tenure as chair to give a newdimension to relations between SADC and India and Chinardquo32 Chinaalso provided itself with a permanent platform the China-AfricaCooperation Forum (FOCAC) on which I will elaborate later

Apart from the contacts themselves it is also striking how Beijingadheres to a well-conceived official discourse that is carried out consis-tently at every occasion Jiang Zemin then President laid the founda-tion of this discourse in 1996 when he summed up five cornerstones ofChinarsquos Africa policy sincere friendship equality unity and cooperationcommon development and looking into the future In 2003 this approachwas modified slightly by his successor who formulated six pillars thatcan be summarized as non-interference African ownership in dealingwith problems mutual trust and cooperation the increase of economicassistance without political conditions to appeal the international com-munity to pay more attention to Africa and to promote a more friendly

29 lsquoChina Congo agree to further economic trade cooperationrsquo Peoplersquos Daily March22 2005

30 lsquoSassou Nguesso en Chine place aux affairesrsquo see Congopage via ltwwwcon-gopagecomgt

31 lsquoChinese official stresses cooperation with Africarsquo Peoplersquos Daily July 8 200432 lsquoSADC to further boost relations with China Indiarsquo Peoplersquos Daily August 12 2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145


international environment for Africarsquos development33 This approach canalso be discovered in earlier statements of Hu such as in his key speechhe delivered in 1999

China will as always adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistencerespecting independent choices of political system and development road byAfrican nations according to their realities supporting the just struggle ofAfrican nations to safeguard national independence sovereignty and terri-torial integrity supporting these nationsrsquo efforts to maintain domestic sta-bility and unity invigorate national economy and promote social progressIn international affairs China will actively support African nationsrsquo partici-pation in international affairs strengthen bilateral consultations and coop-eration and make concerted efforts to safeguard the just rights of thedeveloping nations trying to help establish a fair and reasonable interna-tional political and economic order at an early date China also urges theinternational community especially the developed countries to respect andshow concern for Africa pay attention to Africarsquos peace and developmentand adopt effective measures to promote stability in Africa help Africadevelop its economy get rid of poverty at an early date and narrow thegap in development between Africa and the rest of the world34

The main points of this vision have been restated over and over againWhat is the significance of this official view for Chinarsquos commercial rela-tions A first element to consider is the principle of ldquonon-interferencerdquoWhereas Western governments and international concerns are understrain to pay attention to human rights the respect of democracy andenvironmental norms whenever they deal with third world countriesChinese actors do not have to confine themselves by these contempla-tions and are permitted to operate freely This gives them a leap incountries and situations that are not in line with the common standardsof the international read Western community cases in which Chineseenterprises sneak between the meshes are rife35 The promise not to inter-fere with internal affairs also sets local governments at ease and makes

33 For the complete version of Hu Jintaorsquos six pillars see lsquoChinarsquos Africa Policyrsquo vialtwwwChinaorgcngt

34 lsquoChinese Leaders on Sino-African Relationsrsquo December 10 2003 see ltwwwchinaorgcngt

35 Even during the butcheries in Darfur Sudan Chinese companies continued to dobusiness with Sudan Thanks to Europersquos and the USrsquos embargo to Iran China suc-ceeded to carve out lucrative oil concessions Whereas Western companies are becom-ing reclusive to invest in Saudi Arabiarsquos energy sources Chinese companies are slippingin The same counts for countries such as Myanmar Uzbekistan North Korea andKazakhstan

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146


them more accommodating to grant concessions and public contractsldquoUn-conditionalityrdquo too contributes to this more unregimented way ofdoing business The discourse also implicitly alludes at the hostile char-acter of the current ldquointernational communityrdquo and the actual ldquopoliticaland economic orderrdquo two structures created and dominated by the WestWhen related to the frequent references Chinese officials make to ashared fate as developing countries and the revival of a ldquoBandung spiritrdquoit is obvious that this line of reasoning aims at setting Africa apart fromthe dominating West36 This ldquocommon-destinyrdquo principle ties closely towhat is currently named as the ldquoBeijing Consensusrdquo an alternative tothe well-known ldquoWashington Consensusrdquo that promotes a rigid policy ofliberalization and privatization as a panacea for development in devel-oping countries37 Instead of this strategy China stands for a gradualprocess of development that departs from the internal conditions andneeds of a country ldquoComplementarityrdquo we already mentioned this beforeis another crucial element of Chinarsquos policy toward its partners in Africaby working together China and African countries have to endeavour amutual favourable specialization of their economies or in other wordsldquohave to take an active part in international division of labour and coop-erationrdquo in order to ldquorealize their own development goals [emphasisadded]rdquo38 Thus Chinarsquos vision on its economic relations with Africaconsists in the assertion of a common need to pursue a policy that dis-tinguishes from the currently dominating Western approach Instead ofprescribing bitter structural adaptation plans and wry requirements Beijingonly beckons with sweet carrots instead of forcing African countries toadapt the PRC adapts its own policy in such a way that it fits smoothlyto the demands of the African regimes Whether or not this is com-mercial pragmatism a sincere ideology or both it is clear that thisapproach will derive goodwill and permit to do business suavely

The China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) is another means forbolstering commercial and political relations Established in 2000 theFOCAC forms an interface for officials and business leaders throughministerial conferences senior officialsrsquo meetings and the China-Africa

36 For instance Hu referred to China and Africarsquos shared faith in terms of both beingldquoburdened with arduous tasks of developmentrdquo [Peoplersquos Daily September 13 2005] Allusions made to Bandung are inter alia Hursquos pledge ldquoto carry on the Bandung spiritand contribute to the continuous progress in Asia and Africardquo [Peoplersquos Daily April 222005]

37 Ramo JC 200438 ldquoFull text of Hu Jintaorsquos speech at Asian-African Business Summit receptionrdquo Peoplersquos

Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147


Joint Business Council Its current goals are stressed out in the AddisAbaba Action Plan and entails issues related to peace and security mul-tilateral cooperation economic development and social development39

Let us go more into detail on the economic segment A first priority inthis regard is the development of Africarsquos agriculture ldquoin order to strengthenthe food security of Africa and to increase its exports to China and othermarketsrdquo40 China will also continue to support and encourage strongand viable Chinese enterprises through financial and policy incentiveschemes to develop agricultural cooperation projects in Africa41 Secondand particularly emphasized is the infrastructure development ldquoChinawill encourage its enterprises to take an active part in Africarsquos infra-structure projects and expand cooperation in transportation telecom-munication energy water supply electricity and other fieldsrdquo42 Thirdaim is to promote trade through import-tariff reduction initially on com-modities later on other goods too might be included after bilateral nego-tiations between China and each particular African state43 Fourthly theAction Plan addresses the facilitation of investments ldquofocusing onsimplification of approval procedures for Chinese companies which areinterested in investing in Africardquo44 African countries are also urged tohold consultations with the China Council for the Promotion ofInternational Trade (CCPIT) with a view to establishing a China-AfricaChamber of Industry and Commerce Next comes the development oftourism In this regard China is expected to grant its Approved DestinationStatus (ADS) to more African countries45 The sixth vow concerns Chinarsquosintention to ldquotake an active part in resources development projects inAfrican countries and increase its investment in this areardquo46 In this fieldAfrican countries are insisted on to provide ldquoall necessary informationrdquoand to ldquoaccord facilities for Chinese enterprisesrdquo Other elements of theeconomic section of the Action Plan are debt relief and development aid

State companies are still the main actors that are sought to imple-ment the aspirations set by the government However several structural

39 FOCAC (2003) Addis Ababa Action Plan Addis Ababa December 26 2003 SeeltwwwisscozaAFauchinaafrica03htm gt

40 Ibid art 41141 Ibid art 41242 Ibid art 42243 Ibid art 4344 Ibid art 4445 Approved Destination Status (ADS) is the permission for Chinese tourists to travel

to a particular country The granting of an ADS often coincides with the promotionand facilitation of voyages to these places

46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148


shortcomings impede them to play a competitive role in overseas mar-kets None of the Chinarsquos largest firms appears on the short-list of theworldrsquos most competitive corporations47 Without going into detail Chinarsquosstate-companies often lack technological innovation capacity recogniz-able brands and comparative advantage in niche markets48 In additionChinarsquos thousands of state-owned enterprises (SOE) often compete witheach other on the same terrain Hence parallel to what Japan and Korearealized in the recent past Beijing pursues an active policy to create anelite corps of national champions large vertically integrated businessgroups that encompass entire industries from upstream to down Accordingto The Economist the government decided that 30 to 50 of its best statefirms had to turn into ldquoglobally competitive multinationalsrdquo by 201049

At home these concerns would benefit from favourable tax regimes andadministrative support abroad they will be propped up with export cred-its loans and backed diplomatically Thus instead of letting its still frag-ile companies be preyed by foreign competitors Beijing prefers to endowthem with everything they need to mature to global champions Thegrip of the central government on these firms will remain to be assuredin several ways First Chinarsquos law prescribes that the State Council ldquorep-resents the State in performing the responsibilities of investor in largestate-owned enterprises state-owned holding enterprises and enterpriseswith state-owned equity which have a vital bearing on the lifeline ofthe national economy and State security and in large state-owned enter-prises state-owned holding enterprises and enterprises with state-ownedequity within such sectors as important infrastructure and natural re-sourcesrdquo50 In practice it is the state-owned Assets Supervision andAdministration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) who is enti-tled to ldquoadvance the establishment of modern enterprise system in SOErsquosrdquoand to manage the ldquostrategic adjustment of the structure and layout ofthe state economyrdquo The SASAC can assign so-called ldquosupervisory pan-elsrdquo to large enterprise on behalf of the state and appoints and removestop-executives of enterprises51 Second the SOErsquos are only permitted forlimited auctions often these public offers do not take place on WallStreet or in London but in Hong Kong52 As a result several important

47 See UNCTAD (2005) World Investment Report 2005 UN New YorkGeneva AnnexA19 lsquoThe worldrsquos top 100 non-financial TNCsrsquo

48 See for instance Nolan P China and the Global Economy Palgrave New York 200149 ldquoThe struggle of the championsrdquo The Economist January 8 2005 pp 58-5950 State Council of the PRC Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management Decree

of the State Council adopted on May 13 200351 See ltwwwsasacgovcngt52 Financial Times November 14 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149


SOErsquos exhibit a dual corporate structure On one hand they comprisea segment that remains controlled by the state through the SASAC andvia the provision of support On the other hand they include a divisionthat is more or less privatized via a joint-venture or auctions The resultof this structure is that state and semi-state companies demonstrate anappalling solvability This enables them to realize the imposed long-termgoals even if these are not lucrative in terms of financial profits

Beijing nourishes its companyrsquos overseas activities financially throughseveral institutions First there is the national Export and Import Bankof China (Exim Bank) This institute the worldrsquos third largest exportcredit agency is entirely funded by the central government and has tofurnish exporting Chinese companies with export credits and to providecontracted governments with low-interest concessional loans For instancein 2004 the Exim Bank wrote out 490 loans to enable other states toafford services provided by Chinese construction companies53 Such gov-ernment-to-government loans constitute the bulk of the bankrsquos fundingand specifically target developing countries For the period from 2005until 2008 Beijing has vowed to provide 10 billion USD in concessionalloans and preferential export buyers credit to developing countries Asidefrom the Exim Bank the government-owned China Construction Bank(CCB) too is active and provides services to stimulate investment andtrade between China and Africa financially In this perspective its recentbranch in Pretoria is expected to play a leading role Particular supportis also allocated to the mining industry by means of special capitals andtax reductions designated by the Ministry of Finance A senior officialof the Ministry of Finance summarized the policy as follows ldquoTo pro-mote the implementation of the strategy of lsquogoing overseasrsquo to encour-age and to guide geological institutions and mining enterprises to exploreand utilize foreign mineral resources the Ministry has arranged specialcapitals for the work of general survey on foreign mineral resources fea-sibility studies and initial stage venture surveys These funds initiatedand implemented a group of projects on oversea venture survey reduc-ing the initial exploration risks for mining enterprises to go overseasrdquo54

Chinarsquos Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) aswell stimulates companies financially ldquoto process and assemble productswith brought-in materials from overseasrdquo55

53 lsquoChina Exim Bank puts foreign trade on sound footingrsquo China Daily May 17 2005p 31

54 Li J Chinarsquos financial and policy supports for mining industry Address of the DeputyDirector General of Business Development Department Ministry of Finance at the ChinaMining Conference Beijing October 5 2005

55 Moftec ldquoAnnouncement on Releasing the Category of Products (the First Batch)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150


Next there is the promotion of business-to-business contacts throughseveral agencies and events China established multiple permanent tradeagencies in overseas countries For instance aside from the embassiesthe Ministry of Commerce keeps open a permanent trade representa-tion in Rwanda and Uganda and at the other side supplies Africantrade agencies with accommodation to bolster their presence in ChinaAccording to the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade(CCPIT) Chinarsquos largest non-official trade promotion organization 27Chinese business exhibitions were held in Africa in 2004 and 30 in200356 Government sponsored seminars have also been organized indifferent provinces of China to brief farmers about conditions in Africaand related government incentive policies for investment57 In December2004 the Commercial Ministry and the Ministry of Information orga-nized a 10-day conference for a group of 10 African telecom ministersthe event eg comprised a visit to the ZTE Headquarters58

Even cultural cooperation is an essential part of Chinarsquos foreign tradepolicy ldquoCultural relations are a precondition to promote commercialrelationsrdquo59 The former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on his turn describeddiplomacy as an airplane with diplomacy as the body economy and cul-ture as the two wings60 In 2004 the Democratic Republic of Congowas invited to participate in an African art festival To date China hassigned with 46 African countries a bilateral cultural agreement Last yearthe Chinese government and governments of African countries mutuallysent 200 cultural delegations In 2004 three artist delegations visited 12African countries with exhibitions as well as the ldquoChina Art Festivalrdquoheld there

Aid is a political ticket61 Development cooperation is a powerful leverto influence development countries As from the nascence of the PRCBeijing paid much attention to maintain an image of China as a benev-olent primus inter pares a mecenas ready to share the fruits of its devel-opment with other less fortunate peers Since 2004 China became a

whose process and assembly with brought-in raw materials from overseas are encour-aged by the Chinese Government May 6 1999

56 lsquoExperts Optimistic About China-Africa Trade Prospectrsquo Peoplersquos Daily January 52005

57 Muekalia DJ 2004 p 1058 lsquoAfrican Telecom Ministers Visit ZTE Headquartersrsquo via ltwwwcellularcozagt59 Statement of Chinarsquos Ambassador to Belgium at the Royal Military Academy

Brussels November 3 200560 lsquoCultural exchanges promote Sino-African co-operationrsquo Peoplersquos Daily May 10

200561 Kindleberger CP 1970 p 145

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151


net-donor of development aid with a budget of 730 million USD62 Thisdevelopment assistance materializes in several forms First China employsdozens of medical specialists in overseas hospitals in Central AfricaChinarsquos medical staff amounts to 748 specialists It is also planning todeliver drugs and other medicine to several countries In the field ofeducation the PRC annually offers 1500 scholarships to African stu-dents Intercollegiate exchange and cooperation has been establishedbetween 27 African universities and their Chinese counterparts TheChinese governmentrsquos African Human Resources Development Fundpays for 10000 Africans to be trained in Beijing63 China provides tech-nical assistance and delivers equipment to several educational institu-tions64 Other terrains of development cooperation concern agriculturetransportation and technological development China showed itself gen-erous when it decided to cancel the bilateral debts before 2004 ThePRC also flexes its muscles as a supporter of regional security Currentlyit contributes 230 officers to peacekeeping missions of the United Nationsin the region From 1998 until 2003 the Peoplersquos Liberation Army hasbeen training 89 military officers from the DROC and in 2004 it agreedto train another batch of 60 China also provides military equipment tothe DROC Uganda and the CAR65

The Peoplersquos Republic combines a wide array of instruments to enforceits bounds with the Central African region Many of these devices arenot that different from those other powers applied in order to gaininfluence in this region However what characterizes the Chinese pol-icy particularly is its determinedness and its ability to operate its devisesin a tight and coherent way the Chinese government still has muchmore steering capacity than its Western competitors who rather try to facili-tate their affiliated companies instead of guiding them to operate whenand where it is the most suitable to the realization of the statersquos interest

Results

To assess the results of Chinarsquos policy is a delicate exercise To startwith facts and figures are limited and inaccessible at large Whereas onecan rely on the standard databases such as these of the UNCTAD andthe WTO for general figures spanning longer periods more detailed

62 McGregor R lsquoChina becomes a net donor of aidrsquo Financial Times April 4 200563 See ltwwwchinafriquecomgt64 lsquoThe technical cooperation between China and Uganda has achieved remarkable

achievementsrsquo Xinhua December 5 200365 See Sali BH lsquoChina is 38 million richerrsquo The Monitor October 2 2003

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152


data provided by the Chinese agencies themselves are only available forrecent years Second there is the question of reliability without goinginto detail we found official figures often contradicting with data result-ing from expert calculations Third it is obvious that the direct tradevolumes do not necessarily cover all goods that arrive at the final des-tination goods exported from China to South Africa for instance canstill find their way to Uganda and vice versa

As mentioned later many of Central Africarsquos raw commodities pre-cious minerals in particular are exported to China after a stopover inSouth Africa Thailand or Hong Kong It is a fruitless task and outsidethe scope of this dossier to try to clear out all these hubs and transi-tions but even if we take the figures for what they are they still pro-vide us useful insights Hence how did we specify Chinarsquos politicalaspirations into measurable targets In general terms the aim is to increaseexports of manufactured goods and the imports of strategically vital com-modities Here we will present the overall trade figures for the last fiveyears aside from facts concerning the composition of these flowsConsecutive to this quantitative overview we will go more into detailwith regard to Chinarsquos realizations in the field of the different mineralresources but also vis-agrave-vis the construction of infrastructure and telecom-munication

A large number of facts in this part are drawn from numerous writ-ten as well as oral sources Open publications are mentioned in the foot-notes Oral sources however are kept anonymous given the fact thatmost of informants kind of sharing their expertise are affiliated withofficial institutions gorsquos and companies who are present in the region

1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Exports Imports Share in exports Share in imports

Figure 2

The regionrsquos trade relations with China (mio USD and )Source China customs (2005) and WTO (2005)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153


Every fact drawn from oral sources is at least double-checked in sepa-rate conversations interviews or email queries

Any kind of a graph such as the one supra might suggest that Chinesepolicymakers should start to worry While Central Africarsquos imports fromChina nearly rose the exports from the particular region surged sig-nificantly Hence between 2000 and 2003 Chinarsquos trade deficit grewfrom 0 to 84 percent of the total trade volume A mere two percent ofthe arearsquos imports originated from the PRC which indicates that Chinesecompanies do not succeed to gain much terrain on other competitorsOn the spot we did not find any indication either that these Chinesegoods enter in substantial amounts via other states Hence Chinarsquos firstaim appears not to be achieved Still despite the deficit these graphsdo not exclude the PRC to accomplish its second objective the importof resources Therefore let us concentrate on the next graph that depictsthe composition of Central Africarsquos export to China The figures aredrawn from several data files provided by Chinarsquos Customs Agencyproduct categories were reduced to five main groups petroleum (petro-leum and petroleum derivates) minerals (ores and scrap) logs (cork andwood) food (coffee tea fruits meat etc) and manufactured goods Itbecomes obvious that except for some percentages of manufactured goodsthe entire trade flow from the region consists of raw materials In 2003more than 64 percent of the value concerns petroleum 25 percent logsand up to 8 percent minerals Consider for instance the increase ofCentral Africarsquos exports between 2002 and 2003 877 percent of thisupsurge was due to a new petroleum deal with Gabon and the ROC

In 2003 China was able to buy 184 percent of the total petroleumexport of Gabon and the ROC by far Central Africarsquos two largest oil-producing countries Hitherto Western consortia such as Total Agipand Chevron dominated both markets however since 2004 Chinesecompanies too are showing their flag In 2004 Sinopec acquired thepermission to explore for oil in Gabon besides it was also put forwardthe possibility to build a second oil refinery Even though analysts doubtwhether this investment will turn out to be profitable since 1997 Gabonrsquosoil output declined unabatedly from 370000 barrels per day to just250000 last year an evolution which made Total-Fina and Shell decideto downsize their activity In March 2005 the Congolese governmentin its turn announced two offshore exploration and production agree-ments with Sinopec for the Marine XII and High Sea C blocks Severalother blocks may be awarded in the near future including Marine IIIMarine VII and Haut Mer A and B66

66 EIA Congo-Brazzaville via ltwwweiadoegovemeucabscongohtmlgt

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4

Composition of the regionrsquos imports froom China (mio USD)Source China Customs (2005)

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured

Composition of the regionrsquos exports to China (mio USD)Source China Customs (2005)

300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155


Chinarsquos achievements in the field of mineral extraction are much moreopaque Apart from the large state-affiliated companies several privateentrepreneurs and individual agents enter the scene What do we knowabout the former category Hitherto Chinese state-owned or exclusivelyChinese enterprises do not have many projects on their account Moreoverthe projects they did succeed to set off are limited in extension com-pared to those of various European American and South African enter-prises67 The most significant concessions were obtained in Gabon InMay 2004 Minmetals the largest supplier of raw materials for the steel-making industries and industrial minerals carved out an exploitationlicence for the excavation of iron ore in the Belinga-Mekambo pit inGabon68 In the same country Xuzhou Huayuan searches for Niobiumand Manganese in Ndjoleacute69

In the DROC Katanga is the area where most Chinese enterprisesare active Jiaxing Mining Industry collects copper near to Lubumbashiand Feza in Likasi where it possesses a comptoir for copper and cobaltores70 China is also investing in the completionupgrading of the Bangularailway track between Katanga and the railway grid of Angola Whetherthere exists a specific strategic aim behind this investment is not surebut this connection might facilitate the transportation of materials fromthe resource rich Katanga to the shores of Angola a country were Chinaalready has a strong foot on the ground Moreover an operational trans-portation corridor in Southeastern Congo might also provide pass throughto the output of the mines China recently obtained in Zambia But stillthis is just one possible explanation we also have to remark that upuntil now there has not been much progress made on the spot

There are several reasons that can explain the limited advancementof the regular Chinese companies First regular firms do not fit thatwell in the context of a predatory economy such as that of the DROCThis marauder economy shows us a mode of excavation productionand trade that deprives a society of its natural possessions by cultivat-ing violence and disorder The subsequent lack of stability administrative

67 Various conversations with mining specialists during the expert meeting Les tressors

de la RDC Brussels November 23-24 2005 For accessible country-by-country reviewssee also USG Geological Mineral Survey Yearbook USG Washington 2004

68 lsquoQuand la Chine reacuteveille lrsquoAfriquersquo via Gabon Flash June 3 200469 lsquoUne socieacuteteacute chinoise autoriseacutee agrave prospecter du manganegravese au Gabonrsquo Panapress

April 4 200470 Katende JC Rapport preacuteliminaire sur lrsquoexploitation illeacutegale des ressources naturelles en RD

Congo ASADHO Katanga 2004 p 21 Gorus J Preparatory note and field researchon the mining industry in Katanga 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156


liability and infrastructure hampers the establishment of streamlined andefficient production activities Second compared to other players Chinesecompanies are not that long acquainted with the Central African envi-ronment its language and its intricate administration Third there isthe experience gap upstream production demands in the region oftendiffer from these in China and Chinese firms are not yet able to meetthese exigencies technically If state-companies do not make the head-way in supplying the mineral recourses to China who does For instancea Chinese mineral analyst testifies that in 2003 at least 30 percent ofChinarsquos cobalt originates from the DROC71 These figures are more orless confirmed by a recent survey of the Cobalt Development Institute72

A Belgian expert with years of experience goes further and states thateven this calculation is a blatant underestimation73 Which players com-pensate for the actual inability of Chinarsquos big investors To start withChinese mineral processing companies purchase from established min-ers directly or indirectly via brokers and agents For instance ChinarsquosNigncxia a coltan-processing firm buys its Congolese commodities viatrading posts in Rwanda According to diplomatic sources Chineseofficials also paid a visit to another Kigali-based Rwandan companyinvolved in coltan export from its western neighbour74 Another impor-tant mineral company the Hong Kong based Pacific Ores Metals ampChemicals concluded a cooperation agreement with the South AfricanCAMEC in turn the latter holds a stake in Exploitations Artisanalesau Congo (EXACO) a firm active in the DROCrsquos Katanga ProvinceA recent report of Global Witness goes more into detail on the role ofSouth-Africa as transit country for the DROCrsquos cobalt and copper flowsto China75 Jinchuan Chinarsquos most important cobalt group recentlyopened a bureau of the DROC from which it networks with local cop-per and heterogenite excavators

Besides these filiegraveres there are several one-man private Chinese actorsinvolved in small-scale mining activities Most of these kinds of busi-nesses concern the collection of precious minerals that can be shippedeasily in small quantities and thus do not demand extensive facilitiesSeveral interviews identified such individual purchasers in the DROCrsquos

71 Interview via e-mail with Belgian mining expert in the DROC October 22 200572 Cobalt News The Cobalt Development Institute October 2004 73 Interview with mining expert Brussels October 23 200574 Interview with diplomat Brussels November 25 2004 75 Global Witness (2004) Rush and Ruin ndash The Devastating Mineral Trade in Southern Katanga

Global Witness Washington 2004 pp 18-24 See ltwwwglobalwitnessorggt

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157


Districts of Nord-Kivu (diamonds) Katanga (gold diamonds hetrogen-ite) and Maniema (diamonds gold coltan) as well in Kigali-Rwanda(unidentified minerals) and Uganda (unidentified minerals but probablydiamonds)76 Concluding China is not yet successful in achieving its con-trol-over-the-well strategy Its mining companies still leap far behind sothat the Chinese processing industry has to rely on foreign mineral sup-pliers The presence of private Chinese actors often individuals appar-ently does not emanate from any kind of official policy it is not clearyet in which extension they contribute to the realization of their homecountryrsquos appetite for minerals

Another sector that has to be taken into account concerns loggingAccording to official figures logs constitute more than 25 percent of theimport from the region with a total value exceeding 200 million USDin 2002 and 2003 Some concrete figures clarify Chinarsquos increasing rolein the Central African logging industry In 2003 half of the ROCrsquos tim-ber production was reported to have been shipped to China77 For Gabonthis figure amounts to 46 percent According to Global Timber anNGO Chinarsquos share in the CARrsquos log exports increased from one per-cent in 2000 to eight percent in 2003 in Gabon seven percent in 1995and 32 percent in 200378 Chinese timber companies are reported to bemore and more active in Gabon and the ROC recently it opened upHuamao Forest amp Timber Company in the DROC But here too Chinais supplied as well by several foreign firms For instance Shanton PresidentWood Supply Company was bashed in a report of the UN SecurityCouncil for its relations with DARA Forest Company an illicit loggerin Ituri79

The last category of Chinarsquos imports from Central Africa concernsagricultural products which comprise 07 percent of the regions tradeflow to the PRC In this field the Africa Agriculture Development Center(AADC) is a vital player that invests in crops livestock and fishery pro-jects in several states In the DROC China Import and Export Companyis active in agricultural production and ldquoanimal husbandryrdquo as well as

76 Conversation with Congolese mining industrialist in Brussels November 23 con-versation with Congolese human rights activist in Brussels November 23 conversationwith Belgian army officer November 17 interview by telephone with Ugandan militaryofficer November 15

77 Oliver R and Fripp E Changing international markets for timber ndash What can African coun-

tries do TTF and IFIA 200478 See ltwwwglobaltimberorgukcongohtmgt79 UN Security Council Report of the panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural

resources and other forms of wealth of DRCongo UN New York April 2001

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158


New Oasis Coffee and a sugar company in the outskirts of KisanganiIn the CAR the PRC is involved in fruit harvesting In Ugandarsquos cap-ital Heritage is investing in a cotton field the government went into apartnership with a Chinese coffee company and a Chinese firm is involvedin fish capture in the Victoria Lake Nevertheless these undertakingsfade entirely away compared to the partnerships the PRC recently bro-kered with agricultural giants such as Brazil and Argentina

Besides the vending of manufactured goods and the import of naturalresources another particular sector and probably the one in whichChinese companies were able to make the most significant advance con-cerns the realization of infrastructure projects Chinese firms are verysuccessful in reaping important public infrastructure contracts from CentralAfrican governments The state company China Roads and Bridges(CRB) for instance became a privileged contractor in several countriesRecently it opened permanent commercial representations in Rwandaand Burundi during the past years CRB was entitled to effectuate allimportant road construction projects in Rwanda In Burundi it com-pleted a highway section between Bujumbura and the Nile River

In the DROC it accomplished a road between Bukavu and Kasongo80

In the ROC the company paved a road between Brazzaville and Pont-Noire81 Another firm the Companie drsquo Eau et Electiciteacute completed sev-eral transportation arteries in Bas-Congo Nord-Kivu Orientale andBandundu Apart from roads other infrastructure as well is built byChinese engineering enterprises Examples are rife Stadiums were erectedin Rwanda the ROC and the DROC In the latter two countries Chinesealso took care for the reconstruction of the national parliaments In theROC China national Machinery Import end Export built the ImboulouDam and repaired the Moukoukou dam82 Other hydropower stationswere taken care of in Burundi (Mugere) the DROC (Bandindu) andUganda ( Jinja)83 Interesting is also Chinarsquos involvement in the re-estab-lishment the DROCrsquos port of Matadi the paving between this harbourand Pont Mpozo and a new commercial center near to the airport ofNrsquodjili84 Besides construction the realization of telecommunication networks

80 lsquoLa chine preacutesenteacutee par son ambassadeur en RDCrsquo Le Potentiel October 1 200581 lsquoPeacutekin va construire une route entre Brazzaville et Pointe-Noirersquo Jeune Afrique

September 27 200582 lsquoLes travaux du barrage drsquoImboulou vont bon trainrsquo via Site Officiel drsquoInformation et

de Conseil sur le Congo October 25 2005 83 lsquoLa chine preacutesenteacutee par son ambassadeur en RDCrsquo Le Potentiel October 1 200584 Interview via email with a development aid worker in the DROC October 28

2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159


is another terrain of activity In the ROC Chinarsquos ZTE outbid the IsraeliRCI and the American Vertex to acquire a contract to develop thecountryrsquos telecommunication network consecutively Congo Chine Teacuteleacutecombecame a main operator85 In the same country China Beijing Constructionerected and equipped a new compound for the state radio and televi-sion86 In the DROC China Telecommunications Company founded alocal subsidiary with a mobile telephone network that hitherto reachesnot farther than the area around Kinshasa but is expected to expandin the near future In other states too Chinese operators are starting tofound new networks Netcom in Uganda Huawei-Onatel in Burundiand an up until now an anonymous applicant in Gabon

How can one explain the progress of Chinese infrastructure projectsFirst whereas firms lack experience in the mining sector this is not thecase for construction and telecommunication firms Despite the fact theydo not deliver state-of the-art-products their results are thought to bequite solid and trustworthy87 Second Chinese contractors succeed toplay out their price competitiveness By employing cheap Chinese engi-neers and labourers and by making use of low-cost techniques the men-tioned firms are able to outbid competitors from inter alia the UnitedArabian Emirates A last utmost important advantage concerns the hugeliquidity flow that the Chinese government put at the disposal of its bid-ders Lending institutions such as the Exim Bank and the ConstructionBank provide investing governments with millions of low-interest loansto enable them to finance the work done by Chinese companies

Time now to make up a preliminary balance of the progress Chinamade in the realization of its aspirations Summed up these achieve-ments have been mixed Relating to the vending of its own manufac-tured products it appears that it only takes a limited share of the marketDespite ldquoMade in Chinardquo visible in every household and in every shopthe monetary value that these goods represent is still modest Chinarsquosgrip on the regionrsquos natural resources is still feeble as well On one handit is clear that it succeeds to appropriate an increasing share of theexports of commodities On the other hand it does not reach down toacquire trade ownership the presence of Chinese companies in CentralAfricarsquos mining is still juvenile there are no indications of a far-reaching

85 Gourmelon I Gestion de la rente peacutetroliegravere au Congo Brazaville FIDH Paris p 5586 lsquoPrecirct chinois pour construire le nouveau siegravege de la radio-teacuteleacutevision du Congorsquo Le

Potentiel October 17 200087 Email queries addressed to 15 development aid workers in the region November

21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160


take-over of important sources The other Chinese players active on theedge between formal and informal trade in commodities do merely con-tribute to the overall export flows However an important question thatstill has to be cleared out is the indirect export of precious Congolesematerials via transit countries such as Rwanda Tanzania and South-Africa Concluding the sector in which China turns out the most suc-cessful concerns the contracting of infrastructure projects obviously themassive financial support has a stake in this Lastly let us come backnow on the trade deficit that China runs with the region it is impor-tant to ask whether this imbalance is a matter of flaw or a matter ofeconomic flexibility and buffer capacity What does a deficit of one bil-lion USD mean to the PRC if it amasses an overall trade surplus of 32billion Hence China seems to have the flexibility to recover its tradedeficit with regions it depends on for their vital goods from the impres-sive surplus it accumulates in general

Impact

It is doubtful that the Central African population will profit much fromChinarsquos increasing presence First the quantitative trade surplus is coun-terweighted by a qualitative trade deficit Chinarsquos infusion of manufac-tured goods although rarely always state-of-the-art products and itstechnical expertise represent a larger added value than the regionrsquos exportof raw materials Second the control-over-the-well policy also impedesCentral African states to foster economic sovereignty By emphasisingthe need to seize ownership of local sources China implicitly vows todisown African societies of their potential ability to manage these them-selves Alien possession of sources of raw materials inhibits them also toprofit substantially from the rising trend in commodity prices Third itis all but certain that the net-incomes originating from the favourabletrade balance come to the benefit of the local populations China forinstance does not pose any demand with regard to the tractability ofthe revenues that governments reap out of concessions and taxes Fourththe argument that cheap Chinese consumption goods are curbing inflationand consecutively engendering purchasing power is partly weakened bythe fact that governments levy high taxes on these imported products88

Fifth Chinese products compete the scarce local manufactured goodsout of the market For instance the Kampala City Traders Associationrecently has complained that their Chinese counterparts are sabotaging

88 Conversation with Rwandan ngo worker Brussels November 21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161


businesses by selling products too cheap89 In this regard a newspaperfrom the ROC accuses China for imposing a new imperialism

A new phenomenon the Avenue of Peace in the community of Poto-Potois transforming into a new China Town or into a Shanghai City AvenueChinese have invested in various sectors of the commerce in such a waythat a visitor who comes here would have an impression of being in thecountry of Mao Zedong As a matter of fact these advertisements in frontof boutiques and stores in rising sun lsquoChinese boutiquesrsquo lsquoChinese storesrsquolsquoChinese beautyrsquo lsquoWan Wursquo lsquoGhua Hursquo lsquoShang Hairsquo lsquoHou Li lsquoChen Panrsquoor else lsquoXin Tianrsquo Specialized in retail these Chinese of Brazzaville offerproducts at low prices and start to gain terrain that was previously occu-pied by West Africans Indians or Pakistanis On their shelves they presenta wide assortment of articles electronic apparels shoes leatherwear deco-ration garments pharmaceutical products make-up and others One hasto conclude that this vast country with its more than one billion inhabitantsis imposing its economic imperialism all over the world90

Sixth the increasing Chinese engagement merely generates new jobsWhereas Western companies are rather used to tapping the cheap locallabour market for Chinese enterprises the principle aim is to employcompatriots Not only the higher skilled cadres but the manual work-ers as well are predominantly recruited in the homeland Take ChinaRoads and Bridges for instance This construction company that carvedout important contracts in Burundi and Rwanda exclusively employsChinese labourers for paving new ways91 Credits provided by Chinesebanks to African governments frequently contain clauses stipulating thata substantial share of the project has to be carried out by Chinese work-ers Locals frequently lament the phenomenon of Chinese stealing jobsOn radio trottoir in Kigali a rumour persists tenaciously that a cementfactory is now even employing Chinese prisoners who are barred orunable to have any form of communication with the outside world92 InGabon a newspaper wrote ldquoOur Chinese friends bring us nothing buttheir labor force for large construction projectsrdquo93 Chinese girls are evenreported to take over the local prostitution quarters94 A Ugandan daily

89 Interview via e-mail with development aid worker October 13 200590 lsquoBrazzaville sous lrsquoemprise chinoisersquo in Afrique Echos September 6 2005 91 Interview by email with 2 development aid workers March 18 200692 Diplomatic source Kigali October 200593 lsquoDes prostitueacutees chinoises agrave Louisrsquo via Gabon Flash August 18 2005 ltwwwflash-

gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162


The Monitor accused its government for allowing the Chinese and Asianbusiness people who come in the pretext of investors to deal in bothwholesale and retail trade ldquoThis hinders our operation because howthen shall we operate if someone from outside comes to deal in the samecommodities as we dordquo95 The same paper also reports

Residents and local leaders of Jinja district especially in the Municipalityare very discontented over the lack of benefits to the local community fromthe huge $70 million (Shs 70bn) Owen Falls Dam civil work being done bythe Chinese company Sichuan International Engineering and TechnicalCorporation (SIETCO) They mainly complained that the project has notemployed significant numbers of people from the area has not consumedfood and other goods and services One resident of Jinja West IsabiryeIbrahim said when the project commenced in 1993 he planned to supplypoultry products fresh vegetables fish fruits and other foodstuffs to the pro-ject lsquoBut I have been terribly disappointed by the Chinese They go fishinginto the Lake or river Nile and allegedly grow vegetables or go to marketsin Jinja where they bargain over vegetables fruits and food stuffs in mar-kets to the lowest pricesrsquo said a visibly disappointed Isabirye He said manylarge-scale commercial farmers in Jinja district had gone into establishingbig farms ostensibly to market their produce to the dam contractors96

Seventh China is replacing old debts it has remitted with new onesand stimulates Central African governments to buy its own services ontick As we already mentioned supra the PRC uses cheap loans to con-vince administrations to contract its companies for having paved newroads erected telecommunication networks etc The Imboulou Dam inthe ROC mainly constructed by Chinese personnel was financed by aloan of 200 million USD loan repayable within 15 years with an inter-est of 02 percent97 The same counts for the Moukoukou Dam financedby a Chinese loan of 46 million USD In 2000 the Exim Bank sup-ported a joint venture between ZTE and the Congolese government witha loan of approximately 10 million USD

Eighth there is the risk of creating new white elephants For instanceone can have doubts if construction projects are determined to fulfill thekey needs of society or to accede to the eagerness of Chinese compa-nies to carve out new contracts For instance several ngo workers expressedtheir frustration about huge investments in sports stadiums in Brazzaville

95 Harera P lsquoKampala traders say foreign counterparts unfairrsquo in The Monitor April7 2003

96 lsquoJinja mourns lack of crumbs from damrsquo The Monitor May 10 9697 Gourmelon I 2003 op cit p 56

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163


and Kinshasa while the surrounding slums do not have access to cleanwater98 In the ROC and in Rwanda hospitals are reported not to fitthe local demands99 Ninth Chinarsquos demand for recourses is directly andindirectly nourishing the informal and criminal economy On the onehand Chinese state-owned mining companies were already pointed atto be involved in the war economy of the DROC100 On the other asan important customer Chinarsquos lack of willingness and capacity to con-trol the origin of its imported goods is indirectly stimulating illicit activ-ities via dire filiegraveres and via private Chinese undertakers A survey ofForest Trends for instance states that ldquoChina is one of the major des-tinations for timber that is harvested unsustainably or illegallyrdquo101 In thisrespect Global Timber Watch reports that the illegal timber exportsfrom Gabon to China have been estimated to be as high as 70 percentof total timber exports102 A recent BBC report describes how Chinesebusinessmen are involved in the illicit mining industry near to Lubumbashiin the DROC

ldquoThe heterogenite is partly treated in furnaces either in DR Congoor in neighboring Zambia and then exported mostly to China via SouthAfrican and Tanzanian ports Truckloads of copper and cobalt leave thecountry every day But statistics of DR Congorsquos exports are not accu-rate [ ] Joseph Chama Mukinay vice president representing the trans-porters in Kasumbalesa describes how between 18 and 25 thirty-tonnetrucks overloaded with copper and cobalt raw and concentrate leaveevery day lsquoAbout 65 percent of the trucks are loaded by Chinese busi-nessmen and are feeding the Chinese marketrsquo he saysrdquo103

To assess the profound impact of Chinarsquos stronger presence on thedevelopment of Central Africa we need to go more into detail that iscertain Nevertheless the remarks and indications we sketched out inthis section cast a shadow over Beijingrsquos official discourse of ldquowin-winrdquocooperation Sure in general financial terms the intensifying trade rela-tions appear to benefit the region beyond this macro-economic picturehowever the Beijing Consensus aiming at complementarity and non-

98 E-mail queries addressed to 15 development aid workers in the region November21 2005

99 Ibid100 UN Security Council 2001 op cit101 Sun X et al Chinarsquos Forest Product Import Trends 1997-2002 analysis of customs data

with emphasis on Asia-Pacific supplying countries Forest Trends January 2004102 Hewitt J China Illegal Imports and Exports Global Timber Watch July 2002103 Zajtman A lsquoChinese demand boosts DR Congo minesrsquo via ltwwwbbcworldcoukgt

2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164


interference appears to comfort the Central African elites in the firstplace Chinarsquos unconditional policy as well with regard to developmentaid as relating to the final destination of trade revenues (taxes conces-sions etc) comforts local regimes but make it difficult to trace were thecash flows end up The majority of the Central African population doesnot appear to benefit much Jobs generated by Chinese companies arerare The torrent of Chinese consumption goods is highly levied whichmake them more expensive but still competitive with the scarce manu-factured products African countries process themselves

Conclusion

No state is pursuing its foreign trade policy more vigorously than ChinaThis diligence is not only a matter of the ambition to turn the countryinto an important world power It is as well a prerequisite for the sur-vival of a party apparatus that embodies the direct interests of millionsof members and functionaries Forty years ago this regime embarkedon the dramatic transformation from a society anchored in agriculturalcommunism and personal cult to a new legitimacy based on the accom-plishment of the integration of more than one billion Chinese in theworld economy Whereas the initial steps to achieve these goals focusedon an inward opening up and liberalization today Beijing is more andmore conscious of the need to foster an outward-oriented economic pol-icy as well In order to make the impressive growth from the first phasesustainable the Peoplersquos Republic needs to gain direct access to foreignmarkets

To start with it has to promote exports in a way that allows oper-ating independently from alien distributors and brands China alreadyhas the factories now it is time to run the shops as well Besides inorder to keep the factory operational it needs to be certain of a sus-tainable supply of raw materials Hence in sum Chinarsquos current mer-cantilism aims at mitigating its dependence and to foster a certain degreeof trade ownership along the entire production chain In this regardmercantilism and liberalism are operated in tandem Thus contrary tothe ubiquitous interpretation that China is still a status-quo power it isobvious that economic expansionism is imperative The PRC is deter-mined to expand its reach of operation and to conquer its share of for-eign markets

What makes the PRCrsquos ldquogo-outrdquo policy particularly mercantilist is thewide array of tools the state has still at its disposal and its capacity tomake use of these in a coherent well-defined strategy that serves thenational interest rather than the aspirations of individual corporate actors

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165


We focused on this in the second section However despite this impres-sive toolbox and despite its huge efforts Chinarsquos mercantilism turns outto be rather one of weakness than one of strength As we argued in thethird section it experiences difficulties to penetrate overseas marketsRegions such as Central Africa in se do not have that much to offerand not that much to ask either given their limited purchasing powerand the fact that even their precious resources can be excavated moreeasily elsewhere The fact that China does not save any effort to enterthis market rather demonstrates its desperateness to achieve progresseven if it means a drop in the ocean Moreover even in the CentralAfrican Region it is not that successful China provides only a limitedshare of the regionrsquos imports and even though it is becoming an impor-tant consumer of the local natural resources it relies much on inter-mediaries and independent actors Its own companies often lack thefamiliarity with the terrain are not competitive enough or lack thecapacity to run the exploitation of concessions autonomously ConsequentlyChina squirms to circumvent or to compensate these impediments Firstthere is the vast liquidity supply of Beijing via export credits grants andvarious types of loans Second there is the official discourse of non-interference that enables companies to neglect ethical considerations andthat makes local regimes comfortable For the rest we mentioned thediplomatic charm offensive the development cooperation and the promo-tion of business-to-business contacts Notwithstanding this rather skepticbalance it is crucial to stress that Chinarsquos go-out policy is still very juve-nile The Coming from half a decade of seclusion the achievements upuntil now are not negligible

Albeit Chinarsquos influence on Central Africa is still limited compared tothe West it becomes clear that it will exert a profound influence on thefuture of the region as well as on the diplomatic course of other pow-ers First it offers the countries new entries to the world economy Itbecomes an important customer on the formal market but also links upwith the informal branches to which Chinese brokers are easily accessi-ble Chinarsquos increasing appetite for resources can be considered as a cat-alyst for informal trade and a new impetus for war economies to go onwith their activities The latter thrive on the booming demand for com-modities in overseas markets104 The new formal and informal links haveto be considered rather in terms of quantity than that something changesqualitatively China is neither interested in value-added goods nor is itintended to invest much in the establishment of new industry in the

104 Gorus J en Doom R 2000

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166


region Hence the changing patterns in the global division of labor inwhich China becomes the world factory does not automatically implythat peripheral regions such as Central Africa will be lifted on a higherechelon their main utility will remain to be the supply of commoditiesThus complementarity in fact turns out to be a synonym for hierarchya hierarchy in which China wants to be on top controlling trade chan-nels recourses etc Second the Peoplersquos Republic sets new standardsfor practicing economic diplomacy Its pragmatism and its obvious con-tempt for ethical standards undermine the leverage of other powers evenif they are traditionally in a more advantageous position To start withCentral African elites will have more friends to talk with and if neces-sary to play off against each other Albeit this has not been the case inthis particular region yet examples such as Sudan Iran KazakhstanUzbekistan and Myanmar demonstrate what the impact of this kind ofquandary can be For the West it will become more difficult to demandcountries to comply with its particular demands vis-agrave-vis human rightsgood governance and transparency if another important partner is turn-ing a blind eye to these issues With the entrance of China but as wellof other would-be powers balances of power and spheres of influencewill gradually modify Central Africa does not escape the global re-configuration of power However it is not likely that the influx of Chineseinfluence will coincide with a trickle down of prosperity and development

References

Amin Samir1976 Unequal Development An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism

Monthly Review Press New YorkBhalla Surjit1998 ldquoChinese Mercantilism Currency Wars and how the East was Lostrdquo

ICRIER New Delhi 4-12Chu Ke Young2001 Collective Values Behavioural Norms and Rules Building Institutions for Economic

Growth World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER)Dong Qi and Ma Xiaoye2004 From ldquoGoing Outrdquo to ldquoGoing Globalrdquo Past and Future of Chinarsquos Overseas Investment

Policy Center on Chinarsquos Transnational Relations Hong Kong Universityof Science and Technology

Gilpin Robert1987 The Political Economy of International Relations Princeton Princeton University

PressGorus Jan en Doom Ruddy2000 Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region VUB Press

Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167


Harris Stuart2002 Globalization and Chinarsquos Diplomacy Structure and Process National University

CamberraJackson Robert and Soslashrensen Georg2003 International Relations Theories and Approaches Oxford University PressKanishka J 2004 lsquoEmbedded mercantilism and open regionalism the crisis of a regional pro-

jectrsquo in Third World Quarterly vol 24 (2)Jones Barry RJ 1986 Conflict and Control in the World Economy Harvester Press SussexKindleberger CP 1970 Power and Money The Politics of International Economics and the Economics of

International Politics Basic New YorkLampton David M ed2001 The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy Stanford University Press

StanfordMcGuire Martin C and Ohta Hiroshi2005 lsquoImplicit Mercantilism Oligopoly and Tradersquo in Review of International

Economics 13(1)

Fieldhouse D 2000 lsquoA new imperial system The role of the multinational corporations recon-

sideredrsquo in Frieden JA and Lake DA IPE Perspectives on Global Power

and Wealth BedfordStMartinrsquos BostonNew York pp 167-180Ivan S Medeiros and M Taylor Fravel2003 ldquoChinarsquos New Diplomacyrdquo Foreign Affairs June 2003 Muekalia DJ 2004 lsquoAfrica and Chinarsquos strategic partnershiprsquo African Security Review vol 13 (1)

10UNCTAD 2003 China An Emerging Outward Investor UN New YorkGeneva2005 Commodity Yearbook UN New YorkGeneva2005 World Investment Report 2005 UN New York Annex A19 lsquoThe worldrsquos

top 100 non-financial TNCsrsquo Ramo JC2004 The Beijing Consensus Foreign Policy Center LondonSeiichi Katayama and Ursprung Heinrich2000 Commercial Culture Political Culture and the Political Economy of Trade Policy the

Case of Japan Institute for Economic ResearchToye J 1987 Dilemmarsquos of Development Reflections on the Counterrevolution in Development Theory

Blackwell OxfordWade R and White G 1985 Developmental States in East Asia Brighton IDS Research Reports no 16Wallerstein Immanuel1984 The Politics of the World-Economy The States Movements and Civilizations Cam-

bridge University Press CambridgeWang Xiaozu Xu Lixin Colin and Zhy Tian2004 lsquoState-owned enterprises go publicrsquo Economics of Transition vol 12 (3)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168


Weiss L 1998 The Myth of the Powerless State Cornell Press New YorkWolf Charles JR1994 lsquoThe New Mercantilismrsquo The Public Interests (Summer) 96-106Wu Friedrich2005 The Globalization of Corporate China The National Bureau of Asian Research

Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169


Four decades passed by and China indeed has been growing spectacularlySince the mid-1990s however Chinarsquos economic transformation hasentered a new stadium Ever since the governmentrsquos orientation shiftedfrom an obsession with growth rates to the ambition to make growthsustainable One of the key ambitions was to create direct links to over-seas markets It took only a short time before international attention wasdrawn to blatant Chinese investments in pariah states such as Sudan andIran Chinarsquos economic engagement in Asia turned into a hot issue aswell Though in several regions commercial activities escaped attentiondespite the Peoplersquos Republic (PRC) and is gaining ground there as wellIn this article we assess the impact of Chinarsquos ldquogo-outrdquo policy on oneparticular region Central Africa The seven states mentioned in this sur-vey constitute a rich sample of what the African continent has or hasnot to offer2 They comprise resource-abundant states as well as com-modity-poor markets stable and war-rigged societies countries that maketheir income from the export of agricultural yields and small oil statesetc This pattern card also allows us to let a wider array of Chinarsquos eco-nomic interests and aspirations come into play Consequently it permitsus also to assess the impact of the Peoplersquos Republicrsquos commercial offensivefrom more perspectives Thus the objective of this article is twofold Onone hand we try to explain the goals and dynamics of Chinarsquos actualforeign trade policy On the other we assess the impact of this strategyon the development of the Central African Region as a case for theinfluence on other developing countries

To start with Chinarsquos ldquogo-outrdquo policy is contextualized concisely inthe theoretical perspective of neo-mercantilism In the second and third sec-tion we focus on the Peoplersquos Republicrsquos trade policy toward the CentralAfrican Region what are its targets and what are the devices at its dis-posal to materialize these aims In this regard we will stress that Beijingis pursuing a dynamic mercantilism and that Chinarsquos economic activityin Central Africa arises out of a well-conceived political strategy Onone hand the government stimulates companies to swarm out via diplo-

2 The 7 countries are Burundi the Central African Republic (CAR) the Republicof Congo (ROC) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) Gabon Rwandaand Uganda It should be noted that within the geo-political morphology of Africa asdefined by formal colonial powers and accepted in the global international relationsUganda is not considered part of Central African region It is located in East Africaand it is also part of the Great Lakes Region of Africa However in terms of its ethnic and cultural ramifications and within the current geo-political economy it hasbeen playing an important role in the re-definition of politics in several Central Africancountries

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 134







UNDP (2005) WTO (2005)






(11)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 135









Ohta Hiroshi 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 136












AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 137







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 138







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







UNDP (2005) WTO (2005)






(11)

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 135









Ohta Hiroshi 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 136












AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 137







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 138







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169









Ohta Hiroshi 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 136












AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 137







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 138







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169












AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 137







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 138







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 138







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 139




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169




16000

12000

8000

4000

0

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3



AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 140






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 141







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 142








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 143







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 144









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 145








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 146






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM 6






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169






Daily April 22 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 147








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM 0










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169








46 Ibid art 48

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 148







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM 0



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 149








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 150










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 151




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169




Results




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 152





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169





1200

800

400

0

10

8

5

4

2

01999 2000 2001 2002 2003


Figure 2


AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 153






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169






AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 154


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169


Figures 3 amp 4


1200

1000

800

600

400

200

02002 2003

Petrol

Minerals

Logs

Food

Manufactured


300

250

200

150

100

50

02002 2003

Textile

Electronics

Processed metals

Machinery

Chemicals

Rest

Primary

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 155










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169










AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 156







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 157









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 158









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169









2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 159







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







21 2005

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 160



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169



Impact




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 161






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169






gaboncomgt94 Ibid

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 162








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169








AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 163








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169








2004

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 164



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169



Conclusion




AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 165





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169





AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 166



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169



References








Brussels

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 167







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169







Economics 13(1)









AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 168



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169



Washington

AAS52_f1_133-169 62906 357 PM Page 169

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