China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the South China Sea

ConflictDavid Arase

Professor of International PoliticsJohns Hopkins SAIS—Hopkins Nanjing Center

“MARITIME SILK ROAD” AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:

PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS International Conference organized by the University of Social Sciences &

Humanities (USSH), VNU-Hanoi Hilton Hotel, Hanoi

26-27 November 2015

China’s Two Silk Roads• “One Belt-One Road” initiative

– Silk Road Economic Belt• Land transportation corridors across Eurasia

– 21st Century Maritime Silk Road• China builds Eurasian maritime rim port network

• Integration via project engineering & policy dialogue, not legal engineering– Infrastructure projects, not WTO-like liberalization– “He who pays the piper names the tune”

• New Development Banks– Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ($50-100 b.)– Silk Road Fund ($40 b.)

• Link Chinese and Eurasian development futures– Serve’s China’s comprehensive security– Develops Eurasian market for next levels of Chinese exports, FDI, finance, RMB

use– Gives China political leverage, great power status

Eurasian geopolitical theory

SILK ROAD AGENDA IN ASEAN

Construction and management of land-sea transportation network that benefits China

XJP visits Indonesia in 2013

• Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank– Not just ASEAN

• 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative– Not just ASEAN

• Community of Common Destiny– China needs followers– Start with ASEAN & Central

Asia– Includes all Silk Road countries

Maritime Silk Road Port Projects

China’s planned high speed railway network

China-Bay of Bengal corridor

BCIM Economic Corridor

China-Arabian Sea corridor

The neglected East-West axis of connectivity

LKQ at 2013 China-ASEAN summit

2 principles: a package deal• Mutual trust & security

– Political-security partnership

• Economic cooperation– Deeper interdependence and

integration

7 policy coordination agendas• China-ASEAN treaty of good

neighborliness & cooperation• Security cooperation

– Defense ministers meeting– More mil-mil cooperation

• Upgraded CAFTA• AIIB • More RMB use• Maritime cooperation• Cultural exchange

LKQ at 2014 ASEAN-China summit

• Reiterates 2013 policy agenda

• Notes progress– CAFTA upgrade– AIIB– Think-tank network

• But no progress on security-political agenda

• South China Sea obstacles– Confrontations w/

Philippines & Vietnam– China changing status

quo in SCS– No progress in COC– No compromise over

territorial sovereignty– Jin SSBM operational

China gets ASEAN to ignore SCS dispute

• Side-track the dispute– Avoid SCS issue in all high level ASEAN meetings– Otherwise economic cooperation and peaceful,

non-coercive relations with China could be upset– Overall peace and stability in SCS is “jointly

upheld” by China and ASEAN, not by outside powers

What China wants

• Unlink SCS problems from silk road agenda• Sign new treaty of good-neighbourliness, friendship,

and cooperation• Create ministerial maritime cooperation forum• ASEAN-China Defence Ministers’ Meeting; • More mil-mil cooperation• Upgraded China-ASEAN Free Trade Area• Bilateral (China-ASEAN) investment treaty. • Endorsements of, support for Chinese initiatives

Chinese goals in SE Asia• Wants – Isolation of rival SCS claimants– Recognition of sovereignty in SCS via bilateral

negotiation (divide & rule)ASEAN recognition of regional primacy

– ASEAN bandwagoning (economic then security-political)• Does not want – ASEAN collective bargaining– ASEAN balancing, hedging among major powers

• Not ASEAN centrality, but China-ASEAN centrality as basis for regional order

China’s political-security agenda

• New Asian Security Concept– May 2014 CICA summit

• Community of Common Destiny– China-centered

• China is ringmaster• China defends CCD

• “Finlandization?”– Do, say nothing to

displease China

US INTEREST IN THE SCS

Free trade rules and open unhindered commercial access to world’s most important growth region

Freedom of Navigation

UNCLOS Art. 58: In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.

Innocent Passage

FON as a public good

• Maintenance of FON is a public good– Is non-excludable– Is shared at zero marginal cost (free rides!)– Allows everyone to trade freely

• Enforcement via multiple channels– Collective effort– Normative (name-and-shame)– Reciprocity (tit-for-tat)– Self-help– Appeal to international judicial authorities

US Pacific Command AOR

Freedom of navigation permits rapid IPR integration and growth

• All states enjoy right of sea and air transit beyond coastal territory. – FON is a right in EEZs– UNCLOS Art. 58: In the exclusive economic zone, all

States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight…

• FON is regulated by international legal conventions• Enforcement is needed to make FON a reality

South China Sea is the IPR pivot

• ASEAN connectivity plan connects East Asia and Indian Ocean region

• Permits formation of a vast economic growth belt

Who maintains FON when it is challenged?

• A hegemon has a rational incentive to defend FON rights of all states

• What happens after hegemon weakens?– New and old powers that share norms & values can

cooperate– But antagonistic powers will compete for advantage

• US asks China to cooperate, but China refuses• SCS is the test of China’s intentions and a struggle

could change the future of international order

Chinese aims

• Normalize Chinese occupation, use, and defense of 9 dash line zone– Fishing & energy development– More active coast guard & military patrols– Effective control of foreign presence

• Create a new status quo that others must recognize (or face consequences)

• Gain legal recognition (only via bilateral agreements with each rival claimant)

• Gain national sovereignty over the SCS

Benefits for China?

• New energy & food resources

• Safe sea lanes and Hainan SSBN base

• Control of first island chain• Platform for distant sea

operations (IOR & WPac)• Leverage over others

dependent on access to SCS• “End cold war thinking”• A regional order governed

by Chinese norms

SCS has become a vortex sucking in big power navies

• Democratic powers are hedging against a possible threat to rights and interests by China– US– Japan– India– Australia

Impact of China’s claim

• Vital SLOCs in SCS must be secured by individual efforts– Inefficient

• Duplication of effort• No sharing of burden

– Self-defeating• Naval competition = less

security = less growth

• Small states lose free ride– Must pay for protection

• Build own navy• Pay a big power for security

Every man for himself!

US stake in the SCS

• PACOM needs FON to perform missions

• Alliances and defense partnerships depend on continuing US presence

• $5.3 trillion of trade flows across the SCS

• US cares about the process of resolving territorial disputes, but not who owns which territory

US is settling on an approach

• SCS is not a bilateral management issue– It is an IPR issue– US-China collusion, even if it happened, could not secure

their individual interests in this region• How should the US deal with SCS issue?– US strategic primacy has ended – Must accept new limitations– Must accept multilateral governance scheme– Need not accept loss of existing rights & interests– Need not accept end of liberal economic & political order

The need for IPR strategy

• Put China’s rise in an IPR strategy framework• Aim for cooperative (multilateral) regional

governance to maintain FON and other legal rights and obligations

• Avoid armed conflict using deterrence, not appeasement

• Assume defensive posture– Cooperate with like-minded partners to defend

legal rights and norms

Strategic rebalancing progress

• Singapore-U.S. Strategic Framework Agreement (2005); Strategic Partnership Dialogue, 2012

• Philippines: EDCA, 4/2014• U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement, 8/2014• U.S.- Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement,

2010; Defense Institution Reform Initiative, 1/2015• US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 4/2015• India: 10-year defense framework agreement, 6/2015• Vietnam: Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations,

6/2015

What difference can ASEAN make?

ASEAN cannot guarantee the security of its members

• Most members face no loss of rights or territory– So not motivated to resist

• SCS members face large direct/indirect losses– But unsure how to act, no framework for

consultation• Each member must find its own solution• Thus, China’s maritime grab meets little

resistance

SE Asian claimant states’ problem

• Share basic interest– Five could lose maritime

claims (national territory or EEZ) to China

– All risk losing important rights and protections of international law if Chinese hegemony is established

– All have reason to align with pro-FON powers

• But lack unified stance– They face different

degrees of loss– Capacities to resist differ– China has different

degrees of leverage over them

– Their affinities with external powers are different

What options do they have?

• Appease demanding power

• Find another power for protection– Formal security treaty to

gain a security guarantee• Philippines w/ US

– Implicit security tie• E.g., encourage

economic, military presence to deter threatening power

• Build own capacity to deter aggression

• Appeal to international community– Like-minded countries– International tribunals– International public opinion– International NGOs

• Seek external aid– Diplomatic support– Material resources

Devising a self-help strategy• Geography gives each local state a share of control over

SCS• US and China are in a standoff• Whether and how each local state uses this leverage will

decide:– How much China succeeds– How much the US succeeds– How large a role India, Japan, and Australia can play– Whether they lose rights– Survival of FON and international rule of law – The future of international governance

China needs followers to be a leader

• China needs SCS states’ cooperation to: – Avoid appeal to third-party adjudication, arbitration,

or mediation to settle disputes with China– Gain recognition of the 9-dash line claims– End US strategic access to the region– Enjoy the right to manage Asian affairs

• Is willing to pay money to own SCS• But SCS states will lose sovereignty & some

independence

The US also needs help to succeed• Small state cooperation is needed to maintain– Strategic access– Economic access– Political influence– The continuing force of international norms and

institutions• But US only needs willing partners with shared

interests• Cooperation deters lawless behavior and should

aim for shared regional governance

Key points

• The Indo-Pacific is one strategic & economic space• The lynchpin is the South China Sea• Geo-politics aside, IPR has a bright future• But rise of assertive China creates geopolitical

competition in SCS• Best future scenario is multilateral regional

governance according to Int’l Law• Local states will tip the balance in the SCS and

shape the future of the IPR