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China Turns to the Sea: Changes in thePeople's Liberation Army Navy Doctrineand Force StructureLoro Horta aa Naval Post Graduate School , Monterey , CA , USAPublished online: 19 Nov 2012.

To cite this article: Loro Horta (2012) China Turns to the Sea: Changes in the People'sLiberation Army Navy Doctrine and Force Structure, Comparative Strategy, 31:5, 393-402, DOI:10.1080/01495933.2012.711117

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China Turns to the Sea: Changes in the People’sLiberation Army Navy Doctrine and Force Structure

LORO HORTANaval Post Graduate SchoolMonterey, CA, USA

As China’s economy continues to expand, its policies and interests change and evolve.Today, Chinese economic and political interests span the globe from Africa to LatinAmerica and the South Pacific. The country has grown more dependent on foreign energysources in once marginal places such as Angola. Access to resources such as oil andnatural gas are now at the forefront of Chinese security policy. While access to marketsand regions where massive Chinese investment is occurring is equally important, thesenew challenges have led to some important changes in China’s security and militaryposture, particularly its naval strategy. While diplomacy and economic power are stillthe most practical alternatives available to China to defend its interests, several Chinesemilitary and civilian observers now openly discuss other alternatives, such as theeventuality of using military power to defend these interests. This is particularly visiblein the People’s Liberation Army Navy, where a more ambitious and confident maritimestrategy is now being discussed.

Introduction

Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) demonstrated a criticaland hostile attitude toward the establishment of overseas military bases. Numerous officialpronouncements emanating from Beijing document this hostility toward overseas bases.1

In these statements, officials denounce countries such as the United States and Great Britainas imperialist and expansionist. China often denounced the presence of American bases inAsia by claiming they are harmful for regional stability. However, in 2009, two scholars,Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, began to raise the possibility that Chinesepolicy toward overseas basing is changing and that China now considers the establishmentof overseas bases an objective.2 Is the People’s Republic of China policy toward overseasbasing changing, and what factors explain the change?

Words to Actions

The Chinese government consistently denies any changes to its policy toward overseasbasing and denounces rumors suggesting otherwise as malicious propaganda. In lightof the fact that very little has been written on the topic so far in general, and givenChinese official denials, the claim that Beijing’s policy toward overseas bases is changingrequires significant elaboration and research. China could settle the dispute by officiallyacknowledging its willingness to establish an overseas base. However, due to the sensitivityof the issue and the penchant for secrecy on the part of the Chinese government, thisacknowledgement appears unlikely. The question could also be answered simply if Chinaestablishes a base, but then there would be no point in addressing the question posed abovebecause the question would have answered itself. Several practical actions denote a changeof policy even if that policy is not publicly enunciated: changes in doctrine; changes in

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Comparative Strategy, 31:393–402, 2012Copyright © 2012 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

0149-5933 print / 1521-0448 onlineDOI: 10.1080/01495933.2012.711117

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force structure; changes to overseas deployments that have already occurred that do notnecessarily consist of establishing bases; historical comparative analysis; and, finally, acareful review of official statements to find contradictions between these statements andhow they relate to practical actions.

Changes in Doctrine

In the past three years, two scholars from the U.S. Naval War College produced researchfindings pointing to small changes in past policy. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, inChinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: the Turn to Mahan and two subsequent works,argue that China is now adopting an expansionist naval strategy.3 However, Holmes andYoshihara do not specifically address the issue of overseas basing. Their main focus is onif the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is changing its doctrine. They argue thatChina has had expansionist naval ideas dating back to the early 1980s, but these ambitionsremained dormant due to China’s limited resources. Holmes and Yoshihara demonstrate thatthe PLAN has increasingly adopted the ideas of the American naval theorist Alfred ThayerMahan, a proponent of large and powerful navies. Several other scholars also conclude,though to differing degrees, that Chinese naval doctrine is becoming more expansionist.4

Real and practical changes in Chinese naval and military doctrine, in general, providevaluable clues. Bernard Cole points out that in the early 2000s, the PLAN began to developthe doctrine of offshore defense and limited area denial. Offshore defense advances thedoctrine of establishing control of the sea in areas close to Chinese territory, i.e., roughlythe waters between China, Japan, and the Philippines. Offshore defense aims to make thePLAN able to extend its area of operations, and more specifically, to make it capable ofobtaining control of the sea beyond the first island chain, which stretches from Japan tothe Philippines all the way down to Singapore and ending in the most westerly islands ofthe South China Sea. Limited area denial limits access to the waters in question to anyexternal navy during wartime. Limited area denial aims to acquire the ability to deny toa powerful fleet temporary access to the waters within 200 miles of the Chinese coast.Initially developed with the objective of preventing the U.S. 7th Fleet from coming to theaid of Taiwan, the doctrine is slowly evolving to encompass the entire South China Sea.5

Beijing strongly believes that Japan is likely to join the United States in an effort to relieveTaiwan. Consequently, the limited area denial doctrine has been expanded to the Yellow Seato deal with Japan. These concepts represent a clear departure from the PLAN’s 50-yearold policy of coastal defense and envision a more expansionist doctrine.

Force Structure

Doctrine is no more than words, ideas, and concepts. A doctrine alone may not providemuch impact unless the military institution in question is able to obtain the means, theforce structure, and training to implement it. In addition to changes in doctrine, changesin force structure reflect a departure from coastal defense to a more ambitious strategy.According to the prestigious Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) in Londonand the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China built 22 new major surfaceships, 10 new submarines (including four nuclear power ones), and hundreds of missilesin the past decade.6 These acquisitions consist primarily of power-projection platformsand access-denial systems. The PLAN’s emerging force structure shows a force increas-ingly designed for power projection well beyond China’s territorial waters.7 Thus, thePLAN’s doctrine is slowly trying to merge the strategies of offshore defense and limited

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area denial. In limited area denial access, the main force will consist of denial capabilitiessuch as submarines and missiles, while in offshore defense, a combination of denial plat-forms and major combatants such destroyers and aircraft carriers will comprise the mainforce.

Bases, Submarines, and Missiles

Confronted with the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. Navy (USN), China can onlyachieve its ambitions of securing the first island chain and establish limited area denial byusing asymmetric means. China hopes to slowly but steadily match the United States onthe high seas. However, Beijing understands that this objective will take at least a decadeor two to achieve. In the interim, China has embarked on an asymmetric naval strategyto mitigate American naval power. This strategy relies heavily on submarines, cruise andballistic missiles, and modern fast-attack craft, which provide the PLAN a powerful seadenial capability.8

Since Admiral Liu Huaqing outlined his global vision for the PLAN in the early 1980s,there has been a period of phenomenal growth and change for the PLAN. The transformationof PLAN’s undersea capabilities is key to this vision. The PLAN has since amassed a fleetof some 76 principal surface combatants and 57 tactical submarines. No other major navyin the world currently boasts such a high proportion of tactical submarines in its fleet(42 percent of its main conventional striking power). Indeed, the PLAN made great stridesin improving the capabilities and range of its tactical submarine fleet. Hence, it is evidentthat China’s tactical undersea fleet will be the cornerstone upon which current and futurenaval ambitions will be built. What is perhaps less obvious to the observers is the rationalebehind those ambitions and the utility of the submarine fleet.

Like the historic Great Wall, China’s undersea wall of tactical submarines serves toprotect the territorial unity and integrity of China; a China that includes the island ofTaiwan, which it considers to be an inseparable part of its territory. Until the sovereigntyissue of Taiwan is resolved, securing the littoral waters around Taiwan and possibly thearea of operations within the first island chain will remain the clear and present concern forthe PLAN. 9

Today the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) asserts that without American interferenceon the side of Taiwan, it could deal with the Taiwanese military without great difficulty.Therefore, increasing the costs for an American intervention is one of the PLAN’s mainobjectives in the coming years. Fundamental to the task will be the core of the PLAN’stactical submarine fleet consisting of recently acquired SSKs (Song, Yuan, and Kilo class).10

Armed with supersonic SS-N-27B “Sizzler” anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, the recently acquired Russian-built Kilos can easilyremain undetected when interdicting enemy carrier battle groups. Indeed, the PLAN’spost-1994 SSKs provide the Chinese with the surgical knives needed to slice open the softunderbelly of a carrier battle group, particularly within the narrow confines of the littoralwaters around Taiwan.11

China realizes that for the foreseeable future it cannot match the USN in naval platformssuch as air carriers and other major surface combatants. Therefore, SSKs provide the PLANwith a cost-effective means of neutralizing a carrier battle group or surface task force andthe ability to temporarily quarantine Taiwan. While eventually the powerful American navywould be able to clear the straits, such an operation would be slow and costly. The longtime required to clear the straits of the PLAN steel sharks may permit the Chinese militaryprecious time in a crisis over Taiwan. The slow clearing process will also cause the main

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elements of the U.S. surface fleet to stay away from the straits until it is cleared. A U.S. LosAngeles–class submarine commander stated that “The Chinese are swamping the straitswith submarines, it will take ages to clear them out and no American admiral in his rightmind will move an air carrier near.”12

According to the Australian diplomat and scholar Peter Howarth, in his excellent studyon China’s submarine force, the PLAN’s use of submarines will be further maximizeddue to limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities currently available to the USNin the Pacific. While the USN possesses some major ASW platforms, these are dispersedthrough the world. Thus, mobilizing and deploying them to a Taiwan contingency may takea significant amount of time and preparation.

In November 2006, a PLAN Song-class submarine reportedly shadowed a U.S. carrierbattle group and surfaced within five nautical miles off the carrier USS Kitty Hawk.13 Thisincident demonstrates the difficulty of detecting an ultra-quiet diesel submarine. What thePLAN lacks in terms of carrier strike groups and Aegis-type main surface combatants isoffset by its considerable undersea capabilities, which are further enhanced when employedin littoral waters around Taiwan. Given these undersea capabilities, combined with thehundreds of missiles deployed adjacent to Taiwan and the growing air assets available tothe PLA, China’s ability to inflict damage is very apparent. As noted by the same Americancommander, “Imagine dozens of missiles being fired at you, both on a ballistic and cruisetrajectory, it would saturate our Aegis defenses and all it may take is one lucky shoot toknout an air carrier.”14

In 2002, the PLAN conducted its first circumnavigation of the globe followed by anincreasing number of long-range naval cruises reaching as far as the North Atlantic. Whilemost observers agree that the PLAN is still confined to the first island chain and is not a blue-water navy,15 the PLAN’s increasing number of long-range naval missions demonstratesthat this status may be changing and that the Chinese navy is growing more confident in itsability to operate outside territorial waters. Its submarine fleet, like its surface counterpart,is also increasing its range of operations and the frequency of its mission.

A sign of the PLAN’s growing confidence in its submarine force is observable withthe high number of intrusions into its neighbor’s territorial waters, with Japan reporting asharp increase in the number of such incursions between 2007 and 2009.16

In addition to conventional and nuclear attack submarines, China has deployed hun-dreds of ballistic and cruise missiles. While most of these missiles are deployed adjacent toTaiwan and intended to deal with the renegade province and any force that aids it, significantnumbers are being deployed within range of the disputed Spratly Islands in the South ChinaSea. In addition, the PLAN has recently expanded its South China Sea fleet and reinforcedits submarine shelters in Hainan Island.17

The Chinese military is currently developing the world’s the first anti-ship ballisticmissile that targets aircraft carriers. The missile is planned to be based at the newly estab-lished 96166 Unit in Guangdong, where unspecified numbers of Dong Feng 21C medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) are also based.18 China has also deployed Russian-builtSovremenny-class destroyers armed with sea-skimming anti-ship missiles capable of tar-geting U.S. carriers. China is adding sea denial capabilities by building a staggering 40-pluscorvettes in the past 10 years and is devoting considerable attention to this type of vessels.The Hubei-class fast attack missile craft is equipped with eight YJ-83 anti-ship missilesand has significant stealth capabilities. With its small dimensions and a speed of up to 36knots, these vessels are ideal for the narrow waters of the South China Sea.19 Used in aswarm attack, they could prove highly destructive.

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Naval Diplomacy

In recent years a string of media reports emanating from both Asian and American sourcesclaimed that the Chinese military established or was negotiating with foreign governmentsto establish naval bases. The reports alleged a series of contacts with foreign governmentssuch as Burma, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Maldives, and even Somalia.20 However, whilemost reports turn out to be inaccurate, they originated from some concrete and widelydocumented Chinese initiatives that are both official and private. Since 2001, Chinesebusiness interests have begun to buy or partially own several major civilian harbors aroundthe world. From the Panama Canal to Sri Lanka, China acquired several port facilities.21

Beijing also funded the construction of major harbor civilian infrastructure through theworld and even assisted some countries in modernizing and expanding their naval bases.

Access to foreign bases, particularly in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea,allows the PLAN to increase its power projection by deploying its assets along its traderoutes. As of 2009, 95 percent of China’s foreign trade was conducted by sea and over 90percent of its oil imports traveled by sea.22 China’s access to the sea is greatly constrainedby two island chains controlled by the United States and its allies. First island chain runsfrom northern Japan through Taiwan and South China Sea, principally composed of theKuril Islands, Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines,and Borneo; from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula. The second islandchain runs from the East Asian continental mainland coast, principally composed of theBonin Islands, Marianas Islands, and Caroline Islands; from Honshu to New Guinea. As aresult, Beijing grows increasingly anxious about American dominance of strategic chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait. China reluctantly accepts the security provided by theUSN as the guarantor of freedom of navigation and hopes that the day will come in whichthe PLAN could do the same.23 According to several studies, this growing dependence onthe seas for energy and trade is leading to substantial changes in China’s naval strategy.China is fearful that in case of a conflict with the United States or major disruptions causedby other sources it could be very easy to cut China off from these vital sea routes.24 Apowerful and forward-deployed PLAN with assets in foreign territories near these strategicchokepoints would significantly improve China’s ability to deal with such a scenario.

The PLAN also interprets foreign bases as a way to counter what it perceives ascontainment by the U.S. military. The Chinese reference the presence of American basesaround its borders as an attempt to contain China. By establishing its own bases, thePLAN can establish counter-encirclement.25 For instance, while the United States couldhypothetically block China’s access to the Malacca Strait, a PLAN base nearby could makethat prospect more difficult.

Acquiring commercial harbors and assisting strategically located nations preestablishesneeded infrastructure and needed political and diplomatic support in the eventuality thatthe PLAN may need to deploy to these regions.

In recent years, the PLAN conducted a growing number of visits to foreign harborsand conducted joint exercises with various navies around the world. For instance, in 2007,Chinese warships visited 11 countries with some of the trips as far as the North Atlantic. In2007, the PLAN carried out joint exercises with the navies of France, Spain, Britain, andRussia. While these exercises were taking place in European waters, two Chinese vesselsconducted visits to Australia and New Zealand. At about the same time, two other PLANships visited Pakistan. All together, during this period an estimated eight PLAN warshipswere deployed in foreign waters.

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The fact that eight Chinese warships were nearly simultaneously deployed in threedifferent continents illustrates the growing importance of naval diplomacy to Beijing. Italso illustrates the PLAN’s growing ability to conduct small-scale operations far from itstraditional area of operations. In 2008, Chinese warships visited eight countries in Asia andEurope, while PLAN delegations visited 17 countries in Asia, Europe, South America, andAfrica.

Educational exchanges are another growing component of China’s naval diplomacy.The PLAN and the Chinese military are sending increasingly larger numbers of officers toattend foreign military academies. In 2006, 23 PLAN officers attended courses overseas,which ranged from short courses to command and staff college programs. Chinese navalofficers also attend courses in foreign civilian universities, with a dozen or so PLAN officersgraduating from postgraduate studies in Singapore, Australia, and Europe in 2007.

The donation of naval equipment and other material is often used by China to acquiregood will among foreign navies. In 2007, following the visit of the Bolivian Chief ofDefense force to China, Beijing donated six 12-meter patrol boats to the Bolivian navy.Medium to small vessels have been donated to Mauritania, Tanzania, Burma, Cambodia,and Sierra Leone. In addition to patrol boats, China also repaired or built naval bases,barracks, storage facilities, and military hospitals, and donated communication equipment,diving equipment, and cartographic materials to roughly 34 countries around the world.26

Several factors account for the growing in Chinese naval diplomacy. First and foremostChina is eager to portray its military expansion and modernization as peaceful and in theinterest of regional stability.

Greater interaction with the outside world and foreign navies also allows the PLANexposure to the latest developments in naval doctrine and technology. For instance, inSeptember 2007, for the first time the PLAN conducted an exercise with an aircraft carrierwhen two of PLAN ships joined a British carrier for maneuvers in the North Atlantic.Keeping in mind China’s publicly stated intentions to acquire an aircraft carrier before2020, such exercises must provide great insight to the PLAN.

These exercises and visits also allow the PLAN to practice some valuable skills such asglobal navigation, resupply at sea, and long-range communications, while also accustomingits sailors and officers to long periods of operations in the high seas. In 2002, the PLANconducted its first circumnavigation of the globe, with two of its ships staying at sea for132 days. In 2008, two Chinese vessels spent 87 days at sea in European and Asian waters.The PLAN’s efforts to strengthen its long-range operational ability are in line with itsambitions to become a blue-water navy. Finally, such visits also enhance China’s prestigeas a great power.

China’s growing naval diplomacy and the fast modernization of its naval forces illus-trate its growing ambitions as a naval power, ambitions China is eager to assure others arebeneficial to the world and, in particular, Asia. In this effort, its naval diplomacy, and itsmilitary diplomacy in general, are crucial to its overall strategy as a great power.

In February 2011, the PLAN conducted its first noncombat evacuation mission abroadwhen it deployed the frigate Xu Zhou to the Mediterranean Sea to assist its 35,000 citizensstranded in Libya as a result of the ongoing violence in that country.27 This deploymentshows the growing confidence of the PLAN to deploy beyond its immediate areas ofoperation.

As Chinese presence and vital interests increase in Africa and the Middle East, theneed to protect them will further drive the PLAN’s desire for overseas bases. An estimated1 million Chinese are believed to be in Africa, where China now has vital interests. Forinstance, in 2008, Angola became China’s largest supplier of oil, even surpassing Saudi

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Arabia.28 Angolan oil currently accounts for 14 percent of Chinese oil imports that reachChina either by the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique Channel.Oil from Equatorial Guinea, just north of Angola, also must travel the same routes. Thesetrade relationships create the need for a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean in thefuture, especially in case the Suez Canal is closed.

From Their Own Mouths

Another indicator that suggests the PLAN is changing its attitude toward overseas basingderives from Chinese writings. The most significant and authoritative of these writingsare those of Admiral Liu Huaqing, the PLAN’s longest serving commander (1982–1988).In contradicting Beijing’s official statements, Liu argued for a stronger navy that focuseson power projection.29 Liu developed the theory of the island chains, which argues forthe gradual attainment of Chinese naval dominance in the region. The first phase of Liu’sisland chain theory, to be accomplished between 1984 and 1994, centered on securingnaval dominance within the first island chain (the chain of islands stretching from Japan inthe north to the Philippines and further south into the western Indian Ocean). Starting in1995, the second phase consisted of securing the second island chain (a chain of islandsstretching from the Aleutian Islands in the north Pacific to Guam in the central Pacific),planned to reach its conclusion in 2000. Liu proposed the construction of several aircraftcarriers, destroyers, and submarines to accomplish these objectives.30 In his memoirs, Liualso advocated for the creation of overseas bases, and referred to them as naval supportcenters. Since the early 2000s, several other Chinese retired naval officers and academicsembraced Liu’s ideas and further expanded on them.31

Textbooks and lectures in Chinese naval institutions such as the PLAN Command andStaff College School in Nanjing, the Dalian Naval Academy, and the Naval Institute inBeijing also show some discrepancies between stated policy and institutional feelings andambitions.32 Interviews of PLAN officers conducted by the author denote a not-so-hostilepolicy toward overseas bases. For example, Senior Captain Yang Yi (Rear Admiral NATO)stated that “The United States possesses more than 30 military bases around the worldincluding a dozen near China’s territory; why can’t we have the same privilege?”33

Finally, while China has not yet established an overseas base, it has, since 2002, beenoperating an electronic eavesdropping facility in Cuba at Bejucal. Bejucal was the biggestSoviet electronic spy center in the developing world, and Moscow only relinquished thebase eight years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China has also operated anothereavesdropping facility in the south Pacific in the Kiribati islands. However, the PRC closedthe facility after the microstate established ties with Taiwan. While ostensibly being ameteorological monitoring center, the facility was most likely used to monitor U.S. navalactivity in the Pacific, particularly in Guam and Midway.34

In May 2011, several media reports quoting WikiLeaks stated that the, Chinese gov-ernment has approached the small and fledging Southeast Asian nation of Timor-L’esterequesting to establish a listening post on the island’s south coast.35 The Timorese gov-ernment reportedly refused the request. A listening post in the south coast of Timor-L’estewould be useful for China for the following reasons. Timor-L’este is strategically locatedby the Straits of Ombai and Wetar, one of the deepest undersea water passages in theworld, frequently used by the U.S. submarine fleet. The straits are also an alternative to thevital Malacca Strait. The south coast of Timor is in very close proximity to the AustralianNorthern Territories, where 70 percent of the Australian military is deployed. China may

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also be interested in monitoring the large joint Australian-American satellite tracking andelectronic surveillance base at Pine Gap.

In 2011, the Chinese government announced that it was considering “an invitation”from the government of Seychelles, an archipelago nation in the northwest section of theIndian Ocean and in very close proximity to the Persian Gulf, to establish a naval base in itsterritory. According to the Chinese government, the naval base is intended for anti-piracyoperations off the coast of Somalia. The Chinese government has recently announced thatit refused the invitation of Seychelles.36

In addition, in 2005, the Chinese military deployed small contingents of special forcesto guard its embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the deployment of such forcesis rather common among Western nations, it was the first time China deployed combattroops overseas. By 2007, China became the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeepingoperations among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This is quite achange for a nation that for decades saw such missions as acts of interference in the domesticaffairs of other nations. Several of China’s past attitudes toward overseas commitments havebeen changing. This in turn is paving the way for the decline of another taboo—overseasbases.

At PLAN schools, considerable attention is now given to the study of the experiencesof the Japanese Imperial Navy and German Navy in World War II. Several Chinese officersbelieve that Japan’s initial success could only be achieved by the establishment of overseasbases that allowed the Imperial Navy to control the Pacific. The PLAN believes that Japan’sultimate failure to retain these bases led to its defeat as the U.S. Navy slowly deprived theresource-poor island of vital raw materials such as oil. Today, China is heavily dependenton energy exports that must travel by sea, and just like in the case of Japan, geography doesnot help China. The PLAN is eagerly waiting to establish control over the first island chainin order to improve its strategic depth. Indicative of this eagerness, the PLAN establishedin 2008 a naval base in its furthest southwest island in the South China Sea. While this basewas established in Chinese territory, it shows the PLAN’s intention to control the waterswithin the first island chain.37

PLAN’s current doctrine of limited area denial and offshore defense, the expansionof its fleet, the acquisition of power-projection capabilities, and its growing involvementin harbor acquisitions and modernization around the world are all strong indicators that aconducive environment for a change in China’s current policy has emerged. The writingsof Admiral Liu and his concept of the island chain clearly demonstrate an expansionist andblue-water navy mindset. While the Chinese government continues to proclaim its opposi-tion to foreign bases, its practical actions and the words of it longest serving commanderand the father of the modern PLAN indicate otherwise.

Conclusion

As China’s dependence on the sea for trade and energy resources increases every day, theChinese leadership appears to be increasingly anxious about the ability of its military forcesto maintain the country’s access to global markets. Today, China’s economic and politicalinterests have spread globally and can no longer be adequately defended without a strongmilitary force, particularly a strong navy. While China denounces the teachings of Mahanas outdated and imperialistic, the PLAN seems to be embracing his ideas.

Despite the claims of the Chinese government that it has no expansionist intentionsand that its policy remains defensive, its actions suggest otherwise. In the past two decades,the PLAN has conducted an unprecedented build-up that does not correspond well with its

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proclamations of a defensive posture. While China uses innocent-sounding terms such asoffshore defense and limited area denial, its force modernization and military maneuversappear more ambitious.

The Chinese military leadership now openly debates, with at least one senior militaryofficer calling for the establishment of overseas bases, specifically a military base in EastAfrica. Chinese involvement in harbor construction and modernization around the world,particularly around the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, raises some pertinentquestions.

The denials of the Chinese leadership are contradicted by the statements of their ownsenior officers and questionable because of the practical actions taken by the military andstate. China’s changing naval doctrine, its evolving force structure, its growing deploymentof military assets overseas, and the words of its most respected admiral and several othersall point to a more assertive and overseas-oriented PLAN. Admiral Liu Huaqing, the fatherof the modern Chinese navy, hoped that by the year 2000 the PLAN would have achieveddominance within the first island chain. While his dream has not yet materialized, Chinais not far from it. As I attended a June 2007 lecture at the Naval Institute in Beijing, thespeaker, a two-star admiral, after denouncing Mahan as outdated, concluded that “In the sealies the future, whoever controls it shall always be the most powerful nation on the earth.”38

The outdated and imperialist Mahan would quite likely have agreed with the Admiral.

Notes

1. Zhang Deshun, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN, statement, March 11, 2010, Beijing:International Conference against Foreign Bases, Final Communication, November 10, 2005, Quito,Ecuador, available at http://www.insurgentamerican.net/download/LalitNoBaseReport.pdf

2. Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Over-seas Basing?” China Brief, vol. 9, no. 19 (September 2009), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=35536&tx ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=1e7c04ad8f

3. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: TheTurn to Mahan (Routledge, 2008); and James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Red Star Over thePacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute,October 2010).

4. Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed.;(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010); David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s MilitaryProgress, Problems, and Prospects (University of California, 2003).

5. Ronald O’Rourke, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities,”Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress, December 23, 2010.

6. IISS annual publication The Military Balance covering the 2000s; and the SIPRI Year Bookon Disarmament covering the same period.

7. O’Rourke, “China’s Naval Modernization.”8. Peter Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2006).9. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Caribbean in the South China Sea,” SAIS

Review, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2006): 79–92.10. C. James Busset and A. Bruce Hellerman, Peoples Liberation Army Navy: Combat Systems

Technology, 1949–2010 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).11. Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power.12. The author interviewed several U.S. naval officers during several courses at U.S. military

institutions between 2004–2011.13. “Defense on Subs to be Reviewed,” Washington Times, November 14, 2006.

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14. Interview with a U.S. Navy Captain and a commander of a Los Angles–class nuclear attacksubmarine in October 2004, Honolulu.

15. Holmes and Yoshihara, “China’s Caribbean in the South China Sea,” 79–92.16. Joseph Ferguson, “Submarine Incursions Set Sino-Japanese Relations on Edge” China

Brief , vol. 4, no. 23 (February 21, 2011), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=3695

17. “China’s New Submarine Base at Hainan, Analyses of Recent Media Reports,” StrategicAnalysis, vol. 32, no. 5 (September 2008): 714–718.

18. “‘Carrier Killer’ Won’t Stop US: Admiral” Taipei Times, February 16, 2011.19. For a detailed inventory of Chinese naval assets, see SinoDefence, available at http://www.

sinodefence.com/20. ‘China: Base Strategy—China Acquires a Base in Maldives Against India with Some Help

from Pakistan, The Delhi Observer, May 8, 2005; and “China to Build in Sir Lanka,” Times of India,September 17, 2010.

21. “Many in Denial Over China’s Quest for Bases,” Japan Times, London, February 12, 2010.22. Hailong Ju, The Strategy of Chinese Sea Power (Beijing: Shi Shi Publishing House, 2010);

��� 〈〈������〉〉����� 2010; and Gabriel B. Collins et al., China’s Energy Strategy:The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

23. Ian Storey, “China’s Malacca Dilemma,” China Brief , vol. 6, no. 8 (April 2006), availableat http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no cache=1&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=3943

24. Gabriel Collins, “Over a Barrel—China’s Problem with Oil,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,ChinaWatch, (1 March); and Gabriel Collins and William Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?”Naval War College Review, vol. 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 79–95.

25. Hailong Ju, The Strategy of Chinese Sea Power. Between November 2006 and October2007 the author interview 14 PLAN officers. In August 2008 two senior officers were interviewedand four more in December 2010. Some of the officers mentioned counter-containment.

26. Loro Horta, “In Uncle Sam’s Backyard: China’s Military Influence in Latin America,”Military Review, vol. 52, no. 7 (September–October 2008): 47–55.

27. Gabriel Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation ofCitizens from Libya” China Brief, vol. 11, no. 4 (March 10, 2011), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D=37633&cHash=7278cfd21e6fb19afe8a823c5cf88f07.

28. “Angola Becomes Largest Oil Import Source,” Xinhua, July 27, 2010.29. Liu Huaqing, Memoir (PLA Press, 2004; (������〉〉������).30. Liu Huaqing, Memoir; Jie Li, The Road to Aircraft Carrier: The Development Debating

and Pondering of Aircraft Carrier (Hai Chao Publishing House, 2010).31. Qing Feng, The Chinese Modern Navy and Japan (Jilin University Press, 2008;�� 〈〈�

��������〉〉������� 2008).32. The author is a graduate of the Peoples Liberation Army National Defense University

one-year Defense and Strategic Course for Senior Officials and the Peoples Liberation Army NavyCommand School in Naming. Several teaching materials and lectures attended at these institutionsexpressed similar feelings.

33. Between November 2006 and October 2007, the author interview 14 PLAN officers. InAugust 2008 two senior officers were interviewed and four more in December 2010.

34. John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise,” The National Interest, June2003, 11–17.

35. “Chinese Bid to Set up East Timor Spy Base,” The Sydney Morning Herald, May 11, 2011,available at www.smh.com.au; and “China Reportedly Wanted Spy Base in East Timor,” ABC News,May 10, 2011, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-10/

36. “China Considers Seychelles Military Base Plan,” The Telegraph, December 13, 2011,available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/

37. “New Rescue Base Established for South China Sea,” Xinhua, July 18, 2006.38. The author is a graduate of People’s Liberation Army National Defense University senior

officers course, and the lecture in question was given as part of the module on naval strategy.

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